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#1.

CHING vs RODRIGUEZ

FACTS:

Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002,[5] the respondents filed a Complaint[6] against the
petitioners and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic
Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching
(Ramon) and his successors-in-interest.The Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement
and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance
of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction," was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and raffled to
Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).

The respondents filed an Amended Complaint[14] dated April 7, 2005 impleading Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of
co-defendant Global Bank. The Amended Complaint relative to the existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in
the amount of P4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The respondents prayed that they be declared as the
rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately released to them. Alternatively, the respondents prayed for the issuance of
a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve it during the pendency of the case.

On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss[18] the respondents' Amended Complaint on the alleged ground of
the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the Amended Complaint
sought the release of the CPPA to the respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's
disinheritance, the suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of nullity. Hence,
jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as an ordinary court.

ISSUE:Whether or not the suit partakes the nature of a special proceeding?

RULING:An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement
of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.[32] A special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.[33] It is distinguished from an
ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.[34] To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement
proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally
transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking
cognizance of respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters
which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.

#2.GOCHAN vs GOCHAN

Gochan vs Gochan

Facts:

Respondents were stockholders of the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and the Mactan Realty Development Corporation.
Respondents offered to sell their shares in the two corporations to the individual petitioners, the heirs of the late Ambassador
Esteban Gochan, for and in consideration of the sum of P200,000,000:00. Petitioners accepted and paid the said amount to
respondents. Accordingly, respondents issued to petitioners the necessary "Receipts."3 In addition, respondents executed their
respective "Release, Waiver and Quitclaim,"4 wherein .they undertook that they would not initiate any suit, action or complaint
against petitioners for whatever reason or purpose.,Respondents, through Crispo Gochan, Jr., required individual petitioners to
execute a "promissory note. Unbeknown to petitioners, Crispo Gochan, Jr. inserted in the "promissory note" a phrase that says,
"Said amount is in partial consideration of the sale."6

On April 3, 1998, respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific performance and damages with the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-21854. Respondents alleged that sometime in November 1996,
petitioner Louise Gochan, on behalf of all the petitioners, offered to buy their shares of stock, consisting of 254 shares in the Felix
Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and 1,624 shares of stock in the Mactan Realty Development Corporation; and that they
executed a Provisional Memorandum of Agreement, wherein they enumerated the following as consideration for the sale:

1. Pesos: Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200M)

2. Two (2) hectares more or less of the fishpond in Gochan Compound, Mabolo, Lot 4F-2-B

3. Lot 2, Block 9 with an area of 999 square meters in Gochan Compound, Mabolo, Cebu

4. Three Thousand (3,000) square meters of Villas Magallanes in Mactan, Cebu

5. Lot 423 New Gem Building with an area of 605 square meters.7

ISSUE:Whether or not there is lack of jurisdiction by the trial court for non-payment of the correct docket fees?

Whether or not there is forum shopping?

RULING:The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fees. In the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,12 this Court held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action.
In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature of a real action, although ostensibly
denominated as one for specific performance. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the
assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant.

Likewise, we do not find that there is forum-shopping in the case at bar. The first petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084,
which is now the subject of the instant petition, involved the propriety of the affirmative defenses relied upon by petitioners in
Civil Case No. CEB-21854. The second petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54985, raised the issue of whether or not public
respondent Judge Dicdican was guilty of manifest partiality warranting his inhibition from further hearing Civil Case No.
CEB-21854.

More importantly, the two petitions did not seek the same relief from the Court of Appeals. In CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, petitioners
prayed, among others, for the annulment of the orders of the trial court denying their motion for preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. CEB-21854. No such reliefs are involved in the second petition, where petitioners merely
prayed for the issuance of an order enjoining public respondent Judge Dicdican from further trying the case and to assign a new
judge in his stead.
#3.HERNANDEZ vs RURAL BANK OF LUCENA INC.

FACTS:

On March 21, 1961 the spouses Francisco S. Hernandez and Josefa U. Atienza obtained from the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. a loan
of P6,000 which was payable on March 21, 1962. The loan was cured by a mortgage on their two lots situated in Cubao, Quezon
City with a total area of 600 square meters. The interest for one year was paid in advance.

