Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant.

Valeriano V. Rovira for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor for
appellee.

PARAS, C. J.:

Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused an, after trial, convicted of the crime of illegal
possesion of fire-arms in the Court of First Instance of Lanao under the following information:

That on or about June 8, 1954, in the Municipality of Marantao, Province of Lanao, Republic
of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep and have his custody
and control one Riot Gun, Winchester, 12 GA. SN-924131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions,
without firs having obtained in proper license or permit therefore from competent authority.

In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership and of the firearm and ammunitions in
question, invokes as his legal excuse or authority therefor, the appointment issued him by Governor
Dimakuta as secret agent on October 1, 1953, which reads as follows: 1awphi1.net

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

For having shown good faith by previously surrending to this Office a firearm, Datu
Sumaguina Macarandang of Kamalig, Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET
AGENT of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes. Accordingly, he is hereby
authorized to hold and carry in his possession one (1) Riot Winchester Shotgun, 12 GA.
Serial No. 942131 with twenty(20) rounds of ammunitions for the successful execution of his
hazardous mission.

Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me from time to time all activities
and whereabouts of lawless and wanted elements roaming in the Municipal District of
Marantoa, as well as all matters affecting tranquility therein existing. lawphi 1.net

It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm
license or permit; but section 879 of the Revise Administrative Code provides, as shown at lease by
the subject matter therefor, that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment of the accused as secret agent to the
assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes, sufficiently put him
within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by section 879.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and accused acquitted, with costs de officio. So
ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo. Labrador and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor
O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not
the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. We hold that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962
reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section
878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control
one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition,
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding
authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the
counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the
gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we
can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm
without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an
assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that
only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be
"whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on
their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal.
22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession
on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically:
"Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and
his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the
accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the
Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document
likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila,
Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret
agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov.
Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was
"willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and
qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of
firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda. 1wph1.t

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of
the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one
year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from
him are forfeited in favor of the Government."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be
affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to
. . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued
to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt.
Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction
and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on
appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered
by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the
clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts
with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Angeles, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-22301. August 30, 1967.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, Defendant-

Appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant and Appellant.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Asst. Solicitor General F .R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C .
Hernandez for plaintiff and appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DUTY OF COURTS TO APPLY THE LAW; WHEN A LAW SHOULD BE
CONSTRUED AND INTERPRETED. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them.

2. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; LICENSE REQUIREMENT; SECRET AGENT NOT EXEMPT; CASE AT
BAR. As secret agent is not included in the enumeration in Section 897 of the Revised Administrative
Code of persons who are not prohibited in Section 878, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4, from possessing "any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition," appellant is not exempt from the requirement of license.

3. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE IN PEOPLE V. MACARANDANG OVERRULED. Reliance of the accused in the case at
bar on People v. Macarandang, 106 Phil. 713, where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the
assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a `peace officer
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 897," is misplaced. It is
not within the power of the Supreme Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory
provision.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the
appointment to and the holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute
a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold
that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading
as follows: "The undersigned accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection
with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as
further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August,
1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in
his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial
number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit
therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the
counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun
involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit
the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit
issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not
question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be
submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not
required to get a license for his firearm." cralaw vi rtua1aw l ibra ry

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the documents so that he could pass on their
authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver
with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13,
1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the
correspondent authority?" The accused now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon
which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also
affirms that the accused admits." cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the
accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment as secret agent of the Hon.
Feliciano Leviste, then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; 1 another document likewise issued by
Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a
confidential mission; 2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent; 3 a certificate dated March 11,
1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste. 4 Counsel for the accused then
stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of
whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt
from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given
time to file their respective memoranda.

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime
of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to
two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of
the Government." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specially allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." 5 The next
section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of
the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered" when
such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their
official duties." 6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task
is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them." 7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside. Accused however would rely on
People v. Macarandang, 8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the
appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns
and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not
within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the
extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer
speaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Angeles, JJ., concur.

Ruling:The appellant was acquitted.Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws,
are nevertheless evidence of what the law means; this is the reasonwhy Article 8 of the New Civil Code
provides that, Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of
the legal system. The interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court constitutes in a way a part of the
law as of the date the law was originally passed,since the courts construction merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate.
The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim

legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet

the interpretation placed upon thewritten law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine
laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land, at
the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm and when he was arraigned by the trial court.
It is true that thedoctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
enunciated in Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his
possession of said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The appellant may not be punished
for anact which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. _____________________*The
accused were acquitted for through their appointment as confidential/secret agent they were

deemed

to be peace officers. Peace officers had the privilege of carrying firearms without license.**Mapa was
convicted although he was a secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that the law did not explicitly
provide that secret/confidential agents are among those who are exempted from acquiring a license to
carry a firearm

Let us advert to Our decisions in

People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra,

and
People v. Mapa, supra

. In

Macarandang

, We reversedthe trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at
the time he was found to possess a certain firearm andammunition without license or permit, he had an
appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace
andorder and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and
ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that theGovernor has no authority to issue any
firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
"peaceofficers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess
firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agentto assist in the maintenance of peace and
order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent
even toa member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are
exempted from the requirements relating to theissuance of license to possess firearms. In

Lucero

, We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearmto
the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to
effect the capture of a Huk leader. In

Mapa

,expressly abandoning the doctrine in

Macarandang

, and by implication, that in

Lucero,

We sustained the judgment of conviction on the followingground:The law is explicit that except as
thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess any firearm,detached
parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used
in themanufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4, RevisedAdministrative Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly
and lawfully issued to officers,soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of
suchofficials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised
Administrative Code.)The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he
is not exempt. ... .It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial
Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the ProvincialCommander in 1964, the prevailing
doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in

People v. Macarandang

(1959) and

People v. Lucero

(1958).Our decision in

People v. Mapa

reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant
be acquittedon the basis of Our rulings in

Macarandang

and

Lucero

, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the

Macarandang

and

Lucero

doctrine in

Mapa

? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed
judgment.Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what
the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ."
Theinterpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law
originally passed, since this Court's constructionmerely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerousauthorities
is a restatement of legal maxim "

legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet

" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competentcourt has the force of law. The
doctrine laid down in
Lucero

and

Macarandang

was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at thetime appellant was found in
possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the
doctrine was overruled inthe

Mapa

case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in theconstruction and application of
criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the
guidance of society.It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess afirearm pursuant to the prevailing
doctrine enunciated in

Macarandang

and

Lucero

, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possessionof said firearm in spite of the absence of
a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for
anact which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed
from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs

de oficio

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo,

ernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,

vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-
appellee.

Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:p

Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in
Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and
one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in
issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v.
Mapa. 1

The complaint filed against the accused reads:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the
poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not
authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his
possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with
one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary
permit or license to possess the same.

At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial
was accordingly held.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed
to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment
as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential
Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them
the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His
appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:

Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be
an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and
order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of
trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the
detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the
undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you have
qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally
of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in
this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be
clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered
sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate
separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a
firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of
your duties.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by
taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.

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FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:

Kind: ROHM-Revolver

Make: German

SN: 64

Cal: .22

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas
as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted
persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order
condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to
possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the
performance of his duties.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs.
Macarandang 2 and People vs. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of
record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial
Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and
carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated
December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground
that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and
abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the
appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.

Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero,

supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of
conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a
certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial
Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of
crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that
while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit,
nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and
Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and
detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero,
We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to
the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to
effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and
by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful
for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition
therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended
by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that
"firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards
in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms
are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of
their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he
is not exempt. ... .

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in
1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the
matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our
decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in
this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero,
or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he
accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law
originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time
appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial
court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that
the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his
possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be
absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held
not to be punishable.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with
costs de oficio.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-30061. February 27, 1974.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, Defendant-

Appellant.

Solicitor General Felix V . Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino, for Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

ANTONIO, J.:

Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case
No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2)
years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction
based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa. 1
The complaint filed against the accused reads: jgc:chanrob les.com .ph

"That on or about 9:00 oclock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of
Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep
in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG-8 German made with one (1) live
ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the
same." cralaw virtua1aw l ibrary

At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was
accordingly held.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition
described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from
the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial
Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the
firearm in question.

Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His
appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads: jgc:chan roble s.com. ph

"Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective agent in
the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of Batangas, especially
with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling,
robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the
undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position.
As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the
preservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month.
It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient
ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1969, you will
have the right to bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of
your duties.

"By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your oath of
office and filing the original thereof with us.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTE

Provincial Governor

FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

Kind: ROHM-Revolver

Make: German

SN: 64

Cal: .22"

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as
Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities wanted persons, loose
firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that night affect the peace and order condition in Batangas
province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess an ROHM revolver,
Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of official duties.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret
Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he
was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts decisions in People v. Macarandang 2 and
People v. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while conceding that on the basis of the evidence of record the accused
had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC
Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the firearm described
in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for
illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the
cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People v. Mapa, supra. The court
considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent.

Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v.
Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial courts judgment of conviction against the accused
because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without
license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said
firearm and ammunition. We there held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any
firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace
officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and
Macarandangs appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection
of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the
municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the
circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary
means to carry out the lawful purpose of the battalion commander and must be deemed incident to or
necessarily included in the duty and power of said military commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader.
In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We
sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground: jgc:chan robles. com.ph

"The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, it shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition. (Sec. 878, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that firearms and
ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal
police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails, are not covered when such firearms are in possession
of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties. (Sec. 879, Revised
Administrative Code.)

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. . . ." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and
Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid
down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa
reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be
acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of
the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first
view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean,
and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ." The interpretation upon a law by this
Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Courts
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends
to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis
interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of
the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found by possession of the firearm in question and when he
was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary
that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant was conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in
spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must he absolved. Certainly, appellant may
not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de
oficio.

Zaldivar, Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., did not take part.

Endnotes:

1. L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.

2. 106 Phil. (1959), 713.

3. Phil (1958), 500.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.

Ernesto C. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Trial
Attorney Josefina Domingo de Leon for appellee.

CONCEPCION, JR., J:
Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of illegal possesion of firearms
and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and
to pay the costs.

The essential facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 1962, accused Jesus Santayana, was
appointed as "Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On March 9, 1962, a
Memorandum Receipt 2 for equipment was issued in the name of the accused regarding one pistol Melior
SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise issued an undated certification 3 to the
effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said
Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was
authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal
protection. On October 29, 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the above-
described pistol with four rounds of ammunition, cal. 25, without a license to possess them. An
investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused.
The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged with its
corresponding penalty. Hence, the case was appealed to US and the accused assigned three errors
allegedly committed by the trial court in disposing of this case.

Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed are whether or not the present subject matter
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court pursuant to Republic Act No. 2613; and
whether or not the appointment of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently
authorizes him to carry and posses firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit
corresponding thereto.

Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that under Section 87 of Republic Act No. 286,
as amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice over cases of illegal possession of firearms. But
equally the Court of First Instance of Manila, which took cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over
the offense charged because under Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296, Court of First Instance have
original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for
more than six (6) months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense
charged in the information is punishable by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year
and one (1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than
one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts over Criminal Cases in
which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or fine of not
more than two hundred (P200.00) pesos or both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and
original to said courts. But considering that the offense of illegal possession of firearms with which
the appellant was charged is penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year
and one (1) day or more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than
one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or more than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic Act No.
4), the offense, therefore, does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal
Court. The Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction over the same.

As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that appellant was appointed as CIS
secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. 4 Indeed, appellant was issued a firearm
in the performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. 5 It also appears that appellant
was informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to apply for a license or to register the
said firearm because it was government property and therefore could not legally be registered or licensed
in appellant's name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant received the firearm also informed
the latter that no permit to carry the pistol was necessary "because you are already appointed as CIS
agent."
At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in the case of
People vs. Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to assist
in the maintenace of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the
category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by
Section 879." The case of People vs. Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on
August 30, 1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant's appointment
as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.

Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the decision
appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero is hereby acquitted.
The bond for his provisional release is cancelled. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Exhibit 1, p. 52, Rollo.

2 Exhibit 2, p. 53, Rollo.

3 Exhibit 3, p. 54, Rollo.

4 Exhibit 1 reads:

You are hereby accredited as Special Agent without regular

compensation. This designation does not confer upon you police
powers and authority to make investigations provided by Section 848
of the Revised Administrative Code nor does it entitled you to
(possess and carry firearms or) take free rides in any public
conveyances. ..." (The parentheses are ours and the words within
were crossed out and initialed by Col. Jose C. Maristela, Chief, CIS,
who signed appellant's appointment.)

5 Exhibit 2 reads:

I akcnowledged to have received from Captain Adolfo M. Bringas, Inf

(PC) ASO, CIS, HPC, the following property for which I am
responsible, subject to the provisions of the Accounting Law, and will
be used in the office of CIS, HPC: 1 Pistol Melior SN-122137 with one
(1) mag & stock Total value P40.00 Note: For the use of Agt. Jesus
E. Santayana while in the performance of his official duties.
Approved: t/s/ Jose C. Maristela, Colonel, Inf (GSC) Chief, CIS, HPC.
...

6 T.S.N., p. 4, July 30, 1963.

 7 L-12088, December 23, 1959, 106 Phil. 713. See also People vs. Jabinal, 55
SCRA 607.

8 L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19190 November 29, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VENANCIO CONCEPCION, defendant-appellant.

Recaredo Ma. Calvo for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

By telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of the Aparri branch of the Philippine
National Bank, Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, between April 10,
1919, and May 7, 1919, authorized an extension of credit in favor of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C."
in the amount of P300,000. This special authorization was essential in view of the memorandum
order of President Concepcion dated May 17, 1918, limiting the discretional power of the local
manager at Aparri, Cagayan, to grant loans and discount negotiable documents to P5,000, which, in
certain cases, could be increased to P10,000. Pursuant to this authorization, credit aggregating
P300,000, was granted the firm of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C.," the only security required
consisting of six demand notes. The notes, together with the interest, were taken up and paid by July
17, 1919.

"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was a copartnership capitalized at P100,000. Anacleto Concepcion

contributed P5,000; Clara Vda. de Concepcion, P5,000; Miguel S. Concepcion, P20,000; Clemente
Puno, P20,000; and Rosario San Agustin, "casada con Gral. Venancio Concepcion," P50,000.
Member Miguel S. Concepcion was the administrator of the company.

On the facts recounted, Venancio Concepcion, as President of the Philippine National Bank and as
member of the board of directors of this bank, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan
with a violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747. He was found guilty by the Honorable Enrique V.
Filamor, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and six months,
to pay a fine of P3,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.
Section 35 of Act No. 2747, effective on February 20, 1918, just mentioned, to which reference must
hereafter repeatedly be made, reads as follows: "The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly,
grant loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch
banks." Section 49 of the same Act provides: "Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of
this Act shall be punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not to
exceed five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment." These two sections were in effect in 1919
when the alleged unlawful acts took place, but were repealed by Act No. 2938, approved on January
30, 1921.

Counsel for the defense assign ten errors as having been committed by the trial court. These errors
they have argued adroitly and exhaustively in their printed brief, and again in oral argument.
Attorney-General Villa-Real, in an exceptionally accurate and comprehensive brief, answers the
proposition of appellant one by one.

The question presented are reduced to their simplest elements in the opinion which follows:

I. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by
Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" within the meaning of
section 35 of Act No. 2747?

Counsel argue that the documents of record do not prove that authority to make a loan was given,
but only show the concession of a credit. In this statement of fact, counsel is correct, for the exhibits
in question speak of a "credito" (credit) and not of a " prestamo" (loan).

The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the confidence or trust
reposed by a lender that he will pay what he may promise. (Donnell vs. Jones [1848], 13 Ala., 490;
Bouvier's Law Dictionary.) A "loan" means the delivery by one party and the receipt by the other
party of a given sum of money, upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum loaned,
with or without interest. (Payne vs. Gardiner [1864], 29 N. Y., 146, 167.) The concession of a "credit"
necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit of the amount fixed in the "credit,"

II. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C.," by
Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" or a "discount"?

Counsel argue that while section 35 of Act No. 2747 prohibits the granting of a "loan," it does not
prohibit what is commonly known as a "discount."

In a letter dated August 7, 1916, H. Parker Willis, then President of the National Bank, inquired of the
Insular Auditor whether section 37 of Act No. 2612 was intended to apply to discounts as well as to
loans. The ruling of the Acting Insular Auditor, dated August 11, 1916, was to the effect that said
section referred to loans alone, and placed no restriction upon discount transactions. It becomes
material, therefore, to discover the distinction between a "loan" and a "discount," and to ascertain if
the instant transaction comes under the first or the latter denomination.

Discounts are favored by bankers because of their liquid nature, growing, as they do, out of an
actual, live, transaction. But in its last analysis, to discount a paper is only a mode of loaning money,
with, however, these distinctions: (1) In a discount, interest is deducted in advance, while in a loan,
interest is taken at the expiration of a credit; (2) a discount is always on double-name paper; a loan
is generally on single-name paper.

Conceding, without deciding, that, as ruled by the Insular Auditor, the law covers loans and not
discounts, yet the conclusion is inevitable that the demand notes signed by the firm "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C." were not discount paper but were mere evidences of indebtedness, because
(1) interest was not deducted from the face of the notes, but was paid when the notes fell due; and
(2) they were single-name and not double-name paper.

The facts of the instant case having relation to this phase of the argument are not essentially
different from the facts in the Binalbagan Estate case. Just as there it was declared that the
operations constituted a loan and not a discount, so should we here lay down the same ruling.

III. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership, "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by
Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, an "indirect loan" within the
meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747?

Counsel argue that a loan to the partnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was not an "indirect
loan." In this connection, it should be recalled that the wife of the defendant held one-half of the
capital of this partnership.

In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to
the intention of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the Legislature is plainly to erect a
wall of safety against temptation for a director of the bank. The prohibition against indirect loans is a
recognition of the familiar maxim that no man may serve two masters that where personal interest
clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always suffers. If, therefore, it is shown that the husband
is financially interested in the success or failure of his wife's business venture, a loan to partnership
of which the wife of a director is a member, falls within the prohibition.

Various provisions of the Civil serve to establish the familiar relationship called a conjugal
partnership. (Articles 1315, 1393, 1401, 1407, 1408, and 1412 can be specially noted.) A loan,
therefore, to a partnership of which the wife of a director of a bank is a member, is an indirect loan to
such director.

That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such an occurrence is shown by the
acknowledged fact that in this instance the defendant was tempted to mingle his personal and family
affairs with his official duties, and to permit the loan P300,000 to a partnership of no established
reputation and without asking for collateral security.

In the case of Lester and Wife vs. Howard Bank ([1870], 33 Md., 558; 3 Am. Rep., 211), the
Supreme Court of Maryland said:

What then was the purpose of the law when it declared that no director or officer should
borrow of the bank, and "if any director," etc., "shall be convicted," etc., "of directly or
indirectly violating this section he shall be punished by fine and imprisonment?" We say to
protect the stockholders, depositors and creditors of the bank, against the temptation to
which the directors and officers might be exposed, and the power which as such they must
necessarily possess in the control and management of the bank, and the legislature unwilling
to rely upon the implied understanding that in assuming this relation they would not acquire
any interest hostile or adverse to the most exact and faithful discharge of duty, declared in
express terms that they should not borrow, etc., of the bank.

