Metaphor and The Main Problem o - Paul Ricoeur

Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics
Author(s): Paul Ricoeur

Source: New Literary History, Vol. 6, No. 1, On Metaphor (Autumn, 1974), pp. 95-110
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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Metaphorand theMain Problemof Hermeneutics
PaulRicoeur
IN THIS
SASSUME PAPER that the main problemof hermeneutics is
that of interpretation.Not interpretation in any undetermined
senseof the word,but interpretation withtwo qualifications: one
concerningitsscope or fieldof application,the otheritsepistemological
specificity.As concerns the firstpoint, I should say that there are
problemsof interpretation because there are texts,writtentexts,the
autonomy of which (as regardseithertheintentionof the author,or the
situation of the work,or the destinationto privilegedreaders) creates
specificproblems;theseproblemsare usuallysolvedin spokenlanguage
by the kind of exchangeor intercoursewhich we call dialogue or con-
versation. With writtentexts,the discoursemust speak by itself. Let
us say, therefore, that thereare problemsof interpretation because the
relationwriting-reading is not a particularcase of the relationspeaking-
hearingin the dialogical situation. Such is the mostgeneralfeatureof
interpretation as concernsits scope or applicationfield.
Secondly, conceptof interpretation
the occurs,at the epistemological
level, as an alternative concept opposed to that of explanation (or
explication); taken together,theyboth forma significantcontrasting
pair, which has given riseto many philosophicaldisputesin Germany
since the time of Schleiermacherand Dilthey; accordingto that tradi-
tion,interpretation has specificsubjectiveimplications,such as the in-
volvementof the reader in the processof understandingand the re-
ciprocitybetween text-interpretation and self-interpretation. This re-
is
ciprocity usually known as the "hermeneutical circle" and has been
opposed, mainlyby logical positivists, but also foropposite reasonsby
Romantic thinkers,to the kind of objectivityand to the lack of self-
involvementwhich is supposed to characterizea scientificexplanation
of things. I shall say laterto what extentwe may be led to amend and
even to rebuildon a new basis the oppositionbetween interpretation
and explanation.
Anyhow,thisschematicdescriptionof the concept of interpretation
96 NEW LITERARY HISTORY
is enough to delineatethe two main problemsof hermeneutics: that

of the statusof writtentextsversusspoken language, and that of the
statusofinterpretationversusexplanation.
Now entersthemetaphor!
The aim of thispaper is to connecttogetherthe problemsraised in
hermeneutics and the problemsraisedin rhetoric,
by text-interpretation
semantics,stylistics-orwhatever may be the disciplineconcerned-by
metaphor.
I. Text and Metaphor as Discourse
Our firsttaskwill be to finda commongroundforthe theoryof text

and forthatof metaphor. This commongroundhas alreadya name-
discourse;it has stillto receivea status.
One firstthingis striking: the two kinds of entitieswhich we are
now consideringare of different lengthand may be comparedfromthe
standpointof lengthof the basic unityof discourse,the sentence. Of
course a textmay be reduced to only one sentence,as in proverbsor
aphorisms; but texts have a maximal length which may go from
paragraphs to chapters,to books, to "selected works," to "complete
works" (GesammelteWerke!), and even to fulllibraries.I shall call a
work the closed sequence of discoursewhich may be consideredas a
text. Whereas textsmay be identifiedon the basis of theirmaximal
length,metaphorsmay be identifiedon the basis of their minimal
length,that of the words. Even if the remainderof the analysistends
to show that there are no metaphors,in the sense of metaphorical
words, withoutcertain contexts,even thereforeif we shall have to
speak of metaphoricalstatementsrequiringat least the length of a
sentence,or of a phrase, neverthelessthe "metaphoricaltwist" (to
speak like Monroe Beardsley) is somethingwhich happens to words;
the shiftof meaning which requires the whole contributionof the
contextaffectsthe word; it is the word that has a "metaphoricaluse,"
or of a nonliteralmeaning,or a novel,"emergentmeaning"in specific
contexts. In that sense the definitionof metaphorby Aristotle-as a
transpositionof an alien name (or word) (ivova) -is not cancelled
by a theorywhichlays the stresson the contextualactionwhichcreates
the shiftof meaningin the word. The word remainsthe "focus,"even
if thisfocusrequiresthe "frame"of the sentence,to use the vocabulary
of Max Black.
METAPHOR AND THE MAIN PROBLEM OF HERMENEUTICS 97
This firstremark-merely formal-concerning the differenceof

