Dlugoleski 1

Deirdre Dlugoleski

Professor Haroon

Islam in Pakistan

23 April 2012

Widening the Intersection of Two Ideas: The Khilafat Movement and Its Multi-

Layered Symbolism

I belong to two circles of equal size, but which are not concentric. One is India, and the
other is the Muslim world.1
Muhammad Ali, address to the Fourth Plenary Session of the Round Table Conference, London,
1930

By the time Muhammad Ali addressed the Round Table Conference in 1930, the political

landscape in India looked very different than it had a decade before. One of the most important

political movements of the decade, however, had already risen and declined in the space of four

or five years. The Khilafat Movement developed in the context of extreme fear for the safety of

the Muslim World. By the end of the 19th century, in the aftermath of the 'Mutiny' of 1857,

Muslims in India looked for a symbol of the survival of the rule of Islamic law and found it in

the Turkish sultan. Concern over the authority of the Ottoman sultan-caliph in the aftermath of

World War I, however, was not limited to the political; poets like Muhammad Iqbal addresses a

keenly felt concern for Islam's place in the world, where it seemed that it was under attack from

all quarters. Unlike Iqbal, however, the founders of the Khilafat movement were not separatists.

Although their agenda of the preservation of the caliphate in Turkey seemed to demand an extra-

territorial loyalty of their followers, they appealed to the symbol of the caliphate in the name of a

much broader, global Islam that was in danger; it was around this symbol that the Muslims of

India could unite and defend themselves, in turn, within Congress. For the Khilafat leadership,
1 Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar, quoted in Wasti, Syed. "The Circles of Maulana Mohamed Ali." Middle
Eastern Studies 38.4 (2002): 51-62. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2012.
 Dlugoleski 2

religion and nationalism were very much synonymous. In this way, the Khilafatists blended the

ideas of Indian nationalism and the survival of Islam in the symbol of the caliphate. For

Muhammad Ali and many others, the Khilafat movement represented the intersection of the two

circles, where Islam and an independent India could coexist productively, and even allow them to

join hands with Hindus in the non-cooperation movement. Thus, the Aligarh-educated Ali

brothers, journalists like Zafar Ali Khan, and 'ulama of different schoools, such as Abdul Bari of

Firangi Mahal and Husain Ahmad Madani of Deoband, all championed the Khilafat cause and

eventually found themselves working towards the same goals as Gandhi with his non-

cooperation movement.

Although in its pan-Islamic appeal the Khilafat movement advocated a strong, unified

Muslim constituency within the national Congress, it is important to note that the movement

itself never began as any sort of centralized body. On the contrary, it was originally within the

framework of the Muslim League that leaders such as Muhammad and Shaukat Ali and Abdul

Bari raised the subject. The Muslim League in turn often took its cues from Congress. The two

often met at the same time in the same cities, and the League frequently endorsed Congress

decisions in its own resolutions. In July of 1920, the League even asked that the Congress meet

first, so that it could provide a recommended course of action for the Muslims.2 Thus, in its close

association with the Muslim League, the emerging Khilafat movement was pro-Congress from

the beginning. Although local committees had sprung up (primarily in large towns in Uttar

Pradesh, Bengal, the Punjab, Bombay and the Frontier3), these also operated within the existing

structure of Muslim League and Congress organizations. It was only after increased agitation

2 Hasan, Mushirul. Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1885-1930. New Delhi: Manohar, 2000. Print. p.
1077.
3 Qureshi, M. Naeem. Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924. Leiden:
Brill, 1999. Print.
 Dlugoleski 3

throughout 1919 that, on 11 November,4 the Bombay Khilafat Committee changed its title to

The Central Khilafat Committee of India, Bombay. After this point, it produced a constitution

and established new provincial committees, including separate committees for women.

It is at this moment in its development that the Khilafat movement merits the most careful

attention. Whom did the Khilafat movement truly represent? And to what extent did it accurately

mirror their views? Although it did not by any means lose its ideological ties to the Muslim

League and to the Congress, it was now responsible for pushing a specific agenda in both the

domestic and international arenas. Unlike the strategy adopted by the Jama'at i-Ulama, the

Khilafatists never offered the option of different levels of involvement or association in their

organizational model. Instead, they wanted full participation or nothing their goals, after all,

included independence, and, more importantly, creating a solid, unified, Muslim constituency

within Congress. Thus, while the Khilafatists claimed to represent the Muslim opinion of India

(especially in their interactions with the British and in the national-level, English press), the ways

in which they projected their ideas to the population varied. It is virtually impossible to recover

what poor, rural peasants, individual Muslim League volunteers or 'ulama members, or

shopkeepers thought about pan-Islamism, the caliphate, or even Indian nationalism. But by

examining the different layers of symbolism that the Khilafat movement used to communicate at

different levels, we can attempt to construct a more accurate picture of how their ideas were

interpreted by their audience across India between 1919 and the decline of the movement in

1923.

