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Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 60 Filed 07/12/17 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY V. BRACEY PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-657 DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI;


MAYOR TONY YARBER INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; JOHN DOES 1-3 DEFENDANTS

PLAINTIFF=S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT YARBER=S MOTION TO DISMISS

COMES NOW the Plaintiff by and through counsel and serves this her Response

to Defendant Yarber=s Motion to Dismiss. In support, Plaintiff attaches the following

exhibits:

A. Plaintiff Supplement Interrogatory Responses;

B. Statement to EEOC; and

For the reasons explained in Plaintiff=s supporting memorandum brief, Defendant

Yarber=s Motion to Dismiss should be denied.

THIS the 12th day of July, 2017.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Nick Norris
NICK NORRIS. (MB# 101574)
Attorney for Plaintiff

OF COUNSEL:

WATSON & NORRIS, PLLC


1880 Lakeland Drive
Suite G
Jackson, Mississippi 39216
(601) 968-0000

1
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 60 Filed 07/12/17 Page 2 of 2

Fax: (601) 968-0010


nick@watsonnorris.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Nick Norris, attorney for Plaintiff, do hereby certify that I have this day served a
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing pleading via ECF filing or by United
States Mail with postage fully prepaid thereon to all counsel of record.

SO CERTIFIED, this the 12th day of July, 2017.

s/ Nick Norris
NICK NORRIS

2
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 60-1 Filed 07/12/17 Page 1 of 6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY V. BRACEY PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:16-CV-657-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI;


MAYOR TONY YARBER INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
JOHN DOES 1-3 DEFENDANTS

PLAINTIFFS SUPPLEMENT RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT, TONY YARBERS,


FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES

INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please describe with specificity all instances of

conduct by Tony Yarber, or any of his agents or representatives, that in any way

support your allegations that you were sexually harassed as alleged in the Complaint,

including the identity of the person(s) who allegedly committed each harassing act, any

witnesses present, the date the alleged harassment occurred, and a description of the

alleged harassment in detail.

RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory as it is overly broad and

vague. Anderson v. UPS, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123878 *6 (D. Kan. Nov. 22,

2010); Aikens v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., 217 F.R.D. 533, 538 (D. Kan. 2003); Hilt v.

SFC Inc., 170 F.R.D. 182, 186-7 (D. Kan. 1997); Stephens v. City of Chicago, 203

F.R.D. 353, 361-2 (N.D. Ill. 2008). Notwithstanding, Plaintiff responds as follows:

Tony Yarber was the influence for most staff to partake in sexual harassing

behavior. He would initiate sexual conversation that would then become an all-around

Exhibit "A"
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 60-1 Filed 07/12/17 Page 2 of 6

conversation for those in the room. Yarber has made comments while looking through

his phone in front of his staff about looking for someone in his index that could provide

oral sex, and how he only ejaculates in a womans face. He made comments in front of

my husband, Jason Goree and himself on his birthday, March 17, 2015 of how he was

headed to meet a lady for oral sex and that he nicknamed her Tide because she blows

bubbles. He often stated how my rear end looked in a pair of gray pants, in dresses,

and how he would perform sexual activity with me. I was often questioned by the office

manager, Charity Clark, of who certain women Yarber was with on community ward

tours, or what she had heard on the street but wanted to confirm with me about his

sexual behavior with both men and women.

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE:

Please refer to bate stamped documents 000692-000693 produced earlier and

the facts detailed in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff inadvertently did not produce the

EEOC file with initial responses and this document was supposed to be referenced in

Plaintiffs original response.

INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please describe in detail all actions of Tony Yarber,

or any of his agents or representatives, that you claim created a hostile work

environment, including the identity of the person(s) who allegedly committed each

hostile act, where the alleged hostile act occurred, any witnesses present, the date the

alleged hostile act occurred, and a description of the alleged hostile act in detail.

RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory as it is overly broad and

vague. Anderson v. UPS, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123878 *6 (D. Kan. Nov. 22,

2010); Aikens v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., 217 F.R.D. 533, 538 (D. Kan. 2003); Hilt v.
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 60-1 Filed 07/12/17 Page 3 of 6

SFC Inc., 170 F.R.D. 182, 186-7 (D. Kan. 1997); Stephens v. City of Chicago, 203

F.R.D. 353, 361-2 (N.D. Ill. 2008). Notwithstanding, Plaintiff responds as follows:

The city councilmen were reached to notify them of public information that I could

not receive in a timely matter and had been ignored by the party I requested it from. The

mayor, Tony Yarber, Gus McCoy (former CAO), Beatrice Slaughter (Director of

Constituent Services) and Monica Joiner (city attorney) all knew of the hostile

environment. Following the termination of Ashley McCullen for reporting a deputy CAO

had sexually harassed her, staff had begun to keep quiet if they were offended by any

sexual harassment activity

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE:

Please refer to bate stamped documents 000692-000693 produced earlier and

the facts detailed in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff inadvertently did not produce the

EEOC file with initial responses and this document was supposed to be referenced in

Plaintiffs original response.

INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Please state with specificity all instances of conduct by

Tony Yarber, or any of his agents or representatives, that in any way support your

allegations that you were retaliated against, including the identity of the person(s) who

allegedly committed each alleged retaliatory act, the identity of any witnesses present,

the date the alleged retaliatory act occurred, and a description of the alleged act of

retaliation in detail.

RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory as it is overly broad and

vague. Anderson v. UPS, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123878 *6 (D. Kan. Nov. 22,

2010); Aikens v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., 217 F.R.D. 533, 538 (D. Kan. 2003); Hilt v.
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 60-1 Filed 07/12/17 Page 4 of 6

SFC Inc., 170 F.R.D. 182, 186-7 (D. Kan. 1997); Stephens v. City of Chicago, 203

F.R.D. 353, 361-2 (N.D. Ill. 2008). Notwithstanding, Plaintiff responds as follows:

In March 2015, I reported that the chief of staff had been bullying me since the

summer 2014. Mitzi Bickers met with Woods and me and mentioned it to the mayor but

nothing was done. Yarber, in November 2014, placed me under the supervision of

Woods but still being his assistant. I was to share his schedule and to let her know

when I would be out of late for work. After more abuse, such as snarling and comments

about me needing a girdle had taken place, she tried to suspend me but Gus McCoy

and Beatrice Slaughter stated that she had no grounds. I reported the bullying again to

Monica Joiner after reporting to her several times in the summer 2014 of the

mistreatment and she called in several employees to testify of what they knew. Ms.

Joiner said that they all sided with me and were aware of the bullying for some time.

