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1) G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918 jump under the conditions which here confronted him.

jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to
AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant, this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum of not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the
P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant. From a imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case
judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant from liability the is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
plaintiff has appealed. considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that.
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12, 1912, on the
Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men
neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are
his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is
the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration,
foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this
by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper
on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent
thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is shown to have a length of when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly
sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized
to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the
without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed
across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity
to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant
horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we believe was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly
that when the accident occurred the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
of the bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails
several days. to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) should perhaps be
above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done; mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while contributory negligence on the part of the person
and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which
assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party. The defendant company had there
the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have employed the plaintiff, as a laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails from a barge in Manila harbor to the
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of company's yards located not far away. The rails were conveyed upon cars which were hauled along a narrow
things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this track. At certain spot near the water's edge the track gave way by reason of the combined effect of the weight
moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of of the car and the insecurity of the road bed. The car was in consequence upset; the rails slid off; and the
greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. It appeared in evidence that the accident was due to the effects of the
to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the typhoon which had dislodged one of the supports of the track. The court found that the defendant company
other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, was negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff was, at the moment of
the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this the accident, guilty of contributory negligence in walking at the side of the car instead of being in front or
by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an behind. It was held that while the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having
appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get exited and failed to keep the track in proper repair nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on account
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of the contributory negligence in the plaintiff. As will be seen the defendant's negligence in that case consisted of defendant is mitigated by the contributory negligence of the parents of the boy "in not providing for the
in an omission only. The liability of the company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous condition of its proper and delegate supervision and control over their son The dispositive part of the decision reads as
track. In a case like the one now before us, where the defendant was actually present and operating the follows:
automobile which caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the negligence of the
respective parties in order to apportion the damage according to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough Wherefore, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff by ordering the defendant to pay
to say that the negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate and determining cause of the to the plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for the death of his son, Manuel Saynes;
accident and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case. the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) for actual expenses for and in connection
with the burial of said deceased child, and the further sum of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) for
A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in the defendant's answer, moral damages and Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos as reasonable attorney's fee, or a total of Nine
to the effect that the subject matter of the action had been previously adjudicated in the court of a justice of Thousand Seven Hundred (P9,700.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs of this suit. It Is So Ordered.
the peace. In this connection it appears that soon after the accident in question occurred, the plaintiff caused
criminal proceedings to be instituted before a justice of the peace charging the defendant with the infliction of Undisputed facts appearing of record are:
serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary investigation the defendant was discharged by the
magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that the acquittal of the defendant at the trial upon
the merits in a criminal prosecution for the offense mentioned would be res adjudicata upon the question of On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan, which started from
his civil liability arising from negligence -- a point upon which it is unnecessary to express an opinion -- the 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon and lasted up to about midnight of the same day. During the storm, the
action of the justice of the peace in dismissing the criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have banana plants standing on an elevated ground along the barrio road in San Pedro Ili of said municipality
no effect. (See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.) and near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the electric wire.
As a result, the live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and
the other fell to the ground under the fallen banana plants.
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is her
rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of other
instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the On the following morning, at about 9:00 o'clock barrio captain Luciano Bueno of San Pedro Iii who was
plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date passing by saw the broken electric wire and so he warned the people in the place not to go near the
of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as not wire for they might get hurt. He also saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant near
to be recoverable. So ordered. the place and notified him right then and there of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but the latter
told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring: Sometime after the barrio captain and Cipriano Baldomero had left the place, a small boy of 3 years
and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the
road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was
After mature deliberation, I have finally decided to concur with the judgment in this case. I do so because of electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution of Manuel Saynes that the
my understanding of the "last clear chance" rule of the law of negligence as particularly applied to automobile broken wire was fixed at about 10:00 o'clock on the same morning by the lineman of the electric plant.
accidents. This rule cannot be invoked where the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the
defendant. Again, if a traveler when he reaches the point of collision is in a situation to extricate himself and
avoid injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a recovery. But Justice Street finds as a fact that the Petitioner claims that he could not be liable under the concept of quasi-delict or tort as owner and manager of
negligent act of the interval of time, and that at the moment the plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid the the Alcala Electric Plant because the proximate cause of the boy's death electrocution could not be due to any
accident. Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is applicable. In other words, when a traveler has reached negligence on his part, but rather to a fortuitous event-the storm that caused the banana plants to fall and cut
a point where he cannot extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in the electric line-pointing out the absence of negligence on the part of his employee Cipriano Baldomero who
reaching that position becomes the condition and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not preclude tried to have the line repaired and the presence of negligence of the parents of the child in allowing him to
a recovery. (Note especially Aiken vs. Metcalf [1917], 102 Atl., 330.) leave his house during that time.

A careful examination of the record convinces Us that a series of negligence on the part of defendants'
employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. First, by the very
evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an
2) G.R. No. L-40570 January 30, 1976 elevated ground which were about 30 feet high and which were higher than the electric post supporting the
TEODORO C. UMALI, petitioner, electric line, and yet the employees of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that
vs. even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down,
HON. ANGEL BACANI, respondents. did not even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line. Second,
even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of the possible damage the storm of
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan Branch IX, in Civil May 14, 1972, could have caused their electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and property, they
Case No. U2412, entitled, "Fidel H. Saynes, plaintiff-appellee versus Teodoro C. Umali, defendant-appellant", did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily done pending
which found the death by electrocution of Manuel Saynes, a boy of 3 years and 8 months, as "due to the fault inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut. Third, employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on the
or negligence of the defendant (Umali) as owner and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant", although the liability morning of the incident because even if he was already made aware of the live cut wire, he did not have the
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foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life and property, and that he should have taken the
necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the live wire; instead Baldomero left the premises
because what was foremost in his mind was the repair of the line, obviously forgetting that if left unattended 3) G.R. No. L-32611 November 3, 1930
to it could endanger life and property. CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
On defendants' argument that the proximate cause of the victim's death could be attributed to the parents' PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.
negligence in allowing a child of tender age to go out of the house alone, We could readily see that because
of the aforementioned series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees resulting in a live wire lying This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the Culion Ice, Fish & Electric Co., Inc.,
on the premises without any visible warning of its lethal character, anybody, even a responsible grown up or for the purpose of recovering from the Philippine Motors Corporation the sum of P11,350, with interest and
not necessarily an innocent child, could have met the same fate that befell the victim. It may be true, as the costs. Upon hearing the cause the trial court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover of the defendant
lower Court found out, that the contributory negligence of the victim's parents in not properly taking care of the the sum of P9,850, with interest at 6 per centum per annum from March 24,1927, the date of the filing of the
child, which enabled him to leave the house alone on the morning of the incident and go to a nearby place cut complaint, until satisfaction of the judgment, with costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed.
wire was very near the house (where victim was living) where the fatal fallen wire electrocuted him, might
mitigate respondent's liability, but we cannot agree with petitioner's theory that the parents' negligence
constituted the proximate cause of the victim's death because the real proximate cause was the fallen live wire The plaintiff and defendant are domestic corporations; and at the time of the incident with which we are here
which posed a threat to life and property on that morning due to the series of negligence adverted to above concerned, H.D. Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in the City of Manila. At the same time the
committed by defendants' employees and which could have killed any other person who might by accident get plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline, which was used in the fishing trade in
into contact with it. Stated otherwise, even if the child was allowed to leave the house unattended due to the the Philippine Islands. In January, 1925, Cranston decided, if practicable, to have the engine on
parents' negligence, he would not have died that morning where it not for the cut live wire he accidentally the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner, expecting thereby to effect economy
touched. in the cost of running the boat. He therefore made known his desire to McLeod & Co., a firm dealing in tractors,
and was told by Mc Kellar, of said company, that he might make inquiries of the Philippine Motors
Corporations, which had its office on Ongpin Street, in the City of Manila. Cranston accordingly repaired to the
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was office of the Philippine Motors Corporation and had a conference with C.E. Quest, its manager, who agreed
only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' lack of due care, the to do the job, with the understanding that payment should be made upon completion of the work.
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be
availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his
employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states: The Philippine Motors Corporation was at this time engaged in business as an automobile agency, but, under
its charter, it had authority to deal in all sorts of machinery engines and motors, as well as to build, operate,
buy and sell the same and the equipment therof. Quest, as general manager, had full charge of the
The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages corporations in all its branches.
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on tile
occasion of their functions.
As a result of the aforesaid interview, Quest, in company with Cranston, visited the Gwendoline while it lay at
anchor in the Pasig River, and the work of effecting the change in the engine was begun and conducted under
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the employer is the supervision of Quest, chiefly by a mechanic whom Quest took with him to the boat. In this work Quest had
supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of the employer is primary and the assistance of the members of the crew of the Gwendoline, who had been directed by Cranston to place
direct (Standard Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Tan and Court of Appeals, 107 Phil. 109). In fact the proper defense for themselves under Quest's directions.
the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good
father of the family to prevent damage not only in the selection of his employees but also in adequately
supervising them over their work. This defense was not adequately proven as found by the trial Court, and We Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest came to the conclusion that the principal thing necessary to
do not find any sufficient reason to deviate from its finding. accomplish the end in view was to install a new carburetor, and a Zenith carburetor was chosen as the one
most adapted to the purpose. After this appliance had been installed, the engine was tried with gasoline as a
fuel, supplied from the tank already in use. The result of this experiment was satisfactory. The next problem
Notwithstanding diligent efforts, we fail to fired any reversible error committed by the trial Court in this case, was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with distillate. For
either in its appreciation of the evidence on questions of facts or on the interpretation and application of laws this purpose a temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on deck above and at a short distance from
government quasi-delicts and liabilities emanating therefrom. The inevitable conclusion is that no error the compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing, which
amounting to grave abuse of discretion was committed and the decision must be left untouched. was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the tank. Owing to this fact the fuel
mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown into the engine compartment. The new fuel line and that
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court dated June 27, 1974 is affirmed. already in use between the gasoline tank and carburetor were so fixed that it was possible to change from the
gasoline fuel to the mixed fuel. The purpose of this arrangement was to enable the operator to start the engine
Costs against petitioner. on gasoline and then, after the engine had been operating for a few moments, to switch to the new fuel
supply. lawphil.net