About three months after that loan was obtained, the Lucena Bank became a distress bank. In a letter dated June 6, 1961 the
Acting Governor of the Central Bank apprised the stockholders of the Lucena bank that the Monetary Board in its Resolution No.
928, which was approved on June 13, 1961 allegedly after hearing the Lucena bank. found that its officers, directors and
employees had committed certain anomalies or had resorted to unsound and unsafe banking practices which were prejudicial to
the government, its depositors and creditors.

That letter of the Central Bank Governor was construed as a directive to the Lucena bank to suspend operations. The Manila times
in its issue of June 21, 1961 carried a news story with the heading "Bank told to suspend operations". The story was accompanied
by a picture of depositors who jammed the lobby of the bank trying to withdraw their money.

It was only on October 12, 1964 when Hernandez and his wife filed an action in the Court of First Instance at Lipa City to compel
the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., the Central Bank as liquidator, and Jose S. Martinez as receiver, to accept the check and to execute
the cancellation of the real estate mortgage. The Hernandez spouses also asked for moral damages in the amount of P10.000 and
attorney's fees of P3,000 (Civil Case No. 1615).

On October 20, 1964 the Central Bank filed a motion to dismiss. It contended that there was improper venue because, as the
action allegedly involved title to real property, it should have been instituted in Quezon City where the encumbered lots are
situated.

ISSUE:Whether or not the suit is in proper venue?

RULING: Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that "actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where
the property or any part thereof lies".
Note that the rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage but does not mention an action for the
cancellation of a real mortgage. In the instant case, the action is primarily to compel the mortgagee to accept payment of the
mortgage debt and to release the mortgage.

That action, which is not expressive included in the enumeration found in section 2(a) of Rule 4, does not involve the title to the
mortgage lots. It is a personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has, not foreclosure the mortgage, Plaintiffs' title is not
in question. They are in possession of the mortgaged lots.

Hence, the venue of plaintiffs' personal action is the place where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found,
or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff (Sec. 2[b], Rule 4).

#4.EMERGENCY LOAN PAWNSHOP INCORPORATED and DANILO R. NAPALA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Tenth Division)
and TRADERS ROYAL BANK, respondents.

1.Civil Procedure ; Certiorari ; Appeal ; Denial of a motion to dismiss acomplaint is an interlocutory order and, hence, cannot
be appealed orquestioned via a special civil action of certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered; Certain
situations where recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate.&.

2.Civil Procedure ; Actions ; Venue ;An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real
property,shall be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part
thereof lies

Facts:On January 18, 1996, Traders Royal Bank (TRB for brevity) sold in favor of petitioner Emergency Loan Pawnshop Incorporated
(ELPI for brevity) a parcel of land located at Km. 3 Asin, Baguio City for Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).[2]At the time
of the sale, TRB misrepresented to ELPI that the subject property was a vacant residential lot valued at P600.00 to P800.00 per
square meters, with a usable land area of 1,143.75 square meters (approximately 75% of the land area of 1,525 sq.m.) without any
illegal occupants or squatters, when it truth the subject property was dominantly a public road with only 140 square meters usable
area.ELPI, after having spent to fully ascertain the actual condition of the property, demanded from TRB the rescission and
cancellation of the sale of the property. TRB refused, hence, on April 16, 1996, ELPI filed with the Regional Trial Court, Davao,
Branch 17, a complaint for annulment of sale and damages against TRB.

On August 27, 1996, TRB filed a Motion to Dismiss[4] the complaint on the ground of improper venue. On September 18,
1996 the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.On October 21, 1996, TRB filed a motion for reconsideration.[6] On November
14, 1996, the trial court denied the motion.On January 15, 1997, TRB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, contending that the trial court committed
a grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue.After due proceedings,
on March 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, finding
merit in the petition, the Orders dated September 18,1996 and November 14, 1996 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE and Civil
Case No. 24,317-96 is hereby DISMISSED on ground of improper venue.