Yarber then moved me from under the supervision of Woods and placed me under the

supervision of Slaughter. Slaughter told me in her office that Woods was still sending

her text messages about I was not doing my job. I reported these incidents to the EEOC

officer for the City of Jackson, Beverly Wallace, who drafted a letter of my statement

and she asked if I would like further investigation to take place. I agreed to the

investigation and Wallace stated she would inform the Yarber and Joiner. Three weeks

following my claim, I was terminated. Prior to my reporting the misconduct by Woods,

Yarber and I had a consensual sexual relationship. After reconciling with my husband

around July 2015, I informed Yarber of the reconciliation. He asked if he could still

perform oral sex with me while we were in the city hall chambers waiting for a meeting

to begin and I responded No. He then sent a text message a few days following this
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 60-1 Filed 07/12/17 Page 5 of 6

event asking if I moved back with my husband and I told him I did but I also had an

apartment in Clinton in case things went bad again. When he returned to the office he

would leave city hall without me knowing when I would always go to every meeting to

take notes, I was placed in a city car instead of being in the same vehicle with him

because Beatrice Slaughter stated it was going around that we were f*****g so I needed

to be moved to another vehicle. He pulled me aside in city hall with Jason Goree being

present stating that was why I got my a** out of his car. After explaining that Beatrice

told me I had to get a city car, he had a meeting with all of us stating he acts like he

cares about us but he does not and he was about to fire us all. This occurred in August

2015. After leaving me at city hall without attending any other meetings as usual, I was

placed under Woods. Following my termination, Woods contacted me by phone but I did

not respond. There was no voicemail left but in case she was trying to taunt me again, I

reported her call to the Hinds County Sherriffs Department and filed a complaint.

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE:

Please refer to bate stamped documents 000692-000693 produced earlier and

the facts detailed in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff inadvertently did not produce the

EEOC file with initial responses and this document was supposed to be referenced in

Plaintiffs original response.

This, the 30th day of June 2017.

Respectfully submitted,

s/Nick Norris
Nick Norris (MB# 101574)
Attorney for Plaintiff
OF COUNSEL:

WATSON & NORRIS, PLLC


1880 Lakeland Drive, Suite G
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 60-1 Filed 07/12/17 Page 6 of 6

Jackson, Mississippi 39216


Telephone: (601) 968-0000
Facsimile: (601) 968-0010
Email: nick@watsonnorris.com
Web: www.watsonnorris.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, NICK NORRIS, attorney for the Plaintiff, do hereby certify that I have this day

served via ECF filing or by United States mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy

of the above and foregoing document to the following counsel of record:

M. Judith Barnett
M. JUDITH BARNETT, P.A.
1911 Dunbarton Drive
Jackson, Mississippi 39216
Telephone: (601) 981-4450
Facsimile: (601) 981-4717
mjbarnettpa@yahoo.com
Attorney for Tony Yarber

LaToya C. Merritt
W. Thomas Siler, Jr.
Jason T. Marsh
4270 I-55 North
Jackson, Mississippi 39211-6391
Post Office Box 16114
Jackson, Mississippi 39236-6114
Telephone: 601-352-2300
Telecopier: 601-360-9777
Email: merrittl@phelps.com
silert@phelps.com
merrittl@phelps.com
marshj@phelps.com
Attorneys for City of Jackson, Mississippi

SO CERTIFIED, this the 30th day of June 2017.

s/Nick Norris
NICK NORRIS
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 60-2 Filed 07/12/17 Page 1 of 2

Exhibit "B"

BRACEY000692
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 60-2 Filed 07/12/17 Page 2 of 2

BRACEY000693
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 57 Filed 06/28/17 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY V. BRACEY PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:16-CV-657-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI;


MAYOR TONY YARBER INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
JOHN DOES 1-3 DEFENDANTS
______________________________________________________________________________

DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON


WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AND FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
______________________________________________________________________________

COMES NOW Defendant, Tony Yarber, and files this his Motion to Dismiss for Failure to

State a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be Granted and for Qualified Immunity, and in support thereof

would show unto the Court the following:

1.

On August 25, 2016, a civil action was commenced by the Plaintiffs filing a Complaint in

the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division, alleging

that the Defendant, Tony Yarber, had committed certain acts that constituted a tort. The Defendant,

Tony Yarber, was named in his individual capacity as Mayor of The City of Jackson, as well as

through the City of Jackson, Mississippi.

2.

Tony Yarber is not a separate legal entity subject to suit, he is the Mayor of the City of

Jackson, and is immune to any tort claim that might be filed against him; therefore, the Complaint

against him fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and it should be dismissed.
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 57 Filed 06/28/17 Page 2 of 3

3.

As governmental entities under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Mississippi Code Annotated

11-46-1 et seq, Defendant, Tony Yarber, in his official capacity, may not be held liable for sexual

harassment or any other claims such as retaliation.

4.

Under Mississippi Code Annotated 15-1-3, Plaintiffs claims against Tony Yarber are barred

as a matter of law.

5.

All claims of punitive damages against an individual acting in their individual capacity within

a governmental entity should be dismissed, as punitive damages may not be assessed against

governmental entities.

6.

Defendant, Tony Yarber, adopts and incorporates herein by reference the memorandum of

authorities in support of his Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted and due to qualified immunity.

WHEREFORE, Tony Yarber prays that the claims asserted in the Complaint be

dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, due to qualified immunity,

and for any and all other reasons the Court may deem to be proper in the premises.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this the 28th day of June, 2017.

TONY YARBER

BY: /s/ M. Judith Barnett


M. JUDITH BARNETT

Page 2 of 3
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 57 Filed 06/28/17 Page 3 of 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THIS is to certify that I, M. Judith Barnett, attorney for Tony Yarber, have this date
served, via the MEC filing system, and United States Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to:

Louis H. Watson, Jr., Esq.


Nick Norris, Esq.
Watson & Norris, PLLC
1880 Lakeland Drive, Suite G
Jackson, MS 39216-4972

LaToya C. Merritt, Esq.


Jason T. Marsh, Esq.
Phelps Dunbar, LLP
P.O. Box 16114
Jackson, MS 39236-6114

THIS the 28th day of June, 2017.

/s/ M. Judith Barnett


M. JUDITH BARNETT

M. JUDITH BARNETT (MSB #99766)


M. JUDITH BARNETT, P.A.
1911 Dunbarton Drive
Jackson, MS 39216
Telephone: (601) 981-4450
Facsimile: (601) 981-4717
mjbarnettpa@yahoo.com
Attorney for Tony Yarber

Page 3 of 3
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 43 Filed 04/13/17 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY V. BRACEY PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:16-CV-657-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI;


MAYOR TONY YARBER INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
JOHN DOES 1-3 DEFENDANTS

PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL

COMES NOW Plaintiff by and through counsel and serves this her Motion to

Compel. In support, Plaintiff attaches the following exhibits:

A. Discovery to Defendant Yarber;

B. Affidavit of Nick Norris;

C. Good Faith Letter and Certificate;

For the reasons explained in Plaintiffs supporting memorandum brief, the

Plaintiffs Motion to Compel should be granted.

THIS the 13th day of April, 2017.

