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ARIMAO vs TAHER
FACTS: Arimao was appointed as Director II, Bureau of Non-
formal Education, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS-ARMM). Thereafter, Taher was appointed
Education Supervisor II. Arimaos appointment, however, was
protested on the ground that said appointment did not pass
through any evaluation by the personnel selection
board. Arimaos appointment was eventually disapproved by
the Civil Service Commission-Field Office for failure to meet
the experience required for the position. The CSC affirmed the
findings of the CSC-FO and ordered Arimao to be reverted to
her former position of Education Supervisor II. 2She sought
reconsideration of the decision.
Arimao was granted a study for one year but she came back
as Supervisor II about a year after the expiration of her leave.
Her motion was denied. Arimao and Taher both reported as
Education Supervisor II. Taher filed a complaint against
Arimao relative to her continued absence. She was declared
AWOL and was dropped from the payroll. The Regional Vice
Governor/Acting Governor ordered her to reassume her
former position as Supervisor II.
Taher filed a Petition for prohibition as she stands to suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury if she is removed from
the office which she has held for more than 5 years.
ISSUE: Who, as between Arimao and Taher, is entitled to the
position of Education Supervisor?
HELD: Neither Arimao and Taher is entitled to the position of
Education Supervisor II.
Arimao cannot be reinstated by mere directive of the ARMM
Regional Governor. With the finality of the AWOL order and
her having been dropped from the rolls, is no longer disputed.
Thus, as found by CSC in its Resolution No. 020743, Tesda has
no legal obligation to reinstate Arimao to the position of
Supervisor II. This however should not be construed as a
declaration that Taher is entitled to the position as Supervisor
II.
Section 13, Rule 6 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V, E.O. 292, provides:
All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be
submitted simultaneously for approval by the Commission.
The disapproval of the appointment of a person proposed to a
higher position invalidates the promotion of those in lower
positions and automatically restores them to their former
positions. However, the affected persons are entitled to the
payment of salaries for services actually rendered at a rate
fixed in their promotional appointments.
As a chain reaction of the disapproval of petitioners
promotional appointment as Director II, respondents
appointment to Education Supervisor II was likewise
invalidated. The efficacy of respondents appointment was
dependent on the validity of petitioners promotional
appointment which in turn was subject to the outcome of the
protest against it.
Thus, as of 17 October 1998or the date of finality of the
denial of the petition questioning the disapproval of
petitioners appointment as Director IIboth petitioner and
respondent were reverted to their former positions. Petitioner
should have been allowed to re-assume her position of
Education Supervisor II as of the said date, and thereafter
remain in the said office until she was dropped from the rolls
in 1999. Respondent, in turn, should have been made to
return to her former position.
Indeed, for all intents and purposes, respondent became the
Education Supervisor II by virtue of her appointment as such
on 25 July 1995. However, her tenure ended when petitioner
was reverted to the same position on 17 October 1998. Thus,
during respondents occupancy of the position of Education
Supervisor II after petitioners promotional appointment had
been disapproved, respondent should be deemed a de
facto officer only. 43 A de facto officer is "one who has the
reputation of being the officer he assumes and yet is not a
good officer in point of law." He is one who is in possession of
the office and discharging its duties under color of authority,
and by color of authority is meant that derived from an
election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so
that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. 44 The difference
between the basis of the authority of a de jure officer and that
of a de facto officer is that one rests on right, the other on
reputation. 45
In Monroy v. Court of Appeals, et al., 46 this Court ruled that a
rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de
facto officer the salary received by the latter during the time
of his wrongful tenure. A de facto officer,not having a good
title, takes the salaries at his risk and must, therefore,
account to the de jure officer for whatever salary he received
during the period of his wrongful tenure. 47 In the instant case,
respondent should account to petitioner for the salaries she
received from the time the disapproval of petitioners
promotion became final, up to the time when petitioner was
declared on AWOL and dropped from the rolls. However,
respondent may be allowed to keep the emoluments she
received during said period, there being no de jure officer at
the time, 48following our ruling in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, 49 to wit:
[I]n cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer
who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to
the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate
action recover the salary, fees and other compensations
attached to the office. 50
There is no question that Taher discharged the duties of
Education Supervisor II from the time she was appointed to
the position and even after her appointment was invalidated
as a result of the invalidation of Arimaos promotional
appointment. In view of the services respondent rendered to
the TESDA and the people of the ARMM, it would be iniquitous
to deny her the salary appertaining to the position
corresponding to the period of her service.
