G.R. No.
L-48321 August 31, 1946 provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply with
OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in the
municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his
disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for registration on
January 17, 1940.
The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower court,
committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the
case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrease
promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the
Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant below to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of
the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
(Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under
the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.
As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to decree or
registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain
(sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).
As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the Public Land
Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature or classifications of the
sought to be registered.
It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate predecessor
in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its
registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessor in
interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits
the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the
registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the
applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the
lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be
called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be
availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is
disqualified.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a suit
between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be necessary,
if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not
even object to the application filed by the vendee.
Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without costs.
G.R. No. 112567 February 7, 2000
THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AQUILINO L. CARIO, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218, which affirmed
the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in LRC No. B-
467, ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of the private respondent.
The facts that matter are as follows:
On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cario, filed with the then Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Laguna, a petition1 for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of forty-three
thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less, forming part of a bigger tract of
land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna.
Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa
Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911, 2 and later administered by him in behalf of his five
brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934. 3
In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cario, became co-owners of Lot No. 6 by virtue
of an extra-judicial partition of the land embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the heirs of Teresa
Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole ownership of
Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent. 4
Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands (now Bureau of Lands Management),
disclosed:
 xxx xxx xxx
1. That the land subject for registration thru judicial confirmation of imperfect title is situated
in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna as described on plan Psu-
108952 and is identical to Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-0, Cabuyao Cadastre; and that the same
is agricultural in nature and the improvements found thereon are sugarcane, bamboo
clumps, chico and mango trees and one house of the tenant made of light materials;
2. That the land subject for registration is outside any civil or military reservation, riverbed,
park and watershed reservation and that same land is free from claim and conflict;
3. That said land is neither inside the relocation site earmarked for Metro Manila squatters
nor any pasture lease; it is not covered by any existing public land application and no patent
or title has been issued therefor;
4. That the herein petitioner has been in continuous, open and exclusive possession of the
land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his deceased mother, Teresa Lauchangco
as mentioned on the Extra-judicial partition dated July 26, 1963 which applicant requested
that said instrument will be presented on the hearing of this case; and that said land is also
declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6359 in the name of the petitioner;
xxx xxx x x x5
With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the Director of Lands as the only
oppositor, the proceedings below ended. On February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence on record,
the trial court granted private respondent's petition, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Count hereby orders and declares the registration and confirmation of
title to one (1) parcel of land identified as Lot 6, plan Psu-108952, identical to Cadastral Lot
No. 3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre, situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of
Cabuyao, province of Laguna, containing an area of FORTY THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED FOURTEEN (43,614) Square Meters, more or less, in favor of applicant
AQUILINO L. CARINO, married to Francisca Alomia, of legal age, Filipino, with residence
and postal address at Bian, Laguna.
After this decision shall have become final, let an order for the issuance of decree of
registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.6
From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court of Appeals, which, on
November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed from.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition; theorizing that:
I performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
HAS NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF HIS FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR PROOF OF
POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY THE
LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
HAS NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS A PORTION OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.7
The Petition is impressed with merit.
The petition for land registration8 at bar is under the Land Registration Act. 9 Pursuant to said Act, he
who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title
since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant,
a composicion con al estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and
"informacion possessoria" or "possessory information title", which would become a "titulo gratuito" or
a gratuitous title.10
In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced a single
muniment of title substantiate his claim of ownership. 11 The Court has therefore no other recourse,
but to dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration of subject land under Act 496.
Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land Act (CA
No. 141), as amended, private respondent's petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency of
evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is not enough to
prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years
required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,12 as amended R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No. 3872, the law
prevailing at the time the Petition of private respondent was filed on May 15, 1975, provides:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claim and the issuance of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless the occupant
can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required period to
constitute a grant from the State.13
Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration cases
is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed. In Director
of Lands vs. Agustin,14 this Court stressed that:
. . . The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens
system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of
his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court,
that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property
under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even
in the absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system,
upon the ground that the facts presented did not show that petitioner is the owner, in fee
simple, of the land which he is attempting to have registered. 15
There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles over public
agricultural lands may be granted judicial
recognition.16
The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of the public domain. As enunciated in Republic
vs. Lee:17
. . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the
utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its
command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of
real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence.
Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for
viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever
classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its right
over the same as dominus. . . .18
In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the petitioners may savor the benefit
resulting from the issuance of certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him
(petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for registration, for at least (30) thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of title. 19
In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his own possession of subject
parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extra-judicial
settlement and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the private respondent has
possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed his
petition for the registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his possession to what
he theorized upon as possession of the same land by his parents. However, other than his unilateral
assertion, private respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that
his late mother possessed the land in question even prior to 1911.1wphi1.nt
Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and circumstances
evidencing his alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements, which are mere
conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice. 20
From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the earliest tax declaration covering
Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214 issued in 1949 under the names of the private respondent
and his brother, Severino Cario. The same was followed by Tax Declaration No. 1921 issued in 1969
declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax
Declaration No. 6359 issued in 1974 in the name of private respondent, declaring an assessment of
Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy (P21,770.00) Pesos.21
It bears stressing that the Exhibit "E" referred to in the decision below as the tax declaration for subject
land under the names of the parents of herein private respondent does not appear to have any
sustainable basis. Said Exhibit "E" shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921 for Lot No. 6 in the name of
private respondent and not in the name of his parents. 22
The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court is
not without exceptions. Where, as in this case, pertinent records belie the findings by the lower courts
that subject land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of private respondent's predecessor-
in-interest, such findings have to be disregarded by this Court. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,23 the
Court ratiocinated thus:
This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court overlooked certain
facts of substance and value that if considered would affect the result of the case (People v.
Royeras, 130 SCRA 259) and when it appears that the appellate court based its judgment
on a misapprehension of facts (Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et
al., 97 SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88; Director of Lands v.
Funtillar, et al., G.R. No. 68533, May 3, 1986). This case therefore is an exception to the
general rule that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and
cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court.'
and
. . . in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering such a
pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below. The Supreme Court is
clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision. 24
Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial court. Had it examined the
original records of the case, the said court could have verified that the land involved was never
declared for taxation purposes by the parents of the respondent. Tax receipts and tax declarations
are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are mere indicia of claim of
ownership.25 In Director of Lands vs. Santiago.26
. . . if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in
possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for the
first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the
property.27
As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother had been in
possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence.
The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner", by which characteristics
private respondent describes his possession and that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law
requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private respondent, as
applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his
parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not
amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor. 28
In a case,29 this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the
registration of a parcel of land in the name of the applicant, pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Law; holding as follows:
Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged
twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which
supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application, was
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private
respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion that the
spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more
than twenty (20) years found in private respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Private respondent should have
presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession. . . . 30
The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot being claimed by the private
respondent ceased to be a public land and has become private property. 34 To reiterate, under the
Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State. 35 Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains
its basic rights over the same as dominus.36
Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his petition for
registration under the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present convincing and positive proof
of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en concepto de dueo for at
least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his petition, 37 the Court is of the opinion, and so
finds, that subject Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952, forms part of the public domain not
registrable in the name of private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11,
1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional
Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. 8-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No. 6, covered by and more
particularly described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a public land, under the administrative
supervision and power of disposition of the Bureau of Lands Management. No pronouncement as to
costs

In Director of Lands vs. Datu,31 the application for confirmation of imperfect title was likewise denied
on the basis of the following disquisition, to wit:

We hold that applicants' nebulous evidence does not support their claim of open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 2027-B en concepto de dueo. Although they
claimed that they have possessed the land since 1950, they declared it for tax purposes only
in 1972. It is not clear whether at the time they filed their application in 1973, the lot was still
cogon land or already cultivated land.

They did not present as witness their predecessor, Peaflor, to testify on his alleged
possession of the land. They alleged in their application that they had tenants on the land.
Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that the applicants had possessed
the land as owners.

xxx xxx xxx

On the basis of applicants' insubstantial evidence, it cannot justifiably be concluded that they
have an imperfect title that should be confirmed or that they had performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant of a portion of the public domain. 32

Neither can private respondent seek refuge under P.D. No. 1073, 33 amending Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 under which law a certificate of title may issue to any occupant of a public
land, who is a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open, continuous exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Failing to prove that his predecessors-in-interest
occupied subject land under the conditions laid down by law, the private respondent could only
establish his possession since 1949, four years later than June 12, 1945, as set by law.
G.R. No. 171631 November 15, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and GLICERIO R. DELA
PAZ, represented by JOSE R. DELA PAZ, Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No.
84206, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, in
LRC Case No. N-11514, granting respondents application for registration and confirmation of title
over a parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.

The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz,
and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an
application for registration of land3 under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with an area of 25,825
square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn-
00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig
Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the
following documents: (1) Special power of attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose
dela Paz to file the application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM
590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the annotation that the survey is inside L.C.
Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development,
Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic
Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated
June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated
March 10, 1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land patent or any public
land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila, that the tax on the real property for the year 2003 has been paid.

Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural land, by virtue
of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob4 dated June 18, 1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and
Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from their deceased parent
Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga
Pag-aari ng Namatay5 dated March 10, 1979. In their application, respondents claimed that they are
co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public,
adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents
further averred that by way of tacking of possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept
of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than fifty (50) years since the filing of
the application of registration with the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is classified
as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date, respondents presented
documentary evidence to prove compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the application for registration on the following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question for a period of not less than thirty (30) years; (2)
that the muniments of title, and/or the tax declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any,
attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
fide acquisition of the land applied for; and (3) that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public
domain belonging to the Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there
was no other oppositor to the application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default 6 against the whole world except as
against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in support of their application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application for registration of
the subject property. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered, judgment is hereby rendered
AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R.
dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal address at No. 65
Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described and bounded under Plan Ccn-
00-000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping,
containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters, more or less,
situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the operation of P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon payment of all taxes and
other charges due on the land, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration shall be
accordingly undertaken.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 8 The CA, in its Decision dated February
15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents
were able to show that they have been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of
the subject property through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest. The CA found that
respondents acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the concept of an owner since time
immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were able to present sufficient evidence to
establish that the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following grounds:
I SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING
RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN
IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT
IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT
IN RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO
PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.9
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents and their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in the concept of owners,
for more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to
show actual or constructive possession and occupation over the subject land in the concept of an
owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject property is within the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain. The subject property remained to be owned by the State
under the Regalian Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present evidence of specific acts of
ownership showing open, notorious, continuous and adverse possession and occupation in the
concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous and uninterrupted possession of
the subject land, they presented several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985,
1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents
presented a tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are
up to date in their payment of real property taxes. Respondents maintain that the annotations
appearing on the survey plan of the subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the issues
raised by the petitioner are questions of fact which the Court should not consider in a petition for
review under Rule 45.
The petition is meritorious.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited
to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of
support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts.10 It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is
a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous
as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. 11
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that the subject land is
part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.12 These the
respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence. 13
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated
to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. 14 The burden of proof
in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.15
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable,
respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-00008416 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos.
3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C.
Torres with the following annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau
of Forest Development, Quezon City on Jan. 03, 1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento,17 the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the
blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area,
Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry," is
insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the
land remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,18 the Court held that:
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law
is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable
and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject
of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative
action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable
and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the
Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of
the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of
the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government
agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche, 19 the Court held that the applicant bears
the burden of proving the status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he must present
a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR.
He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey
by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof required by law
to prove that the subject land falls within the alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed to
submit a certification from the proper government agency to establish that the subject land are part of
the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence
to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider
the same as still inalienable public domain.20
Anent respondents possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading of the records failed
to show that the respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and
occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphil
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation over the subject
property consists of the testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent
lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents predecessors-in-interest' possession
and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19,
1939,21 testified that since he attained the age of reason he already knew that the land subject of this
case belonged to them.22 Amado testified that he was a tenant of the land adjacent to the subject
property since 1950,23 and on about the same year, he knew that the respondents were occupying
the subject land.24
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no specific details as to
when respondents' predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of the land subject of this case.
While Jose testified that the subject land was previously owned by their parents Zosimo and Ester,
who earlier inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear evidence was presented to
show Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and that he had been in possession of the same
on or before June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by law. It is a rule that general
statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and
cannot suffice.25 An applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law
to embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the
alleged ownership and possession of the land. 26
Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best, respondents can only prove possession since
said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respondents
and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.27 Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in interest
have possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was
only in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for purposes of taxation.
Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or
of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed
property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration
or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
a claim of ownership.28
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that respondents by vs.
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988

Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest
vs.
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all
bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and
surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.

G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 15,
2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, vs.
Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land, HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all
with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight hundred twenty-five (25,825) square meters situated at surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED.
CRUZ, J.:

The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the
earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which have been
consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.

These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965,
by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and
Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered
by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-
9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3

In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject
land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after
the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under
claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who
declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado,
nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix
Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's
father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to
1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had
been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced
by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological
samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and
Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on
January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from
these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such
as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of
1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both
surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and
purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of
possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The applicants appealed to the
respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but
subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. 12 In other words, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving
the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The
Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private
respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable
and registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. The
Court of Appeals correctly declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral
claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June
Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James
E. Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of
the June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office
on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements
on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had
submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet
introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted
geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet
redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered
in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all
of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge
Mining Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims
of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the
Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become
private properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when
the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and
according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and
applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42
Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the
area from the public domain. Said the court in that case: The
moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on
the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with
law, the power of the United States Government to deprive him
of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the
located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands
and they were exempted from lands that could be granted to
any other person. The reservations of public lands cannot be
made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of
course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands
afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or
reservation does not affect the validity of the former location.
By such location and perfection, the land located is segregated
from the public domain even as against the Government.
(Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet,
160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only
to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to
the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right
to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and
conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of
a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public
domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining &
Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law
ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is perfected
it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of
present and exclusive possession, with the right to the
exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all
the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by
the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the
 locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent.
While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue
of his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the
fee remains in the government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L.
1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio
Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico
Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-
266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held
in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the
owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions
of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is
as good as though secured by patent.
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the
requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain,
and not even the government of the Philippines can take away this right from them.
The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties of the oppositors,
they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law. 13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made subject
to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the government established under
this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public agricultural lands,
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary
notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within
lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative
Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said
reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of
their respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in
force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over
the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the
land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15As the land had become the private property of the locators,
they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the "vicissitudes
of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private respondents aver,
by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the
case at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession
submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves had
acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged
possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16The trial judge, who had the opportunity to consider the
evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was not
convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse
of discretion or without sufficient basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really been in
possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining
claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and
they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators nor
were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio
testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind,
much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of
the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-
known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. 19 Under the aforesaid ruling, the
land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of
title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the
mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may
interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops
above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's
rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely
mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was
originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral
once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as mining operations were being undertaken
thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so,
because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the
surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:
 Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease
or concession at the time of the inauguration of government established under the
Constitution.

SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the
ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found
on or under the surface.

SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded
and excepted from all such patents.

SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted
from all such titles.

This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit
of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be
found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or
(for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize
the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could
be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that
once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time,
such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise
of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any
private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining
operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to
just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing
at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them
and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of
the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008 defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean
up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving,
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and other forms of contact recreation.3
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS (2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA,
FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON (3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
DECISION
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
VELASCO, JR., J.:
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the
attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of
pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper (7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale
few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself. 2 But amidst hard evidence and clear (8) Executive Order No. 192;
signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators
can still be heard.
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices
or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal (10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their
official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national priority it deserves, (11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the
environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.
(12) International Law

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay
life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a
and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and
institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular inspection
of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed
Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for
a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government
petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed
agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila
that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number
Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged
(MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and
that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law,
other forms of contact recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100
specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This
ml.4
environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from:

Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission
petitioners, testified about the MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the
[of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the
Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part
depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL
of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on ship-generated waste
treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes
accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and
rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming,
skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with
defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof,
to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and
concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment
facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and
operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate
and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes
but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution
of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage
disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the
marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic
animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of
cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the
free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which
eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the
government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of
sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge
companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal
sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the
importance of preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the
Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals
(CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police
(PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court
a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said
petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the
Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not
cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for
cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial
act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision
of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside
of their usual basic functions under existing laws. 7
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the following
ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON
BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION
DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND
DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS
 I First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC
POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL
ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the
headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are
they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be
compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. 8 A ministerial duty
is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." 9 It connotes an act in
which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising
under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law."10 Mandamus is available to compel
action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and
liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the
part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make
decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility studies and
cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners duty
to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of
discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for
example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to
contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether
or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDAs
ministerial duty to attend to such services.
We agree with respondents.
hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the
implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature
and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza11 in which the
Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027
directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-
called "Pandacan Terminals" within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate
with respect to the instant case, the MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is
ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDAs duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec.
3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope
of the MMDAs waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of
policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall
likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related
facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse
and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA
9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42
which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the
operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, 12 enjoining
the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15,
2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such
effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.
The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper
waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to exercise judgment and
choose to perform or not to perform."14 Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not
to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would
yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to
perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.
Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192, 15 is the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural
resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates
the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation,
more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under
the Acts Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location,
magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and
[takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution."
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an
Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area
Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA
9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible
for the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein.
As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and
publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months
following the completion of the status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months
following the completion of the framework for each designated water management area.
Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area governing board
every five (5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of
completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework. 16 Within twelve
(12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan. 17 Again,
like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the
assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-government
organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan
with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal
Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should
more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over
all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila
and several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for
the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can
prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor
and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and
furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm
water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with
providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection,
treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country. 19 In relation to the instant
petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292), 20 is
designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the
conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local government units
(LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance
system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and
managed on a sustainable basis.21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with
the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters. 22 More
specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall
primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development,
management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under
EO 29223 to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood
control and water resource development systems in accordance with national development objectives
and approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide
services relating to "flood control and sewerage management which include the formulation and
implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage
and sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA,
whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the
rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood control services. The
mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall include the removal
of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros
(drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and
Sec. 6 of PD 979,24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of
enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the
Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with the national rules and
policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for the
effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend
violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any
other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner,
into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged,
or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind,
or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter
of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and
passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same
shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and
 c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on
the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed
into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or
otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level
of pollution of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was
signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police
functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions
of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to perform such
functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and perform
the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate
with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the
territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce
said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations. 25
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate,
manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national
development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within the
ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its
purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs
and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles,
as well as movement within the port of watercraft. 27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78, 28 the
Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and
terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is
tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and
liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at
ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine
territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill
and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It
is primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which
would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are
dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid
waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non-
biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as enjoined
in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance
certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition
may be allowed "when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads,
parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and
concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways,
and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan,
Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay,
the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in
coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to
promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source
of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH,
in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and
standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation
of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage
or a mix sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.131 of
Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and
monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict
enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection
treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is
mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels. 32 Under
Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and
Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational campaign to
promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the
integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste
management principles.33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and
revenues so as to effectively achieve the countrys development objectives. 34
One of the countrys development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water
Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner
consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine
waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline processes
and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection
of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments
and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national
program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot
be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public
health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution
focusing on pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of
RA 9275 in line with the countrys development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and
complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We
need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the
cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies
concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such
water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain,
remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to
do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and
clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the
persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o, amended the
counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues,
however, to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26
hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the
applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up
any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have
been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency
cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same,
the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake
containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall
be reimbursed by the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper
administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to
the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were
sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real
since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the
DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves
only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general.
They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and
(h), which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills," as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged
or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result
from accidents such as collisions and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government
agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted
portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20
is limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are situations that presuppose the occurrence of
specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning
operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires "cleanup
operations" to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been
a specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as
mentioned in Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the
application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only.
Contrary to petitioners posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the
coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed
covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila
Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however,
emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational
scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated
in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.
To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow
reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the
Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup
coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase "cleanup operations"
embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases
"cleanup operations" and "accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter
where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government
agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act
even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage." This section, to stress, commands
concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary to
meet the prescribed water quality standards." In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of
water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly
applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the
mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the
cleanup work for the polluters account. Petitioners assertion, that they have to perform cleanup
operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do
not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier
discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific
duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them.
Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275
on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident.
In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at
once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive
program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 &
20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents." 35
Granting arguendo that petitioners position thus described vis--vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is
correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude
and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution
incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are.
We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water pollution incidents" which may be caused by
polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or
waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to "any
person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies," which may refer to an individual or an
establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the
contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so
numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond
the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so
undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila
Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has
been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove, or clean
up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and
undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for
all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-
term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as
important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the
rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise,
any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water
quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and
other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies
and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform,
their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water
to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus," 36 the Court
may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its
decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of
continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges
River from industrial and municipal pollution.37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which
do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region
(NCR) (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the
Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River,
the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which
discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and
eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems
and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal
or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts
to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much. 38
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or
the Water Code,39 which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers
and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout
their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20)
meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins,
are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation,
floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zonelonger
than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along
or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they
may not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly
contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the concerned LGUs,
have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a
reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their
industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major
rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying establishments shall be shut
down or asked to transfer their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply
with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage
problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there
reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights
of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and
Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off.
Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the
surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste
in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that
lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an
understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains
of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River
systems and Manila Bay.40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established
as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be
taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.No open dumps shall
be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person,
including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after
the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5)
years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended
on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with
the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping
of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open
burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal
facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in the Manila
Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water
bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport
or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which
proscribes the introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment including
"dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of
petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid,
gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme
necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge
their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need
to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them
by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot
be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor
and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting
as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all
civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that
the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila
Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their
limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes
unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities
cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and
rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners hiding behind two untenable claims: (1)
that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the
cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the
State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. 41 Even assuming the absence of a
categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and
women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the
waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal
of the trust reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No.
1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or
supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-
government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and
maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural
resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency
responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement
its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and
conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination
meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful
implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the
Local Government Code of 1991,42 the DILG, in exercising the Presidents power of general
supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under
Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments,
and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction,
such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las
Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando
(Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other
minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting
the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as
prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall
be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks
within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing
into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines
and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and
maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite
where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the
DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the
efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore
the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite,
Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and
aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with
Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550,
and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,49 the DepEd
shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like
subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and,
through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining
a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of
2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and
preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development objective to
attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our
marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP
Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing
mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report
of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge
and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters
from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.