In the course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its connections, it was observed that the
carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to the
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carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he appeared to think lightly of the matter The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea that, inasmuch as Quest had control of
and said that, when the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding would disappear. the Gwendolineduring the experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the position of a bailee and that,
as a consequence, the burden of proof was on the defendant to exculpate itself from responsibility by proving
After preliminary experiments and adjustments had been made the boat was taken out into the bay for a trial that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest. We are unable to accede to this point of view. Certainly,
run at about 5 p.m. or a little later, on the evening of January 30,1925. The first part of the course was covered Quest was not in charge of the navigation of the boat on this trial run. His employment contemplated the
without any untoward development, other than he fact that the engine stopped a few times, owing no doubt to installation of new parts in the engine only, and it seems rather strained to hold that the defendant corporation
the use of an improper mixture of fuel. In the course of the trial Quest remained outside of the engine had thereby become bailee of the boat. As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owner's yard, or
compartment and occupied himself with making distillate, with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking it to his shop, are not bailees, and their rights and liabilities
two elements would give best results in the engine. are determined by the general rules of law, under their contract. The true bailee acquires possession and what
is usually spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a consequence of such possession and special
property, the bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These ideas seem to be incompatible with the situation
As the boat was coming in from this run, at about 7:30 p.m. and when passing near Cavite, the engine stopped, now under consideration. But though defendant cannot be held liable in the supposition that the burden of
and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been done the proof had not been sustained by it in disproving the negligence of its manager, we are nevertheless of the
mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a back fire opinion that the proof shows by a clear preponderance that the accident to the Gwendoline and the damages
occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the resulting therefrom are chargeable to the negligence or lack of skill of Quest.
carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were
unable to subdue. They were therefore compelled, as the fire spread, to take to a boat, and their escape was
safely effected, but theGwendoline was reduced to a mere hulk. The salvage from, the wreck, when sold, This action was instituted about two years after the accident in question had occured, and after Quest had
brought only the sum of P150. The value of the boat, before the accident occured, as the court found, was ceased to be manager of the defendant corporation and had gone back to the United States. Upon these facts,
P10,000. the defendant bases the contention that the action should be considered stale. It is sufficient reply to say that
the action was brought within the period limited by the statute of limitations and the situation is not one where
the defense of laches can be properly invoked.
A study of the testimony lead us to the conclusion that the loss of this boat was chargeable to the negligence
and lack of skill of Quest. The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great
an elevation from the carburetor, with the result that when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure It results that the judgment appealed from, awarding damages to the plaintiff in the amount of P9,850, with
in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This was no doubt the interest, must be affirmed; and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.
cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the result was that; when the back fire occurred, the external parts
of the carburetor, already saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated 4) G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918
to the highly inflammable material near-by. Ordinarily a back fire from an engine would not be followed by any JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,
disaster, but in this case the leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous vs.
situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
The back fire may have been due either to the fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly
mixed. At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the employment
of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of
In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself out as being competent to do San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in
things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied
one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest had had by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in
ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and,
experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture form making, his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail
the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the with his right hand for support.
danger of fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently warned
from those circumstances to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against the danger. In other On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which
words Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in
engines on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down
inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said another passenger, named Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car,
to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had
occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact
in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame. with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the
platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm
We therefore see no escape from the conclusion that this accident is chargeable to lack of skill or negligence was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward
in effecting the changes which Quest undertook to accomplish; and even supposing that our theory as to the possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
exact manner in which the accident occurred might appear to be in some respects incorrect, yet the origin of
the fire in not so inscrutable as to enable us to say that it was casus fortuitus.

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The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of
by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult an obligation already existing . . . ."
to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in the 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.
fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the
station for the shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on the Upon this point the Court said:
platform in a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of melons and
the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon
one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see these The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood to
objects in the darkness is readily to be credited. be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations
already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches
of those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic,
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries which Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
he had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila
where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory,
and the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain cases
was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to
of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the English Common Law, upon the
his curation. principle of respondeat superior if it were, the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally
but upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who by
their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused. One who
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of
recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all the
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage arises at the very instant that the
to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of his employment causes the injury. The liability of the master
of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom is personal and direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and
his conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his
that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between
the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form the master and the person injured.
recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant relieves the
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these master from liability for the latter's acts on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has never
sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon
from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused
plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into
recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to
each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he
contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined. is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his
servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third person suffer damage. True it is that under
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and article 1903 of the Civil Cos much more broader than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does,
that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say,
that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability
liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract
the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to existed between the parties.
obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of
expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual. The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and
to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual,
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally
this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf imputable to defendant's servants.
and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference
between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between

5
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting
servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to
means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the
was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor
alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving
was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory
negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly
ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence. the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of
the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the
injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in support of free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it
the contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train. We are not disposed was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his
to subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is too badly stated mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform
and is at variance with the experience of every-day life. In this particular instance, that the train was barely where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train
moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of
place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions every day of contributory negligence.
the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions.
There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk,
it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place. and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment.
Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work to the standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair
on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows: compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he
is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services,
and other incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to
alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether
an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25,
the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined and for the costs of both instances. So ordered.
to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a
man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Separate Opinions
Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we
may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord, namely, "It may be admitted that had plaintiff
alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not
under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and have occurred." With the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory negligence, we are likewise in full
his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.1awph!l.net accord, namely, "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per se." Adding these two points
together, should be absolved from the complaint, and judgment affirmed.
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able to discern 5) G.R. No. L-21291 March 28, 1969
clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS, plaintiff-appellant,
presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction vs.
which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellant.
reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the
plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the
platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of Youth, the threshold of life, is invariably accompanied by that euphoric sense of well-being, and with reason.
a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by The future, bright with promise, looms ahead. One's powers are still to be tested, but one feels ready for
any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of whatever challenge may come his way. There is that heady atmosphere of self-confidence, at times carried to
them adequately so that their presence would be revealed. excess. The temptation to take risks is there, ever so often, difficult, if not impossible, to resist. There could
be then a lessening of prudence and foresight, qualities usually associated with age. For death seems so
remote and contingent an event. Such is not always the case though, and a slip may be attended with
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following consequences at times unfortunate, even fatal.
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the