Respectfully submitted,
s/ Nick Norris
NICK NORRIS. (MB# 101574)
Attorney for Plaintiff

OF COUNSEL:

WATSON & NORRIS, PLLC


1880 Lakeland Drive
Suite G
Jackson, Mississippi 39216
(601) 968-0000
Fax: (601) 968-001

1
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 43 Filed 04/13/17 Page 2 of 2

nick@watsonnorris.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Nick Norris, attorney for Plaintiff, do hereby certify that I have this day served a

true and correct copy of the above and foregoing pleading via ECF filing or by United

States Mail with postage fully prepaid thereon to all counsel of record:

SO CERTIFIED, this the 13th day of April, 2017.

s/ Nick Norris
NICK NORRIS

2
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 44 Filed 04/13/17 Page 1 of 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY V. BRACEY PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:16-CV-657-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI;


MAYOR TONY YARBER INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
JOHN DOES 1-3 DEFENDANTS

PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, Plaintiff moves this Court for an

order compelling Defendant Yarber to adequately respond to Interrogatories and

Requests for Production. In support of this motion, Plaintiff would show unto the Court

the following:

1. On January 31, 2017, Plaintiff filed notices of service of Interrogatories ,

Requests for Admissions and Request for Production of Documents, and served the

discovery upon Defendants. [Docs. 23]; See Discovery to Defendant Yarber, attached

hereto as Exhibit A.

2. On February 22, 2017, counsel for Defendant City of Jackson sent

an e-mail to Plaintiffs counsel requesting until April 3, 2017, to respond to written

discovery. Plaintiff agreed to this extension. While the City of Jackson did not respond

to discovery by April 3, 2017, it notified the Plaintiff that it will respond by the end of the

week and its delay in responding is because it will be producing around 8,000 pages of

documents that have been requested by Plaintiff.

3. In contrast, Defendant Yarber has never requested an extension from


Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 44 Filed 04/13/17 Page 2 of 5

Plaintiff or the Court to respond to written discovery. After Defendant Yarber missed the

deadline, Plaintiff sent Defendant Yarber a good faith letter on March 7, 2017, in hopes

that this would encourage Defendant Yarber to respond to written discovery. See

Affidavit of Nick Norris, attached as Exhibit B; See Good Faith Letter and Certificate,

attached hereto as Exhibit C.

3. Instead of responding to the good faith letter, Defendant Yarber only sent

Plaintiff written discovery to answer. [Docs. 33 & 34].

4. When Defendant Yarber again did not respond to written discovery

Plaintiff requested a discovery conference before the Court. On March 21, 2017, the

Court held a telephonic discovery hearing.

5. Plaintiff informed the Court that Defendant Yarber had not responded to

discovery, had not requested any extension, had not informed the Plaintiff when he

would respond to discovery and Defendants only response to the good faith letter was

by sending written discovery to Plaintiff to answer. Defendant Yarbers counsel

informed the Court that Defendant Yarber had asserted to his counsel that he had

already given his counsel the responses to discovery; however, Defendant Yarbers

counsel confirmed she had received no such responses.

6. The Court questioned as to why Plaintiffs counsel was pushing discovery

responses so early as it was out of the ordinary. Plaintiffs counsel explained to the

Court that the Plaintiffs expert designation deadline is currently May 3, 2017, and that

2
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 44 Filed 04/13/17 Page 3 of 5

Plaintiff needs Defendant Yarber to submit to a DNA test to complete the expert

designation.1 Plaintiffs counsel also explained while it is almost certain Plaintiff will

have to seek an extension of the deadline, Plaintiff wants to make sure it is clear to the

Court that Plaintiff has been seeking the DNA test since prior to the Case Management

Conference and throughout discovery so it will be clear that Defendant Yarbers failure

to respond that has caused the delay. At the end of the conference the Court granted

Plaintiff leave to file a motion to compel, but asked the parties to continue to attempt to

resolve the situation.

7. More than two weeks have passed with no responses from Defendant

Yarber and no indication of any intent to respond any time soon. In contrast, the City

has responded to discovery on April 13, 2017, and Plaintiff has timely responded to

written discovery both parties on March 31, 2017.

8. As such, Plaintiff requests that the Court order Defendant Yarber to

immediately respond to written discovery, and require Defendant Yarber to pay attorney

fees for Plaintiffs counsel having to take the time to force Defendant Yarber to respond

to written discovery.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff respectfully requests that

the Court enter an Order compelling Defendant to proffer adequate responses to the

1
Plaintiff has already produced lab results to both Defendants that show male DNA was detected on a
necklace owned by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff contends that the male DNA belongs to Defendant Yarber. Plaintiff is
requesting this DNA test to determine if there is a match so an expert designation can be completed.

3
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referenced Interrogatories and Request for Production, and that Defendant Yarber be

required to pay attorney fees for Plaintiff having to file a motion to compel on this issue.

THIS the 13th day of April, 2017.

Respectfully submitted,

/s Nick Norris
NICK NORRIS MB #101574

OF COUNSEL:

WATSON & NORRIS, PLLC


1880 Lakeland Drive
Suite G
Jackson, MS 39216
Phone: (601) 968-0000
Fax: (601) 968-0010
nick@watsonnorris.com

4
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 44 Filed 04/13/17 Page 5 of 5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Nick Norris, attorney for Plaintiff do hereby certify that I have this day caused to

be served by ECF a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document to all

counsel of record:

SO CERTIFIED, this the 13th day of April, 2017.

/s Nick Norris
NICK NORRIS

5
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 43-2 Filed 04/13/17 Page 1 of 3

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY V. BRACEY PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:16-CV-657-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI;


MAYOR TONY YARBER INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
JOHN DOES 1-3 DEFENDANTS

AFFIDAVIT OF NICK NORRIS

1. My name is Nick Norris. I am over the age of eighteen years old.

I state the following based upon my own personal knowledge and am competent to testify

as to these matters.

2. On January 31, 2017, Plaintiff filed notices of service of Interrogatories ,

Requests for Admissions and Request for Production of Documents, and served the

discovery upon Defendants.

3. On February 22, 2017, counsel for Defendant City of Jackson sent

an e-mail to Plaintiffs counsel requesting until April 3, 2017, to respond to written

discovery. Plaintiff agreed to this extension. While the City of Jackson did not respond to

discovery by April 3, 2017, it notified the Plaintiff that it will respond by the end of the week

and its delay in responding is because it will be producing around 8,000 pages of

documents that have been requested by Plaintiff.

4. In contrast, Defendant Yarber has never requested an extension from

Plaintiff or the Court to respond to written discovery. After Defendant Yarber missed the

deadline, I sent Defendant Yarbers counsel a good faith letter on March 7, 2017, in hopes

Exhibit "B"
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 43-2 Filed 04/13/17 Page 2 of 3

that this would encourage Defendant Yarber to respond to written discovery.

3. Instead of responding to the good faith letter, Defendant Yarber only sent

Plaintiff written discovery to answer.

