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1. Secretary of DENR vs Yap


Natural Resources and Environmental Laws: Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008

FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the
petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and
ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine
reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan. The
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition
countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed
part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for
disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural
land, therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. A positive act
declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act
of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land
into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

568 SCRA 164 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds


Land Classifications Boracay Cases Positive Act by the
Government in Reclassifying Lands
These are two consolidated cases.

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for declaratory relief to have a judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes for the land theyve been occupying in
Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
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earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty
taxes on them.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was
not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705
or the Revised Forestry Code. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable
and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. RTC Ruled in
favor of Yap et al. The OSG appealed.

G.R. No. 173775


During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in May 2006, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400)
hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and
96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation
likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads
and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for
forest land protection purposes.

Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay landowners in Boracay filed with the
Supreme Court (SC) an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested
rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of
pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on
their lots.

The OSG again opposed Sacays petition. The OSG argued that Sacay et al do not have a
vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public
forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed
portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need
for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

ISSUES: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal
obstacle for Yap et al and Sacay et al, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to
their occupied lands in Boracay Island.

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian Doctrine
dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source
of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act of the government, such as
an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented. The records are bereft
of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition
before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
3

Also, private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay
Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the
island into private ownership. Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926
does not create a presumption that the land is alienable. It is plain error for petitioners
to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands
are alienable and disposable.

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the
said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
under CA No. 141, namely:

(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and

(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
element of possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not
sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced
on June 12, 1945.

Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not


automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply
for a title to the land they are presently occupying. The SC is constitutionally bound to
decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and
jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of
title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and
considerable investment in the island.
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2. Pagkatipunan v. CA (379 SCRA 621, G.R. No. 129682,


March 21, 2002)
FACTS: Petitioners (Nestor Pagkatipunan and Rosalina Maagas-Pagkatipunan) were able
to register a parcel of land. 18 years later, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the CA
an action to cancel the registration for the certificates of title therein are null and void
alleging that at the tile of the filing of the land registration, the subject land was still
classified as timberland, hence inalienable and not subject to registration. Petitioner on the
other hand raised the defenses of indefeasibility of title for it took the government 18 years
to assail the validity of the certificate of title issued to them.

ISSUE: WON the republic is barred by prescription? NO.

HELD Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private
person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Occupation thereof in
the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as
a title. Furthermore, evidence extant on record showed that at the time of filing of the
application for land registration and issuance of the certificate of title over the disputed
land in the name of petitioners, the same was timberland and formed part of the public
domain. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. In the case at bar, there was
no evidence showing that the land has been reclassified as disposable or alienable. Before
any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the
government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and
until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of Government. It cannot be
presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor deemed waived. It calls for proof. The
classification of forest land, or any land for that matter, is descriptive of its legal nature or
status, and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. A person
cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn
credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first
declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land.

PAGKATIPUNAN V. CA MARCH 21 2002


FACTS:
Sometime in November 1960, petitioners predecessors-in-interest, spouses Getulio
Pagkatipunan and Lucrecia Esquires, filed with the Court of First Instance of Gu
maca, application for judicial confirmation and registration of their title to L
ots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-174406 and Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-112066, all located
in San Narciso, Quezon.5 On May 4, 1961, the Court of First Instance entered an order of
default against the whole world, except spouses Felicisimo Almace and Teodulo Medenilla
who were given ten (10) days to file their written opposition as regards Lot No. 2 of Pl
an Psu-174406. Upon motion of petitioners predecessors, Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-174
406 was removed from the coverage of the application. The remaining parcel of la
nd covered by Lot No. 1 has an area of 3,804.261 square meters. On June 15, 1967, the
Court of First Instance promulgated a decision confirming petitioners title to the property.
On October 23, 1967, OCT No. O-12665 was issue d in the name of petitioners.Almost
eighteen (18) years later, or on September 12, 1985, the Republic of the Philippines filed
with the Intermediate Appellate Court an action to declare the proceedings in LRC Case
No. 91-G, LRC Record No. N-19930 before the Court of Fi rst Instance of Gumaca,
5