6
Some such thought apparently was in the mind of the lower court when it dismissed the complaint for recovery in the conclusion thus arrived at. It is a fair statement of the governing, principle to say that the appellate
of damages filed by plaintiff-appellant, Preciolita V. Corliss whose husband, the late Ralph W. Corliss, was, at function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the result reached by the trial court.
the tender age of twenty-one, the victim of a grim tragedy, when the jeep he was driving collided with a
locomotive of defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company, close to midnight on the evening of Feb 21, 1957, As was held in a 1961 decision: "We have already ruled, that when the credibility of witnesses is the one at
at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the Clark Air Force Base. In the decision issue, the trial court's judgment as to their degree of credence deserves serious consideration by this
appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the evidence, concluded that the deceased "in his Court." 6 An earlier expression of the same view is found in Jai-Alai Corporation v. Ching Kiat: "After going over
eagerness to beat, so to speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, the record, we find no reason for rejecting the findings of the court below. The questions raised hinge on
but unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation." 1 credibility and it is well-settled that in the absence of compelling reasons, its determination is best left to the
trial judge why had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and observing their demeanor on the witness
The negligence imputed to defendant-appellee was thus ruled out by the lower court, satisfactory proof to stand." 7
that effect, in its opinion, being lacking. Hence this appeal direct to us, the amount sought in the concept of
damages reaching the sum of P282,065.40. An examination of the evidence of record fails to yield a basis for In a 1964 opinion, we adhered to such an approach. Thus: "'Nothing in the record suggests any arbitrary or
a reversal of the decision appealed from. We affirm. abusive conduct on the part of the trial judge in the formulation of the ruling. His conclusion on the matter is
sufficiently borne out by the evidence presented. We are denied, therefore, the prerogative to disturb that
According to the decision appealed from, there is no dispute as to the following: "In December 1956, plaintiff, finding, consonant to the time honored tradition of the Tribunal to hold trial judges better situated to make
19 years of age, married Ralph W. Corliss Jr., 21 years of age, ...; that Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark conclusions on questions of fact'." 8 On this ground alone we can rest the affirmance of the judgment appealed
Air Force Base; that at the time of the accident, he was driving the fatal jeep; that he was then returning in from.lwphi1.et
said jeep, together with a P.C. soldier, to the Base; and that Corliss Jr. died of serious burns at the Base
Hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious physical injuries and burns." 2 2. Nor is the result different even if no such presumption were indulged in and the matter examined as if we
were exercising original and not appellate jurisdiction. The sad and deplorable situation in which plaintiff-
Then came a summary of the testimony of two of the witnesses for plaintiff-appellant. Thus: "Ronald J. Ennis, appellant now finds herself, to the contrary notwithstanding we find no reason for reversing the judgment of
a witness of the plaintiff, substantially declared in his deposition, ..., that at the time of the accident, he also the lower court.
awaiting transportation at the entrance of Clark Field, which was about 40 to 50 yards away from the tracks
and that while there he saw the jeep coming towards the Base. He said that said jeep slowed down before This action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that whoever by act or omission causes
reaching the crossing, that it made a brief stop but that it did not stop dead stop. Elaborating, he declared damage to another, there being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done. 9 Unless it could
that while it was slowing down, Corliss Jr. shifted into first gear and that was what he meant by a brief stop. be satisfactorily shown, therefore, that defendant-appellee was guilty of negligence then it could not be held
He also testified that he could see the train coming from the direction of San Fernando and that he heard a liable. The crucial question, therefore, is the existence of negligence.
warning but that it was not sufficient enough to avoid the accident." 3 Also: "Virgilio de la Paz, another witness
of the plaintiff, testified that on the night of February 21, 1957, he was at the Balibago checkpoint and saw the
train coming from Angeles and a jeep going towards the direction of Clark Field. He stated that he heard the The above Civil Code provision, which is a reiteration of that found in the Civil Code of Spain, formerly
whistle of the locomotive and saw the collision. The jeep, which caught fire, was pushed forward. He helped applicable in this jurisdiction, 10 had been interpreted in earlier decisions. Thus, in Smith v. Cadwallader Gibson
the P.C. soldier. He stated that he saw the jeep running fast and heard the tooting of the horn. It did not stop Lumber Co.,11 Manresa was cited to the following effect "'Among the questions most frequently raised and
at the railroad crossing, according to him." 4 upon which the majority of cases have been decided with respect to the application of this liability, are those
referring to the determination of the damage or prejudice, and to the fault or negligence of the person
responsible therefor. These are the two indispensable factors in the obligations under discussion, for without
After which reference was made to the testimony of the main witness for defendant-appellee, Teodorico damage or prejudice there can be no liability, and although this element is present no indemnity can be
Capili, "who was at the engine at the time of the mishap," and who "testified that before the locomotive, which awarded unless arising from some person's fault or negligence'."
had been previously inspected and found to be in good condition approached, the crossing, that is, about 300
meters away, he blew the siren and repeated it in compliance with the regulations until he saw the jeep
suddenly spurt and that although the locomotive was running between 20 and 25 kilometers an hour and Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo 12 and United States v.
although he had applied the brakes, the jeep was caught in the middle of the tracks." 5 Barias. 13Cooley' formulation was quoted with approval in both the Juanillo and Barias decisions. Thus: "Judge
Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to be: "The failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
1. The above finding as to the non-existence of negligence attributable to defendant-appellee Manila Railroad circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury." There was likewise a reliance on Ahern
Company comes to us encased in the armor of what admittedly appears to be a careful judicial appraisal and v. Oregon Telephone Co. 14Thus: "Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative
scrutiny of the evidence of record. It is thus proof against any attack unless sustained and overwhelming. Not or comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the
that it is invulnerable, but it is likely to stand firm in the face of even the most formidable barrage. degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high
degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances."
In the more traditional terminology, the lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness.
It is entitled to great respect. After all, the lower court had the opportunity of weighing carefully what was To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to defendant-appellee, and the action of plaintiff-
testified to and apparently did not neglect it. There is no affront to justice then if its finding be accorded appellee must necessary fail. The facts being what they are, compel the conclusion that the liability sought to
acceptance subject of course the contingency of reversal if error or errors, substantial in character, be shown be fastened on defendant-appellee had not arisen.

7
3. Plaintiff-appellant, in her brief, however, would seek a reversal of the judgment appealed from on the It is true, as plaintiff-appellant would now allege that there has been a drift away from the apparent rigid and
ground that there was a failure to appreciate the true situation. Thus the first three assigned errors are factual inflexible doctrine thus set forth in the two above cases evidenced by Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co., 18 the
in character. The third assigned error could be summarily disposed of. It would go against the evidence to controlling facts of which, however, are easily distinguishable from what had been correctly ascertained in the
maintain the view that the whistle was not sounded and the brakes not applied at a distance of 300 meters present case. Such a deviation from the earlier principle announced is not only true of this jurisdiction but also
before reaching the crossing. of the United States.

The first two assigned errors would make much of the failure of the lower court to hold that the crossing bars This is made clear by Prosser. Speaking of a 1927 decision by Justice Holmes, he had the following to say:
not having been put down and there being no guard at the gate-house, there still was a duty on the part of "Especially noteworthy in this respect is the attempt Mr. Justice Holmes, in Baltimore & Ohio Railway v.
Corliss to stop his jeep to avoid a collision and that Teodorico Capili, who drove the engine, was not qualified Goodman, to 'lay down a standard once for all,' which would require an automobile driver approaching a
to do so at the time of the accident. For one cannot just single out circumstance and then confidently assign railroad crossing with an obstructed view to stop, look and listen, and if he cannot be sure otherwise that no
to it decisive weight and significance. Considered separately, neither of the two above errors assigned would train is coming to get out of the car. The basic idea behind this is sound enough: it is by no means proper care
call for a judgment different in character. Nor would a combination of acts allegedly impressed with negligence to cross a railroad track without taking reasonable precautions against a train, and normally such precautions
suffice to alter the result. The quantum of proof required still not been met. The alleged errors fail of their said will require looking, hearing, and a stop, or at least slow speed, where the view is obstructed." 19
effect. The case for plaintiff-appellant, such as it had not been improved. There is no justification for reversing
the judgment of the lower court. Then, barely seven years later, in 1934, came Pakora v. Wabash Railway, 20 where, according to Prosser, it
being shown that "the only effective stop must be made upon the railway tracks themselves, in a position of
It cannot be stressed too much that the decisive considerations are too variable, too dependent in the lid obligation danger, the court disregarded any such uniform rule, rejecting the 'get out of the car' requirement
analysis upon a common sense estimate of the situation as it presented itself to the parties for us to be able as 'an uncommon precaution, likely to be futile and sometimes even dangerous,' and saying that the driver
to say that this or that element having been isolated, negligence is shown. The factors that enter the judgment need not always stop. 'Illustrations such as these,' said Mr. Justice Cardozo 'bear witness to the need for
are too many and diverse for us to imprison them in a formula sufficient of itself to yield the correct answer to caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law.... Extraordinary situations may not wisely
the multi-faceted problems the question of negligence poses. Every case must be dependent on its facts. The or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations that are fitting for the commonplace or normal." 21
circumstances indicative of lack of due care must be judged in the light of what could reasonably be expected
of the parties. If the objective standard of prudence be met, then negligence is ruled out. What Justice Cardozo announced would merely emphasize what was set forth earlier that each and every,
case on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present
In this particular case, it would be to show less than fidelity to the controlling facts to impute negligence to themselves. There can be no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care,
defendant-appellee. The first three errors assigned certainly do not call for that conclusion. precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. Thus defendant-appellee acted. It is undeniable then
that no negligence can rightfully be imputed to it.
4. The fourth assigned error is deserving of a more extended treatment. Plaintiff-appellant apparently had in
mind this portion of the opinion of the lower court: "The weight of authorities is to the effect that a railroad track What commends itself for acceptance is this conclusion arrived at by the lower court: "Predicated on the
is in itself a warning or a signal of danger to those who go upon it, and that those who, for reasons of their testimonies of the plaintiff's witnesses, on the knowledge of the deceased and his familiarity with the setup of
own, ignore such warning, do so at their own risk and responsibility. Corliss Jr., who undoubtedly had crossed the checkpoint, the existence of the tracks; and on the further fact that the locomotive had blown its siren or
the checkpoint frequently, if not daily, must have known that locomotive engines and trains usually pass at whistle, which was heard by said witnesses, it is clear that Corliss Jr. was so sufficiently warned in advance
that particular crossing where the accident had taken place." 15 of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident and this consisted simply
in stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on. A prudent man under similar
Her assignment of error, however, would single out not the above excerpt from the decision appealed from circumstances would have acted in this manner. This, unfortunately, Corliss, Jr. failed to do." 22
but what to her is the apparent reliance of the lower court on Mestres v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light
Co. 16 and United States v. Manlabat & Pasibi. 17 In the Manabat case, the doctrine announced by this Court WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of November 29, 1962 dismissing the complaint, is affirmed.
follows: "A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and Without pronouncement as to costs.
who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost
immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence, providing a collision occurs and 6) G.R. No. L-39587 March 24, 1934
injury results. Considering the purposes and the general methods adopted for the management of railroads ALEKO E. LILIUS, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
and railroad trains, we think it is incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing to use all of his faculties vs.
of seeing and hearing. He should approach a railroad crossing cautiously and carefully. He should look and THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
listen and do everything that a reasonably prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the track." The
Mestres doctrine in a suit arising from a collision between an automobile and a street car is substantially
similar. Thus: "It may be said, however, that, where a person is nearing a street crossing toward which a car This case involves two appeals, one by the defendant the Manila Railroad Company, and the other by the
is approaching, the duty is on the party to stop and avoid a collision who can most readily adjust himself to the plaintiffs Aleko E. Lilius et al., from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
exigencies of the case, and where such person can do so more readily, the motorman has a right to presume dispositive part of which reads as follows:
that such duty will be performed."
Wherefore, judgment is rendered ordering the defendant company to pay to the plaintiffs, for the
purposes above stated, the total amount of P30,865, with the costs of the suit. And although the suit