ISSUES:1. Whether C.A.erred in entertaining the petition for certiorari and prohibition, for lack of jurisdiction;

2. Whether erred in ruling that the Regional Trial Court erred in not dismissing the complaint for improper venue.

RULING:According to petitioners, the determination of whether the venue of an action was improperly laid was a question of law,
thus, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari and prohibition, which involves pure questions
of law.Petitioners further alleged that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory in nature that can not be the subject of
an appeal and can not be even reviewed by a special civil action for certiorari.

We find the petition not meritorious.

The general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an interlocutory order and, hence, cannot be appealed or
questioned via a special civil action of certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered.

The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in his
motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. However,
the rule is not ironclad. Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, (a) when
the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial
court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a
defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the
defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case."

In the case at bar, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred grievously amounting to ousting itself of
jurisdiction. The motion of respondent TRB was well founded because venue was clearly improperly laid. The action in the
Regional Trial Court was for annulment of sale involving a parcel of land located at Km. 3 Asin Road, Baguio City. The venue of such
action is unquestionably within the territorial jurisdiction of the proper court where the real property or part thereof lies.[14] An
action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, shall be commenced and tried
in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies.Hence, the case at bar clearly
falls within the exceptions to the rule. The Regional Trial Court has committed a palpable and grievous error amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue.WHEREFORE, the Court
denies the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 43095, in toto.

5
#6.Gomez v CA
GR No. 127692

March 10, 2004

Rule 14 service of summons

FACTS: Sometime in 1975, the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two (2) parcels of land to Dr. Clarence Yujuico. The
mortgage was foreclosed and subsequently sold at public auction in 1988. Before expiration of the redemption

period, the spouses sold the property to Spouses Fortunato and Aurora Gomez.However, the spouses Trocino, upon redemption
from Dr. Yujuico, refused to convey ownership to spouses Gomez.Plaintiffs filed an action for specific performance and/or
rescission against heirs of Jesus J. Trocino Sr and Caridad Tocino in 1991. The process server served summons to respondents,
through defendant Caridad Trocino, as described in the Return of Service. Defendants through Caridad, filed a verified pleading.
After trial on merits, RTC rendered decision on March 1993 ordering defendants to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of plaintiffs
while plaintiffs pay defendants the balance of P2,000,000.00. Otherwise, the sale is rescinded and revoked and defendants repay
plaintiffs the sum of P500,000.00.Defendants failed to deliver the TCTs to plaintiffs. Thus, the RTC issued and order dated August
1995 declaring said titles null and void, ordering ROD of Cebu City to issue new titles in petitioners name. Respondents Adolfo and
Mariano Trocino filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment alleging that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons as they were not validly served with a copy of the summons and the complaint. Adolfo lived in Ohio, USA since 1986 while
Mariano lived in Talibon, Bohol since 1986. The CA granted their petition and annulled the RTC decision in September in
1996.Petitioners filed Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the present the Petition.

ISSUE: W/N there was a valid service of summons

RULING: NO.Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the
means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Any judgment without service in the absence of a valid waiver is
null and void.In the present case, the action is an action in personam because it is an action against

persons, namely, herein respondents, on the basis of their personal liability. While it is a real action because it affects title to or
possession of land, it does not automatically follow that the action is one in rem. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. An action in personam is an action
against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against
the person. The present case is an action in personam, because it is an action against persons, on the basis of their personal
liability of non-delivery of titles. Thus, personal service of summons upon the private respondents is essential in order for the
court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons. The court, therefore, did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Adolfo Trocino
who is a non-resident. Neither did the court acquire jurisdiction over the person of Mariano Trocino, absent the showing of
impossibility of service within a reasonable time in the return of service or officers return. Such improper service of summons
renders the same ineffective; thus, all subsequent proceedings are invalidated.Inasmuch as the sheriffs return failed to state the
facts and circumstances showing the impossibility of personal service of summons upon spouses Trocino within a reasonable time,
spouses Gomez should have sought the issuance of an alias summons. Alias summons may be issued when the original summons
is returned without being served on any or all of the defendants. (Sec 5 Rule 14 ROC)

