Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
No. 16-P-1244.
1
Formerly known as Bank of New York, as trustee for the
Certificateholders CWABS, Inc., Asset Backed Certificates Series
2007-10.
2
at the time of foreclosure, did not hold both the mortgage and
the note, see Eaton v. Federal Natl. Mort. Assn., 462 Mass. 569,
2
For a discussion about MERS and its role in the
residential mortgage industry, see Eaton, 462 Mass. at 572 n.5.
3
a default.3
3
The mortgage stated that "Borrower understands and agrees
that MERS holds only legal title to the Interests granted by
Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to
comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and
Lender's successors and assigns) has the right to exercise any
or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the
right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action
required of Lender."
4
209 Code Mass. Regs. 18.00 et seq. (2013), entitled
"Conduct of the Business of Debt Collectors and Loan Servicers,"
was promulgated by the Massachusetts Division of Banks and Loan
Agencies. Section 18.21A(2)(c) provides:
place in August.
the Bank could not utilize the statutory power of sale remedy
Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011), S.C., 466 Mass. 156 (2013),
quoting from Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636
(2008).
in which the affiant avers that the Bank holds the note as
5
"PSAs are securitized trust agreements that operate[] as
the governing document for the Trust." Dyer v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,
141 F. Supp. 3d 149, 154 (D. Mass. 2015) (quotation omitted).
Under the PSA in this case, MERS was obliged to transfer certain
mortgage loans and their supporting documentation to the Bank no
later than thirty days after June 29, 2007.
6
General Laws c. 183, 54B, as amended by St. 2012,
c. 282, 2, reads as follows: " Notwithstanding any law to the
contrary, (1) a discharge of mortgage; (2) a release, partial
release or assignment of mortgage; (3) an instrument of
subordination, non-disturbance, recognition, or attornment by
the holder of a mortgage; (4) any instrument for the purpose of
foreclosing a mortgage and conveying the title resulting
therefrom, including but not limited to notices, deeds,
affidavits, certificates, votes, assignments of bids,
confirmatory instruments and agreements of sale; or (5) a power
of attorney given for that purpose or for the purpose of
servicing a mortgage, and in either case, any instrument
executed by the attorney-in-fact pursuant to such power, if
7
than MERS held, the mortgage in this case expressly granted MERS
Haskins v. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 632,
Strawbridge's property.
Bank Natl. Assn. v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637 (2011). There, the
provide proof that it was the mortgage holder at the time of the
the mortgage from MERS that predates the foreclosure notice sent
meaning of "nominee" was unclear, "the use of the word may have
some bearing on" the issue of agency. Eaton, supra at 590 n.29.
9
mortgage before the date noted in the PSA would, at most, only
9
Furthermore, because the mortgagees in Ibanez were the
plaintiffs in those cases, they bore the burden of proof. In
this case, Strawbridge, responding to a rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, bears the burden of showing she has advanced a
plausible claim.
10
Mellon Corp. v. Wain, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 498, 502 (2014) ("where
assignment process").10
validly held both the mortgage and the note at the time of the
10
Strawbridge attempts to frame her PSA argument as a trust
issue, claiming that because the assignment was not executed
prior to the date identified in the PSA, it was never validly
included as an asset of the CWABS trust and as such, the Bank,
in its capacity as trustee of the CWABS trust, has no authority
to foreclose. This argument is unavailing. Whether the PSA is
considered a contract or a trust document, Strawbridge is not a
party to that agreement or a third-party beneficiary thereof.
Consequently, where the assignment complies with the statutory
requirements, and there is no evidence to suggest the assignment
is void, Strawbridge does not have standing to challenge the
assignment. See Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 733 F.3d 349,
354 (1st Cir. 2013) ("[C]laims that merely assert procedural
infirmities in the assignment of a mortgage, such as a failure
to abide by the terms of a governing trust agreement, are barred
for lack of standing").
11
detract from the fact that the Bank held the mortgage and the
the foreclosure.
not have physical possession of the note, but need only "act[]
12
foreclosure, the Bank possessed both the mortgage and the note,
14.11
have not been addressed here, "they have not been overlooked.
of Rev. v. Ryan R., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 389 (2004) (quotation
omitted).
factual basis for her claim12 that the Bank lacks the authority
11
There is no language in either Eaton or G. L. c. 244,
14, that supports Strawbridge's arguments. Nowhere in Eaton
does it say that prior cases in which the actions of a mortgagee
were analyzed under the "previous statutory construction" of
G. L. c. 244, 14, are no longer applicable. The cases decided
since Eaton have applied the full weight of Eaton's prospective
holding when analyzing foreclosure actions by a mortgagee,
including the requirement that the mortgagee demonstrate that it
was in possession of the mortgage and the underlying note at the
time of the foreclosure, and have not limited their reliance to
the pre-Eaton understanding of a mortgagee, as Strawbridge
argues.
12
While the Supreme Judicial Court has not yet addressed
whether, in an action such as this one, the plaintiff-mortgagor
or the defendant-mortgagee bears the burden of proof, "because
the facts concerning the relationship between the mortgagee and
the note holder are far more readily available to them, and
because the statutory requirements governing nonjudicial
foreclosures must be strictly adhered to . . . , it can be
argued that once the mortgagor makes a plausible showing that
the mortgagee does not hold the note and is not acting on behalf
13
the judge's allowance of the Bank's rule 12(b)(6) motion was not
error.13
Judgment affirmed.