Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
- Petitioners' alleged cause of action and
deportation against herein respondent arose in
1962. However, the warrant of arrest of
respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo
only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It
is clear that petitioners' cause of action has
already prescribed and by their inaction could not
now be validly enforced by petitioners against
respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the
warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was
already recalled and the Identification certificate of
respondent, among others, was revalidated on
March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner
Nituda.
- The Court, therefore, holds that the period of
effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a
warrant of exclusion based on a final order of the
BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself
provides for a period of prescription. Prescription
of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the
State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a
certain time, while prescription of the penalty is
the loss or forfeiture by the government of the
right to execute the final sentence after the lapse
of a certain time
Disposition Petition Dismissed. William
Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen.
CAMARA V MUNICIPAL COURT
387 US 523
WHITE; June 5, 1967
FACTS
- November 6, 1963 - An inspector of the Division
of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco
Department of Public Health entered an apartment
building to make a routine annual inspection for
possible violations of the city's Housing Code.
- The building's manager informed the inspector
that Camara, lessee of the ground floor, was using
the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence.
Claiming that the building's occupancy permit did
not allow residential use of the ground floor, the
inspector confronted Camara and demanded that
he permit an inspection of the premises. Appellant
refused to allow the inspection because the
inspector lacked a search warrant.
- November 8, 1963 – The inspector returned again
but still without a warrant so Camara still refused
to let him in.
- A citation was then mailed ordering Camara to
appear at the district attorney's office. When
Camara failed to appear, two inspectors returned
to his apartment on November 22. They informed
appellant that he was required by law to permit an
inspection under the Housing Code which states
that “authorized employees of the City
departments or City agencies, so far as may be
necessary for the performance of their duties,
shall, upon presentation of proper credentials,
have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any
building, structure, or premises in the City to
perform any duty imposed upon them by the
Municipal Code.”
- Camara still refused to allow entry. A complaint
was filed charging him with refusing to permit a
lawful inspection in violation of 507 of the Code.
He was arrested on December 2 and released on
bail.
- Camara argues that A503 is contrary to the 4th
and 15th Amendments in that it authorizes
municipal officials to enter a private dwelling
without a search warrant and without probable
cause to believe that a violation of the Housing
Code exists therein. Consequently, appellant
contends, he may not be prosecuted under A507
for refusing to permit an inspection
unconstitutionally authorized by A503.
- CA held that 503 does not violate Fourth
Amendment rights because it “is part of a
regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather
than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section
creates a right of inspection which is limited in
scope and may not be exercised under
unreasonable conditions.”
ISSUE
1. WON administrative searches can be considered
as intrusion to privacy
2. WON warrants should issue only when the
inspector possesses probable cause to believe that
a particular dwelling contains violations of the
minimum standards prescribed by the code being
enforced
3. WON Camara’s acts should be sustained
HELD
1. YES
Ratio One governing principle has consistently
been followed: except in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, a search of private property
without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it
has been authorized by a valid search warrant.
Reasoning
55
A2010
- The 4th Amendment provides that “the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” The basic purpose
of this Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions
by governmental officials.
- Frank vs. Maryland would not squarely fall into
place in this case. In the Frank case, this Court
upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit
a warrantless inspection of private premises for
the purposes of locating and abating a suspected
public nuisance. Municipal fire, health, and
housing inspection programs "touch at most upon
the periphery of the important interests
safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection against official intrusion," because the
inspections are merely to determine whether
physical conditions exist which do not comply with
minimum standards prescribed in local regulatory
ordinances.
- The Court may agree that a routine inspection of
the physical condition of private property is a less
hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's
search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime.
For this reason, Frank differed from the great bulk
of 4th Amendment cases which have been
considered by the Court. But the Fourth
Amendment interests at stake in these inspection
cases cannot be regarded as merely "peripheral."
- Under the present system (in 1967), when the
inspector demands entry, the occupant has no way
of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal
code involved requires inspection of his premises,
no way of knowing the lawful limits of the
inspector's power to search, and no way of
knowing whether the inspector himself is acting
under proper authorization.
2. NO
Ratio Where considerations of health and safety
are involved, the facts that would justify an
inference of `probable cause' to make an
inspection are clearly different from those that
would justify such an inference where a criminal
investigation has been undertaken.
Reasoning
- “Probable cause” is the standard by which a
particular decision to search is tested against the
constitutional mandate of reasonableness. To
Administrative Law
apply this standard, it is obviously necessary first
to focus upon the governmental interest which
allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the
constitutionally protected interests of the private
citizen.
- The area inspection is a "reasonable" search of
private property within the meaning of the 4th
Amendment, it is obvious that "probable cause" to
issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an area inspection are satisfied with
respect to a particular dwelling.
3. YES
Reasoning
- There was no emergency demanding immediate
access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to
the building in an attempt to obtain appellant's
consent to search. Yet no warrant was obtained
and thus appellant was unable to verify either the
need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection.
- Camara had a constitutional right to insist that
the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that
appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for
refusing to consent to the inspection.
Disposition Judgment reversed
SEE V SEATTLE
387 U.S. 541
WHITE; June 5, 1967
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of Supreme Court of
Washington
FACTS
-An inspection was conducted by a representative
of Seattle Fire Dept as part of a periodic city-wide
canvass to obtain compliance with Seattle's Fire
Code. City of Seattle Ordinance No. 87870.
