The union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, Finding their computation to be in order, the

er, the NLRC awarded to petitioners

1. G.R. No. 160073 October 24, 2005
ABUNDIO BARAYOGA and BISUDECO-PHILSUCOR CORFARM
WORKERS UNION (PACIWU CHAP-TPC),Petitioners,
vs.
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST,* Respondent.
Responsibility for the liabilities of a mortgagor towards its
employees cannot be transferred via an auction sale to a purchaser
who is also the mortgagee-creditor of the foreclosed assets and
chattels.
FACTS:
The Facts
"Bisudeco-Philsucor Corfarm Workers Union is composed of workers of
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO), a sugar
plantation mill located in Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur.
Asset Privatization Trust (APT), a public trust was created under
Proclamation No. 50, as amended, mandated to take title to and
possession of, conserve, provisionally manage and dispose of non-
performing assets of the Philippine government identified for privatization
or disposition.
"Pursuant to Section 23 of Proclamation No. 50, former President
Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 14 identifying certain
assets of government institutions that were to be transferred to the
National Government. Among the assets transferred was the financial
claim of the Philippine National Bank against BISUDECO in the form of a
secured loan. Consequently, by virtue of a Trust Agreement executed
between the National Government and APT, APT was constituted as
trustee over BISUDECOs account with the PNB.
illegal deduction and underpayment of wages and other labor standard their money claims for underpayment, labor-standard benefits, and
benefits plus damages. ECOLA. It also awarded them their back wages, computed at the
prevailing minimum wage, for the period May 1, 1991 (the date of their
illegal dismissal) until October 30, 1992 (the sale of BISUDECO assets to
"In the meantime, APTs Board of Trustees issued a resolution accepting
the BAPCI). On the other hand, the NLRC ruled that petitioners were not
the offer of Bicol-Agro-Industrial Cooperative (BAPCI) to buy the sugar
entitled to separation pay because of the huge business losses incurred
plantation and mill. Again, the board passed another resolution
by BISUDECO, which had resulted in its bankruptcy.
authorizing the payment of separation benefits to BISUDECOs
employees in the event of the companys privatization. BAPCI purchased
the foreclosed assets of BISUDECO from APT and took over its sugar Respondent sought relief from the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under
milling operations under the trade name Peafrancia Sugar Mill Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
(Pensumil).
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The union filed a similar complaint, later to be consolidated with its earlier
complaint and it filed an amended complaint, impleading as additional
The CA ruled that APT should not be held liable for petitioners claims for
party respondents APT and Pensumil.
unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, illegal deduction and
underpayment of wages, as well as other labor-standard benefits plus
"In their Position Paper, the union alleged that when Philsucor initially damages. As found by the NLRC, APT was not the employer of
took over the operations of the company, it retained BISUDECOs petitioners, but was impleaded only for possessing BISUDECOs
existing personnel under the same terms and conditions of employment. mortgaged properties as trustee and, later, as the highest bidder in the
Nonetheless, at the start of the season sometime in May 1991, Philsucor foreclosure sale of those assets.
started recalling workers back to work, to the exception of the union
members. Management told them that they will be re-hired only if they
Citing Batong Buhay Gold Mines v. Dela Serna,8 the CA concluded that
resign from the union. Just the same, thereafter, the company started to
petitioners claims could not be enforced against APT as mortgagee of
employ the services of outsiders under the pakyaw system.
the foreclosed properties of BISUDECO.
"BISUDECO, Pensumil and APT all interposed the defense of lack of
Issue:
employer-employee relationship.
WON APT is liable for petitioners monetary claims.
LA:
HELD: NO
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent APT is hereby ordered
to pay herein complainants of the mandated employment benefits
provided for under Section 27 of Proclamation No. 50 which benefits had It should be stressed at the outset that, pursuant to Administrative Order
been earlier extended to other employees similarly situated. No. 14, Series of 1987,11 PNBs assets, loans and receivables from its
borrowers were transferred to APT as trustee of the national government.
Among the liabilities transferred to APT was PNBs financial claim against
"Both the union and APT elevated the labor arbiters decision before
BISUDECO, not the latters assets and chattel.
NLRC."

Contrary to petitioners assertions, BISUDECO remained the owner of

"Sometime later, BISUDECO contracted the services of Philippine Sugar
Corporation (Philsucor) to take over the management of the sugar
plantation and milling operations until August 31, 1992.
"Meanwhile, because of the continued failure of BISUDECO to pay its
outstanding loan with PNB, its mortgaged properties were foreclosed and
subsequently sold in a public auction to APT, as the sole bidder. APT
was issued a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale.
NLRC:
The NLRC affirmed APTs liability for petitioners money claims. While no
employer-employee relationship existed between members of the
petitioner union and APT, at the time of the employees illegal dismissal,
the assets of BISUDECO had been transferred to the national
government through APT. Moreover, the NLRC held that APT should
have treated petitioners claim as a lien on the assets of BISUDECO. The
Commission opined that APT should have done so, considering its
awareness of the pending complaint of petitioners at the time BISUDECO
sold its assets to BAPCI, and APT started paying separation pay to the
workers.
the mortgaged properties in August 1988, when the Philippine Sugar
Corporation (Philsucor) undertook the operation and management of the
sugar plantation until August 31, 1992, under a so-called Contract of
Lease between the two corporations. At the time, APT was merely a
secured creditor of BISUDECO.
It was only in April 1991 that APT foreclosed the assets and chattels of
BISUDECO because of the latters continued failure to pay outstanding
loan obligations to PNB/APT. The properties were sold at public auction
to APT, the highest bidder, as indicated in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale
issued on April 2, 1991. It was only in September 1992 (after the
expiration of the lease/management Contract with Philsucor in August
1
1992), however, when APT took over BISUDECO assets, preparatory to
the latters privatization.
In the present case, petitioner-unions members who were not recalled to
work by Philsucor in May 1991 seek to hold APT liable for their monetary
claims and allegedly illegal dismissal. Significantly, prior to the actual sale
of BISUDECO assets to BAPCI on October 30, 1992, the APT board of
trustees had approved a Resolution on September 23, 1992. The
Resolution authorized the payment of separation benefits to the
employees of the corporation in the event of its privatization. Not included
in the Resolution, though, were petitioner-unions members who had not
been recalled to work in May 1991.
The question now before the Court is whether APT is liable to pay
petitioners monetary claims, including back wages from May 1, 1991, to
October 30, 1992 (the date of the sale of BISUDECO assets to BAPCI).
We rule in the negative. The duties and liabilities of BISUDECO,
including its monetary liabilities to its employees, were not all
automatically assumed by APT as purchaser of the foreclosed
properties at the auction sale. Any assumption of liability must be
specifically and categorically agreed upon.
In Sundowner Development Corp. v. Drilon,13 the Court ruled that,
unless expressly assumed, labor contracts like collective bargaining
agreements are not enforceable against the transferee of an enterprise.
Labor contracts are in personam and thus binding only between the
parties.
No succession of employment rights and obligations can be said to have
taken place between the two. Between the employees of BISUDECO and
APT, there is no privity of contract that would make the latter a substitute
employer that should be burdened with the obligations of the corporation.
To rule otherwise would result in unduly imposing upon APT an
unwarranted assumption of accounts not contemplated in Proclamation
No. 50 or in the Deed of Transfer between the national government and
PNB.
Furthermore, under the principle of absorption, a bona fide buyer or
transferee of all, or substantially all, the properties of the seller or
transferor is not obliged to absorb the latters employees. 14 The most that
the purchasing company may do, for reasons of public policy and social
justice, is to give preference of reemployment to the selling companys
qualified separated employees, who in its judgment are necessary to the
continued operation of the business establishment.
In any event, the national government (in whose trust APT previously
held the mortgage credits of BISUDECO) is not the employer of
petitioner-unions members, who had been dismissed sometime in May
1991, even before APT took over the assets of the corporation. Hence,
under existing law and jurisprudence, there is no reason to expect any
kind of bailout by the national government.16 Even the NLRC found that
no employer-employee relationship existed between APT and petitioners.
Thus, the Commission gravely abused its discretion in nevertheless
holding that APT, as the transferee of the assets of BISUDECO, was
liable to petitioners.
Petitioners also contend that in Central Azucarera del Danao v. Court of
Appeals,17 this Court supposedly ruled that the "sale of a business of a
going concern does not ipso facto terminate the employer-employee
relations insofar as the successor-employer is concerned, and that
change of ownership or management of an establishment or company is
not one of the just causes provided by law for termination of
employment[.]"
A careful reading of the Courts Decision in that case plainly shows that it
does not contain the words quoted by counsel for petitioners. At this
juncture, we admonish their counsel19 of his bounden duty as an officer of
the Court to refrain from misquoting or misrepresenting the text of its
decisions.20 Ever present is the danger that, if not faithfully and exactly
quoted, they may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment
of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled.21
In that case, contrary to the assertions of petitioners, the Court held as
follows:
"There can be no controversy for it is a principle well-recognized, that it is
within the employers legitimate sphere of management control of the
business to adopt economic policies or make some changes or
adjustments in their organization or operations that would insure profit to
itself or protect the investment of its stockholders. As in the exercise of
such management prerogative, the employer may merge or consolidate
its business with another, or sell or dispose all or substantially all of its
assets and properties which may bring about the dismissal or termination
of its employees in the process. Such dismissal or termination should not
however be interpreted in such a manner as to permit the employer to
escape payment of termination pay. x x x.
"In a number of cases on this point, the rule has been laid down that the
sale or disposition must be motivated by good faith as an element of
exemption from liability. Indeed, an innocent transferee of a business
establishment has no liability to the employees of the transferor to
continue employing them. Nor is the transferee liable for past unfair labor
practices of the previous owner, except, when the liability therefor is
assumed by the new employer under the contract of sale, or when liability
arises because of the new owners participation in thwarting or defeating
the rights of the employees."22 (Citations omitted.)
In other words, the liabilities of the previous owner to its employees
are not enforceable against the buyer or transferee, unless
(1) the latter unequivocally assumes them; or
(2) the sale or transfer was made in bad faith.
Thus, APT cannot be held responsible for the monetary claims of
petitioners who had been dismissed even before it actually took over
BISUDECOs assets.
Moreover, it should be remembered that APT merely became a
transferee of BISUDECOs assets for purposes of conservation because
of its lien on those assets -- a lien it assumed as assignee of the loan
secured by the corporation from PNB. Subsequently, APT, as the highest
bidder in the auction sale, acquired ownership of the foreclosed
properties.
Relevant to this transfer of assets is Article 110 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6715, which reads:
"Article 110. Workers preference in case of bankruptcy. In the
event of bankruptcy or liquidation of the employers business, his workers
shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid wages and other
monetary claims shall be paid in full before the claims of the Government
and other creditors may be paid."