8
brought by the plaintiffs has the nature of a joint action, it must be understood that of the amount and seriously hurt. In spite of the efforts of engineer Andres Basilio, he was unable to stop the locomotive until
adjudicated to the said plaintiffs in this judgment, the sum of P10,000 personally belongs to the plaintiff after it had gone about seventy meters from the crossing.
Sonja Maria Lilius; the sum of P5,000, to the plaintiff Brita Marianne Lilius; the sum of P250, to Dr.
Marfori of the Calauan Hospital, Province of Laguna, and the balance to the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius. On the afternoon of the same day, the plaintiff's entered St. Paul's Hospital in the City of Manila where they
were treated by Dr. Waterous. The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius suffered from a fractured nose, a contusion above
In support of its appeal, the appellant the Manila Railroad Company assigns nine alleged errors committed by the left eye and a lacerated wound on the right leg, in addition to multiple contusions and scratches on various
the trial court in its said judgment, which will be discussed in the course of this decision. parts of the body. As a result of the accident, the said plaintiff was highly nervous and very easily irritated, and
for several months he had great difficulty in concentrating his attention on any matter and could not write
As a ground of their appeal, the appellants Aleko E. Lilius et al., in turn, assign two alleged errors as committed articles nor short stories for the newspapers and magazines to which he was a contributor, thus losing for
by the same court a quo in its judgment in question, which will be discussed later. some time his only means of livelihood.

This case originated from a complaint filed by Aleko E. Lilius et al., praying, under the facts therein alleged, The plaintiff Sonja Maria Lilius suffered from fractures of the pelvic bone, the tibia and fibula of the right leg,
that the Manila Railroad Company be ordered to pay to said plaintiffs, by way of indemnity for material and below the knee, and received a large lacerated wound on the forehead. She underwent two surgical operations
moral damages suffered by them through the fault and negligence of the said defendant entity's employees, on the left leg for the purpose of joining the fractured bones but said operations notwithstanding, the leg in
the sum of P50,000 plus legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint, with costs. question still continues deformed. In the opinion of Dr. Waterous, the deformity is permanent in character and
as a result the plaintiff will have some difficulty in walking. The lacerated wound, which she received on her
forehead, has left a disfiguring scar.
The defendant the Manila Railroad Company, answering the complaint, denies each and every allegation
thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius, with the cooperation of his wife
and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be absolved from the complaint. The child Brita Marianne Lilius received two lacerated wounds, one on the forehead and the other on the left
side of the face, in addition to fractures of both legs, above and below the knees. Her condition was serious
and, for several days, she was hovering between life and death. Due to a timely and successful surgical
The following facts have been proven at the trial, some without question and the others by a preponderance operation, she survived her wounds. The lacerations received by the child have left deep scars which will
of evidence, to wit: permanently disfigure her face, and because of the fractures of both legs, although now completely cured, she
will be forced to walk with some difficulty and continuous extreme care in order to keep her balance.
The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius has, for many years, been a well-known and reputed journalist, author and
photographer. At the time of the collision in question, he was a staff correspondent in the Far East of the Prior to the accident, there had been no notice nor sign of the existence of the crossing, nor was there anybody
magazines The American Weekly of New York and The Sphere of London. to warn the public of approaching trains. The flagman or switchman arrived after the collision, coming from the
station with a red flag in one hand and a green one in the other, both of which were wound on their respective
Some of his works have been translated into various languages. He had others in preparation when the sticks. The said flagman and switchman had many times absented himself from his post at the crossing upon
accident occurred. According to him, his writings netted him a monthly income of P1,500. He utilized the the arrival of a train. The train left Bay station a little late and therefore traveled at great speed.
linguistic ability of his wife Sonja Maria Lilius, who translated his articles and books into English, German, and
Swedish. Furthermore, she acted as his secretary. Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence which the parties presented at the trial
in support of their respective contentions, and after taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case,
At about 7 o'clock on the morning of May 10, 1931, the plaintiff, his wife Sonja Maria Lilius, and his 4-year old this court is of the opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant
daughter Brita Marianne Lilius, left Manila in their Studebaker car driven by the said plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius company, for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing at Dayap, to serve as a warning
for the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, on a sight-seeing trip. It was the first time that he to passers-by of its existence in order that they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the
made said trip although he had already been to many places, driving his own car, in and outside the railroad; and, on the part of its employees the flagman and switchman, for not having remained at his post
Philippines. Where the road was clear and unobstructed, the plaintiff drove at the rate of from 19 to 25 miles at the crossing in question to warn passers-by of the approaching train; the stationmaster, for failure to send
an hour. Prior thereto, he had made the trip as far as Calauan, but never from Calauan to Pagsanjan, via the said flagman and switchman to his post on time; and the engineer, for not having taken the necessary
Dayap. He was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road at said points and had no knowledge of precautions to avoid an accident, in view of the absence of said flagman and switchman, by slackening his
the existence of a railroad crossing at Dayap. Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to speed and continuously ringing the bell and blowing the whistle before arriving at the crossing. Although it is
indicate its existence and inasmuch as there were many houses, shrubs and trees along the road, it was probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting its
impossible to see an approaching train. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing, coming from aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such diligence in supervising their work and the discharge of
Calauan, the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to their duties because, otherwise, it would have had a semaphore or sign at the crossing and, on previous
have alighted from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down to about 12 miles an occasions as well as on the night in question, the flagman and switchman would have always been at his post
hour and sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not at the crossing upon the arrival of a train. The diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in
see the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or employees but
itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the defendant company's train coming eastward includes inspection of their work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.
from Bay to Dayap station. The locomotive struck the plaintiff's car right in the center. After dragging the said
car a distance of about ten meters, the locomotive threw it upon a siding. The force of the impact was so great However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for damages from the person liable
that the plaintiff's wife and daughter were thrown from the car and were picked up from the ground unconscious therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been guilty of negligence, but it is also necessary that the said

