Austria vs.

Reyes
G.R. No. L-23079, February 27, 1970

Facts:
Basilia Austria Vda. De Cruz filed a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and
testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners who were nephews and nieces of
Basilia. The opposition was dismissed and the probate of the will was allowed.
Under the will of Basilia, the bulk of her estate would pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz,
Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Lyn Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and
declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
More than two years after her will was allowed, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was
subsequently appointed as executor of her estate. However, the petitioners filed in the same
proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest kin of
Basilia and that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law.
Such petition in intervention was allowed.
More than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the petitioners moved the lower
court to set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents. Before the
date of the hearing arrived, one of the respondents Benita Cruz Meez filed a motion asking the lower
court to confine the petitioners intervention to properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent.
The court granted the said motion.
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the lower court. Hence, this
instant petition for certiorari to have the order restricting petitioners intervention to properties that
were not included in the decedents testamentary dispositions annulled was filed.

Issue: Whether or not the institution of the heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof
that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent was false

Ruling:
YES. Article 850 of the Civil Code provides The statement of a false cause for the institution of
an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not
have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause. Under this provision, before the
institution of heirs may be annulled, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the
institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it
must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of the cause.
From the use in the will of the terms sapilitang tagapagmana (compulsory heirs) and
sapilitang mana (legitime), the petitioners contended that the institution of the respondents as heirs
was only impelled by her belief that they were her compulsory heirs. However, the Court made mention
of the fact that if such reason indeed prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, Basilia did
not make it known in her will. The Court found petitioners theory to be highly speculative of what was
in the mind of the testatrix when she executed the will. The Court could not annul the institution of heirs
on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.
The phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana" were borrowed from the
language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted
and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offered no absolute indication that the decedent would
have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to
make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate which largely favored the
respondents showed a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she
thought the law enjoined her to give to them. This may be taken in comparison with the relatively small
devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo
Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. If respondents Perfecto
Cruz, et al, were excluded from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces
would succeed to the bulk of the estate by intestacy a result which would subvert the clear wishes of
the decedent.

Austria v. Reyes

Facts:

1. Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents,
alll have been declared by the former as her legally adopted children.

2. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by
the petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will
was allowed.

3. In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were
the nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the
decedent in accordance with law, hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed as
heirs.

4. The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs.
It held that the testator was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was executed
free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence.

Issue: Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

RULING: Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary
institution does not affect the validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is
that the falsity will set aide the institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution
of the heirs will be annulled under Art. 850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause
must be stated in the will, 2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must appear from the
face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the
falsity. Moreover, testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side especially when the
will shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole
estate as in this case.

SECTION 2- Institution of Heir

Article 850
Austria vs. Reyes

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will
that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

Article 854

Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu

If there is a compulsory heir in the direct line, such heir is instituted in the will, and the
testamentary disposition given to such heir is less than her legitime, there is no preterition.
There is no total omission, inasmuch as the heir received something from the inheritance. The
remedy is for completion of legitime under Articles 906 and 907.

Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu

1967 | JBL Reyes

Nature: Direct appeal from judgment of CFI dismissing the complaint of Tirso Reyes and ordering the same to
deliver to Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu the properties received by his deceased wife under the terms of the
will of the late Bibiano Barretto.

Parties:
Tirso Reyes, guardian of minors Azucena, Flordelis and Tirso, all surnamed Reyes y Barretto, PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS
Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

Facts:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime, they acquired vast estate (real property
in Manila, Pampanga and Bulacan). When Bibiano died (Feb. 18, 1936), he left his share in a will to Salud
Barretto (mother of the minors) and Lucia Milagros Barretto; and a small portion as legacies to his sisters
Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for
Maria (the widow). As appointed administratrix, Maria prepared a project of partition, signed by her in her
own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros. It was approved, and the estate was distributed and the
shares delivered. Salud took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of OCTs and
issuance of new titles in her name.

Upon Marias death (Mar. 5, 1948), it was discovered that she executed two wills: in the first, she instituted
Salud and Milagros as her heirs; in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of
Milagros alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by
Tirso Reyes (as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto), the TC held that Salud was not the daughter of the
decedent Maria by her husband Bibiano. The SC affirmed the same.

TC: The project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano is
null and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee (Salud), predecessor of Tirso et.
 al., was not a daughter of the Sps. Bibiano and Maria. The nullity of the project of partition was
decreed on the basis of Art. 1081 (OCC) (A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir,
without being so, has been included, shall be null and void). As Milagros was the only true heir of
Bibiano, she was entitled to recover from Salud and her successors all the properties received by her
from Bibianos estate, in view of Art. 1456 (NCC) which states that property acquired by mistake or
fraud is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the real owner.

Having lost the fight for a share in the estate of Maria as her legitimate heir, Tirso now falls back upon the
remnant of the estate of Bibiano (the fishpond), which was given in usufruct to Maria. Hence, this action for
the recovery of the one-half portion thereof. This action afforded Milagros an opportunity to set up her
right of ownership; not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and
delivered to Salud, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano, thereby
directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based
thereon as well.

Issues/Held:
(1) W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud did not
acquire valid title to it. NO.
(2) W/N Milagros action is barred by the statute of limitations. YES.

Ratio
(1) Art. 1081 (OCC) is misapplied! Salud admittedly had been instituted heir in Bibianos last will and
testament together with Milagros. Hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with
a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void under Art.
1081. The legal precept of Art. 1081 does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without
distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud did not happen to be a
daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for
Bibiano was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share
() assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a
testamentary heir of Bibiano. Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her fathers will a share
smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was no preterition or total
omission of a forced heir here.