#7.Erminita Munoz v. Victoriano Yabut

The subject is a house and lot sold Munoz which she sold to her sister Emilia Ching, who in turn sold it to the Go spouses.
When the Go spouses defaulted on their loan to BPI the property was foreclosed. BPI won as the highest bidder at the auction and
the property was sold to the Chan spouses. Munoz registered her adverse claim and filed a complaint with the RTC for annulment
of a deed of absolute sale, cancellation of TCT in the spouses Gos names and for revival of the TCT under her name. She also
caused the annotation of a lis pendens. After the RTC filed a writ of execution implementing its judgment, the spouses Chan came
forward and filed an urgent motion to stop the execution against them. They asserted ownership and possession on the basis of a
clean title registered in their names, also contending that the final judgment cannot be executed against them as they were not
parties to the case and that they purchased the property from BPI without any defects to the title. Munoz discovered the
cancellation of her adverse claim and notice of lis pendens, plus the subsequent events that led to transfer and registration from
Go, to BPI then to the Chans. The CA sustained the RTC orders holding that the Chans right to due process was vitiated by
impleading them only at the execution stage of the civil case. The order of the RTC in the civil case was null and void, and
considering they are strangers to the case and they are innocent purchasers for value. Thereafter Munoz filed a motion for
contempt with the RTC against the Chan spouses and Atty. The RTC denied Munozs motion for contempt, but ordering an alias
writ of execution to deliver the property to Munoz, ordering Go to vacate. Munoz filed a motion for clarificatory order, pointing
out that the spouses Chan are the present occupants and that the property could not be delivered unless the spouses Chan are
evicted. The motion was denied reiterating the rule that once a judgment has become final only clerical errors may be corrected.

Issue:WON the effect of judgment includes parties not impleaded to the case

Ruling:The SC denies Munozs petition for contempt and motion for clarificatory order seeking that the Chans be executed against
because the prior civil case against Go is an action for reconveyance which is an action in personam. Since the Chans and BPI were
not impleaded as parties, the effect of the judgment cannot bind or be extended to them by simply issuing alias writs of execution.
No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment
rendered to the court. Although the titles of Ching and Go were deemed void, there was no similar determination as to the titles
that BPI and Chan had. Munoz cannot collateraly attack the title that the Chans have; they must be given their day in court in a
proceeding designated for that purpose.

#8.JESSE U. LUCASv.jESUS S. LUCAS

G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011, SECOND DIVISION (Nachura,J.)

FACTS:Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be
made before a court may order a compulsory blood test.Jesse U. Lucas (Jesse), filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion
for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse narrated his mothers account of he
history with Jesus S. Lucas (Jesus) and attached several copies of his personal
documents. Though Jesus was not summoned and was not served a copy of the petition, he nevertheless learned of it and
obtained for himself a copy. He then filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting among others that the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him as respondent.Unbeknownst to Jesus on the day before he
filed his Comment, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and
hence set the case for hearing.

After learning of the RTCs order, Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of
a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father. Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and
held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case
of Herrera v. Alba . This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration of his own which the RTC granted. Anew hearing was
scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC.
He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to
show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.

RULING:Petition GRANTED.Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties
have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural
aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be
determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when

only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that

petitioner failed to establish a

prima facie case the first procedural aspect in a paternity case is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys
evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.Section 4 of the Rule on DNA evidence. The Rule on DNA Evidence
was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the
prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity ( i.e.,

the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports,etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the
admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the evidence
gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and,
more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public.Not
surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and
integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states: The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprioor on application of any
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice
to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample:
(i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the
results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing
has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence
of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule
shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the best of any party, including law enforcement agencies,
before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean,
however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if,during the hearing, the said conditions are established.Court
order for blood testing equivalent to search under the Constitution.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must
first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or are reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the
holding of the test.In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in
ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case,or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
eloquently explained; Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances
of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding
the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must
be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a
preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses
to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing .The same condition
precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the
hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.