This Court has ruled in a long line of cases that under Articles 2241 and
2242 of the Civil Code, a mortgage credit is a special preferred credit
that enjoys preference with respect to a specific/determinate
property of the debtor. On the other hand, the workers preference
under Article 110 of the Labor Code is an ordinary preferred credit.
While this provision raises the workers money claim to first priority in the
order of preference established under Article 2244 of the Civil Code, the
claim has no preference over special preferred credits.
Thus, the right of employees to be paid benefits due them from the
properties of their employer cannot have any preference over the latters
mortgage credit. In other words, being a mortgage credit, APTs lien on
BISUDECOs mortgaged assets is a special preferred lien that must be
satisfied first before the claims of the workers.
Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC25 explained the rationale of
this ruling as follows:
"x x x. A preference applies only to claims which do not attach to specific
properties. A lien creates a charge on a particular property. The right of
first preference as regards unpaid wages recognized by Article 110 does
not constitute a lien on the property of the insolvent debtor in favor of
workers. It is but a preference of credit in their favor, a preference in
application. It is a method adopted to determine and specify the order in
which credits should be paid in the final distribution of the proceeds of the
insolvents assets. It is a right to a first preference in the discharge of the
funds of the judgment debtor. x x x"
Furthermore, workers claims for unpaid wages and monetary benefits
cannot be paid outside of a bankruptcy or judicial liquidation proceedings
against the employer. It is settled that the application of Article 110 of the
Labor Code is contingent upon the institution of those proceedings,
2
during which all creditors are convened, their claims ascertained and
inventoried, and their preferences determined.27 Assured thereby is an
orderly determination of the preference given to creditors claims; and
preserved in harmony is the legal scheme of classification, concurrence
and preference of credits in the Civil Code, the Insolvency Law, and the
Labor Code.
2. G.R. No. 153192 January 30, 2009
DEALCO FARMS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th DIVISION),
CHIQUITO BASTIDA, and ALBERT CABAN,Respondents.
Facts:
DEALCO is a corporation engaged in the business of importation,
production, fattening and distribution of live cattle for sale to meat
dealers, meat traders, meat processors, canned good manufacturers and
other dealers in Mindanao and in Metro Manila. It imports cattle by the
boatload from Australia into the ports of General Santos City, Subic,
Batangas, or Manila. In turn, these imported cattle are transported to, and
housed in, petitioners farms in Polomolok, South Cotabato, or in
Magalang, Pampanga, for fattening until the cattle individually reach the
market weight of 430 to 450 kilograms.
Respondents were hired by petitioner on June 25, 1993 and October 29,
1994, respectively, as escorts or "comboys" for the transit of live cattle
from General Santos City to Manila. Respondents work entailed tending
to the cattle during transportation. It included feeding and frequently
showering the cattle to prevent dehydration and to develop heat
resistance. On the whole, respondents ensured that the cattle would be
safe from harm or death caused by a cattle fight or any such similar
incident.
Upon arrival in Manila, the cattle are turned over to and received by the
duly acknowledged buyers or customers of petitioner, at which point,
respondents work ceases.
For every round trip travel for 12 days, respondents were each
paid P1,500.00. The 12-day period is occasionally extended when
petitioners customers are delayed in receiving the cattle. In a month,
respondents usually made two trips.
Respondents Bastida and Caban, together with Ramon Maquinsay and
Roland Parrocha, filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for
separation pay with full backwages, salary differentials, service incentive
leave pay, 13th month pay, damages, and attorneys fees against
petitioners. Although the four complainants collectively filed a case
against petitioner, Maquinsay and Parrocha never appeared in any of the
conferences and/or hearings before the Labor Arbiter. Neither did they
sign the verification page of complainants position paper. Most
importantly, Maquinsay and Parrocha executed affidavits in favor of
petitioner praying for the dismissal of the complaint insofar as they were
concerned.
Respondents were told by a Jimmy Valenzuela, a hepe de viaje, that he
had been instructed by Ramis to immediately effect their replacement.
Valenzuela proffered no reason for respondents replacement.
Respondents repeated attempts to see and meet with Ramis, as well as
to write Alcoriza, proved futile, compelling them to file an illegal dismissal
case against petitioner and its officers.
In all, respondents alleged in their position paper that: (1) they were
illegally dismissed, as they never violated any of petitioners company
rules and policies; (2) their dismissal was not due to any just or
authorized cause; and (3) petitioner did not observe due process in
effecting their dismissal, failing to give them written notice thereof. Thus,
respondents prayed for money claims, i.e., salary differentials, service
incentive leave pay, cost of living allowance (COLA) and 13th month pay.
Petitioner asserts that the finished cattle are sold to traders and
middlemen who undertake transportation to Manila for distribution to the
wet markets. In fact, according to petitioner, the buyers and end-users of
their finished cattle actually purchase the cattle as soon as they are
considered ready for the market. Petitioner claims that once the finished
cattle are bought by the buyers, these buyers act separately from, and
independently of, petitioners business. In this regard, the buyers
themselves arrange, through local representatives, for the (a) hauling
from petitioners farm to the port area; (b) shipment of the finished cattle
to Manila; and (c) escort or "comboy" services to feed and water the
cattle during transit.
Petitioner relates only one instance when it engaged the services of
respondents as "comboys." Petitioner maintains that their arrangement
with respondents was only on a "per-trip" or "per-contract" basis to escort
cattle to Manila which contemplated the cessation of the engagement
upon return of the ship to the port of origin.
Petitioner further narrates that sometime in 1998, and well into 1999, its
import of cattle from Australia substantially decreased due to the
devalued dollar. Consequently, petitioner was forced to downsize, and
the sale and shipments to Manila were drastically reduced. Thus,
petitioner and/or its buyers no longer retained escort or "comboy"
services.
Petitioner denies the existence of an employer-employee
relationship with respondents. Petitioner posits that: (a) respondents
are independent contractors who offer "comboy" services to various
shippers and traders of cattle, not only to petitioner; (b) in the
performance of work on board the ship, respondents are free from the
control and supervision of the cattle owner since the latter is interested
only in the result thereof; (c) respondents can only be considered as
casual employees performing work not necessary and desirable to the
usual business or trade of petitioner and (d) respondents failed to
complete the one-year service period, whether continuous or broken, set
forth in Article 2804 of the Labor Code, as petitioners shipments were
substantially reduced in 1998-1999, thereby limiting the escort or
"comboy" activity for which respondents were employed.
The Labor Arbiter found that respondents were employees of petitioner,
thus:
[Petitioner] admits having engaged the services of [respondents] as
caretakers or "comboys" (convoys) though it qualifies that it was on a "per
trip" or "per contract" basis. It also admits paying their remuneration
of P1,500.00 per trip. It tacitly admits having terminated [respondents]
services when it said that [respondents] were among the group of escorts
who were no longer accommodated due to the decrease in volume of
imports and shipments. [Petitioner] also undoubtedly exercised control
and supervision over [respondents] work as caretakers. The preparation
of the cattle for shipment, manning and feeding them prior to and during
transit, and making a report upon return to General Santos City to tally
the records of the cattle shipped out versus cattle that actually reached
Manila are certainly all in accordance with [petitioners] instructions.
x x x [Respondents] also performed activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of [petitioner] (Art.
280, Labor Code). [Petitioners] contention, to the contrary, is erroneous.
Transporting the cattle to its main market in Manila is an essential and
component aspect of [petitioners] operation. As held by [the NLRCs]
Fifth Division in one case:
Complainants task of escorting the livestock shipped to Manila, taking
care of the livestock in transit, is an activity which is necessary and
desirable in the usual business or trade of respondent.
More, it also appears that [respondents] had rendered service for more
than one year doing the same task repeatedly, thus, even assuming they
were casual employees they may be considered regular employees with
respect to the activity in which they were employed and their employment
shall continue while such activity exists.
[Petitioners] witnesses tried to corroborate [its] contention that
[respondents] also offered their services to various shippers and traders
of cattle, not only to [petitioner]. Former complainants Maquinsay and
Parrocha mentioned the names of these traders/buyers or shippers as
Lozano Farms, Bibiana Farms and other big cattle feedlot farms in
SOCSARGEN (Annexes "A" and "E," [petitioners] position paper.) But
not a modicum of evidence was adduced to prove payment of
[respondents] services by any of these supposed traders or that
[respondents] received instructions from them.
3
Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter granted respondents claim for separation
pay, COLA and union service fees. The Labor Arbiter awarded
respondents: (a) separation pay of one month for every year of service;
(b) COLA, as petitioner failed to prove payment thereof or its exemption
therefrom; and (c) union service fees fixed at 10% of the total monetary
award. However, the Labor Arbiter denied respondents claim for
backwages, 13th month pay, salary differential, service incentive leave
pay and damages.
[Respondents] are not entitled to their claims for 13th month pay and
service incentive leave pay because they were paid on task basis. The
claim for damages is denied for lack of factual and legal basis as there is
no showing that respondent acted in bad faith in downsizing the number
of its caretakers. It even appears that the same is due to a legitimate
cause
On appeal to the NLRC, the Fifth Division affirmed the Labor Arbiters
ruling on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
the parties and the total monetary award of P41,580.00 representing
respondents separation pay, COLA and union service fees. The NLRC
declared:
The element of control, jurisprudentially considered the most essential
element of the four, has not been demolished by any evidence to the
contrary. The branch has noticed that the preparation of the shipment of
cattle, manning and feeding them while in transit, and making a report
upon their return to General Santos that the cattle shipped and which
reached Manila actually tallied were all indicators of instructions,
supervision and control by [petitioner] on [respondents] performance of
Issue: Whether or not respondents are petitioners employees.
Ruling:
[Maquinsay and Parrocha, petitioners] witnesses, tried to corroborate
[petitioners] contention that complainants also offered their services to
various shippers and traders of cattle, not only to [petitioner]. Former
complainants Maquinsay and Parrocha mentioned the names of these
traders/buyers or shippers as Lozano Farms, Bibiana Farms and other
big cattle feedlot farms in SOCSARGEN (Annexes "A" and "B",
[petitioners] position paper). But not a modicum of evidence was
adduced to prove payment of [respondents] services by any of these
supposed traders or that [respondents] received instructions from them.
There is also no record that the trader/s actually shipped livestock and
engaged the services of caretakers.16
Echoing the same observation, the NLRC declared, thus:
At this point, we emphasize the fact that even on appeal [petitioner]
decline to refute, by way of evidence, the finding of the branch that they
failed to prove the payment of [respondents] services by any of the
supposed traders, or that said traders actually shipped livestock. This is
the point where the case of NFL v. Bibiana Farms cited by [petitioner]
differ from the instant case in that bills of lading issued to, thus, in the
name of the hog shippers were submitted as proof that said shippers
engaged, compensated and supervised the escorts or convoys in their
work, and not the hog raisers.17
Yet, petitioner is adamant that its lack of documentary evidence should
not be taken against it since Maquinsay and Parrocha, two of the original
complainants, attest to the nature of a "comboys" or escorts work.