In order to successfully claim to represent the voice of the Muslims of India, the Khilafat

movement not only had to work to win over Muslim support, but also had to present itself to

non-Muslims including non-Muslim Indians, the British, and on occasion the larger
4 Qureshi, Regionalizing Pan-Islamism, p. 121.
 Dlugoleski 4

international community in such a way that would bolster this claim. For this reason, there is a

marked difference in how the movement presents itself in the English press, as opposed to the

Urdu, which the Khilafat leaders themselves often dominated. Thus, the Khilafat leadership also

used language within the sphere of the press as a tool to select, or at least narrow, their audience,

and temper their message accordingly. In the English press, the Khilafatists worked to build their

image of having already attained what they hoped to achieve a unified representative body for

India's Muslims. The Central Khilafat Committee often made sure that newspapers like The

Times of India and The Tribune (Lahore) published its communications with the British

government. Direct communication with the British gave the movement a sense of legitimacy; in

an English-language publication, a local magistrate would have the same chance as an English

speaking Hindu or non-Khilafatist Muslim to see that the Khilafat leadership was comfortable

advocating for Muslims and not only India's Muslims on an international stage. On 22

January 1920, The Tribune published a column titled The Khilafat and Loyalty to the

Sovereign, in which a commentator observes that the requirements of Islamic law are so

definite and of such a binding nature that they cannot be reduced by a hair's breadth to fit the

desires of allied and associated Powers any more than they can be enlarged to further the

mundane ambitions of Musalmans themselves.5 Here, the author has not acknowledge any

existence of interpretative difference in Islamic law, implying that all of India's Muslims are

obliged to follow the same set of principles. Later, on 25 June 1920, The Times published a letter

from the Central Khilafat Committee to the Viceroy, signed by about 90 Sunni Muslims, which

stated:

We, the undersigned, claim to represent the largest body of Sunni Muslim opinion. We
have most carefully read the Turkish peace terms and we consider them to be in direct
5 "The Khilafat and Loyalty to the Sovereign." The Tribune [Lahore] 22 Jan. 1920. World Newspaper Archive.
Web. 13 Apr. 2012.
 Dlugoleski 5

violation of the religious sentiments of Mussalmans. They violate the obligations

imposed upon Sunnis and wound the susceptibilities of all Mussalmans.6
In this letter, the Khilafat leadership makes a point of specifying that they represent a specific

theological division within Islam. It is likely that, while dealing with the British, the Central

Khilafat Committee thought it advantageous to appeal to a very specific theological justification

for their dissatisfaction. While they knew the British understood the Sunni to be a majority, this

strategy also served the double advantage of strengthening their claim against British action in

regard to the holy places of Islam and solidifying their representative capacity within the

Congress; they could much more legitimately claim a staunch, unified following if they

presented the basis of their ideology in such specific religious terms.

The Khilafatists were also, however, eager to showcase the degree to which they

cooperated with non-Muslim groups as well. On March 18th, 1920 the Central Khilafat

Committee published a letter sent to Chotani (then President):

Dear Sir, I am taking the liberty of writing to tell you that a number of English
Christians in India are praying for the guidance of God in the matter of [sic] political
future of India I understand that my Mahomedan fellow citizens are about to hold a
day of prayer in this connection. I would that the Christians would do the same.7

Thus, even as they presented themselves as theological sticklers in their correspondence to the

British government, they also worked to project an image of widespread support that was not

limited to the Muslim community. The treatment of the Shi'a community in the press is

illustrative of this trend. Although it often specified that it represented the Sunni Muslim opinion

in India, the Khilafat proved more than willing to sideline finer theological considerations for the

sake of mass-mobilization. In March 1921, at the annual pilgrimage to the shrine at Ajmer, Abdul

Bari addressed the Shi'a and expressed the possibility that the British had bombarded Najaf. He

6 "The Khilafat: Letter to the Viceroy." The Times of India 25 June 1920. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Web.
14 Apr. 2012.
7 "The Khilafat: Letter to the Editor of the Times of India." The Times of India 18 Mar. 1920. Web. 14 Apr. 2012.
 Dlugoleski 6

couched his argument in terms of religious freedom the same terms which the Khilafat

movement frequently presented to the British in their interactions (most publicly in the trial of

the 'Karachi Seven'). This allowed at least Western-educated Shi'a to support the Khilafat cause

on political grounds. The mujtahids, however, still presented a problem, since the Shi'a did not

acknowledge the caliphate, but by sidestepping this issue and presenting the issue of cooperation

with the Government specifically in terms of their own religious practice, the Khilafat movement

successfully gained some Shi'a participation. A draft of his speech was, of course, published in

The Independent,8 a newspaper in which Sayyid Husain, a prominent Khilafat member, was the

editor. Khilafat leaders like Abdul Bari and Azad had to work to present this pluralism within an

Islamic framework and maintain the 'ulama's support. Furthermore, the Khilafat leadership itself

was split in their personal reactions to the Shi'a. Husain Ahmad Madani, for example, held a deep

personal antipathy towards Shi'as, for all his enthusiasm for secular nationalism. On the other

hand, there was also a precedent to find common ground. Many of Shi'a mujtahids with whom

the movement entered into dialogue and the Khilafat leaders had come from Firangi Mahal,

which exemplifies a school of thought in Sunni Islam that emphasizes reconciliation and

common bonds. In either case, the Khilafat leadership was willing to work around the purely

theological priorities that they presented to the British in favor of expanding their support base,

and did so in the national English-language press; their top priority in this arena clearly lay in

legitimizing their representative capacity to the greatest possible extent. To this end, they

presented the caliphate in their interactions with the Shi'a community as just one among Islam's

many threatened traditions.