(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects
and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP
Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other
agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments
established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San
Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal
implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more
particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall
remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA
7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways,
and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed
by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial
jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills
and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal
cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003, 47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean
Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.

(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from
finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities
for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall
give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the
necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
G.R. No. 162243 November 29, 2006

HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as

Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Petitioner,
vs.
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 164516 November 29, 2006

PICOP RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 171875 November 29, 2006

THE HON. ANGELO T. REYES (formerly Hon. Elisea G. Gozun), in his capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Petitioner,
vs.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES (PICOP), Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

On the line are three consolidated Petitions, all arising from the 11 October 2002 Quezon City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision1 granting the Petition for Mandamus filed by Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP). The Court of Appeals affirmed the 11 October 2002 RTC
Decision, with modification, in a 19 February 2004 Decision. 2

In G.R. No. 162243, then Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary
Heherson T. Alvarez, who was later successively substituted by subsequent DENR Secretaries Elisea
G. Gozun and Angelo T. Reyes, assails the 19 February 2004 Decision insofar as it granted the
Petition for Mandamus. In G.R. No. 164516, PICOP assails the same Decision insofar as it deleted
the imposition of damages against then Secretary Alvarez. Secretary Reyes filed a third Petition
docketed as G.R. No. 171875, assailing the 16 December 2004 Amended Decision3 of the Court of
Appeals lifting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction that enjoined the enforcement of the 11 October 2002
Decision and 10 February 2003 Orders of the RTC.