Significantly, Maquinsays and Parrochas affidavits proffer no reason
why, in the first place, they filed, along with herein respondents, the
complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. Maquinsay and Parrocha
made an absolute turnaround and retracted their previous claim of
regular employee status without proof to support their allegations as
against the claim of the remaining complainants, herein respondents.
Conveniently, for its purposes, petitioner claims that Maquinsays and
Parrochas affidavits "substantiate the claim of petitioner that indeed
shipping arrangements and accommodation of escorts, which are
informal in nature and, thus, unrecorded, are under the responsibility,
control and supervision of the buyers and traders." Essentially, petitioner
insists that the affidavits of Maquinsay and Parrocha should bear more
weight than the claims of respondents in their complaint and position
paper.
We reject petitioners self-serving contention. Having failed to
substantiate its allegation on the relationship between the parties, we
stick to the settled rule in controversies between a laborer and his master
that doubts reasonably arising from the evidence should be resolved in
the formers favor.18 The policy is reflected in no less than the
Constitution,19 Labor Code20 and Civil Code.21
Moreover, petitioners other contention that the shipment and the escort
of live cattle is not part of its business, thus, at most, respondents may
only be considered as casual employees, likewise fails to persuade.
First. Petitioner failed to disprove respondents claim that they were hired
by petitioner as "comboys" from 1993 and 1994, respectively. In fact,
petitioner admits that respondents were engaged, at one point, as
"comboys," on a "per trip" or "per contract" basis. This assertion petitioner
failed anew to substantiate. Noteworthy is the fact that Maquinsays and
Parrochas affidavit merely contain a statement that the offer of their
services as "comboys" or escorts was not limited to petitioner alone. The
affidavits simply aver that they, including herein respondents, were
engaged by Dealco on a "per trip" basis, which commenced upon
embarkation on a ship for Manila and terminated upon their return to the
port of origin. Maquinsay and Parrocha did not state that respondents
engagement by petitioner was on a one-time basis. As a result,
petitioners claim remains an unsubstantiated and bare-faced allegation.
Second. Even assuming that respondents task is not part of petitioners
regular course of business, this does not preclude their attainment of
regular employee status.
Article 280 of the Labor Code explicitly provides:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such
activity exists.22
Undoubtedly, respondents were regular employees of petitioner with
respect to the escort or "comboy" activity for which they had been
engaged since 1993 and 1994, respectively, without regard to continuity
or brokenness of the service.
Lastly, considering that we have sustained the Labor Arbiters and the
NLRCs finding of an employer-employee relationship between the
parties, we likewise sustain the administrative bodies finding of
respondents illegal dismissal. Accordingly, we are not wont to disturb the
award of separation pay, claims for COLA and union service fees fixed at
10% of the total monetary award, as these were based on the finding that
respondents were dismissed without just or authorized cause.
G.R. No. 164774 April 12, 2006
STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO &
SEBASTIAN CHUA, Petitioners,
vs.
RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E.
ESTRELLA, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation
engaged in trading principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is
its Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department while
Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director.
4
Respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia)
and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all regular employees of the
company.1
Simbol was employed by the company. He met Alma Dayrit, also an
employee of the company, whom he married. Prior to the marriage,
Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one
of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in
1995,2 viz.:
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and
another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of
their employment and then decided to get married, one of them should
resign to preserve the policy stated above.3
Simbol resigned pursuant to the company policy.4
Comia was hired by the company and met Howard Comia, a co-
employee, whom she married. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that
pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get
married, Comia then resigned.5
Estrella was hired and met Luisito Zuiga (Zuiga), also a co-worker.
Petitioners stated that Zuiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The
company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality
but she opted to resign.6
The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement.
They stated therein that they have no money and property
accountabilities in the company and that they release the latter of any
claim or demand of whatever nature.7
Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and
Comia allege that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to
resign in view of an illegal company policy. As to respondent Estrella, she
alleges that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuiga who
misrepresented himself as a married but separated man. After he got her
pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed
her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy.
She met an accident and was advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic
Hospital to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days. She returned to work but
she found out that her name was on-hold at the gate. She was denied
entry. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where one of
the staff handed her a memorandum. The memorandum stated that she
was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the
memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and
has not been given a chance to explain. The management asked her to
write an explanation. However, after submission of the explanation, she
was nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for
money, she later submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her
thirteenth month pay.8
Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive
dismissal, separation pay and attorneys fees. They averred that the
aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of
the Labor Code. They also contended that they were dismissed due to
their union membership.
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed
the complaint for lack of merit, viz.:
[T]his company policy was decreed pursuant to what the respondent
corporation perceived as management prerogative. This management
prerogative is quite broad and encompassing for it covers hiring, work
assignment, working method, time, place and manner of work, tools to be
used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers
and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.
Upon appeal of the NLRC decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the
NLRC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 31, 2002 (sic) Decision 12
of the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new one is entered as follows:
(1) Declaring illegal, the petitioners dismissal from employment and
ordering private respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the time
of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and
(2) Ordering private respondents to pay petitioners attorneys fees
amounting to 10% of the award and the cost of this suit.13
Issue: Whether or not the subject 1995 policy/regulation is violative of the
constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of
Article 136 of the Labor Code; and whether or not respondents
resignations were far from voluntary.
Ruling:
We affirm.
The 1987 Constitution15 states our policy towards the protection of labor
under the following provisions, viz.:
Article II, Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare.
xxx
Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local
and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including
the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security
of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in
the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns
on investments, and to expansion and growth.
The Civil Code likewise protects labor with the following provisions:
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor
contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are
subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes
and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and
similar subjects.
Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts
shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting
labor. The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which
provides:
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall
not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting
married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of her marriage.
Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the above provision.
Petitioners allege that its policy "may appear to be contrary to Article 136
of the Labor Code" but it assumes a new meaning if read together with
the first paragraph of the rule. The rule does not require the woman
employee to resign. The employee spouses have the right to choose who
between them should resign. Further, they are free to marry persons
other than co-employees. Hence, it is not the marital status of the
employee, per se, that is being discriminated. It is only intended to carry
out its no-employment-for-relatives-within-the-third-degree-policy which is
within the ambit of the prerogatives of management.16
5
It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from
working in the same company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism
employment policy. Companies adopt these policies to prevent the hiring
of unqualified persons based on their status as a relative, rather than
upon their ability.17 These policies focus upon the potential employment
problems arising from the perception of favoritism exhibited towards
relatives.
We note that two types of employment policies involve spouses:
policies banning only spouses from working in the same company (no-
spouse employment policies), and those banning all immediate family
members, including spouses, from working in the same company (anti-
nepotism employment policies).18
In our jurisdiction where there is no express prohibition on marital
discrimination.
In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United
States, complainants utilize two theories of employment discrimination:
the disparate treatment and the disparate impact. Under the disparate
treatment analysis, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is
discriminatory on its face. No-spouse employment policies requiring an
employee of a particular sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are
facially discriminatory. For example, an employment policy prohibiting the
employer from hiring wives of male employees, but not husbands of
female employees, is discriminatory on its face.22
On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the complainants must
prove that a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a
particular class. For example, although most employment policies do not
expressly indicate which spouse will be required to transfer or leave the
company, the policy often disproportionately affects one sex.23
The courts narrowly25 interpreting marital status to refer only to a
person's status as married, single, divorced, or widowed reason that if the
legislature intended a broader definition it would have either chosen
different language or specified its intent. They hold that the relevant
inquiry is if one is married rather than to whom one is married. They
construe marital status discrimination to include only whether a person is
single, married, divorced, or widowed and not the "identity, occupation,
and place of employment of one's spouse." These courts have upheld the
questioned policies and ruled that they did not violate the marital status
discrimination provision of their respective state statutes.
The courts that have broadly26 construed the term "marital status" rule
that it encompassed the identity, occupation and employment of one's
spouse. They strike down the no-spouse employment policies based on
the broad legislative intent of the state statute. They reason that the no-
spouse employment policy violate the marital status provision because it
arbitrarily discriminates against all spouses of present employees without
regard to the actual effect on the individual's qualifications or work
performance.27 These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy
invalid for failure of the employer to present any evidence of business
necessity other than the general perception that spouses in the same
workplace might adversely affect the business.28 They hold that the
absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification29 invalidates a
rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment
of the other spouse in the same office.30 Thus, they rule that unless the
employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business require
a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or
acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose,
an employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the
identity of the employees spouse.31 This is known as the bona fide
occupational qualification exception.
We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification
justifies an employers no-spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly
and narrowly by these state courts. There must be a compelling business
necessity for which no alternative exists other than the discriminatory
practice.32 To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer
must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2)
that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the
duties of the job.33
The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not foreign in our
jurisdiction. We employ the standard ofreasonableness of the company
policy which is parallel to the bona fide occupational qualification
requirement.
The requirement of reasonableness must be clearly established to
uphold the questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden
to prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity.
We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.
Petitioners sole contention that "the company did not just want to have
two (2) or more of its employees related between the third degree by
affinity and/or consanguinity"38 is lame. That the second paragraph was
meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule 39 is
evidently not the valid reasonable business necessity required by the law.
It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired
after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they
married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of
Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an
employee of the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business
operations. Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen
in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting
Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-
machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees
married to each other will be less efficient.
Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee
marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-
employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of
the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the
disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a
showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit
disproportionate, effect.
Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital
discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The
protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we
cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislatures silence 41 that
married persons are not protected under our Constitution and declare
valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of
petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business
necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of
management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether
respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot
and academic.
As to respondent Estrella, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their
ruling on the singular fact that her resignation letter was written in her
own handwriting. Both ruled that her resignation was voluntary and thus
valid. The respondent court failed to categorically rule whether Estrella
voluntarily resigned but ordered that she be reinstated along with Simbol
and Comia.
Estrella claims that she was pressured to submit a resignation letter
because she was in dire need of money. We examined the records of the
case and find Estrellas contention to be more in accord with the
evidence.
Estrella avers that she went back to work on December 21, 1999 but was
dismissed due to her alleged immoral conduct. At first, she did not want
to sign the termination papers but she was forced to tender her
resignation letter in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.
The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign
because she got impregnated by a married man and she could not stand
being looked upon or talked about as immoral43 is incredulous. We have
held that in voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal
reason(s) to dissociate himself from employment. It is done with the
intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of
abandonment. 44 Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a
complaint for illegal dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the
part of petitioners that the resignation was voluntary, Estrellas dismissal
is declared illegal.
6
G.R. No. 162994 September 17, 2004
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A.
TECSON, petitioners,
vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
Facts:.
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo
Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative after
Tecson had undergone training and orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates,
among others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company
rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing
drug companies and should management find that such relationship
poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an
employee is expected to inform management of any existing or future
relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees
of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of
interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the
employees employment with the company, the management and the
employee will explore the possibility of a "transfer to another department
in a non-counterchecking position" or preparation for employment outside
the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an
employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals3(Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy
was Astras Branch Coordinator. She supervised the district managers
and medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing
strategies for Astra.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from
his District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his
relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson
married Bettsy.
