STAR PAPER CORP. vs. SIMBOL detrimental to its business operations.
detrimental to its business operations. The policy is premised on the mere fear that
G.R. No. 164774. April 12, 2006
FACTS:
Star Paper Corporation is engaged in trading of paper products. The company policies stated
that:
New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a relative, up to
the 3rd degree already employed by the company.
In case of two employees decided to get married, one of them should resign to
preserve the policy stated above.
The complainants alleged that they were co-employees and they got married co-e. They were
compelled to resign because of the company policy. They lodged a complaint for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice.
ISSUE:
Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company
violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is it a valid
exercise of management prerogative
HELD:
There are two types of employment policies involving spouses:
No-spouse employment policies policies banning only spouses from working in
the same company
Anti-nepotism employment policies those banning all immediate family
members, including spouses, from working in the same company
To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors:
1. That the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation
of the job involved; and
2. That there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons
meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the
job.
In the case at bar, there is no a reasonable business necessity. The employees were hired
after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-
employee. Star Paper failed to show how the marriages of the employees could be
employees married to each other will be less efficient.
PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman as
reliever for employees on leave in two instances. On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was
asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150
days. She indicated in the application form that she was single although she had contracted
marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch
supervisor required her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a
reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment.
She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed
down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De
Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was
apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in
violation of company policies.
ISSUE:
Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of
an employee.
HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that
company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to
their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination
or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our
labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with
PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are
not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts
of dishonesty.
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as
a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee
shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.
ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR
A.M. No. P-02-1651
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a widow and works as a court interpreter. She was charged with
committing Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct under the Administrative Code for living with
a man not her husband and having borne a child within the live-in set-up. She asserted that
her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious belief and has the approval of
her congregation with the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness. It allows members of the
congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations,
thus making the union moral and bindings.
Soledad was abandoned by her husband when she started the live-in set-up. Eventually, he
died which lifts her legal impediment to marry but her partner is not eligible for marriage yet.
The above-mentioned declaration is done with diligent investigation as to backgrounds of the
members who avail of it.
Once all legal impediments are lifted, the validity of the declaration ceases and the couple
should legalize their union.
ISSUE:
Can ones religious belief and practice enough reason to dismiss the charge and to justify a
conjugal arrangement?
HELD:
Soledads conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she made out a case for exemption
from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.
Man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State. Soledads sincerity and
centrality of her claimed religious belief and practice is beyond doubt.
The administrative complaint was dismissed.
GOITIA vs CAMPOS-RUEDA
35 PHIL 252
FACTS:
Eloisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married in Manila on January 7, 1915. They
established their residence and lived together for a month.
The husband demanded from his wife to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs which the wife refused to perform. The husband continually demanded such lewd
acts from his wife. The constant refusal of the wife induced the husband to inflict physical
injuries. This forced Eloisa to leave the conjugal home and take refuge in the home of her
parents.
Eloisa demanded financial support from Jose. The Court held that the defendant cannot be
compelled to support the wife except in his own house, unless it is by virtue of a judicial
decree granting her a divorce or separation.
ISSUE:
Would the husband be compelled to provide financial support for his wife who refuses to live
with him?
HELD:
The act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife as a
natural and legal duty. This obligation is not terminated by his own wrongful acts in driving
his wife to seek protection.
Separation and divorce arguments to create financial obligation is weak because separate
maintenance is a specific duty mandated by the State and is not payable either as damages
or as penalty.
EUGENIO vs. VELEZ
185 SCRA 45
FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas a 25 y.o single was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and
was confined by the petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis
Oriental. She cohabited with the petitioner against her will and always had the intention of
escaping. She died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence on
Aug. 28, 1988.
Unaware of her death her brothers and sisters (Vargases) filed a petition for Habeas Corpus
on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging. The court then issued a
writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitalianas body to the sheriff
on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. The court
ordered that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio
assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE:
Who has the right to claim custody of the deceased?