FACTS

The facts, culled from the records of the three consolidated petitions, are as follows:
On 24 May 1952, PICOPs predecessor, Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. (BBLCI) was granted Timber
License Agreement (TLA) No. 43.4 The TLA was amended on 26 April 1953 and 4 March 1959. As
amended, TLA No. 43 covers an area of 75,545 hectares in Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Sur,
Compostela Valley, and Davao Oriental.
Allegedly sometime in 1969, the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued a presidential warranty to
BBLCI, confirming that TLA No. 43 "definitely establishes the boundary lines of [BBLCIs] concession
area."5
TLA No. 43, as amended, expired on 26 April 1977. It was renewed on 7 October 1977 for another 25
years to "terminate on April 25, 2002."6
On 23 December 1999, then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles promulgated DENR Administrative
Order (DAO) No. 99-53 which had for its subject, the "Regulations Governing the Integrated Forest
Management Program (IFMP)."7
In a 28 August 2000 letter to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),
DENR-Region XIII-D4, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, PICOP signified its intention to convert its TLA No. 43
into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) invoking the provisions of Section 9,
Chapter III of DAO No. 99-53.8
Acting on the said letter, Forester III Trifino M. Peregrino, In-Charge, Office of the CENRO, wrote a
letter dated 1 September 2000 to PICOPs resident manager in Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur,
informing PICOP "that we will consider said letter as an advance notice considering that it is yet
premature to act on your request since we are yet in CY 2000." 9
In a 24 January 2001 letter, Neolito Frondozo, Group Manager, Forest Operations Manager of PICOP,
requested for a favorable indorsement of their letter of intent from the CENRO of the DENR, Region
XIII-D4 in Bislig City. This was followed up by another letter dated 25 January 2001 of Wilfredo D.
Fuentes, Vice President and Resident Manager of PICOP, to the Regional Executive Director (RED),
DENR, Caraga Region XIII in Ambago, Butuan City, likewise, requesting for a favorable indorsement
of their letter of intent to the DENR Secretary. 10
The Officer-In-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director Constantino A. Paye, Jr., in a 6 March 2001
Memorandum, forwarded PICOPs letter of intent dated 28 August 2000 to the DENR Secretary
informing the latter that the DENR Caraga Region XIII in Ambago, Butuan City, had created a team
tasked to conduct a performance evaluation on PICOP on the said TLA pursuant to DAO No. 99-53.11
Subsequently, Elias R. Seraspi, Jr., RED, DENR, Caraga Region XIII in Ambago, Butuan City,
submitted a 31 July 2001 Memorandum to the DENR Secretary on the performance evaluation of
PICOP on its TLA No. 43. Paragraph 11 of the same Memorandum reads:
Hence, it is imperative to chart a good forest policy direction for the management, development and
protection of TLA No. 43 after it expires on April 26, 2002 for the purpose of sustainable forest
management of the area in support of national development. With this vision, the proper evaluation to
consider the request for automatic conversion of TLA No. 43 to IFMA pursuant to Section 9, DENR
A.O. No. 99-53, upon its expiration on April 26, 2002 is hereby recommended.12
Attached to said Memorandum, inter alia, were the 11 July 2001 Report and 27 July 2001
Supplemental Report of the Performance Evaluation Team created to conduct such performance
evaluation indicating violations by PICOP of existing DENR Rules and Regulations governing TLA No.
43, such as the non-submission of its five-year forest protection plan and seven-year reforestation
plan as required by the DENR rules and regulations. The said 31 July 2001 Memorandum was
forwarded to the Forest Management Bureau (FMB) for appropriate action and recommendation. 13
Sometime in September 2001, the DENR Secretary was furnished a copy of Forest Management
Specialist II (FMS II) Teofila L. Orlanes 24 September 2001 Memorandum concerning alleged unpaid
and overdue forest charges of respondent on TLA No. 43. Attached thereto was a 19 September 2001
Memorandum of Amelia D. Arayan, Bill Collector of the DENR R13-14, Bislig City, likewise indicating
purported unpaid and overdue forest charges by PICOP on its TLA No. 43. 14
Said Memorandum was referred to FMB Director Romeo T. Acosta, who directed FMB Senior Forest
Management Specialist (SFMS) Ignacio Evangelista to proceed to Region 13 to gather forestry-related
data and validate the report contained in the respective Memoranda of Orlanes and Arayan. 15 SFMS
Evangelista found that the 8 May 2001 to 7 July 2001 forest charges adverted to in the Orlanes and
Arayan Memoranda was belatedly filed. He also found that PICOP had not paid its regular forest
charges covering the period of 22 September 2001 to 26 April 2002 in the total amount of
15,056,054.05.16 Moreso, he discovered that from 1996 to 30 August 2002, PICOP was late in
paying some of its forest charges in 1996, and was consistently late in paying all its forestry charges
from 1997 onwards.17
The overdue and unpaid forest charges (including penalties, interests and surcharges) of PICOP total
150,169,485.02. Its silvicultural fees amount to 2,366,901.00 from 1996 up to 30 August 2002. In
all, PICOP has an outstanding and overdue total obligation on its forest charges in the amount of
167,592,440.90 as of 30 August 2002.18
Thus, FMB Director Acosta submitted a 5 October 2001 Memorandum to the DENR Secretary
concerning PICOPs application for conversion of its TLA No. 43 into an IFMA, viz:
RECOMMENDATION
The conversion of the TLA into IFMA is primarily aimed at sustaining the raw materials for the
continuous operation of the integrated wood processing plant of the company. However, the very
complex issues presented cannot just be ignored and have to be fully addressed to before further
appropriate action is taken on the application for conversion. In the absence of categorical comments
and recommendation of the regional office to resolve the issue, it is recommended that a transition
team composed of the following be created: x x x.19
In lieu of a transition team, the DENR Secretary constituted a negotiating team by virtue of Special
Order No. 2001-698 dated 23 October 2001 composed of Undersecretary Ramon J.P. Paje as
chairman, with the following as members: Undersecretary Gregorio V. Cabantac and FMB Assistant
Director Neria A. Andin. The team was authorized to negotiate for such terms and conditions as are
advantageous to the Government.20
The DENR Secretary sent a 25 October 2001 letter to PICOP, through its president, requesting him
to designate its representative/s to discuss with the DENR negotiating team "the conditions and details
of the said IFMA including the production sharing arrangement between PICOP and the
government."21
Since PICOP failed to send a representative, and considering that TLA No. 43 was about to expire,
DENR Undersecretary Paje called for a meeting on 21 March 2002. It was only then, or almost five
months from the receipt of the 25 October 2001 letter from the DENR Secretary, that PICOP sent its
representatives to the DENR.22
On 9 April 2002, the DENR Negotiating Team issued Resolution No. 1, series of 2002, creating a
Technical Working Committee (TWC) to provide technical assistance to the negotiating team
composed of representatives from both DENR and PICOP. 23 On 10 April 2002, the members of the
TWC met and discussed the findings of the Performance Evaluation Team that PICOP has neither
submitted its Five-Year Forest Protection Plan nor presented its Seven-Year Reforestation Plan, both
being required by DENR rules and regulations. In the same meeting, PICOP agreed to secure and
submit a clearance from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as required by
Section 59 of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). 24
On 15 April 2002, another TWC meeting was conducted, wherein the proposed validation of PICOPs
overall performance "as part of the evaluation process for the conversion of the TLA into an IFMA"
was discussed with PICOP representatives being given copies of the performance evaluation of
PICOP on its TLA No. 43.25 PICOPs representatives were subsequently requested to prepare a map
showing by categories the area planted with trees in compliance with PICOPs reforestation
requirements.26
In the next TWC meeting on 19 April 2002, PICOPs representatives were asked of their compliance
with their agreement during the 10 April 2002 meeting that they should have submitted a list of
stockholders on 15 April 2002. The PICOP representatives did not submit such list and instead
inquired on the TWCs interpretation of the 25 October 2001 letter of the DENR Secretary to PICOP,
which provides in full, thus:
25 October 2001
MR. TEODORO G. BERNARDINO
President
PICOP Resources Incorporated
2nd Flr, Moredel Building
2280 Pasong Tamo Extension
Makati City
Dear Mr. Bernardino:
Consistent with our attached Memorandum to Her Excellency, the President, dated 17 October 2001
and in response to your Letter of Intent dated 25 February 2001, we wish to inform you that, pursuant
to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-53, we have cleared the conversion of PICOPs Timber License
Agreement (TLA) No. 43 to Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) effective from the
expiration of said TLA on April 26, 2002.
In this regard, you are hereby requested to designate PICOPs representative(s) to discuss with the
DENR Team, created under Special Order No. 2001-638, the conditions and details of the said IFMA,
including the production sharing agreement between PICOP and the government.
For your information and guidance.
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ
Secretary27
It was the position of the DENR members of the TWC that PICOPs application for the IFMA
conversion should undergo the process as provided in DAO No. 99-53. PICOP representative Atty.
Caingat, however, claimed that "the TLA has been converted" and suggested the suspension of the
meeting as they would submit a written position on the matter the following day. 28
On 22 April 2002, the TWC members of the DENR received a letter from PICOP dated 18 April 2002
insisting that "the conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA has already been completed" and indicated that
they had "no choice except to decline participation in the ongoing meeting and bring our issues to the
proper public and legal forum."29
On 24 April 2002, the TWC submitted a Memorandum dated 22 April 2002 to the Undersecretary for
Operations and Undersecretary for Legal, Lands and International Affairs of the DENR, enumerating
the salient points taken up during the TWC meetings. This includes the performance evaluation report
of the DENR Regional Office covering the period from 24 June 1999 to 23 June 2000. The report
states that PICOP has not submitted its 5-Year Forest Protection Plan and 7-Year Reforestation Plan;
that it has unpaid and overdue forest charges; and its failure to secure a clearance from the Regional
Office of the NCIP considering the presence of Indigenous Peoples (IPs) in the area and Certificate
of Ancestral Domain Claims issued within the area.
The DENR Secretary instructed the RED, Caraga Region, to coordinate with PICOP and reiterate the
requirements for conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA.
Thereafter, the FMB Director received a letter dated 6 August 2002 from NCIP Chairperson Atty.
Evelyn S. Dunuan informing him that, based on their records, no certification has been issued to
PICOP concerning its application for conversion of its TLA No. 43 into IFMA, "as there has never been
an application or endorsement of such application to our office." 30
On 12 August 2002, a meeting was held at the Office of the President of the Philippines presided by
Undersecretary Jose Tale and Undersecretary Jake Lagonera of the Office of the Executive Secretary.
PICOPs representatives committed to submit the following, to wit:
1. Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation issued on 12 August 2002 that
extended PICOPs corporate term for another fifty (50) years;
2. Proof of Payment of forest charges;
 3. Proof of Payment of Reforestation Deposit;
4. Response to social issues, particularly clearance from the NCIP; and
5. Map showing reforestation activities on an annual basis. 31
PICOP submitted its purported compliance with aforesaid undertaking through a letter dated 21
August 2002 to the DENR Secretary. Upon evaluation of the documents submitted by PICOP, the
TWC noted that:
a) PICOP did not submit the required NCIP clearance;
b) The proof of payments for forest charges covers only the production period from 1 July
2001 to 21 September 2001;
c) The proof of payment of reforestation deposits covers only the period from the first quarter
of CY 1999 to the second quarter of CY 2001;
d) The map of the areas planted through supplemental planting and social forestry is not
sufficient compliance per Performance Evaluation Teams 11 July 2001 report on PICOPs
performance on its TLA No. 43, pursuant to Section 6.6 of DAO 79-87; and
e) PICOP failed to respond completely to all the social issues raised. 32
Accordingly, the Secretary of DENR claims that further processing of PICOPs application for the
conversion of TLA No. 43 cannot proceed until PICOP complies with the requirements.
Insisting that the conversion of its TLA No. 43 had been completed, PICOP filed a Petition for
Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez before the RTC of Quezon City, which
was raffled to Branch 220, presided by Hon. Jose G. Paneda. The petition was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-02-47764 (hereinafter referred to as the MANDAMUS CASE).
On 11 October 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision granting PICOPs Petition for Mandamus, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Mandamus is hereby GRANTED.
The Respondent DENR Secretary Hon. Heherson Alvarez is hereby ordered:
1. to sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and/or documents to PICOP and issue the
corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the IFMA, formerly TLA
No. 43, as amended;
2. to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from the said
area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw material requirements of petitioners pulp and
paper mills in accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969 between the
government and PICOPs predecessor-in-interest; and
3. to honor and respect the Government Warranties and contractual obligations to PICOP
strictly in accordance with the warranty and agreement dated July 29, 1999 (sic) between
the government and PICOPs predecessor-in-interest (Exhibits "H", "H-1" to "H-5",
particularly the following:
a) the area coverage of TLA No. 43, which forms part and parcel of the government
warranties;
b) PICOP tenure over the said area of TLA No. 43 and exclusive right to cut, collect
and remove sawtimber and pulpwood for the period ending on April 26, 1977; and
said period to be renewable for [an]other 25 years subject to compliance with
constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber
concessions; and
c) The peaceful and adequate enjoyment by PICOP of the area as described and
specified in the aforesaid amended Timber License Agreement No. 43.
The Respondent Secretary Alvarez is likewise ordered to pay petitioner the sum of 10 million a month
beginning May 2002 until the conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, to IFMA is formally effected and
the harvesting from the said area is granted.33
On 25 October 2002, the DENR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 34
PICOP filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Mandatory Injunction. 35
On 12 November 2002, then DENR Secretary Alvarez filed a Motion to Inhibit Hon. Jose G. Paneda
from further trying the case, attaching to said motion an administrative complaint against the latter
which was filed by the former before the Office of the Court Administrator. 36 The Motion was denied
in an Order dated 10 December 2002.
On 19 December 2002, PICOP filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implead Hon. Elisea Gozun as
respondent,37which was granted. Elisea Gozun was, thus, substituted as respondent in her official
capacity as the new DENR Secretary.38
On 6 November 2002, then NCIP Chairperson Atty. Evelyn S. Dunuan sent a letter to the DENR (1)
informing the DENR Secretary that after validation by the NCIP, it was found out that the area of
47,420 hectares covered by PICOPs TLA No. 43 conflicts with the ancestral domains of the Manobos;
and (2) reiterating the information that no NCIP certification was sought by PICOP to certify that the
area covered by TLA No. 43, subject of its IFMA conversion, does not overlap with any ancestral
domain. Accordingly, she "strongly urge[d] the revocation of the one-year permit granted to PICOP
until the full provisions of [the] IPRA are followed and the rights of our Indigenous Peoples over their
ancestral land claims are respected."39
On 25 November 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297,
"EXCLUDING A CERTAIN AREA FROM THE OPERATION OF PROCLAMATION NO. 369 DATED
FEBRUARY 27, 1931, AND DECLARING THE SAME AS MINERAL RESERVATION AND AS
ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA." The excluded area consists of 8,100 hectares, more or less,
which formed part of PICOPs expired TLA No. 43, subject of its application for IFMA conversion. 40
On 21 January 2003, PICOP filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the aforesaid presidential
