Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Alcon &
Joann S. Papa
GR No. 194884, 22 October 2014
FACTS:
Ramonchito and Joann were hired as manual welders in 2001 by IPMC, a company
engaged in the manufacture of auto-seat recliners.
Around 12:40 A.M. of October 5, 2002, when Ramonchito and Joann were on
second-shift duty. Cyrus, a security guard on duty, patrolled and inspected the
company premises. When he reached the Tools and Die Section, he heard the
sound of an industrial fan running; intending to turn the fan off, he followed the
sound and there Cyrus discovered Ramonchito and Joann having sexual intercourse
using a piece of cartoon as mattress. Cyrus went back to the guard house and
requested his buddy Danilo, to conduct a follow-up inspection. When he went to
the Tool and Die Section, Danilo saw several employees leaving the area, including
Ramonchito and Joann, where he noticed Ramonchito picked up the cartoon they
used and put it back in its proper place. Curys then submitted a handwritten report
to the companys Finance and Administration Manager.
Ramonchito and Joann thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC,
reiterating their assertions at the hearing.
The Labor Arbiter ruled their dismissal as valid, which the NLRC affirmed.
However, the Court of Appeals, upon petition for certiorari by Ramonchito and
Joann, reversed and set aside the NLRC decision holding that sexual misconduct
inside company premises not enough to warrant dismissal, but imposed on them
the penalty of three months suspension. Thus, the company elevated its case to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not sexual intercourse inside company premises during working hours
constitute serious misconduct and which punishable by dismissal.
HELD:
Yes, sexual intercourse inside company premises during working hours constitute
serious misconduct which is punishable by dismissal.
Sexual acts and intimacies between two consenting adults belong, as a principled
ideal, to the realm of purely private relations. Whether aroused by lust or inflamed
by sincere affection, sexual acts should be carried out at such place, time and
circumstance that, by the generally accepted norms of conduct, will not offend
public decency nor disturb the generally held or accepted social morals. Under
these parameters, sexual acts between two consenting adults do not have a place
in the work environment.
(Engaging in illicit sexual relations prohibited under a personnel policy is a ground for
termination even if does not connect to the performance of his duties.)
Co-employee complains that married employee having relationship with co-employee's sister. It
was based on "ethical grounds" i.e. disgrace to the community.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent, on the other hand, denied the accusation against him. He, instead,
claimed that the accusation was a result of the insecurity felt by some members of
the cooperative and of the Board because of his growing popularity owing to his
exemplary record as an employee. Thelma executed an affidavit likewise denying
the allegations of extra-marital affair.
Meanwhile, on June 7, 1997, the Board received a petition from about fifty
members of the cooperative asking the relief of respondent due to his illicit affair
with Thelma.
On the day of the hearing, respondent requested for postponement on the ground
that his lawyer was not available. The request was, however, denied and the
hearing proceeded as scheduled.
On April 30, 1998, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed respondent complaint for lack
of merit. The LA concluded that respondent had been or might still be carrying on
an affair with a married woman. The LA found it unforgiving in the case of a married
employee who sleeps with or has illicit relations with another married person for
in such case, the employee sullies not only the reputation of his spouse and his
family but the reputation as well of the spouse of his paramour and the latter
family. As opposed to respondent claim that the accusation is a mere fabrication of
some of the directors or cooperative members who were allegedly envious of his
growing popularity, the LA gave more credence to the testimonies of petitioner
witnesses who were relatives of Thelma and who had no motive to falsely testify
because their family reputation was likewise at a risk of being tarnished. The LA,
thus, found respondent to have been validly dismissed from employment for
violation of the cooperative Personnel Policy. The LA also found no violation of
respondent right to due process as he was given ample opportunity to defend
himself from the accusation against him.
On appeal, the NLRC set aside the LA decision. The NLRC found petitioner Personnel
Policy to be of questionable existence and validity because it was unnumbered. It
held that even assuming that respondent had an extra-marital affair with a married
woman, the latter is not his fellow worker in petitioner business establishment. It,
thus, concluded that respondent dismissal was not founded on any of the just
causes for termination of employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as
amended.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, but it failed to obtain a favorable decision.
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari
insisting on the validity of respondent dismissal from employment.