Quezon null and void, and to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-12665 and titles
derived therefrom as null and void, to direct the register of deeds to annul said certificates
of title, and to confirm the subject land as part of the public domain. The Republic claimed
that at the time of filing of the land registration case and of rendition of the decision on
June 15, 1967, the subject land was classified as timberland under LC Project No. 15-B of
San Narciso, Quezon, as shown in BF Map No. LC-1180; hence inalienable and not subject
to registration. Moreover, pe titioners title thereto can not be confirmed for lack of showing
of possession an d occupation of the land in the manner and for the length of time required
by Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. Neither did petitioners have
any fee simple title which may be registered under Act No. 496, as amended.
Consequently, the Court of First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction over the res
and any proceedings had therein were null and void. Petitioners claim that their title to the
land became incontrovertible and indefeasible one (1) year after issuance of the decree of
registration. Hence, the Republics cause of action was barred by prescription and
resjudicata, proceedings having been initiated only after about 18 years from the time the
decree of registration was made. Contrary to the appellate courts findings, the land is
agricultural and the inclusion and classification thereof by the Bureau of Forestry in 1955
as timberland can not impair the vested rights acquired by petitioners predecessors-in-
interest who have been in open, continuous, adverse and public possession of the land in
question since time immemorial and for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of
the application for registration in 1960.

ISSUE:
W/O CA committed grave error when it denied their motion to set aside entry of judgment
in the land registration case contending that at the time of filing of the land registration
case and of rendition of the decision on June 15, 1967, the subject land was classified as
timberland, hence inalienable and not subject to registration.

RULING:
The CA committed grave error when it denied their motion to set aside entry of judgment
in the land registration case. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title. Evidence extant on record showed that at the time of
filing of the application for land registration and issuance of the certificate of title over the
disputed land in the name of petitioners, the same was timberland and formed part of the
public domain, as per certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development on April 1,
1985. This fact was even admitted by petitioners during the proceedings before the court
quo on March 10, 1986, when they confirmed that the land has been classified as forming
part of forest land, albeit only on August 25, 1955.23 Since no imperfect title can be
confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable, the title issued to herein
petitioners is considered void ab initio.24 Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same
doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.25 To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of the
applicationis alienable or disposable.26 In the case at bar, there was no evidence showing
that the land has been reclassified as disposable or alienable. Before any land may be
declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even
rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land
classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. 27 Declassification of
forest land is an express and positive act of Government. 28 It cannot be presumed. Neither
should it be ignored nor deemed waived.29 It c alls for proof.30 The court a quo found
registrable title in favor of petitioners based on the Republics failure to show that the land
is more valuable as forest land than for agricultural purposes, a finding which is based on a
wrong concept of what is fores t land.
6

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in the dictionary and "forest or timber
land" as a classification of land of the public domain in the Constitution. One is descriptive
of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal
purposes. The "forest land" started out as a "forest" or vast tracts of wooded land with
dense growths of trees and under brush. However, the cutting down of trees and the
disappearance of virgin forest do not automatically convert the land of the public domain
from forest or timber land to alienable agricultural land.31 The classification of forest land,
or any land for that matter, is descriptive of its legal nature or status, and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.32 A person cannot enter into forest land
and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual
confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be
alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and
exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.33
As ruled in the case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry:34 A forested area
classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified
as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators
or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.
Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish
or se a water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the l
and actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
Moreover, the original text of Section 48 (b), Chapter VIII of the Public Land A
ct, which took effect on December 1, 1936, expressly provided that only agricult ural land
of the public domain are subject to acquisitive prescription. Thus, it is clear that the
applicant must prove not only his open, continuous, e xclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed
therein, but most importantly, he must prove that the land is alienable public land.35 In the
case at bar, petitioners failed to do so. Petitioners contention that the Republic is now
barred from questioning the validity of the certificate of title issued to them considering
that it took the government almost eighteen (18) years to assail the same is erroneous. It is
a basic precept that prescription does not run against the State.36 The lengthy occupat
ion of the disputed land by petitioners cannot be counted in their favor, as it remained part
of the patrimonial property of the State, which property, as state d earlier, is inalienable and
indisposable.37 In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not err when it set aside
th e June 15, 1967 decision of the courta quo and ordered that the subject lot be r
everted back to the public domain. Since the land in question is unregistrable, the land
registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the same. Any proceedings had or
judgment rendered therein is void and is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid
judgment. Consequently, the Court of Appeals rightfully denied petitioners motion to set
aside the judgment rendered on December 12, 1986, in the land registration case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
June 27, 1986 in AC-G.R. SP No. 07115, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
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3. G.R. No. 152570 September 27, 2006


SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES, INC.,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
x------------------------------------------------x
PEDRO URGELLO, intervenor-appellant.