All the same, however, Taher cannot continue her
unauthorized occupancy, notwithstanding the fact that the
position of Education Supervisor II has been vacant since
1999. Absent any showing that she has been reappointed to
the position after petitioner was declared AWOL and dropped
from the rolls, Taher cannot lay a valid claim thereto.
MENZON VS PETILLA
FACTS: On February 16, 1988, by virtue of the fact that no
Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, the
Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated the
Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of
Leyte.
On March 25, 1988, Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated by
Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the
province of Leyte.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued a resolution where it
held invalid the appointment of Menzon as acting Vice-
Governor of Leyte. The Regional Director of the Department
of Local Government, wrote a letter that the resolution be
modified and salary be paid to Menzon as acting Vice-
Governor of Leyte. The Acting Governor and SP refused to
correct the resolution. Menzon filed a petition for the
nullification of Resolution.
In the meantime, however, the issue on the governorship of
Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the
Governor of the province of Leyte.
During the pendency of the petition, more particularly on May
16, 1990, the provincial treasurer of Leyte, Florencio Luna
allowed the payment to the petitioner of his salary as acting
Vice-Governor of Leyte in the amount of P17,710.00, for the
actual services rendered by the petitioner as acting Vice-
Governor.
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On August 28, 1990, this Court dismissed the petition filed by
Aurelio D. Menzon.
On September 6, 1990, Leopoldo Petilla, by virtue of the
above resolution requested Governor Larrazabal to direct
Menzon to pay back to the province of Leyte all the
emoluments and compensation which he received while
acting as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. Menzon filed a motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON Menzon is entitled to the emoluments for his
services rendered as designated acting vice-governor under
the principles of good faith, simple justice and equity? YES
HELD: By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this
case, the mode of succession provided in LG Code for
permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a
temporary vacancy in the same office.
In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy. Menzon is a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the
highest number of votes. The Department Secretary acted
correctly in extending the temporary appointment.
Menzons right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of
the Vice Governor is indubitable. The compensation, however,
to be remunerated to Menzon, following the example in
Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative
Code, and pursuant to the proscription against double
compensation must only be such additional compensation as,
with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized
by law for the Office of the Vice-Governor.
And finally, even granting that the President, acting through
the Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power to
appoint Menzon, at the very least, the petitioner is a de
facto officer entitled to compensation.
There is no denying that Menzon assumed the Office of the
Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment. As
revealed by the records, Menzon was appointed by no less
than the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local
Government, after which he took his oath of office before
Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local
Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra.
Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The
respondents themselves acknowledged the validity of
Menzon's appointment and dealt with him as such. It was only
when the controversial Resolution No. 505 was passed by the
same persons who recognized him as the acting Vice-
Governor that the validity of the appointment of Menzon was
made an issue and the recognition withdrawn.
Menzon, for a long period of time, exercised the duties
attached to the Office of the Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed
as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the principle of public
policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic
considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now
deny him the salary due him for the services he actually
rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order
No. 284 which contains a provision allowing members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation of not more
than two positions. Petitioner maintains that EO 284 is
unconstitutional being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. Sec. 13 prohibits the President, VP,
members of the cabinet and their deputies and assistants to
hold any other office during their tenure unless otherwise
provided by the Consitution.
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is
being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission
that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than
those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners,
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by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other
office or employment in Government are those provided in
the Constitution.
Petitioners insist that because of the phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII,
the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON EO 284 is unconstitutional? YES.
