Supression of evidence

People vs padrigone
Facts:
Pedrigone assails the procedural irregularities committed by the prosecution and by the
trial court. He claims that the prosecution SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE by not presenting
Rowena, the rape victim, when the latter should have had her sane moments. As a
consequence, the trial court deprived Pedrigone of the opportunity to cross-examine her
when she was allegedly declared before the Chief of Police that it was only Pedrigone
who raped her which declaration became the basis for the latter's conviction.

Besides, the non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as

SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court,
the rule that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply
if:
1. he evidence is at the disposal of both parties;
2. the suppression was not willful;
3. it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and
4. the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a Suppression of Evidence.

Held:
Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case.
FIRST: The defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecutor
did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness
stand.
SECOND: Rowena was certified to be suffering from Acute Psychotic Depressive
Condition and thus, cannot stand judicial proceedings yet. The non-presentation
therefore, of Rowena was not willful.
THIRD: In any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact
witnessed the violation committed on her sister.
Power of Judicial Notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative
Merope Enriquez VDA de Catalan vs Louella A Catalan Lee
(not my digest)
Facts:
Case is for issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando
B. Catalan.
Orlando Catalan naturalized American citizen.
After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the US from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he
contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.
18 Nov 2004 Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
28 Feb 2005 Petitioner filed a Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration for her appointment as administrator of the intestate estate of
Orlando.
3 Mar 2005 respondent (one of the children from Orlandos first marriage), filed
a similar petition.
Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person
qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate
of Orlando.
o In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for
bigamy was filed against petitioner, alleging that petitioner contracted a
second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio
Bristol on 12 December 1959.
6 Aug 1998 RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy on the ground that the
deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since the deceased was a
divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under
Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.
o Furthermore, the court found that petitioner had never been married to
Eusebio Bristol.
26 June 2006, Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by
petitioner was dismissed.
o Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous
bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that
petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration.
CA denied appeal.
Issue:
1) WON Petitioner has proven her divorce with Eusebio Bristol, allowing her to
validly marry the deceased.
Held:
No. Evidence of the official documents of divorce was not presented.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June
2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be
REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
Our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign
nationality. (Citing Van Dorn v Romillo Jr.)
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated
in Garcia v. Recio.
o Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.
o A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
o The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official
body or tribunal of a foreign country.
o Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document.
o If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
o The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to
be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
 o Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18,
1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification.
Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge.
Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney,
Australia.
o The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.
In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations
in their answer when they introduce new matters.
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden
of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely
upon him.
o It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws.
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.
In the case at bar, the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity
of Orlandos divorce under the laws of the US and the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased.
Power of Judicial Notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative
Merope Enriquez VDA de Catalan vs Louella A Catalan Lee
(my digest)
FACTS
Deceased Orlando B. Catalan is a naturalized American citizen. After he obtained a
US divorce for his first marriage withFelicitas Amor, he subsequently contracted a
second marriage with herein petitioner Merope Enriquez Vda. De Catalan.Felicitas,
thereafter, filed a bigamy case against Merope for having contracted a second marriage
with her husband despite anexisting marriage to one Eusebio Bristol.Sometime in 1998,
the RTC acquitted Merope of bigamy . It ruled that since the deceased was a divorced
American citizen,and since that divorce was not recognized under the Philippine
jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.Furthermore, it found
out that petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.Sometime in 2004,
Orlando died inestate in the Philippines. Thus, on February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a
petition for the.Pending said petition, herein respondent, one of the children of Orlando
from his first marriage, filed a similar petition. The two caseswere subsequently
consolidated.Respondent questioned the legal standing of the petitioner to file such an
action. She alleged that Merope cannot beconsidered as an interested person
to qualified to file such action since she was never considered married to the deceased
by virtue of the decision of the RTC on the bigamy case.On June 26, 2006, the trial
court dismissed the petition filed by petitioner and granted that of the respondent. It held
that themarriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when
she married Orlando, and went on to say that petitioner was not an interested party
to file such petition.Hence, the petitioner went to the CA armed with a marriage
certificate of her marriage with Orlando. However, the CAdismissed the petition for
certiorari she filed and ruled that a marriage certificate, like any public document, is only
a prima facieevidence of facts stated therein. In addition the CA stated that the
deduction of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Merope, being the second wife of the deceased Orlando, has
a legal standing on filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration for
her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the latter notwithstanding
thededuction of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates
the validity of her subsequent marriage withOrlando B. Catalan has not been disproved
by her.
HELD:
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by thepolicy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law, as a matter of comity; provided further that before a
foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, thedocument must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decreeitself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an actof an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or officialrecord of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custodyof the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by theproper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is keptand (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like anyother facts, they must be alleged and proved. The power of judicial notice
must be exercised with caution, and everyreasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negativeIn this case, the US divorce obtained by Orlando, a naturalized
American citizen, for his marriage with Felicitas maybe recognized in the Philippines.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of
Orlandos divorce under the laws of
theUnited States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is
a need to remand the proceedings to the trialcourt

for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.Should petitioner prove
the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to
be issued theletters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of
administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly thedaughter or next of
kin of the deceased.
Judicial Notice of other proceedings
People vs Kulais
(not my digest)