4. When Defendant Yarber again did not respond to written discovery

I requested a discovery conference before the Court. On March 21, 2017, the Court held

a telephonic discovery hearing.

5. I informed the Court that Defendant Yarber had not responded to discovery,

had not requested any extension, had not informed the Plaintiff when he would respond to

discovery and Defendants only response to the good faith letter was by sending written

discovery to Plaintiff to answer. Defendant Yarbers counsel informed the Court that

Defendant Yarber had asserted to his counsel that he had already given his counsel the

responses to discovery; however, Defendant Yarbers counsel confirmed she had received

no such responses.

6. The Court questioned as to why I was pushing discovery responses so early

as it was out of the ordinary. I explained to the Court that the Plaintiffs expert designation

deadline is currently May 3, 2017, and that Plaintiff needs Defendant Yarber to submit to

a DNA test to complete the expert designation. I also explained while it is almost certain

Plaintiff will have to seek an extension of the deadline, Plaintiff wants to make sure it is

clear to the Court that Plaintiff has been seeking the DNA test since prior to the Case

Management Conference and throughout discovery so it will be clear that Defendant

Yarbers failure to respond that has caused the delay. At the end of the conference the
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 43-2 Filed 04/13/17 Page 3 of 3

Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a motion to compel, but asked the parties to continue

to attempt to resolve the situation.

7. More than two weeks have passed with no responses from Defendant

Yarber and no indication of any intent to respond any time soon. In contrast, the City has

responded to discovery on April 13, 2017, and Plaintiff has timely responded to written

discovery both parties on March 31, 2017.

8. In addition, Defendant Yarber has not returned the good faith certificate I sent

to his attorneys.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above and foregoing is true and correct

as therein stated.

Further Affiant saith not.

Executed this the 13th day of April, 2017.

/S NICK NORRIS
NICK NORRIS
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 35 Filed 03/20/17 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY V. BRACEY PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16cv657-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

This case is before the Court on Counter-Defendant Kimberly V. Braceys Motion to

Dismiss [14]. Bracey asks the Court to dismiss Counter-Plaintiff Tony Yarbers Counterclaim

[9] against her. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted and the Counterclaim is

dismissed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On August 25, 2016, Kimberly V. Bracey filed this lawsuit alleging sex-discrimination,

sexual-harassment, hostile-work-environment, and retaliation claims against the City of Jackson

and Mayor Tony Yarber, individually and in his official capacity. In general terms, Braceys

claims center on allegations of mistreatment by Yarber while she was employed by the City of

Jackson from April 2014, through April 2015.

On October 24, 2016, Yarber, in his individual capacity, filed his Answer and

Counterclaim [9]. He asserts claims against Bracey for abuse of process and defamation related

to her filing of the Complaint and Amended Complaint [3] in this action. Bracey moved to

dismiss those claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Following the entry of a

show-cause order, Yarber responded in opposition, and Bracey filed a reply. The Court has

personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and is prepared to rule.


Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 35 Filed 03/20/17 Page 2 of 5

II. Standard

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-

pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Martin K. Eby

Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v.

Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). But the tenet that a court must

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.

Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To overcome a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead

enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). Id. at 555

(citations and footnote omitted).

III. Analysis

A. Abuse of Process

Yarber alleges that the filing of the Complaint and the filing and service of the Amended

Complaint containing false allegations . . . constitute abuse of process. Countercl. [9] at 9.

To maintain an action for abuse of process, the plaintiff must establish: (1) that
the defendant made an illegal and improper perverted use of the process, a use
neither warranted nor authorized by the process; (2) that the defendant had an
ulterior motive or purpose in exercising such illegal, perverted, or improper use of
process; and (3) that damage resulted to the plaintiff from the irregularity.

Moon v. Condere Corp., 690 So. 2d 1191, 1197 (Miss. 1997) (quoting State ex rel. Foster v.

Turner, 319 So. 2d 233, 236 (Miss. 1975)).

Typical of the cases where the action of abuse of process will lie is where through
the employment of process a man has been arrested or his property seized in order
to extort payment of money from him, even though the claim be a just one other
2
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 35 Filed 03/20/17 Page 3 of 5

than in that suit, or to prevent a conveyance, or to compel him to give up


possession to some thing or value, when such were not the legal objects of the
suit.

Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 93 So. 2d 171, 175 (Miss. 1957). Where the only

process involved was a simple summon to defend the suit, a claim for abuse of process will not

lie. Id.; see also Gatheright v. Clark, No. 16-60364, 2017 WL 728698, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 23,

2017) (Where a claim is based solely on the filing of a suit, and not on any perversion of the

process once process issues, a claim for abuse of process will fail.); Austin Firefighters Relief &

Ret. Fund v. Brown, 760 F. Supp. 2d 662, 67677 (S.D. Miss. 2010) ([W]here an abuse of

process claim is based simply on the filing of a lawsuit, it cannot be said that process of the court

has been abused by accomplishing a result not commanded by it or not lawfully obtainable under

it.).

In this case, as in the cases cited above, Yarbers counterclaim is not based on any

perversion of any process[;] rather, it [is] based simply on the filing of the suit. Moon, 690 So.

2d at 1197 (citing Edwards, 93 So. 2d at 174); see also id. ([T]he only process involved in this

case was the summons. There were no arrests made, and there was no seizure of property. Thus,

there was no improper use of process after it had been issued.). Because Yarbers abuse-of-

process claim is based solely on Braceys filing of this lawsuit, the claim fails as a matter of law.

The motion to dismiss is granted as to the abuse-of-process claim, which is dismissed with

prejudice.

B. Defamation

In his defamation count, Yarber claims that Bracey made numerous false and

defamatory statements concerning him. Countercl. [9] at 10. All of the false statements

attributed to Bracey in the facts section of the Counterclaim are described as contained within

either the Complaint or the Amended Complaint in this matter. Id. at 89.
3
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 35 Filed 03/20/17 Page 4 of 5

To establish a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must prove the following


elements: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning plaintiff; (2)
unprivileged publication to third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence
on part of publisher; (4) and either actionability of statement irrespective of
special harm or existence of special harm caused by publication.

Armistead v. Minor, 815 So. 2d 1189, 1193 (Miss. 2002) (emphasis added) (quoting Franklin v.

Thompson, 722 So. 2d 688, 692 (Miss. 1998)). Importantly, [s]tatements made in connection

with judicial proceedings, including pleadings, are, if in any way relevant to the subject matter of

the action, absolutely privileged and immune from attack as defamation, even if such statements

are made maliciously and with knowledge of their falsehood. McCorkle v. McCorkle, 811 So.

2d 258, 266 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Gunter v. Reeves, 21 So. 2d 468, 470 (Miss. 1945));

see also Knotts by Knotts v. Hassell, 659 So. 2d 886, 890 (Miss. 1995) (This Court has long

recognized the absolute privilege that is attached to relevant statements made during the course

of judicial proceedings.).