In the case of People vs. Knapp ([1912], 206 N. Y., 373), relied upon in the Binalbagan Estate
decision, it was said:

We are of opinion the statute forbade the loan to his copartnership firm as well as to himself
directly. The loan was made indirectly to him through his firm.
IV. Could Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, be convicted of a
violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747 in relation with section 49 of the same Act, when these
portions of Act No. 2747 were repealed by Act No. 2938, prior to the finding of the information and
the rendition of the judgment?

As noted along toward the beginning of this opinion, section 49 of Act No. 2747, in relation to section
35 of the same Act, provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any of the provisions of
the Act. It is contended, however, by the appellant, that the repeal of these sections of Act No. 2747
by Act No. 2938 has served to take away the basis for criminal prosecution.

This same question has been previously submitted and has received an answer adverse to such
contention in the cases of United Stated vs. Cuna ([1908], 12 Phil., 241); People vs.
Concepcion ([1922], 43 Phil., 653); and Ong Chang Wing and Kwong Fok vs. United States ([1910],
218 U. S., 272; 40 Phil., 1046). In other words, it has been the holding, and it must again be the
holding, that where an Act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense, such repeals a former Act
which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the
courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentenced offenders charged with violations of the old law.

V. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by
Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, in violation of section 35 of Act No.
2747, penalized by this law?

Counsel argue that since the prohibition contained in section 35 of Act No. 2747 is on the bank, and
since section 49 of said Act provides a punishment not on the bank when it violates any provisions of
the law, but on a personviolating any provisions of the same, and imposing imprisonment as a part
of the penalty, the prohibition contained in said section 35 is without penal sanction. lawph!l.net

The answer is that when the corporation itself is forbidden to do an act, the prohibition extends to the
board of directors, and to each director separately and individually. (People vs. Concepcion, supra.)

VI. Does the alleged good faith of Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank,
in extending the credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." constitute a
legal defense?

Counsel argue that if defendant committed the acts of which he was convicted, it was because he
was misled by rulings coming from the Insular Auditor. It is furthermore stated that since the loans
made to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." have been paid, no loss has been
suffered by the Philippine National Bank.

Neither argument, even if conceded to be true, is conclusive. Under the statute which the defendant
has violated, criminal intent is not necessarily material. The doing of the inhibited act, inhibited on
account of public policy and public interest, constitutes the crime. And, in this instance, as previously
demonstrated, the acts of the President of the Philippine National Bank do not fall within the purview
of the rulings of the Insular Auditor, even conceding that such rulings have controlling effect.

Morse, in his work, Banks and Banking, section 125, says:

It is fraud for directors to secure by means of their trust, and advantage not common to the
other stockholders. The law will not allow private profit from a trust, and will not listen to any
proof of honest intent.
JUDGMENT

On a review of the evidence of record, with reference to the decision of the trial court, and the errors
assigned by the appellant, and with reference to previous decisions of this court on the same
subject, we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that no reversible error was committed in the trial of
this case, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in the information. The penalty imposed by the trial judge falls within the limits of the
punitive provisions of the law.

Judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2348 February 27, 1950

GREGORIO PERFECTO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BIBIANO MEER, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Francisco Carreon for oppositor
and appellant.
Gregorio Perfecto in his own behalf.

BENGZON, J.:

In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income
tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802),
he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was
illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in
violation of the Constitution.

The Manila judge upheld his contention, and required the refund of the amount collected. The
defendant appealed.
The death of Mr. Justice Perfecto has freed us from the embarrassment of passing upon the claim of
a colleague. Still, as the outcome indirectly affects all the members of the Court, consideration of the
matter is not without its vexing feature. Yet adjudication may not be declined, because (a) we are not
legally disqualified; (b) jurisdiction may not be renounced, ad it is the defendant who appeals to this
Court, and there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred; (c) supreme courts in
the United States have decided similar disputes relating to themselves; (d) the question touches all
the members of the judiciary from top to bottom; and (e) the issue involves the right of other
constitutional officers whose compensation is equally protected by the Constitution, for instance, the
President, the Auditor-General and the members of the Commission on Elections. Anyway the
subject has been thoroughly discussed in many American lawsuits and opinions, and we shall hardly
do nothing more than to borrow therefrom and to compare their conclusions to local conditions.
There shall be little occasion to formulate new propositions, for the situation is not unprecedented.

Our Constitution provides in its Article VIII, section 9, that the members of the Supreme Court and all
judges of inferior courts "shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office." It also provides that "until Congress shall provide
otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen
thousand pesos". When in 1945 Mr. Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not "provided
otherwise", by fixing a different salary for associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided
by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.

Now, does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution thereof?.

A note found at page 534 of volume 11 of the American Law Reports answers the question in the
affirmative. It says:

Where the Constitution of a state provides that the salaries of its judicial officers shall not be
dismissed during their continuance in office, it had been held that the state legislature cannot
impose a tax upon the compensation paid to the judges of its court. New Orleans v. Lea
(1859) 14 La. Ann. 194; Opinion of Attorney-General if N. C. (1856) 48 N. C. (3 Jones, L.)
Appx. 1; Re Taxation of Salaries of Judges (1902) 131 N. C. 692, 42 S. E. 970; Com. ex. rel.
Hepburn v. Mann (1843) 5 Watts & S,. (Pa.) 403 [but see to the contrary the earlier and
much criticized case of Northumberland county v. Chapman (1829) 2 Rawle (Pa.) 73]*

A different rule prevails in Wisconsin, according to the same annotation. Another state holding the
contrary view is Missouri.

The Constitution of the United States, likes ours, forbids the diminution of the compensation of
Judges of the Supreme Court and of inferior courts. The Federal Governments has an income tax
law. Does it embrace the salaries of federal judges? In answering this question, we should consider
four periods:

First period. No attempts was made to tax the compensation of Federal judges up to 1862 1.

Second period. 1862-1918. In July, 1862, a statute was passed subjecting the salaries of "civil
officers of the United States" to an income tax of three per cent. Revenue officers, construed it as
including the compensation of all judges; but Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the judiciary, wrote to
the Secretary of the Treasury a letter of protest saying, among other things:

The act in question, as you interpret it, diminishes the compensation of every judge 3 per
cent, and if it can be diminished to that extent by the name of a tax, it may, in the same way,
be reduced from time to time, at the pleasure of the legislature.
 The judiciary is one of the three great departments of the government, created and
established by the Constitution. Its duties and powers are specifically set forth, and are of a
character that requires it to be perfectly independent of the two other departments, and in
order to place it beyond the reach and above even the suspicion of any such influence, the
power to reduce their compensation is expressly withheld from Congress, and excepted from
their powers of legislation.

Language could not be more plain than that used in the Constitution. It is, moreover, one of
its most important and essential provisions. For the articles which limits the powers of the
legislative and executive branches of the government, and those which provide safeguards
for the protection of the citizen in his person and property, would be of little value without a
judiciary to uphold and maintain them, which was free from every influence, direct and
indirect, that might by possibility in times of political excitement warp their judgments.

Upon these grounds I regard an act of Congress retaining in the Treasury a portion of the
Compensation of the judges, as unconstitutional and void2.

The protest was unheeded, although it apparently bore the approval of the whole Supreme Court,
that ordered it printed among its records. But in 1869 Attorney-General Hoar upon the request of the
Secretary of the Treasury rendered an opinion agreeing with the Chief Justice. The collection of the
tax was consequently discontinued and the amounts theretofore received were all refunded. For half
a century thereafter judges' salaries were not taxed as income.3

Third period. 1919-1938. The Federal Income Tax Act of February 24, 1919 expressly provided that
taxable income shall include "the compensation of the judges of the Supreme Court and inferior
courts of the United States". Under such Act, Walter Evans, United States judge since 1899, paid
income tax on his salary; and maintaining that the impost reduced his compensation, he sued to
recover the money he had delivered under protest. He was upheld in 1920 by the Supreme Court in
an epoch-making decision.*, explaining the purpose, history and meaning of the Constitutional
provision forbidding impairment of judicial salaries and the effect of an income tax upon the salary of
a judge.

With what purpose does the Constitution provide that the compensation of the judges "shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office"? Is it primarily to benefit the judges, or
rather to promote the public weal by giving them that independence which makes for an
impartial and courageous discharge of the judicial function? Does the provision merely forbid
direct diminution, such as expressly reducing the compensation from a greater to a less sum
per year, and thereby leave the way open for indirect, yet effective, diminution, such as
withholding or calling back a part as tax on the whole? Or does it mean that the judge shall
have a sure and continuing right to the compensation, whereon he confidently may rely for
his support during his continuance in office, so that he need have no apprehension lest his
situation in this regard may be changed to his disadvantage?

The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory that a larger measure of liberty and
justice would be assured by vesting the three powers the legislative, the executive, and
the judicial in separate departments, each relatively independent of the others and it was
recognized that without this independence if it was not made both real and enduring
the separation would fail of its purpose. all agreed that restraints and checks must be
imposed to secure the requisite measure of independence; for otherwise the legislative
department, inherently the strongest, might encroach on or even come to dominate the
others, and the judicial, naturally the weakest, might be dwarf or swayed by the other two,
especially by the legislative.
The particular need for making the judiciary independent was elaborately pointed our by
Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist, No. 78, from which we excerpt the following:

xxx xxx xxx

At a later period John Marshall, whose rich experience as lawyer, legislator, and chief justice
enable him to speak as no one else could, tersely said (debates Va. Gonv. 1829-1831, pp.
616, 619): . . . Our courts are the balance wheel of our whole constitutional system; and our
is the only constitutional system so balanced and controlled. Other constitutional systems
lacks complete poise and certainly of operation because they lack the support and
interpretation of authoritative, undisputable courts of law. It is clear beyond all need of
exposition that for the definite maintenance of constitutional understandings it is
indispensable, alike for the preservation of the liberty of the individual and for the
preservation of the integrity of the powers of the government, that there should be some
nonpolitical forum in which those understandings can be impartially debated and determined.
That forum our courts supply. There the individual may assert his rights; there the
government must accept definition of its authority. There the individual may challenge the
legality of governmental action and have it adjudged by the test of fundamental principles,
and that test the government must abide; there the government can check the too
aggressive self-assertion of the individual and establish its power upon lines which all can
comprehend and heed. The constitutional powers of the courts constitute the ultimate
safeguard alike of individual privilege and of governmental prerogative. It is in this sense that
our judiciary is the balance wheel of our entire system; it is meant to maintain that nice
adjustment between individual rights and governmental powers which constitutes political
liberty. Constitutional government in the United States, pp. 17, 142.

Conscious in the nature and scope of the power being vested in the national courts,
recognizing that they would be charge with responsibilities more delicate and important than
any ever before confide to judicial tribunals, and appreciating that they were to be, in the
words of George Washington, "the keystone of our political fabric", the convention with
unusual accord incorporated in the Constitution the provision that the judges "shall hold their
offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a
compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." Can there be
any doubt that the two things thus coupled in place the clause in respect of tenure during
good behaviour and that in respect of an undiminishable compensation-were equally coupled
in purpose? And is it not plain that their purposes was to invest the judges with an
independence in keeping with the delicacy and importance of their task, and with the
imperative need for its impartial and fearless performance? Mr. Hamilton said in explanation
and support of the provision (Federalist No. 79): "Next to permanency in office, nothing can
contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. . .
. In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a
power over his will.

xxx xxx xxx

These considerations make it very plain, as we think, that the primary purpose of the
prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of
tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench, and to promote that independence
of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations,
and pervading principles of the constitution, and to the admiration of justice without respect
to persons, and with equal concern for the poor and the rich.
 xxx xxx xxx

But it is urged that what plaintiff was made to pay back was an income tax, and that a like tax
was exacted of others engaged in private employment.

If the tax in respect of his compensation be prohibited, it can find no justification in the
taxation of other income as to which there is no prohibition, for, of course, doing what the
Constitution permits gives no license to do what it prohibits.

The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to be directed against
all diminution, whether for one purpose or another; and the reason for its adoption, as
publicly assigned at the time and commonly accepted ever since, make with impelling force
for the conclusion that the fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit diminution by
taxation as well as otherwise, that they regarded the independence of the judges as of far
greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. (American
law Reports, annotated, Vol. 11, pp. 522-25; Evans vs. Gore, supra.)

In September 1, 1919, Samuel J. Graham assumed office as judge of the Unites States court of
claims. His salary was taxed by virtue of the same time income tax of February 24, 1919. At the time
he qualified, a statute fixed his salary at P7,500. He filed action for reimbursement, submitting the
same theory on which Evans v. Gore had been decided. The Supreme Court of the United States in
1925 reaffirmed that decision. It overruled the distinction offered by Solicitor-General Beck that
Judge Graham took office after the income tax had been levied on judicial salaries, (Evans qualified
before), and that Congress had power "to impose taxes which should apply to the salaries of Federal
judges appointed after the enactment of the taxing statute." (The law had made no distinction as to
judges appointed before or after its passage)

Fourth period. 1939 Foiled in their previous attempts, the Revenue men persisted, and
succeeded in inserting in the United States Revenue Act of June, 1932 the modified proviso that
"gross income" on which taxes were payable included the compensation "of judges of courts of the
United States taking office after June 6, 1932". Joseph W. Woodrough qualified as United States
circuit judge on May 1, 1933. His salary as judge was taxed, and before the Supreme Court of the
United States the issue of decrease of remuneration again came up. That court, however, ruled
against him, declaring (in 1939) that Congress had the power to adopt the law. It said:

The question immediately before us is whether Congress exceeded its constitutional power
in providing that United States judges appointed after the Revenue Act of 1932 shall not
enjoy immunity from the incidence of taxation to which everyone else within the defined
classes of income is subjected. Thereby, of course, Congress has committed itself to the
position that a non-discriminatory tax laid generally on net income is not, when applied to the
income of federal judge, a diminution of his salary within the prohibition of Article 3, Sec. 1 of
the Constitution. To suggest that it makes inroads upon the independence of judges who
took office after the Congress has thus charged them with the common duties of citizenship,
by making them bear their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government, is to
trivialize the great historic experience on which the framers based the safeguards of Article
3, Sec. 1. To subject them to a general tax is merely to recognize that judges also are
citizens, and that their particular function in government does not generate an immunity from
sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution
and laws they are charged with administering. (O'Malley vs. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, A. L.
R. 1379.)
Now, the case for the defendant-appellant Collector of Internal Revenue is premised mainly on this
decision (Note A). He claims it holds "that federal judges are subject to the payment of income taxes
without violating the constitutional prohibition against the reduction of their salaries during their
continuance in office", and that it "is a complete repudiation of the ratio decidenci of Evans vs. Gore".
To grasp the full import of the O'Malley precedent, we should bear in mind that:

1. It does not entirely overturn Miles vs. Graham. "To the extent that what the Court now says is
inconsistent with what said in Miles vs. Graham, the latter can not survive", Justice Frankfurter
announced.

2. It does not expressly touch nor amend the doctrine in Evans vs, Gore, although it indicates that
the Congressional Act in dispute avoided in part the consequences of that case.

Carefully analyzing the three cases (Evans, Miles and O'Malley) and piecing them together, the
logical conclusion may be reached that although Congress may validly declare by law that salaries
of judges appointed thereafter shall be taxed as income (O'Malley vs. Woodrough) it may not tax the
salaries of those judges already in office at the time of such declaration because such taxation would
diminish their salaries (Evans vs. Gore; Miles vs. Graham). In this manner the rationalizing principle
that will harmonize the allegedly discordant decision may be condensed.

By the way, Justice Frankfurter, writing the O'Malley decision, says the Evans precedent met with
disfavor from legal scholarship opinion. Examining the issues of Harvard Law review at the time
of Evans vs. Gore (Frankfurter is a Harvard graduate and professor), we found that such school
publication criticized it. Believing this to be the "inarticulate consideration that may have influenced
the grounds on which the case went off"4, we looked into the criticism, and discovered that it was
predicated on the position that the 16th Amendment empowered Congress "to collect taxes on
incomes from whatever source derived" admitting of no exception. Said the Harvard Law Journal:

In the recent case of Evans vs. Gore the Supreme Court of the United States decided that by
taxing the salary of a federal judge as a part of his income, Congress was in effect reducing
his salary and thus violating Art. III, sec. 1, of the Constitution. Admitting for the present
purpose that such a tax really is a reduction of salary, even so it would seem that the words
of the amendment giving power to tax 'incomes, from whatever source derived', are
sufficiently strong to overrule pro tanto the provisions of Art. III, sec. 1. But, two years ago,
the court had already suggested that the amendment in no way extended the subjects open
to federal taxation. The decision in Evans vs. Gore affirms that view, and virtually strikes
from the amendment the words "from whatever source derived". (Harvard law Review, vol.
34, p. 70)

The Unites States Court's shift of position5 might be attributed to the above detraction which, without
appearing on the surface, led to Frankfurter's sweeping expression about judges being also citizens
liable to income tax. But it must be remembered that undisclosed factor the 16th Amendment
has no counterpart in the Philippine legal system. Our Constitution does not repeat it. Wherefore, as
the underlying influence and the unuttered reason has no validity in this jurisdiction, the broad
generality loses much of its force.

Anyhow the O'Malley case declares no more than that Congress may validly enact a law taxing the
salaries of judges appointed after its passage. Here in the Philippines no such law has been
approved.

Besides, it is markworthy that, as Judge Woodrough had qualified after the express legislative
declaration taxing salaries, he could not very well complain. The United States Supreme Court
probably had in mind what in other cases was maintained, namely, that the tax levied on the salary
in effect decreased the emoluments of the office and therefore the judge qualified with such reduced
emoluments.6

The O'Malley ruling does not cover the situation in which judges already in office are made to pay
tax by executive interpretation, without express legislative declaration. That state of affairs is
controlled by the administrative and judicial standards herein-before described in the "second period"
of the Federal Government, namely, the views of Chief Justice Taney and of Attorney-General Hoar
and the constant practice from 1869 to 1938, i.e., when the Income Tax Law merely taxes "income"
in general, it does not include salaries of judges protected from diminution.

In this connection the respondent would make capital of the circumstance that the Act of 1932,
upheld in the O'Malley case, has subsequently been amended by making it applicable even to
judges who took office before1932. This shows, the appellant argues, that Congress interprets the
O'Malley ruling to permit legislative taxation of the salary of judges whether appointed before the tax
or after. The answer to this is that the Federal Supreme Court expressly withheld opinion on that
amendment in the O'Malley case. Which is significant. Anyway, and again, there is here no
congressional directive taxing judges' salaries.