Tecsons superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a
conflict of interest. Tecsons superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy
should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs, although
they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because
he was performing his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against
entering into a relationship with an employee of a competitor company.
He explained that Astra, Bettsys employer, was planning to merge with They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as shown by
Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the the following circumstances: (1) he was transferred from the Camarines
redundancy package to be offered by Astra. With Bettsys separation Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales
from her company, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. area, (2) he suffered a diminution in pay, (3) he was excluded from
At the same time, they would be able to avail of the attractive redundancy attending seminars and training sessions for medical representatives,
package from Astra. and (4) he was prohibited from promoting respondents products which
were competing with Astras products.8
Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. Tecson
applied for a transfer in Glaxos milk division, thinking that since Astra did In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the company policy
not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would be prohibiting its employees from having a relationship with and/or marrying
eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxos "least- an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its
movement-possible" policy. management prerogatives and does not violate the equal protection
clause; and that Tecsons reassignment does not amount to constructive
dismissal.9
Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur
sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his
request was denied. Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of
pharmaceutical products, it has a genuine interest in ensuring that its
employees avoid any activity, relationship or interest that may conflict
Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transfer and
with their responsibilities to the company. Thus, it expects its employees
brought the matter to Glaxos Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however,
to avoid having personal or family interests in any competitor company
remained firm in its decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to
which may influence their actions and decisions and consequently
comply with the transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer order and
deprive Glaxo of legitimate profits. The policy is also aimed at preventing
continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-
a competitor company from gaining access to its secrets, procedures and
Camarines Norte sales area.
policies.10
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his
It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but
salary, but was not issued samples of products which were competing
only proscribes existing or future relationships with employees of
with similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also not included in
competitor companies, and is therefore not violative of the equal
product conferences regarding such products.
protection clause. It maintains that considering the nature of its business,
the prohibition is based on valid grounds.11
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance
machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo
According to Glaxo, Tecsons marriage to Bettsy, an employee of Astra,
offered Tecson a separation pay of one-half () month pay for every year
posed a real and potential conflict of interest. Astras products were in
of service, or a total of P50,000.00 but he declined the offer. The National
direct competition with 67% of the products sold by Glaxo. Hence,
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring
Glaxos enforcement of the foregoing policy in Tecsons case was a valid
as valid Glaxos policy on relationships between its employees and
exercise of its management prerogatives.12 In any case, Tecson was
persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right
given several months to remedy the situation, and was even encouraged
to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
not to resign but to ask his wife to resign form Astra instead. 13
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals
Issue/s: Whether or not Glaxos policy against its employees marrying
assailing the NCMB Decision.
employees from competitor companies is valid, and that said policy does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (2) Whether
On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying Tecson was constructively dismissed.
the Petition for Review . The appellate court held that Glaxos policy
prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships with
Ruling:
employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its
management prerogatives.4
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Petitioners contend that Glaxos policy against employees marrying
employees of competitor companies violates the equal protection clause The stipulation in Tecsons contract of employment with Glaxo being
of the Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions among questioned by petitioners provides:
employees on account only of marriage. They claim that the policy
restricts the employees right to marry.7
7

10. You agree to disclose to management any existing or future
relationship you may have, either by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies. Should it pose a
possible conflict of interest in management discretion, you agree to resign
voluntarily from the Company as a matter of Company policy.
17
The same contract also stipulates that Tescon agrees to abide by the
existing company rules of Glaxo, and to study and become acquainted
with such policies.18 In this regard, the Employee Handbook of Glaxo
expressly informs its employees of its rules regarding conflict of interest:
1. Conflict of Interest
Employees should avoid any activity, investment relationship, or interest
that may run counter to the responsibilities which they owe Glaxo
Wellcome.
Specifically, this means that employees are expected:
a. To avoid having personal or family interest, financial or otherwise, in
any competitor supplier or other businesses which may consciously or
unconsciously influence their actions or decisions and thus deprive Glaxo
Wellcome of legitimate profit.
b. To refrain from using their position in Glaxo Wellcome or knowledge of
Company plans to advance their outside personal interests, that of their
relatives, friends and other businesses.
c. To avoid outside employment or other interests for income which would
impair their effective job performance.
d. To consult with Management on such activities or relationships that
may lead to conflict of interest.
1.1. Employee Relationships
Employees with existing or future relationships either by consanguinity or
affinity with co-employees of competing drug companies are expected to
disclose such relationship to the Management. If management perceives
a conflict or potential conflict of interest, every effort shall be made,
together by management and the employee, to arrive at a solution within
six (6) months, either by transfer to another department in a non-counter
checking position, or by career preparation toward outside employment
after Glaxo Wellcome. Employees must be prepared for possible
resignation within six (6) months, if no other solution is feasible.19
No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled
that Glaxos policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship
with an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of
management prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas,
marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information
from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in
the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees
of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is reasonable under
the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed
company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the
possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and
procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot
be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of
enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to
reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and
growth.20 Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional
policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that
every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also
recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect
and enforcement in the interest of fair play.21
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. The only
exception occurs when the state29 in any of its manifestations or actions
has been found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful
private conduct.27 Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this
case. Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after
repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the
application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed
manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the
policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an
absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and
those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate
relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the
company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the
employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships. As
succinctly explained by the appellate court, thus:
The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An
employee of the company remains free to marry anyone of his or her
choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative
that belongs only to the individual. However, an employees personal
decision does not detract the employer from exercising management
prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and business success. . .28
The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company
policy which forms part of respondents Employee Code of Conduct and
of its contracts with its employees, such as that signed by Tescon, was
made known to him prior to his employment. Tecson, therefore, was
aware of that restriction when he signed his employment contract and
when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly
and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the
stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, thus, should
be complied with in good faith."29 He is therefore estopped from
questioning said policy.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners contention that Tescon was
constructively dismissed when he was transferred and when he was
excluded from attending the companys seminar on new products which
were directly competing with similar products manufactured by Astra.
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation
resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution
in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an
employer becomes unbearable to the employee.30 None of these
conditions are present in the instant case. The record does not show that
Tescon was demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of such
transfer. As found by the appellate court, Glaxo properly exercised its
management prerogative in reassigning Tecson:
. . . In this case, petitioners transfer to another place of assignment was
merely in keeping with the policy of the company in avoidance of conflict
of interest, and thus validNote that [Tecsons] wife holds a sensitive
supervisory position as Branch Coordinator in her employer-company
which requires her to work in close coordination with District Managers
and Medical Representatives. Her duties include monitoring sales of
Astra products, conducting sales drives, establishing and furthering
relationship with customers, collection, monitoring and managing Astras
inventoryshe therefore takes an active participation in the market war
characterized as it is by stiff competition among pharmaceutical
companies. Moreover, and this is significant, petitioners sales territory
covers Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte while his wife is supervising
a branch of her employer in Albay. The proximity of their areas of
responsibility, all in the same Bicol Region, renders the conflict of interest
not only possible, but actual, as learning by one spouse of the others
market strategies in the region would be inevitable. [Managements]
appreciation of a conflict of interest is therefore not merely illusory and
wanting in factual basis31
As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo
impartially and disinterestedly for a long period of time. In the case at bar,
the record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate
the conflict of interest brought about by his relationship with Bettsy. When
their relationship was still in its initial stage, Tecsons supervisors at
Glaxo constantly reminded him about its effects on his employment with
the company and on the companys interests. After Tecson married
Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve the conflict by either resigning
from the company or asking his wife to resign from Astra. Glaxo even
expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its employ because of his
8
satisfactory performance and suggested that he ask Bettsy to resign from
her company instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his repeated requests
for more time to resolve the conflict of interest. When the problem could
not be resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to
reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for
Astra.
G.R. NO. 153477 March 6, 2007
DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA VELASCO, Respondent.
Facts:
Lolita M. Velasco (respondent) started working with Del Monte
Philippines (petitioner) as a seasonal employee and was regularized on.
Her latest assignment was as Field Laborer.
Respondent was warned in writing due to her absences. Respondent,
thru a letter, was again warned in writing by petitioner about her
absences without permission and a forfeiture of her vacation leave
entitlement for the year 1990-1991 was imposed against her.
Another warning letter was sent to respondent regarding her absences
without permission during the year 1991-1992. Her vacation entitlement
for the said employment year affected was consequently forfeited.
In view of the said absences without permission, a notice of hearing was
sent to respondent notifying her of the charges filed against her for
violating the Absence Without Official Leave rule: that is for excessive
absence without permission.
Respondent having failed to appear on September 23, 1994 hearing,
another notice of hearing was sent to her resetting the investigation on
September 30, 1994. It was again reset to October 5, 1994.
After hearing, the petitioner terminated the services of respondent due to
excessive absences without permission.
Feeling aggrieved, respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal against
petitioner asserting that her dismissal was illegal because she was on the
family way suffering from urinary tract infection, a pregnancy-borne, at
the time she committed the alleged absences. She explained that for her
absence from work she had sent an application for leave to her
supervisor, Prima Ybaez. Thereafter, she went to the company hospital
for check-up and was advised accordingly to rest in quarters for four (4)
days. Still not feeling well, she failed to work on September 1, 1994 and
was again advised two days of rest in quarters on September 2-3, 1994.
Unable to recover, she went to see an outside doctor, Dr. Marilyn Casino,
and the latter ordered her to rest for another five (5) consecutive days, or
from September 5 to 9, 1994. She declared she did not file the adequate
leave of absence because a medical certificate was already sufficient per
company policy. On September 10, 1994 she failed to report to work but
sent an application for leave of absence to her supervisor, Prima Ybaez,
which was not anymore accepted.3
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. The Labor
Arbiter held that the respondent was an incorrigible absentee; that she
failed to file leaves of absence; that her absences in 1986 and 1987 were
without permission; that the petitioner gave the respondent several
chances to reform herself; and that the respondent did not justify her
failure to appear during the scheduled hearings and failed to explain her
absences.
Respondent appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC declared that the
dismissal was illegal.