Of course, the Central Khilafat Committee frequently used the national press as a means

of communicating directly to their supporters, often urging them to observe hartal, remember
8 Minault, The Khilafat Movement, p. 192.
 Dlugoleski 7

their commitment to non-violence, and work peacefully with Hindus. Aside from its obvious

value as a simple message system, publishing these communications in the national English press

also helped bolster the Khilafat movement's implicit claim to a large following. In their own

Urdu publications, however, the Khilafat leadership capitalized on another talent that many of

them possessed: poetry. Although the traditional scene of poetic recitation, the musha'ira, was

typically reserved for upper-class men, a popular tradition of singing devotional poetry at

religious festivals (Muharram, for example) and pilgrimage sites ran along parallel lines. Thus,

by publishing political verses, the Khilafat leadership could effectively reach a Muslim audience

on an emotional level even illiterate members, who could have verses read to them, and still

feel their affect. Zafar Ali Khan and Hasrat Mohani, for example, were both poets, as well as

journalists and orators. Zafar Ali Khan (editor of Zamindar) in particular manipulated traditional

imagery to fit a political discourse.

The garden is restless to hear the song

God is one,
The time to set the nightingale free from
his cage has come.9

In this couplet, Zafar Ali Khan has invoked traditional image of the nightingale in a cage,

normally used to represent a lover begging his beloved to grant his desires. By consistently

titling his pieces with political topics (Martial Law, or The Central Khilafat Committee),

Zafar Ali Khan cued his readers in to the next level of meaning in this particular case, the

nightingale in the cage could be a call for India's independence. Hasrat Mohani, editor of Urdu-

e-Mu'alla, also wrote political poetry, much more explicitly so than Zafar Ali Khan's:

The custom of tyranny successful, how long will it last?

Love of a country in a stupor, how long will it last?

How long will the chains of deception hold fast?

9 Minault, The Khilafat Movement, p. 156.
 Dlugoleski 8

The stymied anger of people, how long will it last?10

It is clear that the Khilafat leaders composed their verse with a much larger public in mind than

the traditional musha'ira although some, like Zafar Ali Khan, chose to retain a more traditional

ambiguity in their verse, many delivered an overtly political message clearly intended for mass-

mobilization. We must also, however, examine these poems in the context of their respective

publications, both of which strongly advocated Khilafatist nationalism. By appealing to an

Islamic cultural tradition in the same publication as overtly political prose appeals for religious

freedom and swaraj, Zafar Ali Khan and Hasrat Mohani associated the symbol of the caliphate

with a larger cultural identity to which their readers could easily relate. Furthermore, although it

is difficult to gauge how much Urdu political poetry directly affected political participation, it is

significant that others outside of the central Khilafat leadership often reproduced it at the local

level with the same message. A school teacher in Pilibhit, Muhammad Haider, wrote:

Let the respect for the nation be restored

And the trumpet of the faith heralded
Follow Mohamed (Ali), Shaukat and Ghandi
Adopt swadeshism and shun all that is from outside
So that poverty is removed and self-reliance is achieved.11

Thus, in political poetry, the Khilafat leaders had found a way to not only widely disseminate

their message to an Urdu-speaking audience, but also (since poetry in this cultural context was

heavily tied to public recitation) to make sure that it spread independently of their efforts.

Although it worked hard to present itself as a centralized body with a solid support base

in the national press, the Central Khilafat Committee was acutely aware that much work was

needed to actually create this constituency. Winning over the minds of their readers to their

ideology was one thing; creating facts on the ground was quite another. To do this, they had to

10 Minault, The Khilafat Movement, p. 159.

11 Cited in Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, p. 124.
 Dlugoleski 9

communicate the Khilafat message through entirely different means, and rely on another level of

symbols. Their interactions at the provincial level, therefore, served primarily for expanding their

influence. After the decision to transform the Bombay Khilafat Committee into the Central

Khilafat Committee, the leadership moved to both consolidate extant provincial committees and

to send volunteers to form new ones in areas that did not already have them. To achieve this

quickly and efficiently, Khilafat volunteers often integrated the new committee into extant

political and cultural groups. In his book Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1885-

1930,12 Mushirul Hasan notes that Khilafat committees were often indistinguishable from local