9
victim has not, through his own negligence, contributed to the accident, inasmuch as nobody is a guarantor of render it difficult for her to walk freely, continuous extreme care being necessary in order to keep her balance
his neighbor's personal safety and property, but everybody should look after them, employing the care and in addition to the fact that all of this unfavorably and to a great extent affect her matrimonial future.
diligence that a good father of a family should apply to his own person, to the members of his family and to
his property, in order to avoid any damage. It appears that the herein plaintiff-appellant Aleko E. Lilius took all With respect to the plaintiffs' appeal, the first question to be decided is that raised by the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius
precautions which his skill and the presence of his wife and child suggested to him in order that his pleasure relative to the insufficiency of the sum of P5,000 which the trial court adjudicated to him by way of indemnity
trip might be enjoyable and have a happy ending, driving his car at a speed which prudence demanded for damages consisting in the loss of his income as journalist and author as a result of his illness. This question
according to the circumstances and conditions of the road, slackening his speed in the face of an obstacle has impliedly been decided in the negative when the defendant-appellant entity's petition for the reduction of
and blowing his horn upon seeing persons on the road, in order to warn them of his approach and request said indemnity was denied, declaring it to be reasonable.
them to get out of the way, as he did when he came upon the truck parked on the left hand side of the road
seven or eight meters from the place where the accident occurred, and upon the persons who appeared to
have alighted from the said truck. If he failed to stop, look and listen before going over the crossing, in spite of As to the amount of P10,000 claimed by the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius as damages for the loss of his wife's
the fact that he was driving at 12 miles per hour after having been free from obstacles, it was because, his services in his business as journalist and author, which services consisted in going over his writings, translating
attention having been occupied in attempting to go ahead, he did not see the crossing in question, nor them into English, German and Swedish, and acting as his secretary, in addition to the fact that such services
anything, nor anybody indicating its existence, as he knew nothing about it beforehand. The first and only formed part of the work whereby he realized a net monthly income of P1,500, there is no sufficient evidence
warning, which he received of the impending danger, was two short blows from the whistle of the locomotive of the true value of said services nor to the effect that he needed them during her illness and had to employ a
immediately preceding the collision and when the accident had already become inevitable. translator to act in her stead.

In view of the foregoing considerations, this court is of the opinion that the defendant the Manila Railroad The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of what is called Anglo-Saxon
Company alone is liable for the accident by reason of its own negligence and that of its employees, for not common law "consortium" of his wife, that is, "her services, society and conjugal companionship", as a result
having employed the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of the said employees in the of personal injuries which she had received from the accident now under consideration.
discharge of their duties.
In the case of Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil., 252, 255, 256), this court, interpreting the provisions of the
The next question to be decided refers to the sums of money fixed by the court a quo as indemnities for Civil Marriage Law of 1870, in force in these Islands with reference to the mutual rights and obligations of the
damages which the defendant company should pay to the plaintiffs-appellants. spouses, contained in articles 44-48 thereof, said as follows:

With respect to the plaintiff-appellant Aleko E. Lilius, although this court believes his claim of a net income of The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and
P1,500 a month to be somewhat exaggerated, however, the sum of P5,000, adjudicated to him by the trial obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The
court as indemnity for damages, is reasonable. husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow
him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. . . .
As to the sum of P10,635 which the court awards to the plaintiffs by way of indemnity for damages, the different
items thereof representing doctor's fees, hospital and nursing services, loss of personal effects and torn Therefore, under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husband's rights is to count on his wife's
clothing, have duly been proven at the trial and the sum in question is not excessive, taking into consideration assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the home and the performance of household
the circumstances in which the said expenses have been incurred. duties, including the care and education of the children and attention to the husband upon whom primarily
devolves the duty of supporting the family of which he is the head. When the wife's mission was circumscribed
to the home, it was not difficult to assume, by virtue of the marriage alone, that she performed all the said
Taking into consideration the fact that the plaintiff Sonja Maria Lilius, wife of the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius is in tasks and her physical incapacity always redounded to the husband's prejudice inasmuch as it deprived him
the language of the court, which saw her at the trial "young and beautiful and the big scar, which she has of her assistance. However, nowadays when women, in their desire to be more useful to society and to the
on her forehead caused by the lacerated wound received by her from the accident, disfigures her face and nation, are demanding greater civil rights and are aspiring to become man's equal in all the activities of life,
that the fracture of her left leg has caused a permanent deformity which renders it very difficult for her to walk", commercial and industrial, professional and political, many of them spending their time outside the home,
and taking into further consideration her social standing, neither is the sum of P10,000, adjudicated to her by engaged in their businesses, industry, profession and within a short time, in politics, and entrusting the care
the said trial court by way of indemnity for patrimonial and moral damages, excessive. In the case of their home to a housekeeper, and their children, if not to a nursemaid, to public or private institutions which
of Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez (56 Phil., 177), the right leg of the plaintiff Narciso Gutierrez was fractured as a result take charge of young children while their mothers are at work, marriage has ceased to create the presumption
of a collision between the autobus in which he was riding and the defendant's car, which fractured required that a woman complies with the duties to her husband and children, which the law imposes upon her, and he
medical attendance for a considerable period of time. On the day of the trial the fracture had not yet completely who seeks to collect indemnity for damages resulting from deprivation of her domestic services must prove
healed but it might cause him permanent lameness. The trial court sentenced the defendants to indemnify him such services. In the case under consideration, apart from the services of his wife Sonja Maria Lilius as
in the sum of P10,000 which this court reduced to P5,000, in spite of the fact that the said plaintiff therein was translator and secretary, the value of which has not been proven, the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius has not presented
neither young nor good-looking, nor had he suffered any facial deformity, nor did he have the social standing any evidence showing the existence of domestic services and their nature, rendered by her prior to the
that the herein plaintiff-appellant Sonja Maria Lilius enjoys.1vvphi1.ne+ accident, in order that it may serve as a basis in estimating their value.

As to the indemnity of P5,000 in favor of the child Brita Marianne Lilius, daughter of Aleko E. Lilius and Sonja Furthermore, inasmuch as a wife's domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are purely personal and
Maria Lilius, neither is the same excessive, taking into consideration the fact that the lacerations received by voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to render (Arroyo vs. Vazquez de Arroyo, 42
her have left deep scars that permanently disfigure her face and that the fractures of both her legs permanently Phil., 54), it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the person
10
obliged to render them had done so before he was injured and that he would be willing to continue rendering That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly
them had he not been prevented from so doing. identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf
of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and
In view of the foregoing considerations this court is of the opinion and so holds: (1) That a railroad company exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance
which has not installed a semaphore at a crossing an does not see to it that its flagman and switchman faithfully of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise
complies with his duty of remaining at the crossing when a train arrives, is guilty of negligence and is civilly being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants
liable for damages suffered by a motorist and his family who cross its line without negligence on their part; (2) appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value
that an indemnity of P10,000 for a permanent deformity on the face and on the left leg, suffered by a young involved in the claim in the complaint.
and beautiful society woman, is not excessive; (3) that an indemnity of P5,000 for a permanent deformity on
the face and legs of a four-year old girl belonging to a well-to-do family, is not excessive; and (4) that in order Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods.
that a husband may recover damages for deprivation of his wife's assistance during her illness from an For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:
accident, it is necessary for him to prove the existence of such assistance and his wife's willingness to continue
rendering it had she not been prevented from so doing by her illness. ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
The plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to interest of 6 percent per annum on the amount of the indemnities passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
adjudicated to them, from the date of the appealed judgment until this judgment becomes final, in accordance
with the provisions of section 510 of Act No. 190. Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735,
and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further
Wherefore, not finding any error in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby affirmed in toto, with the sole set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
modification that interest of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the appealed judgment until this judgment
becomes final will be added to the indemnities granted, with the costs of both instances against the appellant. ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
So ordered. can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
7) G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been
vs. at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant. prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755

Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence
defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, their authority or in violation of the order of the common carriers.
including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right
of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands
whom the witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst
and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the
out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of the
passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the bus, We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina
particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said they could not get out of the bus. There is Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with
nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from the wreck, including the the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon.
driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the
inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the
hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-
evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the
immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its
inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and
around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.