The NLRC held that, under the company rules, the employee may make
a subsequent justification of her absenteeism, which she was able to do
in the instant case; that while it is not disputed that the respondent
incurred absences exceeding six (6) days within one employment year
a ground for dismissal under the company rules the petitioner actually
admitted the fact that the respondent had been pregnant, hence,
negating petitioners assertion that the respondent failed to give any
explanation of her absences; that the records bear the admission of
petitioners officer of the receipt of the hospital record showing the cause
of her absences ("RIQ advice" or "rest-in-quarters") for August 19-20,
1994 which, in turn, could already serve as reference in resolving the
absences on August 15 to 18; that the petitioner further admitted that the
respondent was under "RIQ advice" on September 2-3, 1994 and yet
insisted in including these dates among respondents 16 purported
unexplained absences; that it is sufficient notice for the petitioner, "a plain
laborer" with "unsophisticated judgment," to send word to her employer
through a co-worker on August 15 to 16, 1994 that she was frequently
vomiting; that the sheer distance between respondents home and her
workplace made it difficult to send formal notice; that respondent even
sent her child of tender age to inform her supervisor about her absence
on September 5, 1994 due to stomach ache, but her child failed to
approach the officer because her child felt ashamed, if not mortified; that
respondents narration that she had to bear pains during her absences on
September 21 to 27, 1994 is credible; that she dared not venture through
the roads for fear of forest creatures or predators; that the petitioner is
guilty of unlawfully discharging respondent on account of her pregnancy
under Article 137(2) of the Labor Code; and, that petitioners reference to
the previous absenteeism of respondent is misplaced because the latter
had already been penalized therefor.
Petitioner appealed to the CA, however it was dismissed and affirmed the
NLRC ruling.
In affirming the NLRC, the CA held that absences due to a justified cause
cannot be a ground for dismissal; that it is undisputed that the respondent
was pregnant at the time she incurred the absences in question; that the
certification issued by a private doctor duly established this fact; that it
was no less than petitioners company doctor who advised the
respondent to have rest-in-quarters for four days on account of a
pregnancy- related sickness; that it had been duly established that
respondent filed leaves of absence though the last had been refused by
the company supervisor; that the dismissal of an employee due to
prolonged absence with leave by reason of illness duly established by the
presentation of a medical certificate is not justified; that it is undisputed
that respondents sickness was pregnancy-related; that under Article
137(2) of the Labor Code, the petitioner committed a prohibited act in
discharging a woman on account of her pregnancy.
Issue/s: Whether or not the employment of respondent had been validly
terminated on the ground of excessive absences without permission and
whether or not the petitioner discharged the respondent on account of
pregnancy, a prohibited act.
Ruling:
The petitioner posits that respondent was absent without permission on
several other days which were not supported by any other proof of illness
and, hence, she is guilty of ten unjustified absences; (b) Per Filflex
Industrial and Manufacturing Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission
(Filflex),7 if the medical certificate fails to refer to the specific period of the
employees absence, then such absences, attributable to chronic
asthmatic bronchitis, are not supported by competent proof and, hence,
they are unjustified. By parity of reasoning, in the absence of evidence
indicating any pregnancy-borne illness outside the period stated in
respondents medical certificate, such illness ought not to be considered
as an acceptable excuse for respondents excessive absences without
leave; (c) Respondents latest string of absences, taken together with her
long history of absenteeism without permission, established her gross
and habitual neglect of duties, as established by jurisprudence; (d) The
respondent was dismissed not by reason of her pregnancy but on
account of her gross and habitual neglect of duties. In other words, her
pregnancy had no bearing on the decision to terminate her employment;
and, (e) Her state of pregnancy per se could not excuse her from filing
prior notice for her absence.
Petitioners arguments are without merit.
In this case, by the measure of substantial evidence, what is controlling is
the finding of the NLRC and the CA that respondent was pregnant and
suffered from related ailments. It would be unreasonable to isolate such
condition strictly to the dates stated in the Medical Certificate or the
Discharge Summary. It can be safely assumed that the absences that are
not covered by, but which nonetheless approximate, the dates stated in
the Discharge Summary and Medical Certificate, are due to the
continuing condition of pregnancy and related illnesses, and, hence, are
justified absences.
As the CA and the NLRC correctly noted, it is not disputed that
respondent was pregnant and that she was suffering from urinary tract
9
infection, and that her absences were due to such facts and, as the CA
aptly held, it was no less than the company doctor who advised the
respondent to have "rest-in-quarters" for four days on account of a
pregnancy-related sickness.9
On this note, this Court upholds and adopts the finding of the NLRC,
thus:
In this jurisdiction tardiness and absenteeism, like abandonment, are
recognized forms of neglect of duties, the existence of which justify the
dismissal of the erring employee. Respondents rule penalizing with
discharge any employee who has incurred six (6) or more absences
without permission or subsequent justification is admittedly within the
purview of the foregoing standard.
However, while it is not disputed that complainant incurred absences
exceeding six (6) days as she actually failed to report for work, her being
pregnant at the time these absences were incurred is not
questioned and is even admitted by respondent. Medical and health
reports abundantly disclose that during the first trimester of
pregnancy, expectant mothers are plagued with morning sickness,
frequent urination, vomiting and fatigue all of which complainant
was similarly plagued with.
Despite contrary declaration, the records bear the admission of
respondents P/A North Supervisor, PB Ybanez, of her receipt of the
hospital record showing complainants RIQ advice which could
already serve as respondents reference in resolving the latters
absences on August 15 to 18, 1994. Respondent further admitted
complainant was under RIQ advice on September 2-3, 1994, yet,
insisted in including these dates among her 16 purported
unexplained absences justifying termination of her
employment.10 (emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contention that the cause for the dismissal was gross and
habitual neglect unrelated to her state of pregnancy is unpersuasive.
The respondents sickness was pregnancy-related and, therefore, the
petitioner cannot terminate respondents services because in doing so,
petitioner will, in effect, be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an
employer to discharge an employee on account of the latters
pregnancy.11
Article 137 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 137. Prohibited acts. It shall be unlawful for any employer:
(2) To discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy, while
on leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy; or
Second. The petitioner stresses that many women go through pregnancy
and yet manage to submit prior notices to their employer, especially if
"there is no evidence on record indicating a condition of such gravity as to
preclude efforts at notifying petitioner of her absence from work in
series."12 But it must be emphasized that under petitioners company
rules, absences may be subsequently justified.13 The Court finds no
cogent reason to disturb the findings of the NLRC and the CA that the
respondent was able to subsequently justify her absences in accordance
with company rules and policy; that the respondent was pregnant at the
time she incurred the absences; that this fact of pregnancy and its related
illnesses had been duly proven through substantial evidence; that the
respondent attempted to file leaves of absence but the petitioners
supervisor refused to receive them; that she could not have filed prior
leaves due to her continuing condition; and that the petitioner, in the last
analysis, dismissed the respondent on account of her pregnancy, a
prohibited act.
The Court is convinced that the petitioner terminated the services of
respondent on account of her pregnancy which justified her absences
and, thus, committed a prohibited act rendering the dismissal illegal.
G.R. No. 166379 October 20, 2005
LAKPUE DRUG, INC., LA CROESUS PHARMA, INC., TROPICAL
BIOLOGICAL PHILS., INC. (all known as LAKPUE GROUP OF
COMPANIES) and/or ENRIQUE CASTILLO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELGA, Respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Tropical Biological Phils., Inc. (Tropical), a subsidiary of Lakpue
Group of Companies, hired on March 1, 1995 respondent Ma. Lourdes
Belga (Belga) as bookkeeper and subsequently promoted as assistant
cashier. On March 19, 2001, Belga brought her daughter to the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH) for treatment of broncho-pneumonia. On her way
to the hospital, Belga dropped by the house of Marylinda O. Vegafria,
Technical Manager of Tropical, to hand over the documents she worked
on over the weekend and to give notice of her emergency leave.
While at the PGH, Belga who was pregnant experienced labor pains and
gave birth on the same day. On March 22, 2001, or two days after giving
birth, Tropical summoned Belga to report for work but the latter replied
that she could not comply because of her situation. On March 30, 2001,
Tropical sent Belga another memorandum ordering her to report for work
and also informing her of the clarificatory conference scheduled on April
2, 2001. Belga requested that the conference be moved to April 4, 2001
as her newborn was scheduled for check-up on April 2, 2001. When
Belga attended the clarificatory conference on April 4, 2001, she was
informed of her dismissal effective that day.
Belga thus filed a complaint with the Public Assistance and Complaint
Unit (PACU) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
Attempts to settle the case failed, hence the parties brought the case
before the NLRC-NCR.
Tropical, for its part, averred that it hired Belga on March 1, 1995 as a
bookkeeper and later promoted to various positions the last of which was
as "Treasury Assistant". Tropical claimed that this position was not
merely clerical because it included duties such as assisting the cashier in
preparing deposit slips, bills purchased, withdrawal slips, provisional
receipts, incoming and outgoing bank transactions, postdated checks,
suppliers checklist and issuance of checks, authorities to debit and doing
liaison work with banks.
Tropical also alleged that Belga concealed her pregnancy from the
company. She did not apply for leave and her absence disrupted
Tropicals financial transactions. On March 21, 2001, it required Belga to
explain her unauthorized absence and on March 30, 2001, it informed her
of a conference scheduled on April 2, 2001. Tropical claimed that Belga
refused to receive the second memorandum and did not attend the
conference. She reported for work only on April 4, 2001 where she was
given a chance to explain.
On April 17, 2001, Tropical terminated Belga on the following grounds:
(1) Absence without official leave for 16 days; (2) Dishonesty, for
deliberately concealing her pregnancy; (3) Insubordination, for her
deliberate refusal to heed and comply with the memoranda sent by the
Personnel Department on March 21 and 30, 2001 respectively. 4
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Belga and found that she was illegally
dismissed, thus:
WHEREFORE, the termination of complainant is hereby declared illegal.
ACCORDINGLY, she should be reinstated with full backwages, which as
of May 31, 2002, now amounts to P122, 248.71.
Ten (10%) percent of the total monetary award as attorneys fees is
likewise ordered.
SO ORDERED.5
Tropical appealed to the NLRC, which reversed the findings of the labor
arbiter in its Decision dated April 14, 2003, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. We thereby render judgment:
(1) declaring complainant-appellees dismissal valid; and
(2) nullifying complainant-appellees monetary claims.
10
SO ORDERED.6
Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration on September 24,
2003,7 Belga filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which
found in favor of Belga, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision promulgated on April
14, 2003 and the Resolution promulgated on September 24, 2003 of the
public respondent National Labor Relations Commission are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated
June 15, 2002 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, Tropical filed the instant petition claiming that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY
DISMISSED.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ERROR IN DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.9
The petition lacks merit.
Tropicals ground for terminating Belga is her alleged concealment of
pregnancy. It argues that such non-disclosure is tantamount to
dishonesty and impresses upon this Court the importance of Belgas
position and the gravity of the disruption her unexpected absence brought
to the company. Tropical also charges Belga with insubordination for
refusing to comply with its directives to report for work and to explain her
absence.
Tropical cites the following paragraphs of Article 282 of the Labor Code
as legal basis for terminating Belga:
Article 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work;
....
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by
his employer or duly authorized representative; ....
We have defined misconduct as a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.