- See did not permit him to enter and inspect his
locked commercial warehouse without a warrant
and without probable cause to believe that a
violation of any municipal ordinance existed. See
was arrested charged with violating 8.01.050 of
the Fire Code1
1
"INSPECTION OF BUILDING AND PREMISES. It shall be the
duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and he may enter all
buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings,
as often as may be necessary for the purpose of
ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions
Dean Carlota
-See was convicted. He claimed that 8.01.050, if
interpreted to authorize this warrantless inspection
of his warehouse, would violate his rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
ISSUE/S
WON the Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a
person who has refused to permit a warrantless
code-enforcement inspection in commercial
premises
HELD
YES
-the basic component of a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment - that it not be
enforced without a suitable warrant procedure is
applicable to business as well as to residential
premises. Therefore, appellant may not be
prosecuted for exercising his constitutional right to
insist that the fire inspector obtain a warrant
authorizing entry upon appellant's locked
warehouse.
-Administrative entry, without consent, upon the
portions of commercial premises which are not
open to the public may only be compelled through
prosecution or physical force within the framework
of a warrant procedure.
-In Camara v Municipal Court, we held that the
Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person
who has refused to permit a warrantless code-
enforcement inspection of his personal residence.
In Camara, a search of private houses is
presumptively unreasonable if conducted without
a warrant. The businessman, like the occupant of a
residence, has a constitutional right to go about
his business free from unreasonable official entries
upon his private commercial property. The
businessman, too, has that right placed in
jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for
violation of regulatory laws can be made and
enforced by the inspector in the field without
official authority evidenced by a warrant.
-(Court applied analogous case of administrative
subpoena) It is these rather minimal limitations on
administrative action which we think are
constitutionally required in the case of
investigative entry upon commercial
liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of
this Title, and of any other ordinance concerning fire
hazards."
56
A2010
establishments. The agency's particular demand
for access will of course be measured, in terms of
probable cause to issue a warrant, against a
flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into
account the public need for effective enforcement
of the particular regulation involved. But the
decision to enter and inspect will not be the
product of the unreviewed discretion of the
enforcement officer in the field.
Disposition Reversed
CLARK, (HARLAN and STEWART join),
DISSENT
-Frankfurter wrote in Frank v. Maryland: "Time
and experience have forcefully taught that the
power to inspect dwelling places is of
indispensable importance to the maintenance of
community health; a power that would be greatly
hobbled by the blanket requirement of the
safeguards necessary for a search of evidence of
criminal acts. The need for preventive action is
great, and city after city has seen this need and
granted the power of inspection to its health
officials; and these inspections are apparently
welcomed by all but an insignificant few."
-As I read it, the Fourth Amendment guarantee of
individual privacy is, by its language, specifically
qualified. It prohibits only those searches that are
"unreasonable." I submit that under the carefully
circumscribed requirements of health and safety
codes, as well as the facts and circumstances of
these particular inspections, there is nothing
unreasonable about the ones undertaken here.
These inspections meet the Fourth Amendment's
test of reasonableness and are entirely consistent
with the Amendment's commands and our cases.
-There is nothing here that suggests that the
inspection was unauthorized, unreasonable, for
any improper purpose, or designed as a basis for a
criminal prosecution; nor is there any indication of
any discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious action
affecting the appellant in either case. See was
operating a locked warehouse - a business
establishment subject to inspection.
- The Court says the question is not whether the
"inspections may be made, but whether they may
be made without a warrant." With due respect,
inspections of this type have been made for over a
century and a half without warrants and it is a little
late to impose a death sentence on such
procedures now. In most instances the officer
could not secure a warrant - such as in See's case -
thereby insulating large and important segments
Administrative Law
of our cities from inspection for health and safety
conditions. (Human nature being what it is, we
must face up to the fact that thousands of
inspections are going to be denied. The economics
of the situation alone will force this result.
Homeowners generally try to minimize
maintenance costs and some landlords make
needed repairs only when required to do so.
Immediate prospects for costly repairs to correct
possible defects are going to keep many a door
closed to the inspector)
-The Court then addresses itself to the propriety of
warrantless area inspections. The basis of
"probable cause" for area inspection warrants, the
Court says, begins with the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement; in determining
whether an inspection is reasonable "the need for
the inspection must be weighed in terms of these
reasonable goals of code enforcement." It adds
that there are "a number of persuasive factors"
supporting "the reasonableness of area code-
enforcement inspections. They are: long
acceptance historically; the great public interest in
health and safety; and the impersonal nature of
the inspections - not for evidence of crime - but for
the public welfare. Upon this reasoning, the Court
concludes that probable cause exists "if
reasonable legislative or administrative standards
for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with
respect to a particular dwelling." These standards
will vary, it says, according to the code program
and the condition of the area with reference
thereto rather than the condition of a particular
dwelling. The majority seem to hold that warrants
may be obtained after a refusal of initial entry; I
can find no such constitutional distinction or
command. These boxcar warrants will be identical
as to every dwelling in the area, save the street
number itself. I ask: Why go through such an
exercise, such a pretense? As the same essentials
are being followed under the present procedures.
In my view this will not only destroy its integrity
but will degrade the magistrate issuing them and
soon bring disrepute not only upon the practice
but upon the judicial process.