proclamation as well as its implementing DENR Administrative Order No. 2002-35 (DAO No. 2002-
35) which was raffled to Branch 78 of the RTC in Quezon City. The Petition was docketed as Special
Civil Action No. Q-03-48648 (hereinafter referred to as the NULLITY CASE).
In said NULLITY CASE, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining respondents
therein41from implementing the questioned issuances. The DENR Secretary and her co-respondents
in said case filed on 6 February 2003 an Omnibus Motion (1) To Dissolve the Temporary Restraining
Order dated 3 February 2003; and (2) To Dismiss (With Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction).42
The trial court issued a Resolution dated 19 February 2003 granting the Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the Petition does not state a cause of action.43 PICOP filed a Motion for Reconsideration
as well as a Motion to Inhibit. On 24 March 2003, the presiding judge of Branch 78 inhibited himself
from hearing the case.44 Accordingly, the NULLITY CASE was re-raffled to Branch 221 of the RTC of
Quezon City, which granted PICOPs Motion for Reconsideration by setting for hearing PICOPs
application for preliminary injunction.
Meanwhile, in the MANDAMUS CASE, the RTC denied the DENR Secretarys Motion for
Reconsideration and granted the Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of
Mandatory Injunction via a 10 February 2003 Order. 45 The fallo of the 11 October 2002 Decision was
practically copied in the 10 February 2003 Order, although there was no mention of the damages
imposed against then Secretary Alvarez.46 The DENR Secretary filed a Notice of Appeal 47 from the
11 October 2002 Decision and the 10 February 2003 Order.
On 28 February 2003, the DENR Secretary filed before the Court of Appeals, a Petition for Certiorari
With a Most Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction insofar as the trial court ordered the execution of its 11 October 2002 Decision
pending appeal. The petition (hereinafter referred to as the INJUNCTION CASE) was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 75698, which was assigned to the Special 13th Division thereof.
On 11 March 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a 60-day TRO48 enjoining the enforcement of the 11
October 2002 Decision and the 10 February 2003 Order of the RTC. On 30 April 2003, the Court of
Appeals issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 49
On 30 October 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision50 in the INJUNCTION CASE granting
the Petition and annulling the Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Mandatory Injunction issued by the
trial court. PICOP filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 51
On 19 February 2004, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision52 on the
MANDAMUS CASE, affirming the Decision of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with modification that the order directing then
DENR Secretary Alvarez "to pay petitioner-appellee the sum of P10 million a month beginning May,
2002 until the conversion to IFMA of TLA No. 43, as amended, is formally effected and the harvesting
from the said area is granted" is hereby deleted. 53
PICOP filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration54 of this Decision, which was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a 20 July 2004 Resolution.55
Meanwhile, in a 22 March 2004 Resolution, 56 the Special Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals
held in abeyance the ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration of the INJUNCTION CASE pending the
Seventh Divisions resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration of the 19 February 2004 Decision in
the MANDAMUS CASE.
The DENR Secretary and PICOP filed with this Court separate Petitions for Review on the 19 February
2004 Court of Appeals Decision in the MANDAMUS CASE. These Petitions were docketed as G.R.
No. 162243 and 164516, respectively.
On 16 December 2004, the Special Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended
Decision57 on the INJUNCTION CASE lifting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction it had previously issued,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 22, 2004 holding in abeyance the resolution of the motion
for reconsideration of Our October 30, 2003 decision is set aside and the Decision dated October 30,
2003 reconsidered.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 30 April 2003 is hereby lifted and dissolved and the Order
dated 10 February 2003 allowing execution pending appeal and authorizing the issuance of the writ
of mandamus and/or writ of mandatory injunction is hereby affirmed. The Petition dated February 27,
2003 is herewith dismissed.58
Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration in a 9 March 2006 Resolution, 59 the DENR Secretary
filed with this Court, a Petition for Review60 of the INJUNCTION CASE. The Petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 171875.
On 5 July 2006, this Court resolved61 to consolidate G.R. No. 162243, 164516, and 171875.
ISSUES
In G.R. No. 162243, the DENR Secretary brought forth the following issues for our consideration:
I
WHETHER THE PRESIDENTIAL WARRANTY IS A CONTRACT WHICH CONSTITUTES A LEGAL
BAR TO THE EXERCISE BY THE STATE OF ITS FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
REGARDING THE EXPLORATION DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION OF ITS NATURAL
RESOURCES.
II
WHETHER [PICOP] HAD ACQUIRED A VESTED RIGHT OVER ITS FOREST CONCESSION AREA
BY VIRTUE OF THE AFORESAID PRESIDENTIAL WARRANTY.
III
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THIS CASE
BECAUSE THE SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF PERTAINS TO THE EXCLUSIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE DOMAIN OF [THE DENR SECRETARY].
IV
WHETHER [PICOPS] PETITION FOR MANDAMUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (1) FOR
LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION; AND (2) BECAUSE THE SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF IS NOT
CONTROLLABLE BY CERTIORARI.
V watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
WHETHER [PICOP] HAS FAITHFULLY COMPLIED WITH ALL THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS ENTITLING IT TO AN IFMA CONVERSION.
VI
WHETHER [PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 605]62 HAS BEEN PARTLY REPEALED BY [REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 8975].63
In G.R. No. 164516, PICOP submits the sole issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY DELETED THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO
PETITIONER BY THE TRIAL COURT.64
Finally, in G.R. No. 171875, the DENR Secretary submits the following arguments:
A. [PICOP] DID NOT ACTUALLY FILE A MOTION FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.
B. THERE ARE NO GOOD REASONS FOR THE GRANT OF EXECUTION PENDING
APPEAL.65
THIS COURTS RULING
Whether or not outright dismissal was proper
Since the third, fourth and sixth issues raised by the DENR Secretary, if determined in favor of the
DENR Secretary, would have warranted an outright dismissal of the MANDAMUS CASE as early as
the trial court level, it is proper to resolve these issues first.
The DENR Secretary alleges that the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the MANDAMUS CASE
pertains to the exclusive administrative domain of the DENR, and therefore, the RTC had been in
error in taking cognizance thereof. The DENR Secretary adds that, assuming arguendo that the RTC
properly took cognizance of the MANDAMUS CASE, it committed a reversible error in not dismissing
the same (1) for lack of cause of action; and (2) because the subject matter thereof is not controllable
by mandamus.
The Petition filed before the trial court was one for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction with damages. Specifically, it sought to compel the
DENR Secretary to: (1) sign, execute and deliver the IFMA documents to PICOP; (2) issue the
corresponding IFMA number assignment; and (3) approve the harvesting of timber by PICOP from
the area of TLA No. 43. The DENR Secretary contends that these acts relate to the licensing regulation
and management of forest resources, which task belongs exclusively to the DENR66 as conveyed in
its mandate:
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the countrys environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation and
resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos. 67
The Court of Appeals ruled:
The contention does not hold water. In its petition for mandamus, [PICOP] asserted that "DENR
Secretary Alvarez acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction in refusing to
perform his ministerial duty to sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and to issue the
corresponding IFMA number to it." The cited jurisdiction of the DENR on licencing regulation and
management of our environment and natural resources is not disputed. In fact, the petition seeks to
compel it to properly perform its said functions in relation to [PICOP]. What is at stake is not the scope
of the DENR jurisdiction but the manner by which it exercises or refuses to exercise that jurisdiction.
The courts have the duty and power to strike down any official act or omission tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The 1987 Constitution is explicit in providing that judicial power includes not only
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government.68
The Court of Appeals is correct. Since PICOP alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
DENR Secretary, it behooves the court to determine the same. An outright dismissal of the case would
have prevented such determination.
For the same reason, the MANDAMUS CASE could not have been dismissed outright for lack of cause
of action. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint.69 In ruling upon the DENR Secretarys Motion to Dismiss, PICOPs
allegation that it has a contract with the government should, thus, be hypothetically admitted.
Necessarily, the DENR Secretarys argument that there was no such contract should be considered
in the trial of the case and should be disregarded at this stage of the proceedings.
The DENR Secretary, however, counters that he/she has not yet exercised his/her exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, i.e., either to approve or disapprove PICOPs
application for IFMA conversion. Hence, it is argued that PICOPs immediate resort to the trial court
was precipitate based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 70
The Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is disregarded
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, 71 which are averred to
be extant in this case, citing PICOPs employment of a sizable number of workers and its payment of
millions in taxes to the government.72 The Court of Appeals appends:
Moreover, contrary to [the DENR Secretarys] claim, the approval of an application for IFMA
conversion is not purely discretionary on the part of the DENR Secretary since the approval of an
IFMA conversion depends upon compliance with the requirements provided under DAO No. 99-53.
Of course, as earlier intimated, even assuming, arguendo, that the approval of an IFMA conversion
involves the exercise of discretion by the DENR Secretary, the writ of mandamus may be issued to
compel the proper exercise of that discretion where it is shown that there was grave abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. 73
While the Court of Appeals is correct in making such rulings, such accuracy applies only insofar as
the RTC assessment that the MANDAMUS CASE should not have been subjected to outright
dismissal. The issue of whether there was indeed an urgency of judicial intervention (as to warrant
the issuance of a writ of mandamus despite the exclusive jurisdiction of the DENR) is ultimately
connected to the truth of PICOPs assertions, which were hypothetically admitted in the motion to
dismiss stage. In other words, it all boils down to whether the DENR Secretary committed grave abuse
of discretion in not executing the IFMA documents and in not approving PICOPs harvesting of timber
from the area of TLA No. 43. The sixth issue raised by the DENR Secretary concerns Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 605 which, according to the Court of Appeals had been partly repealed by
Republic Act No. 8975. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 605 provides:
SECTION 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the
issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the
proper administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of
any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development of
the natural resources of the Philippines.
According to the Court of Appeals,
Section 1 of PD 605 has been partly repealed by RA No. 8975, enacted on November 7, 2002. Section
3 of the said law limits the prohibition on the issuance of restraining orders and injunctions to the
following:
"(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site of location of any national
government project;
"(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2
hereof;
"(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or
project;
"(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
"(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/project."
Noticeably, the subject coverage on concessions, licenses and the like contemplated in Section 1 of
PD 605 is notreproduced in the foregoing enumeration under Section 3 of R.A. 8975. The effect of the
non-reenactment is a partial repeal of Section 1 of PD 605. It is a rule of legal hermenuetics (sic) that
an act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain operates as a repeal of anything
omitted which was contained in the old act and not included in the act as revised. As the repealing
clause of R.A. 8975 states:
"Sec. 9. Repealing Clause All laws, decrees including Presidential Decree Nos. 605, 1818 and
Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with
this act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly." 74
The DENR Secretary claims that since Republic Act No. 8975 simply declares that Presidential Decree
No. 605 or parts thereof "inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly,"
then, there should be an inconsistency between Presidential Decree No. 605 and Republic Act No.
8975 before there can be a partial repeal of Presidential Decree No. 605.
We agree with the DENR Secretary. Republic Act No. 8975 was not intended to set out in full all laws
concerning the prohibition against temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and
preliminary mandatory injunctions. Republic Act No. 8975 prohibits lower courts from issuing such
orders in connection with the implementation of government infrastructure projects, while Presidential
Decree No. 605 prohibits the issuance of the same, in any case involving licenses, concessions and
the like, in connection with the natural resources of the Philippines. This can be further seen from the
respective titles of these two laws, which, of course, should express the subjects thereof: 75
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8975
AN ACT TO ENSURE THE EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLETION OF
GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY PROHIBITING LOWER COURTS FROM
ISSUING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS OR
PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTIONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 605
BANNING THE ISSUANCE BY COURTS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN CASES INVOLVING
CONCESSIONS, LICENSES, AND OTHER PERMITS ISSUED BY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICIALS OR BODIES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES.
However, when the licenses, concessions and the like also entail government infrastructure projects,
the provisions of Republic Act No. 8975 should be deemed to apply, 76 and, thus, Presidential Decree
No. 605 had been modified in this sense.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that Presidential Decree No. 605 subsists, the DENR Secretary must
have missed our ruling in Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, 77 wherein we held that the prohibition in
Presidential Decree No. 605 "pertains to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts
against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical
cases, because to allow courts to judge these matters could disturb the smooth functioning of the
administrative machinery. But on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions
of law, courts are not prevented by Presidential Decree No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain
or prohibit administrative acts."
While there are indeed questions of facts in the present Petitions, the overriding controversy involved
herein is one of law: whether the Presidential Warranty issued by former President Marcos are
contracts within the purview of the Constitutions Non-Impairment Clause. Accordingly, the prohibition
in Presidential Decree No. 605 against the issuance of preliminary injunction in cases involving permits
for the exploitation of natural resources does not apply in this case.
Moreover, as we held in Republic v. Nolasco, 78 statutes such as Presidential Decree No. 605,
Presidential Decree No. 1818 and Republic Act No. 8975 merely proscribe the issuance of temporary
restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. They
cannot, under pain of violating the Constitution, deprive the courts of authority to take cognizance of