#9.Asiavest Merchant Bankers Berhad v. Court of Appeals and Philippine National Construction Corp.
GR No. 110263, July 20, 2001

FACTS:

Herein petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia, which sought to recover indemnity of performance
bond against the respondent, and filed the said case before the High Court of Malaysia. The judgment of the High Court of
Malaysia was in favor of the petitioner. However, petitioner was unsuccessful in securing the payments from the private
respondents. Petitioner initiated a complaint before the RTC of Pasig, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaysia.
Private respondent sought to dismiss the case contending that the decision of the High Court of Malaysia is tainted with want of
jurisdiction. The said dismissal was denied. Private respondent filed its answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, for the same
grounds stated in his motion to dismiss. However, the petitioner insisted that the High Court of Malaysia acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the private respondent by the voluntary submission of the appointed counsels of the private respondents. The trial
court dismissed the petitioners complaint, and the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE:Whether the CA erred in (a) holding that the Malaysian Court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over the private
respondent, and (b) whether the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement of the Malaysian Courts judgment.

RULING:
(a) In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that determines that validity of
the service of court process on private respondent as well as other matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian
procedural law is, remains a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice and must be pleaded and
proved like any other fact. It was then incumbent upon the private respondent to present evidence as to what the
Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed service of summon upon the financial officer of a
corporation, as alleged by it, is invalid. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of service of summon
and the decision thereafter by the High Court of Malaysia must stand.

(b) There is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment is not enforceable in view of the absence of any
statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner was based. As aforestated, the lex fori or
the internal law of the forum governs matters of remedy and procedure. Considering that under the procedural rules
of the High Court of Malaysia, a valid judgment may be rendered even without stating in the judgment every fact and
law upon which the judgment is based, then the same must be accorded respect and the courts in this jurisdiction
cannot invalidate the judgment of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.
Instant petition is granted.

#10.TERESA CHAVES BIACO,Petitioner,vs.PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, Respondent.

GR No. 161417,February 8, 2007

FACTS:Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While employed in the Philippine Countryside Rural
Bank (PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank.As security for the payment of the said
loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank covering the parcel of land which the real estate mortgages
bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco.When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent
bank through counsel sent him a written demand,however, proved futile.Respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of
mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses
Biaco through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank). The RTC ruled against them; a writ of execution was served on the
spouses.Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending, among others, that the trial court failed
to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her through her husband without any explanation as to why personal
service could not be made. The CA affirmed RTC decision invoking that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As
such, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner?

RULING:No. The Court ruled that validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over
the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into
actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized
and made effective.

In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction
over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not
required, it being sufficient that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

#11.PNB V. CA- Material Alteration

256 SCRA 491

FACTS:

DECS issued a check in favor of Abante Marketing containing a specific serial number, drawn against PNB.
The check was deposited by Abante in its account with Capitol and the latter consequently deposited the same
with its account with PBCOM which later deposited it with petitioner for clearing. The check was thereafter
cleared. However, on a relevant date, petitioner PNB returned the check on account that there had been a
material alteration on it. Subsequent debits were made but Capitol cannot debit the account of Abante any longer for the latter
had withdrawn all the money already from the account. This prompted Capitol to seek reclarification from
PBCOM and demanded the recrediting of its account. PBCOM followed suit by doing the same against PNB.
Demands unheeded,

it filed an action against PBCOM and the latter filed a third-party complaint against petitioner.

HELD:An alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of the instrument. It means an unauthorized change in the
instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party or an unauthorized addition of
words or numbers or other change to an incomplete instrument relating to the obligation of the party. In other
words, a material alteration is one which changes the items which are required to be stated under Section 1 of the NIL.

In this case, the alleged material alteration was the alteration of the serial number of the check in issuewhich is
not an essential element of a negotiable instrument under Section 1. PNB alleges that the alteration was material
since it is an accepted concept that a TCAA check by its very nature is the medium of exchange
of governments, instrumentalities and agencies. As a safety measure, every government office or agency
is assigned checks bearing different serial numbers. But this contention has to fail. The checks serial number is not the sole
indicia of its origin. The name of the government agency issuing the check is clearly stated therein. Thus, the checks drawer is
sufficiently identified, rendering redundant the referral to its serial number. Therefore, there being no material alteration in the
check committed, PNB could not return the check to PBCOM. It should pay the same.