Wherefore, unless and until our Legislature approves an amendment to the Income Tax Law
expressly taxing "that salaries of judges thereafter appointed", the O'Malley case is not relevant. As
in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included
in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally
be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913,
taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from
diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to
have been transplanted here;7 and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved
(in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was
known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs.
Graham were then outstanding doctrines; and the inference is not illogical that in restraining the
impairment of judicial compensation the Fathers of the Constitution intended to preclude taxation of
the same.8

It seems that prior to the O'Malley decision the Philippine Government did not collect income tax on
salaries of judges. This may be gleaned from General Circular No. 449 of the Department of Finance
dated March 4, 1940, which says in part:

xxx xxx xxx

The question of whether or not the salaries of judges should be taken into account in
computing additional residence taxes is closely linked with the liability of judges to income
tax on their salaries, in fact, whatever resolution is adopted with respect to either of said
taxes be followed with respect to the other. The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, to which the attention of this
department has been drawn, appears to have enunciated a new doctrine regarding the
liability of judges to income tax upon their salaries. In view of the fact that the question is of
great significance, the matter was taken up in the Council of State, and the Honorable, the
Secretary of Justice was requested to give an opinion on whether or not, having in mind the
said decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of O'Malley v.
Woodrough, there is justification in reversing our present ruling to the effect that judges are
not liable to tax on their salaries. After going over the opinion of the court in the said case,
the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, stated that although the ruling of the Supreme Court
 of the United States is not binding in the Philippines, the doctrine therein enunciated has
resolved the issue of the taxability of judges' salaries into a question of policy. Forthwith, His
Excellency the President decided that the best policy to adopt would be to collect income
and additional residence taxes from the President of the Philippines, the members of the
Judiciary, and the Auditor General, and the undersigned was authorized to act accordingly.

In view of the foregoing, income and additional residence taxes should be levied on the
salaries received by the President of the Philippines, members of the Judiciary, and the
Auditor General during the calendar year 1939 and thereafter. . . . . (Emphasis ours.)

Of course, the Secretary of Justice correctly opined that the O'Malley decision "resolved the issue of
taxability of judges' salaries into a question of policy." But that policy must be enunciated by
Congressional enactment, as was done in the O'Malley case, not by Executive Fiat or interpretation.

This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying
gasoline, or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay
taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only
when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official
stipend that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter.

Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block
encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial
salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore waivable but a basic limitation
upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest. (Evans vs. Gore)

Indeed the exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or
privilege. Let the highest court of Maryland speak:

The exemption of the judicial compensation from reduction is not in any true sense a gratuity,
privilege or exemption. It is essentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable
consideration. The covenant on the part of the government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is
as much as part of the consideration agreed as is the money salary. The undertaking has its
own particular value to the citizens in securing the independence of the judiciary in crises;
and in the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent foundation whereby judicial
preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are qualified by talent, knowledge,
integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a private fortune as to make an
assured salary an object of personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the
judiciary relinquish their position at the bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their
connection with their clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the discharge of the
onerous duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable that they guaranty against a reduction
of salary by the imposition of a tax is not an exemption from taxation in the sense of freedom
from a burden or service to which others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a
valid consideration is merely a nominal exemption, since the valid and full consideration or
the public purpose promoted is received in the place of the tax. Theory and Practice of
Taxation (1900), D. A. Wells, p. 541. (Gordy vs. Dennis (Md.) 1939, 5 Atl. Rep. 2d Series, p.
80)

It is hard to see, appellants asserts, how the imposition of the income tax may imperil the
independence of the judicial department. The danger may be demonstrated. Suppose there is power
to tax the salary of judges, and the judiciary incurs the displeasure of the Legislature and the
Executive. In retaliation the income tax law is amended so as to levy a 30 per cent on all salaries of
government officials on the level of judges. This naturally reduces the salary of the judges by 30 per
cent, but they may not grumble because the tax is general on all receiving the same amount of
earning, and affects the Executive and the Legislative branches in equal measure. However, means
are provided thereafter in other laws, for the increase of salaries of the Executive and the Legislative
branches, or their perquisites such as allowances, per diems, quarters, etc. that actually compensate
for the 30 per cent reduction on their salaries. Result: Judges compensation is thereby diminished
during their incumbency thanks to the income tax law. Consequence: Judges must "toe the line" or
else. Second consequence: Some few judges might falter; the great majority will not. But knowing
the frailty of human nature, and this chink in the judicial armor, will the parties losing their cases
against the Executive or the Congress believe that the judicature has not yielded to their pressure?

Respondent asserts in argumentation that by executive order the President has subjected his salary
to the income tax law. In our opinion this shows obviously that, without such voluntary act of the
President, his salary would not be taxable, because of constitutional protection against diminution.
To argue from this executive gesture that the judiciary could, and should act in like manner is to
assume that, in the matter of compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par
with the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs.

The judgment will be affirmed. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

OZAETA., J., dissenting:

It is indeed embarrassing that this case was initiated by a member of this Court upon which devolves
the duty to decide it finally. The question of whether the salaries of the judges, the members of the
Commission on Elections, the Auditor General, and the President of the Philippines are immune
from taxation, might have been raised by any interested party other than a justice of the Supreme
Court with less embarrassment to the latter.

The question is simple and not difficult of solution. We shall state our opinion as concisely as
possible.

The first income tax law of the Philippines was Act No. 2833, which was approved on March 7, 1919,
to take effect on January 1, 1920. Section 1 (a) of said Act provided:

There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the entire net income
received in the preceding calendar year from all sources by every individual, a citizen or
resident of the Philippine Islands, a tax of two per centum upon such income. . . . (Emphasis
ours.)

Section 2 (a) of said Act provided:

Subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are hereinafter allowed, the taxable net
income of a person shall include gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages or
compensation for personal service of whatever kind and is whatever form paid, or from
professions, vocations, businesses, trade, commerce, sales, or dealings in property, whether
 real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal
property, also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business
carried on for gain or profit, or gains, profits, and income derived from any source whatever.

That income tax law has been amended several times, specially as to the rates of the tax, but the
above-quoted provisions (except as to the rate) have been preserved intact in the subsequent Acts.
The present income tax law is Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act
No. 466, sections 21, 28 and 29 of which incorporate the texts of the above-quoted provisions of the
original Act in exactly the same language. There can be no dispute whatsoever that judges (who are
individuals) and their salaries (which are income) are as clearly comprehended within the above-
quoted provisions of the law as if they were specifically mentioned therein; and in fact all judges had
been and were paying income tax on their salaries when the Constitution of the Philippines was
discussed and approved by the Constitutional Convention and when it was submitted to the people
for confirmation in the plebiscite of May 14, 1935.

Now, the Constitution provides that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts "shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office." (Section 9, Article VIII, emphasis ours.)a

The simple question is: In approving the provisions against the diminution of the compensation of
judges and other specified officers during their continuance in office, did the framers of the
Constitution intend to nullify the then existing income tax law insofar as it imposed a tax on the
salaries of said officers ? If they did not, then the income tax law, which has been incorporated in the
present National Internal Revenue Code, remains in force in its entirety and said officers cannot
claim exemption therefrom on their salaries.

Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution provides that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall
remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified. or
repealed by the Congress of the Philippines.

In resolving the question at bar, we must take into consideration the following well-settled rules:

"A constitution shall be held to be prepared and adopted in reference to existing statutory
laws, upon the provisions of which in detail it must depend to be set in practical operation"
(People vs. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; People vs. Draper, 15 N. Y. 537; Cass vs. Dillon, 2 Ohio St.
607; People vs. N. Y., 25 Wend. (N. Y. 22). (Barry vs. Traux, 3 A. & E. Ann. Cas 191, 193.).

Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the
previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which
they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption (Baltimore vs. State, 15 Md. 376,
480; 74 Am. Dec. 572; State vs. Mace, 5 Md. 337; Bandel vs. Isaac, 13 Md. 202; Manly vs.
State, 7 Md. 135; Hamilton vs. St. Louis County Ct., 15 Mo. 5; People vs. Gies, 25 Mich. 83;
Servis vs. Beatty, 32 Miss. 52; Pope vs. Phifer, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 686; People vs. Harding, 53
Mich. 48, 51 Am. Rep. 95; Creve Coeur Lake Ice Co. vs. Tamm, 138 Mo. 385, 39 S. W. Rep.
791). (Idem.)

A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light
and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Constitutions, like
statutes, are properly to be expounded in the light of conditions existing at the time of their
adoption, the general spirit of the times, and the prevailing sentiments among the people.
Reference may be made to the historical facts relating to the original or political institutions of
 the community or to prior well-known practices and usages. (11 Am. Ju., Constitutional Law,
676-678.)

The salaries provided in the Constitution for the Chief Justice and each associate Justice,
respectively, of the Supreme Court were the same salaries ]which they were receiving at the time
the Constitution was framed and adopted and on which they were paying income tax under the
existing income tax law. It seems clear to us that for them to receive the same salaries, subject to
the same tax, after the adoption of the Constitution as before does not involve any diminution at all.
The fact that the plaintiff was not a member of the Court when the Constitution took effect, makes no
difference. The salaries of justices and judges were subject to income tax when he was appointed in
the early part of 1945. In fact he must have declared and paid income tax on his salary for 19454
he claimed exemption only beginning 1946. It seems likewise clear that when the framers of the
Constitution fixed those salaries, they must have taken into consideration that the recipients were
paying income tax thereon. There was no necessity to provide expressly that said salaries shall be
subject to income tax because they knew that already so provided. On the other hand, if exemption
from any tax on said salaries had been intended, it would have been specifically to so provide,
instead of merely saying that the compensation as fixed "shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office."

In the light of the antecedents, the prohibition against diminution cannot be interpreted to include or
refer to general taxation but to a law by which said salaries may be fixed. The sentence in question
reads: "They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office." The next sentence reads: "Until the Congress shall provide
otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of P16,000,
and each associate Justice, P15,000." It is plain that the Constitution authorizes the Congress to
pass a law fixing another rate of compensation, but that such rate must be higher than that which the
justices receive at he time of its enactment or, if lower, it must not affect those justice already in
office. In other words, Congress may approve a law increasing the salaries of the justices at any
time, but it cannot approve a law decreasing their salaries unless such law is made effective only as
to justices appointed after its approval.

It would be a strained and unreasonable construction of the prohibition against diminution to read
into it an exemption from taxation. There is no justification for the belief or assumption that the
framers of the Constitution intended to exempt the salaries of said officers from taxes. They knew
that it was and is the unavoidable duty of every citizen to bear his aliquot share of the cost of
maintaining the Government; that taxes are the very blood that sustains the life of the Government.
To make all citizens share the burden of taxation equitably, the Constitution expressly provides that
"the rule of taxation shall be uniform." (Section 22 [1], Article VI.) We think it would be a
contravention of this provision to read into the prohibition against diminution of the salaries of the
judges and other specified officers an exemption from taxes on their salaries. How could the rule of
income taxation be uniform if it should not be applied to a group of citizens in the same situation as
other income earners ? It is to us inconceivable that the framers ever intended to relieve certain
officers of the Government from sharing with their fellows citizens the material burden of the
Government to exempt their salaries from taxes. Moreover, the Constitution itself specifies what
properties are exempt from taxes, namely: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes." (Sec. 22 [3], Article VI.) The omission of the salaries in
question from this enumeration is in itself an eloquent manifestation of intention to continue the
imposition of taxes thereon as provided in the existing law. Inclusio est exclusio alterius.

We have thus far read and construed the pertinent portions of our own Constitution and income tax
law in the light of the antecedent circumstances and of the operative factors which prevailed at the
time our Constitution was framed, independently of the construction now prevailing in the United
States of similar provisions of the federal Constitution in relation to the present federal income tax
law, under which the justices of the Supreme Court, and the federal judges are now, and since the
case of O'Malley vs. Woodrough was decided on May 22, 1939, have been, paying income tax on
their salaries. Were this a majority opinion, we could end here with the consequent reversal of the
judgment appealed from. But ours is a voice in the wilderness, and we may permit ourselves to utter
it with more vehemence and emphasis so that future players on this stage perchance may hear and
heed it. Who knows? The Gospel itself was a voice in the wilderness at the time it was uttered.

We have to comment on Anglo-American precedents since the majority decision from which we
dissent is based on some of them. Indeed, the majority say they "hardly do nothing more than to
borrow therefrom and to compare their conclusions to local conditions." which we shall presently
show did not obtain in the United States at the time the federal and state Constitutions were
adopted. We shall further show that in any event what they now borrow is not usable because it has
long been withdrawn from circulation.

When the American Constitution was framed and adopted, there was no income tax law in the
United States. To this circumstance may be attributed the claim made by some federal judges
headed by Chief Justice Taney, when under the Act of Congress of July 1, 1862, their salaries were
subjected to an income tax, that such tax was a diminution of their salaries and therefore prohibited
by the Constitution. Chief Justice Taney's claim and his protest against the tax were not heeded, but
no federal judge deemed it proper to sue the Collector of Internal Revenue to recover the taxes they
continued to pay under protest for several years. In 1869, the Secretary of the Treasury referred the
question to Atty. General Hoar, and that officer rendered an opinion in substantial accord with Chief
Justice Taney's protest, and also advised that the tax on the President's compensation was likewise
invalid. No judicial pronouncement, however, was made of such invalidity until June 1, 1920, when
the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U.S. 245, 64 L. ed. 887) was decided upon the constitutionality of
section 213 of the Act of February 24, 1919, which required the computation of incomes for the
purpose of taxation to embrace all gains, profits, income and the like, "including in the case of the
President of the United States, the judges of the Supreme and inferior courts of the United States,
[and others] . . . the compensation received as such." The Supreme Court of the United States,
speaking through Mr. Justice Van Devanter, sustained the suit with the dissent of Justice Holmes
and Brandeis. The doctrine of Evans vs. Gore holding in effect that an income tax on a judge's salary
is a diminution thereof prohibited by the Constitution, was reaffirmed in 1925 in Miles vs. Graham, 69
L. ed 1067.

In 1939, however, the case of O'Malley vs. Woodrough (59 S. Ct. 838, 122 A. L. R. 1379) was
brought up to the test the validity of section 22 of the Revenue Act of June 6, 1932, which included in
the "gross income," on the basis of which taxes were to be paid, the compensation of "judges of
courts of the United States taking office after June 6, 1932." And in that case the Supreme Court of
the United States, with only one dissent (that of Justice Butler), abandoned the doctrine of Evans vs.
Gore and Miles vs. Graham by holding:

To subject them [the judges] to a general tax is merely to recognize that judges are also
citizens, and that their particular function in government does not generate an immunity from
sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution
and laws they are charged with administering.

The decision also says:

To suggest that it [the law in question] makes inroads upon the independence of judges who
took office after Congress had thus charged them with the common duties of citizenship, by
making them bear their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government, is to
 trivialize the great historic experience on which the framers based the safeguard of Article 3,
section 1.

Commenting on the above-quoted portions of the latest decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States on the subject, Prof. William Bennett, Munro, in his book, The Government of the United
States, which is used as a text in various universities, says: ". . .

All of which seems to be common sense, for surely the framers of the Constitution from ever
cutting a judge's salary, did not intend to relieve all federal judges from the general
obligations of citizenship. As for the President, he has never raised the issue; every occupant
of the White House since 1913 has paid his income tax without protest. (Pages 371-372.)

We emphasize that the doctrine of Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham is no longer operative, and
that all United States judges, including those who took office before June 6, 1932, are subject to and
pay income tax on their salaries; for after the submission of O'Malley vs. Woodrough for decision the
Congress of the United States, by section 3 of the Public Salary Act of 1939, amended section 22 (a)
of the Revenue Act of June 6, 1932, so as to make it applicable to "judges of courts of the United
States who took office on or before June 6, 1932." And the validity of that Act, in force for more than
a decade, has not been challenged.

Our colleagues import and transplant here the dead limbs of Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs.
Graham and attempt to revive and nurture them with painstaking analyses and diagnoses that they
had not suffered a fatal blow from O'Malley vs. Woodrough. We refuse to join this heroic attempt
because we believe it is futile.

They disregard the actual damage and minimize it by trying to discover the process by which it was
inflicted and he motivations that led to the infliction. They say that the chief axe-wielder, Justice
Frankfurter, was a Harvard graduate and professor and that the Harvard Law Journal had
criticized Evans vs. Gore; that the dissenters in said case (Holmes and Brandeis) were Harvard men
like Frankfurter; and that they believe this to be the "inarticulate consideration that may have
influenced the grounds on which the case [O'Malley vs. Woodrough] went off." This argument is not
valid, in our humble belief. It was not only the Harvard Law Journal that had criticized Evans vs.
Gore. Justice Frankfurter and his colleagues said that the decision in that case "met with wide and
steadily growing disfavor from legal scholarship and professional opinion," and they cited the
following: Clark, Furthermore Limitations Upon Federal Income Taxation, 30 Yale L. J. 75;
Corwin, Constitutional Law in 1919-1920, 15 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 635, 641-644; Fellman, Diminution
of Judicial Salaries, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 89; Lowndes, Taxing Income of Federal Judiciary, 19 Va. L.
Rev. 153; Powell, Constitutional Law in 1919-1920, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 117, 118; Powell, The Sixteenth
Amendment and Income from State Securities, National Income Tax Magazine (July, 1923), 5, 6; 20
Columbia L. Rev. 794; 43 Harvard L. Rev. 318; 20 Ill. L. Rev. 376; 45 Law Quarterly Rev. 291; 7 Va.
L. Rev. 69; 3 University of Chicago L. Rev. 141. Justice Frankfurter and his colleagues also said that
"Evans vs. Gore itself was rejected by most of the courts before whom the matter came after that
decision." Is not the intention to throw Evans vs. Gore into the graveyard of abandoned cases
manifest from all this and from the holding that judges are also citizens, liable to income tax on their
salaries?

The majority say that "unless and until our legislature approves an amendment to the income tax law
expressly taxing 'the salaries of judges thereafter appointed,' the O'Malley case is not relevant." We
have shown that our income tax law taxes the salaries of judges as clearly as if they are specifically
mentioned therein, and that said law took effect long before the adoption of the Constitution and long
before the plaintiff was appointed.
We agree that the purpose of the constitutional provision against diminution of the salaries of judges
during their continuance in office is to safeguard the independence of the Judicial Department. But
we disagree that to subject the salaries of judges to a general income tax law applicable
to all income earners would in any way affect their independence. Our own experience since the
income tax law went effect in 1920 is the best refutation of such assumption.

The majority give an example by which the independence of judges may be imperiled thru the
imposition of a tax on their salaries. They say: Suppose there is power to tax the salaries of judges
and the judiciary incurs the displeasure of the Legislature and the Executive. In retaliation the
income tax law is amended so as to levy a 30 per cent tax on all salaries of government officials on
the level of judges, and by means of another law the salaries of the executive and the legislative
branches are increased to compensate for the 30 per cent reduction of their salaries. To this we
reply that if such a vindictive measure is ever resorted to (which we cannot imagine), we shall be the
first ones to vote to strike it down as a palpable violation of the Constitution. There is no parity
between such hypothetical law and the general income tax law invoked by the defendant in this
case. We believe that an income tax law applicable only against the salaries of judges and not
against those or all other income earners may be successfully assailed as being in contravention not
only of the provision against diminution of the salaries of judges but also of the uniformity of the rule
of taxation as well as of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. So the danger apprehended
by the majority is not real but surely imaginary.