(PAST DIGESTS)
LOVINA V. MORENO
9 SCRA 557
REYES, J.B.L: November 29, 1963
A2010
Dean Carlota
NATURE: Appeal from a decision of the Court of the Secretary to remove unauthorized
First Instance of Manila obstructions or encroachments upon public
streams, constructions that no private person
FACTS: was anyway entitled to make, because the bed
- The cause started by a petition of numerous of navigable streams is public property, and
residents of the said municipality to the ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, possession
complaining that appellees had blocked the - It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's
"Sapang Bulati", a navigable river in Macabebe,
power under the Act necessarily involves the
Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions be
determination of some questions of fact, such as
ordered removed, under the provisions of
the existence of the stream and its previous
Republic Act No. 2056.
navigable character; but these functions,
- After notice and hearing to the parties, the said
whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are
Secretary found the constructions to be a public
merely incidental to the exercise of the
nuisance in navigable waters ordered the land
power granted by law to clear navigable
owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5)
streams of unauthorized obstructions or
closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the
encroachments, and authorities are clear that
Secretary would order their removal at the
they are, validly conferable upon executive
expense of the respondent.
officials provided the party affected is given
- After receipt of the decision, the respondent
opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required
filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of
by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.
Manila to restrain the Secretary from enforcing
- It thus appears that the delegation by Congress
his decision. The trial court, after due hearing,
to executive or administrative agencies of
granted a permanent injunction, which is now
functions of judicial, or at least, quasi-judicial
the subject of the present appeal.
functions is incidental to the exercise by such
- The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the
agencies of their executive or administrative
court below was that Republic Act No. 2056 is
powers, is not in violation of the Separation of
unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary
Powers so far as that principle is recognized by
of Public Works and Communications with
the Federal Constitution nor is it in violation of
sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable
due process of law.
authority to pass upon the issues of whether a
- The mere fact that an officer is required by law
river or stream is public and navigable, whether
to inquire the existence of certain facts and to
a dam encroaches upon such waters and is
apply the law thereto in order to determine what
constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether
his official conduct shall be and the fact that
the law applies to the state of facts, thereby
these acts may affect private, rights do not
constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of
constitute an exercise of judicial powers.
judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works
Accordingly, a statute may give to non-judicial
and Communications.
officers the power to declare the existence of
facts which call into operation its provisions, and
ISSUE:
similarly may grant to commissioners and other
WON there RA 2056 is unconstitutional
subordinate officer, power to ascertain and
because it constitutes unlawful delegation of
determine appropriate facts as a basis for
judicial power
procedure in the enforcement of particular laws.
HELD:
NO
Reasoning CHINA BANKING CORP & CBC
- The objections of the appellees to the PROPERTIES AND COMPUTER
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not
only as an undue delegation of judicial power to CENTER INC. v MEMBERS OF THE
the Secretary of Public Works but also for being BOARD OF TRUSTEES, HOME
unreasonable and arbitrary, are not tenable. It DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND
will be noted that R.A. 2056 merely empowers
57
Administrative Law
307 SCRA 443
GONZAGA-REYES; MAY 19, 1999
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from RTC order
FACTS
- Petitioners China Banking Corp. (CBC) and CBC
Properties and Computer Center Inc. (CBC-PCCI)
are both employers who were granted by the
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) waiver
certificates for having a “Superior Retirement
Plan” pursuant to Sec. 19 of PD 1752 (Home
Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980) which
provides: employers who have their own existing
provident AND/OR employees-housing plans may
register for annual certification for waiver or
suspension from coverage or participation in the
Home Development Mutual Fund.
- In June 1994, RA 7742 amending PD 1752 was
approved. In Sept. 1995, respondent HDMF Board
issued an amendment to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing RA 7742 (“The
Amendment”), and pursuant to said amendment,
the Board issued a circular entitled “Revised
Guidelines and Procedure for filing Application for
Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under PD
1752 (“Guidelines”). Under the Amendment and
the Guidelines, a company must have a
provident/retirement AND housing plan superior
to that provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund to be
entitled to exemption/waiver from fund coverage.
- CBC and CBC-PCCI applied for renewal of waiver
of coverage from the fund for the year 1996, but
the applications were disapproved after a finding
that “their retirement plan is not superior to Pag-
IBIG Fund.” The other reason is that under the
amended IRR of RA 7742, to qualify for waiver, a
company must have retirement/provident and
housing plans which are both superior to Pag-IBIG
funds.
- Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the RTC seeking to annul and
declare void the Amendment and the Guidelines
for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners claimed
that the HDMF Board exceeded its rule-making
power in requiring the employer to have both a
retirement/provident plan and an employee
housing plan in order to be entitled to a certificate
of waiver or suspension of coverage from the
HDMF.
Dean Carlota
- Respondent Board filed motion to dismiss which
was granted by the RTC. The petition for certiorari
was dismissed by the RTC on the grounds (1) that
the denial or grant of an application for
waiver/coverage is within the power and authority
of the HDMF Board, and the said Board did not
exceed its jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of
discretion in denying the applications; and (2) the
petitioners have lost their right to appeal by failure
to appeal within the periods provided in the Rules
for appealing from the order of denial to the HDMF
Board of Trustees, and thereafter, to the CA. RTC
stated that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for
a lost remedy of appeal.
- Petitioners filed a MFR which was denied. They
then filed this appeal contending that it does not
question the power of respondent HDMF, as an
administrative agency to issue rules and
regulations to implement PD 1752 and Sec.5 of RA
7742; however, the Amendment and Guidelines
issued by it should be set aside and declared null
and void for being inconsistent with the enabling
law, PD 1752, as amended by RA 7742, which
merely requires as a pre-condition for exemption
for coverage, the existence of either a superior
provident (retirement) plan or a superior housing
plan, and not the concurrence of both plans.
