John Patrick A.

Israel
LlB-4A

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al. v. HON. SALVADOR C.

MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al. G.R. No. 231658, 04 July 2017, EN
BANC (Del Castillo, J.)
FACTS:
President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 effective May 23, 2017, declaring
a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao for a period not exceeding 60 days. Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress, a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out among others that for decades, Mindanao has been
plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing
of time. The said report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and
significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed
out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless
groups. After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate and the House of
Representatives issued a resolution expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and
finding Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law. In
the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found no compelling reason to revoke the same.
Invoking the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, various citizens filed
several petitions, essentially invoking the Courts specific and special jurisdiction to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216; and seeking to nullify Proclamation No.
216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis. On June 5, 2017,
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones,
and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Petition. The Lagman Petition claims that the declaration
of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi
City or in any part of Mindanao. It labels the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in Marawi
City and other outlying areas as mere propaganda and not an open attempt to remove such areas
from the allegiance to the Philippine Government and deprive the Chief Executive of the assertion
an exercise of his powers and prerogatives therein.

Another petition was filed and claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute Group and
other rebel groups to sow terror and cause death and damage to property does not rise to the level
of rebellion sufficient to declare martial law in the whole of Mindanao. It also posits that there is
no lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City.

ISSUES:
1.Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of Martial Law or
suspension of the privilege or writ of habeas corpus.
2. Whether or not the power of the Supreme Court to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately

RULING:

1. YES. The President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed
public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and
prerogative, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of
rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
John Patrick A. Israel
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Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, " namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise
of such power." Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down.

A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in
issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual ' bases tending to show that actual rebellion
exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose
of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its
territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was
reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged
his burden of proof. What the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for
a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The determination of the Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise
of the power to declare martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, must
be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made
the declaration or suspension which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as
the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at
the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the
present depends on the President.

Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included
in the written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since
these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be used
only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis,
but not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.

2. YES. The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may
revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to, or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed to undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.
On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but
likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into the absolute
correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and
further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic
in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or
suspension was made. Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress
are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they
have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to
say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation
of Congress.
John Patrick A. Israel
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REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al. v. HON. SALVADOR C.

MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al. G.R. No. 231658, 04 July 2017, EN
BANC (Del Castillo, J.)
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: On the night of 23 May 201 7, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte) issued
Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ in
the whole of Mindanao. Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President submitted to Congress, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out among others that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion
and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.

The events commencing on 23 May 2017 put on public display the groups' clear intention
to establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities - the
President, foremost - of their powers and prerogatives. These activities constitute not simply a
display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their
planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of Martial Law or
suspension of the privilege or writ of habeas corpus.
2. Whether or not "appropriate proceeding" under paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution is a sui generis petition not falling under any of the actions or proceedings
under the Rules of Court.

RULING:
1. Probable cause exists that there is actual rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ in Marawi City, but not elsewhere. The
Maute-Hapilon armed fighters in Marawi City, numbering no more than 500, do not constitute
masses or multitudes. Neither do they command masses or multitudes of followers in Marawi City.
Nevertheless, rebellion may be committed even by a single armed fighter who publicly takes up
arms against the government to remove a certain territory from allegiance to the Government.
Rebellion is not necessarily a crime of masses or multitudes.

The President's Report to Congress do not contain any evidence whatsoever of actual
rebellion outside of Marawi To allow martial law in the whole of Mindanao on the sole basis of
securing the arrest of rebels who escape Marawi City would not only violate the 1987 Constitution,
but also render useless the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Court. The act
of the rebels in fleeing or escaping to other territories outside of the place of rebellion will certainly
not constitute armed public uprising for the purpose of removing from allegiance to the Philippines
the territory where the rebels flee or escape to. Moreover, sporadic bombings in other areas of
Mindanao outside of Marawi City, in the absence of an armed public uprising against the
Government and sans an intent to remove from allegiance to the Government the areas where the
bombings take place, cannot constitute actual rebellion.

2. The "appropriate proceeding" referred to is a sui generis petition not falling under any of the
actions or proceedings in the Rules of Court. Any citizen can be a petitioner. The "citizen" who
can challenge the declaration of martial law need not be a taxpayer, or a resident of the locality
where martial law is declared, or even directly or personally prejudiced by the declaration.

The Court is vested by the 1987 Constitution with the power to determine the "sufficiency
of the factual basis" of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ and
the standard of "sufficiency of factual basis" is a unique standard applicable only to a review of
the constitutionality of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.
John Patrick A. Israel
LlB-4A

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al. v. HON. SALVADOR C.

MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al. G.R. No. 231658, 04 July 2017, EN
BANC
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN J.:
FACTS: On the night of 23 May 201 7, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte) issued
Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ in
the whole of Mindanao. Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President submitted to Congress, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out among others that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion
and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.

The events commencing on 23 May 2017 put on public display the groups' clear intention
to establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities - the
President, foremost - of their powers and prerogatives. These activities constitute not simply a
display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their
planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao.

On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano,

Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Petition. The Lagman Petition
claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because there is no
rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It labels the flying of ISIS flag
by the Maute Group in Marawi City and other outlying areas as mere propaganda and not an open
attempt to remove such areas from the allegiance to the Philippine Government and deprive the
Chief Executive of the assertion an exercise of his powers and prerogatives therein. Another
petition was filed and claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups
to sow terror and cause death and damage to property does not rise to the level of rebellion
sufficient to declare martial law in the whole of Mindanao. It also posits that there is no lawless
violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City. The Supreme Court Majority
Decisions sustained the factual basis of the Presidents declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of Martial Law or
suspension of the privilege or writ of habeas corpus.

2. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and
thus null and void, with its inclusion of "other rebel groups;" or. since it has no
guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao
region

RULING:

1. I cannot agree to granting the President undefined powers of martial law over the entire
Mindanao region. The group committing atrocities in Marawi are terrorists. They are not rebels.
They are committing acts of terrorism. They are not engaged in political acts of rebellion. They do
not have the numbers nor do they have the sophistication to be able to hold ground. The actual
acts of the criminal elements in Marawi are designed to slow down the advance of government
forces and facilitate their escape.
They are not designed to actually control seats of governance. The provincial and city
governments are existing and are operating as best as they could under the circumstances. They
are not rendered inutile such that there is now a necessity for the military to take over all aspects
of governance. Civilians are also helping recover other civilians caught in the crossfire as well as
attend to the wounded and the thousands displaced.
John Patrick A. Israel
LlB-4A

Martial law is not the constitutionally allowed solution to terrorism. It is an emergency

grant of power in cases where civilian authority has been overrun due to actual hostilities motivated
by a demonstrable purpose of actually seizing government. As an emergency measure, the
capability and commitment of the lawless group must also be shown. Elevating the acts of a
lawless criminal group which uses terrorism as tactic to the constitutional concept of rebellion
acknowledges them as a political group. Rebellion is a political crime, by acknowledging them as
rebels, we elevate their inhuman barbarism as an "armed conflict of a non-international character"
protected by International Humanitarian Law. We will be known worldwide as the only country
that acknowledges them, not as criminals, but as rebels entitled to protection under international
law
Hostilities and lawless violence and their consequences can be addressed by many of the
prerogatives of the President as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. In my view, there is
no showing that martial law has become necessary for the safety of entire Mindanao.

2. I disagree with the proposed ponencia's view that the vagueness of a Presidential Proclamation
on martial law can only be done on grounds of alleged violation of freedom of expression. The
doctrine of void for vagueness is a ground for invalidating a statute or a governmental regulation
for being vague. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

It is clear that what is relevant in the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is not
whether it is a freedom of speech case, but rather whether it violates the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution for failure to accord persons a fair notice of which conduct to avoid; and whether it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out their functions. Proclamation No. 216
fails to accord persons a fair notice of which conduct to avoid and leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out their functions.

The proclamation that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended is a
clear act that needs no further explication. A declaration of a state of martial law is not so clear. It
is comparable to congress passing a law that says, "Congress has passed a law," without providing
the substance of the law itself. The nation is left at a loss as to how to respond to the proclamation
and what conduct is expected from its citizens, and those implementing martial law are left
unbridled discretion as to what to address, without any standards to follow. Indeed, it was so vague
that the Operations Directive of the Armed Forces, for the implementation of martial law in
Mindanao, includes as a key task the dismantling not only of rebel groups, but also illegal drug
syndicates, among others. The dismantling of illegal drug syndicates has no. discernible relation
to rebellion, but Proclamation No. 216 and General Order No. 1 had no guidelines or standards to
follow for their implementation, leaving law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out their
functions.

Proclamation No. 216 and General Order No. 1 command, law enforcers to immediately
arrest persons who have committed, are committing, or attempting to commit, any and all acts in
relation to rebellion and lawless violence in Mindanao, without any guidelines for the citizens to
determine what conduct they may be arrested for. The description of the acts meriting arrest under
General Order No. 1 is so vague that it could easily be construed to cover any manner of speech.
This renders an invocation of the void-for-vagueness doctrine proper, even in a facial challenge
such as this.