11
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were
degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who driver did not follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and
were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires,
injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as
injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, we have already stated, the blow out would not have occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that the
pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows: driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical
injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of their goods, and yet the criminal case against him,
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to support the complaint, either failed or appear or were
'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting reluctant to testify. But the record of the case before us shows the several witnesses, passengers, in that bus,
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect of the said driver was negligent. In the public interest
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom. In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are increased from
ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively, the
physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs.
by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to
death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the 8) G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989
vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not vs.
only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES,
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.
by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was
dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a Sought to be reversed in this petition is the Decision * of the respondent Court of Appeals' First Division,
rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers setting aside the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Ilocos Norte, with the following dispositive
should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other portion:
words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning
of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of
the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby set aside and another rendered in its stead whereby
According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at defendant is hereby sentenced to pay plaintiffs actual damages of P30,229.45; compensatory damages
least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline of P50,000.00; exemplary damages of P10,000.00; attorney's fees of P3,000.00; plus the costs of suit
could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside in both instances. (p. 27 Rollo)
from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a
distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn Basically, this case involves a clash of evidence whereby both patties strive for the recognition of their
the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the respective versions of the scenario from which the disputed claims originate. The respondent Court of Appeals
carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763. (CA) summarized the evidence of the parties as follows:

As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the deceased, as From the evidence of plaintiffs it appears that in the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June
well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the amount of SIX THOUSAND 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing
(P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to include compensatory, moral, and other heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, after
damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased Isabel Lao
rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial court, but also in the course of the appeal, and not losing Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19
sight of the able briefs prepared by them, the attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and proceeded northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters
PESOS for the loss of merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed. Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that
might have been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence, one of the Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo
passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda
visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased, Suddenly, the

12
deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear question. As a public service operator and in line with its business of supplying electric current to the
dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire public, defendant had installed safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to
dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto property in case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others. Defendant had 12
dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four linesmen charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively
meters away from her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded assigned to them.
Ernesto to seek help from Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or five blocks away.
Defendant asserts that although a strong typhoon struck the province of Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967,
When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in law had been electrocuted, he acted putting to streets of Laoag City under water, only a few known places in Laoag were reported to have
immediately. With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the City suffered damaged electric lines, namely, at the southern approach of the Marcos Bridge which was
Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or washed away and where the INELCO lines and posts collapsed; in the eastern part near the residence
INELCO to cut off the electric current. Then the party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The of the late Governor Simeon Mandac; in the far north near the defendant's power plant at the corner of
floodwater was receding and the lights inside the house were out indicating that the electric current Segundo and Castro Streets, Laoag City and at the far northwest side, near the premises of the Ilocos
had been cut off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the deceased. The body Norte National High School. Fabico Abijero, testified that in the early morning before 6 o'clock on June
was recovered about two meters from an electric post. 29, 1967 he passed by the intersection of Rizal and Guerrero Streets to switch off the street lights in
Area No. 9. He did not see any cut or broken wires in or near the vicinity. What he saw were many
In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on that fateful date, June 29, 1967, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power people fishing out the body of Isabel Lao Juan.
Plant Engineer of the National Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain
fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited A witness in the person of Dr. Antonio Briones was presented by the defense to show that the deceased
lines. Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection. On the could not have died of electrocution Substantially, the testimony of the doctor is as follows: Without an
way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, no doctor, not even a medicolegal expert, can speculate as to
Since he could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to the INELCO Office at the Life Theatre the real cause of death. Cyanosis could not have been found in the body of the deceased three hours
on Rizal Street by way of Guerrero. As he turned right at the intersection of Guerrero and Rizal, he saw after her death, because cyanosis which means lack of oxygen circulating in the blood and rendering
an electric wire about 30 meters long strung across the street "and the other end was seeming to play the color of the skin purplish, appears only in a live person. The presence of the elongated burn in the
with the current of the water." (p. 64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972) Finding the Office of the INELCO still closed, left palm of the deceased (Exhibits C-1 and C-2) is not sufficient to establish her death by electrocution;
and seeing no lineman therein, he returned to the NPC Compound. since burns caused by electricity are more or less round in shape and with points of entry and exit. Had
the deceased held the lethal wire for a long time, the laceration in her palm would have been bigger
At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the compound again on another inspection trip. Having and the injury more massive. (CA Decision, pp. 18-21, Rollo)
learned of the death of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed by the house of the deceased at the corner of
Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the body had been taken. Using the resuscitator which An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted by the heirs of the deceased with
was a standard equipment in his jeep and employing the skill he acquired from an in service training the aforesaid CFI on June 24, 1968. In its Answer (Vide, Record on Appeal, p. 55, Rollo), petitioner advanced
on resuscitation, he tried to revive the deceased. His efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. the theory, as a special defense, that the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by
On the left palm of the deceased, Engr. Juan noticed a hollow wound. Proceeding to the INELCO electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner. In this regard, it was pointed
Office, he met two linemen on the way. He told them about the grounded lines of the INELCO In the out that the deceased, without petitioner's knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by
afternoon of the same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the restoration of power. connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter
The dangling wire he saw on Guerrero early in the morning of June 29, 1967 was no longer there. with electric current whenever the switch is on. Petitioner then conjectures that the switch to said burglar
deterrent must have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her
Many people came to the house at the corner of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar after learning that the gate that early morning of June 29, 1967. After due trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of petitioner and
deceased had been electrocuted. Among the sympathizers was Dr. Jovencio Castro, Municipal Health dismissed the complaint but awarded to the latter P25,000 in moral damages and attorney's fees of P45,000.
Officer of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Upon the request of the relatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro examined An appeal was filed with the CA which issued the controverted decision.
the body at about 8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967. The skin was grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic,
which indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged In this petition for review the petitioner assigns the following errors committed by the respondent CA:
wound" (Exh. C-1: p. 101, TSN, Nov. 28, 1972) or a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb on
the left hand was a burned wound. (Exh. C-2, pp. 102-103, Ibid.) The certificate of death prepared by 1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion and error in considering the
Dr. Castro stated the cause of' death as ,'circulatory shock electrocution" (Exh. I; p. 103, Ibid.). purely hearsay alleged declarations of Ernesto de la Cruz as part of theres gestae.

In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies of its officers and employees, namely, 2. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion and error in holding that the
Conrado Asis, electric engineer; Loreto Abijero, collector-inspector; Fabico Abijero, lineman; and Julio strong typhoon "Gening" which struck Laoag City and Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967 and the flood and
Agcaoili, president-manager of INELCO Through the testimonies of these witnesses, defendant sought deluge it brought in its wake were not fortuitous events and did not exonerate petitioner-company from
to prove that on and even before June 29, 1967 the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole liability for the death of Isabel Lao Juan.
franchise area, including Area No. 9 which covered the residence of Antonio Yabes at No. 18 Guerrero
Street, did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property. The service
lines, devices and other INELCO equipment in Area No. 9 had been newly-installed prior to the date in
13
3. The respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion and erred in not applying the legal the sight of an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Ernesto
principle of "assumption of risk" in the present case to bar private respondents from collecting damages dela Cruz also tried to approach the deceased, but he turned back shouting that the water was
from petitioner company. grounded. These bits of evidence carry much weight. For the subject of the testimonies was a startling
occurrence, and the declarations may be considered part of the res gestae. (CA Decision, p. 21, Rollo)
4. That the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in completely reversing
the findings of fact of the trial court. For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the principal
act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were made before the declarant had
5. The findings of fact of the respondent Court of Appeals are reversible under the recognized time to contrive or devise; (3) that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and its
exceptions. immediately attending circumstances (People vs. Ner, 28 SCRA 1151; People vs. Balbas, 122 SCRA 959).
We do not find any abuse of discretion on the CA' part in view of the satisfaction of said requisites in the case
at bar.
6. The trial court did not err in awarding moral damages and attorney's fees to defendant corporation,
now petitioner company.
The statements made relative to the startling occurrence are admitted in evidence precisely as an exception
to the hearsay rule on the grounds of trustworthiness and necessity. "Trustworthiness" because the statements
7. Assuming arguendo that petitioner company may be held liable from the death of the late Isabel Lao are made instinctively (Wesley vs. State, 53 Ala. 182), and "necessity" because such natural and spontaneous
Juan, the damages granted by respondent Court of Appeals are improper and exhorbitant. (Petitioners utterances are more convincing than the testimony of the same person on the stand (Mobile vs. Ascraft 48
Memorandum, p. 133, Rollo) Ala. 31). Therefore, the fact that the declarant, Ernesto de la Cruz, was not presented to testify does not make
the testimony of Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong hearsay since the said declaration is part of the res
Basically, three main issues are apparent: (1) whether or not the deceased died of electrocution; (2) whether gestae. Similarly, We considered part of the res gestae a conversation between two accused immediately
or not petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death; and (3) whether or not the respondent CA's after commission of the crime as overheard by a prosecution witness (People vs. Reyes, 82 Phil. 563).
substitution of the trial court's factual findings for its own was proper.
While it may be true that, as petitioner argues (vide petitioner's Memorandum, p. 135, Rollo), Ernesto de la
In considering the first issue, it is Our view that the same be resolved in the affirmative. By a preponderance Cruz was not an actual witness to the instant when the deceased sank into the waist-deep water, he acted
of evidence, private respondents were able to show that the deceased died of electrocution, a conclusion upon the call of help of Aida Bulong and Linda Alonzo Estavillo with the knowledge of, and immediately after,
which can be primarily derived from the photographed burnt wounds (Exhibits "C", "C-1", "C-2") on the left the sinking of the deceased. In fact the startling event had not yet ceased when Ernesto de la Cruz entered
palm of the former. Such wounds undoubtedly point to the fact that the deceased had clutched a live wire of the scene considering that the victim remained submerged. Under such a circumstance, it is undeniable that
the petitioner. This was corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Jovencio Castro who actually examined the body a state of mind characterized by nervous excitement had been triggered in Ernesto de la Cruz's being as
of the deceased a few hours after the death and described the said burnt wounds as a "first degree burn" (p. anybody under the same contingency could have experienced. As such, We cannot honestly exclude his
144, TSN, December 11, 1972) and that they were "electrically charged" (p. 102, TSN, November 28, 1972). shouts that the water was grounded from the res gestae just because he did not actually see the sinking of
Furthermore, witnesses Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong added that after the deceased screamed "Ay" the deceased nor hear her scream "Ay."
and sank into the water, they tried to render some help but were overcome with fear by the sight of an electric
wire dangling from an electric post, moving in the water in a snake-like fashion (supra). The foregoing therefore Neither can We dismiss the said declaration as a mere opinion of Ernesto de la Cruz. While We concede to
justifies the respondent CA in concluding that "(t)he nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who the submission that the statement must be one of facts rather than opinion, We cannot agree to the proposition
saw them can lead to no other conclusion than that they were "burns," and there was nothing else in the street that the one made by him was a mere opinion. On the contrary, his shout was a translation of an actuality as
where the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn except the dangling live wire of defendant perceived by him through his sense of touch.
company" (CA Decision, p. 22, Rollo).
Finally, We do not agree that the taking of Ernesto de la Cruz' testimony was suppressed by the private
But in order to escape liability, petitioner ventures into the theory that the deceased was electrocuted, if such respondents, thus, is presumed to be adverse to them pursuant to Section 5(e), Rule 131. For the application
was really the case when she tried to open her steel gate, which was electrically charged by an electric wire of said Rule as against a party to a case, it is necessary that the evidence alleged to be suppressed is available
she herself caused to install to serve as a burglar deterrent. Petitioner suggests that the switch to said burglar only to said party (People vs. Tulale, L-7233, 18 May 1955, 97 Phil. 953). The presumption does not operate
alarm was left on. But this is mere speculation, not backed up with evidence. As required by the Rules, "each if the evidence in question is equally available to both parties (StaplesHowe Printing Co. vs. Bldg. and Loan
party must prove his own affirmative allegations." (Rule 131, Sec. 1). Nevertheless, the CA significantly noted Assn., 36 Phil. 421). It is clear from the records that petitioner could have called Ernesto de la Cruz to the
that "during the trial, this theory was abandoned" by the petitioner (CA Decision, p. 23, Rollo). witness stand. This, precisely, was Linda Alonzo Estavillo's suggestion to petitioner's counsel when she
testified on cross examination:
Furthermore the CA properly applied the principle of res gestae. The CA said:
Q. And that Erning de la Cruz, how far did he reach from the gate of the house?
Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller, and Aida Bulong, a salesgirl, were with the deceased during that
fateful morning of June 29, 1967. This Court has not been offered any sufficient reason to discredit the A. Well, you can ask that matter from him sir because he is here. (TSN, p. 30, 26 Sept. 1972)
testimonies of these two young ladies. They were one in the affirmation that the deceased, while wading
in the waist-deep flood on Guerrero Street five or six meters ahead of them, suddenly screamed "Ay"
and quickly sank into the water. When they approached the deceased to help, they were stopped by