TINGA, J.:

The instant petition for review assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 18 July
2001 and 18 March 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64097, reversing and setting aside the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-17173.

On 18 October 1967, Socorro Orcullo filed her application for Free Patent for Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-
D, a parcel of land with an area of 12.8477 hectares located in Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu.

Thereafter, on 14 February 1971, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Free
Patent No. 473408 for Lot No. 1434, while the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu issued OCT
No. 0-6667 over the said lot.1

Subsequently, the subject lot was sold to SAAD Agro- Industries, Inc. by one of Orcullo's heirs.

Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a complaint for
annulment of title and reversion of the lot covered by Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 and
reversion of Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D to the mass of the public domain, on the ground that the
issuance of the said free patent and title for Lot No. 1434 was irregular and erroneous, following
the discovery that the lot is allegedly part of the timberland and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu.

The discovery was made after Pedro Urgello filed a letter-complaint with the Regional Executive Director
of the Forest Management Sector, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Region
VII, Cebu City, about the alleged illegal cutting of mangrove trees and construction of dikes within
the area covered by Urgello's Fishpond Lease Agreement.

On 14 July 1995, Urgello filed a complaint-in-intervention against the heirs of Orcullo, adopting the
allegations of respondent.

However, the heirs failed to file their answer to the complaint and were thus declared in default.

On 15 May 1999, the trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that respondent failed to show that
the subject lot is part of the timberland or forest reserve or that it has been classified as such
before the issuance of the free patent and the original title.

According to the trial court, the issuance of the free patent and title was regular and in order, and must
be accorded full faith.

Considering the validity of the free patent and the OCT, petitioner's purchase of the property was also
declared legal and valid. The trial court also denied the complaint-in-intervention filed by Urgello.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court's judgment. It held that timber or forest lands, to
which the subject lot belongs, are not subject to private ownership, unless these are first classified as
agricultural lands. Thus, absent any declassification of the subject lot from forest to alienable and
disposable land for agricultural purposes, the officers erred in approving Orcullo's free patent
application and in issuing the OCT; hence, title to the lot must be cancelled.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals invalidated the sale of the lot to petitioner. However, it declared
that Urgello's Fishpond Lease Agreement may continue until its expiration because lease does
not pass title to the lessee; but thereafter, the lease should not be renewed.

Free Patent No. 473408 and the corresponding OCT [No.] 0-6667 as NULL and VOID ab initio.
SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. is directed to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of OCT [No.] 0-6667
to the Register of Deeds of Cebu City.
8

The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is hereby ordered to cancel OCT [No.] 0-6667 and all other
transfer certificates of title that may have been subsequently issued.

Lot No. 1434, CAD 315[-]D located at Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu, subject matter of this
case, is hereby REVERTED as part of [the] public domain and to be classified as timberland. 11

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, claiming insufficiency of evidence and failure to consider
pertinent laws, proved futile as it was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals categorically
stated that there was a preponderance of evidence showing that the subject lot is within the timberland
area.

Petitioner now claims that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the DENR officer's testimony. It claims
that the testimony was a mere opinion. Such opinion was premised on the officer's construction of a
provision of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code, the
pertinent portion of which reads:

Those still to be classified under the present system shall continue to remain as part of the public
forest.14

Petitioner points out that P.D. No. 705 took effect on 19 May 1975, or long after the issuance of the free
patent and title in question. Thus, the provision stating that all public lands should be considered as
"part of the public forests" until a land classification team has declassified them is applicable only after
the effectivity of P.D. No. 705 and cannot be made retroactive to cover and prejudice vested rights
acquired prior to the effectivity of said law, petitioner concludes.

It adds that if the subject lot was encompassed by the term "public forest," the same should have been
designated as a "Timberland Block," not as Cadastral Lot No. 1434, CAF-315-D, Sibonga Cadastre
which was the designation made by the Republic prior to 1972.