We vote for the reversal of the judgment appealed from the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

Paras J., concurs.

Footnotes

* Evans vs. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 and Gordy v. Dennis, 5 Atl. (2d) 69, hold identical view.

1 Evans vs. Gore, 253 U. S. 254, 64 L. ed. 887.

2 157 U. S. 701, Evans vs. Gore, supra.

3 See Evans vs. Gore, supra.

* Evans vs. Gore, supra.

(Note A) The defendant also relies on the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in
Evans vs. Gore, supra, forgetting that subsequently Justice Holmes did not dissent in
Miles vs. Graham, and apparently accepted Evans vs. Gore as authority in writing his
opinion in Gillespie vs. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 66 Law ed. 338. This remark
applies to Taylor vs. Gehner (1931), No. 45 S. W. (2d) 59, which merely echoes
Holmes dissent.

State vs. Nygaard, 159, Wisc. 396 and the decision of English courts invoked by
appellant, are refuted or distinguished in Gordy vs. Dennis, 5 Alt. (2d) 68, known to
him since he invokes the minority opinion therein.
 4Frankfurter, The Administrative Side of Chief Justice Hughes, Harvard Law Review,
November, 1949.

5It was a coincidence that the dissenters (Holmes and Brandeis) were Harvard men like
Frankfurter. It is not unlikely that the Harvard professor and admirer of Justice Holmes
(whose biography he wrote in 1938) noted and unconsciously absorbed the dissent.

6 Baker vs. C.I.R. 149 Fed. (2d) 342.

7It requires a very clear case to justify changing the construction of a constitutional provision
which has been acquiesced in for so long a period as fifty years. (States vs. Frear, 138 Wisc.
536, 120 N. W. 216. See also Hill vs. Tohill, 225 Ill. 384, 80 NE, 253.

8
On persuasive weight of contemporary construction of constitutional provision, see
generally Cooley, Constitutional Limitation 98th Ed.) Vol. I pp. 144 et seq.

a The Constitution also provides that the President shall "receive a compensation to be
ascertained by law which shall be neither increased nor diminished during the period for
which he shall have been elected" (section 9, Article VII); that the Auditor General "shall
receive an annual compensation to be fixed by law which shall not be diminished during his
continuance in office" (section 1, Article XI); and that the salaries of the chairman and the
members of the Commission on Elections "shall be neither increased nor diminished during
their term of office" (section 1, Article X).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of
Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of
Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the
income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to
Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary
from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from
October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of law, they were
jointly submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a
rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the doctrine laid down by
this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the
salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore
was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.

We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the
arguments pro and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought
up and presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United
States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing
the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the
Constitution. We shall now confine our-selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the
collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.

According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue,
our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress,
because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home
his point, the Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower
House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:.

SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office
during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by
law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand
pesos.

As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto
case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the
collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their
continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according
to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto
case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at
least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We
quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:

SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not
to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly
section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their
salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by
the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no
salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer)
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said
income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the
Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a
judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided
otherwise? To determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles
regarding separation of powers.

Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to
make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the
provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the
Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.
Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in
order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will
have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit
or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al.,
44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the
Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they
cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain
the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as
Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the
courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would
lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a
statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the
suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of
the judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)

Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important
functions in trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely
connected power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not
contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the
salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation
or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with
the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its
meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function
in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)
 The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate
it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so
construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)

We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and
the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the
interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial
processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on
a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a
subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative
department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the
fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the
separation of powers.

So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we believe
that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the
old system where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime thereafter, the
decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the official who had previously received his full
salary was called upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his
income tax on his salary. His salary fixed by law was received by him in the amount of said tax
comes from his other sources of income, he may not fully realize the fact that his salary had been
decreased in the amount of said income tax. But under the present system of withholding the income
tax at the source, where the full amount of the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in
advance and divided into equal portions corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year
and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday, said official actually does not
receive his salary in full, because the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say,
twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to say, he should receive P1,000 a month or
P500 every payday, fifteenth and end of month. In the present case, the amount collected by the
Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by twelve (months)
we shall have P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685,
which is the income tax deducted form the collected on his salary each half month. So, if Justice
Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of the income tax, instead of
receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead of receiving
P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday, his
salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?

Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127, which became
Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law
was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any
exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay income
tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the
members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the Court
of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The exemption also extends to other constitutional officers,
like the President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the members of the Commission on
Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service
Commission, and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all these
officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant. There are more than 990 other
judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals, about 107
Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The reason
behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court
and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of
the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials.

The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public
policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs.
Gore (253 U. S., 245):

The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but,
like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench and to
promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of
the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the
administration of justice without respect to person and with equal concern for the poor and
the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a
limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not restrictively, but in accord with its
spirit and the principle on which it proceeds.

Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption,
especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as
P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law, such as
P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national revenue to be
derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional
exemption, could not be large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not affect, much
less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that prompted the establishment of the
constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court
declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as
greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of
income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by
the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and
preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to the members of the
Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited
membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and
training required, one generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late in life,
on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he
does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of
exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit.
They are relatively more numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive, they can less
afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be
real, substantial and onerous.

Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is
based on public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged
with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of Representatives except in
cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in
the session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech, remark
or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or
juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in making
such statements during their sessions are extended immunity and exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and
juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used
exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].)
Holders of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or interest
they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act
No. 566). Payments or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of
the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration are exempt from
taxation. (Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army
who served in the Armed Forces of the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services
corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income tax.
(Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the
Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No.
35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by
constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his
income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the
framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying
taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the independence
of the Judiciary.

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect
that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so
violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution
and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way
that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task
of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no
pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:

Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, G. R. No. L-2314, in view of the part I had in that case as former Solicitor General, I wish
however to state that I concur in the opinion of the majority to the effect that section 13, Republic Act
No. 590, in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered "not
to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law", constitutes an invasion of
the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, I am of the opinion that said section is null
and void, it being a transgression of the fundamental principle underlying the separation of powers.
PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto vs.
Meer, 85 Phil., 552, in which I concurred. But I disagree with the majority in ruling that no legislation
may provide that it be held valid although against a provision of the Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME COURT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila,
seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from
their salaries.

In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial
officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in
and by said Constitution."

It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response
to representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes
from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed
the Chief Justice's directive as follows:

RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief
Justice's previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this
Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices
of the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of the judiciary.

That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the Court has
deemed it best to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown
hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express
grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give
substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner
Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard to
Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos,
that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to
all taxpayers.

This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as
approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured
by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public
officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since
then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the
members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary.
The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and
Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from
payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during
their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are
properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment
of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against
decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.

A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution provided:

... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office ... 1 (Emphasis supplied).

Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of
judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their
continuance in office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours).

And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution specifically
stipulated:

No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including

constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax. 3

The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased. 4(Emphasis supplied).

The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973
Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the
original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate
such contention.

The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:

Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
and of judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly
shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of _____________
and each Associate Justice ______________ pesos. 5(Emphasis ours)

During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two Commissioners presented
their objections to the provision on tax exemption, thus:

MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of justices, does this
not violate the principle of the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal protection of
the law? After all, tax is levied not on the salary but on the combined income, such that when
the judge receives a salary and it is comingled with the other income, we tax the income, not
the salary. Why do we have to give special privileges to the salary of justices?

MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the increase or

decrease of their salary during their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing their salary
and affecting the independence of the judges.

MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect tenure, but the
special privilege on taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of uniformity in
taxation and the equal protection clause. 6

xxx xxx xxx

MR. OPLE. x x x

Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor, Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion, for whom we have the highest respect, to surround the Supreme Court and the
judicial system as a whole with the whole armor of defense against the executive and
legislative invasion of their independence. But in so doing, some of the citizens outside,
especially the humble government employees, might say that in trying to erect a bastion of
justice, we might end up with the fortress of privileges, an island of extra territoriality under
the Republic of the Philippines, because a good number of powers and rights accorded to
the Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest degree by other employees of the
government.

An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic immunity, which
is, of course, denied to the entire executive department and the legislative. 7

And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo A.
Rigos proposed that the term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and that the words "nor
subjected to income tax" be deleted so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches
in the government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, defended the
original draft and referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that "the independence of
the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries."
Commissioner Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a vote. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas
stood up "in support of an amendment to the amendment with the request for a modification of the
amendment," as follows:

FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment saying that it is
not enough to drop the phrase "shall not be subjected to income tax," because if that is all
that the Gentleman will do, then he will just fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and
in Dencia vs. David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which
excludes them from income tax, but rather I would propose that the statement will read:
"During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE
SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN support of this position, I would say that the
argument seems to be that the justice and judges should not be subjected to income tax
because they already gave up the income from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees. And I know right now, for instance, there are many
people who have accepted employment in the government involving a reduction of income
and yet are still subject to income tax. So, they are not the only citizens whose income is
reduced by accepting service in government.

Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment. Commissioner Rustico
F. de los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon resumption, Commissioner
Bernas announced:

During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original proponent,

Commissioner Rigos, that his amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: "During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED."But this is on the understanding
that there will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the General
Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:

No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including

constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.

So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that the salary of justices
is subject to tax.

When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-exemption from tax of
salaries of public officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:

FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General Provisions.
But at any rate, when we put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the understanding that
the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore.

The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally approved without
objection.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is that there will
be a provision under the Article on General Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario Braid
kindly take note that the salaries of officials of the government including constitutional
officers shall not be exempt from income tax? The amendment proposed herein and
 accepted by the Committee now reads as follows: "During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor subjected to income tax" is deleted.9

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary
taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting
it should be given effect.10 The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution.11 it may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were
guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.12 1avv phi 1

Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again
reproduced hereunder:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased. (Emphasis supplied).

it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation
of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of
enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a
strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the
discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income
tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs.
Meer,13 as affirmed in Endencia vs. David 14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the
fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the
meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the
cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation
equitably.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Section 9,Articie VIII.

2 Section 10, Article X.

 3 Section 6, Article XV, General Provisions.

4 Section 10, Article VIII.

5 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 433.

6 Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 460.

7 Ibid., at page 467,

8 85 Phil. 552 (1950).

9 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 506.

10 Gold Creek Mining Co. vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938).

11J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, No. L-21064, February 18, 1970,
31 SCRA 413.

12 Tanada, Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 21.

13 85 Phil. 552 (1950).

14 93 Phil. 696 (1953).

[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third

Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense
of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal
pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond
which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish
with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of
rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all
cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-
preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it
behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective
wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought
changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties
more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the
web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of
multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision,
between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its
members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual
rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA
7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses
that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore
makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b)
it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes
the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of
which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed
constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business,

enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or

raids on the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,

kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or
government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,

equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other

combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or

influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered
by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests
and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived
from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring
supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it

shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring
supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8)
separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as
amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3,
par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713
(The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim.
Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No.
26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the
Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses
under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits
and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised
were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the
vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus
Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No.
26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance
of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on
which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for
Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed
its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner
submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the
issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is
unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and,
(c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within
the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative
act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This
strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one
branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate
branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and
act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in
favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the
provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to
sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged
law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of
the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs
of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed
domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the
fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party
challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there
is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding
of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by
Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant
case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder
Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit inits description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden,
and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination

or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the NationalGovernment or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by
establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one
charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the
proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed
statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at
least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of
the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating
with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have
committed:

"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the

Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a.
'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and
John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A.
No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO
ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY
SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO
THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,

MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-
FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM
ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,

converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion
of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax
share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN
DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND
OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF
STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS,
FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT
NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,

PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the
amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none
- that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions
clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of
the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec.
4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms
without defining them;[6] much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every
word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its
inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness
or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from
the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,[7] unless it is evident
that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[8] The intention
of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to
use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words
"combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of
combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure
individual characters.

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in
spatial and temporal succession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their
popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which
eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May

1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say

THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS
MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF.Now when we say combination, we
actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one
and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the
same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be
included also?

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one
enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It
cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
 REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we
seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very
good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may
already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a
series of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as.
Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But
when we say acts of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts
falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the
public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to
the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal
acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1,
par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for
"combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in
the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or

series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1
(d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an
'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or
method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the
overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the
"void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in
various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal
offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence
can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that
specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by
a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply
as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless
specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet
fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction,
while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such
activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear
and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness"
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather
than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of
the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague
and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that
"a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."[14]

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is

overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is
that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person
making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a
statute drawn with narrow specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed
for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as
in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that "claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held
that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."[19]

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation,
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only]
'as applied' to a particular defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on
the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected.[22] It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without
concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme
Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary.The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all
the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last
resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In determining the constitutionality of a
statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must
be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.[27]
 In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the
Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than
real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute
to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every
provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be
sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of
constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of
what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage,
petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its
appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full
knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate and
emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law
itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction
that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being
vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and
elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative
precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give
fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.Petitioners further argued that the
Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted"
benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad
faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in
the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3)
offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest
partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the
different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be
committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the
indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or
without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of
Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition,
Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt
practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in

the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep.
Act 3019, as amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions
penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which
is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the
term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was
understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners'
objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the
Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof
of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall
not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal.[29] The use of the"reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is
critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves
people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free
society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government
cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his
guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in
the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.[30] The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo
Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9

October 1990
 MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the
information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him
guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the
accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but
the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery,
falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the
crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the
robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was
charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved
two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the
totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be
taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in
the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality
of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is
just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the
crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential
element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations
and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million,
but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in
those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved
beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder(underscoring
supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the
standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution
to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime
suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs
to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at
least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing
that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids
on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being
sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only
that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion
that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy"
inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise,
such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate
acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate
acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other
explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment
of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
"pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged,
(as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the
accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law
without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised
Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder
Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused
charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the
law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and
it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can
avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes
charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the
crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can
be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern"
is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and
unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder
xxxx
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal
case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a
means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient
evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is
flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the
rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing
rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides
for a separability clause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application

thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such
provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as
a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not
really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other,
especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in
se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens
rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended
information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully
and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens
rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following
remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:

SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would
not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient
to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.[33]

However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the
transcript quoted by petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in
Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a
speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]

Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder,
the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme
or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the
acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must
be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

Indeed, 2 provides that -

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal

Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens
rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply
as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit,
but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean."[35]

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be

deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993
to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No.
7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:[36]

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very
nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like
an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his
or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim
or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the
victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is
detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched
itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds
translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very
survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the
effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting
in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that
their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to
society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies
that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37]and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes
are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as
though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P.
Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA
7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for
him to resurrect thislong dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that
RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary
effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in
high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has
become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive
more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical
measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially
designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked,
will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of
our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to
ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities
in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of
national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's
ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal
statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger
for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism
and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Quisumbing, JJ., join concurring opinion of J. Mendoza.
Puno, Vitug, JJ., concurred and joins J. Mendoza's concurring opinion.
Kapunan, Pardo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., please see concurring opinion.
Panganiban J., please see separate concurring opinion.
Carpio, J., no part. Was one of the complainants before Ombudsman.

[1]
Approved 12 July 1991 and took effect 8 October 1991.
[2]
Approved 13 December 1993 and took effect 31 December 1993.
[3]
Lim v. Pacquing, et al., G.R. No. 115044, 27 January 1995, 240 SCRA 644.
[4]
G.R. No. 87001, 4 December 1989, 179 SCRA 828.
[5]
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 414 (1925).
[6]
82 C.J.S. 68, p. 113; People v. Ring, 70 P.2d 281, 26 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 768.
[7]
Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104988, 18 June 1996, 257 SCRA 430, 448.
[8]
PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 943774, 27 August 1992, 213 SCRA 16, 26.
[9]
Resolution of 9 July 2001.
[10]
See People v. Nazario, No. L-44143, 31 August 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195-196.
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
State v. Hill, 189 Kan 403, 369 P2d 365, 91 ALR2d 750.
[13]
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L. Ed. 328 (1926) cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Ass'n. v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849, 867 (1967).
[14]
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 12, 2 L. Ed 325, 338 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker 364 U.S. 479, 5 L. Ed.
2d 231 (1960).
[15]
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408, 413 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[16]
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 95 L. Ed 2d 697, 707 (1987); see also People v. De la Piedra, G.R.
No. 121777, 24 January 2001.
[17]
413 U.S. 601, 612-613, 37 L. Ed 2d 830, 840-841 (1973).
[18]
United States v. Salerno, supra.
[19]
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 369
(1982).
[20]
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524, 529 (1960). The paradigmatic case is Yazoo &
Mississippi Valley RR. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 57 L. Ed. 193 (1912).
[21]
G. Gunther & K. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 1299 (2001).
[22]
Id. at 1328. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and Facial Challenges, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321 (2000)
arguing that, in an important sense, as applied challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication
and that determinations that statutes are facially invalid properly occur only as logical outgrowths of ruling on
whether statutes may be applied to particular litigants on particular facts.
[23]
Constitution, Art. VIII, 1 and 5. Compare Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936); "[T]he
power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to be constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities."
[24]
401 U.S. 37, 52-53, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669, 680 (1971). Accord, United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524
(1960); Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 106 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1989).
[25]
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 613, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 841; National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524
U.S. 569, 580 (1998).
[26]
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 223, 107 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990); Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000 (Mendoza, J., Separate Opinion).
[27]
United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 9 L. Ed. 2d 561, 565-6 (1963).
[28]
G.R. No. 57841, 30 July 1982, 115 SCRA 793.
[29]
People v. Ganguso, G.R. No. 115430, 23 November 1995, 250 SCRA 268, 274-275.
[30]
People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 94187, 4 November 1992, 215 SCRA 349, 360.
[31]
Then Senate President Jovito R. Salonga construed in brief the provision, thuswise: If there are lets say 150
crimes all in all, criminal acts, whether bribery, misappropriation, malversation, extortion, you need not prove all
those beyond reasonable doubt. If you can prove by pattern, lets say 10, but each must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, you do not have to prove 150 crimes. Thats the meaning of this (Deliberations of Committee on
Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Laws, 15 November 1988, cited in the Sandiganbayan Resolution of 9
July 2001).
[32]
TSN, 18 September 2001, pp. 115-121.
[33]
4 Record of the Senate 1316, 5 June 1989.
[34]
Ibid.
[35]
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339, 73 L.Ed. 722, 728 (1929).
[36]
267 SCRA 682, 721-2 (1997) (emphasis added).
[37]
Black's Law Dictionary 959 (1990); Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 324, 338 (1986).
[38]
G.R. No. 117472, 7 February 1997, 267 SCRA 682.

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity

as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST
CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO,
JR., respondent.