14
The foregoing shows that petitioner had the opportunity to verify the declarations of Ernesto de la Cruz which, high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be" (Astudillo vs.
if truly adverse to private respondent, would have helped its case. However, due to reasons known only to Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself
petitioner, the opportunity was not taken. from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God
combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the
Coming now to the second issue, We tip the scales in the private respondents' favor. The respondent CA injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).
acted correctly in disposing the argument that petitioner be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods
are fortuitous events. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It
may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a
the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. We subscribe to the conclusions of the roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo (see TSN, p. 5, 26 Sept. 1972)
respondent CA when it found: and Aida Bulong (see TSN, p. 43, 26 Sept. 1972), the deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on
their way to the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish
On the issue whether or not the defendant incurred liability for the electrocution and consequent death her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable
of the late Isabel Lao Juan, defendant called to the witness-stand its electrical engineer, chief lineman, presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is
and lineman to show exercise of extraordinary diligence and to negate the charge of negligence. The excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the
witnesses testified in a general way about their duties and the measures which consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril (65A C.S.C.
defendant usually adopts to prevent hazards to life and limb. From these testimonies, the lower court Negligence(174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property (Harper and James, "The
found "that the electric lines and other equipment of defendant corporation were properly maintained Law of Torts." Little, Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's
by a well-trained team of lineman, technicians and engineers working around the clock to insure that property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time
these equipments were in excellent condition at all times." (P. 40, Record on Appeal) The finding of the the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent
lower court, however, was based on what the defendant's employees were supposed to do, not on as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred
what they actually did or failed to do on the date in question, and not on the occasion of from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence (ibid., p. 1165, 1166).
theemergency situation brought about by the typhoon.
But petitioner assails the CA for having abused its discretion in completely reversing the trial court's findings
The lower court made a mistake in assuming that defendant's employees worked around the clock of fact, pointing to the testimonies of three of its employees its electrical engineer, collector-inspector, lineman,
during the occurrence of the typhoon on the night of June 28 and until the early morning of June 29, and president-manager to the effect that it had exercised the degree of diligence required of it in keeping its
1967, Engr. Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation affirmed that when he first set out on an electric lines free from defects that may imperil life and limb. Likewise, the said employees of petitioner
inspection trip between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M. on June 29, 1967, he saw grounded and disconnected categorically disowned the fatal wires as they appear in two photographs taken on the afternoon of June 29,
electric lines of the defendant but he saw no INELCO lineman. The INELCO Office at the Life theatre 1967 (Exhs. "D" and "E"), suggesting that said wires were just hooked to the electric post (petitioner's
on Rizal Street was still closed. (pp. 63-64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972) Even the witnesses of defendant Memorandum, p. 170, Rollo). However, as the CA properly held, "(t)he finding of the lower court ... was based
contradict the finding of the lower court. Conrado Asis, defendant's electrical engineer, testified that he on what the defendant's employees were supposed to do, not on what they actually did or failed to do on the
conducted a general inspection of the franchise area of the INELCO only on June 30, 1967, the day date in question, and not on the occasion of the emergency situation brought about by the typhoon" (CA
following the typhoon. The reason he gave for the delay was that all their vehicles were submerged. Decision, p. 25, Rollo). And as found by the CA, which We have already reiterated above, petitioner was in
(p. 337, TSN, July 20, 1973) According to Asis, he arrived at his office at 8:00 A.M. onJune 30 and fact negligent. In a like manner, petitioner's denial of ownership of the several wires cannot stand the logical
after briefing his men on what to do they started out. (p. 338, lbid) One or two days after the typhoon, conclusion reached by the CA when it held that "(t)he nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses
the INELCO people heard "rumors that someone was electrocuted" so he sent one of his men to the who saw them can lead to no other conclusion than that they were 'burns', and there was nothing else in the
place but his man reported back that there was no damaged wire. (p. 385, Id.) Loreto Abijero, chief street where the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn except the dangling live wire of defendant
lineman of defendant, corroborated Engr. Juan. He testified that at about 8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967 company" (supra).
Engr. Juan came to the INELCO plant and asked the INELCO people to inspect their lines. He went
with Engr. Juan and their inspection lasted from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 noon. (pp. 460, 465, TSN, Jan. 28, "When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt efforts to discover and
1975) Fabico Abijero lineman of defendant, testified that at about 6:00 on June 29, 1967 the typhoon repair broken lines" (Cooley on Torts, 4th ed., v. 3, p. 474). The fact is that when Engineer Antonio Juan of
ceased. At that time, he was at the main building of the Divine Word College of Laoag where he had the National Power Corporation set out in the early morning of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw
taken his family for refuge. (pp. 510-511, Ibid.) grounded and disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground but did not see any INELCO lineman either
in the streets or at the INELCO office (vide, CA Decision, supra). The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to
In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the exercise extraordinary diligence under the circumstance was not observed, confirming the negligence of
early hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be inconstant petitioner. To aggravate matters, the CA found:
vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not
show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or . . .even before June 28 the people in Laoag were already alerted about the impending typhoon,
otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office. (CA Decision, pp. 24-25, Rollo) through radio announcements. Even the fire department of the city announced the coming of the big
flood. (pp. 532-534, TSN, March 13, 1975) At the INELCO irregularities in the flow of electric current
Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to were noted because "amperes of the switch volts were moving". And yet, despite these danger signals,
the general public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required INELCO had to wait for Engr. Juan to request that defendant's switch be cut off but the harm was done.
of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this Asked why the delay, Loreto Abijero answered that he "was not the machine tender of the electric plant
15
to switch off the current." (pp. 467-468, Ibid.) How very characteristic of gross inefficiency! (CA that said garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., Valentin
Decision, p. 26, Rollo) Teus, Fernando F. de Villa-Abrille and Joaquin Bona, prepared a letter for the signature of the President
of the Bank informing the plaintiff Julian C. Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff
From the preceding, We find that the CA did not abuse its discretion in reversing the trial court's findings but in that case. Another letter was also prepared and signed by the said President of the Bank for the
tediously considered the factual circumstances at hand pursuant to its power to review questions of fact raised Special Sheriff dated April 17, 1963.
from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, formerly the Court of First Instance (see sec. 9, BP 129).
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one for the amount of P383 in favor
In considering the liability of petitioner, the respondent CA awarded the following in private respondent's favor: of B. M. Glass Service dated April 16, 1963 and bearing No. C-424852, and check No. C-394996 for
P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim's death and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); the amount of P100 in favor of the Lega Corporation, and drawn against the said Bank, were deposited
P50,000 in compensatory damages, computed in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case by the said drawers with the said bank. Believing that the plaintiff Singson, the drawer of the check,
(31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of the deceased; P10,000 in exemplary had no more control over the balance of his deposits in the said bank, the checks were dishonored and
damages; P3,000 attorney's fees; and costs of suit. Except for the award of P12,000 as compensation for the were refused payment by the said bank. After the first check was returned by the bank to the B. M.
victim's death, We affirm the respondent CA's award for damages and attorney's fees. Pusuant to recent Glass Service, the latter wrote plaintiff Julian C. Singson a letter, dated April 19, 1963, advising him
jurisprudence (People vs. Mananquil, 132 SCRA 196; People vs. Traya, 147 SCRA 381), We increase the that his check for P383.00 bearing No. C-424852 was not honored by the bank for the reason that his
said award of P12,000 to P30,000, thus, increasing the total actual damages to P48,229.45. account therein had already been garnished. The said B. M. Glass Service further stated in the said
letter that they were constrained to close his credit account with them. In view thereof, plaintiff Julian
C. Singson wrote the defendant bank a letter on April 19, 1963, claiming that his name was not included
The exclusion of moral damages and attorney's fees awarded by the lower court was properly made by the in the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The defendant
respondent CA, the charge of malice and bad faith on the part of respondents in instituting his case being a President Santiago Freixas of the said bank took steps to verify this information and after having
mere product of wishful thinking and speculation. Award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where confirmed the same, apologized to the plaintiff Julian C. Singson and wrote him a letter dated April 22,
the action was filed in good faith; there should be no penalty on the right to litigate (Espiritu vs. CA, 137 SCRA 1963, requesting him to disregard their letter of April 17, 1963, and that the action of garnishment from
50). If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Auyong Hian his account had already been removed. A similar letter was written by the said official of the bank on
vs. CTA, 59 SCRA 110). April 22, 1963 to the Special Sheriff informing him that his letter dated April 17, 1963 to the said Special
Sheriff was considered cancelled and that they had already removed the Notice of Garnishment from
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent, except for the slight modification that actual plaintiff Singson's account. Thus, the defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been
damages be increased to P48,229.45 is hereby AFFIRMED. inadvertently committed, resulting in the temporary freezing of the account of the plaintiff with the said
bank for a short time.
SO ORDERED. xxx xxx xxx