FACTS
[August 22, 1990] five Informations for kidnapping for ransom and three
informations for kidnapping were filed before the RTC of Zamboanga City against
Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais,
Jalina Hassan de Kamming, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin
Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and several John and Jane Does.
The informations for kidnapping for ransom set forth identical allegations
save for the names of the victims.
The three informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances,
except the names of the victims.
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended.
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for
ransom and one count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which
offenses it imposed upon him six terms of life imprisonment.
It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for the
kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco.
[May 7, 1991] Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan
de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their Joint Notice of Appeal.
In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais,
withdrew their appeal because of their application for amnesty (said motion
granted)
Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of the SC.

ISSUE
Whether the trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in
another case, also pending before it, affects the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt
is proven beyond reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming
evidence, both testimonial and documentary.

HELD:
NO. The appeal of Kulais is bereft of merit.
In the case at bar, appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the
trial court took judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt.
Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops that captured
him and his purported cohorts. Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross-
examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the
latter's testimony should not be used against him.

even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it
did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence,
Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on the
positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod,
Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous
cross-examinations conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial court's
mention of Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither
affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.
Judicial Notice of other proceedings
People vs Kulais
(my digest)
Facts:
On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom and three informations
for kidnapping were filed before the RTC of Zamboanga City against Carlos
Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina Hassan
de Kamming, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah,
Freddie Manuel and several John and Jane Does. The informations for kidnapping for
ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the names of the victims. The
three informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims. Of
the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended.
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and
one count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon
him six terms of life imprisonment. It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal
detention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco.
On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de
Kulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their Joint Notice of Appeal. In a letter dated February 6,
1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their
application for amnesty. In a Resolution dated March 19, 1997, it granted the motion.
Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court is faulted with the following errors:
a. In taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case by Lt.
Melquiades Feliciano
b. On the assumption that Lt. Felicianos testimony could be validly taken judicial
notice of
Held:
Wherefore, the conviction of appellant Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping for
ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is affirmed, but the penalty imposed is
modified.
As a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in
other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or
have been heard and are actually pending before the same judge. This is especially
true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice
of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the
cases against the appellant. Hence, appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His
conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap
victims.
The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual,
having been clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial
courts finding of appellants guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.
Judical Notice of other proceedings
People vs Mendoza
Facts:
In the morning of June 9, 1981, Romeo Esquillo, a painter, was in his house at
Barangay San Gabriel, Malolos, Bulacan when he decided to go to a store nearby. At
the store, he was approached by a certain Roberto Marquez, who convinced him to go
to latter's house. While in the house of Marquez, a person by the name of Romeo
Magtoto arrived and he was introduced to Esquillo. Marquez, Esquillo and Magtoto on
board a motorcycle driven by Marquez, went to Malanday. When they reached
Malanday, a person, who was riding in a car approached them. Marquez told Esquillo
that the man was Barok Mendoza The group thereafter wen to the house of a friend of
Barok Mendoza where they took some drinks. After the drinking session, they
proceeded to Polo where they just stood by the street purportedly waiting for a friend to
pass by. When a red jeep (Isuzu pick-up KB) suddenly appeared, the group scrambled,
boarded their vehicles and chased the vehicle which turned out to be that of the
Alkuinos. Appellant rode in the car together with Ramos and Magtoto while Esquillo
rode at the back of the motorcycle driven by Marquez. When the motorcycle was
already very close to the pick-up vehicle of the Alkuinos, appellant gave Esquillo a gun
and told him that the occupants of the jeep have money and if he will not get the money
he will kill him (Esquillo). Esquillo did what was commanded of him. When he jumped
into the red jeep as ordered by Marquez, Esquillo poked the gun at the occupants of the
vehicle and announced the holdup.