- Respondents contend that there is no question of
law involved. The interpretation of the phrase
"and/or" is not purely a legal question and it is
susceptible of administrative determination. In
denying petitioners’ application for waiver of
coverage, respondent Board was exercising its
quasi-judicial function and its findings are
generally accorded not only respect but even
finality. Moreover, the Amendment and the
Guidelines are consistent with the enabling law,
which is a piece of social legislation intended to
provide both a savings generation and a house
building program.
ISSUE
WON respondent Board acted in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
Amendment and Guidelines insofar as they impose
as a requirement for exemption from coverage or
participation in the HMDF Fund the existence of
both a superior housing plan and a provident plan.
HELD
58
A2010
YES. The assailed Amendment to the Rules and
Regulations and the Revised Guidelines suffer from
a legal infirmity and should be set aside.
Ratio The rules and regulations which are the
product of a delegated power to create new or
additional legal provisions that have the effect of
law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the
Administrative agency.
- Administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law,
and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions.
- The rule making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted.
The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules
that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
Reasoning
Sec. 19 of PD 1752 provides: “An employer and/or
employee-group who, at the time this Decree
becomes effective have their own provident
and/or employee-housing plans, may register with
the Fund, for any of the following purposes.”
- On June 17, 1994, RA 7742, amending certain
sections of PD 1752 was approved. Sec. 5 of the
said statute provides “that within sixty (60) days
from the approval of the Act, the Board of Trustees
of the Home Development Mutual Fund shall
promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for
the effective implementation of (this) Act.”
- Pursuant to the above authority the Home
Development Mutual Fund Board of Trustees
promulgated The Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 7742 amending PD 1752, Rule
VII Sec.1 thereof reads:
“SECTION 1. Waiver or Suspension-Existing
Provident or Retirement Plan.
An employer and/or employee group who has
an existing provident or retirement plan as of
the effectivity of RA 7742, qualified under RA
4917 and actuarially determined to be sound
and reasonable by an independent actuary duly
accredited by the Insurance Commission, may
apply with the Fund for waiver or suspension of
coverage.”
- Subsequently, the HDMF Board adopted in a
Special Board Meeting, Amendments to the Rules
and Regulations Implementing RA 7742. As
Administrative Law
amended, Rule VII on "Waiver or Suspension" now
reads:
“RULE VII. WAIVER OF SUSPENSION
SEC1 Waiver or Suspension Because of Existing
Provident/Retirement and Housing Plan.
Any employer with a plan providing both for a
provident/retirement and housing benefits for
all his employees and existing as of Dec. 14,
1980, the effectivity date of Presidential Decree
No. 1752, may apply with the Fund for waiver or
suspension of coverage.”
- On Oct.23, 1995, HDMF Circular No. 124-B
entitled “Revised Guidelines and Procedure for
Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of
Fund Coverage” under PD 1752, as amended by
RA 7742, was promulgated. The Circular
pertinently provides:
“I. GROUNDS FOR WAIVER OR SUSPENSION OF
FUND COVERAGE:
A. SUPERIOR PROVIDENT/RETIREMENT PLAN
AND HOUSING PLAN
ANY EMPLOYER WHO HAS A PROVIDENT,
RETIREMENT, GRATUITY OR PENSION PLAN AND
A HOUSING PLAN, EXISTING AS OF DECEMBER
14, 1980, THE EFFECTIVITY OF P.D. NO. 1752,
may file an application for waiver or suspension
from Fund coverage, provided:”
- In the instant case, the legal meaning of the
words “and/or” should be taken in its ordinary
signification, i.e., “either and or”; e.g. butter
and/or eggs means butter and eggs or butter or
eggs. It is accordingly ordinarily held that the
intention of the legislature in using the term
“and/or” is that the word “and” and the word “or”
are to be used interchangeably.
- It is seems to us clear from the language of the
enabling law that Sec.19 of PD 1752, intended that
an employer with a provident plan or an employee
housing plan superior to that of the fund may
obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had
intended that the employee should have both a
superior provident plan and a housing plan in
order to qualify for exemption, it would have used
the words “and” instead of “and/or.” The law
obviously contemplates that the existence of
either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the
grant of an exemption; needless to state, the
concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient.
To require the existence of both plans would
radically impose a more stringent condition for
waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the
basic law. By removing the disjunctive word “or” in
Dean Carlota
the implementing rules the respondent Board has
exceeded its authority.
Disposition petition is given due course and the
assailed Orders of the court a quo are SET ASIDE.
The “Amendment” and the “Guideline,” insofar as
they require that an employer should have both a
provident/retirement plan superior to the
retirement/provident benefits offered by the Fund
and a housing plan superior to the Pag-IBIG
housing loan program in order to qualify for waiver
or suspension of fund coverage, are hereby
declared null and void.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY v AIRSPAN CORP
(Sarah)
CATURA V COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS
37 SCRA 303
FERNANDO: January 30. 1971
NATURE: Petition for review
FACTS:
- On December 27, 1966, a complaint against
Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, the President
and Treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees
Association, a legitimate labor organization duly
registered was filed by the prosecution division
of the respondent Court, the principal
complainants being now respondent Celestino
Tabaniag as well as other employees
constituting more than ten percent of the entire
membership of such labor organization.
- In the complaint, it was charged that during the
tenure of office of petitioners before us as such
President and Treasurer, they were responsible
for "unauthorized disbursement of union funds"
with complainants on various occasions during
the latter part of 1966 demanding from them "a
full and detailed report of all financial
transaction of the union and to make the book of
accounts and other records of the financial
activities of the union open to inspection by the
members," only to be met with a refusal on their
part to comply.