[G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-

ARROYO, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito
Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but more
transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties dispute. While the
significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the
ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the
President.
 In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some (10) million
Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from lifes adversity. Both
petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems
that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4,
2000. Ilocos Sur Governos, Luis Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air
and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos
from jueteng lords.[1]
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator
Teofisto Guingona Jr, then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery
privilege speech entitled I Accuse. He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million
in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged
that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended
for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the
Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on
Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.[2]
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and
Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of
Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and
Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime
Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese
of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority
to govern.[3] Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines
joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner.[4] Four days later, or on October 17, former
President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the supreme self-sacrifice of
resignation.[5] Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12,
respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services[6] and
later asked for petitioners resignation.[7]However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and
refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the
Council of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala,
former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington
Sycip.[8] On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade
and Industry.[9] On November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel
Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng
Masang Pilipino.[10]
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13,
House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment[11] signed by 115 representatives,
or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused
political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator
Pimentel as Senate President.Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentabella.[12] On
November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one
(21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
presiding.[13]
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment
trial started.[14] the battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal
profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte
and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar
Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio
Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were
former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito
P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flamiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House
Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial
was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating.Its high and low
points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the
December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-
PCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the
signature Jose Velarde on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their
bank on February 4, 2000.[15]
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of
Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the
prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioners Secretary of
Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources
Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.[16] Then came the
fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10[17] the senator-judges ruled against the
opening of the second envelop which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner
held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The public and private
prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate
President.[18] The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit
the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and
speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering
their collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance
with the impeachment tribunal.[19] Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite
postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have
resolved the issue of resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the
motion.[20]
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioners resignation. A 10-
kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino
Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the peoples
solidarity in demanding petitioners resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes
in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA
Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people.[21]
 On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the
petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the
holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the
growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General
Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.[22] In the
presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering
demonstrators, General Reyes declared that on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong
members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this
government.[23] A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service
commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.[24] Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their
posts.[25] Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To
stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of
the highly controversial second envelop.[26] There was no turning back the tide. The tide had
become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations
for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacaangs Mabini Hall, Office of the
Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon
Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel
Fernandez, head of the presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent
Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance
Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.[27] Outside the palace, there was a
brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-
throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke
out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the
EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines.[28] At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang
Palace.[29] He issued the following press statement:[30]

20 January 2001

STATEMENT FROM

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal
minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will
prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of
this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to
me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may
come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive

national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.

MABUHAY!

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:[31]

Sir:

By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the
Acting President.

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m., on January
20.[32] Another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it
was received only at 9:00 p.m.[33]
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately
discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the
following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:

A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to

Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the
Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the
Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which
request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to
confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to
the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January
20, 2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that
maybe filed by a proper party.

Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special
envoys.[34] Recognition of respondent Arroyos government by foreign governments swiftly
followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d honneur at Malacaang, led by the Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats
recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.[35] US President George W. Bush gave the
respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her
government.[36]
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives.[37] The House then passed Resolution No. 175 expressing the full support of the
House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Philippines.[38] It also approved Resolution No. 176 expressing the support of the
House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and
expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nations goals
under the Constitution.[39]
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act. [40] A few
days later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising Ban and Fair Election Practices
Act.[41]
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice
President.[42] the next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the
nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.[43] Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile,
and John Osmea voted yes with reservations, citing as reason therefore the pending challenge on
the legitimacy of respondent Arroyos presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa
Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.[44] The House of Representatives also approved
Senator Guingonas nomination in Resolution No. 178.[45] Senator Guingona took his oath as Vice
President two (2) days later.[46]
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court
is functus officio and has been terminated.[47] Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated for the
record that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate
had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of
whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.[48]
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyos public acceptance
rating jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.[49] In another survey
conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the
Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey
also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the
balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to
52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes:
 58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass, and 54%
among the Es or very poor class.[50]

After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in
clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in
motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23,
2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers
Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and
corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for
government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines
Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery,
perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on
November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property,
plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28,
2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080;
and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for
plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to
investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan,
Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the
panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his
witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints
against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court
GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in Case
Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that
may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted. Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. Acting on GR
Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents to comment
thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001. On February 13, the Court
ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the
respondents comments on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15.
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before
the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.,[51] and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban[52] recused
themselves on motion of petitioners counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked
the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have compromised themselves by indicating that they
have thrown their weight on one side but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the
parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to
submit their simultaneous replies.
 In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and
press statement for Gag Order on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R.
No. 146738, the Court resolved:

(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001
declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue
a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;

(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under
pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in
public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court,
and

(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent
Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in
his office against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it
appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately
resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing
held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and
academic.[53]

The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed
submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I

Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

II

Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner

Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III

Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the

criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that
petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV

Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of

prejudicial publicity.
 We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I

Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question

Private respondents[54] raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question,
and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its
embroideries, the cases at bar assail the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration. They stress that
respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her
oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency
and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these realities on
ground constitute the political thicket which the Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to
lift the shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal
minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on
the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in
the mills constitutional law.[55] In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to
determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962
case of Baker v. Carr,[56] viz:

x x x Prominent on the surface on any case held to involve a political question is

found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretions; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable
from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground
of a political questions presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of political
questions, not of political cases.

In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for
a firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question.[57] Our leading case
is Tanada v. Cuenco,[58] where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
held that political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, notlegality of a particular measure. To a
great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine
when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.[59] Heretofore,
the judiciary has focused on the thou shalt nots of the Constitution directed against the exercise
of its jurisdiction.[60]With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to
determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with
this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political
thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in
limpid language to x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x.
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver
A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.[61] and related cases[62] to support their thesis
that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo,
they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they
are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was
the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than
the Freedom Constitution[63] declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, as amended. It is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a
successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government
automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of
respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA
Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.[64] In her oath, she categorically swore to
preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the
powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is
clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the
whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only
affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the
new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is
intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession
of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political
question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the
freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting
edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these
rights was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P.
Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and
included it as among the reforms sine quibus non.[65] The Malolos Constitution, which is the
work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not
be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through
the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human
life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the
authorities, individually or collectively. These fundamental rights were preserved when the
United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the instruction to the Second
Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically
provided that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the
rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances. The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.[66]
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,[67] and
the 1973[68] Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, viz:

Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of

the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.

The indispensability of the peoples freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now
self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a
means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing
knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-
making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and
hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage
and necessary consensus.[69] In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in
which the conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the
society.[70] In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,[71] this function of free speech and
assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the
American Bar Association which emphasized that the basis of the right of assembly is the
substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this
means talk for all and by all.[72] In the relatively recent case of
Subayco v. Sandiganbayan, this Court similarly stressed that "... it should be clear even to
[73]

those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of
grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are
deaf to their grievances are ciphers.
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues
for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution,
notably section 1 of Article II,[74] and section 8[75]of Article VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under section 11[76] of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on
the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the
right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v.
Madison,[77] the doctrine has been laid down that it is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is . . . Thus, respondents invocation of the doctrine
of political is but a foray in the dark.
II
 Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President

We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a
political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable
from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as
President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the
President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as president.
The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides:

Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of

the President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then acts as President
until President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.

x x x.

The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered
resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the
Republic. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and
its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment.[78] The validity of a resignation is not governed by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be
implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the
oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by
the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important
to follow the succession of events after the expos of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioners alleged misgovernance in
the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in
the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding
snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of
the House of Representatives.Soon, petitioners powerful political allies began deserting
him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and
Former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior
economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.
 As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the peoples call for his resignation
intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment
tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before
the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress
of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread
to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of
mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the
diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.[79] The Angara
Diary reveals that in morning of January 19, petitioners loyal advisers were worried about the
swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to crate an ad hoc committee to handle
it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small
office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo
(Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)[80] An hour later or at 2:30, p.m., the petitioner
decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The
proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an
indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.At 3:00
p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the
petitioner and dramatically announced the AFPs withdrawal of support from the petitioner and
their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as
a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to
consider the option of dignified exit or resignation.[81] Petitioner did nor disagree but listened
intently.[82] The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to
the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a
sweetener by saying that petitioner would allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support
him and his family.[83] Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion
for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country. [84] At 10:00 p.m.,
petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five
days to a week in the palace.[85] This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the
reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace
period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up
Secretary Angara and requested, Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (lets cooperate
to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power.[86] There was no defiance to the
request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was
already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner
was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at
12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3)
points: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioners resignation; (2) the guarantee of
the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to
vindicate the name of the petitioner.[87]Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was
not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to
Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following
entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
xxx

I explain what happened during the first round of

negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-day
period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name.

If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang

masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont
want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy,
the intrigue.)

I just want to clear my name, then I will go.[88]

Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is
clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the
following happened:

Oppositions deal

7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagals spokesperson) Rene
Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.

Rene pulls out a document titled Negotiating Points. It reads:

1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001,
that will be effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice
President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.

2. Beginning today, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the
new administration shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice president to
various positions and offices of the government shall start their orientation activities
in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.

3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall
function under the Vice President as national military and police effective
immediately.
4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the
security of the president and his family as approved by the national military and police
authority (Vice President).

5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with
the alleged savings account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance
with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President.

Our deal

We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:

The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and
undertake as follows:

1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which
time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of
their person and property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President
Estrada and his families are guaranteed freedom from persecution or retaliation from
government and the private sector throughout their natural lifetimes.

This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities
Vice President (Macapagal).

3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate siting as an impeachment court
will authorize the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof
that the subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada.

4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January
2001 (the Transition Period), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an
appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation
program.

During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall
function under Vice President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall
obtain all the necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful
implementation and observance thereof.

Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor
provided for in Annex A heretofore attached to this agreement.[89]

The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has
resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of
the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were
the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement which was premised on the resignation
of the petitioner was further refined. It was then signed by their side and he was ready to fax it
to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United
Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her
oath-taking. The Angara Diary narrates the fateful events, viz:[90]

xxx

11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the
five points to effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these
points with a group he is with. I hear voices in the background.

Agreement

The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which
resignation shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President
will assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.

xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:

2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall
commence on 20 January 2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President to
various government positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent officials.

3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the
safety and security of the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes
as approved by the national military and police authority Vice President.

4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police authorities.
5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the
impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject
savings account does not belong to the President.

The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in
Annex B heretofore attached to this agreement.

xxx

11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed
by our side and awaiting the signature of the United Opposition.

And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has
decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.

Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (Why couldnt you
wait? What about the agreement)? I asked.

Reyes answered: Wala na, sir (Its over, sir).

I asked him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?

And General Reyes answer: Oo nga, i-delete na natin, sir (Yes, were deleting that
part).

Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.

But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since
this matter is already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first
provision and faxes the documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and
Macel to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.

I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the
signatures of the other side, as it is important that the provision on security, at
least, should be respected.

I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide
will administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.

The president is too stunned for words.

Final meal
12 noon Gloria takes her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.

12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.

The President is having his final meal at the Presidential Residence with the few
friends and Cabinet members who have gathered.

By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at
Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military
have already withdrawn their support for the President.

1 p.m. The Presidents personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada familys
personal possessions as they can.

During lunch, Ronie Puno mentions that the President needs to release a final
statement before leaving Malacaang.

The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong
and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as
president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and
order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of
this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to
me for service to our people. I will not shrik from any future challenges that may
come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive

national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.

MABUHAY!

It was curtain time for the petitioner.

In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by
his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged
the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation
about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for
the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given
him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to
a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5)
he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity
could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave
of absence due to his inability to govern. In support of this thesis, the letter dated January 20,
2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again,
we refer to the said letter, viz:

Sir

By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the
Acting President.

(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada

To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.[91] The pleadings filed by the
petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the circumstances that led to its
preparation.Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances
during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal
value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there
was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too
easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to
govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time
being. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the
resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly
showing his resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If,
however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal
significance. Petitioners resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a
changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his
repudiation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot give any legal
significance to petitioners letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that
he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his
resignation, viz:
Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation,
criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense
under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the
petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated from Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when
it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it
now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill,
reserved to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect
that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under
administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire.[92] During the period
of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:

Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire
pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against
him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on bribery.

The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his
prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency.[93]

The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the
second paragraph of the provision and insisted that the Presidents immunity should extend even
after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar to Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter
passed. Section 15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this
particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the President which was one of the
reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against
the resignation or retirement of a public official with pending criminal and administrative cases
against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the
act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to
stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to
prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the
Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be
a violation of his constitutional right.[94] A public official has the right not to serve if he really
wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is
facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will
not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use
his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the
records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him
before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and
0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from
conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting
President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be
considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA
No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose
investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity
from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that,
under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of
an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an
administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned
because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the
opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public
prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner
when he resigned.
III

Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.

We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to
perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As
aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the
same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the
inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant
submittal is that Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether
the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of
Article VII.[95] This contention is the centerpiece of petitioners stance that he is a President on
leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a
majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President
of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules
and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not
in session within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-
thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President;
otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."

That is the law. Now the operative facts:

(1) Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate
President and Speaker of the House;
(2) Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January
20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
(3) Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representative passed on January 24,
2001 House Resolution No. 175;[96]
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No.
176[97]which states:

RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS
CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER
ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE
NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

WHEREAS, as a consequence of the peoples loss of confidence on the ability of

former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority of his cabinet had
withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on
20 January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;

WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had

extended their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President
of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a

policy of national healing and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national
unity and development;

WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved

if it is divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of
Representatives as an institution and that of the individual members thereof of fealty
to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must ensure to the
people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the
attainment thereof;

WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all

efforts to unify the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political
wounds, and to be an instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a
direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation;

WHEREAS, without surrendering its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all
the foregoing, for the House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration
to the administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to
be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest demanding no
less: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption

into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic
of the Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the Nations goals under the
Constitution.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary General

On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No.
178[98] which states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS
NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the
assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the
event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of
the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated

Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of
the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with

integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated
responsibility and patriotism;

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true

statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, as
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines - qualities which
merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now,
therefore, be it

Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of

Representatives confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the
Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.

Adopted,

(Sgd) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary General

(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioners letter claiming inability, some twelve (12)
members of the Senate signed the following:

RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for
meaningful change and challenge;

WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation
needs unity of purpose and resolute cohesive resolute (sic) will;

WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative
measures in unity despite diversities in perspectives;

WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge our duties to attain desired
changes and overcome the nations challenges.[99]

On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82[100] which states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS
NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, there is it vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President due to the

assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the
event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of
the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated

Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of
the Republic of the Phillippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with
integrity, competence, and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated
responsibility and patriotism;

WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true

statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, as
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice. Senator of the land - which qualities merit
his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen.
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.

President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

Secretary of the Senate

On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83[101] which
states:

RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT

IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment
Court is functus officio and has been terminated.

Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court of Monday, January
15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.

Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the second
envelope be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and
preservation in accordance with the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval
thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the Senate President.

Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.

President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

Secretary of the Senate

(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to
be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate
garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by
respondent Arroyo as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any
recognition from any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his
inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has
clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses
of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following Taada v.
Cuenco,[102] we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an issue in regard
to which full discretionary authorityhas been delegated to the Legislative x x x branch of the
government. Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,[103] there is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon
petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question
is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a
political issue which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully
claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by
this Court.
IV

Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the
respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the
impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit,
whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioners contentions, a revisit of our legal history on executive immunity
will be most enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a
case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco tiaco and Crossfield,[104] the respondent
Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret
Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to
China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:

The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary
has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover
of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would
mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly
abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of
courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the
executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must
submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the Governor-General, like
the judges of the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be personally
mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance
of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is
properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the
Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any
person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is
assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal
or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The
thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General personally in
damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more that it can a
member of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public policy
forbids it.

Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be
personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such
official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had,
particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy
between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when
he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said
to have exercise discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What
is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only
when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he
actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining
whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in
determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected
provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably
qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of
authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its
determination. In such case, he acts, not as Governor-General but as a private
individual, and, as such, must answer for the consequences of his act.

Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted
immunity from suit, viz: x x x. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and
substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the
person of one of the highest officials of the State and for the office he occupies; a tendency to
unrest and disorder; resulting in a way, in a distrust as to the integrity of government itself.[105]
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on
executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of
the amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:

The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit
whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific
orders during his tenure.

The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in
Article XVII of this Constitution.

In his second Vicente G. Sinco Professional Chair Lecture entitled, Presidential Immunity And
All The Kings Men: The Law Of Privilege As A Defense To Actions For
Damages,[106] petitioners learned counsel, former Dean of the UP college of Law, Atty. Pacifico
Agabin, brightlined the modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the existing
law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:

In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and
fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President
not only from civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we
enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the President outside the scope
of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only the
President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals,
who acted upon orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us
were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome).

The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept
of executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by then Member of
Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency
immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public
trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism the king can do no
wrong.[107] The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the
People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not
reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The
following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas, viz:[108]

Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the committees omitting in the draft proposal the
immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the
Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the
original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the
Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the
President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not
provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing
litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?

Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present
jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.

Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.

Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the
1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.

Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam
President.

I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.

We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his
argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the
walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on
February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.[109] Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it
is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before
he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better
situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings
and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional
Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against
him, viz:[110]

xxx

Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed

against the President, for example, and the President resigns before judgment of
conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does
it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?

Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office,
then his resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the
provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary
courts.

This is in accord with our ruling in In re: Saturnino Bermudez[111]that incumbent

Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the
impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the
presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal
prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His
reliance in the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan[112] and related cases[113]are inapropos for they
have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity
of a non-sitting president.Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President
to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be
anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and
omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.[114] Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal
a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for
truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,[115] US President
Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and
documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President
Nixons associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which
were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washingtons
Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an
unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among
others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be
impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial
proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that when the
ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is
based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. In the 1982 case of
Nixon v. Fitzgerald,[116] the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President
from civil damages covers only official acts. Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion
to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones[117] where it held that the US Presidents
immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to
unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of
executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is
that a public office is a public trust.[118] It declared as a state policy that (t)he State shall
maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruption."[119] It ordained that (p)ublic officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[120] It set the rule that (t)he right
of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from
them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel.[121] It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.[122] It created the office of the
Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "(i)nvestigate on its
own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.[123] The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.[124] These
constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioners claim that a non-sitting
president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V

Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting
the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his
guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the
criminal cases in violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with
the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile
cases.[125] The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice
a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to
fair trial suffers a threat.[126] The American approach is different. US courts assume
a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused
to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial
probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop
the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases.[127] In People vs. Teehankee,
Jr.,[128] later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[129] we laid down
the doctrine that:

We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due
to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at
bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then
and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to
a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial
for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x
x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage
does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and
impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the
bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The
state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to
our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday
menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial
judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed
the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their
impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per
se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial
judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of
the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of
possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the
case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during
the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged
the burden.

We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de
Leon, etc.[130] and its companion cases. viz.:

Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process
while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its
early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a
preliminary investigation.

xxx

The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be

avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic
developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the
high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation
of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated
even today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which
are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case the NBI, the
respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in this media
blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding,
criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. Inn the seminal
case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was wisely held:

xxx

(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American
justice demonstrates conclusively that the time this Nations organic laws were
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open,
thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and
discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias
or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials
was recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and
public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an
important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility,
and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that societys criminal process satisfy
the appearance of justice, Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct
11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this
unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries
past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of
a criminal trial under this Nations system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v. United States,
362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.