The view that the partition in question is void for being a compromise on the civil status of Salud, in
violation of Art. 1814 (OCC) is erroneous. A compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy
through mutual concessions of the parties; and the condition of Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano,
while untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of testator. There can be no
compromise over issues not in dispute. While a compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere
forbids a settlement by the parties over the share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate.

At any rate, independently of the project of partition (a mere proposal for distribution of estate), it is the
court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the
parts to which each is entitled. It is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the
distributees. Where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the same has
become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.

(2) Milagros contends that as Maria could not have ignored that Salud was not her child, the act of Maria in
agreeing to the partition and distribution was a fraud on her rights and entitles her to belief. This
contention is unfounded.

First, there is no evidence that when Bibianos estate was judicially settled and distributed, Salud knew
that she was not Bibianos child. Thus, if fraud was committed, it was Maria who was solely responsible;
and neither Salud nor her minor children can be held liable therefor.
 Second, granting there was such fraud, relief therefor can be obtained within 4 years from its discovery,
and the record shows that this period had elapsed a long time ago.

At the time of distribution, Milagros was only 16. She became of age 5 years later (1944). On that year,
her cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of fraud the court decree distributing her
fathers estate and the 4-year period of limitation started to run, to expire in 1948. Conceding that
Milagros only became aware of the true facts in 1946, her action still became extinct in 1950. Her
action was barred in Aug. 1956, when she filed her counterclaim in this case contesting the decree of
distribution of Bibianos estate.
There is no evidence of an alleged verbal promise by Tirso to reconvey the properties received by
Salud, which allegedly induced Milagros to delay the filing of the action. Granting that there was such
promise, it would not bind Tirsos wards, who are the real parties-in-interest. An abdicative waiver of
rights by a guardian, being an act of disposition, and not of administration, cannot bind his wards,
being null and void as to them unless duly authorized by the proper court

Dispositive: CFI decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as it orders Tirso to reconvey to Milagros the
properties enumerated in said decision. The same is AFFIRMED, insofar as it denies any right of Milagros to
accounting. The action for partition of the fishpond must be GIVEN DUE COURSE.

Aznar vs. Duncan

Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all
or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting
him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. In a case where the testator left
to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the
legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, it was
held that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirs be annulled
entirely, but only that the legitimate be completed.

Succession - 020
AZNAR v. DUNCAN (1966)

Doctrine: When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the
legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask
that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.

Facts: Edward Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died leaving a will. CFI admitted
the will to probate, and declared that Helen Garcia was his natural child. The declaration was appealed to this
Court; affirmed.

Meanwhile, CFI approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of the will,
which said court found to be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia appealed from the order of approval,
and this Court reversed the same on the ground that the validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by
Philippine law, and returned the case to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as provided by
said law.

CFI approved the project of partition submitted by the executor, wherein the properties of the estate were divided
equally between Lucy Duncan, whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his natural daughter, and
Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death.
- Basis: Since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled.
Hence the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate, saving only the legacies left in
favor of certain other persons, which legacies have been duly approved by the lower court and distributed to the
legatees.

Hence this appeal.

The CFI ruled, and appellee maintains, that there has been preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the
direct line, resulting in the annulment of the institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

Appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition. Considering the provisions of the will whereby the testator
expressly denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless although less than the
amount of her legitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited. Based on Articles 906 and 918 of the Civil Code,
Helen Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the
succession were intestate.

Issue: WON the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be divided in equal shares, OR the inheritance of
Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced

Held/Ratio: Lucy's inheritance should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover Helen's legitime,
equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate.

Edward Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy
of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume
that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone
any change and that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly
recognized by him.

When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as
an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that the
institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.

CFI's order is set aside; case remanded with instructions to partition the hereditary estate anew.

Aznar v. Duncan
17 SCRA 590

FACTS:

Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared that
Helen Garcia was a natural child of the deceased. The Court of First Instance equally
divided the properties of the estate of Christensen between Lucy Duncan (whom testator
expressly recognized in his will as his daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the order, the CFI
held that Helen Garcia was preterited in the will thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as
heir was annulled and the properties passed to both of them as ifthe deceased died
intestate.

ISSUE:

Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or whether
the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the
extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to of the entire
estate.

HELD:

The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia.

Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter and limited
her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth
less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as
a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that
the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.

Acain vs. IAC

An adopted child, if totally omitted in the inheritance, is preterited and can invoke its protection
and consequences. Since an adopted child is given by law the same rights as a legitimate child,
the adopted child can, in proper cases, invoke Article 854 in the same manner a legitimate child
can.

Acain v. IAC (1987)

Facts:

On May 1984, Constantino Acain (petitioner hereinafter Acain) filed on the RTC of Cebu City, a
petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to Acain of
letters testamentary. When Nemesio died, he left a will in which Acain and his siblings were
instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio was submitted by petitioner without
objection raised by private respondents.

Segundo, the brother of Nemesio, was initially instituted as the heir, in case Segundo pre-
deceases Nemesio, Segundos children would then succeed.

After the petition was set for hearing, the respondents (Virginia Fernandez, legally adopted
daughter of Nemesio, and the latter's widow, Rosa Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on the
following grounds: for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; he is
merely a universal heir and the Rosa and Fernandez have been pretirited. Motion was denied.

After the denial, respondents filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the IAC. The IAC granted the private
respondents' petition and ordered the TC to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of
Nemesio.

His MR having been denied, Acain filed this present petition for the review of IACs decision.

Issues:

1. Whether private respondents have been preterited. No for the widow, yes for Fernandez.

2. Whether Acain has legal standing to intervene in the probate proceedings. No.

**3. Whether the probate court went beyond its authority. No.

Ratio/Held:

1. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, there is no
preterition, for she is not in the direct line. However, the same cannot be said for Fernandez. It
cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator. Neither
can it be denied that she was not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the Fernandez. The universal institution of Acain and his siblings to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will.

2. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as
a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate.
Acain, at the outset, appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, however, intestacy having
resulted from the preterition of Fernandez and the universal institution of heirs, Acain is in effect
not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by
the deceased and must then be dismissed.

**3. The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of
the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes
only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. The rule, however, is
not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless
to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. Where
circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon even
before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue.
The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.

The petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Acain v. IAC (October 27, 1987)

FACTS: On February 17, 1960, Nemesio Acain executed a will written in Bisaya with English
translation providing the institution of his brother Segundo as the universal heir. The will provided
that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo
(father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundos
children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Constantino then filed a petition for the probate of the
will of the late Nemesio.
The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter's widow
Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.

ISSUE: Was there preterition?

HELD: widow NO; adopted daughter- YES

Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply. Even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in
the direct line.

However, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption by
the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a
legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will
of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime.
Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition
of the legally adopted child.

Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the
legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the
legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written.

NOTE:
 Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited

In Dy Yieng Seangio, et al. v. Hon. Amor Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 140371-72, November 27, 2006,
there was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was denominated as
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana. The private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of
Segundo did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus did not meet the
definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only
showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else;
that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence
there was preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents
maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the
will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of
the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary
disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1) generally, the
authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; (2)
private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3) disinheritance
constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on preterition did not apply
because Segundos will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more
compulsory heirs.
The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a petition
for certiorari was filed where petitioners argued as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of the Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court which respectively mandate the court to: (a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to
be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general
circulation; and (b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatee and devisees of the testator
Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title
clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir.
Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not
intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents
alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically
and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate
case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to
petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can
be considered as a holographic will.
 Held: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be
made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa(Article 783) can be clearly
deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of
the latters property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In
other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of
those who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in
the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is
only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be
given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law
should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this
regard, the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the
testator to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form
of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.

Seangio vs. Hon. Amor A. Reyes

G.R. November 27, 2006

Azcuna, J.:

FACTS:

On September 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo.
Petitioners opposed assailing among others that Segundo left a holographic will which is entirely a declaration of
disinheritance affecting Alfredo, one of the private respondents. Private respondents opposed the probate on the ground that
the holographic will did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased. RTC dismissed the petition for probate
easoning that the holographic will clearly shows preterition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

RULING:

A holographic will must be written, dated and signed by the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly
deducted from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative deposition of the latters property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, is an act of disposition in itself. The disinheritance results in the disposition of the property in favor
of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

With regard to the issue on preterition, the court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in
the will. It was Segundos last expression bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo.
Nuguid vs Nuguid, No. L-23445, June 23, 1966;
17 SCRA 449, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on January 4, 2012

(Special Proceedings Difference between Preterition and Disinheritance)

Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.
Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will
be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.

Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of
Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the
direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is
void.

Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir.

Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than
one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.

Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir
preterited the compulsory heirs.
Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, and her holographic will does not
explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of
preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by
law.

Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits
the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal
institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

J.L.T. AGRO, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER, JULIAN L. TEVES VS.

ANTONIO BALANSAG AND HILARIA CADAYDAY
G.R. No. 141882, March 11, 2005
TINGA, J.:

Facts:
 Don Julian L. Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena, and after her
death, with Milagros Donio Teves. Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa
Teves Escao and Emilio Teves. He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio, namely:
Maria Evelyn Donio Teves, Jose Catalino Donio Teves, Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes
Teves. The present controversy involves a parcel of land. When Antonia died, the land was
among the properties involved in an action for partition and damages, the second wife of Don
Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a
Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian.
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the present dispute, lays down the
effect of the eventual death of Don Julian vis--vis his heirs:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties hereinafter adjudicated
to Josefa Teves EscaHo and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda
Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be understood as
including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the
legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the other half
belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves.
In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not
including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the
wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio
Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and
his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves.
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of
Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Don Julian died intestate.
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject
lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease
agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday, respondents herein.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from
the second marriage

Ruling:
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the
heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by
not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of
the properties. It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. It
consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the
testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary
property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter
case. But there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the
legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced heir.
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a
partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise
Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don
Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other
properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his
death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julians desire
along this line. Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julians heirs from the second
marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.

Adjudication:

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

J.L.T. AGRO, INC. v. BALANSAG

G.R. No. 141882, March 11, 2005

Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena and had
two kids namely Josefa and Emilio. After her death, he married Milagros Teves and they
had four children namely: Maria Teves, Jose Teves, Milagros Teves and Pedro
Teves. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement.

When Antonia died an action for partition was instituted where the parties
entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the
properties of Don Julian. On the basis of the compromise agreement, the CFI declared
a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by
Don Julian and his two children of the first marriage. The property was to remain
undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other
properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the movie property, the commercial
areas, and the house where Don Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was
retained by Don Julian.

On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of

Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc.
(petitioner). Later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument
entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of
Liabilities (Supplemental Deed) dated 31 July 1973. This instrument transferred
ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner. The appellate
court ruled that the supplemental deed, conveying ownership to JLT agro is not valid
because the Compromise Agreement reserved the properties to Don Julians two sets
of heirs their future legitimes. The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and
possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them and Don Julian himself
could no longer dispose of the same. The appellate court in holding that the
Supplemental Deed is not valid, added that it contained a prohibited preterition of
Don Julians heirs from the second marriage.

ISSUE: (A.) Was there preterition in the case? (B) Whether or not the future legitime
can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian
(A) None. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will.
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a
partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise
Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the
death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his
legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage
could inherit from Don Julian upon his death.