For his part, Yarber does not seem to dispute the absolute privilege afforded to statements

made in judicial proceedings, instead characterizing the Counterclaim as including defamatory

statements [Bracey made] about [Yarber] to Anna Wolfe of the Clarion Ledger Newspaper that

were printed in an article, as well as statements made in a radio interview. Counter-Pl.s Resp.

[17] at 3. But the Counterclaim does not reference these alleged statements, so as of now, they

are not part of Yarbers defamation claim. As pleaded, the defamation claim fails to allege the

unprivileged publication of any false statement. The motion to dismiss is also granted as to the

defamation claim, which is dismissed without prejudice.

4
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 35 Filed 03/20/17 Page 5 of 5

IV. Conclusion

The Court has considered all arguments. Those not specifically addressed would not

have changed the outcome. For the foregoing reasons, Counter-Defendant Kimberly V. Braceys

Motion to Dismiss [14] is granted. Yarbers Counterclaim is dismissed. 1

SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 20th day of March, 2017.

s/ Daniel P. Jordan III


UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1
At this time, Yarber has not moved to amend the Counterclaim. Because the dismissal
of the defamation claim is without prejudice, Yarber may file a motion for leave to amend out of
time, attaching a proposed Amended Counterclaim, if he chooses. See Thomas v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d 586, 59091 (5th Cir. 2016) (explaining that a party seeking leave to
amend must provide some specificity as to the substance of the proposed amendment); L.U.
Civ. R. 15 (If leave of court is required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, a proposed amended pleading
must be an exhibit to a motion for leave to file the pleading . . . .).
5
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 15 Filed 11/14/16 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY V. BRACEY PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:16-CV-657-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI;


MAYOR TONY YARBER INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
JOHN DOES 1-3 DEFENDANTS

PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

COMES NOW Plaintiff by and through counsel, and respectfully submits her

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. In support thereof, Plaintiff would show

unto the Court the following:

1. On August 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Complaint alleging sexual

harassment and retaliation by Defendants. [Doc. 1]. On August 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed

her First Amended Complaint. [Doc. 3].

2. On October 24, 2016, Defendant Tony Yarber filed his Answer, and

asserted counterclaims for abuse of process and defamation. [Doc. 9].

3. Both counterclaims assert claims that are based solely upon Plaintiff filing

a lawsuit against Defendant Yarber.

4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a

complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the district court will "accept as true the well
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 15 Filed 11/14/16 Page 2 of 4

pleaded factual allegations in the complaint." Culliver v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th

Cir. 2007). However, when the allegations in a complaint, even when taken as true,

"could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, 'this basic deficiency should be ...

exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the

court." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007).

5. To maintain an action for abuse of process, the plaintiff must establish:

(1) that the defendant made an illegal and improper perverted use of the process, a use

neither warranted nor authorized by the process; (2) that the defendant had an ulterior

motive or purpose in exercising such illegal, perverted or improper use of process; and

(3) that damage resulted to the plaintiff from the irregularity. Moon v. Condere Corp.,

690 So.2d 1191, 1197 (Miss. 1997). In the current case, Counter Plaintiff Yarber cannot

show that Counter Defendant Bracey made an illegal and improper perverted use of the

process merely by filing a complaint and having a summons issued to him. Id. (citing

Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 93 So. 2d 171, 230 Miss. 583 (1957)). As

such, this claim should be dismiss with prejudice.

6. The problem with Counter Plaintiff Yarbers defamation claim is that filing

a lawsuit is a privileged action that is immune to defamation claims.

Statements made in connection with judicial proceedings,


including pleadings, are, if in any way relevant to the subject
matter of the action, absolutely privileged and immune from
attack as defamation, even if such statements are made
maliciously and with knowledge of their falsehood.

McCorkle v. McCorkle, 811 So.2d 258, 266 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Gunter

v. Reeves, 21 So. 2d 468, 470 (Miss. 1945); Hardtner v. Salloum, 114 So. 621, 623-4

(Miss. 1927). In the current case, Counter Plaintiff Yarber is solely relying upon
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 15 Filed 11/14/16 Page 3 of 4

statements made in Mrs. Braceys Complaint and First Amended Complaint. As such,

Counter Plaintiff Yarbers defamation claim should be dismissed with prejudice.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff respectfully requests that

the Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

BY: /s Nick Norris


NICK NORRIS MB #101574
Attorney for Plaintiff

OF COUNSEL:

WATSON & NORRIS, PLLC


1880 Lakeland Drive
Suite G
Jackson, MS 39216
Phone: (601) 968-0000
Fax: (601) 968-0010
nick@watsonnorris.com
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 15 Filed 11/14/16 Page 4 of 4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Nick Norris, attorney for Plaintiff do hereby certify that I have this day filed the

foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system which sent notification of

such filing or mailed, via United States Mail, postage prepaid, on all counsel of record.

SO CERTIFIED, this the 14th day of November, 2016.

/s Nick Norris

NICK NORRIS
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 9 Filed 10/24/16 Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY V. BRACEY PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:16-CV-657-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI;


MAYOR TONY YARBER INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
JOHN DOES 1-3 DEFENDANTS

TONY YARBERS ANSWER, DEFENSES, AND COUNTERCLAIM

(JURY TRIAL REQUESTED)

COMES NOW, Answering Defendant, Tony Yarber, in his individual capacity, by and

through counsel, and files this his Answer, Defenses, and Counterclaim as follows:

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE


The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against

Answering Defendant. Accordingly, Answering Defendant moves this Court for a dismissal with

prejudice of the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE


The Amended Complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE


Some or all of the claims of the Plaintiff are barred by waiver.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE


Some or all of the claims of the Plaintiff are barred by her failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE


Affirmatively and alternatively, and without waiving any other defenses asserted herein,

Page 1 of 11
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 9 Filed 10/24/16 Page 2 of 11

Answering Defendant hereby pleads any and all defenses available under the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and United States and Mississippi law.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE


The Amended Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of

action against this Answering Defendant.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE


Plaintiffs claims are barred, in whole or in part, because Plaintiff failed to mitigate any

injuries and damages she has allegedly suffered.

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE


To the extent Plaintiff claims any damages suffered by her are attributable to this

Answering Defendant, any such damages were the result of Plaintiffs own acts, omissions

and/or the acts or omissions of third parties for which Answering Defendant has no legal

responsibility.

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE


Plaintiffs claims are barred, in whole or in part, because this Answering Defendant did

not owe any legal duty to Plaintiff or, if Answering Defendant owed any such legal duty,

Answering Defendant did not breach that duty.

TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE


To the extent that the Amended Complaint seeks any award or assessment of punitive

damages against this Answering Defendant, such award would be contrary to the laws of the state

of Mississippi and the laws of the United States of America, and would be violative of the Fifth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the

State of Mississippi.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE


Answering Defendant cannot be held liable for punitive damages, because at no time did

he act maliciously, fraudulently or with any intent to harm the Plaintiff or to deprive her of any

Page 2 of 11
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 9 Filed 10/24/16 Page 3 of 11

legally protected rights.

TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE


Answering Defendant pleads any and all defenses and affirmative defenses available to

him which may become applicable through discovery and during the trial of this cause.

THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE


Affirmatively and alternatively, and without waiving any other defenses elsewhere

asserted herein, and the facts having not been fully developed, Answering Defendant would

affirmatively plead any and all affirmative defenses as may be applicable in this action: accord

and satisfaction, antenuptial knowledge, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, condonation,
constructive desertion, contributory negligence, discharge and bankruptcy, duress, estoppel,

failure of consideration, failure to mitigate damages, fraud, illegality, impossibility, insufficient

process, insufficient service of process, injury by fellow servant, laches, lack of capacity to

commit the offense, lack of standing, license, payment, preexisting injuries or damages,

reconciliation, recrimination, reformation, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of

limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.

FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND ANSWER


This Answering Defendant responds to the allegations of the Amended Complaint,

paragraph by paragraph and incorporates by reference all affirmative defenses heretofore

mentioned, as follows:

1. This Answering Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to

either admit or deny the allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint, and

insofar as the allegations pertain to this Answering Defendant, they are denied and Answering

Defendant demands specific proof thereof.

2. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 2 of the Amended Complaint are

Admitted.

3. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 3 of the Amended Complaint are

Page 3 of 11
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 9 Filed 10/24/16 Page 4 of 11

Denied.

4. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 4 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

5. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 5 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

6. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 6 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof
thereof.

7. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 7 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Admitted as to the fact that on April 24, 2014, Tony

Yarber did employ the Plaintiff as his Executive Assistant. However, that was changed shortly

thereafter and she was required to directly report to Beatrice Slaughter for the rest of her tenure

as an employee with the City of Jackson in the Mayors office.

8. This Answering Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to

either admit or deny the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Amended Complaint, and

insofar as the allegations pertain to this Answering Defendant, they are denied and Answering

Defendant demands specific proof thereof.

9. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 9 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

10. This Answering Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to

either admit or deny the allegations contained in paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint, and

insofar as the allegations pertain to this Answering Defendant, they are denied and Answering

Defendant demands specific proof thereof.

Page 4 of 11
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 9 Filed 10/24/16 Page 5 of 11

11. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 11 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

12. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 12 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

13. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 13 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.
14. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 14 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

15. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 15 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

16. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 16 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

17. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 17 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

18. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 18 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

19. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 19 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

Page 5 of 11
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 9 Filed 10/24/16 Page 6 of 11

thereof.

20. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 20 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

21. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 21 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

22. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 22 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof
thereof.

23. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 23 of the Amended Complaint

are Denied.

24. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 24 of the Amended Complaint

are Denied.

25. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 25 of the Amended Complaint

are Denied.

26. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 26 of the Amended Complaint

are Denied.

COUNT I

27. Answering Defendant re-alleges each and every Affirmative Defense and response

set forth in paragraphs 1 through 26 as if fully set forth herein.

28. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 28 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

29. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 29 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

Page 6 of 11
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 9 Filed 10/24/16 Page 7 of 11

thereof.

COUNT II

30. Answering Defendant re-alleges each and every Affirmative Defense and response

set forth in paragraphs 1 through 29 as if fully set forth herein.

31. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 31 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

32. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 32 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

COUNT III

33. Answering Defendant re-alleges each and every Affirmative Defense and response

set forth in paragraphs 1 through 32 as if fully set forth herein.

34. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 34 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

35. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 35 of the Amended Complaint

that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

36. The allegations contained in Paragraph numbered 36 of the Amended Complaint


that pertain to this Answering Defendant are Denied and this Defendant demands specific proof

thereof.

37. In that the unnumbered paragraph appearing after the term WHEREFORE,

PREMISES CONSIDERED of the Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations,

Answering Defendant asserts no belief as to the truth of said paragraph, but Answering

Defendant would deny that the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought in said paragraph and any

Page 7 of 11
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 9 Filed 10/24/16 Page 8 of 11

and all subsections of said unnumbered paragraph.

COUNTERCLAIM
Now having fully answered the Amended Complaint, Answering Defendant herein

assumes the role of counterclaimant and would show unto this Court the following:

PARTIES
1. Counter-Plaintiff, Tony Yarber, is an adult resident citizen of the First Judicial

District of Hinds County, Mississippi.

2. Counter-Defendant, Kimberly V. Bracey, upon information and belief, is an adult

resident citizen of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi who can be served with

process by and through her attorney of record in this matter.

FACTS
3. That on or about August 25, 2016, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant filed a Complaint

in the above-referenced matter falsely alleging that the Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff engaged in a

sexual relationship with her, among other false statements.

4. That on or about August 25, 2016, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant filed a Complaint

in the above-referenced matter falsely alleging that the Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff engaged in

numerous sexual relationships with other women during this time, among other false

statements.

5. That on or about August 25, 2016, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant filed a Complaint

in the above-referenced matter falsely alleging that the Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff sexually


harassed her, among other false statements.

6. That on or about August 25, 2016, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant filed a Complaint

in the above-referenced matter falsely alleging that the Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff committed

retaliation against her, among other false statements.

7. That on or about August 29, 2016, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant filed an Amended

Complaint in the above-referenced matter falsely alleging that the Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff

Page 8 of 11
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 9 Filed 10/24/16 Page 9 of 11

engaged in a sexual relationship with her, among other false statements.

8. That on or about August 29, 2016, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant filed an Amended

Complaint in the above-referenced matter falsely alleging that the Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff

engaged in numerous sexual relationships with other women during this time, among other

false statements.

9. That on or about August 29, 2016, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant filed an Amended

Complaint in the above-referenced matter falsely alleging that the Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff

sexually harassed her, among other false statements.

10. That on or about August 29, 2016, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant filed an Amended

Complaint in the above-referenced matter falsely alleging that the Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff

committed retaliation against her, among other false statements.

11. That on or about September 7, 2016, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant caused

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff to be served with a Summons and copy of the Amended Complaint.

COUNT I - ABUSE OF PROCESS


12. Counter-Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, realleges and incorporates by reference each

and every allegation contained in paragraphs numbered 1 through 11 of this Counterclaim with

the same force and effect as if more fully set forth at length herein.

13. That the filing of the Complaint and the filing and service of the Amended

Complaint containing false allegations against the Counter-Plaintiff by the Counter-Defendant is

a malicious perversion of a regularly issued civil process, for a purpose and to obtain a result not
lawfully warranted or properly attainable thereby.

14. That the actions of the Counter-Defendant were done with the intent to abuse the

privileges of the legal system.

15. The actions of the Counter-Defendant constitute abuse of process.

16. That as a direct and proximate result of said abuse of process, Counter-Plaintiff

has been caused to suffer damages of a personal and pecuniary nature, including but not limited

Page 9 of 11
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 9 Filed 10/24/16 Page 10 of 11

to out of pocket expenses, damage to reputation, attorneys fees, and other damages to be proven

at trial.