HELD:
The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the
surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a
child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the
deceased.
Petitioners claim that he is the spouse cannot be valid as contemplated under Art. 294 of the
Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where a man and a
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife
in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions.
In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
COSCA vs. PALAYPAYON
237 SCRA 249
FACTS:
Complainants work in MTC-Tinambak, Camarines Sur. They alleged that Judge Palaypayon
solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, couples were
able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent. As a consequence, the
marriage contracts of the couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization reasoning out that he had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by
the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondent. Palaypayon
contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code
thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict
instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and
to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. The spouses
subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their
marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar.
The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their
marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. The marriage of
Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence
of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the
marriage contract.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD:
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the
formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable. He was
found guilty of solemnizing marriages without a marriage license
His claim that Abellano and Edralin executed a joint affidavit that they have been living
together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already would show that Abellano is less
than 13 years old when they started living together which. He is found to be negligent in his
duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false
joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.
WASSMER vs. VELEZ
12 SCRA 648
FACTS:
Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez decided to get married. They applied and acquired
marriage license and set the wedding on September 4, 1954. Necessary publication and
preparations including sending off invitations were done.
Two days before the scheduled wedding, Francisco went home to his province without
properly notifying Beatriz. He sent a telegram that they have to postpone the wedding
because his mother opposes it. He gave an assurance that he will return but he never did.
Beatriz sued for damages, Francisco filed no answer and was declared in default. The Court
ordered Francisco to pay for actual damages, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees. Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders and motion for a new trial. The court
then proposed for amicable settlement.
Francisco contended that his failure to marry beatriz was due to fortuitous event and
circumstances beyond his control.
ISSUE:
Can a person be held liable for walking out of his own wedding?
HELD:
YES. Breech of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong however, that the extent
to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for
Article 21 of said Code provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently
issued and their wedding was set. Necessary preparation and publicity were done only for
the defendant to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized. This is
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. This Courts opinion,
considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15, 000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
NAVARRO vs. DOMAGTOY
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309, 19 July 1996
FACTS:
Rodolfo Navarro lodged a complaint against Judge Hernando Domagtoy for two acts:
1. For solemnizing the wedding between Gaspar Tabadan and Arlyn Borga. The groom
is merely separated from his wife. The judge relied on the affidavit by the MTC
Judge of Basy that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for
almost seven years, thus the presumption that she is already dead.
2. For solemnizing a wedding between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma Del
Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Domagtoy can be held liable of the above acts.
HELD:
1. Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the
first wifes presumptive death. In the absence of which, he remains married to the
first wife thus, legally incapacitated to contract a subsequent marriage. It was an
error to have accepted a joint affidavit. The judges negligence resulted to
solemnizing a bigamous marriage.
2. The justification that the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was solemnized in
his home on the basis of an affidavit submitted by Gemma alone is erroneous.
According to the Family Code, marriage can be solemnized outside of the Courts
jurisdiction upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect.
Judge Domagtoy was suspended for six months and given a stern warning that repetition of
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
ARAES vs. JUDGE OCCIANO
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge
solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Araes and Orobia as husband and wife until her husband passed away. Since the marriage
was a nullity, she was deprived to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia and to receive
the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo to solemnize the
marriage of the parties having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were
complete. He agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at MTC Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo requested if respondent judge could solemnize the
marriage in Nabua because Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of
travelling to Balatan.
He discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he suggested
resetting it. Due to the earnest pleas of the parties, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage
out of human compassion. He reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and
admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void.
Respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala which never
materialized.
Petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court
Administrator. That after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her
own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
ISSUES:
Can the judge be liable for solemnizing a marriage outside of his jurisdiction and without the
requisite of marriage license given his reason of human compassion and given the fact that
the petitioner already desisted from her complaint?
HELD:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability. The respondent judge exhibited ignorance of
elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality
of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized
the marriage of petitioner.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by
petitioner. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline
of court personnel, would be undermined.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5, 000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.