(B) As a general rule, No. Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even
future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a
contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to
future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is partition inter vivos referred to
in Article 1080.

The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant
to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only upon
the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the
properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere
expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the
prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. Evidently, at the
time of the execution of the supplemental deed in favor of petitioner, Don
Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would
only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death.

PALACIOS v. RAMIREZ

FACTS:

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on
July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.

On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the
deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow en plenodominio in satisfaction
of her legitime; the other part or free portion shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez en
nudapropriedad. Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widows usufruct and
the remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in Spain
on December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:

Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez

-widow

-French who lives in Paris

-received (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
-two grandnephews

-lives in Malate

-received the (free portion)

Wanda de Wrobleski
-companion

-Austrian who lives in Spain

-received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion

-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez

-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix

-Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because

a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widows usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wandas usufruct is INVALID because first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived
the testator

b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not related to the second heirs or
substitutes within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC

c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5

d. proposed partition of the testators interest in the Santa Cruz Building between widow and appellants
violates testators express will to give this property to them

-LC: approved partition

ISSUE
WON the partition is valid insofar as

a. widows legitime

b. substitutions

c. usufruct of Wanda

HELD
a. YES, appellants do not question because Marcelle is the widow[1]and over which he could impose
no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever[2]

-the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testators widow of a usufruct over 1/3 of the
free portion of the testators estate cannot be made where it will run counter to the testators express will.
The Court erred for Marcelle who is entitled to of the estate enpleno dominio as her legitime and
which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the
estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testators intention for as stated
above his disposition even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the only case where a vulgar
substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases also include refusal or incapacity to
accept inheritance therefore it is VALID.

BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez are not
related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it validates a fideicommissary substitution provided that
such substitution does not go beyond one degreefrom the heir originally instituted. Another is that
there is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact the
apellee agrees that the testator contradicts the establishment of the fideicommissary substitution when he
permits the properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement ofthe usufructuaries and
naked owners.
c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID

-Art XIII[3]Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except toindividuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold land
of the public domain in the Philippines.[4]

The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation
of law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the opinion that this provision does not apply to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would
circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece
of land BUT an alienmay be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the
Philippines. Therefore, the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld because it does not
vest title to the land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens
which is proscribed by the Constitution.
Decision: Marcelle (as legitime), Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in naked ownership and
the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace
Ramirez

Palacios vs Ramirez
Palacios vs Ramirez

Facts:

The testator instituted Wanda as the first heir, and Juan and Horacio as second heir in a fideicommissary
substitution. Juan and Horacio are strangers to Wanda.

Issue:

Whether or not the fideicommissary substitution is valid.

Held:

No, because the second heirs are not within one degree relation ship or strangers to Wanda.

A fideicommissary substitution is void if first heir is not related in the 1st degree to the second heir.As
regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is
void for the following reasons: The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not
related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary
substitution provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted.
PCIB vs. ESCOLIN
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, vs. Hon. Venicio Escolin (CFI-Iloilo) and Avelina A.
Magno; Testate Estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges. Testate Estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges. PCIB, administrator-appellant, vs. Lorenzo Carles, Jose
Pablico, Alfredo Catedral, Salvador Guzman, Belcesar Causing, Florenia Barrido, Purificacion Coronado, Graciano Lucero, Ariteo Thomas Jamir, Melquiades
Batisanan, Pepito Iyulores, Esperidion Partisala, Winifredo Espada, Rosario Alingasa, Adelfa Premaylon, Santiago Pacaonsis, and Avelina A. Magno, appellees,
Western Institute of Technology, Inc., movant-appellee
March 29, 1974; Barredo, J.
*This case has the length of a PIL case. Court admitted several times that it was clueless as to some facts so it copied into the
decision entire pleadings. (!!!) Plus, PCIB raised 78 assignment of errors! Well probably read the case again in Spec Pro.

Short version: The Hodges lived in the Philippines for almost half a century and died leaving substantial
properties in Iloilo and in the US. The missus died 5 years before the husband, providing in her will that
while her estate would go to him, upon his death, the remainder should pass to her siblings. (They were
childless.) The court held that this testamentary provision, while probably ineffectual as a substitution
under the Civil Code, is not actually a substitution, but is a valid and simultaneous institution of heirs,
though the passing of title to the inheritance to the others (the siblings) was made to depend on a
resolutory condition (the husbands death). Case was remanded to the trial court for the determination of
the proper application of the renvoi principle (conflict of laws between Philippines and Texas law), and
the proper distribution of Linnies, Charles, and their conjugal estates.

Facts:
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from Texas, USA. During their
marriage, they had acquired and accumulated considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and
in Oklahoma and Texas in the US. They both lived, worked and were domiciled in Iloilo City for around
50 years. Before her death, Linnie Jane executed a will leaving her estate, less her debts and funeral
expenses, to her husband Charles. Should Charles die, the will provided that the remainder of her estate
go to her brothers and sisters, share and share alike. Should any of the brothers and sisters die before the
husband, Linnie willed that the heirs of the said sibling be substituted in the deceaseds siblings place.

When Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate court, and was appointed Executor, then later, Special
Administrator. He moved to be allowed to continue administering the family business, as per Linnie
Janes wishes, and to engage in sales, conveyances, leases, mortgages and other necessary transactions.
He also filed the necessary and appurtenant administration/accounting records, and income tax returns
for the estate. Charles named seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her heirs (Esta, Emma, Leonard,
Aline, David, Sadie, Era and Nimroy), but the order admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted
one of the heirs, Roy (Nimroy?) Higdon, so Charles filed a verified motion to have Roys name included.

As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering
under American law. He did file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In
Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was
contemplating "renouncing the will". On the question as to what property interests
passed to him as the surviving spouse, he answered:

None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and
other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to
distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their
 Community estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts,
liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid.

Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having liquidated Linnies estate,
which includes her share in the conjugal partnership. A longtime employee of the
Hodges, Avelina Magno, was appointed Administratrix (for Linnies estate) and a
Special Administratrix (for Charles). Magno was appointed, but later Harold Davies
(representative of Charles heirs in the US) was designated Co-Special Administrator,
who was then replaced by one Joe Hodges, Charles nephew. One Atty. Mirasol was
also appointed as co-administrator, and an order of probate and letters of
administration were issued to Hodges and Mirasol.

At this point, the SC was already very much confused about the gaps in the facts,
convinced that the parties representing both estates had cooked up a modus operandi to
settle money matters (a settlement with records the Court never saw)which, however,
went awry, with more and more heirs from the US flocking to the Iloilo shores, and
lawyers (Ozaetas! Mabantas! Manglapuses!) filing their respective claims for retainer
fees. Much much later, PCIB became the administrator of Charles estate, asserting a
claim to all of his estate, including those properties/assets that passed to him upon
Linnie Janes death. Avelina naturally opposed this, as Linnie Janes other heirs (the
HIGDONS) would be prejudiced, so she continued acting in her capacity as
administrator (entering into sales and other such conveyances). For these acts, the PCIB
dismissed her as an employee of Charles estate, to which she responded by locking up
the premises being used by PCIB as offices, which were among the estates properties.

PCIBs Claims
Linnie Janes will should be governed by Philippine Law, with respect to the order of
succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of its
testamentary provisions.
Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will.
Article 16, CC, provides that "the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found", shall prevail. However,
the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary
law (Philippine law) should govern the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables, and the law of
the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines) as regards immovables.
Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied in the Christensen case (1963), Philippine law should
apply.
Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally
between them. Thus, upon Linnies death, of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting their conjugal
estate pertained automatically to Charles, not by way of inheritance, but in his own right as partner in the conjugal partnership.
The other one-half (1/2) portion forming part of Linnies estate, cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her Will,
be enhanced or increased by income, earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing after her death. All rents, emoluments and
income from said estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate
as he may need or desire."
 Articles 900, 995 and 1001 provide that the surviving spouse of a deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants is
entitled, as a matter of right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and
no testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and validly affect this right of the surviving spouse. In fact, her
husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article 886)
Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least 3/4 or 75%
percent of all of the conjugal assets of the spouses, 50% by way of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of
inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and income" accruing to said conjugal estate from the moment of
Linnie Jane Hodges' death.
In his capacity as sole heir and successor to Linnies estate, Charles appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He
operated all the assets, engaged in business and performed all acts in connection with the entirety of the conjugal
estate, in his own name alone, just as he had been operating, engaging and doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still
alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession and control, and registered
in his name alone, not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all said assets.
As the sole and exclusive heir, Charles did not need to liquidate the estate.
Neither was there any asset left to Linnies estate at the time of Charles death,
though Linnies estate may have referred to all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate which would go to her siblings in the event of Charles
death. The provision is thus void and invalid at least as to Philippine assets.
There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized by our Civil Code
(Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or common substitution, sometimes referred to
as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All other
substitutions are merely variations of these. The substitution provided for by paragraph four of
the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary substitution, because there is clearly no
obligation on the part of C. N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the properties for
the substitute heirs. At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order that
a vulgar orsimple substitution can be valid, three alternative conditions must be present, namely,
that the first designated heir (1) should die before the testator; or (2) should not wish to accept the
inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do so. None of these conditions apply to C. N.
Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution provided for by the above-quoted provision of the Will is
not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is void. Manresa even said, when another heir is
designated to inherit upon the death of a first heir, the second designation can have effect only in case the
first instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or not that was the true intention of said testator.
The remedy of the Higdons, then, who are claiming dubious rights to of the conjugal estate of
the Hodges, is to file a claim against the estate of Charles.
It also follows that the conveyances executed by Avelina, claiming to be merely in continuation of
the Hodges businesses, and which corresponding deeds of sale were confirmed by the probate
court, are null and void and should be subject to reconveyance.

Avelinas Claims
(At one point, even Linnies heirs wanted to have Avelina removed from her capacity as administrator, but the
lower court reversed its earlier grant of the motion, on account of a previous injunction it issued.)
Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate, and gave a vested
remainder-estate or the naked title over the same estate, to her relatives.
After Linnies death, Charles, as administrator and executor of the will, unequivocably and
clearly through oral and written declarations and sworn public statements, renounced,
disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct.
Since there was no separation or segregation of the interests of Linnie and Charles in the
combined conjugal estate, as there has been no such separation or segregation, and because of
Charles repudiation, both interests have continually earned exactly the same amount of rents,
emoluments and income.

Issue:
1. Is Linnies disposition in favor of her siblings void? NO
2. How should the estate be partitioned/liquidated? REMAND!

Reasoning:
1. To a certain extent, PCIBs contention that Linnies testamentary substitution, when
viewed as a substitution, may not be given effect, is correct. Indeed, legally speaking,
Linnies will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of
the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is
no vulgar substitution because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the
testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the
inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary
substitution therein because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve
the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct
to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question
are therefore inoperative and invalid.

The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition
exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that
subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious that substitution
occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into
inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857) and, in the present
case, no such possible default is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges
are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what
Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from
his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with
Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges
was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and
sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her
estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute
dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that while he could
completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other
than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might
remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency,
inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although
vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative
upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any
remainder of her estate then.