59
A2010
- It was further asserted that the executive board
of such labor organization passed a resolution
calling for a general membership meeting so
that petitioners could be confronted about the
status of union funds, but then, Pablo Catura, as
President, cancelled such meeting.
- There was thereafter a general membership
resolution reiterating previous demands "for a
full and detailed report of all financial
transactions of the union," but again there was
no response, thus compelling the members to
refer the matter to the Department of Labor
which duly issued subpoenas for the
presentation of such book of accounts to
petitioners without any success. After setting
forth that complainants had exhausted all
remedies provided in the union's constitution
and by-laws, which were all unavailing, the
complaint sought, after due hearing and
judgement, to declare present petitioners, as
respondents, guilty of unfair labor practice under
the above provision of the Industrial Peace Act,
for them to cease and desist from further
committing such unfair labor practice
complained of, and to render a full and detailed
report of all financial transactions of the union as
well as to make the book of accounts and other
records of these financial activities open to
inspection by the members
- On December 28, 1966, respondent Celestino
Tabaniag and the other members, as petitioners
in the above complaint before respondents
Court, sought an injunction to prevent now
petitioners Pablo Catura who, it turned out, was
again elected as President in an election on
November 15, 1966, from taking his oath of
office in view of his alleged persistence in the
abuse of his authority in the disbursement of
union funds as well as his refusal to make a full
and detailed report of all financial transactions
of the union
- Then came the order of December 29, 1966, by
Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador which,
instead of granting the injunction sought, limited
itself to requiring and directing "personally the
respondents Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador,
president and treasurer, respectively, of the
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
Employees' Association, to deliver and deposit to
this Court all the said Association's book of
accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union
funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents
Administrative Law
related to the finances of the said labor union at
the hearing of this petition on January 3, 1967.
- There was a motion for reconsideration on
January 2, 1967 by now petitioners Pablo Catura
and Luz Salvador on the ground that they were
not heard before such order was issued, which
moreover in their opinion was beyond the power
of respondent Court. With Associate Judge
Ansberto P. Paredes dissenting, the order was
sustained in a resolution by the Court en banc
on February 28, 1967.
- The petition was given due course by this Court
in a resolution of April 13, 1967 with a
preliminary injunction
ISSUE:
WON respondent Court, in the exercise of its
power of investigation to assure compliance with
the internal labor organization procedures under
Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act, can require
a labor organization's "books of accounts, bank
accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts,
vouchers and other documents related to [its]
finances" be delivered and deposited with it at the
hearing to conduct such investigation in
accordance with a complaint duly filed without the
officials of such labor organization, therein named
as respondents and petitioners before us, being
heard prior to the issuance of such order.
HELD:
YES
Reasoning
- The controlling provisions of law to the specific
situation before this Court concerning the power
of investigation of respondent Court to assure
compliance with internal labor organization
procedures with the corresponding authority to
investigate to substantiate alleged violations
may be found in paragraphs (b), (h), and (l) of
Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act. Thus:
"The members shall be entitled to full and
detailed reports from their officers and
representatives of all financial transactions as
provided in the constitution and by-laws of the
organization." ... "The funds of the organization
shall not be applied for any purpose or object
other than those expressly stated in its
constitution or by-laws or those expressly
authorized by a resolution of the majority of the
member." ... "The books of accounts and other
records of the financial activities of a legitimate
Dean Carlota
labor organization shall be open to inspection by
any officer or member thereof."
- The complaint before respondent Court against
petitioners as President and Treasurer of the
union, specifically recited an unauthorized
disbursement of union funds as well as the
failure to make a full and detailed report of
financial transactions of the union and to make
the book of accounts and other records of its
financial activities open to inspection by the
members. Clearly, the matter was deemed
serious enough by the prosecutor of respondent
Court to call for the exercise of the statutory
power of investigation to substantiate the
alleged violation so as to assure that the rights
and conditions of membership in a labor
organization as specifically set forth in Section
17 be respected. On its face, it cannot be said
that such a requirement is beyond the statutory
power conferred.
- The power to investigate, to be conscientious
and rational at the very least, requires an inquiry
into existing facts and conditions. The
documents required to be produced constitutes
evidence of the most solid character as to
whether or not there was a failure to comply
with the mandates of the law. It is not for this
Court to whittle down the authority conferred on
administrative agencies to assure the effective
administration of a statute, in this case intended
to protect the rights of union members against
its officers. The matter was properly within its
cognizance and the means necessary to give it
force and effectiveness should be deemed
implied unless the power sought to be exercised
is so arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of
petitioners entitled to priority. No such showing
has been made; no such showing can be made.
----------o0o----------
c. Imposition of Fines and Penalties
OCEANIC STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v
STRANAHAN
214 US 320
White; June 1, 1909
FACTS:
- Oceanic Steam Navigation Co sought the
recovery of money paid to the collector of
60
A2010
customs of the port of New York which was
exacted by that official under an order of the
Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The findings
of the court showed that the money was paid to
the collector under protest, and involuntarily. It
was established that the company was coerced
by the certainty that, if it did not pay, the
collector would refuse a clearance to its
steamships plying between New York City and
foreign ports at periodical and definite sailings.