Petitioner also questions the Court of Appeals' reliance on the land classification map (L.C. Map)
presented by respondent. The trial court had previously declared L.C. Map No. 2961 as inadmissible,
finding that "the plaintiff has not duly proved the authenticity and contents." According to petitioner, the
L.C. Map presented in court is neither a certified true copy nor one attested to be a true copy by any
DENR official having legal custody of the original thereof, and thus should not have been made the
basis of the cancellation of the free patent and title.

Petitioner further contends that the projection survey conducted by the DENR to determine if the subject
lot falls within the forest area "is not clear, precise and conclusive," since the foresters who conducted
the survey used a magnetic box compass, an unreliable and inaccurate instrument, whose results are
easily affected by high tension wires and stones with iron minerals. 18

Finally, petitioner claims that respondent failed to overcome the presumption of regularity of the
issuance of the free patent and title in favor of Socorro Orcullo.

In sum, petitioner asserts that respondent failed to show that the subject lot is inside the timberland
block, thereby casting doubt on the accuracy of the survey conducted by the Bureau of Forestry and the
opinions of DENR officers. Since respondent is the original plaintiff in the reversion case, the burden is
on it to prove that the subject lot is part of the timberland block, petitioner adds.

ISSUE: Whether the subject lot is a timberland.

HELD: Respondent failed to show that the subject lot is part of timberland or forest reserve it adverted
to. Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 as valid and regular issuances, respondent's
insistence on the classification of the lot as part of the forest reserve was rejected.

Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.

The State, as the party alleging the fraud and misrepresentation that attended the application of the free
patent, bears that burden of proof. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent
and annulment of title, should never be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate.

It was incumbent upon respondent to prove that the free patent and original title were truly
erroneously and irregularly obtained. Unfortunately, respondent failed to do so.

Reliance on the provision of P.D. No. 705 particularly Section 13 is highly misplaced.

P.D. No. 705 was promulgated only on 19 May 1975, or four (4) years after the free patent and title were
awarded to Orcullo. Thus, it finds no application in the instant case.
9

Prior forestry laws, including P.D. No. 389, which was revised by P.D. No. 705, does not contain a similar
provision. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided."

The subject parcel was unclassified at the time Orcullo applied for a free patent thereto, the fact
remains that when the free patent and title were issued thereon in 1971, respondent in essence
segregated said parcel from the mass of public domain. Thus, it can no longer be considered
unclassified and forming part of the public forest as provided in P.D. No. 705.

Respondent's main basis for asserting that the subject lot is part of the timberland or forest reserve is a
purported L.C. Map No. 2961. Even assuming that the L.C. Map submitted by respondent is admissible
in evidence, still the land in question can hardly be considered part of the timberland or forest reserve.

L.C. Map No. 2961, which purports to be the "correct map of the areas demarcated as permanent forest
pursuant of the provisions of P.D. No. 705 as amended" was made only in 1980. Thus, the delineation
of the areas was made nine (9) years after Orcullo was awarded the free patent over the subject
lot.

Private interests have intervened before classification was made pursuant to P.D. No. 705. Not only has
Orcullo by herself and through her predecessors-in-interest cultivated and possessed the subject lot
since 1930, a free patent was also awarded to her and a title issued in her name as early as 1971.

In fact, it appears that the issuance of the free patent and certificate of title was regular and in order.

Orcullo complied with the requisites for the acquisition of free patent provided under Commonwealth Act
No. 141 (Public Land Act), as certified by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Besides, the records do not show that respondent has considered the lot in question as forest reserve
prior to the issuance of Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667. To declare the land now as forest
land on the authority of L.C. Map No. 2961 approved only in 1980, and opinions based on the said map,
would unduly deprive petitioner of their registered property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

REVERSION: BURDEN OF PROOF

SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES, INC. V. REPUBLIC


503 SCRA 522
FACTS:
- Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application for Free Patent for Lot No. 1434.
- The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Free Patent No. 473408
for Lot No. 1434.
- Subsequently, the subject lot was sold to SAAD Agro- Industries, Inc. (petitioner)
by one of Orcullos heirs.
- The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a complaint
for annulment of title and reversion of the lot covered by Free Patent No. 473408
and OCT No. 0-6667 and reversion of Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D to the mass of
the public domain, on the ground that the issuance of the said free patent and title
for Lot No. 1434 was irregular and erroneous, following the discovery that the lot
is allegedly part of the timberland and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu.
- The discovery was made after Pedro Urgello filed a letter-complaint with
the Regional Executive Director of the Forest Management Sector, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Region VII, Cebu City, about the
alleged illegal cutting of mangrove trees and construction of dikes within the area
covered by Urgellos Fishpond Lease Agreement.
- Urgello filed a complaint-in-intervention against the heirs of Orcullo, adopting the
allegations of respondent. However, the heirs failed to file their answer to the
complaint and were thus declared in default.
- The trial court dismissed the complaint for reversion. Respondent appealed.
- CA reversed the trial court. Petitioner appeals.
10

- Thus the instant petition.