(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First
Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as
those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of
everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First
Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that
the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from
summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the
time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also
relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst
to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was
deliberately linked by the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the
people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and
where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality
of what takes place.

(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees
to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not
expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of
enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the
First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could
be eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain
circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus,
in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al.,we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at
bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the
publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and
impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of
publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown
and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal
investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded
by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable
indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-record evidence
except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation
was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no
instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ
Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.
(emphasis supplied)

Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to
enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent
Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of
proof.[131] He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the
petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the
office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner
that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of
the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with
its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable
to the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with
bias. To quote petitioners submission, the respondent Ombudsman has been influenced by the
barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him
by the mobs.[132] News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman
has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner[133]and it is postulated that the prosecutors
investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy
of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this
Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice
and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he
is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the
prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own
findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.[134] They can be
reversed but they can not be compelled to change their recommendations nor can they be
compelled to prosecute cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating
prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent
Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the
finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it
before the proper court.
VI.
 Epilogue

A word of caution to the hooting throng. The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a
different dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman.
Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the
gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent
Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused
to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the most fundamental of all
freedoms.[135] To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His
is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-
free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls the impatient
vehemence of the majority. Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment
is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number
for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of
the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has
respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of
multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to mans progress from the
cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some peoples prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., no part in view of expression given in the open court and in the extended
explanation.
Vitug, J., see concurring opinion.
Kapunan, J., concur in the result and reserve the right to write a separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion.
Panganiban, J., no part per letter of Inhibition dated Feb. 15, 2000 mention in footnote 51 of
ponencia.
Pardo, J., in the result; believes that petitioner was constrained to resign and reserve his vote
in immunity from suit
Buena, J., in the result.
Ynares-Santiago, J., concur in the result and reserve the filing of a separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concur in the result and reserve the right to write a separate opinion.

[1]
Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), October 5, 2000, pp. A1 and A17.
[2]
PDI, October 6, 2000, pp. A1 and A18.
[3]
Ibid., October 12, 2000, pp. A1 and A17.
[4]
Ibid., October 14, 2000, p. A1.
[5]
Ibid., October 18, 2000, p. A1.
[6]
Ibid., October 13, 2000, pp. A1 and A21.
[7]
Ibid., October 26, 2000, p. A1.
[8]
Ibid., November 2, 2000, p. A1.
[9]
Ibid., November 3, 2000, p. A1.
[10]
Ibid., November 4, 2000, p. A1.
[11]
The complaint for impeachement was based on the following grounds: bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of
public trust, and culpable violation of the Cnstitution.
[12]
Ibid., November 14, 2000, p. A1.
[13]
Ibid., November 21, 2000, p. A1.
[14]
Ibid., December 8, 2000, p. A1.
[15]
Ibid., December 23, 2000, pp. A1 and A19.
[16]
Ibid., January 12, 2001, p. A1.
[17]
Those who voted yes to open the envelop were: Senators Pimentel, Guingona, Drilon, Cayetano, Roco, Legarda,
Magsaysay, Flavier, Biazon, Osmea III. Those who vote no were Senators Ople, Defensor-Santiago, John Osmea,
Aquino-Oreta, Coseteng, Enrile, Honasan, Jaworski, Revilla, Sotto III and Tatad.
[18]
Philippine Star, January 17, 2001, p. 1.
[19]
Ibid., January 18, 2001, p. 4.
[20]
Ibid., p. 1.
[21]
Ibid., January 19, 2001, pp. 1 and 8.
[22]
Eraps Final Hours Told by Edgardo Angara, (hereinafter referred to as Angara Diary), PDI, February 4, 2001, p.
A16.
[23]
Philippine Star, January 20, 2001, p. 4.
[24]
PDI, February 4, 2001, p. A16.
[25]
Philippine Star, January 20, 2001, pp. 1 and 11.
[26]
Ibid., January 20, 2001, p. 3.
[27]
PDI, February 5, 2001, pp. A1 and A6.
[28]
Philippine Star, January 21, 2001, p. 1.
[29]
PDI, February 6, 2001, p. A12.
[30]
Annex A, DOJ-OSG, Joint Comment; Rollo, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, p. 288.
[31]
Annex A-1, Petition, G.R. Nos. 146710-15; Rollo, p. 34.
[32]
Ibid.
[33]
Annex A, Petition, G.R. Nos. 146710-15; Rollo, p. 33.
[34]
Philippine Star, January 21, 2001, p. 1; January 23, 2001, pp. 1 and 4; January 24, 2001, p. 3; PDI, January 25,
2001, pp. A1 and A15.
[35]
Philippine Star, January 24, 2001, p. 1.
[36]
PDI, January 25, 2001, p. 1.
[37]
Ibid., p. 2.
[38]
Annex C, DOJ-OSG Joint Comment; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15 p. 290.
[39]
Annex D, id; ibid., p. 292.
[40]
PDI, January 27, 2001, p. 1.
[41]
PDI, February 13, 2001, p. A2.
[42]
Philippine Star, February 13, 2001, p. A2.
[43]
Annex E, id.; ibid., p. 295.
[44]
PDI, February 8, 2001, pp. A1 & A19.
[45]
Annex F, id.; ibid., p. 297.
[46]
PDI, February 10, 2001, p. A2.
[47]
Annex G., id.; ibid., p. 299.
[48]
PDI, February 8, 2001, p. A19.
[49]
Philippine Star, February 3, 2001, p. 4.
[50]
Acceptance of Gloria is Nationwide, Mahar Mangahas, Manila Standard, February 16, 2001, p. 14.
[51]
See The Chief Justices Extended Explanation for His Voluntary Inhibition; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, pp. 525-
527.
[52]
See Letter of Inhibition of Associate Justice Panganiban; Rollo, GR No. 146738, pp. 120-125.
[53]
Rollo, G.R. No. 146738, p. 134.
[54]
Leonard de Vera and Dennis Funa; see their Memorandum, pp. 16-27; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, Vol. III, pp.
809-820.
[55]
Gunther and Sullivan, Constitutional Law, 13th ed., pp. 45-46.
[56]
369 US 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L ed 2d 663, 686 (1962).
[57]
See e.g., Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, et al., GR No. 141284, 15 August 2000;
Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA 603 (1999); Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756 (1998); Tatad v. Secretary of the
Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997); Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989);
Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129 Phil 7 (1967); Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1 (1947); Avelino v. Cuenco 83 Phil.
17 (1949); Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil 192 (1946); Alejandrino v.Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1942).
[58]
103 Phil 1051, 1068 (1957).
[59]
Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
[60]
Note that the early treatises on Constitutional Law are discourses on limitations of power typical of which is,
Cooleys Constitutional Limitations.
[61]
Joint Resolution, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. Pres. Corazon C. Aquino,
et al., GR No. 73748; Peoples Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution, etc. v. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., GR No.
73972; and Councilor Clifton U. Ganay v. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., GR No. 73990, May 22, 1986.
[62]
Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, 210 SCRA 597 [1992].
[63]
Proclamation No. 3. (1986)
[64]
It states:
I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Vice President of the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its
laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the nation.
So help me God.
(Annex I, Comment of the Ombudsman; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15 Vol. II, p. 332)
[65]
See Filipinas Despues de Cien Aos (The Philippines a Century Hence), p. 62.
[66]
The guaranty was taken from Amendment I of the US Constitution which provides: Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof of abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievance.
[67]
See section 8, Article IV.
[68]
See section 9, Article IV.
[69]
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, 1970 ed., p. 6, et seq.
[70]
Ibid., See also concurring opinion of Justice Branders in Whitney v. California (74 US 357, 375-76) where he
said ... the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people...
[71]
307 US 496 (1939).
[72]
Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, 1946 ed., pp. 413-415, 421.
[73]
260 SCRA 798 (1996).
[74]
Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution reads:

The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
[75]
Infra at 26.
[76]
Infra at 41.
[77]
1 Cranch (5 US) 137, 2 L ed 60 (1803).
[78]
Gonzales v. Hernandez, 2 SCRA 228 (1961).
[79]
See its February 4, 5, and 6, 2001 issues.
[80]
PDI, February 4, 2001, p. A1.
[81]
Ibid.
[82]
Ibid.
[83]
Ibid.
[84]
Ibid.
[85]
Ibid.
[86]
PDI, February 5, 2001, p. A1.
[87]
Ibid., p. A-1.
[88]
Ibid.
[89]
PDI, February 5, 2001, p. A6.
[90]
PDI, February 6, 2001, p. A1.
[91]
In the Angara Diary which appeared in the PDI issue of February 5, 2001, Secretary Angara stated that the letter
came from Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla; that he and Political Adviser Banayo opposed it; and that PMS head
Macel Fernandez believed that the petitioner would not sign the letter.
[92]
Congressional Record, 4th Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 1959, pp. 603-604.
[93]
Id., May 9, 1959, p. 1988.
[94]
Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist
except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
[95]
Reply Memorandum, p. 3; Rollo, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, Vol. IV.
[96]
House Resolution No. 175, 11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001), reads:
RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF HER EXCELLENCY, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, on January 20, 2001, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as the 14th President of
the Philippines;
WHEREAS, her ascension to the highest office of the land under the dictum, the voice of the people is the voice of
God establishes the basis of her mandate on integrity and morality in government;
WHEREAS, the House of Representatives joins the church, youth, labor and business sectors in fully supporting the
Presidents strong determination to succeed;
WHEREAS, the House of representative is likewise one with the people in supporting President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyos call to start the healing and cleansing process for a divided nation in order to build an edifice of peace,
progress and economic stability for the country: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the House of Representatives, To
express its full support to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, 14th President of the
Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) Roberto P. Nazareno
Secretary General
[97]
11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001).
[98]
11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001).
[99]
Annex 2, Comment of Private Respondents De Vera, et al.; Rollo, GR No. 146710-15, Vol. II, p. 231.
[100]
11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001).
[101]
11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001).
[102]
103 Phil 1051, 1067 (1957).
[103]
Baker vs. Carr, supra at 686 headnote 29.
[104]
16 Phil 534 (1910).
[105]
The logical basis for executive immunity from suit was originally founded upon the idea that the King can do
no wrong. [R.J. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV.. 303 (1959)]. The concept thrived at the
time of absolute monarchies in medieval England when it was generally accepted that the seat of sovereignty and
governmental power resides in the throne. During that historical juncture, it was believed that allowing the King to
be sued in his court was a contradiction to the sovereignty of the King.
With the development of democratic thoughts and institutions, this kind of rationalization eventually lost its moral
force. In the United States, for example, the common law maxim regarding the Kings infallibility had limited
reception among the framers of the Constitution. [J. Long, How to Sue the President: A Proposal for Legislation
Establishing the Extent of Presidential Immunity, 30 VAL. U.L. REV. 283 (1995)]. Still, the doctrine of presidential
immunity found its way of surviving in modern political times, retaining both its relevance and vitality. The
privilege, however, is now justified for different reasons. First, the doctrine is rooted in the constitutional tradition of
separation of powers and supported by history. [Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 451 U.S. 731 (1982)]. The separation of powers
principle is viewed as demanding the executives independence from the judiciary, so that the President should not be
subject to the judiciarys whim. Second, by reason of public convenience, the grant is to assure the exercise of
presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that the Chief Executive is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention. [Soliven v. Makasiar, 167
SCRA 393 (1988)]. Otherwise, the time and substance of the chief executive will be spent on wrangling litigation,
disrespect upon his person will be generated, and distrust in the government will soon follow.[Forbes v. Chouco
Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534 (1910)]. Third, on grounds of public policy, it was recognized that the gains from discouraging
official excesses might be more than offset by the losses from diminished zeal [Agabin, op. cit., at 121.]. Without
immunity, the president would de disinclined to exercise decision-making functions in a manner that might
detrimentally affect an individual or group of individuals. [See H. Schnechter, Immunity of Presidential Aides from
Criminal Prosecution, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 779 (1989)].1
[106]
62 Phil. L.J. 113 (1987).
[107]
See Bulletin Today, August 16, 1984, p. 1; December 18, 1984, p. 7.
[108]
Records of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Vol. II, Records, p. 423, July 29, 1986.
[109]
Supra at 47.
[110]
Records of Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 28, 1986, p. 355.
[111]
145 SCRA 160 (1986).
[112]
128 SCRA 324 (1984).
[113]
In Re: Raul Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771 (1988); Cuenco v. Fernan, 158 29 (1988); and Jarque v. Desierto, A.C.
No. 4509, 250 SCRA xi-xiv (1995).
[114]
Wallace v. Board of Education, 280 Ala. 635, 197 So 2d 428 (1967).
[115]
418 US 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L ed 1039 (1974).
[116]
457 US 731, 73 L ed. 349, 102 S Ct. 2690 (1982).
[117]
520 U.S. 681 (1997).
[118]
See section 1, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
[119]
See section 27, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.
[120]
See section 1, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
[121]
See section 15, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
[122] See section 4, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.

[123]
See section 13 (1), Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
[124]
See section 14, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
[125]
See Brandwood, Notes: You Say Fair Trial and I say Free Press: British and American Approaches to Protecting
Defendants Rights in High Profile Trials, NYU Law Rev., Vol. 75, No. 5, pp. 1412-1451 (November 2000).
[126]
Id., p. 1417.
[127]
See e.g., Martelino, et al. V. Alejandro, et al., 32 SCRA 106 (1970); People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54 (1995).
[128]
249 SCRA 54 (1995).
[129]
287 SCRA 581 at pp. 596-597 (1988).
[130]
247 SCRA 652 (1995).
[131]
Extensive publicity did not result in the conviction of well known personalities. E.g., OJ Simpson, John
Mitchell, William Kennedy Smith and Imelda Marcos.
[132]
Memorandum, p. 25; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, Vol. III, p. 647.
[133]
Memorandum, pp. 29-30; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, Vol. III, pp. 572-573.
[134]
See section 4, Rule 112.
[135]
Estes v. Texas, 381 US 532, 540 (1965).

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity

as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST
CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO,
JR., respondents.

[G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-

ARROYO, respondent.

RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
 For resolution are petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and
Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the Courts Decision of March 2, 2001.
In G.R. Nos. 146710-15, petitioner raises the following grounds:
I. IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR AND EXPLICIT PROVISIONS OF ART. XI, SECTION
3 (7) OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THEREON.
II. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER CAN BE PROSECUTED NOW, FOR THIS RULING
WOULD VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION,
CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS ACQUITTED IN THE IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS.
III. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS NO LONGER ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
IV. IT HELD THAT PETITIONERS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL HAVE
NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY.
V. IT HELD THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE COURT
TO ENJOIN THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE INCUMBENT
OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER HAVING FAILED TO PROVE THE IMPAIRED
CAPACITY OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO RENDER A BIASED FREE DECISION.
In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises and argues the following issues:
1. WHETHER PETITIONER RESIGNED OR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED RESIGNED AS
OF JANUARY 20, 2001;
2. WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF
THE FOLLOWING RULES ON EVIDENCE: HEARSAY, BEST EVIDENCE,
AUTHENTICATION, ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA;
3. WHETHER RELIANCE ON NEWSPAPER ACOUNTS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
HEARSAY RULE;
4. WHETHER CONGRESS POST FACTO CAN DECIDE PETITIONERS INABILITY TO
GOVERN CONSIDERING SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION; and
5. WHETHER PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY HAS AFFECTED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO
FAIR TRIAL.
We find the contentions of petitioner bereft of merit.
I

Prejudicial Publicity on the Court

Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails the
Decision for adverting to newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the
conclusion that he has resigned. In our Decision, we used the totality test to arrive at the
conclusion that petitioner has resigned. We referred to and analyzed events that were prior,
contemporaneous and posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. All these
events are facts which are well-established and cannot be refuted. Thus, we adverted to prior
events that built up the irresistible pressure for the petitioner to resign. These are: (1) the expose
of Governor Luis Chavit Singson on October 4, 2000; (2) the I accuse speech of then Senator
Teofisto Guingona in the Senate; (3) the joint investigation of the speech of Senator Guingona by
the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice; (4) the investigation of the Singson
expose by the House Committee on Public Order and Security; (5) the move to impeach the
petitioner in the House of Representatives; (6) the Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Jaime Cardinal
Sin demanding petitioners resignation; (7) a similar demand by the Catholic Bishops conference;
(8) the similar demands for petitioners resignation by former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and
Fidel V. Ramos; (9) the resignation of respondent Arroyo as Secretary of the DSWD and her call
for petitioner to resign; (10) the resignation of the members of petitioners Council of Senior
Economic Advisers and of Secretary Mar Roxas III from the Department of Trade and Industry;
(11) the defection of then Senate President Franklin Drilon and then Speaker of the House of
Representatives Manuel Villar and forty seven (47) representatives from petitioners Lapiang
Masang Pilipino; (12) the transmission of the Articles of Impeachment by Speaker Villar to the
Senate; (13) the unseating of Senator Drilon as Senate President and of Representative Villar as
Speaker of the House; (14) the impeachment trial of the petitioner; (15) the testimonies of
Clarissa Ocampo and former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu in the impeachment trial; (16)
the 11-10 vote of the senator-judges denying the prosecutors motion to open the 2nd envelope
which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held a P3.3 billion deposit in a secret
bank account under the name of Jose Velarde; (17) the prosecutors walkout and resignation; (18)
the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings to give a chance to the House of
Representatives to resolve the issue of resignation of their prosecutors; (19) the rally in the
EDSA Shrine and its intensification in various parts of the country; (20) the withdrawal of
support of then Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and the then Chief of Staff,
General Angelo Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services; (21) the same
withdrawal of support made by the then Director General of the PNP, General Panfilo Lacson,
and the major service commanders; (22) the stream of resignations by Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs; (23) petitioners agreement to hold a
snap election and opening of the controversial second envelope. All these prior events are facts
which are within judicial notice by this Court. There was no need to cite their news
accounts. The reference by the Court to certain newspapers reporting them as they
happened does not make them inadmissible evidence for being hearsay. The news account
only buttressed these facts as facts. For all his loud protestations, petitioner has not singled
out any of these facts as false.
We now come to some events of January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath taking of
respondent Arroyo. We used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the
petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to distill a persons subjective
intent from the evidence before them. Everyday, courts ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil
law cases involving last wills and testaments, in commercial cases involving contracts and in
other similar cases. As will be discussed below, the use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by
the hearsay rule. Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by the Court
from the facts narrated in the Diary but that does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence.
We did not stop with the contemporaneous events but proceeded to examine some events
posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Specifically, we analyzed the all important
press release of the petitioner containing his final statement which was issued after the oath-
taking of respondent Arroyo as president. After analyzing its content, we ruled that petitioners
issuance of the press release and his abandonemnt of Malacaang Palace confirmed his
resignation.[1] These are overt acts which leave no doubt to the Court that the petitioner has
resigned.
In light of this finding that petitioner has resigned before 12 oclock noon of Janaury
20, 2001, the claim that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo
took her oath of office at half past noon of the same day has no leg to stand on.
We also reject the contention that petitioners resignation was due to duress and
an involuntary resignation is no resignation at all.