- Both the Secretary and collector were expressly
authorized by law, entitled “An Act to Regulate
the Immigration of Aliens into the United
States”, enacted on March 3, 1903. Section 9 of
said Act, under which the Secretary and
collector acted, provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person,
including any transportation company other
than railway lines entering the United States
from foreign contiguous territory, or the
owner, master, agent, or consignee of any
vessel, to bring to the United States any
alien afflicted with a loathsome or with a
dangerous contagious disease; and if it shall
appear to the satisfaction of the Secretary
of Treasury [Secretary of Commerce and
Labor] that any alien so brought to the
United States was afflicted with such a
disease at the time of foreign embarkation,
and that the existence of such disease
might have been detected by means of a
competent medical examination at such
time, such person or transportation
company, or the master, agent, owner, or
consignee of any such vessel, shall pay to
the collector of customs of the customs
district in which the port of arrival is located
the sum of one hundred dollars ($100) for
each and every violation of the provisions of
this section; and no vessel shall be granted
clearance papers while any such fine
imposed upon it remains unpaid, nor shall
such fine be remitted.
- Oceanic Steam argues that:
1. However complete may be the power of
Congress to legislate concerning the exclusion
of aliens, and to entrust the enforcement of
legislation of that character to administrative
officers, nevertheless the particular legislation
here in question is repugnant to the
Constitution because it defines a criminal
offense, and authorizes a purely
Administrative Law
administrative official to determine whether
the defined crime has been committed, and, if
so, to inflict punishment
2. Even though it be conceded that
Congress may, in some cases, impose
penalties for the violation of a statutory duty,
and provide for their enforcement by civil suit
instead of by criminal prosecution,
nevertheless that doctrine does not warrant
the conclusion that a penalty may be
authorized, and its collection committed to an
administrative officer without the necessity of
resorting to the judicial power. In all cases of
penalty or punishment, enforcement must
depend upon the exertion of judicial power,
either by civil or criminal process, since the
distinction between judicial and administrative
functions cannot be preserved consistently
with the recognition of an administrative
power to enforce a penalty without resort to
judicial authority.
3. The fines which constituted the exactions
were repugnant to the 5th Amendment,
because amounting to a taking of property
without due process of law, since, as asserted,
the fines were imposed, in some cases,
without any previous notice, and in all cases
without any adequate notice or opportunity to
defend.
Issue:
WON the power conferred upon the named officials
is consistent with the Constitution
Held:
YES
- The exaction which the section authorizes the
Secretary of Commerce and Labor to impose,
when considered in the light afforded by the
context of the statute, is clearly but a power
given as a sanction to the duty which the statute
places on the owners of all vessels, to subject all
alien emigrants, prior to bringing them to the
United States, to medical examination at the
point of embarkation, so as to exclude those
afflicted with the prohibited diseases. In other
words, the power to impose the exaction which
the statute confers on the Secretary is lodged in
that officer only when it results from the official
medical examination at the point of arrival not
only that an alien is afflicted with one of the
prohibited diseases, but that the stage of the
Dean Carlota
malady, as disclosed by the examination,
establishes that the alien was suffering with the
disease at the time of embarkation, and that
such fact would have been then discovered had
the medical examination been then made by the
vessel or its owners, as the stature requires.
- The power thus lodged in the officers was
intended to be exclusive and that its exertion
was authorized as the result of the probative
force attributed to the official medical
examination for which the statute provides, and
that the power to refuse clearance to vessels
was lodged for the express purpose of causing
both the imposition of the exaction and its
collection to be acts of administrative
competency, not requiring a resort to judicial
power for their enforcement.
- The report of the Senate committee on
immigration is considered:
“Section 10 [which became Section 9] therefore
imposes a penalty of $100, to be imposed by the
[Secretary of Commerce and Labor] for each
case brought to an American port, provided, in
his judgment, the disease might have been
detected by means of medical examination at
the port of embarkation. This sufficiently guards
the transportation lines from an unjust and hasty
imposition of the penalty, insures a careful
observance of the law, and leaves in their own
hands the power to escape even a risk of the
fine being imposed, since they can refuse to
take on board even the most doubtful case until
certified by competent medical authority to be
entirely cured.”
- Court’s discussion on Oceanic Steam’s
arguments:
1. The various sections of the Act accurately
distinguish between those cases where it was
intended that particular violations of the Act
should be considered as criminal and be
punished accordingly, and those where it was
contemplated that violations should not
constitute crime, but merely entail the
infliction of penalty, enforceable in some
cases by purely administrative action and in
others by civil suit. The sole purpose of
Section 9 was to impose a penalty, based
upon the medical examination for which the
statute provided, thus tending, by the
avoidance of controversy and delay, to secure
the efficient performance by the steamship
company of the duty required by the statute,
61
A2010
and thereby aid in carrying out the policy of
Congress.
2. The interference of the courts with the
performance of the ordinary duties of the
executive departments of the government
would be productive of nothing but mischief.
- The legislation of Congress from the
beginning has proceeded on the conception
that it was within the competency of
Congress, when legislating as to matters
exclusively within its control, to impose
appropriate obligations, and sanction their
enforcement by reasonable money penalties,
giving to executive officers the power to
enforce such penalties without the necessity
of invoking the judicial power.
3. Court did not think it necessary to
entertain the controversy, as it is evident that
the statute unambiguously excludes the
conception that the steamship company was
entitled to be heard, in the sense of raising an
issue and tendering evidence concerning the
condition of the alien immigrant upon arrival
at the point of disembarkation, as the plain
purpose of the statute was to exclusively
commit that subject to the medical officers for
which the statute provided.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD v PHIL.
AIRLINES INC.
