Você está na página 1de 37

Reliability

y Centered Maintenance 101

Bob Appleton
References
DoDI 4151.22,, December 2,, 2007
NAVAIR 00-25-403, 1 March 2003
SAE JA
JA-1011,
1011, August 1999
SAE JA-1012, January 2002
Boeing (2010) Statistical Summary of
Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents, Worldwide
Operations 1959-2009, Seattle
Moubray, J. (1997) Reliability-centered
Maintenance. New York: Industrial Press
.
Overview

Background
Condition Based Maintenance
Changing views of Maintenance
History and background of RCM
The RCM Process
The RCM team
The Seven Questions
Results of the Analysis
What is RCM?
Definition
A process used to determine what must be done to
ensure that any physical asset continues to do what its
users want it to do in its present operating context
Mitigate the consequences of failure
Yeah, but what is it?
Highly structured analysis process to:
Devise maintenance policy
Design for ease of maintenance & effective operation
Consensus from all stakeholders
Identification of critical maintenance practices
Reduction of counterproductive maintenance practice

Key Enabler of Condition Based Maintenance


Condition Based Maintenance

CBM+ is the application and integration of appropriate


processes
processes, technologies
technologies, and knowledge based
capabilities to improve the reliability and maintenance
effectiveness of DoD systems and components. At its
core, CBM+ is maintenance performed on evidence
of need provided by reliability centered maintenance
((RCM)) analysis
y and other enablingg pprocesses

DoDI 4151
4151.22,
22 December 2,
2 2007
Condition Based Maintenance
Condition based maintenance plus (CBM+) is the primary
reliability driver in the total life-cycle systems management
(TLCSM) supportability
t bilit strategy
t t off the
th Department
D t t off Defense.
D f I
In
concert with the other TLCSM enablers, such as continuous
process improvement (CPI), cause and effect predictive modeling,
andd desired
d i d outcomes
t achieved
hi d through
th h performance
f b d
based
logistics (PBL), CBM+ strives to optimize key performance
measures of materiel readiness - materiel availability, materiel
reliability, mean downtime, and ownership costs. Under d theh
authority in DoD Directive 5134.01 (Reference (a)), this
Instruction establishes policy and guidance for the Military
Departments and Defense Agencies for implementation of CBM+
pursuant to DoD Directive 4151.18 and DoD Instruction 5000.2
(References (b) and (c)).

DoDI 4151.22, December 2, 2007


What Does THAT Mean?
Do maintenance based upon the condition of the
asset;
t nott on rigid
i id titime b
based
d schedules
h d l
Reservists change clean oil on schedule even though
the vehicle may have less than 100 miles since the last
oil change
More maintenance is not better maintenance
Excessive preventive maintenance creates failures
Infant mortality
Asset Health Monitoring is key to successful CBM
Sensor selection must be examined carefully
CBM is third generation maintenance and is an
important step toward prognostic maintenance
Changing Views of
Maintenance

PREVENTIVE CBM/RCM
MAINTENANCE

BUILD HEAVY

Time Based

Reliability, Availability,
Reliability Availability
Maintainability, TOC
Views of Wear Out Patterns
Failure Patterns
Condition Based Maintenance
Origin of RCM
Boeing 747 and United Airlines
MSG-1 (Maintenance Steering Group)(1968)
DC-8 required 4 million man hours per 20,000 flight
hours
(200 man hours per flight hour)
Using RCM techniques 747 required 66,000 while
improving
p g reliability
y
(3.3 man hours per flight hour)
MSG-2 & MSG-3 followed for many military and civilian aircraft
Nowlan & Heap
Heap, RCM
RCM, 1978
SAE standardized RCM requirements for industrial equipment
with:
JA-1011
JA-1012
NAVAIR standard 00-25-403
Record of Improved Safety
The RCM Analysis Team

Maintenance
Officer
Officer or Chief or Chief

Maintainer
The RCM Process

Disciplined and highly structured


Synergy created by the multifunctional team
Collective wisdom of team members from all areas
Operations
Maintenance
E i
Engineer
Logisticians
Specialists
Decisions based upon consensus
Cross functional information sharing leading to
d
deeper understanding
d t di off th the assett b
by allll
The Seven Questions
1. What are the functions and associated performance
standards
t d d off th
the assett in
i it
its presentt operating
ti
context?
2 In what ways does it fail to fulfill its functions?
2.
3. What causes each functional failure?
4 What happens when
4. hen each fail
failure
re occ
occurs?
rs?
5. In what way does each failure matter?
6 What
6. Wh can b
be d
done to predict
di or prevent each
h ffailure?
il ?
7. What should be done if a suitable proactive task
cannot be found?
Break
1. Functions
What are the functions and associated performance
standards of the asset in its present operating
context?
t t?
What do its users want the asset to do?
Primary function the main purpose the asset was acquired.
Secondary functions
Safety - Comfort
Environmental - Appearance
pp
Control - Protection
Containment - Economy/efficiency
What is the Operating Context?
Where, when, under what conditions
What are the required performance standards?
How
H much;
h hhow ffast
Sample Function Statement
PRIMARY FUNCTION - To pump water from tank X to tank
Y at not less than 800 gallons per hour at temperatures
ranging from 40 degrees F to 120 degrees F.

