CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 1
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW - MANILA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES
ARTICLE III Bill of Rights
SECTION 1
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
PEOPLE vs. VERA
Is probation and pardon the same? NO
The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete
liberty, and may be far from it. It is really a new mode of punishment,
to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in substitution of the
imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws. For this reason
its application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying
out the law deemed applicable to the offense. The executive act of
pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal law, which binds and
directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no
conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality
of the Probation Act for this cause.
Distinguish probation from reprieve and commutation of sentence
That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the
power of the Governor to grant reprieves is settled by the decisions of
the various courts; it being held that the distinction between a
"reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones
the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is
for an indefinite time.
The undue delegation of power to provincial boards
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the
power of suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their
respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions provided that
laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its authority.
What is Equal Protection of the Laws?
The equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme
Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."
Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of
the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will
cover every case can be formulated.
Classification on a reasonable basis
Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in
prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made
arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted.
The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences
(1) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(2) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(3) must apply equally to each member of the class.
Obnoxious discrimination in the case at bat
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow
from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although
perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the
example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course
of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund
to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may
refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in
operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that
a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be
liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another
person similarly situated in another province would be denied those
same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination.
May a law appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance?
YES
A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibitions. In other words, statutes may be adjudged
unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If the law has the
effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional.
Section 11 of the Probation Act unconstitutional and void
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is
unconstitutional and void because it is also repugnant to equal-
protection clause of our Constitution.
ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ
Equal Protection Clause
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
Alienage as the root cause of distinction
The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his
adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is
attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we
admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking
in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he
temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard,
sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would
prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting
them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to
his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The
experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter
disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his
profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical
as it may seem.
The power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications
and the application of equal protection clause to a law
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not take from the state the power to classify in the
adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the
wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is
done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and
therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not
offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some
inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if
any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would

sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the
law was enacted must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry
the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any
reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary.
Citizenship as a valid classification
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a
classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the
class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a
higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes
than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the
difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited,
but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in
some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to
be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it could not state
that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed
for the legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the
legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil.
Citing Anton vs. Van Winkle: I have said enough so that obviously it
cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was
without plausible reason for making the classification, and therefore
appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates to the subject of
legislation. . . .
VILLEGAS vs. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO
P50.00 fee is unreasonable and invalid classification
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but
because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation
among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of
the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being
collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or
permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or
a highly paid executive
Ordinance 6537 has no standard and criterion
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to
guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that
where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set
up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no
purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions
for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring
upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the
issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an
undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an
activity per se lawful.
Justice Teehankees Concurring Opinion RE: Employment of Aliens
I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez which affirms
the lower court's judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 of the City
of Manila null and void for the reason that the employment of aliens
within the country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which
properly pertain to the national government officials and agencies
concerned and not to local governments, such as the City of Manila,
which after all are mere creations of the national government.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 2
PEOPLE vs. CAYAT
Requisites of Reasonable Classification
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements
Under the first requisite
The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary
or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or
parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of
civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to
religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more
directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities." This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the
Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-
Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who
at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their
Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the
classification thus established.
Under the second requisite
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The
prohibition is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in
and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of
the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free
use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have
often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts
of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
Under the third requisite
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the
time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as
those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for
appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are
"impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the
Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow
process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection
and security.
Under the fourth requisite
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is
evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation
against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of
culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
In Connection with Due Process
Due process of law means simply:
(1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the
general powers of the legislative department of the
government;
(2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation;
(3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and
(4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or
to all of the class.
NOTE: the property sought to be prohibited in this case constitutes
corpus delicti