The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated
character and not merely trivial and unimportant. Such misconduct,
however serious, must, nevertheless, be in connection with the
employees work to constitute just cause for his separation.10
In the instant case, the alleged misconduct of Belga barely falls within the
situation contemplated by the law. Her absence for 16 days was justified
considering that she had just delivered a child, which can hardly be
considered a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty; much less does it imply
wrongful intent on the part of Belga. Tropical harps on the alleged
concealment by Belga of her pregnancy. This argument, however, begs
the question as to how one can conceal a full-term pregnancy. We agree
with respondents position that it can hardly escape notice how she grows
bigger each day. While there may be instances where the pregnancy may
be inconspicuous, it has not been sufficiently proven by Tropical that
Belgas case is such.
Belgas failure to formally inform Tropical of her pregnancy can not be
considered as grave misconduct directly connected to her work as to
constitute just cause for her separation.
The charge of disobedience for Belgas failure to comply with the
memoranda must likewise fail. Disobedience, as a just cause for
termination, must be willful or intentional. Willfulness is characterized by a
wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employees act
inconsistent with proper subordination.11 In the instant case, the
memoranda were given to Belga two days after she had given birth. It
was thus physically impossible for Belga to report for work and explain
her absence, as ordered.
Tropical avers that Belgas job as Treasury Assistant is a position of
responsibility since she handles vital transactions for the company. It
adds that the nature of Belgas work and the character of her duties
involved utmost trust and confidence.
Time and again, we have recognized the right of employers to dismiss
employees by reason of loss of trust and confidence. However, we
emphasize that such ground is premised on the fact that the employee
concerned holds a position of responsibility or trust and confidence. 12 In
order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must
be "work-related" such as would show the employee concerned to be
unfit to continue working for the employer.13 More importantly, the loss of
trust and confidence must be based on the willful breach of the trust
reposed in the employee by his employer. A breach of trust is willful if it is
done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently.14
Belga was an assistant cashier whose primary function was to assist the
cashier in such duties as preparation of deposit slips, provisional receipts,
post-dated checks, etc. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals,
these functions are essentially clerical. For while ostensibly, the
documents that Belga prepares as Assistant Cashier pertain to her
employers property, her work does not call for independent judgment or
discretion. Belga simply prepares the documents as instructed by her
superiors subject to the latters verification or approval. Hence, her
position cannot be considered as one of responsibility or imbued with
trust and confidence.
Furthermore, Tropical has not satisfactorily shown how and to what
extent it had suffered damages because of Belgas absences. For while it
may be true that the company was caught unprepared and unable to hire
a temporary replacement, we are not convinced that Belgas absence for
16 days has wreaked havoc on Tropicals business as to justify her
termination from the company. On the other hand, it is undisputed that
Belga has worked for Tropical for 7 years without any blemish on her
service record. In fact, the company admitted in its petition that she "has
rendered seven (7) years of service in compliance with [the companys]
rules".15 And her fidelity to her work is evident because even in the midst
of an emergency, she managed to transmit to the company the
documents she worked on over the weekend so that it would not cause
any problem for the company.
All told, we find that the penalty of dismissal was too harsh in light of the
circumstances obtaining in this case. While it may be true that Belga
ought to have formally informed the company of her impending maternity
leave so as to give the latter sufficient time to find a temporary
replacement, her termination from employment is not commensurate to
her lapse in judgment.
Even assuming that there was just cause for terminating Belga, her
dismissal is nonetheless invalid for failure of Tropical to observe the twin-
notice requirement. The March 21, 2001 memorandum merely informed
her to report for work and explain her absences. The March 30, 2001
memorandum demanded that she report for work and attend a
clarificatory conference. Belga received the first memorandum but
allegedly refused to receive the second.
In Electro System Industries Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission,16 we held that, in dismissing an employee, the employer
has the burden of proving that the worker has been served two notices:
(1) one to apprise him of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought, and (2) the other to inform him of his employers
decision to dismiss him. The first notice must state that the dismissal is
sought for the act or omission charged against the employee, otherwise
the notice cannot be considered sufficient compliance with the rules. It
must also inform outright that an investigation will be conducted on the
charges particularized therein which, if proven, will result to his dismissal.
Further, we held that a notation in the notice that the employee refused to
sign is not sufficient proof that the employer attempted to serve the notice
to the employee.
11
An employee who was illegally dismissed from work is entitled to Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is Chairman: May boyfriend ka na ba?
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and other privileges and to enough to dampen an employees spirit and her capacity for
his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life. 1
Lourdes: Dati nagkaroon po.
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 17 Thus,
Before this Court are three Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Belga is entitled to be reinstated to her former or equivalent position and Chairman: Nasaan na siya?
October 18, 2002 Resolution of the CAs Former Ninth Division2 in CA-
to the payment of full backwages from the time she was illegally
G.R. SP No. 61026. The Resolution modified the December 14, 2001
dismissed until her actual reinstatement.
Decision3of the Court of Appeals Eleventh Division, which had affirmed Lourdes: Nag-asawa na ho.
the Decision of the Office of the President (OP) dismissing from the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The July 28, 2004 service then National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Chairman
Chairman: Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80616 and its Rogelio I. Rayala (Rayala) for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
December 17, 2004 Resolution are AFFIRMED in toto.
All three petitions stem from the same factual antecedents. Lourdes: Nainip po.
SO ORDERED.
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Chairman: Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay kumuha
G.R. No. 155831 February 18, 2008 Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual ka ng Law at ako ang bahala sa iyo, hanggang ako
pa ang Chairman dito.
harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs. Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang amerikana at
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent. inaabot sa akin.
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the
incidences of sexual harassment complained of, thus:
x-------------------------x Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.
xxxx
G.R. No. 155840 February 18, 2008 Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko kailangan.
4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni Chairman
Rayala ng mga salitang "Lot, gumaganda ka yata?" Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo. Ayusin mo ang
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, petitioner,
vs. dapat ayusin.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RONALDO V. ZAMORA, in his capacity 5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman
as Executive Secretary; ROY V. SENERES, in his capacity as at hahawakan ang aking balikat sabay pisil sa mga ito habang Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan. Natatakot
Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission (in lieu of ako ay nagta-type at habang nagbibigay siya ng diktasyon. Sa at kinakabahan na kapag hindi ko tinanggap ang pera ay baka
RAUL T. AQUINO, in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the National mga pagkakataong ito, kinakabahan ako. Natatakot na baka siya magagalit kasabay na rito ang pagtapon sa akin kung
labor Relations Commission); and MA. LOURDES T. mangyari sa akin ang mga napapabalitang insidente na saan-saan opisina o kaya ay tanggalin ako sa posisyon.
DOMINGO, respondents. nangyari na noon tungkol sa mga sekretarya niyang nagbitiw
gawa ng mga mahahalay na panghihipo ni Chairman.
Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang pera. Ayaw ko
x-------------------------x ng may makaka-alam nito. Just the two of us.
6. Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay nasa
8th Floor, may nagsabi sa akin na kailangan akong bumaba sa
G.R. No. 158700 February 18, 2008 Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?
7th Floor kung nasaan ang aming opisina dahil sa may
koreksyon daw na gagawin sa mga papel na tinayp ko.
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE Bumaba naman ako para gawin ito. Habang ginagawa ko ito, Chairman: Basta. Maraming tsismosa diyan sa labas.
OF THE PRESIDENT; and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, in his capacity as lumabas si Chairman Rayala sa silid ni Mr. Alex Lopez. But I dont give them a damn. Hindi ako mamatay sa
Executive Secretary, petitioners, Inutusan ako ni Chairman na sumunod sa kaniyang silid. Nang kanila.
vs. nasa silid na kami, sinabi niya sa akin:
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.
Tumayo na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng 8th Floor at
Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat. pumunta ako sa officemate ko na si Agnes Magdaet. Ikinwento
DECISION ko ang nangyari sa akin sa opisina ni Chairman. Habang
At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa mga kinikwento ko ito kay Agnes ay binilang namin ang pera na
NACHURA, J.: personal na bagay sa aking buhay. Ang ilan dito ay tungkol sa nagkakahalaga ng tatlong libong piso (PHP 3,000). Sinabi ni
aking mga magulang, kapatid, pag-aaral at kung may boyfriend Agnes na isauli ko raw ang pera, pero ang sabi ko ay natatakot
na raw ba ako. ako baka magalit si Sir. Nagsabi agad kami kay EC Perlita
Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang nangyari. Sinabi niya na isauli ko
12
ang pera at noong araw ding iyon ay nagpasiya akong isauli na
nga ito ngunit hindi ako nagkaroon ng pagkakataon dahil
marami siyang naging bisita. Isinauli ko nga ang pera noong
Lunes, Setyembre 14, 1998.
7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong
din sa akin si Chairman Rayala na hindi ko masikmura, at sa
aking palagay at tahasang pambabastos sa akin.
Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?
Lourdes: Sir, wala po.
Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?
Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka
live-in.
Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?
Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.
Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.
Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.
Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin ang usapan.
8. Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto ni
Chairman Rayala. Ito ay sa kadahilanang ang fax machine ay
nasa loob ng kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-aasikaso nito, si Riza
Ocampo, ay naka-leave kaya ako ang nag-asikaso nito noong
araw na iyon. Nang mabigyan ko na ng fax tone yung kausap
ko, pagharap ko sa kanan ay nakaharang sa dadaanan ko si
Chairman Rayala. Tinitingnan ako sa mata at ang titig niya ay
umuusad mula ulo hanggang dibdib tapos ay ngumiti na may
mahalay na pakahulugan.
9. Noong hapon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may nag-
aapply na sekretarya sa opisina, sinabi ko ito kay Chairman
Rayala:
Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung applicant, mag-
papainterview po yata sa inyo.
Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap smear muna siya
Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex. (Alex Lopez,
Chief of Staff).
10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni Chairman
Rayala sa kaniyang opisina upang kuhanin ko ang diktasyon
niya para kay ELA Oscar Uy. Hindi pa kami nakakatapos ng
unang talata, may pumasok na bisita si Chairman, si Baby
Pangilinan na sinamahan ni Riza Ocampo. Pinalabas muna
ako ni Chairman. Nang maka-alis na si Ms. Pangilinan,
pinapasok na niya ako ulit. Umupo ako. Lumapit sa likuran ko
si Chairman, hinawakan ang kaliwang balikat ko na pinipisil ng
kanang kamay niya at sinabi:
Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?
Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta.
Huminto siya pagkatapos, at nilagay niya ang kanang kamay
niya sa aking kanang balikat at pinisil-pisil ito pagkatapos ay
pinagapang niya ito sa kanang bahagi ng aking leeg, at
pinagapang hanggang kanang tenga at saka kiniliti. Dito ko
inalis ang kaniyang kamay sa pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang
kamay. At saka ko sinabi:
Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!
Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi
ko na maintindihan ang na-isulat ko dahil sa takot at inis na
nararamdaman ko.4
After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and
asked to be immediately transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint
for sexual harassment on the basis of Administrative Order No. 250,
the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of
Labor and Employment.
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the
Complaint to the OP, Rayala being a presidential appointee. The OP,
through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary
Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a
committee for such purpose. On December 4, 1998, Secretary Laguesma
issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 280, Series of 1998,5 constituting a
Committee on Decorum and Investigation (Committee) in accordance
with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.6
The Committee heard the parties and received their respective evidence.