SECONDARY FUNCTION - To contain water within the


pump, not permitting leaks exceeding 1 ounce per 8 hour
work shift
SECONDARY FUNCTION To prevent any contamination
at all of the water from lubricating oil.
oil
SECONDARY FUNCTION To shut off automatically if the
p
water in tank Y rises above 90% capacity y to p
prevent
overflow
Initial Capability

Pump
1000 GPH

X Y

Output 800 GPH


Deterioration (Not failed)

Pump
800 GPH

Output 800 GPH


G
2 Functional Failures
2.
In what ways does it fail to fulfill its functions?
Failure The inability of any asset to do what its users
want it to do
Functional
Functional Failure
Failure The inability of an asset to fulfill a
function to a standard of performance which is
acceptable to the user.
Performance standard must be agreed to by all stakeholders
Total failure fails to pump any water at all
Partial failure pumps water at less than 800 GPM
Partial failure will likely be caused by different failure modes
than total failure
Partial
P i l failure
f il is
i not theh same as deterioration
d i i
Asset may fail by breaching either upper or lower limits
Failure

Pump
No water at
all

Output 800 GPH


G
Functional Failure (Partial)

Pump
799 GPH

Output 800 GPH


3 Failure Modes (FMEA)
3.
What causes each functional failure?
Failure mode statements should contain a noun and
a verb
Bearing
ea g seseized
ed o or impeller
pe e worn
o
Not broken, fails, or malfunctions
Ineffective Failure Mode statements lead to
unproductive
d ti ffailure
il managementt ttechniques
h i
P: Number 3 engine missing.
S: Engine found on right wing after brief search.
P: Aircraft handles funny.
S: Aircraft warned to straighten up, fly right, and be
serious.
P: Something loose in cockpit.
S: Something tightened in cockpit.
3 Failure Modes (FMEA)
3.

All maintenance is managed at the Failure Mode


level
Reactive maintenance identifies failure modes after
the fact
CBM requires that all potential failure modes be
identified beforehand in order to monitor, measure
and manage them

Categories of failure modes


Decreasing capability
Increase in desired performance
Initial incapability
Different Failures;
Different Failure Modes

Pump Pump
799 No
GPH water at
all

Output Output
800 GPH 800 GPH
4 Failure Effects (FMEA)
4.

What happens when each failure mode occurs?


Evidence of failure
What threat to safety or environment
How does it affect operations
What damage is done by the failure
What must be done to repair the failure
Consider down time vs repair time when measuring
effects
Best
B t sources off FMEA data
d t are the
th users who
h workk
with the asset daily
5 Failure Consequences
5.

In
I what
h t way does
d each
h ffailure
il matter?
tt ?
How and how much does each failure matter
Major consequences require great effort to
avoid, eliminate or minimize consequences
Minor consequences may be run to failure
Hidden failure requires special treatment
Consequence could be a multiple failure
Protected function fails while the protective device
is in a failed state
Different Failure Modes;
Different Failure
Consequences
Pump Pump
799 No
GPH water at
all

Output Output
800 GPH 800 GPH
Different Operating Context;
Different Failure
Consequences
Primary
Pump

Standby
Pump

Output 800 GPH


Hidden Function; Hidden
Failure
Primary
P i
Pump

Standby
S db
Pump

O
Output 800 GPH
6. Failure Management
Techniques
q
What can be done to predict or prevent each
f il ?
failure?
All tasks must be technically feasible and worth
doing. Proactive tasks (preventive)(age related
f il
failures))
Scheduled restoration
Scheduled discard
Scheduled on-condition
Proactive Tasks (predictive)
On
On-condition
condition maintenance
Condition Monitoring
Product quality variation
Primary
Pi effects
ff t monitoring
it i
Human senses
Task Selection
7. Failure Management
Techniques
ec ques

What if a suitable predictive or preventive


task cannot be found?
Defa
Default
lt actions
Failure finding
For hidden failures of p
protective devices
Run to failure
Redesign
Outcomes of RCM Analysis
Revised maintenance schedules and practices

Revised Operating procedures

Recommended
R d dEEngineering
i i ChChanges

Database of maintenance requirements


Useful to provide documentation for decisions

Analysis team members gain a deeper understanding


of the asset
Questions?

Você também pode gostar