the issues raised in the principal action, as long as such action and the relief sought are within their
jurisdiction. We further held in Nolasco:
However, it must be clarified that Republic Act No. 8975 does not ordinarily warrant the outright
dismissal of any complaint or petition before the lower courts seeking permanent injunctive relief from
the implementation of national government infrastructure projects. What is expressly prohibited by the
statute is the issuance of the provisional reliefs of temporary restraining orders, preliminary
injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions. It does not preclude the lower courts from
assuming jurisdiction over complaints or petitions that seek as ultimate relief the nullification or
implementation of a national government infrastructure project. A statute such as Republic Act No.
8975 cannot diminish the constitutionally mandated judicial power to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. x x x. 79
As the disposition of these consolidated Petitions will be dispositions of the principal actions, any
applicability of the prohibitions in Presidential Decree No. 605 will be mooted.
Whether or not the presidential warranty was a contract
PICOPs ground for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is the supposed contract entered into by the
government in the form of a Presidential Warranty, dated 29 July 1969 issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos to PICOP. The DENR Secretary refutes this claim, and alleges that the RTC and
the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Presidential Warranty a valid and subsisting contract under
the Constitutions Non-Impairment Clause.
The Court of Appeals has this brief statement concerning the main issue of the MANDAMUS CASE:
The questioned warranty is a valid contract. It was freely entered into by the government and [PICOP].
Mutual considerations were taken into account in the execution of that contract. [PICOP] invested
billions of pesos in its concession areas. In return, the government assured [PICOP] of its tenurial
rights over TLA No. 43, as amended, as well as its exclusive right to cut, collect and saw timber and
pulpwood therein. The DENR must perforce honor and respect the warranty by maintaining the area
alloted (sic) to [PICOP] under TLA No. 43, as amended.80
We are constrained to disagree. In unequivocal terms, we have consistently held that such licenses
concerning the harvesting of timber in the countrys forests cannot be considered contracts that would
bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare.81 Such unswerving verdict is synthesized in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,82 where we held:
In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to
dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to
the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license
holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public
interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by petitioners, into every timber
license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
"x x x Provided, that when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace
or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein x x
x."
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the constitution. In Tan vs. Director
of Forestry, [125 SCRA 302, 325 (1983)] this Court held:
"x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J.
168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights. (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x"
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary
[190 SCRA 673, 684 (1990)]:
"x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983,
125 SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
cannot be invoked.
PICOP, however, argues that these rulings laid down in Tan v. Director of Forestry, 83 Felipe Ysmael,
Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary84 and Oposa do not find application in the present case
allegedly because the issue here is the unlawful refusal of then DENR Secretary Alvarez to issue an
IFMA to PICOP and not the matter of a timber license being merely a license or privilege. 85
We are not persuaded. PICOP filed the MANDAMUS CASE against then DENR Secretary Alvarez on
the ground that Secretary Alvarezs refusal to issue an IFMA in its favor allegedly violated its vested
right over the area covered by its TLA No. 43 and presidential warranty, and impaired the obligation
of contract under said agreement and warranty.86
The argument that the Presidential Warranty is a contract on the ground that there were mutual
considerations taken into account consisting in investments on PICOPs part is preposterous. All
licensees put up investments in pursuing their businesses. To construe these investments as
consideration in a contract would be to stealthily render ineffective the settled jurisprudence that "a
license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permittee, and is not
a property in the constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional proscription against the
impairment of contracts may extend."87 Neither shall we allow a circumvention of such doctrine by
terming such permit as a "warranty."
Whether or not there was compliance with the requirements for the conversion of TLA No. 43 as
amended into an IFMA
DAO No. 99-53 enumerates the requirements for the grant of the IFMA conversion:
Sec. 9. Qualifications of Applicants. The applicants for IFMA shall be:
(a) A Filipino citizen of legal age; or
(b) Partnership, cooperative or corporation whether public or private, duly registered under
Philippine laws.
However, in the case of application for conversion of TLA into IFMA, an automatic conversion after
proper evaluation shall be allowed, provided the TLA holder shall have signified such intention prior
to the expiry of the TLA, PROVIDED further, the TLA holder has shown satisfactory performance and
have complied with the terms and conditions of the TLA and pertinent rules and regulations.
Therefore, the following are the requisites for the automatic conversion of the TLA into an IFMA, to
wit:
1. The TLA holder had signified its intent to convert its TLA into an IFMA prior to the
expiration of its TLA;
2. Proper evaluation was conducted on the application; and
3. The TLA holder has satisfactorily performed and complied with the terms and conditions
of the TLA and the pertinent rules and regulations.
The Court of Appeals held:
From the foregoing provision, it can be gleaned that as long as an applicant-corporation has signified
its intention to convert its TLA into an IFMA prior to the expiration of its TLA, has shown satisfactory
performance as a TLA holder and has complied with the terms and conditions of the TLA and pertinent
rules and regulations, conversion follows as a matter of course. It becomes automatic.
[PICOP] has complied with the administrative requirements. In its letter dated August 28, 2000 to the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) for DENR-RXIII-D4, Bislig, Surigao
del Sur, it signified its intention to convert its TLA into an IFMA. It has also shown satisfactory
performance as a TLA holder as evidenced by the July 31, 2001 Report of Director Elias Seraspi, Jr.
The said report states that [PICOP] was able to hold on its management and protection of its
concession areas.
xxxx
Apparently, [the DENR Secretary] refuses to sign the documents on the grounds that [PICOP] has not
secured and submitted a clearance from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
showing that its TLA areas do not overlap with existing ancestral domains: and that [PICOP] has
outstanding and overdue obligation in forest charges.
The two reasons last cited by the Secretary for refusing to sign and deliver the IFMA documents are
not real nor valid.
Section 59 of RA 8371, which requires prior certification from the NCIP that the areas affected do not
overlap with any ancestral domain before any IFMA can be entered into by the government, should
be read in conjunction with Sections 3 (a) and 56 of the same law.
Section 3 (a) of RA 8371 describes ancestral domains as "areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present xxx." On the other
hand, Section 56 of the same law provides:
"Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. Property rights within the ancestral domains already
existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and respected."
It can thus be deduced that Section 59 can only be interpreted to refer to ancestral domains which
have been duly established as such (i.e., the concerned indigenous people must have been in
continuous possession or occupation of the area concerned since time immemorial up to the present).
Too, existing property rights over the areas sought to be declared as part of an ancestral domain must
be recognized and respected.
[PICOP] has already acquired property rights over its concession areas. It has been in exclusive,
continuous and uninterrupted possession and occupation of TLA No. 43 areas since 1952 to present.
From the time it managed and operated TLA No. 43, it has made huge investments on its concession
areas. These include the planting of millions of trees and the scientific silvicultural treatment of the
forest to make it more productive. Having acquired property rights over TLA No. 43 areas, [PICOP]
need not be required to secure clearance from the NCIP pursuant to Section 59 of RA 8371.
[The DENR Secretarys] claim that [PICOP] failed to settle its outstanding obligations to the
government in the form of unpaid forest charges do not inspire belief. Under Sec. 3 (3.5) of DENR
Memorandum Circular No. 96-04 dated March 14, before an Integrated Annual Operations Plan
(IAOP) can be issued, it is a condition precedent that the licensee has no pending forestry accounts.
If it were true that [PICOP] had unpaid forest charges, why was it issued IAOP for calendar year 2001-
2002 by Secretary Alvarez himself?88
Upon close scrutiny of the records, this Court observes that these findings of compliance by PICOP
are negated by the very evidence on which they are supposedly moored.
As clearly shown by the 31 July 2001 Memorandum of Regional Executive Director Elias D. Seraspi,
Jr., DENR Caraga Region, RED Seraspi neither made a categorical finding of PICOPs satisfactory
performance on its TLA No. 43 nor favorably recommended approval of PICOPs application for IFMA
conversion. Rather, RED Seraspi recommended the proper evaluation of PICOPs request for the
automatic conversion of TLA No. 43 into an IFMA:
Hence, it is imperative to chart a good forest policy direction for the management, development and
protection of TLA No. 43 after it expires on April 26, 2002 for the purpose of sustainable forest
management of the area in support of national development. With this vision, the proper evaluation to
consider the request for automatic conversion of TLA No. 43 to IFMA pursuant to Section 9, DENR
A.O. No. 99-53, upon its expiration on April 26, 2002 is hereby recommended. 89
Administrative Requirements
There was actually no way by which RED Seraspi could have come up with a satisfactory performance
finding since the very Performance Evaluation Team tasked to make the evaluation found PICOP to
have violated existing DENR rules and regulations. According to the 11 July 2002 Memorandum
Report of the Performance Evaluation Team, PICOP has not submitted its Five-Year Forest Protection
Plan and its Seven-Year Reforestation Plan.90
Forest charges are, on the other hand, due and payable within 30 days from removal of the forest
products from the cutting area when timber and other forest products are removed for domestic sales
pursuant to Sections 6 and 6.2 of DAO No. 80, series of 1987. Thus:
Section 6. Payment of Forest Charges. x x x In such a case, the forest charges shall be due and
payable as follows:
6.1 When timber and other forest products are intended for export. x x x x
6.2 When timber and other forest products are to be removed for domestic sales. The forest charges
shall be due and payable within thirty (30) days from removal thereof at the cutting area, or where the
forest products are gathered; Provided, that such date of removal shall in no case be beyond thirty
(30) days when the products are cut, gathered and removed.
As testified to by FMB SFMS Ignacio M. Evangelista, PICOP failed to pay its regular forest charges
covering the period from 22 September 2001 to 26 April 2002 in the total amount of
15,056,054.05.91 PICOP was also late in paying most of its forest charges from 1996 onwards for
which it is liable for a surcharge of 25% per annum on the tax due and interest of 20% per annum
which now amounts to 150,169,485.02.92 Likewise, it has overdue and unpaid silvicultural fees in the
amount of 2,366,901.00 as of 30 August 2002. 93 In all, PICOP has unpaid and overdue forest
charges in the sum of 167,592,440.90 as of 10 August 2002. 94
PICOPs failure to pay its regular forest charges, interests, penalties and surcharges and silvicultural
fees amounting to 167,592,440.90 as of 30 August 2002 is further evidenced by the collection letters
sent to PICOP and the absence of official receipts in the DENR records in Bislig City evidencing
payment of the overdue amounts stated in the said collection letters.95 As can be gleaned from SFMS
Evangelistas tabulation, all the official receipts evidencing payments of PICOP with their
corresponding periods are indicated. However, there are no similar official receipts for the period
covering 22 September 2001 to 26 April 2002, which indicate that no payment has been made for the
same period.
With the DENR Secretarys presentation of its positive and categorical evidence showing PICOPs
failure to pay its forest charges amounting to 167,592,440.90 as of 10 August 2002, the burden of
evidence has been shifted to PICOP to prove otherwise. PICOP should have, thus, presented official
receipts as proof of their payment of such forest charges, but failed to do so.
Despite the foregoing evidence, the Court of Appeals declared that if it were true that PICOP has
unpaid forest charges, it should not have been issued an IAOP for the year 2001-2002 by Secretary
Alvarez himself.96 In doing so, the Court of Appeals disregarded the part of the very evidence
presented by PICOP itself, which shows that the IAOP was approved subject to several conditions,
not the least of which was the submission of proof of updated payment of forest charges from April
2001 to June 2001.97
Neither was this the only evidence presented by PICOP which showed that it has unpaid forest
charges. PICOP presented the certification of CENRO Calunsag which refers only to its alleged
payment of regular forest charges covering the period from 14 September 2001 to 15 May 2002.98 The
certification does not mention similar payment of the penalties, surcharges and interests which it
incurred in paying late several forest charges, which fact it did not rebut.
The 27 May 2002 Certification by CENRO Calunsag, on the other hand, specified only the period
covering 14 September 2001 to 15 May 2002 and the amount of 53,603,719.85 paid by PICOP
without indicating the corresponding volume and date of production of the logs. This is in contrast to
the findings of SFMS Evangelista which cover the period from CY 1996 to 30 August 2002 which
includes penalties, interests, and surcharges for late payment pursuant to DAO 80, series of 1987.
Per request of PICOP, a certification dated 21 August 2002 was issued by Bill Collector Amelia D.
Arayan, and attested to by CENRO Calunsag, showing that PICOP paid only regular forest charges
of its log production covering 1 July 2001 to 21 September 2001. However, there being log productions
after 21 September 2001, PICOP failed to pay the corresponding regular forest charges amounting to
15,056,054.05.99 The same certification also shows delayed payment of forest charges, thereby
corroborating the testimony of SFMS Evangelista and substantiating the imposition of penalties and
surcharges.
Finally, even if we consider for the sake of argument that the IAOP should not have been issued if
PICOP had existing forestry accounts, the issuance of the IAOP cannot be considered proof that
PICOP has paid the same. Firstly, the best evidence of payment is the receipt thereof. PICOP has not
presented any evidence that such receipts had been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in
court.100 Secondly, it is a well known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its
government, is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. 101 If
PICOP had been issued an IAOP in violation of the law allegedly because it may not be issued if
PICOP had existing forestry accounts, the government cannot be estopped from collecting such
amounts and providing the necessary sanctions therefor, including the withholding of the IFMA until
such amounts are paid.
Statutory Requirements
To recap, the Court of Appeals had relied on RED Seraspis certification in concluding that there was
satisfactory performance on the part of PICOP as a TLA holder, despite said certification showing
non-compliance with the required Five-Year Forest Protection Plan and Seven-Year Reforestation
Plan. The Court of Appeals also declared that PICOP has paid its outstanding obligations based on
an inference that the IAOP would not have been issued if PICOP had unpaid forest charges, contrary
to the conditions laid down in the IAOP itself, and in violation of the Best Evidence Rule and the
doctrine disallowing the estoppel of the government from the acts of its officers.
On the statutory requirement of procuring a clearance from the NCIP, the Court of Appeals held that
PICOP need not comply with the same at all. As quoted above, the Court of Appeals held that Section