HELD:
The existence of the Personnel Policy containing provisions on the grounds for
termination of employees was not questioned by respondent. In his position
paper, respondent only assailed the effectivity of the policy, as for him as it was
amended on the same date as the letter-complaints against him. In other words,
he claimed that the policy was amended in order to include therein the ground
for his termination to make sure that he is removed from his position.
There is also no reason to doubt the statement of Melanie Gao-ay, the wife of
Napoleon, who witnessed the embarrassing "encounter", to borrow the term she
used, between [respondent] and Thelma in her own boarding house.
The next question is whether procedural due process was observed in the
termination of respondent services. "Before the services of an employee can be
validly terminated, the employer must furnish him two written notices: (a) a
written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving the employee reasonable opportunity to explain his side;
and (b) a written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that
upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to
justify his termination. "The employer must inform the employee of the charges
against him and to hear his defenses. A full adversarial proceeding is not necessary
as the parties may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position
papers, memorandum or oral argument.
GRANTED
Lovers' fight outside workplace - serious misconduct? NO.
FACTS:
Petitioner and Ma. Dulcena Lim were lovers and also both employee Bristol-Myers Squibb.
Sometime, after a meeting, Lagrosas saw Lim rode with another guy Menquito. Due to jealousy,
petitioner approached them and hit Menquito with a metal steering wheel lock. When Lim tried
to intervene, Lagrosas accidentally hit her head.
In violation of the Code of Discipline for Territory Managers, Bristol-Myers dismissed Lagrosas.
Lagrosas then filed a complaint illegal dismissal, non-payment of vacation and sick leave benefits,
13th month pay, attorneys fees, damages and fair market value of his Team Share Stock Option
Grant.
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) set aside the Decision of Labor Arbiter. It held that
Lagrosas was validly dismissed for serious misconduct in hitting his co-employee and another
person with a metal steering wheel lock.
NLRC issued a Resolution reversing its earlier ruling. It ratiocinated that the incident was not
work-related since it occurred only after the district meeting of territory managers.
The appellate court considered the misconduct as having been committed in connection with
Lagrosas duty as Territory Manager since it occurred immediately after the district meeting of
territory managers. It also held that the gravity and seriousness of the misconduct cannot be
denied.
HELD:
Tested against the foregoing standards, it is clear that Lagrosas was not guilty of serious
misconduct. It may be that the injury sustained by Lim was serious since it rendered her
unconscious and caused her to suffer cerebral contusion that necessitated hospitalization for
several days. But we fail to see how such misconduct could be characterized as work-related and
reflective of Lagrosas unfitness to continue working for Bristol-Myers.
Although we have recognized that fighting within company premises may constitute serious
misconduct, we have also held that not every fight within company premises in which an
employee is involved would automatically warrant dismissal from service. More so, in this case
where the incident occurred outside of company premises and office hours and not intentionally
directed against a co-employee, as hereafter explained.
First, the incident occurred outside of company premises and after office hours since the district
meeting of territory managers which Lim attended at McDonalds had long been finished.
McDonalds may be considered an extension of Bristol-Myers office and any business conducted
therein as within office hours, but the moment the district meeting was concluded, that ceased
too. When Lim dined with her friends, it was no longer part of the district meeting and considered
official time. Thus, when Lagrosas assaulted Lim and Menquito upon their return, it was no longer
within company premises and during office hours. Second, Bristol-Myers itself admitted that
Lagrosas intended to hit Menquito only. In the Memorandum dated March 23, 2000, it was stated
that You got out from your car holding an umbrella steering wheel lock and proceeded to hit Mr.
Menquito. Dulce tried to intervene, but you accidentally hit her on the head, knocking her
unconscious. Indeed, the misconduct was not directed against a co-employee who unfortunately
got hit in the process. Third, Lagrosas was not performing official work at the time of the incident.
He was not even a participant in the district meeting. Hence, we fail to see how his action could
have reflected his unfitness to continue working for Bristol-Myers.
In light of Bristol-Myers failure to adduce substantial evidence to prove that Lagrosas was guilty
of serious misconduct, it cannot use this ground to justify his dismissal. Thus, the dismissal of
Lagrosas employment was without factual and legal basis.