9) G.R. No. L-24837 June 27, 1968 On May 8, 1963, the Singsong commenced the present action against the Bank and its president, Santiago
JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO, plaintiffs, Freixas, for damages1 in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account.1wph1.t
vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his capacity as President of the After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment dismissing the
said Bank, defendants. complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict,
because the relation between the parties is contractual in nature; because this case does not fall under Article
Appeal by plaintiffs, Julian Singson and his wife, Ramona del Castillo, from a decision of the Court of First 2219 of our Civil Code, upon which plaintiffs rely; and because plaintiffs have not established the amount of
Instance of Manila dismissing their complaint against defendants herein, the Bank of the Philippine Islands damages allegedly sustained by them.
and Santiago Freixas.
The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasi-delict, their relation
It appears that Singson, was one of the defendants in civil case No. 23906 of the Court of First Instance, with the defendants being contractual in nature. We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a
Manila, in which judgment had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein, namely, Celso contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the
Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to the plaintiff therein, Philippine Milling Co. consequent recovery of damages therefor.2 Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively
Singson and Lobregat had seasonably appealed from said judgment, but not Villa-Abrille & Co., as against recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso,3 involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class
which said judgment, accordingly, became final and executory. In due course, a writ of garnishment was ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist
subsequently served upon the Bank of the Philippine Islands in which the Singsons had a current account compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's
insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits against the Bank were concerned. What happened thereafter is set forth in part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature ...
the decision appealed from, from which we quote: the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort".

Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank in charge of all matters of execution In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the circumstance, that
and garnishment, upon reading the name of the plaintiff herein in the title of the Writ of Garnishment the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and
as a party defendants, without further reading the body of the said garnishment and informing himself his subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages the amount

16
of which need not be proven4 in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney's fees in the sum of P500, would facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain
suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.5 complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered sentencing A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law, however, solely
the defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands to pay to the plaintiffs said sums of P1,000, as nominal damages, insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court
and P500, as attorney's fees, apart from the costs. It is so ordered. of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party
and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence
10) G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966 the facts"which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process from which the Court
AIR FRANCE, petitioner, draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not
vs. confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to
the evidence for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so
requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the
by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that
between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even
interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the
fees; and the costs of suit. judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item of
evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty has been regularly
P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by
petitioner. it. 15

The case is now before us for review on certiorari. Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written statement of
the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are: thereon". 16They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A
question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on
March 30, 1958.
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of
Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support
Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked its judgment.
to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager
that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto 3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that
Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket.
Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the
May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. 3 parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific
flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class
Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues seats.
properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the
appellate court's decision. These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of
Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the

17
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus: Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the
trial court. 26
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no
guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the
first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow
every station for the necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an
cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal
to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a
first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only
keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is
it issues are to be honored or not.22 desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the
covenants in the ticket.
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question. Apart from of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first
his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own witness, class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter
Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows: of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor
do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat
to provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean? office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why,
then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a
A. That the space is confirmed. better right to the seat?

Q. Confirmed for first class? 4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages there
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169) must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; 31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a
finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:

xxx xxx xxx


3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable
consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which said
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on
plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting
Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said
witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation
whatever. 4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok,
defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after protestations, arguments
and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's employees.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation
for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such
confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by 5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23 only TouristClass accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has
been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths at
Bangkok after he was already seated.
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount
refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment 6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and embarrassments
of the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane
in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
error and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the
appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy xxx xxx xxx
construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its
findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of

18
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff there, by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the
suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious meaning of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for
anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of the
P30,000.00. 33 Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:

xxx xxx xxx "Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the passenger
has arranged with you?
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class
passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when
petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a "better right" to
faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant airline did not prove
set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff
the action is put on wrongful expulsion. was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.

Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the defendant
guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but
was oustedby petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse
fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is
unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for constrained to find, as it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely
moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his "first class"
conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared: seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the witness Ernesto
G. Cuento, the "white man".38
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the
defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without his It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did not use
consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before the the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The
court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook which manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he
notation reads as follows: imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of
having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right
thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind
refused to intervene", affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior
purpose." 39
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The captain of
the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the judgment
to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this evidence of the Court of First Instance, thus:
for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify at
the trial of the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad
faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent
The Court of appeals further stated of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the
airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. Hence, Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and
if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had the defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the "first class"
already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the one to suffer the seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding "first class"
consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40
presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by defendant's
employees, the manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely
ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened

19
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled A No, because I did not give my ticket.
in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article
21 of the Civil Code says: Q About that purser?

ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room,
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, "I have
recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me because it was recorded
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of in French "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42 captain refused to intervene."

6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual Mr. VALTE
relation. 43And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly
with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's the notes. Your Honor.
employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
COURT
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against 49
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule I will allow that as part of his testimony.
or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier. 44 Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook
reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not
tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come
worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in
origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case, Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling
"Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then,
fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement
point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the
passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has
the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
passenger.1awphl.nt
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no
we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser? damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the flight Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages. 54
attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, "We
will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to 9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment
accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything there because I am for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that
protesting to this transfer". attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised
as it was here should not be disturbed.
Q Was she able to note it?

20
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:
P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees.
The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with
the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57

On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We
accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

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