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC
Equal protection guarantee in the case at bar
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard
of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee
of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If
the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one
class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been
validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to
require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the
time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not
be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has
intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence
of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand,
it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good
elective local officials.
Retirement as disqualification
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also
be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may
neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old
retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not
a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired
from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify
him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as
provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood
assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is
present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired
employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the
same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he
would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality
will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just
as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit
of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons
similarly situated are sinlilarly treated.
Another consideration
Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned
provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. Courts are
practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be
declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear
beyond reasonable doubt
Chief Justice Fernandos Concurring Opinion RE: Equal Protection
Citing J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration: "It
suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons
under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the
same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if
not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding on the rest. 10 It cannot be denied that others similarly fall
under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely. The most
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 3
that can be said is that he falls within the-proscribed class. The point
was likewise raised as to why should national officials be excluded in
the above provision. The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent
the legislative body from following a system of priorities. This it did
under the challenged legislative provision. In its opinion, what called
for such a measure is the propensity of the local officials having
reached the retirement age and having received retirement benefits
once again running for public office.
Justice Teehankees Dissenting Opinion RE Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause
To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired
elective local official from running for the same elective office (of
governor, in this case) previously held by him and from which he has
retired is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Persons similarly
situated are not similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or
councilor of 65 is entitled to run for governor (because the
disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run for the
same elective office from which he retired) but petitioner is barred
from doing so (although he may run for any other lesser office). Both
are 65 and are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of
governor. What is the valid distinction? Is this not an arbitrary
discrimination against petitioner who has cause to that "the aforesaid
provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of
petition to make a political comeback as governor of Nueva
Vizcaya 1 (since no other case by a former governor similarly barred
by virtue of said provision can never be cited 2 ). Is there not here,
therefore a gross denial of the cardinal constitutional guarantee that
equal protection and security shall be given under the law to every
person, under analogous if not Identical circumstances?
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs.
DRILON
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
Distinction between Sexes
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to
"female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality
before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect
Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that
(1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
(4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
Under the first requisite
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy
plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially
domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in
not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of
maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and
various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning
workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As
precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon
to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court
sustains the Government's efforts.
Under the second requisite
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the
purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed
objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for
Filipino female overseas workers"

Under the third requisite
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it
is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This
is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative
and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."),
meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed
with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-
gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on
the circumstances of each case.
Under the fourth requisite
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to
all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all
Filipina workers" is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the
ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been
unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are
similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the
singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing
class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair
advantage to another person or group of persons.
QUINTO vs. COMELEC
Not violative of the equal protection clause
We now hold that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
Citing FARINAS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
In Farinas, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act,
in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was
assailed on the ground, among others, that it unduly discriminates
against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed Section 67
(i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in respect of elected officials) of
the Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are no longer
considered ipso facto resigned from their respective offices upon their
filing of certificates of candidacy. In contrast, since Section 66 was not
repealed, the limitation on appointive officials continues to be
operative they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of
candidacy.
The petitioners in Farinas thus brought an equal protection challenge
against Section 14, with the end in view of having the deemed-resigned
provisions apply equally to both elected and appointive officials. We
held, however, that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a
reasonable classification, as there are material and significant
distinctions between the two classes of officials.
Does equal protection clause demand absolute equality? NO
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 4
Substantial distinction between elective and appointed officials
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.
On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive
officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.
Distinction under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil
Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292)
appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are
strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or
take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision,
elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are
obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral
activities.
Applying Stare decisis in the case at bar
The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle
is that our assailed Decision gave it new life. We ought to be guided
by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine,
which is really adherence to precedents, mandates that once a case has
been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same
point at issue should be decided in the same manner.
Farinas Ruling is not a mere obiter dictum
This rule applies to all pertinent questions that are presented and
resolved in the regular course of the consideration of the case and lead
up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to the matter on
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
which the decision is predicated. For that reason, a point expressly
decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition
of the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground; or even
though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might
have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point,
otherwise than it did.
In posing an equal protection challenge
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must
convincingly show that the law creates a classification that is palpably
arbitrary or capricious. He must refute all possible rational bases for
the differing treatment, whether or not the Legislature cited those bases
as reasons for the enactment, such that the constitutionality of the law
must be sustained even if the reasonableness of the classification is
fairly debatable.
Citing the Overruled MANCUSO vs. TAFT
Pathetically, our assailed Decision, relying on Mancuso, claimed:
(1) The right to run for public office is inextricably linked with two
fundamental freedoms freedom of expression and association;
(2) Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this
fundamental right must be subjected to strict equal protection review;
and
(3) While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty
and impartiality of its public work force, the deemed-resigned
provisions pursue their objective in a far too heavy-handed manner as
to render them unconstitutional.
It then concluded with the exhortation that since the Americans, from
whom we copied the provision in question, had already stricken down