lengthbetweentext and metaphor,that is, between work and word,
will help us to elaborate our initialproblemin a more accurate way:
to what extentmay we treatmetaphoras a work in miniature? The
answerto thisfirstquestionwill help us afterwardsto raise the second
question: to what extent may the hermeneuticalproblem of text-
interpretation be consideredas a large-scaleexpansionof the problems
condensedin the explicationof a local metaphorin a giventext?
Is a metaphora work in miniature? May a work-say, a poem-
be considered as an expanded metaphor? The answer to the first
question relieson the general propertiesbelongingto discourse,since
both textand metaphor,work and word, fall under one and the same
category,that of discourse.
I shall not elaboratethe conceptof discourseat length,but limitmy
analysisto those featureswhich are necessaryfor the comparisonbe-
tween text and metaphor. For the sake of this analysis,I shall con-
sider only the followingcharacteristics.All of them presentthe form
of a paradox, that is, of an apparentcontradiction.
First,all discourseoccurs as an event; it is the oppositeof language
as "langue," code, or system; as an event, it has an instantaneous
existence,it appears and disappears. But, at the same time-here lies
the paradox-it can be identifiedand reidentifiedas the same; this
samenessis what we call, in the broad sense, its meaning. All dis-
course,let us say, is effectuatedas an event,but all discourseis under-
stood as meaning. We shall see in what sense metaphorconcentrates
on the characterof event and of meaning.
Second, metaphor as a pair of contrastingtraits: the meaning is
carriedby a specificstructure,that of the proposition,which involves
an inner opposition between a pole of singular identification(this
man, the table, Mr. Jones,London) and a pole of generalpredication
(mankind as a class, lightnessas a property,equality with such and
such as a relation,runningas an action). Metaphor, as we shall see,
relieson this "attribution"of charactersto the "principal subject" of
a sentence.
Third, discourse,as an act, may be consideredfromthe point of
view of the "content"of the propositionalact (it predicatessuch and
such charactersof such and such things) or fromthe point of view of
what Austincalled the "force" of the complete act of discourse (the
"speech act" in his terms): what is said of the subject is one thing;
what I "do" in saying that is another thing: I may make a mere
description,or give an order,or formulatea wish,or give a warning,

etc. Hence the polaritybetweenthe locutionaryact (the act ofsaying)
and the illocutionary act (that which I do in saying); thispolaritymay
seem to be less usefulthan the precedingones, at least at the level of
the structureof the metaphoricalstatement;it will play a significant
role when we shall have to replace the metaphor in the concrete
setting,say, of a poem, of an essay,of a fictionalwork.
Fourth,metaphoras a pair of oppositefeatures: discourse,mainly
as sentence,implies the polarityof sense and reference,that is, the
possibilityto distinguishbetween what is said, by the sentenceas a
whole and by the words as parts of the sentence,and about what
somethingis said. To speak is to say somethingabout something.This
polaritywill play the centralrole in the second and the thirdparts of
this paper, since I shall tryto connectthe problemsof explanationto
the dimensionof "sense," that is, to the immanentdesign of the dis-
course-and the problemsof interpretation to the dimensionof "ref-
erence" understoodas the power of discourseto apply to an extra-
linguisticrealityabout whichit sayswhat it says.
But, beforedevelopingthisdichotomyof sense and referenceas the
ground forthe oppositionbetweenexplanationand interpretation, let
us introducea last polaritywhich will play a decisiverole in the her-
meneuticaltheory. Discourse has not only one kind of reference,but
two kindsof reference: it refersto an extralinguistic reality,say, the
world or a world,but it refersequally to its own speakerby the means
of specificdeviceswhich functiononly in a sentence,thereforein dis-
course,such as personal pronouns,verbal tenses,demonstratives, etc.
In thatway, language has both a reality-reference and a self-reference.
And it is the same entity-the sentence-which has this twofoldref-
erence,intentionaland reflective, thing-boundand self-bound.As we
shall see, this connectionbetweenthe two directionsof referencewill
be the key of our theoryof interpretation and the basis of our re-
appraisal of the hermeneutical circle.
I enumeratethe basic polaritiesof discoursein the followingcon-
densed way: event and meaning,singularidentification and general
predication,propositional act and illocutionaryacts, sense and ref-
erence, reference to realityand self-reference.
Now, in what sense may we say thattextand metaphorrelyon this
same kind of entitywhich we called discourse?
It is easy to show thatall textsare discourse,sincetheyproceedfrom
the smallestunityof discourse,the sentence. A text is at least a set
of sentences.We shall see that it has to be somethingmorein orderto