ISSUES:
- Whether or not the complaint for reversion should be given due course.

HELD/RATIO:
- Under the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land
and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Under this doctrine, lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State.
- It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves a serious controversy,
involving a question of fraud and misrepresentation committed against the
government and it is aimed at the return of the disputed portion of the public
domain.
- The State, as the party alleging the fraud and misrepresentation that attended the
application of the free patent, bears that burden of proof. Fraud and
misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title,
should never be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate.
- It is but judicious to require the Government, in an action for reversion, to show the
details attending the issuance of title over the alleged inalienable land and explain
why such issuance has deprived the State of the claimed property.
- It was incumbent upon respondent to prove that the free patent and original title
were truly erroneously and irregularly obtained. Unfortunately, respondent failed
to do so.
- The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only in the present Constitution, but
also in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The Court has always recognized and
upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of the State's property regime.
Nevertheless, in applying this doctrine, we must not lose sight of the fact that in
every claim or right by the Government against one of its citizens, the paramount
considerations of fairness and due process must be observed. Respondent in this
case failed to show that the subject lot is part of timberland or forest reserve it
adverted to. In the face of the uncontroverted status of Free Patent No. 473408 and
OCT No. 0-6667 as valid and regular issuances, respondents insistence on the
classification of the lot as part of the forest reserve must be rejected.
11

4. Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000


Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of
the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz
et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-
7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority
vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral
domains may include natural resources somehow against the regalian doctrine.

Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural


Resources (2000)
Petitioners: Isagani Cruz
Respondents: Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources
Topic: Territory, People, and Government - Territory
SUMMARY: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain provisions of the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) or RA 8371 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR). However, due to a tie vote (7-7) after due
deliberation and re-deliberation, the petition was dismissed. (Thus, the separate
opinions are more important in this case).
FACTS: See issues.
ISSUE/S:
Most important issue: WoN Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, and 57, and 58 of
RA 8371/IPRA and its IRR are unconstitutional for unlawfully depriving the State of
its ownership over lands of the public domain, minerals, and other natural
resources therein, violating the regalian doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution

o Justice Kapunan: NO.

Said provisions affirming the ownership by indigenous peoples of


their ancestral lands and domains by virtue of native title (definition:
lands held in private ownership since time immemorial) do not
diminish the States ownership of lands within the public domain,
because said ancestral lands and domains are considered as
private land, and never to have been part of the public domain,
following the doctrine laid down in Cario v. Insular Government.
12

Section 3(a) does not confer or recognize any right of ownership


over the natural resources to the ICCs/IPs. Its purpose is
definitional and not declarative of a right or title.

Section 57 only grants priority rights to ICCs/IPs in the utilization


of natural resources and not absolute ownership thereof. The State
retains full control over the exploration, development and utilization
of natural resources through the imposition of requirements and
conditions for the utilization of natural resources under existing
laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 and the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995. Neither does the grant of said rights exclude
non-indigenous peoples from undertaking the same activities within
the ancestral domains upon authority granted by the proper
governmental agency.

o Justice Puno: NO.

Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of
the public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. The
classification of lands in the public domain under Section 3, Article
XII of the Constitution does not include ancestral lands nor
ancestral domains. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by
native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens
title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with
respect to ancestral lands only. Both modes presume or recognize
the land as private and not public.

The right of ownership to ancestral domain under Section 7(a)


involves lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied
by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds,
and all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains, not waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources enumerated in
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. Ownership therefore of
natural resources remain with the State.

Small-scale utilization of resources in Section 7(b) is also allowed


under paragraph 3, section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

Finally, the large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57


of RA 8371/IPRA is allowed under paragraphs 1 and 4, section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution since only priority rights (which does
not necessarily mean ownership rights) are given to ICCs/IPs.