HELD: Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil
service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law
or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when
expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words,
Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot
possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section
7, Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution
must not, however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided
by law and as required 22 by the primary functions of said
officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise
"any other office" within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of
additional duties and functions on said officials. 23
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not
to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of the concerned
official's office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by
virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual
character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-
officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character,
or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the
office." 27 An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a
member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without
further warrant or appointment.
The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the
order of importance and thus means chief or principal
function. If the functions required to be performed are merely
incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or
otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official,
such additional functions would fall under the purview of "any
other office" prohibited by the Constitution.
It bears repeating though that in order that such additional
duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition
embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
such additional duties or functions must be required by the
primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform
the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without
receiving any additional compensation therefor.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the
official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The reason
is that these services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office.
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In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII
in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to
not more than two (2) positions in the government and
government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually
allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
As earlier clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the
executive official concerned without additional compensation
as provided by law and as required by the primary functions
of his office do not fall under the definition of "any other
office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition.
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm,
the court hereby orders to immediately relinquish their other
offices or employment, as herein defined, in the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents
may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to
emoluments for actual services rendered. 46 It has been held
that "in cases where there is no de jure,officer, a de
facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the
office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is
legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an
appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other
compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is,
undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems
unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an
officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any
one for such services.
MALALUAN vs EVANGELISTA
FACTS: Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent
Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in
the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the
Synchronized National and Local Elections held on May 11,
1992. Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor for having garnered
10,498 votes as against Malaluans 9,792 votes. Malauan filed
an election protest with the Regional Trial Court. The trial
court declared Malaluan as the duly elected municipal mayor.
Malaluan immediately assumed office through an Execution
Pending Appeal. Evangelista appealed to COMELEC.
COMELEC ordered Malaluan to vacate the office and so
declared Evangelista to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor
of said municipality. Malauan was ordered to pay as part of
damages constituting salary and other emoluments from
March, 1994 to April, 1995 that would have accrued to him
had there not been an execution of the trial courts decision
pending appeal therefrom in the COMELEC.
ISSUE: WON Malauan is a de facto officer? WON he is entitled
to salary?
Malaluan was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one
who undertakes to act officially without any color of right,
[31]
the Malaluan exercised the duties of an elective office
under color of election thereto. [32] It matters not that it was
the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared Malaluan as
the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral
process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral
contests. At the risk of sounding repetitive, if only to
emphasize this point, we must reiterate that the decision of a
judicial body is no less a basis than the proclamation made by
the COMELEC-convened Board of Canvassers for a winning
candidates right to assume office, for both are undisputedly
legally sanctioned. We deem Malaluan, therefore, to be a de
facto officer who, in good faith, has a possession of the office
and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto [33] and is
thus legally entitled to the emoluments of the office.
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The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that
notwithstanding his subsequent ouster as a result of an
election protest, an elective official who has been proclaimed
by the COMELEC as winner in an electoral contest and who
assumed office and entered into the performance of the
duties of that office, is entitled to the compensation,
emoluments and allowances legally provided for the position.
ISSUE: WON Malaluan should be liable for damages?
We have painstakingly gone over the records of this case and
we can attribute to petitioner no breach of contract or quasi-
contract; or tortious act nor crime that may make him liable
for actual damages. Neither has private respondent been
able to point out to a specific provision of law authorizing a
money claim for election protest expenses against the losing
party.
Malaluan should not be held liable for damages. Section 259
of the Omnibus Election Code mandates that the award for
compensatory damages is allowed only if it is duly proven that
the losing party is directly and indirectly had committed any
wrongful or unlawful breach of obligation, which resulted to
his proclamation. In the instant case, such was not proven.
Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code only provides for
the granting in election cases of actual and compensatory
damages in accordance with law. The victorious party in an
election case cannot be indemnified for expenses which he
has incurred in an electoral contest in the absence of a
wrongful act or omission or breach of obligation clearly
attributable to the losing party. Evidently, if any damage had
been suffered by private respondent due to the execution
ofjudgment pending appeal, that damage may be said to be
equivalent to damnum absque injuria, which is, damage
without injury, or damage or injury inflicted without injustice,
or loss or damage without violation of a legal right, or a wrong
done to a man for which the law provides no remedy.