Contrary to Avelinas view, however, it was not the usufruct alone of Linnies estate, as
contemplated in Article 869, that she bequeathed to Charles during his lifetime, but the
full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even
as there was no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or
any portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court saw no legal impediment
to this kind of institution, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Charles as the
surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Linnie had no
surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904.)

Hodges acts of administration and accounting strongly negate PCIBs claims that he had adjudicated to
himself all of Linnies estate. While he may have used language like herein executor (being) the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated
there is no other person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to
be given notice, he wouldve known that doing so would impute bad faith unto him. Also, in his very
motions, Hodges asserted the rights of Linnies named heirs. He even moved to include Roys name
included in the probate courts order, lest Roys heirs think that they had been omitted.

Thus, he recognized, in his own way, the separate identity of his wifes estate from his own share of the
conjugal partnership up to the time of his death, more than 5 years after that of his wife. He never
considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one can
gather from this is that he could have been preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's
estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her
brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as intimated in his tax return in the US. And
assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the basis of
his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his
co-heirs. The Court thus viewed that under the peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of
the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her sole heir, pending the actual
transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death,
and whatever adjustment might be warranted should there be any such remainder then is a matter that
could well be taken care of by the internal revenue authorities in due time. The Court also considered as
basis of Charles intentions several questionnaires in solemn forms in filing estate taxes abroad, though
they have not been introduced in evidence (!!!), only referred to several times by the parties.

It is obvious, though, that Charles procrastinating in settling Linnies estate, and his sole administration
of it, commingled his and his co-heirs interests, making it difficult to properly make an accounting of
their shares. PCIB, then, cannot administer the properties on its own. What would be just and proper is
for both administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have been segregated
from each other.
2. The parties were in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code should be applied. On the one hand, PCIB
claimed that inasmuch as Linnie was a resident of the Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article 16, construed
in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of
succession under the Civil Code, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal
properties, the other fourth being, as already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900) which she could not have
disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872). On the other hand, Avelina denied that Linnie died a resident of
the Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in Texas, United
States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen of
Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which,
according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, Linnies brothers and sisters are entitled to the remainder of the
whole of her share of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Avelina further maintained that, in
any event, Charles had renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents
touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal significance of which PCIB questioned.

The Court cannot decide on the claims, though, for neither the evidence submitted by the parties appeared to be adequate
enough for it to render an intelligent comprehensive and just resolution. No clear and reliable proof of what in fact the
possibly applicable laws of Texas are, was presented (Remember judicial notice in case of foreign laws?). Then also, the
genuineness of documents relied upon by Avelina is disputed. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all
other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings thereafter to be held for the
purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her
duly probated will.

Linnies estate is the remainder of 1/4 of the conjugal partnership properties, considering that even PCIB did not maintain
that the application of the laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her
will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other
parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a
position contradictory to or inconsistent with them.

The only question that remains to be settled in the remand to the court below are:
(1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime provided
therein
(2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.

In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize
further protracted legal controversies between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the
possible consequences of dispositions made by Charles after Linnies death, from the mass of the unpartitioned estates
without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to whether his intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance
from his wife or part of his own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after the death of Hodges.
After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows:

(1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be individuals, corporations or
foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of properties constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it
appearing from the tenor of his motions of May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make sales
or other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which include his own share of the conjugal estate, he
was not invoking particularly his right over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance
pursuant to the will of his wife;

(2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales or the properties taken in by virtue
of such exchanges, shall be considered as merely the products of "physical changes" of the properties of her estate which the
will expressly authorizes Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said products should remain with the estate at the
time of the death of Hodges should go to her brothers and sisters;
(3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed as covering only the properties
belonging to his estate considering that being only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed
of properties belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither could such dispositions be considered as involving conjugal
properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal partnership automatically ceased when Linnie died, and by the peculiar
provision of her will, under discussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically upon the death of Hodges
to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these constructions of Linnies
will should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two
estates in question.

Disposition
Remand for determination of proper application of Art. 16, CC (renvoi), and of Charles alleged renunciation of his ineritance under
Linnies will. Avelina remains to be the administrator of Linnies estate. The said estate consists of of the community properties of
the said spouses, as of the time of Linnies death on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed
of in favor of third persons from said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the
proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the
husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be
made from said estate. PCIB and Avelina should act thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as
administrators.

CONCURRING OPINIONS

Fernandoconcurred with procedural aspect of the decision.

Teehankeeagreed with most parts but had substantial differences in the reasoning:
C. N. Hodges could not validly make gratuitous dispositions of any part or all of his wife's estate "completely and
absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself" in the language of the main
opinion and thereby render ineffectual and nugatory her institution of her brothers and sisters as her designated
heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her) husband."

If according to the main opinion, Hodges could not make such gratuitous "complete and absolute dispositions" of his
wife Linnie's estate "mortis causa," it would seem that by the same token and rationale he was likewise proscribed by
the will from making such dispositions of Linnie's estate inter vivos.

I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should be resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the
probate court ahead of the partition and segregation of the minimum one-fourth of the conjugal or community
properties constituting Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate, which task considering that it is now seventeen (17) years
since Linnie Jane Hodges' death and her conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has remained unliquidated up to now
might take a similar number of years to unravel with the numerous items, transactions and details of the sizable
estates involved.

Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two prejudicial questions of renvoi and
renunciation were resolved favorably to Linnie's estate meaning to say that if it should be held that C. N. Hodges is
not entitled to any legitime of her estate and at any rate he had totally renounced his inheritance under the will), then
Linnie's estate would consist not only of the minimum one-fourth but one-half of the conjugal or community
properties of the Hodges spouses, which would require again the partition and segregation of still another one-fourth
of said properties to complete Linnie's separate estate.

Justice Teehankee also drew up suggested guidelines for application in the probate court. Please see original case.