be a work. But it is at least a set of sentences,therefore a discourse.
The connectionbetweenmetaphorand discourserequiresa specific
justification,preciselybecause the definitionof metaphoras a trans-
positionoccurringto names,or to words,seems to put it in a category
of entitiessmaller than the sentence. But the semanticsof the word
demonstratesvery clearly that words have actual meanings only in
a sentenceand thatlexical entities-wordsin the dictionary-have only
potentialmeaningsand forthe sake of theirpotentialuses in sentences.
As concernsthe metaphoritself,semanticsdemonstrates with the same
strength thatthe metaphoricalmeaning of a word is nothingwhichmay
be found in a dictionary(in that sense we may continue to oppose
the metaphoricalsenseto the literalsense,if we call literalsense what-
ever sense may occur among the partial meaningsenumeratedin the
dictionary,and not a so-called original,or fundamental,or primitive,
or propermeaning). If themetaphoricalsenseis morethan the actuali-
zation of one of the potentialmeaningsof a polysemicword (and all
our wordsin commondiscourseare polysemic),it is necessarythat this
metaphoricaluse is only contextual; by that I mean a sense which
emergesas the resultof a certain contextualaction. We are led in
that way to oppose contextualchanges of meaningto lexical changes,
which concern the diachronisticaspect of language as code, system,
or langue. Metaphor is such a contextualchange of meaning.
By sayingthat, I agree partially1with the moderntheoryof meta-
phor,fromI. A. Richardsto Max Black and Monroe Beardsley;more
specifically,I agree with these authors on the fundamentalissue: a
word receives a metaphorical meaning in specific contexts within
which they are opposed to other words taken literally;this shiftin
meaning resultsmainlyfroma clash betweenliteralmeanings,which
excludes a literaluse of the word in question and gives clues for the
findingof a new meaning which is able to fitin the contextof the
sentenceand to make sense in thiscontext.
This contextualaction creates a word meaning which is an event,
since it existsonlyin thiscontext;but it can be identifiedas the same
when it is repeated;in thatway the innovationof an "emergentmean-
ing" (Beardsley) may be recognizedas a linguisticcreation; if it is
I My main disagreementconcerns their use of the "field of associated common-

places" or of the "potential range of connotations" which concerns more trivial
metaphors than genuine metaphors. In that case, which is alone paradigmatic,
the contextual effectgoes furtherthan mere actualization of the potential range
of commonplaces or connotations. I shall return to this point in the second part.
The theory of metaphor must address itself directly to novel metaphor and not
proceed throughan expansion fromflat metaphors to novel metaphors.
adopted by an influentialpart of the speech community,it may even

become a standardmeaningand be added to the polysemyof the literal
entities,contributing in that way to the historyof language as langue,
code, or system.But, at that ultimatestage,metaphoris a dead meta-
phor. Only genuine metaphorsare at the same time "event" and
"meaning."
The contextualaction requiresin the same way our second polarity,
that betweensingularidentification and general predication;a meta-
phor is said of a "principalsubject"; as a "modifier"of thissubject,it
worksas a kind of "attribution."The threetheoriesto which I refer
here rely on this predicativestructure,eitherwhen they oppose the
"vehicle" to the "tenor,"or the "frame"to the "focus,"or the "modi-
fier"to the "principalsubject."
That metaphor requiresthe polaritybetween sense and reference
will demand a completesectionof this paper; the same mustbe said
of the polaritybetween referenceto realityand self-reference. You
will understandlater why I am unable to say more about sense and
reference,and about reality-reference and self-referenceat the level
of metaphoricstatements.Here the mediation of the theoryof text
willbe required.
We have so fardelineatedtheframework of our comparison.We are
now preparedforthesecondpart of our task,in whichwe shall answer
our second question: to what extentmay textexplanationand inter-
pretation,on the one hand, and the explicationof metaphor,on the
other hand, be said to be similarprocesses,only applied at two dif-
ferentlevels of discourse,the level of the work and the level of the
word?
II. Explanationand Metaphor

I want to explorethefollowingworkinghypothesis.From one stand-
point the processof understandinga metaphoris the key for that of
understanding largertexts,say,literaryworks;thispointof view is that
of explanation and develops only this aspect of the meaning which
we called the sense-the immanentdesignof discourse. But, fromone
otherstandpoint,it is the understandingof a work as a whole which
givesthekeyto metaphor;thisotherpointof view is that of interpreta-
tion properly,which developsthe second aspect of the meaningwhich
thatis, theintentionaldirectiontowarda world
we called the reference,
and the reflectivedirectiontoward a self. Therefore,if we apply
explanation to sense as the immanentdesign of the work, we may
reserveinterpretation to the kind of inquirydevoted to the power of
METAPHOR AND THE MAIN PROBLEM OF HERMENEUTICS IOI
a workto projecta world of its own and to initiatethe hermeneutical