COUNT II - DEFAMATION
17. Counter-Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, realleges and incorporates by reference each

and every allegation contained in paragraphs numbered 1 through 16 of this Counterclaim with

the same force and effect as if more fully set forth at length herein.

18. At all times material and relevant, the Counter-Defendant made numerous false

and defamatory statements concerning Counter-Plaintiff.

19. That at all times material and relevant, said statements were unprivileged and

were published to third parties.

20. At all times material and relevant, said statements were made with malice,

recklessness and with knowledge that said statements were false.

21. The actions of the Counter-Defendant constitute defamation.

22. That as a direct and proximate result of said defamation, Counter-Plaintiff has

been caused to suffer damages of a personal and pecuniary nature, including but not limited to

out of pocket expenses, damage to reputation, attorneys fees, and other damages to be proven at

trial.

DAMAGES
23. Counter-Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, realleges and incorporates by reference each

and every allegation contained in paragraphs numbered 1 through 22 of this Counterclaim with
the same force and effect as if more fully set forth at length herein.

24. As a direct and proximate result of the Counter-Defendants actions, inactions,

refusals and omissions, the Counter-Plaintiff has suffered injuries of a personal and pecuniary

nature, including, but not limited to, out of pocket expenses, damage to reputation, attorneys

fees, and other damages to be proven at trial.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Counter-Plaintiff prays that the

Page 10 of 11
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 9 Filed 10/24/16 Page 11 of 11

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that this Court award judgment

to the Counter-Plaintiff of, from, and against the Counter-Defendant, Kimberly V. Bracey, in a

sum that will fully and fairly compensate the Counter- Plaintiff for his loss, plus cost of court,

reasonable attorney fees and any other relief that this Court or a jury deems just and proper.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this the 24th day of October, 2016.

Tony Yarber, Individually

/s/ M. Judith Barnett


M. JUDITH BARNETT

M. JUDITH BARNETT (MSB #99766)


M. JUDITH BARNETT, P.A.
1911 Dunbarton Drive
Jackson, Mississippi 39216
Telephone: (601) 981-4450
Facsimile: (601) 981-4717
mjbarnettpa@yahoo.com
Attorney for Tony Yarber

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I, M. Judith Barnett, attorney for Tony Yarber, have this date served,
via the CM/ECF filing system, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Answer,
Defenses, and Counterclaim to the following Counsel of Record:

Louis H. Watson, Jr., Esq.


Nick Norris, Esq.
Watson & Norris, PLLC
1880 Lakeland Drive, Suite G
Jackson, MS 39216-4972

LaToya C. Merritt, Esq.


Jason T. Marsh, Esq.
Phelps Dunbar, LLP
P.O. Box 16114
Jackson, MS 39236-6114

SO CERTIFIED, this the 24th day of October, 2016.

/s/ M. Judith Barnett


M. JUDITH BARNETT

Page 11 of 11
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 3 Filed 08/29/16 Page 1 of 9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY V. BRACEY PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:16-CV-657-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI;


MAYOR TONY YARBER INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
JOHN DOES 1-3 DEFENDANTS

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT


JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Kimberly V. Bracey, by and through her counsel,

Watson & Norris, PLLC, and files this action against Defendants, City of Jackson,

Mississippi, Mayor Tony Yarber and John Does 1-3. As more specifically set forth

below, Plaintiff has been subjected to sex discrimination, sexual harassment, a sexually

hostile work place in violation of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, has been unlawfully retaliated against in the terms and conditions of her

employment with Defendant, City of Jackson, Mississippi, has been subjected to

violations of the 14th Amendment, Equal Protection, by Defendant Mayor Tony Yarber

and has suffered violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act by

Defendants. In support of this cause, the Plaintiff would show unto the Court the

following facts to-wit:

PARTIES

1. The Plaintiff, Kimberly V. Bracey, is an adult female resident of Hinds

County, Mississippi, residing at 6331 Lyndon B. Johnson Drive, Jackson, MS 39213.


Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 3 Filed 08/29/16 Page 2 of 9

2, Defendant, City of Jackson, Mississippi, is a municipality in the state of

Mississippi and may be served through the City Clerk, Kristi Moore, 219 South

President Street, Jackson, MS 39205.

3. Defendant, Mayor Tony Yarber, may be served with process by serving

the Office of the Mayor, 219 S. President Street, Jackson, MS 39205.

4. In addition to the Defendants identified above, there are Defendants

whose identities are presently unknown to Plaintiff. These unknown Defendants are

identified as John Doe Defendants 1-3 pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Every allegation in the Complaint is an allegation and a filing as of this date against

each John Doe Defendant. These Defendants are persons whose identities are

unknown at this time; however, they are believed to be employees of Defendant, City of

Jackson, Mississippi.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5. This Court has federal question jurisdiction.

6. This Court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the

Defendants and venue is proper in this Court. A true and correct copy of Plaintiffs

Charge of Discrimination is attached hereto as Exhibit A, and a true and correct copy

of the EEOCs Dismissal and Notice of Rights is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

7. Plaintiff was hired by Defendant on April 24, 2014 as an Executive

Assistant to the Mayor, Tony Yarber. As such, Defendant Tony Yarber was in a position

of direct authority over Plaintiff.


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8. In May 2014, Plaintiff separated from her husband and moved in with

Monica Joiner, who is the City Attorney for Defendant City of Jackson, Mississippi.

9. During this time Defendant, Tony Yarber, engaged in a sexual relationship

with Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not make Ms. Joiner aware of this relationship as Ms. Joiner

was also actively pursuing a sexual relationship Defendant Yarber. Plaintiff was also

aware that Defendant Yarber engaged in numerous sexual relationships with other

women during this time.

10. In July 2014, Plaintiff reconciled her relationship with her husband and

moved back into their family home.

11. At this point, Plaintiff ended her consensual relationship with Defendant

Yarber.

12. In response, Defendant Yarber transferred Plaintiff to be supervised by

other staff members.

13. Around this same time, Defendant Yarber began forcing Plaintiff to

continue the sexual relationship by making it clear that she could be terminated if she

did not have sex with him. Plaintiff was the sole source of income for her family at this

time, and could not easily find comparable work.

14. Defendant Yarber has requested Plaintiff to encourage another female to

give Defendant Yarber oral sex in exchange for guaranteed employment.

15. Defendant Yarber subjected Plaintiff to inappropriate sexual comments

about other women on several occasions.

16. In May or June 2014, Plaintiff was required to attend a fundraiser arranged

by Marshand Crisler in New Orleans, Louisiana. Mitzi Bickers, who is a campaign


Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 3 Filed 08/29/16 Page 4 of 9

contributor for Defendant Yarber, hosted a dinner at a restaurant in New Orleans where

numerous city staff members were in attendance. Later that evening, Plaintiff,

Defendant Yarber, Jason Goree, Torrence Mayfield and Jackie Anderson Woods met

Ms. Bickers at a strip club where Ms. Bickers paid for everything. Plaintiff and Mr.