On March 2, 2000, the Committee submitted its report and
recommendation to Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty of the
offense charged and recommended the imposition of the minimum
penalty provided under AO 250, which it erroneously stated as
suspension for six (6) months.
The following day, Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the
Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP, but with the
recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6) months
and one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora, issued
AO 119,7 the pertinent portions of which read:
Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, I concur with
the findings of the Committee as to the culpability of the
respondent [Rayala], the same having been established by
clear and convincing evidence. However, I disagree with the
recommendation that respondent be meted only the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day considering the
circumstances of the case.
What aggravates respondents situation is the undeniable
circumstance that he took advantage of his position as the
superior of the complainant. Respondent occupies the highest
position in the NLRC, being its Chairman. As head of said
office, it was incumbent upon respondent to set an example to
the others as to how they should conduct themselves in public
office, to see to it that his subordinates work efficiently in
accordance with Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and to
provide them with healthy working atmosphere wherein co-
workers treat each other with respect, courtesy and
cooperation, so that in the end the public interest will be
benefited (City Mayor of Zamboanga vs. Court of Appeals, 182
SCRA 785 [1990]).
What is more, public service requires the utmost integrity and
strictest discipline (Gano vs. Leonen, 232 SCRA 99 [1994]).
Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest
sense of honesty and integrity, and "utmost devotion and
dedication to duty" (Sec. 4 (g), RA 6713), respect the rights of
others and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, and
good morals (Sec. 4(c)). No less than the Constitution
sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public trust, and
enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency
(Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution).
Given these established standards, I see respondents acts not
just [as] a failure to give due courtesy and respect to his co-
employees (subordinates) or to maintain good conduct and
behavior but defiance of the basic norms or virtues which a
government official must at all times uphold, one that is
contrary to law and "public sense of morality." Otherwise
stated, respondent to whom stricter standards must apply
being the highest official [of] the NLRC had shown an
attitude, a frame of mind, a disgraceful conduct, which renders
him unfit to remain in the service.
13
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Rogelio I.
Rayala, Chairman, National Labor Relations Commission, is
found guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral
conduct and is herebyDISMISSED from the service effective
upon receipt of this Order.
SO ORDER[ED].
Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a
Resolution8 dated May 24, 2000. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure before this Court on June 14,
2000.9 However, the same was dismissed in a Resolution dated June 26,
2000 for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.10 Rayala filed a Motion for
Reconsideration11 on August 15, 2000. In its Resolution12 dated
September 4, 2000, the Court recalled its June 26 Resolution and
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate action.
The CA rendered its Decision13 on December 14, 2001. It held that there
was sufficient evidence on record to create moral certainty that Rayala
committed the acts he was charged with. It said:
The complainant narrated her story complete with details. Her
straightforward and uninhibited testimony was not emasculated
by the declarations of Commissioner Rayala or his witnesses. x
xx
Moreover, Commissioner Rayala has not proven any vicious
motive for Domingo and her witnesses to invent their stories. It
is very unlikely that they would perjure themselves only to
accommodate the alleged conspiracy to oust petitioner from
office. Save for his empty conjectures and speculations, Rayala
failed to substantiate his contrived conspiracy. It is a hornbook
doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and
convincing evidence (People v. Noroa, 329 SCRA 502
[2000]). Besides, it is improbable that the complainant would
concoct a story of sexual harassment against the highest
official of the NLRC and thereby expose herself to the
possibility of losing her job, or be the subject of reprisal from
her superiors and perhaps public ridicule if she was not telling
the truth.
It also held that Rayalas dismissal was proper. The CA pointed out that
Rayala was dismissed for disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of
RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees. It held that the OP was correct in concluding that
Rayalas acts violated RA 6713:
Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official, holding the Chairmanship
of the National Labor Relations Commission, entrusted with the
sacred duty of administering justice. Occupying as he does
such an exalted position, Commissioner Rayala must pay a
high price for the honor bestowed upon him. He must comport
himself at all times in such a manner that the conduct of his
everyday life should be beyond reproach and free from any
impropriety. That the acts complained of were committed within
the sanctuary of [his] office compounded the objectionable
nature of his wrongdoing. By daring to violate the complainant
within the solitude of his chambers, Commissioner Rayala
placed the integrity of his office in disrepute. His disgraceful
and immoral conduct warrants his removal from office.14
Thus, it dismissed the petition, to wit:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED and Administrative Order No. 119 as well
[as] the Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P. Case
No. 00-E-9118 dated May 24, 2000 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.15
Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Justices Vasquez and
Tolentino voted to affirm the December 14 Decision. However, Justice
Reyes dissented mainly because AO 250 states that the penalty
imposable is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day.16 Pursuant to
the internal rules of the CA, a Special Division of Five was
constituted.17 In its October 18, 2002 Resolution, the CA modified its
earlier Decision:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated December [14], 2001 is
MODIFIED to the effect that the penalty of dismissal is
DELETED and instead the penalty of suspension from service
for the maximum period of one (1) year is HEREBY IMPOSED
upon the petitioner. The rest of the challenged decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review18 before this Court, which we denied
in our February 19, 2003 Resolution for having a defective verification.
She filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court granted; hence,
the petition was reinstated.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this Court essentially
arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual harassment.
Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs
October 18, 2002 Resolution. The CA denied the same in its June 3,
2003 Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public respondents
Motion for Reconsideration, (sic) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.20
On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3)
petitions.
G.R. No. 155831
Domingo assails the CAs resolution modifying the penalty imposed by
the Office of the President. She raises this issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the penalty for the
respondent from dismissal to suspension from service for the
maximum period of one year. The President has the
prerogative to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on
an erring Presidential appointee. The President was well within
his power when he fittingly used that prerogative in deciding to
dismiss the respondent from the service.21
She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential appointee, is
lodged with the President who has control of the entire Executive
Department, its bureaus and offices. The OPs decision was arrived at
after affording Rayala due process. Hence, his dismissal from the service
is a prerogative that is entirely with the President.22
As to the applicability of AO No. 250, she argues that the same was not
intended to cover cases against presidential appointees. AO No. 250
refers only to the instances wherein the DOLE Secretary is the
disciplining authority, and thus, the AO does not circumscribe the power
of the President to dismiss an erring presidential appointee.
G.R. No. 155840
In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:
I. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE ACTS OF HEREIN PETITIONER DO NOT
CONSTITUTE SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS LAID DOWN BY
THE En Banc RULING IN THE CASE OFAQUINO vs.
ACOSTA, ibid., AS WELL AS IN THE APPLICATION OF
EXISTING LAWS.
II. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE
ELEMENT IN A CASE FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT. THE
HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT IT IS
AN OFFENSE THAT IS MALUM PROHIBITUM.
14
 III. THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, AND NOW, THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, HAS MISAPPLIED AND EXPANDED THE
DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE UNDER R.A. No. 7877, BY APPLYING DOLE
A.O. 250, WHICH RUNS COUNTER TO THE RECENT
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT.23
Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,24 Rayala argues that the case is the definitive
ruling on what constitutes sexual harassment. Thus, he posits that for
sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877, there must be: (a) demand,
request, or requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-
condition to hiring, re-employment, or continued employment; or (c) the
denial thereof results in discrimination against the employee.
Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any
sexual favor, demand, or request from petitioner in exchange for her
continued employment or for her promotion. According to Rayala, the
acts imputed to him are without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely
Domingos perception of malice in his alleged acts a "product of her
own imagination"25 that led her to file the sexual harassment complaint.
Likewise, Rayala assails the OPs interpretation, as upheld by the CA,
that RA 7877 is malum prohibitum such that the defense of absence of
malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment is considered an
offense against a particular person, not against society as a whole. Thus,
he claims that intent is an essential element of the offense because the
law requires as a conditio sine qua non that a sexual favor be first sought
by the offender in order to achieve certain specific results. Sexual
harassment is committed with the perpetrators deliberate intent to
commit the offense.26
Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877.
In particular, he assails the definition of the forms of sexual harassment:
Rule IV
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. Sexual
harassment may be committed in any of the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not
limited to going out on dates, outings or the like for the same
purpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes
of sexual gratification which is generally annoying, disgusting
or offensive to the victim.27
He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request,
or requirement do not constitute sexual harassment as contemplated by
the law.28 He alleges that the rule-making power granted to the employer
in Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only to procedural matters. The law
did not delegate to the employer the power to promulgate rules which
would provide other or additional forms of sexual harassment, or to come
up with its own definition of sexual harassment.29
G.R. No. 158700
The Republic raises this issue:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly
dismiss respondent Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for
committing acts of sexual harassment.30
The Republic argues that Rayalas acts constitute sexual harassment
under AO 250. His acts constitute unwelcome or improper gestures of
affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual nature, which are generally
annoying or offensive to the victim.31
It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CAs reduction of the
penalty imposed by the OP. Rayalas dismissal is valid and warranted
under the circumstances. The power to remove the NLRC Chairman
solely rests upon the President, limited only by the requirements under
the law and the due process clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one
(1) year suspension, it will not prevent the OP from validly imposing the
penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even though Rayala is a
presidential appointee, he is still subject to the Civil Service Law. Under
the Civil Service Law, disgraceful and immoral conduct, the acts imputed
to Rayala, constitute grave misconduct punishable by dismissal from the
service.32 The Republic adds that Rayalas position is invested with public
trust and his acts violated that trust; thus, he should be dismissed from
the service.
This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article
215 of the Labor Code, which states that the Chairman of the NLRC
holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only during good
behavior.33 Since Rayalas security of tenure is conditioned upon his good
behavior, he may be removed from office if it is proven that he has failed
to live up to this standard.
All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two
ultimate questions, namely:
(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
Initially, however, we must resolve a procedural issue raised by Rayala.
He accuses the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for the
Republic, of forum shopping because it filed a motion for reconsideration
of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 and then filed a comment in
G.R. No. 155840 before this Court.
We do not agree.
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment
or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly
securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
special civil action for certiorari.34 It consists of filing multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment.35
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity
of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest
in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as
the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two
preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will
constitute litis pendentia.36
Reviewing the antecedents of these consolidated cases, we note that the
CA rendered the assailed Resolution on October 18, 2002. The Republic
filed its Motion for Reconsideration on November 22, 2002. On the other
hand, Rayala filed his petition before this Court on November 21, 2002.
While the Republics Motion for Reconsideration was pending resolution
before the CA, on December 2, 2002, it was directed by this Court to file
its Comment on Rayalas petition, which it submitted on June 16, 2003.