Makalintal, CJ.
Regardless of whether or not C. N. Hodges was entitled to a legitime in his deceased wife's estate which question,
still to be decided by the said probate court, may depend upon what is the law of Texas and upon its applicability in
the present case the said estate consists of one-half, not one-fourth, of the conjugal properties. There is neither a
minimum of one-fourth nor a maximum beyond that. It is important to bear this in mind because the estate of Linnie
Hodges consists of her share in the conjugal properties, is still under administration and until now has not been
distributed by order of the court.

The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-fourth portion of the conjugal properties as Linnie
Hodges minimum share is a misnomer and is evidently meant only to indicate that if her husband should eventually
be declared entitled to a legitime, then the disposition made by Linnie Hodges in favor of her collateral relatives
would be valid only as to one-half of her share, or one-fourth of the conjugal properties, since the remainder, which
constitutes such legitime, would necessarily go to her husband in absolute ownership, unburdened by any
substitution, term or condition, resolutory or otherwise. And until the estate is finally settled and adjudicated to the
heirs who may be found entitled to it, the administration must continue to cover Linnie's entire conjugal share.

Digest by Pia
PCIB V. ESCOLIN

Short Summary:
Mr. and Mrs Hodges both made in their wills provisions that upon their deaths, their whole estates should be
inherited by the surviving spouse and that spouse could manage and alienate the said lands, with the exception of
the Texas property. Upon death of the latter spouse, the residue of the estate inherited by the later spouse from the
spouse who predeceased him would redound to the brothers and sisters. Mrs. Hodges died first then Mr. Hodges,
but since there was no liquidation of Mrs. Hodges estate, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges wanted to
determine the extent of her estate that they could inherit. (believe me, this is a short summarycase is long)

Facts

-Charles & Linnie Hodges, both TEXAN nationals, provided in their respective wills that

bequeath remainder of estate to spouseduring lifetime

remainder goes to brothers and sis of surviving spouse
-Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges appointed as EXECUTOR

in Financial Statements submitted before the court, he made statements that the estate of Mrs. Hodges is
1/2 of conjugal estate
that he allegedly renounced his inheritance in a tax declaration in US
for 5 years before his death, he failed to make accounting, failed to acquire final adjudication of wife's
estate

-Charles died. Magno, initially administratrix of both spouse's estate, later replaced by PCIB for Charles' estate

WON Action is prescribed?

NO. 33 appeals were timely made

-Court did not pass upon its timeliness

WON Certiorari and Prohibition is proper?

YES. Appeal insufficient remedy

-many appeals, same facts, same issues = multiplicity of suits

WON THERE IS STILL A RESIDUE FOR MRS. HODGES' HEIRS?

YES.

1. WON SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR SETTLEMENT OF MRS. HODGES ESTATE SHOULD ALREADY BE CLOSED, BASED
ON THE DECEMBER 1957 COURT ORDER ALLEGEDLY ADJUDICATING MR. HODGES AS SOLE HEIR? NO

.no final distribution to all parties concerned of the estate

2. R90.1 (on RESIDUE):

after residue assigned to parties entitled to it, S.P. deemed ready for FINAL CLOSURE:

1. Order issued for distribution/assignment of estate among those entitled

 2. Debts

Funeral expenses
Expenses of administration
Widow allowance
Taxes
Etc.
should be paid already

3. Motion of party requesting the same (not motu proprio) Would include distribution of residue of estate

-Here:

a. No final distribution of residue of Linney's estate

b. No special application made by charles/PCIB
c. Merely allowed advance or partial payments/implementation of will before final liquidation
d. If charles already deemed sole heir, why PCIB needed to file a motion to declare that Charles is indeed the
sole heir?

3. ON ALLEGED INTENTION OF MR. HODGES

PCIB: He intended to adjudicate whole estate to himself (Thus, no residue left, thus ulit, tapos na special

proceeding)

BUT SC:

1. Whatever was intended, he can't deprive those who have rights over the estate
2. Order - motion filed merely for exercise of ownership pending proceeding
3. Mr. Hodges was aware that wife's siblings had rights:
In FS, stated that 1/2 of conjugal estate belonged to Estate of Linney
In Petition for will's probate, he listed the bros and sis as heirs
Lawyer of Magno was initially lawyer of Charles when latter was still executor of Linney's estate
so may know what Charles' intended
Charles admitted omitting a bro of Linney
He even allegedly renounced his share of the estate (but was not proven)
Charles had duty, as Surviving spouse, of trustee of wife's estate so had to act in GF

4. ON PROPERTIES FOR SIBLINGS: since there's still a residue, can't close SP yet

>PCIB: NO LIQUIDATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTIES YET, PCIB SHOULD SOLELY ADMINISTER EVERYTHING TO
DETERMINE THE SEPARATE ESTATE OF LINNEY, OVER W/C MAGNO COULD ADMINISTER H:

NO. both PCIB and Magno should administer

a. It was Charles' fault why no administration of estate yet

b. Admin should both be
impartial
extent of interest
c. Executor (PCIB) of Executor (Charles, over Linney's) Can't administer estate of decedent (Linney) _ R78.6
d. Liquidation of conjugal partnership may be done in either spouse's probate proceedings - R73.2

SUCCESSION: WON THERE'S SUBSTITUTION? None

1. No simple or vulgar substitution (A859, NCC)

 no provision for:
i. Predecease of T for designated heir
ii. Refusal
iii. Incapacity of designated heir to accept inheritance
2. No fideicomissary substitution
no obligation on Charles to preserve the estate
3. There's simultaneous institution of heirs subject to resolutory condition of Charles' death
Charles was to enjoy the whole estate
but he can't dispose of property mortis causa (because it's already subject to the will made by his
wife, which he agreed in the provision of his will)
4. Charles didn't get mere usufruct: he exercises full ownership

PRIL: WON RP LAW GOVERNS LEGITIME OF CHARLES?