x x x [I]t has been said that, in determining whether a given resignation is voluntarily
tendered, the element of voluntariness is vitiated only when the resignation is
submitted under duress brought on by government action. The three-part test for
such duress has been stated as involving the following elements: (1) whether one side
involuntarily accepted the others terms; (2) whether circumstances permitted no other
alternative; and (3) whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the
opposite side. The view has also been expressed that a resignation may be found
involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances it appears that the employers
conduct in requesting resignation effectively deprived the employer of free choice in
the matter. Factors to be considered, under this test, are: (1) whether the employee
was given some alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the
nature of the choice he or she was given; (3) whether the employewe was given a
reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she was permitted to select
the effective date of resignation. In applying this totality of the circumstances test, the
assessment whether real alternatives were offered must be gauged by an objective
standard rather than by the employees purely subjective evaluation; that the
employee may perceive his or her only option to be resignation for example,
because of concerns about his or her reputation is irrelevant. Similarly, the mere
fact that the choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives for example,
resignation or facing disciplinary charges does not of itself establish that a
resignation was induced by duress or coercion, and was therefore
involuntary. This is so even where the only alternative to resignation is facing
possible termination for cause, unless the employer actually lacked good cause to
believe that grounds for termination existed. In this regard it has also been said that a
resignation resulting from a choice between resigning or facing proceedings for
dismissal is not tantamount to discharge by coercion without procedural view if the
employee is given sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation of the choice
posed. Futhermore, a resignation by an officer charged with misconduct is not given
under duress, though the appropriate authority has already determined that the officers
alternative is termination, where such authority has the legal authority to terminate the
officers employment under the particular circumstances, since it is not duress to
threaten to do what one has the legal right to do, or to threaten to take any measure
authorized by law and the circumstances of the case.[2]

In the cases at bar, petitioner had several options available to him other than
resignation. He proposed to the holding of snap elections. He transmitted to the Congress a
written declaration of temporary inability. He could not claim he was forced to resign because
immediately before he left Malacaang, he asked Secretary Angara: Ed, aalis na ba ako? which
implies that he still had a choice of whether or not to leave.
To be sure, pressure was exerted for the petitioner to resign. But it is difficult to believe
that the pressure completely vitiated the voluntariness of the petitioners resignation. The
Malacaang ground was then fully protected by the Presidential Security Guard armed with tanks
and high-powered weapons. The then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, and other military
officers were in Malacaang to assure that no harm would befall the petitioner as he left the
Palace. Indeed, no harm, not even a scratch, was suffered by the petitioner, the members of his
family and his Cabinet who stuck it out with him in his last hours. Petitioners entourage was
even able to detour safely to the Municipal Hall of San Juan and bade goodbye to his followers
before finally going to his residence in Polk Street, Greenhills. The only incident before the
petitioner left the Palace was the stone throwing between a small group of pro and anti Erap
rallyists which resulted in minor injuries to a few of them. Certainly, there were no tanks that
rumbled through the Palace, no attack planes that flew over the presidential residence, no
shooting, no large scale violence, except verbal violence, to justify the conclusion that petitioner
was coerced to resign.
II

Evidentiary Issues

Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by this Court of
the Angara Diary. It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of
the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay
evidence.
We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court
statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot
complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its
use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings.[3] The
three parts of the Diary published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached as Annexes
A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T. Capulong, et al., dated
February 20, 2001. The second and third parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes
12 and 13 of the Comment of private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001. In
fact, petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second part
of the diary, published on February 5, 2001,[4] and the third part, published on February 6,
2001.[5] It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral
arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but
unfortunately failed to do so.
 Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is
not covered bythe hearsay rule.[6] Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in
whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce it.[7] There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1)
absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the
oath.[8] Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge
body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and
necessity.[9] The emergence of these exceptions and their wide spread acceptance is well-
explained by Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams and Berger as follows:

xxx

On the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of other
persons accounts of what happened, and verdicts are usually sustained and affirmed
even if they are based on hearsay erroneously admitted, or admitted because no
objection was made. See Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d 452, 454-455 (1st Cir. 1985)
(hearsay evidence alone can support a verdict). Although volumes have been written
suggesting ways to revise the hearsay rule, no one advocates a rule that would bar all
hearsay evidence. Indeed, the decided historical trend has been to exclude
categories of highly probative statements from the definition of hearsay (sections
2 and 3, infra), and to develop more class exceptions to the hearsay rule (sections
4-11, infra). Furthermore, many states have added to their rules the residual, or
catch-all, exceptions first pioneered by the Federal Rules which authorize the
admission of hearsay that does not satisfy a class exception, provided it is
adequately trustworthy and probative (section 12, infra).

Moreover, some commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be abolished
altogether instead of being loosened. See, e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundation of
the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1786, 1804-1805, 1815 (1980) (footnotes
omitted):

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Under this structure, exclusion is justified by fears of how the jury will be
influenced by the evidence. However, it is not traditional to think of hearsay as merely
a subdivision of this structure, and the Federal Rules do not conceive of hearsay in
that manner. Prejudice refers to the jurys use of evidence for inferences other than
those for which the evidence is legally relevant; by contrast, the rule against hearsay
questions the jurys ability to evaluate the strength of a legitimate inference to be
drawn from the evidence. For example, were a judge to exclude testimony because a
witness was particularly smooth or convincing, there would be no doubt as to the
usurpation of the jurys function. Thus, unlike prejudices recognized by the evidence
rules, such as those stemming from racial or religious biases or from the introduction
of photographs of a victims final state, the exclusion of hearsay on the basis of
misperception strikes at the root of the jurys function by usurping its power to process
quite ordinary evidence, the type of information routinely encountered by jurors in
their everyday lives.

Since virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad hearsay are
either incoherent, inconsistent, or indeterminate, the only altenative to a general rule
of admission would be an absolute rule of exclusion, which is surely inferior. More
important, the assumptions necessary to justify a rule against hearsay seem
insupportable and, in any event, are inconsistent with accepted notions of the function
of the jury. Therefore, the hearsay rules should be abolished.

Some support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research now
available which is, however, derived from simulations that suggests that admitting
hearsay has little effect on trial outcomes because jurors discount the value of
hearsay evidence. See Rakos & Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging
Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 655 (1992); Miene,
Park, & Borgidas, Jury Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76
Minn.L.Rev. 683 (1992); Kovera, Park, & Penrod, Jurors Perceptions of Eyewitness
and Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992); Landsman & Rakos, Research
Essay: A Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the prohibition of Hearsay
Evidence in American Courts, 15 Law & Psychol. Rev. 65 (1991).

Others, even if they concede that restrictions on hearsay have some utility, question
whether the benefits outweigh the cost:

The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to justice. It
also includes the time spent on litigating the rule. And of course this is not just a cost
voluntarily borne by the parties, for in our system virtually all the cost of the court
salaries, administrative costs, and capital costs are borne by the public. As expensive
as litigation is for the parties, it is supported by an enormous public subsidy. Each
time a hearsay question is litigated, the public pays. The rule imposes other costs
as well. Enormous time is spent teaching and writing about the hearsay rule, which are
both costly enterprises. In some law schools, students spend over half their time in
evidence classes learning the intricacies of the hearsay rule, and enormous academic
resources are expended on the rule.

Allen, Commentary on Professor Friendmans Article: The Evolution of the Hearsay

Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 797, 800 [1992] (but would abolish rule
only in civil cases). See also Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic
Analysis of Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992).[10]
 A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether
the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect
examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party
and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.[11] It
has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. Retired Justice Oscar
Herrera of the Court of Appeals cites the various authorities who explain why admissions are not
covered by the hearsay rule:[12]

Wigmore, after pointing out that the partys declaration has generally the probative
value of any other persons asssertion, argued that it had a special value when offered
against the party. In that circumstance, the admission discredits the partys statement
with the present claim asserted in pleadings and testimony, much like a witness
impeached by contradictory statements. Moreover, he continued, admissions pass the
gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded
if there was no opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine because it is the
opponents own declaration, and he does not need to cross examine
himself. Wigmore then added that the Hearsay Rule is satisfied since the party now as
opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his former
assertion. (Wigmore on evidence, Sec. 1048 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972), cited in Sec.
154, McCormick)

According to Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself

rests not upon any notion that the circumstances in which it was made furnish the trier
means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of litigation. A party can
hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is
unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath.

A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible
against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the
truth, and it is his fault if they do not. (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583).

The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized
as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a
candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff
Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be
opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako
sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im
tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will
go. We noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not resign
despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the meltdown is obvious - - - his
will not to resign has wilted.
It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence,
non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive
admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to
treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other
person.[13] Jones explains that the basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that
arising from the ratification or adoption by the party of the statements which the other person had
made.[14] To use the blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is not
mumbo jumbo but common sense.[15] In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to
dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-
chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise
petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object to the
suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioners silence on this and
other related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.[16]
Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated the rule
on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
viz: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, except as hereinafter provided.
Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several
exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a
co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little
President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and
days before he abandoned Malacaang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the
petitioner told Secretary Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang
pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you
have been the only one Ive listened to. And now at the end, you still are.)[17] This statement of full
trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of the first
negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave
Malacaang after taking their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara
Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary Angara: ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do I
have to leave now?)[18] Secretary Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that
Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo
to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers of the
presidency.The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary Angara on the
progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in
the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner
is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on
the principal (petitioner).[19] Jones very well explains the reasons for the rule, viz: What is done,
by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So, whatever is
said by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying
the performance of any act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected
with, and in the course of the particular contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in
the language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and
admissible in evidence against such principal.[20]
 Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant
statements. These are statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true
or not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and
(2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class
includes the following:[21]
a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge,
belief, intention, ill will and other emotions;
b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like;
c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of
another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter;
d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and
e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.
Again, Jones tells us why these independently relevant statements are not covered by
the prohibition against hearsay evidence:[22]

1088. Mental State or Condition Proof of Knowledge.- There are a number of comon
issues, forming a general class, in proof of which hearsay is so obviously necessary
that it is not customary to refer to its admissibility as by virtue of any exception to the
general exclusionary rule. Admissibility, in such cases, is as of course. For
example, where any mental state or condition is in issue, such as motive, malice,
knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless direct testimony of the particular person is
to be taken as conclusive of his state of mind, the only method of proof available is
testimony of others to the acts or statements of such person. Where his acts or
statements are against his interest, they are plainly admissible within the rules
hereinabove announced as to admissions against interest. And even where not against
interest, if they are so closely connected with the event or transaction in issue as to
constitute one of the very facts in controversy, they become admissible of necessity.

As aforediscussed, The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his
state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of
Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioners intent to resign. They are
admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. This has long been a quiet area of our
law on evidence and petitioners attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive our
imprimatur.
Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings and best
evidence were violated in our Decision, viz:

The use of the Angara diary palpably breached several hornbook rules of evidence,
such as the rule on authentication of private writings

xxx
A. Rule on Proof of Private Writings Violated

The rule governing private documents as evidence was violated. The law provides that
before any private writing offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either: a) by anyone who saw the document
executed or written, or b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.

xxx

B. Best Evidence Rule Infringed

Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best evidence of the Angara diary. It is
secondary evidence, of dubious authenticity. It was however used by this Honorable
Court without proof of the unavailability of the original or duplicate original of the
diary. The Best Evidence Rule should have been applied since the contents of the
diary are the subject of inquiry.

The rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances, [w]hen the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself.[23]

Petitioners contention is without merit. In regard to the Best Evidence rule, the Rules of
Court provides in sections 2 to 4 of Rule 130, as follows:

Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings or any

material containing letters, words, numbers, figures or other modes of written
expressions offered as proof of their contents.

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.

Sec. 4. Original of document. (a) The original of a document is one the contents of
which are the subject of inquiry.

(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time,
with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.

(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from
another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally
regarded as originals.

It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did
not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:

Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion,
whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents
of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring
production.[24]

xxx

In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for
certain documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised. This measure is a
sensible and progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its
essential feature is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been
given an opportunity to inspect it. (empahsis supplied)

Franciscos opinion is of the same tenor, viz:

Generally speaking, an objection by the party against whom secondary evidence is

sought to be introduced is essential to bring the best evidence rule into application;
and frequently, where secondary evidence has been admitted, the rule of exclusion
might have successfully been invoked if proper and timely objection had been
taken. No general rule as to the form or mode of objecting to the admission of
secondary evidence is set forth. Suffice it to say here that the objection should be
made in proper season that is, whenever it appears that there is better evidence
than that which is offered and before the secondary evidence has been
admitted. The objection itself should be sufficiently definite to present a tangible
question for the courts consideration.[25]
 He adds:

Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be received in evidence if no

objection is made to its reception.[26]

In regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court provides in section 20 of
Rule 132, viz:

Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic
is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco states that:

A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is,
the identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably established as a pre-
requisite to its admission. (Rouw v. Arts, 174 Ark. 79, 294 S.W. 993, 52 A.L.R. 1263,
and others) However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of a proffered
instrument may not object that it was not properly identified before it was
admitted in evidence. (Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266, 103
A.L.R. 835).[27]

Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro,[28] which frowned on reliance by
courts on newspaper accounts. In that case, Judge Muro was dismissed from the service for
relying on a newspaper account in dismissing eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos. There is a significant difference, however, between the Muro case and the cases at bar. In
the Muro case, Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a newspaper
account without affording the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of
a written comment or on oral argument. . .(this is) not only a blatant denial of elementary due
process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality. In the instant
cases, however, the petitioner had an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the Angara
Diary when he filed his Memorandum dated February 20, 2001, Reply Memorandum dated
February 22, 2001, Supplemental Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and Second
Supplemental memorandum dated February 24, 2001. He was therefore not denied due
process. In the words of Wigmore, supra, petitioner had been given an opportunity to inspect
the Angara Diary but did not object to its admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise his
objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly
on the basis thereof.
III
 Temporary Inability

Petitioner argues that the Court misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, Article VII, of the
Constitution in that congress can only decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of
opinion between a majority of the Cabinet and the President. The situation presents itself when
majority of the Cabinet determines that the President is unable to govern; later, the President
informs Congress that his inability has ceased but is contradicted by a majority of the members
of the Cabinet. It is also urged that the presidents judgment that he is unable to govern
temporarily which is thereafter communicated to the Speaker of the House and the President of
the Senate is the political question which this Court cannot review.
We cannot sustain the petitioner. Lest petitioner forgets, he himself made the
submission in G.R. No. 146738 that Congress has the ultimate authority under the
Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in
the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII.[29] We sustained this submission and
held that by its many acts, Congress has already determined and dismissed the claim of alleged
temporary inability to govern proffered by petitioner. If petitioner now feels aggrieved by
the manner Congress exercised its power, it is incumbent upon him to seek redress from
Congress itself. The power is conceded by the petitioner to be with Congress and its alleged
erroneous exercise cannot be corrected by this Court. The recognition of respondent Arroyo
as our de jure president made by Congress is unquestionably a political judgment. It is
significant that House Resolution No. 176 cited as the bases of its judgment such factors as
the peoples loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to
effectively govern and the members of the international community had extended their
recognition of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines and it has a constitutional duty of fealty to the supreme will of the people x x
x. This political judgment may be right or wrong but Congress is answerable only to the
people for its judgment. Its wisdom is fit to be debated before the tribunal of the people and not
before a court of justice. Needles to state, the doctrine of separation of power constitutes
an inseparable bar against this courts interposition of its power of judicial review to review the
judgment of Congress rejecting petitioners claim that he is still the President, albeit on leave and
that respondent Arroyo is merely an acting President.
Petitioner attempts to extricate himself from his submission that Congress has the ultimate
authority to determine his inability to govern, and whose determination is a political question by
now arguing that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial
question. Petitioners change of theory, ill disguised as it is, does not at all impress. The cases at
bar do not present the general issue of whether the respondent Arroyo is the de jure or a de
facto President. Specific issues were raised to the Court for resolution and we ruled on an issue
by issue basis. On the issue of resignation under section 8, Article VII of the Constitution, we
held that the issue is legal and ruled that petitioner has resigned from office before respondent
Arroyo took her oath as President. On the issue of inability to govern under section 11, Article
VII of the Constitution, we held that the Congress has the ultimate authority to determine the
question as opined by the petitioner himself and that the determination of Congress is a political
judgment which this Court cannot review. Petitioner cannot blur these specific rulings by the
generalization that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial question.
 Petitioner now appears to fault Congress for its various acts expressed thru resolutions
which brushed off his temporary inability to govern and President-on-leave argument. He
asserts that these acts of Congress should not be accorded any legal significance because: (1)
they are post facto and (2) a declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied.
We disagree. There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which states
that the declaration by Congress of the Presidents inability must always be a priori or before the
Vice-President assumes the presidency. In the cases at bar, special consideration should be given
to the fact that the events which led to the resignation of the petitioner happened at express speed
and culminated on a Saturday. Congress was then not in session and had no reasonable
opportunity to act a priori on petitioners letter claiming inability to govern. To be sure,
however, the petitioner cannot strictly maintain that the President of the Senate, the Honorable
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Honorable
Arnulfo P. Fuentebella, recognized respondent Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the
presidency post facto. Petitioner himself states that his letter alleging his inability to govern was
received by the Office of the Speaker on January 20, 2001 at 8:30 A.M. and the Office of the
Senate at 9 P.M. of the same day.[30] Respondent took her oath of office a few minutes past 12
oclock in the afternoon of January 20. Before the oath-taking, Senate President Pimentel, Jr. and
Speaker Fuentebella had prepared a Joint Statement which states:[31]
Joint Statement of Support
and Recognition from the
Senate President and the Speaker
Of the House of Representatives

We, the elected leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives, are called
upon to address the constitutional crisis affecting the authority of the President to
effectively govern our distressed nation. We understand that the Supreme Court at that
time is issuing an en banc resolution recognizing this political reality. While we may
differ on the means to effect a change of leadership, we however, cannot be
indifferent and must act resolutely. Thus, in line with our sworn duty to represent
our people and in pursuit of our goals for peace and prosperity to all, we, the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, hereby
declare our support and recognition to the constitutional successor to the
Presidency. We similarly call on all sectors to close ranks despite our political
differences. May God bless our nation in this period of new beginnings.

Mabuhay and Pilipinas at ang mamamayang Pilipino.

(Sgd.) AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR.