Chua-Qua vs. Hon. Jacobo C. Clave, et al.,
G .R . N o . L-49549, August 30, 1990
Facts:
Evelyn had been employed in an educational institution in Bacolod City as a teacher since 1963
and, in 1976 when this dispute arose, was the class adviser in the sixth grade where one Bobby
was enrolled. The teacher and the student (about half the teacher's age) fell in love and
eventually got married in accordance with the rites of their religion.
On February 4, 1976, private respondent (school) filed with the sub-regional office of the
Department of Labor at Bacolod City an application for clearance to terminate the employment
of petitioner on the ground that her "abusive and unethical conduct (is) unbecoming of a
dignified school teacher and that her continued employment is inimical to the best interest, and
would downgrade the high moral values, of the school.
ISSUES:
1. WON teacher falling in love with students are immoral.
2. WON Reinstatement is possible.
HELD:
1.
Teacher falling in love with student, not immoral.
Even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no direct evidence to show that immoral acts
were committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he concluded that "it is
however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired during
those times." In reversing his decision, the National Labor Relations Commission observed that
the assertions of immoral acts or conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct evidence to
support such claim.
With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows
that the alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis.
Private respondent (school) utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position
to court her student. If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity of their ages and
academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own
which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not
to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage
from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.
It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and educating
children is being unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of petitioner. This policy,
however, is not at odds with and should not be capitalized on to defeat the security of tenure
granted by the Constitution to labor. In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid
cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in
a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
2.
Reinstatement, not possible.
The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as
unwarranted and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the relationship between petitioner
and private respondent has been inevitably and severely strained, we believe that it would
neither be to the interest of the parties nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering
her reinstatement.
Cheryll S. Leus v. St. Scholasticas College Westgrove
Jan 28, 2015
(Pregnant teacher in catholic school - not immoral or disgraceful conduct; both free and
consenting adults from purely public and secular view of morality).
a.) totality of circumstances surrounding the conduct; and
b.) Assessment of the circumstances with the prevailing norms of conduct i.e. what society
considers moral and respectable.
FACTS:
Cheryll was hired by St. Scholasticas College Westgrove (SSCW) as an Assistant to SSCWs
Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate on May 2001. Sometime in
2003, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When SSCW learned of
the petitioners pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao), SSCWs Directress, advised her to
file a resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao
that she would not resign from her employment just because she got pregnant without the
benefit of marriage.
On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she
should not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a
result thereof, which amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee
of a Catholic school.
Cheryll replied stating that her pregnancy outside of wedlock does not amount to serious
misconduct. She thereafter requested a copy of SSCWs policy so that she can better respond to
the charge against her. SSCW did not a have these guidelines as the guidelines handbook was
currently pending of its promulgation. It instead stated that they follow the 1992 Manual of
Regulations for Private School (1992 MRPS), specifically, Sec.94, which cites disgraceful or
immoral conduct" as a ground for dismissal, in addition to the just causes for termination of
employment under Art.282, Labor Code.
The Labor Arbiter in Quezon City decided in favor of SSCW, stating that Cheryll being pregnant
out of wedlock is considered disgraceful and immoral conduct taking into account that she was
employed in a Catholic institution which expect its employees to live up to the Catholic values it
teaches to the students. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE: WON Cherylls pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a valid ground to terminate her
employment.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that Cheryll was illegally dismissed by her employer. Her pregnancy out
of wedlock does not constitute a valid ground to terminate her employment.
Disgraceful conduct is viewed in two ways, the public and secular view and religious view.
Our laws concern the first view. Disgraceful conduct per se will not amount to violation of the
law the conduct must affect or poses a danger to the conditions of society, for example, the
sanctity of marriage, right to privacy and the like.
The Court cited Estrada vs. Escritur in the said case, stating the following relevant explanation;
(1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not ordinarily administratively
liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct. It may be a not-so-ideal situation and may cause
complications for both mother and child but it does not give cause for administrative sanction.
There is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother under those circumstances by reason of her
sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons.
Neither does the situation contravene any fundamental state policy as expressed in the
Constitution, a document that accommodates various belief systems irrespective of dogmatic
origins.
(2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to a woman other than the
mother, then there is a cause for administrative sanction against either the father or the mother.