No answer yet. Remanded

Art 16, NCC > applies: law of nationality

If we apply Texas PRIL law:

Personal property: law of domicile

Real property: law of situs (both in RP)

IF Art16 applies, then Texas law should govern; Texas law provides no legitime

So renvoi to RP: RP Law provides that the Surviving Spouse, being the sole heir,

gets 1/2 o the conjugal property, then 1/2 goes to the estate of the spouse. If 1/2 of the estate of the spouse goes
to the surviving spouse which is the sole heir, then Charles gets 1/4 of the whole conjugal property.

Court said that Texas law may apply, but since not proven as

Courts can't take JN

should show foreign law:
o As certified by person holding/having custody of such law
o Certificate that such officer does have custody over said law
o Aznar can't be used to show what Texas law may contain, as there's a time difference between
this case and that case, thus the Texas law might have changed in between the rulings

BUT WHATEVER HAPPENS, PCIB can't claim that the estate of Linney is not entitled to at least 1/4 of conjugal
property, they having argued that it is so.

NOTES:

1. will executed in Texas - Oklahoma

2. Charles made executor by Linney, but Charles had no executor - so administrator dapat
3. as regards foreign laws:
Should be proved as a fact
R132 on Public documents
SIR: Dapat use an expert witness
Prove in accordance w/RP law
 PCI Bank vs. Escolin

If there is no absolute obligation imposed upon the first heir to preserve the property and transmit it to a second
heir, there is no fideicomisaria. The institution is not necessarily void; it may be valid as some other disposition, but
it is not a fideicomisaria.

PCIB VS. ESCOLIN

56 SCRA 266

FACTS:

Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to her husband. At the time of her death, she was
citizen of Texas but, was, however domiciled in the Philippines. To see whether the testamentary provisions are
valid, it is apparent and necessary to know what law should be applied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable.

RULING:

It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a renvoi will happen or whether
Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with Texas law, that which should be proven is the law
enforced during the death of Hodges and not in any other time.

The Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than
just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to
Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended
by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance
from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now,
the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We,
therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court o quo, as
hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this
stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her
husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their
conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs.
Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal
partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have been gratuitously
disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as
contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones
ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the
legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.
Perez v. Garchitorena

Carmen Perez is in possession of P21,428.58 deposited by La Urbana as the final payment of Ana
Alcantara against Andres Garchitorena. Mariano, son of Andres, sought attachment on said amount after
obtaining judgment worth P7,872.23 against Joaquin Alcantara, husband of Carmen. Carmen contends
that said amount belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of Ana. The lower court ruled that the money
belongs to Carmens children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana.

Issue:

Whether or not the money was the property of Carmens children as fideicommissary heirs.

Held:

The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, between the parties are the ninth, tenth, and
eleventh.1

Fideicommissary substitution has four requisites: a first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the
estate; an obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a
part of the estate; a second heir; and, the fideicommissarius be entitled to the estate from the time the
testator dies, since he is to inherit from the latter and not from the fiduciary.

The clause merely provides for enjoyment and not disposal. This is an indication of the usufruct inherent
in fideicommissary substitution. Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary
substitution is the provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children,
meaning the heiress shall preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due
time to the fideicommissary heirs. Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary
substitution, when a provision is therein made in the event the heiress should die after the testatrix.
That is, said clause anticipates the case where the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and
after receiving and enjoying the inheritance.

1
Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of
age, married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and living in this same house with me, I institute her as my
sole and universal heiress to the remainder of my estate after the payment of my debts and legacies, so that upon
my death and after probate of this will, and after the report of the committee on claims and appraisal has been
rendered and approved, she will receive from my executrix and properties composing my hereditary estate, that
she may enjoy them with God's blessing and my own.
Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her
surviving children; and should any of these die, his share shall serve to increase the portions of his surviving
brothers (and sisters) by accretion, in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or
her children in so far as it is legally possible.
Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen Garchitorena, die after me while her children are still in their
minority, I order that my estate be administered by my executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her default, by
Attorney Ramon Salinas and in his default, by his son Ramon Salinas; but the direction herein given must not be
considered as an indication of lack of confidence in my nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I relieve from the
duties of administering my estate, because I recognize that his character is not adapted to management and
administration.
In this instance, all the requisites of fideicommissary substitution are present. A first heir primarily called
to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the
enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the will. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir
to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is
imposed in clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's)
surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of
leaving the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in
favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in case she should die after
the testatrix. Lastly, a second heir such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as
such second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.

Therefore, the money belongs to Carmens children as fideicommissary heirs.

Johnny Rabadilla vs Court of

Appeals
A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee to a
511, 855 hectare land. A condition was however imposed to the effect that:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the lifetime
of said Maria Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants, shall
continue delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;
4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of
Belleza.
In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny Rabadilla.
In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny to reconvey the
said land to the estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to comply
with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the
land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term near descendants in the will of Aleja pertains to
the near descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence,
since Aleja had no near descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr.
Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to comply with the terms of the Will
left by Aleja Belleza.
HELD: No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The near descendants
being referred to in the will are the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised
property was already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died. Hence, when Dr.
Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the same property was transmitted to Johnny
Rabadilla by virtue of succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear
therefore, that Johnny should have continued complying with the terms of the Will. His
failure to do so shall give rise to an obligation for him to reconvey the property to the estate
of Aleja.

RABADILLA vs. CA

June 29, 2000

FACTS:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have
the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic)
piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to enforce the
provisions of subject Codicil.

ISSUE:

WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.

HELD:

Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the
time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of
the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his
death.