Congress bodies, volunteer groups, Kisan Sabhas and Home Rule Leagues in their composition

and political objectives.13 According to the British Sind C.I.D. Reports for 1921, [i]n Sind the

Khilafat Committees generally speaking exist in name only. Most of the members belong to the

Congress organisations and practically all the work is in the hands of the latter.14 The reports of

the Khilafat Movement in the United Provinces indicated that by the time provincial Khilafat

committees had been established at Meerut, Lucknow and a network of branch committees

provided an organisation capable of being used with great effect.15

Because of this, however, Khilafat demands were heavily integrated with local demands;

it was not always clear who was acting. This allowed the community leadership to present and

disseminate the Khilafat ideology within the framework of their own specific concerns, while

simultaneously providing the Khilafat leadership with an extant platform upon which to present

their agenda. In Uttar Pradesh, Khilafat committees and Kisan Sabhas (Peasant Associations)

worked in cooperation, stirring up the population by making a specific appeal against their more

12 Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India. 2000.

13 Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, p. 123.
14 Hasan, Regionalizing Pan-Islamism, p. 271.
15 Hasan, Regionalizing Pan-Islamism, p. 63.
 Dlugoleski 10

immediate enemy: the landlord. Since the landholding class was commonly perceived to be an

ally of the government, the Khilafatists actually organized Kisan Sabha rallies themselves in

several instances.16 According to the provincial records of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat

Movements in Delhi, Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hassan and Maulvi Ahmed Said arrived in Delhi on

12 June 1920.17 At Dr. Ansari's request, they did not encourage any public demonstration. Maulvi

Ahmed Said, however, delivered an inflammatory speech urging religious students to do all in

their power to harm the English. On the 22nd of March, however, dissatisfied Khilafat members

outside the leadership formed their own Khilafat Workers' Association in order to better ensure

their opinions were heard.18 It seems more than coincidental that Asaf Ali, the founder of the

Home Rule League who also happened to be present in Delhi at that time, successfully urged the

local syces to form a trade union and demand an increase in pay immediately after Maulvi

Ahmed Said's address.19 In this instance, it is significant that there was apparently a considerable

gap between the Central Khilafat Committee's priorities and those of the workers; it is equally

significant that the workers chose to voice their more specific set of concerns still within the

framework of the Khilafat movement, and that these concerns were streamlined into the

beginnings of action against the government that could easily lend itself to the non-cooperation

platform. Furthermore, in these two instances, it is clear that the Khilafat movement was eager to

associate itself with local demands, even if it did not claim direct responsibility for the

corresponding action (e.g. the Kisan Sabha rallies, for instance, stayed Kisan Sabha rallies,

although the Khilafat volunteers had organized them). Their involvement in these organizations

allowed them to associate the success of the Khilafat movement with the realization of local

16 Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, p 123.

17 Hasan, Regionalizing Pan-Islamism, p. 19.
18 Hasan, Regionalizing Pan-Islamism, p. 16
19 Hasan, Regionalizing Pan-Islamism, p. 19
 Dlugoleski 11

goals. Khilafat volunteers at a Kisan Sabha meeting in Faizabad (December 1920) assured

tenants that there would be no more evictions should Ghandi achieve home rule.20 In Bengal, a

very similar collaboration developed, most likely aided by the harvest failures, price rises, and

epidemics of the past several years; slogans of Khilafat protests emphasized swaraj over the

restoration of the caliphate.21 In his memoirs, Jawaharlal Nehru recalls:

...even in the remote bazaars the common folk talked of the Congress and Swaraj but
the word 'Khilafat' bore a strange meaning in most of the rural areas. People thought it
came from khilaf, an Urdu word meaning 'against' or 'opposed to,' and so they took it to
mean: opposed to Government!22

Thus, by integrating the Khilafat movement so heavily with local concerns, the symbol of the

caliphate took on yet another meaning in the provinces: independence and economic well-being

through the preservation of their faith outside of India.

This strategy, however, could sometimes prove a double-edged sword. In several cases,

local organizations sought to use the Khilafat movement for their own ends. One of the

resolutions adopted at the All-India Khilafat Conference in Calcutta (19 March 1924),23 'The

Draft Hindu-Muslim Pact,' does not actually refer to the mentioned pact, but to a power struggle

for communal shares in representation within a body comprised of Bengal Provincial Congress

Committee and the Khilafat provincial committee. In cases like this, in which a local body

overtly moved to place their own demands ahead of that of the Khilafat movement, the ideology

that the movement sought to spread stood in very real danger of complete eclipse. Possibly the

worst instance occurred in Malabar in 1921. In much the same manner as with the Kisan

movement in Uttar Pradesh, the local Khilafat committees in Malabar worked with the Tenants'

20 Cited in Minault, The Khilafat Movement, p. 127.

21 Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, p. 125.
22 Originally from the memoirs of J. Nehru, cited in Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, p. 124.
23 Zaidi, A.M. Sectarian Nationalism and Khilafat. Vol. 2. New Delhi: Michiko & Panjathan, 1975. Print.
Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India. p. 621.
 Dlugoleski 12