Esquillo grabbed the bag containing money and checks worth P48,712.85. Eufrocina
Alkuino and Esquillo grappled for possession of the bag when suddenly the gun went
off. Eufrocina Alkuino felt that her middle finger was injured. At this point, Felipe Alkuino,
the husband of Eufrocina, joined in the grapple until it went off again hitting him in the
chest Esquillo ran with the bag but the contents thereof spilled out. Esquillo, Marquez
and Ramos helped each other pick up the money and placed them inside the bag
Eufrocina summoned for help and the people arrived immediately and brought Felipe to
the hospital where the later expired. The cause of death, as found by Dr. Bienvenido
Muoz, supervising medico-legal officer of the NBI, is hemmorrhage, acute, severe
secondary to gunshot wound. The victim suffered only one gunshot wound. Eufrocina
later identified the man who poked the gun at them as Romeo Esquillo and the two
others she saw in front of their vehicle when it suddenly stopped as Roberto Marquez
and Jose Ramos.In the meantime, Esquillo ran with the bag. He looked for his
companions but they already left him. He was chased by the barrio people and was
later arrested by a certain Sgt. Avelino Francisco. Esquillo was brought to the
Valenzuela Municipal Building where he was investigated. In the investigation
conducted on him, after the regained consciousness, he named his companions in the
robbery holdup as Roberto Marquez, Romeo Magtoto and Jose Ramos. Esquillo then
accompanied the Valenzuela police headed by then Lt. Carlos Tiquia and proceeded to
Catmon, Malolos, Bulacan where Marquez and Ramos were arrested. Magtoto was
able to elude the police and fled.
An investigation was conducted on Marquez and Ramos. This time Marquez mentioned
Melencio Mendoza as the Mastermined of the robbery holdup allegedly seconded by
Esquillo. A team of Valenzuela police was formed and headed for Catmon, Malolos,
Bulacan to track down Mendoza. The team waited for Mendoza as he was not home yet
at that time. At around 10:00 p.m., Mendoza alighted from a passenger jeepney and he
was informed about his alleged involvement in the robbery holdup to which accusation
he vehemently denied. The police brought him to their headquarters for questioning.
On June 10, 1981, a day after that robbery incident, Eufrocina Alkuino arrived at the
Valenzuela Municipal Building as she was informed that the suspects in the robbery
holdup were already apprehended and arrested. In the police line-up, Eufrocina Alkuino
pointed to Mendoza because, according to her, she heard Marquez and Esquillo telling
the police that Mendoza was the mastermined of the holdup. In the preliminary
investigation that was duly conducted by the Municipal Court of Valenzuela presided by
Judge Serapio, Mendoza was dropped from the charge as no probable cause was
found then to indict him to the crime of robbery with homicide and physical injuries.
Three separate Informations were duly filed with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Branch 171. In the course of the trial of Criminal. All the accused in the three criminal
cases were convicted of the crimes charged against them. Subsequently, the Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan filed a separate Information charging Mendoza with the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries, which was docketed as Criminal Case.
defense of the appellant is premised on his allegedly having been somewhere else
when the crime was committed. He claimed that he was working inside the bank on that
day and presented the logbook of the security guard which showed his entering the
place at 8:33 a.m. and leaving it at 5:32 p.m. The robbery happened at around 1:00
p.m. The appellant stated that he took his lunch at his place of work.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in having taken judicial notice of the testimonies in
criminal cases.
Held:
NO. Trial Court did not erred in having taken judicial notice of the testimoues in criminal
cases.
The accused-appellant further assails the court's having taken judicial notice of
Esquillo's testimony in another case despite its not having been offered nor admitted
because Mendoza was not an accused therein and he did not conform to the adoption
of said testimonies in this case. He further contends that granting it were admitted as
part of the prosecution's evidence in this case, it cannot be considered it was repudiated
by Esquillo himself.
This contention must likewise fail.
It is noted that when a motion to adopt the said testimonies of witnesses was made by
the prosecution, the appellant and his counsel did not object but instead gave their
consent.
Moreover, Esquillo was confronted with portions of his testimonies in the previous cases
which he merely denied or refused to explain. Said portions, thus, became part of his
testimony which were duly subjected to cross-examination by the defense counsel.
When confronted with statements given in his previous testimony, it became apparent
that Esquillo was trying to hide something but which he was not able to do when
cornered by the judge. In an effort to exculpate himself, Mendoza claims that he could
not have been at the scene of the crime since he was at his place of work from 8:30-
11:45 and 11:55-5:30 on that day. He presented as proof a xerox copy of his time
records, the logbook as prepared by the security guard on duty and a certification from
a bank officer that he was present that day.
The defense of the accused is mainly based on alibi which this Court has consistently
considered the weakest of all defenses.To established alibi, the accused must show
that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed
at the time of its commission The appellant has failed to establish the impossibility of his
presence at the scene of the crime considering that the distance between the bank and
place of the crime was only a few kilometers away. Also, the crime happened during
lunch break where absence of the employees is not noticeable.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The
appellant is found guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide but
indemnity is increased from THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) to FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) in accordance with recent rulings.