circle between the apprehensionof those projected worlds and the
expansion of self-understanding in frontof these novel worlds.
Our workinghypothesisinvitesus thereforeto proceed frommeta-
phor to textat the level of the "sense" and of the "explanation" of the
sense-then from text to metaphor at the level of the referenceof
the workto a world and to a self,thatis, at the level of interpretation,
properlysaid.
What aspects of metaphorexplicationmay serve as paradigmsfor
textexplicationor explanation?
These aspectsare featuresof the workof explanationwhich do not
appear when we startfromtrivialcases, such as-man is a wolf,or a
fox,or a lion. (You could look at mostof thegood authorson metaphor
and notice interestingvariationswithin the bestiarywhich furnishes
them with examples!) With those examples we elude the major dif-
ficulty,that of identifying a meaning which is a word meaning. The
of
onlyway doing it is to constructit so that the whole sentencemakes
sense.
On what do we relyin the case of trivialmetaphors? Max Black
and Beardsleyargue thatthe meaningof a word does not onlydepend
on the semanticaland syntacticalruleswhich governits use as literal
use, but by other rules-which are neverthelessrules-to which the
membersof a speech communityare committed,and which determines
what Black calls the "systemof associatedcommonplaces"and Monroe
Beardsley the "potential range of connotations." In the statement
"man is a wolf," the principalsubject is qualifiedby one of the traits
of the animal which belong to the "wolf-system of related common-
places" (p. 41));2 this implicationsystem works as a filteror as a
screen; it does not only select, but brings forward aspects of the prin-
cipal subject.
What may we thinkof thisexplicationin the lightof our description
of metaphoras a word meaning occurringin a new context?
I agree entirelywith the "interactionview" impliedby this explica-
tion; the metaphoris more than a meresubstitution foranotherliteral
wordwhichan exhaustingparaphrasecould restitute at thesame place.
The algebraicsum of thesetwo operationsofsubstitution by thespeaker
and of restitutionby the hearer or the reader equals zero. No new
meaningemergesand we learn nothing. As Max Black says: "Inter-
action-metaphors are not expandable ... thisuse of a subsidiarysubject
2 Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca,

1962), page referencesincluded in text.
to fosterinsightintoa principalsubjectis a distinctive

intellectualopera-
tion"; this is why you cannot translatean interactionmetaphor in
plain language without"a loss in cognitivecontent" (p. 46).
But are we doing betterjusticeto the powerof metaphor"to inform
and enlighten,"by merelyadding to thesemanticpolysemyof the word
in the dictionaryand to the semanticrules which governthe literal
use of the lexical terms,the "systemof associatedcommonplaces"and
the cultural rules-I coin the term-which governtheiruse? Is not
thissystemsomethingdead, or at least somethingalreadyestablished?
Of course,thissystemof commonplaceshas to be assumedin order
that the contextualaction followthe guidelinesof some directionsfor
the construction of the new meaning. And Max Black's theoryreserves
the possibilitythat metaphorsare "supportedby speciallyconstructed
systemsof implicationas well as by accepted commonplaces"(p. 43).
The problemis preciselythat of these "specially constructedsystems
of implication." We have thereforeto inquire into the process of
interactionitselfin order to explain the cases of novel metaphorsin
novelcontexts.
Beardsley'stheoryof metaphorleads us a step furtherin that di-
rectionwhen he emphasizesthe role of logical absurdity-or of clash
betweenliteralmeaningswithinthe same context."And in poetry,"he
says,"the chieftacticforobtainingthisresultis that of logical absurd-
ity" (p. 138).3 How? Logical absurditycreates a situationin which
we have the choice betweeneitherpreservingthe literalsense of both
the subject and the modifierand concludingto the meaninglessness of
the wholesentence-or attributing a new meaningto the modifiersuch
as the whole sentencemakes sense. Then we have not only a self-
contradictory attribution,but a significant
self-contradictoryattribution.
When I say "man is a fox" (the foxhas chased the wolf), I mustshift
from a literal to a metaphoricalattributionif I want to save the
sentence. But, wheredo we have thisnew meaningfrom?
As long as we raise thiskind of question-from where-we are sent
back to the same kind of solution;the potentialrange of connotations
does not say more than the systemof associated commonplaces; in-
deed we enlarge the notion of meaning by includingthe "secondary
meanings" as connotationswithinthe scope of the full meaning; but
we keep linkingthe creativeprocessof metaphor-forming to a non-
of
creativeaspect language.
to add to this "potential range of connotations,"as
Is it sufficient
3 Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism

(New York, 1958), page referencesincluded in text.
Beardsleydoes in the "revisedtheoryof controversion"(the metaphori-

cal twist), the range of propertieswhich do not yet belong to the
range of connotationsof my language? At firstsightthisadditionim-
provesthe theory;as Beardsleysaysverystrongly, "the metaphortrans-
formsa propertyactual or attributedinto a sense." The shiftin the
theoryis important,since we have now to say that "the metaphors
would not only actualize a potentialconnotation,but establishit as
a staple one"; and further: "some of the relevantpropertiesare given
a new statusas elementsof verbal meaning."
But to speak of propertiesof things(or of objects) which were not
yet meant is to concede that the novel meaning is not drawn from
anywhere,in language at least (propertyis a thing-implication, not a
word-implication).And to say that a novel metaphoris not drawn at
all, is to recognizeit for what it is, that is, a momentaneouscreation
of language, a semanticinnovationwhich has no status in language,
as alreadyestablished,neitheras designationnor as connotation.
At that point it could be asked how one can speak of a semantic
innovation,of a semantical event as of a meaning which can be
identifiedand reidentified(such was the firstcriterionof discoursein
our firstpart).
Only one answer remainspossible: to take the standpointof the
heareror of the readerand to treatthe noveltyof an emergentmeaning
as thecounterpart, fromtheside of the author,of the construction from
the part of the reader. Then the process of explanationis the only
accessto theprocessofcreation.
If we don't take this way, we do not get rid of the theoryof sub-
stitution;instead of substituting for the metaphoricalexpressionsome
literalmeaning restitutedby the paraphrase,we substitutethe system
of connotationsand commonplaces. This task must remain a pre-
paratorytask which relatesliterarycriticismto psychologyand socio-
logy. The decisive momentof explicationis that of the construction
of the networkof interaction,which makes of this contextan actual
and unique context. In doing that,we point to the semanticeventas
to the point of intersectionbetween several semantic lines; this con-
structionis the means by which all the words taken togethermake
sense. Then-and only then-the "metaphorical twist" is both an
event and a meaning,a meaningfulevent and an emergingmeaning
in language.
Such is the fundamentalfeature of the explication of metaphor
which makes of it a paradigm for the explanationof a literarywork.
We constructthe meaning of a text in a way which is similarto the
way in which we make sense of all of the termsof metaphoricalstate-

ment.
Why have we to "construct"the meaning of a text? Firstbecause
it is a writtenthing: in the asymetricrelationof the text and the
reader, only one of the partnersspeaks for two. Bringinga text to
speech is always somethingelse than hearingsomebodyand listening
to hiswords.
A second reasonconcernsmorespecifically the factthat a textis not
only a written thing, but a work, that is, a closed chain of meaning.
Now a work has to be constructedbecause a text-especially if it is
a literarywork-is more than a linear successionof sentences. It is
a cumulative,holisticprocess.
From thesetwo reasonswhat we may give forthe necessityof con-
struingthe meaningof a textor morepreciselyof a work,of a literary
work,we maydraw moresuggestions concerningthe "how" of thiscon-
struction. It is at that stage that the pole of text understandingis
homologousto the understandingof a metaphoricalstatement.
On the one hand, this constructionnecessarilytakes the formof a
guess. As Hirsch says in his book, Validityin Interpretation,there
are no rules. As concernsthe place of guessingin the construction
it followsfromwhat we said about the absenceof the author'sintention
as a guidelineand the characterof a work as a systemof whole and
parts.We maysummarizein thisway the corresponding featureswhich
are the grounds for the analogy between the explicationof a meta-
phoric statementand a literarywork as a whole.
In both cases the constructionrelieson the "clues" containedin the
text itself: a clue is a kind of index for a specificconstruction, both
a set of permissionsand a set of prohibitions;it excludessome unfitting
constructionsand allows some otherswhich make more sense of the
same words.
Secondly,in both cases a constructionmay be said more probable
than another,but not true. The mostprobable is that which (I) ac-
countsforthe greatestnumberof factsprovidedby the text,including
potentialconnotations,and (2) offersa betterqualitativeconvergence
betweenthe traitswhichit takesinto account. A poor explicationmay
be said to be narrowor farfetched.
I agree here with Beardsleythat a good explicationsatisfiestwo
principles: that of congruenceand that of plenitude. I have spoken
so farof convergence.The principleof plenitudewill provideus witha
transitionto our thirdpart. This principlereads: "all the connota-
tionsthat can fitare to be attached; the poem means all it can mean."
This principleleads us fartherthan mere concern for the "sense."