League, which tried (often unsuccessfully) to protect peasants from the eviction policies of their

(often Hindu) landlords. Khilafat volunteer groups grew around this framework, and called for a

type of non-cooperation that did not exclude violence. Alarmed, Congress and Khilafat leaders

tried to emphasize the real political goals of the Khilafat movement in the region. In February of

1921,24 Yaqub Hasan (affilliated with the Khilafat movement) arrived in Malabar to hold a non-

cooperation meeting (presumably in accordance with the real, non-violent principles that the

movement championed). The district government, however, arrested him and his three local

aides, sentenced them to six months' imprisonment, and banned all further political meetings. In

the face of further organized agitation, the government blamed Khilafat volunteers. This, and the

rumor that British police had desecrated a mosque, sparked an angry mob that soon escalated

into a full-on revolt. In the subsequent violence, the Mappillas targeted both the Government

forces and the Hindu landlords, burning estates, plantations and temples, and forcing conversions

while carrying Khilafat flags and, in some villages, proclaiming Khilafat kingdoms. Although the

British acknowledged both the impoverished condition of the tenants and the region's long

history of violent resistance, they identified the Khilafat-inspired religious tones of the uprising

as its main cause of the revolt. The official Home Government report emphasizes the role of the

Khilafat movement in organizing the uprising:

It was also reported that there were growing indications of incitement to fanatical
outbreak incitment coming from the local Khilafat Committee the tour of the Ali
brothers and Ghandiji in the latter part of April left behind an aftermath of intensive
activity and the Khilafat movement assumed a more definitely religious aspect.25
The report goes on to state that reports had been received at the beginning of June that the local

Khilafat agitators were enrolling volunteers who were dressed in uniform with the Khilafat

24 Minault, The Khilafat Movement, p. 146.

25 Muhammad, Shan, comp. The Indian Muslims: A Documentary Record (1900-1947). Vol. 7. New Delhi:
Meenakshi Prakashan, 1980. Print. p. 104
 Dlugoleski 13

badge and carrying swords.26 The Khilafat leadership, however, was quick to disown the

Mappillas (accounts of the Revolt do not even appear in the records of the Khilafat provincial

committees27), insisted that the conduct of Moplas [sic] [was] against Islamic teachings and

therefore condemnable,28 and cited the economic grievances and poverty of the tenants as the

main causes of the uprising. It is probable that both the Khilafat leadership and the government

were right (although it is equally probable that the government exaggerated the role of the

Khilafat's religious overtones). Still, it is clear that the provincial Khilafat movement had helped

organize the Mappila peasants, but had also worked so much within the concerns of the Tenants'

League that the Mappillas had misunderstood its principles of non-cooperation and resorted to

violence. For the tenants of Malabar, the caliphate had come to symbolize the redress of their

grievances against the Hindu landlords. Understandably, this was the beginning of a deep

downward spiral for Hindu-Muslim relations in the non-cooperation movement.

Although the use of volunteers to set up and help run provincial committees allowed the

Khilafat movement to spread quickly, the movement achieved its most successful results (in

terms of adherence to the principles that it presented at a national level and mobilization towards

its stated goals) when it relied on the networks of its main leaders, who recognized the value of a

personal connection with their supporters and often toured to give speeches and rally support.

Educational institutions in particular were key propaganda targets; since the 19th century, any

political movement in India needed its own school to guarantee its success. Furthermore, Gandhi

and the non-cooperation movement in particular had made independence from Government

services, especially including education, an essential element of swaraj. The chance to not only

produce a noticeable and press-worthy effect for the non-cooperation movement while

26 Ibid.
27 Hasan, Regionalizing Pan-Islamism.
28 Zaidi, Sectarian Nationalism and Khilafat, p. 523.
 Dlugoleski 14

simultaneously winning ideological supporters was not one to pass up, and the Khilafatists

wasted no time. Within the Khilafat leadership, the brothers Muhammad and Shaukat Ali had

both been educated at Aligarh and had done much work to develop the Old Boys network of

alumni and maintained connections with the student body after graduating; they were particularly

well-placed to return to their alma mater, appeal to the students, and challenge the trustees on the

issue of cooperation with the Government. On 11 October 1920, Shaukat Ali sponsored a

resolution at the Moradabad Provincial Conference pushing the withdrawal of students from

schools and colleges in support of non-cooperation.29 He introduced it saying, I have to leave

for Aligarh in five minutes so that, with God's help, I may reduce [sic] into practice the

resolution I am placing before you and may show to the world that Muslims at least will not

tolerate the ridicule of Islam.30 Khilafat Day took place six days later (17 October). By 19

October, The Times of India ran a brief column: Aligarh College. Serious Situation.31 The

article described the situation at the college as grave and never actually clarified what this

situation entailed but went on to say:

The Syndicate and staff are unanimous in upholding the traditional policy of the
institution. The Syndicate appeals to the press and public and especially the Mahomedan
community [sic] the Trustees and old boys to rise to the occasion and support in
maintaining the College and saving it from ruin.