TARROSA vs SINGSON
FACTS: Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko
Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos on July 2, 1993, effective
on July 6, 1993.
Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer," filed a petition for prohibition
questioning the appointment of r Gabriel Singson as Governor
of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Tarrosa
argues that Singson's appointment is null and void since it
was not submitted for confirmation to the Commission on
Appointments. The petition is anchored on the provisions of
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653 which provides that the
appointment of the Governor shall be subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.
Respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative
powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the
Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said
position is not among the appointments which have to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, citing Section
16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON Tarrosa has the capacity to challenge the
appointment of Singson? NO.
HELD: The instant petition is in the nature of a quo
warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent
Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or
exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral.
Such a special civil action can only be commenced by the
Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a
public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by
another.
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A person not claiming to be entitled to a public office or
position unlawfully held or exercised by another could not
bring the action for quo warranto to oust another from said
office as a mere usurper.
ISSUE: WON the appointment of Singson was validly made?
YES
HELD: In Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254 (1992) we ruled
that Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers
of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation
of appointment of other government officials not expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of
the Constitution.
MENDOZA vs ALLAS
FACTS: Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in
1972. He was appointed Customs Service Chief of the
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS) which
was further classified as Director III.
Later, he was temporarily designated as Acting District
Collector. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as
"Acting Director III" of the CIIS. Despite Mendoza's new
assignment as Acting District Collector, however, he
continued to receive the salary and benefits of the position of
Director III.
In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy
Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his
termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of
respondent Allas' appointment as Director III by President
Fidel V. Ramos.
Mendoza wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his
reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of
seniority rights. A decision was rendered granting the
petition.
Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. Allas was promoted
by President Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of
Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a consequence
of this promotion, Mendoza moved to dismiss respondent's
appeal as having been rendered moot and academic. The
Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case
accordingly.
The decision of the trial court had long become final and
executory, and Mendoza prays for its execution. The court
denied the motion on the ground that the contested position
vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by
Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo
warranto petition.
He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite
respondent Olores' appointment because the subject position
was never vacant to begin with. Mendoza's removal was
illegal and he was deemed never to have vacated his office
when respondent Allas was appointed to the
same. Respondent Allas' appointment was null and void and
this nullity allegedly extends to respondent Olores, his
successor-in-interest.[20]
ISSUE: WON Olores should be ousted from his position upon
the allegation that the nullity of the position held extends to
the successor in interest? NO.
HELD: The rule that a judgment against a public officer in
regard to a public right binds his successor-in-office is not
applicable in quo warranto cases.
A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's
successor in office, even though such successor may trace his
title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the
writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as
such, but always against the person-- to determine whether
he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any
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act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays
claim.[22]
In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by
petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed
out before the trial court was the qualification and right of
Mendoza to the contested position as against respondent Ray
Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did
not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision.
Note: Olores is not a party to the proceeding. BOC being not
impleaded as party.
XXX
Special Civil Action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of
the Revised Rules of Court: Quo warranto is a demand made
by the state upon some individual or corporation to show by
what right they exercise some franchise or privilege
appertaining to the state which, according to the Constitution
and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by
virtue of a grant or authority from the state. [9] In other words,
a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the
right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office
and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not
well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the
privilege.[10] The action may be commenced for the
Government by the Solicitor General or the fiscal [11] against
individuals who usurp a public office, against a public officer
whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office,
and against an association which acts as a corporation
without being legally incorporated.[12] The action may also be
instituted by an individual in his own name who claims to be
entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully
held or exercised by another.[13]
Where the action is filed by a private person, he must
prove that he is entitled to the controverted position,
otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed
possession of the office.[14] If the court finds for the
respondent, the judgment should simply state that the
respondent is entitled to the office. [15] If, however, the court
finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of
usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising
the office, judgment may be rendered as follows:
"Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the
defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or
unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right,
privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such
defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and
that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may be, recover his
costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining
the respective rights in and to the office, position, right,
privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice
requires."
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