When the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Republic filed
its own Petition for Review with this Court on July 3, 2003. It cited in its
"Certification and Verification of a Non-Forum Shopping" (sic), that there
was a case involving the same facts pending before this Court
denominated as G.R. No. 155840. With respect to Domingos petition, the
same had already been dismissed on February 19, 2003. Domingos
petition was reinstated on June 16, 2003 but the resolution was received
by the OSG only on July 25, 2003, or after it had filed its own petition. 37
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the OSG is guilty of forum
shopping. We must point out that it was Rayala who filed the petition in
the CA, with the Republic as the adverse party. Rayala himself filed a
motion for reconsideration of the CAs December 21, 2001 Decision,
which led to a more favorable ruling, i.e., the lowering of the penalty from
dismissal to one-year suspension. The parties adversely affected by this
ruling (Domingo and the Republic) had the right to question the same on
15
motion for reconsideration. But Domingo directly filed a Petition for
Review with this Court, as did Rayala. When the Republic opted to file a
motion for reconsideration, it was merely exercising a right. That Rayala
and Domingo had by then already filed cases before the SC did not take
away this right. Thus, when this Court directed the Republic to file its
Comment on Rayalas petition, it had to comply, even if it had an
unresolved motion for reconsideration with the CA, lest it be cited for
contempt.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the OSG "file[d] multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment."
We now proceed to discuss the substantive issues.
It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case
were unanimous in upholding the findings of the Committee and the OP.
They found the assessment made by the Committee and the OP to be a
"meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the
complainant (Domingo), the respondent (Rayala), and their respective
witnesses." 38 They differed only on the appropriate imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was guilty of sexual
harassment is, therefore, the common factual finding of not just one,
but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA. It
should be remembered that when supported by substantial evidence,
factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are
accorded great respect and even finality by the courts.39 The principle,
therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us.40
Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears no
valid ground for this Court to review the factual findings of the CA, the
OP, and the Investigating Committee. These findings are now conclusive
on the Court. And quite significantly, Rayala himself admits to having
committed some of the acts imputed to him.
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment,
because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that there was a
demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her
continued employment or for her promotion to a higher position.41 Rayala
urges us to apply to his case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.42
We find respondents insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which
states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise
to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can
proceed independently of the others.43 This rule applies with full force to
sexual harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877.
Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual
Harassment Defined. Work, education or training-related
sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager,
supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a
work or training or education environment, demands, requests
or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual
harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in
the employment, re-employment or continued employment of
said individual, or in granting said individual favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or
the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or
privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment for the employee.
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal
aspect of the unlawful act of sexual harassment. The same section, in
relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of an independent civil
action for damages and other affirmative relief.
Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for
administrative cases, viz.:
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-
related, Education or Training Environment. It shall be the
sexual harassment.44 It should be enough that the CA, along with the
duty of the employer or the head of the work-related,
educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or
deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to
provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or
prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end,
the employer or head of office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in
consultation with and jointly approved by the
employees or students or trainees, through their duly
designated representatives, prescribing the
procedure for the investigation or sexual harassment
cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to
prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of
sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to
this section (a) shall include, among others,
guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and
educational or training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation
of cases on sexual harassment. The committee shall
conduct meetings, as the case may be, with other
officers and employees, teachers, instructors,
professors, coaches, trainors and students or
trainees to increase understanding and prevent
incidents of sexual harassment. It shall also conduct
the investigation of the alleged cases constituting
sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall
be composed of at least one (1) representative each from the
management, the union, if any, the employees from the
supervisory rank, and from the rank and file employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the
committee shall be composed of at least one (1) representative
from the administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors,
professors or coaches and students or trainees, as the case
maybe.
The employer or head of office, educational or training
institution shall disseminate or post a copy of this Act for the
information of all concerned.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability is not to be
determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is
charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of
Investigating Committee and the Office of the President, found
substantial evidence to support the administrative charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayalas acts strictly by the standards set in
Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable. It is true that
this provision calls for a "demand, request or requirement of a sexual
favor." But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of
a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It
may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender.
16
Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across
her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with
her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of
future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual
overtones all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the
unspoken request for a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the demand,
request or requirement be made as a condition for continued employment
or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondents
acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for
the employee.45 That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and
hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual
finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo
reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a
leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.
Rayalas invocation of Aquino v. Acosta46 is misplaced, because the
factual setting in that case is different from that in the case at bench.
In Aquino, Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), charged then CTA Presiding Judge (now
Presiding Justice) Ernesto Acosta of sexual harassment. She complained
of several incidents when Judge Acosta allegedly kissed her, embraced
her, and put his arm around her shoulder. The case was referred to CA
Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation. In her report, Justice
Salonga found that "the complainant failed to show by convincing
evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her with a kiss on the
cheek, in a `beso-beso fashion, were carried out with lustful and
lascivious desires or were motivated by malice or ill motive. It is clear
from the circumstances that most of the kissing incidents were done on
festive and special occasions," and they "took place in the presence of
other people and the same was by reason of the exaltation or happiness
of the moment." Thus, Justice Salonga concluded:
In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on
the cheeks of the complainant should be understood in the
context of having been done on the occasion of some
festivities, and not the assertion of the latter that she was
singled out by Judge Acosta in his kissing escapades. The
busses on her cheeks were simply friendly and innocent, bereft
of malice and lewd design. The fact that respondent judge
kisses other people on the cheeks in the 'beso-beso' fashion,
without malice, was corroborated by Atty. Florecita P. Flores,
Ms. Josephine Adalem and Ms. Ma. Fides Balili, who stated
that they usually practice 'beso-beso' or kissing on the cheeks,
as a form of greeting on occasions when they meet each other,
like birthdays, Christmas, New Year's Day and even Valentine's
Day, and it does not matter whether it is Judge Acosta's
birthday or their birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who
belongs to complainant's department, further attested that on
occasions like birthdays, respondent judge would likewise greet
her with a peck on the cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner.
Interestingly, in one of several festive occasions, female
employees of the CTA pecked respondent judge on the cheek
where Atty. Aquino was one of Judge Acosta's well wishers.
In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those
six occasions. Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on
her cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual and
customary in nature. No evidence of intent to sexually harass
complainant was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-
beso' were given malicious connotations by the complainant. In
fact, she did not even relate to anyone what happened to her.
Undeniably, there is no manifest sexual undertone in all those
incidents.47
This Court agreed with Justice Salonga, and Judge Acosta was
exonerated.
To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not obtain in the case at
bench. While in Aquino, the Court interpreted the acts (of Judge Acosta)
as casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done during festive or
special occasions and with other people present, in the instant case,
Rayalas acts of holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his
fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, and the inappropriate
comments, were all made in the confines of Rayalas office when no
other members of his staff were around. More importantly, and a
circumstance absent in Aquino, Rayalas acts, as already adverted to
above, produced a hostile work environment for Domingo, as shown by
her having reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last
incident, filing for a leave of absence and requesting transfer to another
unit.
Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he argues
that AO 250 does not cover the NLRC, which, at the time of the incident,
was under the DOLE only for purposes of program and policy
coordination. Second, he posits that even assuming AO 250 is applicable
to the NLRC, he is not within its coverage because he is a presidential
appointee.
We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO 250 covers
Rayala is of no real consequence. The events of this case unmistakably
show that the administrative charges against Rayala were for violation of
RA 7877; that the OP properly assumed jurisdiction over the
administrative case; that the participation of the DOLE, through the
Committee created by the Secretary, was limited to initiating the
investigation process, reception of evidence of the parties, preparation of
the investigation report, and recommending the appropriate action to be
taken by the OP. AO 250 had never really been applied to Rayala. If it
was used at all, it was to serve merely as an auxiliary procedural guide to
aid the Committee in the orderly conduct of the investigation.
Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment
is an offense malum prohibitum. He argues that intent is an essential
element in sexual harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were
done allegedly without malice, he should be absolved of the charges
against him.
We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual
harassment. Thus, whether the crime ofsexual harassment is malum in
se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.
We also reject Rayalas allegations that the charges were filed because
of a conspiracy to get him out of office and thus constitute merely political
harassment. A conspiracy must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. His bare assertions cannot stand against the evidence
presented by Domingo. As we have already ruled, the acts imputed to
Rayala have been proven as fact. Moreover, he has not proven any ill
motive on the part of Domingo and her witnesses which would be ample
reason for her to conjure stories about him. On the contrary, ill motive is
belied by the fact that Domingo and her witnesses all employees of the
NLRC at that time stood to lose their jobs or suffer unpleasant
consequences for coming forward and charging their boss with sexual
harassment.
Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due
process. He accuses the Committee on Decorum of railroading his trial
for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the OPs decision finding him
guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under the Revised
Administrative Code and not for violation of RA 7877. Considering that he
was not tried for "disgraceful and immoral conduct," he argues that the
verdict is a "sham and total nullity."
We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous
cases, this Court held that:
[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be
heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4)
a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.48
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these
procedural due process safeguards. Although in the beginning he
questioned the authority of the Committee to try him,49 he appeared,
personally and with counsel, and participated in the proceedings.
On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal cases,
the designation of the offense is not controlling, thus:
17
 What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense
must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the
specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a
crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature
of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense.50
It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to
disgraceful and immoral conduct.51 Thus, any finding of liability for sexual
harassment may also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful and
immoral conduct.
With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala
committed sexual harassment, we now determine the proper penalty to
be imposed.
Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that under the
pertinent Civil Service Rules, disgraceful and immoral conduct is
punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year. He also argues that since he is charged administratively,
aggravating or mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated for
purposes of imposing the penalty.
Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year, while the penalty for the second
offense is dismissal.52 On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of
198753 and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service54 both provide that the first
offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension
of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is
punishable by dismissal.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold
office during good behavior until he or she reaches the age of sixty-
five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or
becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office. 55
In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper
disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is a valid cause
for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is
qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to effect
President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral his exoneration. He even puts Domingos character in question and casts
conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose doubt on the morality of the former President who ordered, albeit
a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. As erroneously, his dismissal from the service. Unfortunately for him, these
cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of either the are not significant factors in the disposition of the case. It is his character
administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and that is in question here and sadly, the inquiry showed that he has been
immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one found wanting.
(1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose
upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October 18, 2002
can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026
is AFFIRMED. Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831, 155840,
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage and 158700 areDENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
of his high government position, it still could not validly dismiss him from
the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
SO ORDERED
the Civil Service,56 taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be
considered as an aggravating circumstance57and where only aggravating
and no mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall
be imposed.58 Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on
Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.
Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank
equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is not unavailing that rigid standards
of conduct may be demanded of him. In Talens-Dabon v. Judge
Arceo,59 this Court, in upholding the liability of therein respondent Judge,
said:
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that
complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises
control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took
advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his
lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco
parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the
one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior
position.
In yet another case, this Court declared:
As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more
exacting work ethics. He failed to live up to his higher standard
of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity.
And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his
subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal
for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of
every employer to protect its employees from oversexed
superiors.60
It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on how his
employees should conduct themselves in public office, so that they may
work efficiently in a healthy working atmosphere. Courtesy demands that
he should set a good example.61
18