However, by including natural resources, Section 1, Part II, Rule


III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond Section 7(a) and
therefore unconstitutional.

o Justice Panganiban: YES.

Section 3(a) [whose definition of ancestral domain encompasses


natural resources found therein], and 3(b) [defines ancestral lands
as those possessed by ICCs/IPs since time immemorial]
contravene Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which declares
that the State owns all lands of the public domain, minerals, and
natural resources none of which, except agricultural lands, can be
alienated. In addition, mere possession or utilization of land,
13

however long, does not automatically convert them into private


properties.

IPRA/RA 8371 does not specify limits to ancestral lands and


domains.

IPRA/RA 8371 relinquishes the States power under Section 2,


Article XII of the Constitution of full control of natural resources in
ancestral lands and ancestral domains in favor of ICCs/IPs, who
may exercise these rights without any time limit. In addition, they
are also given the right to negotiate directly the terms and
conditions for the exploration of natural resources under Section
7(b), a right vested by the Constitution only to the State.

o Justice Vitug: YES. Sections 7 and 57 go beyond the context of the


fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an
unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a significant area of the
country and its patrimony

WoN Sections 51 to 53, 59, 52(i), 63, 65, and 66 of RA 8371/IPRA, defining the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands, violate the
due process clause of the Constitution

o Justice Kapunan: NO. The fact the NCIP is composed wholly of


indigenous peoples does not mean that it is incapable of being impartial.
Moreover, the use of customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section
5 of Article XII of the Constitution.

o Justice Puno: Not discussed.

o Justice Panganiban: Not discussed. It is best to await specific cases filed


by those whose rights may have been injured by these provisions.

o Justice Vitug: YES, but only on making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands.
The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows
Congress to provide for the applicability of customary laws governing
property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domains. I do not see this statement as saying that Congress
may enact a law that would simply express that customary laws shall
govern and end it there. No discussion on the powers and jurisdiction of
the NCIP.

WoN Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office
of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for
purposes of policy and program coordination, infringes upon the Presidents power
of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution

o Justice Kapunan: NO, since said provision as well as Section 40 of the


IPRA expressly places the NCIP under the Office of the President, and
therefore under the Presidents control and supervision with respect to its
administrative functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers are concerned, the same are
reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of the NLRC and the SEC.

o Justice Puno: Not discussed.


14

o Justice Panganiban: Not discussed. It is best to await specific cases filed


by those whose rights may have been injured by these provisions.

o Justice Vitug: Not discussed.

NOTES:
Seven Justices voted to dismiss the petitions

o Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.

o Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged


provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of
NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he
contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation
of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

o Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it
does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven Justices voted to grant the petition

o Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that


Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections
58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.

o Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that
Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justice Vitug
also mentioned that the petitioners have standing to raise the issue, as it is
of transcendental importance.

o Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the


separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

347 SCRA 128 (400 Phil 904) Civil Law Land Titles
and Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine
Former Justice Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the Republic
Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA Law) on the ground that the
law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include
natural resources.

In addition, Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of


ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found
within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law also violate the rights of private
landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.


15

HELD: The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was
no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the constitutionality of the IPRA law
was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against
the regalian doctrine.
16

5. Republic vs Naguiat
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006

FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located
in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels
of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-
in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to
the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind
nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact
that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or
timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain?

HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent
and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of
the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired
by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title. A forested area
classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.
The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CELESTINA


NAGUIAT
(GR.NO. 134209, Jan. 24, 2006)

Facts:

This is an application for registration of title to four parcels of land by Celestina


Nuguiat located at Botolan, Zambales. Applicant(respondent) alleges that she is the owner
of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation
which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga, and Fausto
Monje and their predecessor in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more
than 30 years.

The Republic filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the
applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since June12, 1945 or prior
thereto; that the monuments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bonafide acquisition of the lands applied for, and
17

that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic
of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

Issue:

Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or
other inalienable lands of the public domain and the applicants registration of title will
prosper.

Held:

Applicants registration of title for said parcels of land will not prosper because the
said land is a public forest lands. Forest lands unless declassified and released by positive
act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable and agricultural lands
of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation.

Forests, in the context of both Public Land act and the Constitution classifying
lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national
parks do not necessarily refer to a large tract of woodland or an expanse covered by dense
growth of trees and underbrush.

Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper
government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable
and disposable. For unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be
registered as title.

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