The same day, The Leader of Allahabad ran a similar column: Aligarh Threatens to Boycott.32

This time, the article described the success of Khilafat Day in the whole town all shops, both

of Hindus and Mahomedans, were closed and published the resolution passed on the occasion,

in which Muslim India33 expressed its determination to boycott British goods if unacceptable

29 Shan, The Indian Muslims (7), p. 67.

30 Ibid.
31 The Times of India 19 October 1920 Aligarh College. Serious Situation.
32 "Aligarh Threatens to Boycott." The Leader [Allahabad] 19 Oct. 1920. World Newspaper Archive. Web. 16 Apr.
2012.
33 Ibid.
 Dlugoleski 15

peace terms with Turkey were reached. Significantly, The Leader does not include any of the

main Khilafat leadership in its list of officials' attendance, including Shaukat Ali. The next day,

however, The Times produced another, much longer, column that anticipated the arrival of Abdul

Kalam Azad. It reported that Maulana Azad Ali had already harangued34 the students, and

stated that it is feared that the boys may leave school at any moment. A large number of

messages have been received from parents. Some have actually come to Aligarh, but they find

their sons for the time being out of control.35 The paper added that other schools had declared

themselves willing to follow Aligarh's example, should the students choose to walk out. It is

clear that Shaukat Ali's personal visit, accompanied by his appeal to the students, set the stage for

this situation. He, his brother Muhammad, and Gandhi all had arrived at Aligarh on 12 October,36

and addressed the trustees, staff and students, and, when the staff proved unreceptive, only the

students, urging them not to cooperate with a Government that limited their religious freedom.

The student non-cooperation movement soon produced the bulk of the Khilafat volunteer corps;

it is telling, then, that although students at secular institutions like Aligarh likely ranked the

preservation of the caliphate in Turkey fairly low on their list of priorities, they still rallied

around its symbol, which the Ali brothers had used to represent a government that would respect

religious freedom the same way that they presented their movement to the Shi'a in order to

side-step theological issues.

The Ali brothers' use of their personal connections at Aligarh worked extremely well. The

most effective network that much of the Khilafat leadership had available was, however, the

'ulama; the Khilafatists often relied on them for mass-mobilization and the dissemination of their

message in the mosques. This is hardly surprising, given that a large part of the Khilafat

34 The Times of India 19 October 1920 Aligarh College. Serious Situation.

35 Ibid.
36 Minault, The Khilafat Movement, p. 117.
 Dlugoleski 16

leadership were 'ulama themselves. Abdul Bari, possibly the greatest public relations asset to the

Khilafat movement, in particular enjoyed a great hold on the Muslim population of India. He was

himself an 'alim of Firangi Mahal and a Qadiriyya Sufi pir. Not only did this give him great

prestige, but it also enabled him to tap into a network of literally thousands of followers all over

India. Abdul Bari operated both through organizations like the Anjuman-i Mu'idu'l-Islam of

Lucknow (founded to further the interests of the Muslim community), and through religious

gatherings like the 'urs of Khwaja Muinud-din Chishti at Ajmer, at which sajjada nashins of Sufi

shrines, other 'ulama, and groups of wealthy, educated elite members of society were all present.

At the very beginning of the Khilafat movement's centralization in 1919, Abdul Bari worked

hard to secure a unanimous fatwa on the question of the caliphate and the Muslim holy places.

Although he succeeded in the end, the 'ulama of Deoband, Bengal and the Punjab refused to

sign, as did a handful of Bari's rivals from Firangi Mahal. In the end, the signatories reflected

Abdul Bari's family and Firangi Mahal connections in a group of Sufis and 'ulama from

Lucknow, Ajmer, Bihar, and Sindh.37

More importantly, however, the 'ulama could replicate the Khilafat's mobilization of

personal networks through their local congregations. Furthermore, it was only with their sanction

that the Khilafatists could legitimately continue to push the nationalist cause in religious terms.

(When Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari, both prominent leaders in the movement, prematurely

broke with this religious symbol in 1922, it ruined their careers.38) More than the press, local

organizations, or even personal visits and networking, the Khilafat movement needed the 'ulama

as the real connection between them and the provinces. Thus, the role of the 'ulama merits a very

careful consideration. It would be a mistake to view them as a collection of rubber-stamps;

37 Minault, The Khilafat Movement, p. 80.
38 Jalal, Ayesha. Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850. London:
Routledge, 2000. Electronic.
 Dlugoleski 17

rather, they had their own agenda and demands. The 'ulama of India, urged on by none other than

Abdul Bari, sought their own unification in much the same way as the Khilafat movement, and at

the exact same time, resulting in the creation of the Jama'at i-Ulama i-Hind. The 'ulama of the

Jama'at were not completely successful in their goal Deoband, for instance, still remained aloof

and would not involve themselves directly in the political scene, but the fact remains that they

had, for the most part, a set of standards for an Islamic government (e.g. a return to shari'a)

which allowed them to identify with the goals of the Khilafat movement. While they were

willing to enthusiastically support the Khilafat nationalist agenda, they also fully expected the

Khilafat movement to advocate their own more specifically religious one.