It alreadysays somethingof the reference.Since it takes as a measure
of plenitudethe requirementsraised by an expressionwhich wants to
be said and to be equated by the semanticdensityof the text. The
principleof plenitude is the corollaryat the level of the sense of a
principleof integralexpressionwhich draws our inquiry in a quite
differentdirection.
A quotationfromHumboldt will help us approach thisnew fieldof
inquiry: "A language," he said, "language as discourse (die Rede)
standson theboundaryline betweenthe expressedand the unexpressed.
Its aim and itsgoal is to always repelthisboundarya bit farther."
Interpretationconformsto thisaim.
III. From Hermeneuticsto Metaphor
I. At the level of interpretation,

text-understandinggivesthe keyfor
metaphor-understanding.
Why? Because some featuresof discoursebegin to play an explicit
role only when discoursetakes the form of a literarywork. These
featuresare those which we put under the two headings of reference
and self-reference. I oppose referenceto sense by identifying "sense"
with "what" and "reference"with "about what" of discourse. Of
course, these two traitsmay be recognizedin the smallest unity of
language as discourse,in sentences. The sentenceis about a situation
which it expressesand refersback to its own speaker by the means
of specificdevices. But referenceand self-reference do not give riseto
perplexingproblemsuntil discoursehas become a text and has taken
theformofa work.
Whichproblems?Let us startonce morefromthe difference between
writtenand spoken language. In spoken language, what a dialogue
ultimatelyrefersto is the situationcommonto the interlocutors, that is,
aspectsof realitywhich can be shown or pointed at; we say then that
referenceis "ostensive." In writtenlanguage referenceis no longer
ostensive: poems, essays,and fictionalworksspeak of things,events,
statesof affairs,characterswhich are evoked,but which are not there.
Nevertheless, literarytextsare about something.About what? About
a world,which is the world of thiswork.
Far fromsayingthat the textis therewithouta world,I will now say
without paradox that only man has a world, and not just a situation, a
Weltand notjust an UmZe'clt.In the same mannerthatthe textfreesits
meaning from the tutelage of the mental intention,it frees its reference
o106 NEW LITERARY HISTORY
fromthe limiiits
of ostensivereference.For us, the worldis the ensemble
of referencesopened up by texts. Thus we speak about the "world"of
Greece,not to designateanyumIorewhatwerethesituationsforthosewho
lived then,but to designatethe nonsituational referenceswhichoutlive
the effaciilelnt
of the firstand whichhenceforth are offeredas possible
modesof being,of symbolicdimensionsof our being-in-the-world.4
This nature of referencein the case of literaryworkshas an im-

portantconsequenceforthe concept of interpretation.It impliesthat
"the meaningof a textis not behind the text,but in frontof it. It is
not somethinghidden, but somethingdisclosed." What has to be
understoodis what pointstoward a possibleworld thanksto the non-
ostensivereferencesof the text. Texts speak of possibleworldsand of
possibleways of orientatingoneselfin thoseworlds. In that way dis-
closurebecomes the equivalentforwrittentextsof ostensivereference
for spoken language. And interpretationbecomes the grasping of
the world-propositions opened up by the nonostensive referencesof the
text.
This concept of interpretation expressesa decisiveshiftof emphasis
withinthe Romanticisttraditionof hermeneutics;here the emphasis
was put on the abilityof the heareror of the readerto transferhimself
in the spirituallife of anotherspeaker or writer. The emphasisnow
is less on the other,as a spiritualentity,than on the world that the
work displays. Verstehen-understanding-isto followthe dynamics
of the work,its movementfromwhat it says to that about which it
speaks. "Beyond mysituationas reader,beyondthe author'ssituation,
I offermyselfto the possibleways of being-in-the-world whichthe text
opens up and discovers for me." This is what Gadamer calls "fusion
of horizons" (Horizontverschmelzung) in historicalknowledge.
The shiftof emphasisfromunderstandingthe otherto understand-
ing the world of his work implies a correspondingshiftin the con-
ception of the "hermeneuticalcircle." By "hermeneuticalcircle"
Romanticistthinkersmeant that the understandingof a text cannot
be an objective procedurein the sense of scientificobjectivity,but
necessarilyinvolvesa precomprehension which expressesthe way in
which the reader has already understood himself and his world.
Therefore,a kind of circularityoccurs betweenunderstandinga text
and understandingoneself. Such is in condensedtermsthe principle
of the "hermeneuticalcircle." It is easy to understandthat thinkers
taughtin the traditionof logical empiricismcould only rejectas sheer
4 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation,tr. Denis