Senate President
(Sgd.) ARNULFO P. FUENTEBELLA
Speaker of the House of Representatives
This a priori recognition by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of respondent Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the presidency was
followed post facto by various resolutions of the Senate and the House, in effect, confirming this
recognition. Thus, Resolution No. 176 expressed x x x the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its
support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nations goal under the
Constitution.[32] Resolution No. 82 of the Senate and Resolution No. 178 of the House of
Representatives both confirmed the nomination of then Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as Vice-
President.[33] It also passed Resolution No. 83 declaring the impeachment court functus
officio.[34] Both Houses sent bills to respondent Arroyo to be signed by her into law as President
of the Philippines.[35] These acts of Congress, a priori and post facto, cannot be dismissed as
merely implied recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President of the
Republic. Petitioners insistence that respondent Arroyo is just a de facto President because said
acts of Congress x x x are mere circumstances of acquiescence calculated to induce people to
submit to respondents exercise of the powers of the presidency[36] is a guesswork far divorced
from reality to deserve further discussion.
Similarly way off the mark is petitioners point that while the Constitution has made
Congress the national board of canvassers for presidential and vice-presidential elections, this
Honorable Court nonetheless remains the sole judge in presidential and vice presidential
contests.[37] He thus postulates that such constitutional provision[38] is indicative of the desire of
the sovereign people to keep out of the hands of Congress questions as to the legality of a
persons claim to the presidential office.[39] Suffice to state that the inference is illogical. Indeed,
there is no room to resort to inference. The Constitution clearly sets out the structure on how
vacancies and election contest in the office of the President shall be decided. Thus, section 7 of
Article VII covers the instance when (a) the President-elect fails to qualify, (b) if a President
shall not have been chosen and (c) if at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-
elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled. Section 8 of Article VII covers
the situation of the death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the
President. Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration
that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. In each case, the Constitution
specifies the body that will resolve the issues that may arise from the contingency. In case of
election contest, section 4, Article VII provides that the contests shall be resolved by this Court
sitting en banc. In case of resignation of the President, it is not disputed that this Court has
jurisdiction to decide the issue. In case of inability to govern, section 11 of Article VII gives the
Congress the power to adjudge the issue and petitioner himself submitted this thesis which was
shared by this Court. In light of these clear provisions of the Constitution, it is inappropriate, to
say the least, for petitioner to make inferences that simply distort their meanings.

IV

Impeachment and Absolute Immunity

 Petitioner contends that this Court disregarded section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution
which provides:

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines,
but the party convicted should nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial
and punishment according to law.

Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must be first convicted in the impeachment
proceedings before he could be criminally prosecuted. A plain reading of the provision will not
yield this conclusion. The provision conveys two uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells us that
judgment in impeachment cases has a limited reach. . .i.e., it cannot extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines,
and second, it tells us the consequence of the limited reach of a judgment in impeachment
proceedings considering its nature, i.e., that the party convicted shall still be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. No amount of manipulation will justify
petitioners non sequitur submission that the provision requires that his conviction in the
impeachment proceedings is a condition sine qua non to his prosecution, trial and punishment
for the offenses he is now facing before the respondent Ombudsman.
Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors walk out from the impeachment
proceedings should be considered failure to prosecute on the part of the public and private
prosecutors, and the termination of the case by the Senate is equivalent to acquittal.[40] He
explains failure to prosecute as the failure of the prosecution to prove the case, hence dismissal
on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits.[41] He then concludes that dismissal of a case for
failure to prosecute amounts to an acquittal for purposes of applying the rule against double
jeopardy.[42]
Without ruling on the nature of impeachment proceedings, we reject petitioners
submission.
The records will show that the prosecutors walked out in the January 16, 2001 hearing of
the impeachment cases when by a vote of 11-10, the Senator-judges refused to open the second
envelope allegedly containing the P3.3 billion deposit of the petitioner in a secret bank account
under the name Jose Velarde. The next day, January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a
letter to the Speaker of the House tendering their resignation. They also filed
their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. Senator
Raul Roco immediately moved for the indefinite suspension of the impeachment
proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the resignation of the
public prosecutors. The Roco motion was then granted by Chief Justice Davide, Jr. Beforethe
House could resolve the issue of resignation of its prosecutors or on January
20, 2001, petitioner relinquished the presidency and respondent Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic. Thus, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Resolution No.
83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio.
Prescinding from these facts, petitioner cannot invoke double jeopardy. Double
jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid complaint; (2) before a competent court; (3) after
arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or
convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.[43] Assuming arguendo that the first four requisites of double jeopardy were complied
with, petitioner failed to satisfy the fifth requisite for he was not acquitted nor was the
impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent. Petitioners claim of double
jeopardy cannot be predicated on prior conviction for he was not convicted by the impeachment
court. At best, his claim of previous acquittal may be scrutinized in light of a violation of his
right to speedy trial, which amounts to a failure to prosecute. As Bernas points out, a failure to
prosecute, which is what happens when the accused is not given a speedy trial, means failure of
the prosecution to prove the case. Hence, dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the
merits.[44]
This Court held in Esmea v. Pogoy[45], viz:

If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should
ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the prosecutions motion
for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not
or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently fails to prove the defendants guilt,
the court upon defendants motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissall amounting to
an acquittal of the defendant.

In a more recent case, this Court held:

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on
the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that
these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy
trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right
of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this
reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. [46]

Petitioner did not move for the dismissal of the impeachment case against him. Even
assuming arguendo that there was a move for its dismissal, not every invocation of an accuseds
right to speedy trial is meritorious. While the Court accords due importance to an accuseds right
to a speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, this right cannot be
invoked loosely. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of
time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.[47] The following provisions of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are apropos:

Rule 115, Section 1(h). Rights of accused at the trial. -- In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

Rule 119, Section 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.-- Trial once
commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It
may be postponed for a reasonable length of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the
case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest
possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period
exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise
authorized by the Supreme Court.

Petitioner therefore failed to show that the postponement of the impeachment

proceedings was unjustified, much less that it was for an unreasonable length of
time. Recalling the facts, on January 17, 2001, the impeachment proceeding was suspended until
the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue on the resignation of the public
prosecutors. This was justified and understandable for an impeachment proceeding without a
panel of prosecutors is a mockery of the impeachment process. However, three (3) days from the
suspension or January 20, 2001, petitioners resignation supervened. With the sudden turn of
events, the impeachment court became functus officio and the proceedings were therefore
terminated. By no stretch of the imagination can the four-day period from the time the
impeachment proceeding was suspended to the day petitioner resigned, constitute an
unreasonable period of delay violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial.
Nor can the claim of double jeopardy be grounded on the dismissal or termination of
the case without the express consent of the accused. We reiterate that the impeachment
proceeding was closed only after the petitioner had resigned from the presidency, thereby
rendering the impeachment court functus officio. By resigning from the presidency, petitioner
more than consented to the termination of the impeachmment case against him, for he brought
about the termination of the impeachment proceedings. We have consistently ruled that when
the dismissal or termination of the case is made at the instance of the accused, there is no double
jeopardy.[48]
Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from
suit. His arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on
the subject. In our Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in our
jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that given the intent of the
1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner,
as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts
committed while a sitting President. Petitioners rehashed arguments including their thinly
disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President, albeit, a
President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30,
2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de
jure President.
Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity
from suit during his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committees omitting in the draft proposal
the immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the
Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the
original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the
Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the
President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not
provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing
litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?

Fr. Bernas: The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez: So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas: There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973
Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez; On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.

I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.[49]

Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the
time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after
which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during
which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons
within or beyond the power of the incumbent.[50] From the deliberations, the intent of the
framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his
tenure and not his term.
Indeed, petitioners stubborn stance cannot but bolster the belief that the cases at bar were
filed not really for petitioner to reclaim the presidency but just to take advantage of the immunity
attached to the presidency and thus, derail the investigation of the criminal cases pending against
him in the Office of the Ombudsman.

Prejudicial Publicity on the Ombudsman

Petitioner hangs tough on his submission that his due process rights to a fair trial have been
prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. In our Decision, we held that there is not enough evidence to
sustain petitioners claim of prejudicial publicity. Unconvinced, petitioner alleges that the vivid
narration of events in our Decision itself proves the pervasiveness of the prejudicial publicity. He
then posits the thesis that doubtless, the national fixation with the probable guilt of petitioner
fueled by the hate campaign launched by some high circulation newspaper and by the bully
pulpit of priests and bishops left indelible impression on all sectors of the citizenry
and all regions, so harsh and so pervasive that the prosecution and the judiciary can no longer
assure petitioner a sporting chance.[51] To be sure, petitioner engages in exageration when he
alleges that all sectors of the citizenry and all regions have been irrevocably influenced by this
barrage of prejudicial publicity. This exaggeration collides with petitioners claim that he still
enjoys the support of the majority of our people, especially the masses.
Petitioner pleads that we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself) to support his argument. Under the res ipsa loquitur rule in its broad sense, the
fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and
present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.[52] It is not a rule of
substantive law but more a procedural rule. Its mere invocation does not exempt the plaintiff
with the requirement of proof to prove negligence. It merely allows the plaintiff to present along
with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine,
creating an inference or presumption of negligence and to thereby place on the defendant the
burden of going forward with the proof.[53]
We hold that it is inappropriate to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitur, a rule usually applied
only in tort cases, to the cases at bar. Indeed, there is no court in the whole world that has
applied the res ipsa loquitur rule to resolve the issue of prejudicial publicity. We again stress
that the issue before us is whether the alleged pervasive publicity of the cases against the
petitioner has prejudiced the minds of the members of the panel of investigators. We reiterate the
test we laid down in People v. Teehankee,[54] to resolve this issue, viz:

We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due
to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at
bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then
and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a
free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial
for, as well pointed out , a responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x
x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage
does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and
impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the
bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The
state of the art of our communication system brings news as hey happen straight to
our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday
menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial
judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed
the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lost their
impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per
se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial
judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of
the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of
possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the
case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during
the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged
the burden.

Petitioner keeps on pounding on the adverse publicity against him but fails to prove
how the impartiality of the panel of investigators from the Office of the Ombudsman has
been infected by it. As we held before and we hold it again, petitioner has completely failed to
adduce any proof of actual prejudice developed by the members of the Panel of
Investigators. This fact must be established by clear and convincing evidence and cannot be left
to loose surmises and conjectures. In fact, petitioner did not even identify the members of the
Panel of Investigators. We cannot replace this test of actual prejudice with the rule of res ipsa
loquitur as suggested by the petitioner. The latter rule assumes that an injury (i.e., prejudicial
publicity) has been suffered and then shifts the burden to the panel of investigators to prove that
the impartiality of its members has been affected by said publicity. Such a rule will overturn our
case law that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair
trial. The cases are not wanting where an accused has been acquitted despite pervasive
publicity.[55] For this reason, we continue to hold that it is not enough for petitioner to conjure
possibility of prejudicebut must prove actual prejudice on the part of his investigators for the Court to
sustain his plea. It is plain that petitioner has failed to do so.
Petitioner agains suggests that the Court should order a 2-month cooling off period to allow
passions to subside and hopefully the alleged prejudicial publicity against him would die
down. We regret not to acquiesce to the proposal. There is no assurance that the so called 2-
month cooling off period will achieve its purpose. The investigation of the petitioner is a natural
media event. It is the first time in our history that a President will be investigated by the Office of
the Ombudsman for alleged commission of heinous crimes while a sitting President. His
investigation will even be monitored by the foreign press all over the world in view of its legal
and historic significance. In other words, petitioner cannot avoid the kleiglight of publicity. But
what is important for the petitioner is that his constitutional rights are not violated in the
process of investigation. For this reason, we have warned the respondent Ombudsman in our
Decision to conduct petitioners preliminary investigation in a circus-free atmosphere.Petitioner is
represented by brilliant legal minds who can protect his right as an accused.

VI

Recusation

Finally, petitioner prays that the members of this Honorable Court who went to EDSA put
on record who they were and consider recusing or inhibiting themselves, particularly those who
had ex-parte contacts with those exerting pressure on this Honorable Court, as mentioned in our
Motion of March 9, 2001, given the need for the cold neutrality of impartial judges.[56]
We hold that the prayer lacks merit. There is no ground to inhibit the twelve (12)
members of the Court who merely accepted the invitation of the respondent Arroyo to attend her
oath taking. As mere spectators of a historic event, said members of the Court did not
prejudge the legal basis of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency at the time she took
her oath. Indeed, the Court in its en banc resolution on January 22, 2001, the first working day
after respondent Arroyo took her oath as President, held in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05
SC, to wit:

A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request for Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to
Take Her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the
Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the
Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which
request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to
confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to
the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January
20, 2001.

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may
be filed by a proper party.

The above resolution was unanimously passed by the 15 members of the Court. It should be
clear from the resolution that the Court did not treat the letter of respondent Arroyo to be
administered the oath by Chief Justice Davide, Jr., as a case but as an administrative matter. If it
were considered as a case, then petitioner has reason to fear that the Court has
predetermined the legitimacy of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency. To
dispel the erroneous notion, the Court precisely treated the letter as an administrative
matter and emphasized that it was without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable
case that may be filed by a proper party. In further clarification, the Court on February 20,
2001 issued another resolution to inform the parties and the public that it xxx did not issue a
resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did
the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution. Thus, there is no
reason for petitioner to request for the said twelve (12) justices to recuse themselves. To be
sure, a motion to inhibit filed by a party after losing his case is suspect and is regarded with
general disfavor.
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is
nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the
fundamental law.Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that
judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the
case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to
the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial
independence.[57] The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Justices.[58]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15
and his Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., no part for reason given in open court and in the extended explanation.
Vitug, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion.
Kapunan, J., concurs on the result but strongly reiterate my separate opinion in the case.
Ynares-Santiago, J., concurs in the result but maintains separate opinion in the main
Decision.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concurs in the result subject to separate opinion in the main
Decision.
Panganiban, J., no part see Extended Explanation of Inhibition prom. on March 8, 2001.

1
Decision, p. 35.
[2]
63C Am Jur 2d Public Officers and Employees, section 158.
[3]
See e.g., Comment of respondents de Vera, Funa and Capulong, p. 26; Rollo, Vol II. p. 204: Memorandum of
respondent Capulong Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 661, et seq.
[4]
See paragraph 6.1 on p. 5 of petitioners Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum.
[5]
Id., see paragraph 7 on pp. 7-8.
[6]
The myth of hearsay is that no one understands it, and students and practicing lawyers always make mistakes
about it. Best, Evidence, 59 (3rd ed., p. 59, 1999).
[7]
Francisco, Evidence, 513 citing 33 CJS 919.
[8]
Mueller and Kirkpatrick, Evidence under the Rules 116-117 (2nd ed., 1993); McCormick Evidence 93-94
[9]
See, generally, Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayers Triumph, 88 Cal. L. Rev. No. 6,
2437-2476 (2000). Swifts thesis is that the view of Thayer and other major twentieth century reformers advocating
increased discretion of trial judges to admit or exclude evidence has prevailed.
[10]
Evidence, Cases and Materials 473-474 (9th ed.). As well put by author Best, supra, p. 87, the supreme irony of
the hearsay doctrine is that a vast amount of hearsay is admissible at common law and under the Federal Rules. Our
hearsay rules are American in origin.
[11]
Admissions of a party should not be confused with declarations against interest, judicial admission and
confessions.
Admission distinguished from declaration against interest. An admission is distinguishable from a declaration
against interest in several respects. The admission is primary evidence and is receivable, although the declarant is
available as a witness; it is competent only when the declarant, or someone identified in legal interest with him, is a
party to the action; and need not have been considered by the decalrant as opposed to his interest at the time when it
was made. The declaration against interest is in the nature of secondary evidence, receivable only when the declarant
is unavailable as a witness; it is competent in any action to which it is relevant, although the declarant is not a party
to, or in privity with, any party to the action; and it must have been, when made, to the knowledge of the declarant,
against his obvious and real interest. (VIII Francisco, Evidence, 304 [1997 ed.])
Admission distinguished from confession.- The term admission is distinguished from that of confession. The former
is applied to civil transactions and to matters of fact in criminal cases not involving criminal intent, the latter to
acknowledgements of guilt in crimnal cases. (id., p. 303)
Judicial and extra-judicial admission defined.- A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the
progress of a trial as to dispense with the introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules
of practice necessary to be observed and complied with.
Extra-judicial admission is one made out of court.
The most important distinction between judicial and other admissions, is that strictly, judicial admissions are
conclusive upon the party making them, while other admissions are, as a rule and where the elements of estoppel are
not present, disputable.(id., p. 90)
[12]
Herrera, Evidence, 315-316.
[13]
Best, op cit., p. 90.
[14]
Herrera, op cit., p. 371, citing 2 Jones Sec. 13-28.
[15]
Evidence Under the Rules, 216 (2nd ed., 1993).
[16]
Section 32, Rule 130 provides: An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation
of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if
not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.
[17]
Phil. Daily Inquirer, February 5, 2001, p. A6.
[18]
Id., February 6, 2001, p. 1; Rollo, Vol. II, p. 250.
[19]
Section 29, Rule 130 states: the act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his
authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after
the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or
declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.
[20]
Jones on Evidence, S. 944, p. 1741.
[21]
Moran, Evidence3, 298.
[22]
Jones, op cit., S. 1088, p. 2010.
[23]
Omnibus Motion, pp. 24-25, footnotes omitted.
[24]
Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1191, p. 334.
[25]
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines: Evidence 139 (1999), citing I Jones on Evidence, 390-
391.
[26]
Id., citing People v. Stuckrath, 64 Cal. App. 84, 220, p. 433; see also Suddayao, et al.v. Agatep, et al., 46 Off.
Gaz. 1119.
[27]
Francisco, supra, p.129.
[28]
236 SCRA 505 (1994).
[29]
See Decision, p. 41.
[30]
See Petition in G.R. No. 146738, p. 7, further stating that no one apparently was around or willing to receive the
letter to the Senate President earlier.
[31]
See Annex A-1, Petition in G.R. No. 146738.
[32]
Decision, p. 12.
[33]
Decision, p. 13.
[34]
Ibid.
[35]
Decision, p. 12.
[36]
Omnibus Motion, p. 37.
[37]
Id., pp. 38-39.
[38]
Id., p. 39.
[39]
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution states in part: The Supreme Court sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
[40]
Motion for Reconsideration, p. 5.
[41]
Id., p. 5, citing Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996, p. 532.
[42]
Id., p. 5, citing People v. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714 and People v. Robles, 105 Phil. 1016.
[43]
Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 318 SCRA 80 (1999).
[44]
Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1987, p. 470.
[45]
102 SCRA 861 (1981), citing 4 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 202, citing Gandicela v.
Lutero, 88 Phil. 299, 307 and People v. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714, 717.
[46]
People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 (1996), citing People v. Tampal, 244 SCRA 202 (1995).
[47]
Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals, 317 SCRA 521 (1999).
[48]
People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516; Sta. Rita v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 484; People v. Leviste, supra.
[49]
Motion for Reconsideration, GR Nos. 146710-15, p. 17.
[50]
Topacio Nueno, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 76 Phil. 12, 21- 22.
[51]
Motion for Reconsideration, p. 27.
[52]
57B Am Jur 2d 493 (1989).
[53]
Ibid., pp. 502-503.
[54]
249 SCRA 54 (1995); see Martelino et al. v. Alejandro, et al., 32 SCRA 106 (1970); Webb v. de Leon, etc., 247
SCRA 652 (1995); Larranaga v. CA, et al., 289 SCRA 581 (1998).
[55]
People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690 (1991).
[56]
Omnibus Motion, p.55.
[57]
Vargas v. Rilloraza, et al., 80 Phil. 297 (1948).
[58]
Abbas, et al., v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651 (1988).