The Hijrat movement is indicative of this symbiotic relationship. Hijrat, meaning

emigration, refers to the example of the Prophet Muhammad, who left Mecca with his

followers and retreated temporarily to Medina in 622 AD, only to return and reconquer the holy

city and begin the spread of Islam through the Muslim conquests. In April of 1920, the Amir of

Afghanistan, Aman-Allah Khan, indicated that he would welcome any Muslims

who felt compelled to emigrate from India to Afghanistan to seek religious

freedom and pledged himself to the cause of the caliphate a position that

his delegation to the Government of India reiterated later that month.39 The

Afghan government, in fact, never meant this offer seriously; they voiced it

only to pressure the British. This was not, however, the first mention of the

possibility of hijrat as a viable alternative to living under British rule in India.

The Ali brothers had come close to advocating the options of either jihad or

hijrat at the Amritsar All-India Khilafat Conference of 1919,40 and had

39 Qureshi, M. Naeem. "The 'Ulama of British India and the Hijrat of 1920." Modern Asian Studies 13.1: 41-59.
JSTOR. Web. 12 Apr. 2012. p. 45.
40 Qureshi, 'The 'Ulama of British India and the Hijrat of 1920,' p. 44.
 Dlugoleski 18

expressed a similar view to Viceroy in their internment that same year:

When a land is not safe for Islam a Muslim has only two alternatives,
Jihad or Hijrat. That is to say, he must either make use of every force
God has given him for the liberation of the land and the ensurement
[sic] of perfect freedom for the practice and preaching of Islam, or he
must migrate to some other and freer land with a view to return[ing] to
it when it is once more safe for Islam In view of our weak condition,
migration is the only alternative for us.41

It is unclear, of course, to what extent the Ali brothers hoped to both

pressure the British and claim theological legitimacy with this statement, but

other Khilafatists, like Zafar Ali Khan and Abdul Kalam Azad, also supported

the idea. Thus, upon hearing the offer from the Afghan government, several

Khilafatists contacted the delegation directly, and the Central Khilafat

Committee released a press summary of the Amir's promises.42 By August

1928, The Times of India had also published a copy of the speech.43 The

'ulama (both outside of and within the Khilafat leadership), however, were

divided on this option. This uncertainty hinged on the question of whether

India was dar al-harb, or dar al-Islam. When consulted by some members of

the 'ulama on issuing a fatwa in approval of an exodus, Abdul Bari refused on

the grounds that India was still dar al-Islam hijrat was not mandatory, and

the flight of Indian Muslims would actually hurt the cause of Islam within the

country. He added that he would prefer to wait for the opinion of the Jama'at-

i Ulama-i Hind.44 Bari, however, encountered stiff resistance in his refusal.

41 Reetz, Dietrich. Hijrat: The Flight of the Faithful. A British File on the Exodus of Muslim Peasants from North
India to Afghanistan in 1920. Berlin: Druckerei Weinart, 1995. Print.
42 Originally cited in Qureshi, 'The 'Ulama of British India and the Hijrat of 1920,' p. 44.
43 "Message from the Amir." The Times of India 28 Aug. 1920. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Web. 13 Apr.
2012.
44 Qureshi article p. 47
 Dlugoleski 19

Multiple 'ulama from across India (some of them Khilafatists) challenged him

and argued that, since the British had replaced shari'a with their own legal

system, India was undeniably dar al-harb, and hijrat obligatory for the

faithful. Although Bari still refused to bend, Abdul Kalam Azad eventually

produced the fatwa sanctioning emigration but added that, since it was

impossible and undesirable for all of India's Muslims to emigrate, those

remaining behind should continue to support the Khilafat movement and

non-cooperation.45 With a fatwa secured, a Central Hijrat Office in Delhi was

established, and volunteers often directly from the Khilafat movement

began working to coordinate emigration. It is significant that, throughout this

time, the Hijrat movement developed within the framework of the Khilafat

movement. The records of the Non-Co-operation and Khilafat Movements in

the NWFP note:

Prior to the Khilafat agitation the 'Volunteer' movement found

expression in the local Sewa Samiti, but this organisation remained a
more or less non-political character and its object was primarily social
service. With the advent of hijrat, however, the movement underwent
considerable expansion and the bodies formed by the various Khilafat
Committees were, both by their size and their later activities, a source
of growing concern and anxiety.46

Both the 'ulama and the volunteers also began a propaganda campaign.