Savage (New Haven, 1970).
METAPHOR AND THE MAIN PROBLEM OF HERMENEUTICS
10o7
scandal the mere idea of a hermeneuticalcircle and considerit as an
outrageousviolationof all the canons of verifiability.
For my part, I do not want to deny that the hermeneuticalcircle
remainsan unavoidable structureof interpretation.No genuineinter-
pretation which does not end in some kind of appropriation-of
Aneignung,if by that termwe mean the processof makingone's own
(eigen) what was other,foreign(fremd). But my claim is that the
hermeneuticalcircle is not correctlyunderstoodwhen it is presented
( I ) as a circlebetweentwo subjectivities, that of the reader and that
of the author, and (2) as the projection of the subjectivityof the
readerin the readingitself.Let us correctthe firstassumptionin order
to correctthesecondone.
"That whichwe make our own, we appropriateforourselves,is not
a foreignexperienceor a distantintention,it is the horizonof a world
towardswhichthisrefers: the appropriationof the referenceno longer
finds any model in the fusion of consciousness,in 'empathy' or in
sympathy.The comingto language of the sense and the referenceof
a text is the coming to language of a world and not the recognition
of anotherperson."
The second correctionof the Romanticistconcept of interpretation
followsfromthe firstone. If appropriationis the counterpartof dis-
closure,then the role of subjectivityis not correctlydescribedas pro-
jection. I should rathersay that the readerunderstandshimselfbefore
the text,beforethe world of the work. To understandoneselfbefore,
in frontof, a world is the contraryof projectingoneselfand one's
beliefsand prejudices; it is to let the work and its world enlarge the
horizonof my own self-understanding.
Hermeneutics,therefore, does not submitinterpretation to the finite
of of a
capacities understanding givenreader; it does not put the mean-
ing of the text under the power of the subject who interprets."Far
fromsayingthat a subject alreadymastershis own way of being in the
world and projectsit as the a prioriof his reading . . .I say that
interpretation is the processby which the disclosureof new modes of
being-or, if you preferWittgensteinto Heidegger,of new formsof
life gives to the subject a new capacity of knowinghimself. If there
is somewherea projectand a projection,it is the referenceof the work
which is the projectof a world; the reader is consequentlyenlargedin
his capacity of self-projection by receivinga new mode of being from
thetextitself."
In thatway the hermeneuticalcircleis not denied,but it is displaced
froma subjectivisticto an ontologicallevel; the circle is between my
way (or mymode) of being-beyond theknowledgewhichI may have

of it-and the mode (or the way) of being disclosedby the text as
thework'sworld.
2. Such is the model of interpretation which I want now to transfer
fromtextsas long sequences of discourseto metaphoras "a poem in
miniature" (Beardsley). Indeed the metaphoris too shorta discourse
to displaythisdialecticbetweendisclosinga world and understanding
one's selfin frontof thisworld. Nevertheless thisdialecticpointstoward
some featuresof metaphorwhich the moderntheoriesI quoted above
do not seem to consider,but whichwere not absentfromGreektheory
of metaphor.
Let us returnto the theoryof metaphorin the Poetics of Aristotle.
Metaphor is only one of the "parts" mere) of that which
Aristotlecalls "diction" (~lti;, lexis); as(p~il,
such it belongs to a family
of language procedures-use of foreignwords,coiningof new words,
shorteningor lengthening of words-all of whichdepartfromcommon
Sxvotov,kyrion) use of words. Now, what makes the unityof lexis?
Only its function poetry. Lexis, in its turn is one of the "parts"
in
(
oIE0i,
mere) of tragedy,taken as the paradigm of the poetic work.
Tragedy,in thecontextof thePoetics,represents thelevelof theliterary
work as a whole. Tragedy, as a poem, has sense and reference.In
the language of Aristotle,the "sense" of tragedyis secured by what
he calls the "fable," or the "plot"
(ifrto;, mythos). We may under-
stand the of
mythos tragedy as its sense, since Aristotlekeeps putting
the emphasison its structuralcharacters; the mythosmust have unity
and coherenceand make of the actions representedsomething"entire
and complete." As such,the mythosis the principal"part" of tragedy,
its "essence"; all the other "parts" of tragedy-the "characters,"the
"thoughts," the "diction," the "spectacle"-are connected to the
mythosas themeansor theconditionsor theperformance of thetragedy
as mythos.
We must draw the inferencethat it is only in connectionwith the
mythosof tragedythatitslexismakessense,and, withlexis,metaphora.
There is no local meaning of metaphorbeside the regional meaning
providedby the mythosof tragedy.
But, if metaphoris relatedto the "sense" of tragedyby the means
of its mythos,it is relatedto the "reference"of tragedythanksto its
generalaim which Aristotlecalls mimesis (itilg)
Why do poets write tragedies,elaborate fables and plots, and use
such "strange" words as metaphors? Because tragedyitselfis related
to a more fundamentalproject-that of imitatinghuman action in a
METAPHOR AND THE MAIN PROBLEM OF HERMENEUTICS I O9
poetic fashion. With these master words-mimesis and poiesis-we