Mayfield were required to watch the door where Mayor Yarber and one of the strippers

went into to be alone.

17. In August 2014, Plaintiff was required to attend another fundraiser for

Defendant Yarber in Atlanta, Georgia, that was hosted by Mitzi Bickers. After the

fundraiser, Defendant Yarber, Plaintiff, Jackie Woods, Artie Stuckey and Jason Goree

rode by boat with Ms. Bickers to one of her friends house. Prior to arriving at the home

Plaintiff had been informed they were going for a dinner. Instead, Plaintiff and others

were greeted by strippers wearing only body paint.

18. In August or September 2014, Plaintiff was required to attend another

fundraiser for Defendant Yarber and Tyrone Lewis in Atlanta that was hosted by Mitzi

Bickers. Ms. Bickers had arranged for a woman to have a sexual relationship with

Defendant Yarber while Plaintiff was attending this fundraiser in Atlanta, Georgia. The

next day after the fundraiser, Plaintiff was required to go with Defendant Yarber for

another gathering at Ms. Bickers home. Again strippers wearing only body paint

greeted them at the door. While Tyrone Lewis and his staff were present at the

fundraiser, they were not present the next day when strippers were present at Ms.

Bickers home.
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19. In early April 2015, Plaintiff could not take the harassment any longer, and

chose to refuse any further advances even if it meant her employment would be

terminated.

20. On April 26, 2015, Plaintiff was falsely accused by Mayor Yarber of

unauthorized use of city equipment for personal use. Plaintiff was threatened with

termination by Jackie Woods, her supervisor. Plaintiff was then placed under the

supervision of Beatrice Slaughter and told by email from Mayor Yarber, who copied the

City Attorney on the email, that Plaintiff would no longer be under the supervision of

Jackie Woods.

21. On April 27, 2015, Plaintiff was abruptly terminated by Mayor Yarber.

Around this same time, Plaintiff learned that City of Jackson, MS employees unlawfully

accessed her private Google e-mail account to assert Plaintiff was using city equipment

for personal use. Defendant John Does 1-3 unlawfully accessed Plaintiffs private

Google e-mail account to pull a flyer for the campaign of Plaintiffs husband to falsely

claim Plaintiff had printed or copied the flyer hundreds of times to be used for the

campaign.

22. Plaintiff had verbal authorization from her director, Beatrice Slaughter, to

use the citys equipment to make copies for her husbands campaign and to keep a log

of the copies, which she did. While Plaintiff did use the citys equipment with

authorization from her supervisor, the particular flyer pulled from her private e-mail

account was never copied using city equipment.


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23. During her tenure as Executive Assistant to Mayor Yarber and her job with

the City of Jackson, Mississippi, Plaintiff always performed her job duties above

satisfactory and had a good work record.

24. In truth, Plaintiff was terminated for refusing the sexual advances of Tony

Yarber, Mayor of the City of Jackson, Mississippi.

25. To Plaintiffs knowledge, there were two other female city employees who

were terminated because they refused sexual advances from Tony Yarber while he was

acting as the Mayor of the City of Jackson, Mississippi.

26. Further, to Plaintiffs knowledge, there were two other co-workers who

violated the same work rule (unauthorized use of city equipment), but were not

disciplined or discharged.

CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT I - VIOLATION OF TITLE VII - SEXUAL HARASSMENT


AND THE 14TH AMENDMENT THROUGH 1983 EQUAL PROTECTION

27. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs 1 through 26 as though

specifically set forth herein and alleges as follows:

28. The actions of Tony Yarber, acting in his individual and official capacity as

Mayor of the Defendant, the City of Jackson, constitute unlawful sexual harassment.

29. The acts of the Defendants constitute a willful and intentional violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the 14th Amendment through

1983, and entitle Plaintiff to the recovery of damages.

COUNT II VIOLATIONS OF TITLE VII AND THE


14TH AMENDMENT THROUGH 1983 RETALIATION
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30. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all averments set forth through

Paragraphs 1 through 29 above as though specifically set forth herein.

31. Defendant City of Jackson, Mississippi has violated Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 and Defendants have violated the 14th Amendment through 42

U.S.C. 1983 by retaliating against Plaintiff for refusing the sexual advances of the Mayor

of the City of Jackson, Mississippi, Tony Yarber.

32. As a result of Defendants said retaliation, Plaintiff suffered damages,

including, but not limited to, compensatory damages, loss of reputation, humiliation,

embarrassment, emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, and mental anguish.

COUNT III VIOLATION OF THE ELECTRONIC


COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT and the STORAGE COMMUNICATIONS ACT

33. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs 1 through 32 as though

specifically set forth herein and alleges as follows:

34. By unlawfully accessing Plaintiffs personal email account as an

employee, agent and/or representative of the City of Jackson, Defendant City of

Jackson, Mississippi, along with John Does 1-3 violated the Electronic Communications

Privacy Act of 1986 as well as the Storage Communication Act.

35. Plaintiff has been harmed as a result of Defendants actions, and the

Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for the same.

36. The acts of the Defendants and their employees, agents and

representatives constitute a willful intentional violation of the Electronic Communications

Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq., and other state and federal laws, and

entitle Plaintiff to recovery of damages, both compensatory and punitive in nature.


Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 3 Filed 08/29/16 Page 8 of 9

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff respectfully prays that upon

hearing of this matter by a jury, the Plaintiff be granted the following relief in an amount

to be determined by the jury:

1. Reinstatement or future wages in lieu of reinstatement;


2. Back pay;
3. Compensatory damages;
4. Punitive damages;
5. Attorneys fees;
6. Costs and expenses; and
7. Any other relief to which she may be properly entitled.

THIS, the 29th day of August 2016.

Respectfully submitted,

KIMBERLY V. BRACEY, PLAINTIFF

By: /s Nick Norris


Louis H. Watson, Jr. (MB# 9053)
Nick Norris (MB#101574)
Attorneys for Plaintiff

OF COUNSEL:

WATSON & NORRIS, PLLC


1880 Lakeland Drive, Suite G
Jackson, Mississippi 39216-4972
Telephone: (601) 968-0000
Facsimile: (601) 968-0010
Email: louis@watsonnorris.com
Case 3:16-cv-00657-DPJ-FKB Document 3 Filed 08/29/16 Page 9 of 9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, NICK NORRIS, attorney for the Plaintiff, do hereby certify that I have this day

served via ECF filing or by United States mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy

of the above and foregoing document to the following counsel of record:

City of Jackson, Mississippi


City Clerk - Kristi Moore
219 South President Street
Jackson, MS 39205

Mayor Tony Yarber,


Office of the Mayor
219 S. President Street
Jackson, MS 39205

SO CERTIFIED, this the 29th day of August 2016.

s/Nick Norris
NICK NORRIS

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