#12.SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. PROSPERO ABALLA

G.R. No. 149011 June 28, 2005

Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and Sunflower Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Sunflower) entered into a one-year
Contract of Service and such contract is renewed on a monthly basis until terminated. Pursuant to this, respondent Prospero
Aballa rendered services to SMC. After one year of service, Aballa filed a complaint before NLRC praying that they be declared as
regular employees of SMC. On the other hand, SMC filed before the DOLE a Notice of Closure due to serious business losses.
Hence, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint and ruled in favor of SMC. Aballa then appealed before the NLRC. The NLRC
dismissed the appeal finding that Sunflower is an independent contractor. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed NLRCs
decision on the ground that the agreement between SMC and Sunflower showed a clear intent to abstain from establishing an
employer-employee relationship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aballa and other employees of Sunflower are employees of SMC?

RULING:The test to determine the existence of independent contractorship is whether one claiming to be an independent
contractor has contracted to do the work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of the employer,
except only as to the results of the work. In legitimate labor contracting, the law creates an employer-employee relationship for a
limited purpose, to ensure that the employees are paid their wages. The principal employer becomes jointly and severally liable
with the job contractor, only for the payment of the employees wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. Other than
that, the principal employer is not responsible for any claim made by the employees. In labor-only contracting, the statute creates
an employer-employee relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is
considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor
as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer.
The Contract of Services between SMC and Sunflower shows that the parties clearly disavowed the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between SMC and private respondents. The language of a contract is not, however,
determinative of the parties relationship; rather it is the totality of the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case. A party
cannot dictate, by the mere expedient of a unilateral declaration in a contract, the character of its business, whether as labor-only
contractor or job contractor, it being crucial that its character be measured in terms of and determined by the criteria set by
statute. What appears is that Sunflower does not have substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises and other materials to qualify it as an independent contractor. On the other hand, it is gathered that
the lot, building, machineries and all other working tools utilized by Aballa et al. in carrying out their tasks were owned and
provided by SMC.

And from the job description provided by SMC itself, the work assigned to Aballa et al. was directly related to the aquaculture
operations of SMC. As for janitorial and messengerial services, that they are considered directly related to the principal business of
the employer has been jurisprudentially recognized. Furthermore, Sunflower did not carry on an independent business or
undertake the performance of its service contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control and supervision
of its principal, SMC, its apparent role having been merely to recruit persons to work for SMC.

All the foregoing considerations affirm by more than substantial evidence the existence of an employer- employee
relationship between SMC and Aballa. Since Aballa who were engaged in shrimp processing performed tasks usually necessary or
desirable in the aquaculture business of SMC, they should be deemed regular employees of the latter and as such are entitled to
all the benefits and rights appurtenant to regular employment. They should thus be awarded differential pay corresponding to the
difference between the wages and benefits given them and those accorded SMCs other regular employees.

#13.BENGUET CORPORATION v. CORDILLERA CARABALLO MISSION

[ GR NO. 155343, Sep 02, 2005 ]

Action : Petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner Benguet Corporation owns Pilo mineral claim covering several hectares of land in Virac, Itogon, Benguet. It
planted pine trees in compliance with the directive of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and built
roads, buildings and security gates in the covered area. Sometime in September 1997, petitioner discovered that representatives
of respondent Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc. (CCMI) bulldozed and leveled the grounds within its Pilo mineral claim in
preparation for the construction of a school. Despite petitioner's demands to cease, respondents continued with the
construction activities.

Petitioner filed a complaint[4] for forcible entry against respondents in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Itogon, Benguet. The
MTC ruled in favor of petitioner's prior possession of the land and ordered respondents to vacate the premises, restore complete
possession to the petitioner, and pay the cost. On appeal, the RTC reversed the judgment of the MTC and dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate court dismissed the petition for failure to attach (a) the board resolution
authorizing the affiant to file the complaint, and (b) the certified copies of other pleadings and documents pertinent and relevant
thereto.

Issues: W/N the complaint state a cause of action?


RULING:In actions for forcible entry, it may be stressed, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire
jurisdiction. First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was
deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely, force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, and stealth. If the alleged dispossession did not occur by any of these means, the proper recourse is to file not an
action for forcible entry but a plenary action to recover possession with the Regional Trial Court.