59 of Republic Act No. 8371, which requires prior certification from the NCIP that the areas affected
do not overlap with any ancestral domain before any IFMA can be entered into by government, should
be interpreted to refer to ancestral domains which have been duly established as such by the
continuous possession and occupation of the area concerned by indigenous peoples since time
immemorial up to the present. According to the Court of Appeals, PICOP has acquired property rights
over the TLA No. 43 areas, being in exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession and
occupation of TLA No. 43 areas since 1952 up to the present.
This ruling defies the settled jurisprudence we have mentioned earlier, including that of Oposa and
Tan which held that "[a] license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state or municipal, granting it and the person to
whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; x x x." 102
The Court of Appeals resort to statutory construction is, in itself, misplaced. Section 59 of Republic
Act No. 8371 is clear and unambiguous:
SEC. 59. Certification Precondition. All departments and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease, or
entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior certification from the NCIP that the area
affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a
field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned:
Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and
written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government agency
or government-owned or controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or
production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That
the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has
not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process.
The court may not construe a statute that is clear and free from doubt. Time and again, it has been
repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there
is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. 103 PICOPs intent to put a cloud of
ambiguity in Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8371 by invoking Section 3(a) thereof fails miserably.
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 8371 defines ancestral domain as follows:
a) Ancestral domains Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a
claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural
welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds,
worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer
be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shifting cultivators;
Ancestral domains remain as such even when possession or occupation of the area has been
interrupted by causes provided under the law such as voluntary dealings entered into by the
government and private individuals/corporation. Therefore, the issuance of TLA No. 43 in 1952 did
not cause the Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples to lose their possession or
occupation over the area covered by TLA No. 43.
The issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title is merely a formal recognition of the ICCs/IPs
rights of possession and ownership over their ancestral domain identified and delineated in
accordance with the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, 104 and therefore, cannot be considered a
condition precedent for the need for an NCIP certification. In the first place, it is manifestly absurd to
claim that the subject lands must first be proven to be part of ancestral domains before a certification
that they are not part of ancestral domains can be required. In Cruz v. Secretary of DENR,105 where
no single member of the Court penned a majority opinion (since the petition to declare Republic Act
No. 8371 unconstitutional was dismissed for the reason that the votes were equally divided), Mr.
Justice Reynato Puno, who voted to dismiss the petition, wrote in his separate opinion:
As its subtitle suggests, [Section 59 of R.A. No. 8371] requires as a precondition for the issuance of
any concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the
NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie with any ancestral domain. The provision
does not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to
grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure
that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been
obtained. Note that the certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do not
necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that are found within the said domains, Sections
7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.
Another requirement determined by the Court of Appeals to have been complied with by PICOP, albeit
impliedly this time by not mentioning it at all, is the requirement posed by Sections 26 and 27 of the
Local Government Code:
SEC. 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It shall
be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or
involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution,
climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover,
and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental
organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or
program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological
balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
SEC. 27. Prior Consultation Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government
authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and
prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where
such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have
been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
These provisions are clear: the prior approval of local government units affected by the proposed
conversion of a TLA into an IFMA is necessary before any project or program can be implemented by
the government authorities that may cause "depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land,
rangeland or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species."
The common evidence of the DENR Secretary and PICOP, namely the 31 July 2001 Memorandum
of RED Seraspi, enumerates the local government units and other groups which had expressed their
opposition to PICOPs application for IFMA conversion:
7. During the conduct of the performance evaluation of TLA No. 43 issues/complaints against PRI
were submitted thru Resolutions and letters. It is important that these are included in this report for
assessment of what are their worth, viz:
xxxx
7.2 Joint Resolution (unnumbered), dated March 19, 2001 of the Barangay Council and Barangay
Tribal Council of Simulao, Boston, Davao Oriental (ANNEX F) opposing the conversion of TLA No. 43
into IFMA over the 17,112 hectares allegedly covered with CADC No. 095.
7.3 Resolution Nos. 10, s-2001 and 05, s-2001 (ANNEXES G & H) of the Bunawan Tribal Council of
Elders (BBMTCE) strongly demanding none renewal of PICOP TLA. They claim to be the rightful
owner of the area it being their alleged ancestral land.
7.4 Resolution No. 4, S-2001 of Sitio Linao, San Jose, Bislig City (ANNEX I) requesting not to renew
TLA 43 over the 900 hectares occupied by them.
7.5 Resolution No. 22, S-2001 (ANNEX J) of the Sanguniang Bayan, Lingig, Surigao del Sur not to
grant the conversion of TLA 43 citing the plight of former employees of PRI who were forced to enter
and farm portion of TLA No. 43, after they were laid off.
7.6 SP Resolution No. 2001-113 and CDC Resolution Nos. 09-2001 of the Sanguniang Panglungsod
of Bislig City (ANNEXES K & L) requesting to exclude the area of TLA No. 43 for watershed purposes.
7.7 Resolution No. 2001-164, dated June 01, 2001 (ANNEX M) Sanguniang Panglungsod of Bislig
City opposing the conversion of TLA 43 to IFMA for the reason that IFMA do not give revenue benefits
to the City.106
As stated in RED Seraspis 31 July 2001 Memorandum, 107 several indigenous groups and some
affected local government units have expressly opposed PICOPs application for IFMA conversion of
its TLA No. 43.
PICOP merely submitted a purported resolution108 of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the
approval of PICOPs application for IFMA conversion. But Surigao del Sur is not the only province
affected by the area covered by the proposed IFMA. As even the Court of Appeals found, PICOPs
TLA No. 43 traverses the length and breadth not only of Surigao del Sur but also Agusan del Sur,
Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental.109 How then can PICOP claim that it complied with the Local
Government Code requirement of obtaining prior approval of the Sangunian concerned when only
one out of the four affected local government units has purportedly signified its concurrence to the
proposed IFMA conversion?
Finally, the DENR, by withholding the conversion of PICOPs TLA No. 43 into an IFMA, has made a
factual finding that PICOP has not yet complied with the requirements for such a conversion. Findings
of facts of administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts
because of the special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. 110 Such
finality of the DENRs factual finding, supported as it is by substantial evidence, can only be overcome
by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction, which is even more
pronounced in a Petition for Mandamus.
Whether or not there has already been a conversion of TLA No. 43 into an IFMA
The Court of Appeals declared that there exists no legal impediment to the conversion of respondents
TLA No. 43 into an IFMA as evidenced by petitioners letters dated 26 October 2002 and 26 April
2002:
Moreover, [the DENR Secretarys] own letters to [PICOP] confirm that it has established a clear right
to the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43 to IFMA. Thus, on October 26, 2002, [the DENR Secretary]
stated in his letter to [PICOP] "that pursuant to DAO-99-53, we have cleared the conversion on
PICOPs TLA No. 43 to IFMA effective from the expiration of said TLA on April 26, 2002." Too, in its
April 24, 2002 letter to [PICOP], [the DENR Secretary] granted PICOPs TDMP "[p]ending the formal
approval of [its] IFMA xxx." It could thus be deduced that there exists no legal impediment to the
conversion of PICOPs TLA 43 to IFMA. Its approval remains a formality.
We disagree. Then DENR Secretary Alvarezs 25 October 2001 letter is reproduced herein for
reference:
Dear Mr. Bernardino:
Consistent with your attached Memorandum to her Excellency, the President, dated 17 October 2001
and in response to your Letter of Intent dated 25 January 2001, we wish to inform you that, pursuant
to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-53, we have cleared the conversion of PICOPs Timber License
Agreement (TLA) No. 43 to Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) effective from the
expiration of said TLA on April 26, 2002.
In this regard, you are hereby requested to designate PICOPs representative(s) to discuss with the
DENR Team, created under Special Order No. 2001-638, the conditions and details of the said IFMA,
including the production sharing arrangement between PICOP and the government. 111
By giving this clearance for the conversion of PICOPs TLA into an IFMA, the DENR Secretary cannot,
by any stretch of imagination, be claimed to have granted the conversion itself. The letter is clear that
the "conversion" could not be final since its conditions and details still have to be discussed as stated
in the second paragraph of said letter; hence, the same letter could not have reduced to a mere
formality the approval of the conversion of PICOPs TLA No. 43 into an IFMA.
Likewise, then DENR Secretary Alvarezs 26 April 2002 letter approving PICOPs Transition
Development and Management Plan (TDMP) cannot be considered as an approval of PICOPs
application for IFMA conversion. Again, the aforesaid letter is quoted in full:
April 24, 2002
MR. WILFREDO D. FUENTES
Vice President Resident Manager
PICOP Resources, Incorporated
2nd Floor, Moredel Building
2280 Pasong Tamo Extension
Makati City
Dear Mr. Fuentes:
This refers to your request for approval of the submitted Two-year Transition Development and
Management Plan of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PRI) for the areas under TLA No. 43 which expires on
April 26, 2002.
Pending the formal approval of your IFMA and consistent with our letter to the PRI President dated 25
October 2002, we hereby grant your Transition Development and Management Plan (TDMP) for a
period of one (1) year, effective 26 April 2002.
Within such period we expect PRI to submit/comply with all the necessary requisites for the final
conversion of TLA 43 into IFMA, as provided for under DENR Administrative Order No. 99-53,
including the settlement of certain obligations such as taxes, if any, and submission of plans and
programs for evaluation and approval of item number 1 of your proposal contained in your letter dated
February 4, 2002.
All other proposed activities in your TDMP, particularly items 2 7 of your letter dated February 4,
2002, are hereby approved.
For your information and guidance.
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ
Secretary
Cc: Mr. Teodoro G. Bernardino
President
The Director, FMB
The aforesaid letter speaks for itself. PICOPs application for IFMA conversion is still pending
approval. Indeed, there could have been no approval of PICOPs application for IFMA conversion
because DAO No. 99-53 (which governs application for IFMA conversion) requires full and complete
compliance with the requirements for conversion before it may be approved. As stated in the letter
itself of then DENR Secretary Alvarez, PICOP has yet to "submit/comply with all the necessary
requisites for final conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA."
Even assuming, however, that the IFMA has already been converted, this is all purely academic
because of the above-discussed settled jurisprudence that logging permits are not contracts within
the Non-Impairment Clause and thus, can be amended, modified, replaced or rescinded when the
national interest so requires. If the DENR Secretary, therefore, finds that the IFMA would be in violation
of statutes, rules and regulations, particularly those protecting the rights of the local governments and
the indigenous peoples within the IFMA area, then it behooves the DENR Secretary to revoke such
IFMA. These same statutes, rules and regulations are the very same requirements mentioned above
for the conversion of the TLA No. 43 into an IFMA.
Whether or not it is proper to determine the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 in these
consolidated petitions
Another reason why the DENR Secretary wishes to further withhold the conversion of PICOPs TLA
No. 43 into an IFMA is the 25 November 2002 Proclamation No. 297 excluding an area of 8,100
hectares, more or less, from the coverage of TLA No. 43, as amended, and which declared the same
as a mineral reservation and as an environmentally critical area. The DENR Secretary claims that said
Presidential Proclamation is rendered nugatory by the Court of Appeals disposition that the DENR
should honor and respect the area allotted to PICOP under TLA No. 43.112
PICOP claims that Proclamation No. 297 is a new matter which the DENR Secretary cannot raise
before this Court without offending the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.113
The DENR Secretary counters that it did not take up the issue of Proclamation No. 297 before the trial
court precisely because said proclamation was issued more than one month after the trial court
rendered its 11 October 2002 Decision. The DENR Secretary claims that PICOP cannot claim a
violation of its right to due process because it raised the issue before the Court of Appeals in its
Memorandum.
While not giving in to the DENR Secretarys argument, PICOP claims that Proclamation No. 297 is
violative of the Constitution and an encroachment on the legislative powers of Congress. 114
We agree with PICOP that this constitutional issue cannot be decided upon in this case. This Court
will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule
that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the court may raise its judgment, that course will be adopted
and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable. 115
The constitutional question presented by PICOP is not the very lis mota in these consolidated cases,
as the preceding discussions very well give us adequate grounds to grant the Petition in G.R. No.
162243, deny the Petition in G.R. No. 164516, and dismiss the Petition in G.R. No. 171875. Moreover,
PICOP has filed a separate petition for the declaration of nullity of Proclamation No. 297, wherein the
issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 is properly ventilated.
PICOP has been fortunate to have been awarded an enormous concession area and thus, a huge
chunk of the benefits of this countrys natural resources. Attached to this fortune is the responsibility
to comply with the laws and regulations implementing the stated legislative policies of environmental
preservation and benefit distribution. These laws and regulations should not be ignored, and the courts
should not condone such blatant disregard by those who believe they are above the law because of
their sizable investments and significant number of workers employed. PICOP has only itself to blame
for the withholding of the conversion of its TLA. But while this disposition confers another chance to
comply with the foregoing requirements, the DENR Secretary can rightfully grow weary if the
persistence on noncompliance will continue. The judicial policy of nurturing prosperity would be better
served by granting such concessions to someone who will abide by the law.