While this included posters advertising the proper arrangements for hijrat

before leaving, many other aspects of the effort were much darker, and

came predominantly from the maulawis and mullahs. Rumors flew that the

British had destroyed the Ka'aba and taken Mecca and Medina, or that the

45 Qureshi article 50
46 Regionalizing Pan-Islam 369
 Dlugoleski 20

Qur'an would be outlawed in India.47 Conversely, they also encouraged

emigration by assuring villagers that the Amir of Afghanistan had promised

muhajirin fertile tracts of land, and that they would be helped and fed by

Afghan Muslims upon arrival.48 These claims were, of course, completely

unsubstantiated. The Times of India published a column on 12 August 1920

that described pro-hijrat propaganda as wild and wicked falsehoods

regarding the occupation and defilement of the Holy Places by British troops

and other malicious lies of this kind.49

The role of the 'ulama in this process is telling. Although in many cases

Khilafat volunteers pressed for action, the 'ulama were the main driving

force, both behind the fatwa that sanctioned emigration (Azad only delivered

the fatwa after Bari refused to change his position under fire from members

of the 'ulama) and in convincing the masses to follow through with the

action. This last in particular is evident in the exponential growth of the

movement in such a short amount of time by August 1920, 13,00050

muhajirin had already crossed into Afghanistan. A week later, the number of

emigrants reached 20,000,51 and more continued arriving. Again, it is

important to remember that the 'ulama were not unified on the question of

hijrat but in spite of this, thousands of people sold their property and

crossed to Afghanistan. If nothing else, this shows just how much an effect

47 Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics, p. 194.

48 Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics, p. 193.
49 "Hijrat Movement: A Curious Sidelight." The Times of India 12 Aug. 1920. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
Web. 13 Apr. 2012.
50 Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics, p. 206.
51 Ibid.
 Dlugoleski 21

an individual 'alim could have within his own personal network. It is equally

important to recall that the Khilfat leadership hesitated over the question;

they themselves were divided, with prominent leaders like Hasrat Mohani, Dr.

Ansari, Dr. Kitchlew and Asaf Ali firmly against the movement. Although the

Central Khilafat Committee eventually produced a resolution in favor of hijrat

in July 1920,52 it was really only an admission of reality; masses of people

had already begun emigrating. Earlier, the Central Committee (and the

Jama'at-i Ulama) had refused to patronize the Hijrat movement, and declared

it optional. And yet the Hijrat movement developed always within the

Khilafat movement trains arriving in Peshawar carrying emigrants were

decked in Turkish flags.53 The 'ulama, even divided, could exercise such

control because they were (literally) the legitimizing factor of the Khilafat

movement, and, as such, had the moral authority to reinterpret Khilafat

symbols as they pleased. In this case, they did so in a way that completely

disregarded its nationalist agenda and the political caliphate itself, and

pushed a purely religious solution to British rule. The 'ulama, in the end, used

exactly the same strategy that the Khilafat movement had used in the

provinces they relied on the framework of an extant organization for a

platform, tempered their message to fit their audience (i.e. the references to

tracts of land and material help from fellow Muslims must have been keenly

followed by impoverished peasants), and adjusted the use of their symbol,

the caliphate, accordingly.

52 Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics, p. 198.

53 Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics, p. 199.
 Dlugoleski 22

The Hijrat movement did not itself derail the Khilafat cause. It began in the spring and

summer of 1920, while the Khilafat realized its most successful mass-mobilization campaigns

either that year or in 1921. The Mappila Revolt of 1921 did much more damage to the

movement's reputation and goals. But the Hijrat movement is indicative of the larger tensions

inherent in the organization that caused its fracture, even before the Turks abolished the caliphate

in 1923. As early as 1921, moderates in the Central Khilafat Committee suggested working

towards a revision of the Treaty of Sevres, in light of Mustafa Kemal's victories.54 They

encountered resistance from other members who opposed working with the British and

working towards a solution to the caliphate question that would produce no foreseeable progress

for Indian nationalism. In the meantime, severe government reprisals after violent riots upon the

visit of the Prince of Wales (17 November 1921) and the deepening mistrust between Hindus and

Muslims after the Mappila Revolt of 1921 presented the Khilafat leadership with a formidable

series of challenges to their unity. In December of that year, a group of 'ulama headed by Hasrat

Mohani challenged non-violence on religious grounds.55 With the Ali brothers in jail at the time,

the moderate Khilafat leadership found itself hard pressed to refute their demands, since they

needed the 'ulama to relate to the masses. The final split occurred with the development of the

Tabligh movement, led by the 'ulama not against the British, but against the Hindus. For

supporters and leaders alike, the caliphate had been the symbol that had brought them together

where Muhammad Ali's two circles, India and Islam, overlapped. While it had created a support

base, however, it had not created a unified ideological following. Rather, the varied and

decentralized way in which the Khilafat movement presented the symbol of the caliphate at the

international, national, and local levels paved the way for the movement to splinter under

54 Minault, The Khilafat Movement, p. 180.

55 Minault, The Khilafat Movement, p. 183.
 Dlugoleski 23

pressure, both within the central leadership and in the provinces.

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