Nothing in the complaint before the MTC would show how the entry was effected nor how dispossession took place. The
complaint merely stated that petitioner's caretaker noticed an ongoing bulldozing and leveling activities. The allegations that
these activities were illegal and that respondents' entry was unlawful are not statements of bare facts but conclusions of law.
The complaint should have specified what made the activities illegal and the entry unlawful. Without these ultimate facts, the MTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. In view of the foregoing, the RTC properly reversed the MTC's decision and then
dismissed the complaint of petitioner for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate court would not and did not commit a
reversible error in sustaining in effect the RTC's decision of dismissal.

#14.Micro Sales Operation Network & Willy Bendol vs. NLRC

Facts:Petitioner Micro Sales Operation Network is a domestic corporation engaged in local transportation of goods by land.
Petitioner Willy Bendol was the companys operations manager at the time of the controversy. Private respondents Larry Hermosa,
Leonardo de Castro, and Ramil Basinillo were employed by the company as driver, warehouseman, and helper, respectively.
Hermosa, de Castro, and Basinillo collectively filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal.The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision.
It denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Undaunted, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for
certiorari. However, the appellate court dismissed the petition for being defective in form. It found that only the company signed
the verification and certification on non-forum shopping. Petitioner Willy Bendol did not sign the same. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied.

The appellate court reasoned that even if petitioner Willy Bendol was not impleaded as a real party in interest, records showed
that he was impleaded as a co-respondent before the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the appellate court ruled, his failure to sign the
verification and certification on non-forum shopping is a ground for the dismissal of the petition. Petitioners insist Willy Bendol
was impleaded merely because he was the immediate supervisor of private respondents. They argue that the real party in interest
in this case is the company.

Issue:WON failure to sign the verification and certification on non-forum shopping of one of the petitioners renders the pleading
defective.

RULING:The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting
the form of the pleading, non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.The Court of
Appeals relied on Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman which held that a certification on non-forum shopping signed by only one
of two or more petitioners is defective, unless he was duly authorized by his co-petitioner. However, the said ruling applies when
the co-parties are being sued in their individual capacities. Note that the petitioners in Loquias were charged with violation in
their various capacities.In the instant case, the petitioners are the company and its operations manager, Willy Bendol. The latter
was impleaded simply because he was a co-respondent in the illegal dismissal complaint. He has no interest in this case separate
and distinct from the company, which was the direct employer of private respondents.Petitioner Bendol is clearly a mere nominal
party in the case. His failure to sign the verification and certification on non-forum shopping is not a ground for the dismissal of the
petition. The appellate court erred in dismissing outright petitioners special civil action for certiorari solely on that ground.

#15.Sarmiento v. Zaratan
Facts: Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against respondent Emerita Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City. On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.. Respondent filed her notice of
appeal. In the Notice of Appealed Case, the RTC directed respondent to submit her memorandum in accordance with the
provisions of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court and petitioner to file a reply memorandum within 15 days from receipt.
Respondents counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003 had until 3 June 2003 within which to file the requisite
memorandum. But on 3 June 2003 he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due to his failure to finish the draft of the
said Memorandum. He cited reasons for the delay but the motion remained enacted. On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her
Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed the appeal.

Issue: WON the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is fatal.

RULING:No. It is not disputed that respondent perfected her appeal on 4 April 2003 with the filing of her Notice of Appeal and
payment of the required docket fees. However, before the expiration of time to file the Memorandum, she filed a Motion for
Extension of Time seeking an additional period of five days within which to file her Memorandum, which motion lacked the Notice
of Hearing required by Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Court which provides: SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion. - Except for
motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for
hearing by the applicant. Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good
cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study
the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. The notice requirement in a motion is
mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is considered pro form a and does not affect the reglementary period
for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have
time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. Considering the
circumstances of the present case, we believe that procedural due process was substantially complied with. There are reasons
which would warrant the suspension of the
Rules: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable
to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Elements or circumstances (c), (d)
and (e) exist in the present case. The motion in question does not affect the substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to
extend the period to file Memorandum. The required extension was due to respondents counsels illness, lack of staff to do the
work due to storm and flood, compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that said motion was
interposed to delay the appeal. As it appears, respondent sought extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so and the
memorandum was subsequently filed within the requested extended period. Under the circumstances, substantial justice requires
that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession of the land in question. Further,
notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice
demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. It has been said that "ex parte motions are frequently
permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule
requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion.

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