a similar measure for being unconstitutional, it is high-time that we,
too, should follow suit.
Citing LETTER CARRIERS
A related concern, and this remains as important as any other, was to
further serve the goal that employment and advancement in the
Government service not depend on political performance, and at the
same time to make sure that Government employees would be free from
pressure and from express or tacit invitation to vote in a certain way
or perform political chores in order to curry favor with their superiors
rather than to act out their own beliefs. It may be urged that
prohibitions against coercion are sufficient protection; but for many
years the joint judgment of the Executive and Congress has been that
to protect the rights of federal employees with respect to their jobs and
their political acts and beliefs it is not enough merely to forbid one
employee to attempt to influence or coerce another. For example, at
the hearings in 1972 on proposed legislation for liberalizing the
prohibition against political activity, the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission stated that the prohibitions against active participation in
partisan political management and partisan political campaigns
constitute the most significant safeguards against coercion . . .. Perhaps
Congress at some time will come to a different view of the realities of
political life and Government service; but that is its current view of the
matter, and we are not now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in our
view, does the Constitution forbid it.
Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political
activities is absolute in any event.
Citing BROADRICK
Whatever other problems there are with s 818, it is all but frivolous to
suggest that the section fails to give adequate warning of what
activities it proscribes or fails to set out explicit standards' for those
who must apply it. In the plainest language, it prohibits any state
classified employee from being an officer or member of a partisan
political club or a candidate for any paid public office. It forbids
solicitation of contributions for any political organization, candidacy
or other political purpose and taking part in the management or affairs
of any political party or in any political campaign. Words inevitably
contain germs of uncertainty and, as with the Hatch Act, there may be
disputes over the meaning of such terms in s 818 as partisan, or take
part in, or affairs of political parties. But what was said in Letter
Carriers, is applicable here: there are limitations in the English
language with respect to being both specific and manageably brief, and
it seems to us that although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent
on finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary
person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand
and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest.'
Constitutionality of Resign-to-Run Laws
We hold, however, that his position is belied by a plain reading of these
cases. Contrary to his claim, Letter Carriers,
Broadrick and Mancuso all concerned the constitutionality of
resign-to-run laws
Doctrine of Substantial Overbreadth
Under Broadrick, when one who challenges a law has engaged in
constitutionally unprotected conduct (rather than unprotected speech)
and when the challenged law is aimed at unprotected conduct, "the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 5
Interests protected by the Deemed-Resigned Provision
(i) efficient civil service faithful to the government and the
people rather than to party;
(ii) avoidance of the appearance of political justice as to
policy;
(iii) avoidance of the danger of a powerful political
machine; and
(iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their
merits and that they be free from both coercion and the
prospect of favor from political activity).
Determining Restrictions on Partisan Political Activities
Indeed, the Morial court even quoted Broadrick and stated that:
In any event, the legislature must have some leeway in determining
which of its employment positions require restrictions on partisan
political activities and which may be left unregulated. And a State can
hardly be faulted for attempting to limit the positions upon which such
restrictions are placed. (citations omitted)
Application on Barangay Elections
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed
resignation rule, under the present state of law, there would be no
occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of
Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For
this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA
9369 must also fail.
BIRAOGO vs. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
Violative of the Equal Protection Clause
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply
equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling
out the previous administration as its sole object makes the PTC an
adventure in partisan hostility. Thus, in order to be accorded with
validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and
corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former
President Arroyo.
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner.
Purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person
within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or
by its improper execution through the states duly constituted
authorities.
Scope of the Equal Protection Clause
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and
extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws,
through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 6

For classification to meet constitutionality ALMONTE vs. VAZQUEZ

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it
must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made
with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class
should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered
by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an
individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long
as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not
justify the non-application of the law to him.
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only,
or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the
class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave
out or underinclude those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification.
The clear intent of the PTC being violative
The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate
and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is just a member of class
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration
is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations.
It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
Not violative of the Equal Protection Clause
Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved
parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or
sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in
proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters
suffice to start an investigation.
In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because
it is provided in the Constitution itself.
In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of
complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the
Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people
which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings.
As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman
is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of
the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public
officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay
or dismiss investigations held against them.
On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and
simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
ORMOC SUGAR CO., INC vs. TREASURER OR ORMOC CITY
Classification is unreasonable
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned
ordinance does not meet them (requisites of classification), for it taxes
only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's
enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar
central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,

JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)

reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing
and selective retribution. ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff,
Physical and Legal Impossibility & Reasonable Prioritization for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly
or that the earlier reports involving the earlier administrations were points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be
already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased levied upon.
presidents and cases which have already prescribed can no longer be
the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to
conduct simultaneous investigations of previous administrations,
given the bodys limited time and resources. The law does not require
the impossible (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).

Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court

logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys
worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order
No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its
mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations. While reasonable
prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck
down for being unconstitutional.

Discretion of the President

Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the
scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and
corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not
guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded
mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice
of the President. If he would decide not to include them, the section
would then be meaningless.