63 SCRA 524
ESGUERRA; APRIL 30, 1975
NATURE
Appeal from 2 resolutions of the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB)
FACTS
- On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of 20
passengers from Baguio to Manila who could not
be accommodated in its regular flight. To
accommodate these 20 passengers, PAL required
the aircraft operating Flight 213 (Tuguegarao to
Manila) to pass Baguio on its way to Manila and
pick up these passengers.
- Claiming that PAL should have first obtained the
permission of the CAB before operating the
flagstop and that such failure is a violation of RA
776, the CAB, through the first questioned
resolution, imposed a fine of P5000 upon PAL.
Administrative Law
Upon PAL’s MFR, the CAB, through the second
questioned resolution, reduced the fine to P2500.
It also stated that “Public Act 4271, as amended,
requires the grantee (of a legislative franchise for
air service), PAL Inc. to comply with the provisions
of RA 776, and regulations promulgated
thereunder from time to time.”
- PAL claims that there is nothing in RA 776 which
expressly empowers the CAB to impose a fine and
order its payment in the manner pursued in this
case. “The power and authority to impose fines
and penalties is a judicial function exercised
through the regular courts of justice, and that such
power and authority cannot be delegated to the
CAB by mere implication or interpretation.”
ISSUE
WON the CAB has authority under the Civil
Aeronautics Act to impose penalties
HELD
YES.
Ratio The CAB is empowered to impose
administrative penalties or those violations
punishable by a fine or civil penalty for violations
of its rules and regulations but no power to impose
fines in the nature of a criminal penalty.
Reasoning RA 776 created the CAB and the CAA
(Civil Aeronautics Administration) so that in the
exercise and performance of their powers and
duties, they shall consider among other things, “as
being in the public interest, and in accordance with
the public convenience and necessity” certain
declared policies which include:
“… the regulation of air transportation in such
manner as 'to recognize and preserve the inherent
advantage of, assure the highest degree of safety
in, and foster sound economic condition in, such
transportation, and to improve the relation
between, and coordinate transportation by, air
carriers;
…to promote safety of flight in air commerce in the
Philippines;”
(Sec. 4, RA 776)
“… the general supervision and regulation of, and
jurisdiction and control over, air carriers as well as
their property, property rights, equipment,
facilities, and franchise, in so far as may be
necessary for the purpose of carrying out the
provisions of this Act” (Sec. 10 RA 776)
“… power to issue, deny, amend, revise, alter,
modify, cancel, suspend or revoke, in whole or in
part, upon petition or complaint, or upon its own
Dean Carlota
initiative, any temporary operating permit or
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity”
(Sec. 10(c) (1) RA 776)
“…power to investigate, upon complaint or upon
its own initiative, whether any individual or air
carrier, domestic or foreign, is violating any
provision of this act, or the rules and regulations
issued thereunder, and shall take such action,
consistent with the provisions of this Act, as may
be necessary to prevent further violation of such
provision, or rules and regulations so issued.”
(Section 10(D) RA 776)
“…power to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal any administrative decision or
order of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on
matters pertaining to imposition of civil penalty or
fine in connection with the violation of any
provision of this Act or rules and regulations issued
thereunder. It has the power also either on its own
initiative or upon review on appeal from an order
or decision of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator,
to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate,
increase, or compromise, such fine and civil
penalties, as the case may be. (Sec. 10(F) (G) RA
776)
“…power to impose fines and/or civil penalties and
make compromise in respect thereto is expressly
given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator (Sec.
32(17) RA 776)
- The fine imposed on PAL by CAB is that fine or
civil penalty contemplated in the provisions of RA
776 and not a fine in the nature of a criminal
penalty as contemplated in the RPC, because the
“fine” in this case was imposed by CAB because of
PAL’s violation of CAB rules on flagstops without
previous authority. The CAB explained in its
resolution that the “imposition of the fine is not so
much on exacting penalty for the violation
committed as the need to stress upon the air
carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing
rules, regulations or requirements of the
government regulating agency.”
- There exists but an insignificant doubt in Our
mind that the C.A.B. is fully authorized by law (RA
776) to impose fines in the nature of civil penalty
for violations of its rules and regulations. To
deprive the CAB of that power would amount to an
absurd interpretation of the pertinent legal
provision because the CAB is given full power on
its own initiative to determine whether to “impose,
remit, mitigate, increase or compromise” “fines
and civil penalties,” a power which is expressly
given to the CAA whose orders or decision may be
62
A2010
reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed
by the CAB. Besides, to deprive the CAB of its
power to impose civil penalties would negate its
effective general supervision and control over air
carriers if they can just disregard with impunity the
rules and regulations designed to insure public
safety and convenience in air transportation. If
everytime the CAB would like to impose a civil
penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules
and regulations it would have to resort to courts of
justice in protracted litigations then it could not
serve its purpose of exercising a competent,
efficient and effective supervision and control over
air carriers in their vital role of rendering public
service by affording safe and convenient air
transit.
- However, PAL committed the violation of the CAB
regulation against flagstops without malice and
with no deliberate intent to flout the same. For this
reason, the penalty imposed by the CAB may be
mitigated and reduced to a nominal sum.
Disposition Resolution appealed from is modified
by reducing the administrative fine imposed on the
appellant PAL to P100.
SCOTY'S DEPARTMENT STORE v
MICALLER
99 Phil 762
BAUTISTA ANGELO; August 25, 1956
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
- Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the
Scoty's Dept Store
- This store was owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam,
Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen Yang. -
Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Industrial Peace
Act, Nena Micaller filed charges of unfair labor
practice against her above employers alleging that
she was dismissed by them because of her
membership in the National Labor Union and that,
prior to her separation, said employers had been
questioning their employees regarding their
membership in said union and had interfered with
their right to organize under the law.