Consequently, all actions and reliefs sought by either PICOP or the DENR Secretary which has
Proclamation No. 297 as its ground or subject should be ventilated either in the pending petition for
the declaration of its nullity, or in another proper suit instituted for that matter.
EPILOGUE AND DISPOSITION
In sum, the DENR Secretary has adequately proven that PICOP has, at this time, failed to comply
with the administrative and statutory requirements for the conversion of TLA No. 43 into an IFMA. The
Petition in G.R. No. 162243 should therefore be granted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 162243 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
insofar as it affirmed the RTC Decision granting the Petition for Mandamus filed by Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition in G.R.
No. 164516 seeking the reversal of the same Decision insofar as it nullified the award of damages in
favor of PICOP is DENIED for lack of merit. The Petition in G.R. No. 171875, assailing the lifting of
the Preliminary Injunction in favor of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources is
DISMISSED on the ground of mootness.

On the other hand, as PICOP is not yet entitled to such conversion, then Secretary Alvarez had been
correct in withholding the same and thus cannot be held liable for damages therefor. Thus, the Petition
in G.R. No. 164516 should be dismissed.

Finally, the DENR Secretarys Petition in G.R. No. 171875, assailing the lifting by the Court of Appeals
of the Preliminary Injunction in its favor, is now mooted.

PICOPs noncompliance with the requirements for the conversion of their TLA is so glaring, that we
almost see a reluctance to uphold the law in light of PICOPs sizeable investments in its business, a
fact repeatedly stressed by PICOP in its pleadings. In applying the judicial policy of nurturing
prosperity, consideration should also be given to the long-term effects of the judicial evaluations
involved, particularly to our nations greatest wealth, our vast natural resources.1wphi1

Our country has been blessed with rich, lush and verdant rain forests in which varied, rare and unique
species of flora and fauna may be found.116 The legislative policy has been to preserve and nourish
these natural resources as they are not only for our benefit but more so for the countless future
generations to which we are likewise responsible. It has also been legislative policy to let the citizens
of this country reap their benefits, foremost the citizens in close proximity to such resources, through
the local governments and the NCIP.

In working for the legislative policy of environmental preservation, the requirements of a five-year
forest protection plan and seven-year reforestation plan had been laid down, together with the levy of
forest charges for the regulation of forestry activities. In pursuing, on the other hand, the benefit
distribution policy, the Local Government Code requires prior Sanggunian approval to ensure that
local communities partake in the fruits of their own backyard, while R.A. No. 8371 provides for the
rights of the indigenous peoples, who have been living in, managing, and nourishing these forests
since time immemorial.