reach the level of what I called the referentialworld of the work.
Indeed, the Aristotelianconcept of mimesisinvolves already all the
paradoxesof reference.On theone hand, it expressesa worldof human
action which is already there; tragedy is bound to express human
reality,the tragedyof life. But, on the otherhand, mimesisdoes not
mean duplicationof reality;mimesisis poesis,that is, fabrication,con-
struction,creation. Aristotlegives at least two hints of this creative
dimensionof mimesis: the fable itselfas a coherentconstructionof
its own, and above all the definitionof tragedyas the imitationof
human actionsas better,nobler,higherthan theyactually are. Could
we not say, then,that mimesisis the Greek name for what we called
the unostensivereferenceof the literarywork,or in otherwords, the
Greekname forworlddisclosure?
If we are right,we may now say somethingabout the power of
metaphor. I say here the "power," and no longerthe "structure,"no
longereven the "processof metaphor." The power of metaphorpro-
ceeds fromitsconnection,withina poeticand work,firstwiththe other
proceduresof "diction" (lexis); secondlywith the "fable," which is
the essence of the work, its immanent "sense," thirdlywith the in-
tentionality of the work as a whole, that is, its intentionto represent
human actions as higherthan theyactuallyare: and this is mimesis.
In that sense the power of metaphorproceedsfromthat of the poem
as a whole.
Let us apply theseremarksborrowedfromAristotle'sPoetics to our
own descriptionof metaphor. Could we not say that the featureof
metaphorthatwe put above all otherfeatures-its nascentor emerging
character-is relatedto the functionof poetryas a creativeimitation
of reality? Why should we invent novel meanings,meanings which
existonlyin the instanceof discourse,if it were not forthe sake of the
poiesis in the mimesis? If it is true that the poem creates a world, it
requiresa language which preservesand expressesits creative power
in specificcontexts.
Link togetherthe poiesisof the poem and metaphoras an emergent
meaning,then you will make sense of both at the same time: poetry
and metaphor.
Such is the way in which the theoryof interpretation paves the way
for an ultimate approach to the power of metaphor. This priority
givento textinterpretation in thislast stage of the analysisof metaphor
does not implythat the relationbetweenboth is not reciprocal. The
explication of metaphor as a local event in the text contributesto
II0 NEW LITERARY HISTORY
the interpretation itselfof the work as a whole. We could even say

that, if the interpretationof local metaphorsis enlightenedby the
interpretation of the textas a whole and by the disentanglement of the
kind of world it projects,the interpretation of the poem as a whole
is controlled,reciprocally,by the explicationof metaphoras a local
phenomenon. I should venture,as an example of thisreciprocalrela-
tion between regionaland local aspects of the text,the possiblecon-
nection,in Aristotle'sPoetics, between the functionof imitation,as
makinghuman actionshigherthan theyactuallyare, and the structure
of metaphor,as transposingthe meaning of ordinarylanguage into
strangeuses. Is therenot a mutualaffinity betweenthe projectof mak-
ing human actions look betterthan theyactually are and the special
of
procedure metaphor as an emergingmeaning?
Let us expressthat relationin more generalterms. Why should we
draw new meaningsfromour language,if we had nothingnew to say,
no new worldsto project? Linguisticcreationswould be meaningless
if theydid not servethe generalprojectof lettingnew,worldsemerge
from poetry.
Allow me to conclude in a way which would be consistentwith a
theoryof interpretation whichlays the stresson "openingup a world."
Our conclusionshould also "open up" some new vistas. On what?
Maybe on the old problem of imagination,which I cautiouslyput
aside. We are preparedto inquire into the power of imagination,no
longer as the facultyof deriving"images" fromsensoryexperiences,
but as the capacity to let new worlds build our self-understanding.
This powerwould not be conveyedby emergingimagesbut by emerg-
ing meaningsin our language. Imagination,then,should be treated
as a dimensionof language. In that way, a new link would appear
between imaginationand metaphor.
UNIVERSITY OF PARIS

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Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics

Author(s): Paul Ricoeur

is enough to delineatethe two main problemsof hermeneutics: that

I. Text and Metaphor as Discourse

Our firsttaskwill be to finda commongroundforthe theoryof text

This firstremark-merely formal-concerning the differenceof

description,or give an order,or formulatea wish,or give a warning,

of sentences.We shall see that it has to be somethingmorein orderto

I My main disagreementconcerns their use of the "field of associated common-

adopted by an influentialpart of the speech community,it may even

II. Explanationand Metaphor

a workto projecta world of its own and to initiatethe hermeneutical

2 Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca,

to fosterinsightintoa principalsubjectis a distinctive

3 Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism

Beardsleydoes in the "revisedtheoryof controversion"(the metaphori-

way in which we make sense of all of the termsof metaphoricalstate-

This principleleads us fartherthan mere concern for the "sense."

III. From Hermeneuticsto Metaphor

I. At the level of interpretation,

This nature of referencein the case of literaryworkshas an im-

4 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation,tr. Denis

way (or mymode) of being-beyond theknowledgewhichI may have

poetic fashion. With these master words-mimesis and poiesis-we

the interpretation itselfof the work as a whole. We could even say

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