In such a case, the disgraceful and immoral conduct consists of having extramarital relations
with a married person. The sanctity of marriage is constitutionally recognized and likewise
affirmed by our statutes as a special contract of permanent union. Accordingly, judicial employees
have been sanctioned for their dalliances with married persons or for their own betrayals of the
marital vow of fidelity. In this case, it was not disputed that, like respondent, the father of her
child was unmarried. Therefore, respondent cannot be held liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct simply because she gave birth to the child Christian Jeon out of wedlock.
Furthermore, there was no substantial evidence to prove that Cherylls pregnancy out of
wedlock caused grave scandal to SSCW and its students. Mere allegation of such will not render
a judgment in favor of the one making the allegation. It is the burden of the employer to prove
by substantial evidence that the termination of the employment of the employee was made and
failure to discharge that duty would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal.
The Court ordered SSCW to reinstate Cheryll. But because this is not possible anymore due to
constrained relations with SSCW, the Court ordered the employer to pay Cheryll separation pay,
full backwages and attorneys fees.
Christine Joy Cadiz v. Brent Hospital ( G.R. 187417, Feb. 24, 2016)
FACTS:
Petitioner was the human resource officer of respondent Brent Hospital and
Colleges Inc. (Brent). She became pregnant out of wedlock. Consequently, Brent
placed her under an indefinite suspension from employment. Brent imposed on
her the condition that she subsequently contract marriage with her then
boyfriend for her to be reinstated.
According to Brent, this is in consonance with the policy against encouraging illicit
or common-law relations that would subvert the sacrament of marriage.
RULING:
No. Statutory law is replete with legislation protecting labor and promoting equal
opportunity in employment. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that the
State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
The Labor Code of the Philippines, meanwhile, provides: Art. 136. Stipulation
against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her
marriage.
With particular regard to women, Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta of
Women protects women against discrimination in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations, including the right to choose freely a spouse and to enter into
marriage only with their free and full consent. Weighed against these safeguards,
it becomes apparent that Brents condition is coercive, oppressive and
discriminatory. There is no rhyme or reason for it. It forces Cadiz to marry for
economic reasons and deprives her of the freedom to choose her status, which is
a privilege that inheres in her as an intangible and inalienable right. While a
marriage or no-marriage qualification may be justified as a bona fide occupational
qualification, Brent must prove two factors necessitating its imposition, viz:
Brent has not shown the presence of neither of these factors. Perforce, the Court
cannot uphold the validity of said condition.
Duncan Assoc. of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Wellcome Phils., Inc.
September 17, 2008
FACTS:
Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract
of employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study
and abide by the existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing
future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees
with competing drug companies and should management find that such
relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that
management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-
counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside of the company
after 6 months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an
employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition. Before getting married, Tecson's District
Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took
place in Sept. 1998.
In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of intrest. Tecson asked
for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign from their
respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson
to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request against
transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee
and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines
Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid.
On Equal Protection
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies, and other confidential programs and information from competitors. The
prohibition against pesonal or marital relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. That
Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied.
It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are
addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily,
it has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal
protection clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct, however,
discriminatory or wrongful.
The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee
to comply with the policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an
impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
On Constructive Dismissal
HELD:
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman
specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November
21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity
leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who
went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to
August 8, 1991.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate
the services of an employee.
HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly
prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is
recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from
hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in
those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all
women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses
clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the
companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the
company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As
stated in the labor code:
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against
marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good
morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status,
a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable
right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and
purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as
the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect,
disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws
of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.
Star Paper Corp. v. Simbol
April 12, 2006
FACTS:
Respondents (complainant employees) were hired after they were found fit for the
job, but were asked to resign when they each married co-employees. They resisted
and assailed the alleged company policy.
The employer contends that its policy will apply only when one employee marries a
co-employee, but employees remain free to marry persons other than co-employees.
HELD: NO.
The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code, but it
creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way
it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the
discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of [the employer] to
prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot
prejudice the employee's right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon
stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.
FACTS:
An international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere
to the weight standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166
pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew
Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an
extended vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once
he lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on leave
without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight,
petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL
decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies
with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for
weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report
for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of
weight check dates, which he did not report to.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability
to attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost leniency extended to him
which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years, his services
were considered terminated effective immediately.
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of
the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be
complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the
performance of his duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally
dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards.
It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for
purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.
HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than
that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the
job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor
Code.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that
obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly
shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude,
determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on
December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that [t]he issue is could I bring my
weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of
the company physician, per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his
work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the
Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be
unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it,
[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the
employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This
element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the
nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized
just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in
Article 282(a), (c), and (d).
NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational
qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons
of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that
sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The
qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the
test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ.
BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely
transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the
aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms
of discipline upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin
crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of
social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious
misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 174184 January 28, 2015
G.J.T. REBUILDERS MACHINE SHOP, GODO FREDO TRILLANA, and
JULIANA TRILLANA, Petitioners,
vs.
RICARDO AMBOS, BENJAMIN PUTIAN, and RUSSELL AMBOS,
Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
To prove serious business losses, employers must present in evidence
financial statements showing the net losses suffered by the business within
a sufficient period of time. Generally, it cannot be based on a single financial
statement showing losses. Absent this proof, employers closing their
businesses must pay the dismissed employees separation pay equivalent to
one-month pay or to at least one-half-month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the Court of Appeals' Decision,2
granting Ricardo Ambos, Russell Ambos,3 and Benjamin Putian's Petition for
Certiorari. The Court of Appeals found that G.J.T. Rebuilders Machine Shop
(G.J.T. Rebuilders) failed to prove its alleged serious business losses. Thus,
when it closed its establishment on December 15, 1997, G.J.T. Rebuilders
should have paid the affected employees separation pay.4
G.J.T. Rebuilders rented space in the Far East Asia (FEA) Building in Shaw
Boulevard, Mandaluyong City, which served as the site of its machine shop.
On September 8, 1996, a fire partially destroyed the FEA Building.6
Due to the damage sustained by the building, its owner notified its tenants to
vacate their rented units by the end of September 1996 "to avoid any
unforeseen accidents which may arise due to the damage."7
Despite the building owners notice to vacate, G.J.T. Rebuilders continued
its business in the condemned building. When the building owner finally
refused to accommodate it, G.J.T. Rebuilders left its rented space and closed
the machine shop on December 15, 1997.8 It then filed an Affidavit of Closure
before the Department of Labor and Employment on February 16, 1998 and
a sworn application to retire its business operations before the Mandaluyong
City Treasurers Office on February 25, 1998.9
In their defense, G.J.T. Rebuilders and the Trillana spouses argued that
G.J.T. Rebuilders suffered serious business losses and financial reverses,
forcing it to close its machine shop. Therefore, Ricardo, Russell, and
Benjamin were not entitled to separation pay.11
Labor Arbiter Facundo L. Leda (Labor Arbiter Leda) decided the Complaint,
finding no convincing proof of G.J.T. Rebuilders alleged serious business
losses. Labor Arbiter Leda, in the Decision12 dated December 28, 1999, found
that Ricardo, Russell, and Benjamin were entitled to separation pay under
Article 283 of the Labor Code.13 In addition, they were awarded attorneys
fees, having been constrained to litigate their claims.14
Even assuming that G.J.T. Rebuilders closure was due to serious business
losses, Labor Arbiter Leda held that the employees affected were still entitled
to separation pay "based on social justice and equity."15
G.J.T. Rebuilders and the Trillana spouses appealed Labor Arbiter Ledas
Decision before the National Labor Relations Commission.16
In contrast with the Labor Arbiters finding, the National Labor Relations
Commission found G.J.T. Rebuilders to have suffered serious business
losses. Because of the fire that destroyed the building where G.J.T.
Rebuilders was renting space, the demand for its services allegedly declined
as "no same customer would dare to entrust machine works to be done for
them in a machine shop lying in a ruined and condemned building."17 The
National Labor Relations Commission then concluded that the fire
"proximately caused"18 G.J.T. Rebuilders serious business losses, with its
financial statement for the fiscal year 1997 showing a net loss of
316,210.00.19
In the Decision20 dated January 25, 2001, the National Labor Relations
Commission vacated and set aside Labor Arbiter Ledas Decision and
dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. Since the Commission found
that G.J.T. Rebuilders ceased operations due to serious business losses, it
held that G.J.T. Rebuilders and the Trillana spouses need not pay Ricardo,
Russell, and Benjamin separation pay.
Ricardo, Russell, and Benjamin filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the
National Labor Relations Commission denied in the Resolution21 dated March
5, 2001.
