G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922
When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the
defendant to the information that initiated this case and in which the appellee
is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in
Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which
so held and dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling
is erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as said
court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction
over crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels
anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes
committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in
the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the
territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed
in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such
circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within
territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains
in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence
prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines
which is now a territory of the United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch
[U. S.], 116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
. . .
would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and
would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government
to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe
temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the
jurisdiction of the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an
offense or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial
waters of any other country, but when she came within three miles
of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to
Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of
principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana
ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.;
Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then
subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such
limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the
proper political agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali
and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was
said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder
which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be
dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship,
but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and,
if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the
local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine which
of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much
will undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the
particular case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a
subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities
are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no
right to interfere to prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the
Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local
port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the
courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when
the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed
 from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open
violation of the laws of the land is committed with respect to which,
as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime, no court other than that established in the
said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an
agreement under an international treaty.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise
to renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect
so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in
question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties,
Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:
the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is
simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of
the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into the
port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke
opium on board.
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special
findings as to costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ.,
concur.

There shall be between the territories of the United States of

America, and all the territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a
reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries,
respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with
their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the
territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to
come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts
of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses
and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and,
generally, the merchants and traders of each nation respectively
shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their
commerce, but subject always to the laws and statutes of the two
countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation
Convention.)

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in
transit was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the
primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines
against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being
about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates
avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of
the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established,
because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our
territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-
General aptly observes:

. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a

foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of