In the Decision25 dated January 17, 2006, the Court of Appeals granted the
Petition for Certiorari, vacating and setting aside the National Labor
Relations Commissions Decision. It reinstated Labor Arbiter Ledas Decision
dated December 28, 1999.
Petitioners G.J.T. Rebuilders and the Trillana spouses filed before this court
a Petition for Review on Certiorari.27 Respondents Ricardo, Russell, and
Benjamin commented28 on the Petition, after which petitioners filed a Reply.29
In their Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners maintain that G.J.T.
Rebuilders suffered serious business losses as evidenced by its financial
statement covering the years 1996 and 1997. Petitioners admit that the
financial statement was belatedly subscribed under oath.30 Nevertheless,
"the credibility or veracity of the entries"31 in the financial statement was not
affected since the Bureau of Internal Revenue received the same
unsubscribed financial statement when G.J.T. Rebuilders allegedly filed its
income tax return on April 15, 1998.32
As for respondents, they contend that G.J.T. Rebuilders failed to prove its
alleged serious business losses. They argue that the financial statement
showing a net loss for the year 1997 was not credible, having been belatedly
subscribed under oath by the Certified Public Accountant who prepared it.33
With no credible proof of G.J.T. Rebuilders supposed serious business
losses, respondents argue that petitioners must pay them separation pay
under Article 283 of the Labor Code.34
The issue for our resolution is whether petitioners sufficiently proved that
G.J.T. Rebuilders suffered from serious business losses.
I
G.J.T. Rebuilders must pay respondents their separation pay for failure to
prove its alleged serious business losses
Footnotes
* Designated acting member per S. 0. No. 1910 dated January 12, 2015.
2 Id. at 1824. The Decision dated January 17, 2006 was penned by
5 Id. at 19.
6 Id. at 29.
7 Id.
10 Id. at 19.
11
Id. at 1920.
12 Id. at 3643.
13 Id. at 3940. This Article was renumbered to Article 297 by Rep. Act No.
15 Id. at 40, citing Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 266 Phil. 770, 780 (1990) [Per J. Medialdea,
First Division] and International Hardware, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission (Third Division), 257 Phil. 261 (1989) [Per J. Gancayco, First
Division].
16 Id. at 44.
17 Id. at 50.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 72.
20 Id. at 4153.
21 Id. at 5455.
23 Id. at 2122.
24 Id. at 22.
25 Id. at 1824.
26 Id. at 2628.
27 Id. at 316.
28 Id. at 6066.
29 Id. at 7076.
30 Id. at 9.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 910.
33 Id. at 6364.
34 Id. at 63.
35 Eastridge Golf Club, Inc. v. Eastridge Golf Club, Inc., Labor Union-Super,
et al., 585 Phil. 88, 101 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
36 Mac Adams Metal Engineering Workers Union-Independent v. Mac Adams
Metal Engineering, 460 Phil. 583, 590 (2003) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
37 Id.
39
Id. at 590.
40 LABOR CODE, art. 283, now renumbered to art. 297 by Rep. Act No.
10151.
41 Indino v. NLRC (Second Division), 258 Phil. 792, 800 (1989) [Per J.
01, August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 179, 186 [Per J. Feliciano, Third Division].
43 Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing & Redrying Corp. v. NLRC, 360 Phil. 218,
Division].
46 325 Phil. 202 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
47 Id. at 205.
48 Id. at 212.
50 Id. at 501.
51 Id. at 509.
53 Id. at 157.
Olalia, G.R. No. 173154, December 9, 2013, 711 SCRA 618, 627629 [Per
J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
56 Rollo, p. 13.
57 Id. at 35.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68
Id.
69 Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. v. Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. Employees Union-
Olalia, G.R. No. 173154, December 9, 2013, 711 SCRA 618, 627 [Per J.
Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 628.
192571, July 23, 2013, 701 SCRA 682, 715 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En
Banc].
74 Id.
75 G.R. No. 173154, December 9, 2013, 711 SCRA 618 [Per J. Perlas-
Olalia, G.R. No. 173154, December 9, 2013, 711 SCRA 618, 630 [Per J.
Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
80 Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corporation, G.R. No. 193494,
82 LABOR CODE, art. 111(1) provides: Art. 111. Attorneys fees. (1) In
Division].
85
Rollo, p. 42.
86 Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corporation, G.R. No. 193494,