- The employers denied the charge. They claim
that the complainant was dismissed from the
service because of her misconduct and serious
disrespect to the management and her co-
Administrative Law
employees so much so that several criminal
charges were filed against her with the city fiscal
of Manila who, after investigation, filed the
corresponding informations against her and the
same are now pending trial in court.
- the court found the following facts: Nena Micaller
was earning P4.80 a day. After every New Year,
she was given from P180 to P200 as bonus
whereas the other employees were only given P60.
For three consecutive years, she was given a first
prize for being the best seller, the most
cooperative and most honest employee. She
organized a union among the employees of the
store which was latter affiliated with the National
Labor Union. Later, the National Labor Union sent a
petition to the store containing ten demands and
Nena was called by the management for
questioning and, in the manager's office, she was
asked who the members of the union were, but
she pretended not to know them.
- Richard Yang and Yu Si Kiao, together with a
brother-in law, went to Nena’s house and
questioned her regarding her union membership.
- Nena was brought by her employers to the house
of their counsel, Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, and there
she was again questioned regarding her union
activities and was even made to sign a paper of
withdrawal from the union.
- the manager of the Store, Yu Ki Lam asked each
the every employee whether they were members
of the union.
- the union gave notice to strike to the
management. Upon receipt of the notice, the
management hired temporary employees equal in
number to the old. The new employees were
affiliated with another labor union.
- an information for threats was filed against Nena
Micaller before the municipal court. This was
dismissed. Another information was filed against
Nena Micaller for slander. A third information for
slander was filed against her before the same
court. And on November 30, she was dismissed for
"insulting the owner of the store and for taking to
the girls inside the store during business hours."
And on the strength of these facts the court found
respondents, now petitioners, guilty of unfair labor
practice and ordered them to pay a fine of P100.
- Petitioners contend that section 25 of Republic
Act No. 875 being penal in character should be
strictly construed in favor of the accused and in
that sense their guilt can only be established by
clear and positive evidence and not merely be
presumptions or inferences as was done by the
Dean Carlota
industrial court. In other words, it is contended
that the evidence as regards unfair labor practice
with reference to the three above-named
petitioners is not clear enough labor practice and
the fine imposed upon them is unjustified.
ISSUE
WON petitioners can be legally punished by a fine
of P100.
HELD
NO.
Ratio The power to impose the penalties provided
for in section 25 of RA 875 is lodged in ordinary
courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations,
notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court"
contained in section 2(a) of said Act. Hence, the
decision of the of the industrial court in so far as it
imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal
and should be nullified.
Reasoning
SEC. 25. Penalties.- Any person who violates the
provisions of section three this act shall be
punished by a fine of not less than one hundred
pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment of not less than one month nor more
than one year, or both by such free and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court.
Any other violation of this Act which is declared
unlawful shall be punished by a fine of not less
than fifty nor more than five hundred pesos for
each offense.
- The above provision is general in nature for its
does not specify the court that may act when the
violation charged calls for the imposition of the
penalties therein provided. It merely states that
they may be imposed "in the discretion of the
court."
- The word “court” cannot refer to the Court of
Industrial Relations for to give that meaning would
be violative of the safeguards guaranteed to every
accused by our Constitution. We refer to those
which postulate that "No person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law", and that "In all criminal prosecution the
accused . . . shall enjoyed the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses in his behalf".
- The procedure laid down by law to be observed
by the Court of Industrial Relations in dealing with
the unfair labor practice cases negates those
63
A2010
constitutional guarantees to the accused. And this
is so because, among other things, the law
provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in
court for the courts of law or equity cannot be
controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this
act that the Court (of Industrial Relations) and its
members and its Hearing Examiners shall use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objective and
without regards to technicalities of law of
procedure.
- legislative record containing the deliberations
made on the bill eliminating the criminal
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relation show
that the real intent of congress was to place that
court on the same footing as the Public Service
Commission and the Court of Industrial relations
by confining their jurisdiction exclusively to civil
matters.
- on the issue of WON there was unfair labor
practice, the court did not rule on this as it
involves questions of fact. The industrial court has
made a careful analysis of the evidence and has
found the petitioners have really subjected
complaint and her co-employees to a series of
questioning regarding their membership in the
union or their union activities which in
contemplation of law are deemed acts constituting
unfair labor practice. This finding is binding upon
this Court following well-known precedents.
Disposition decision appealed from is modified by
eliminating the fine of P100 imposed upon
petitioners.
U.S. VS BARRIAS
11 Phil 327
Tracey; Sept 24 1908
FACTS
- The defendant was charged in CFI Manila with
violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No.
397 of the Insular Collector of Customs. After a
demurrer to the complaint of the lighter Maude, he
was moving her and directing her movement,
when heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo
poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam,
sail, or any other external power. Paragraph 70 of
Circular No. 397 reads as follows: “No heavily
loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be
permitted to move in the Pasig River without being
Administrative Law
towed by steam or moved by other adequate
power.
- Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:For the
violation of any part of the foregoing regulations,
the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of
not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the
discretion of the court.
- By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed
April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is
authorized to license craft engaged in the
lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of
the ports of the Islands, and, with certain
exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are
required to be so licensed. Sections 5 and 8 read
as follows:
SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the
Philippine Islands is hereby authorized,
empowered, and directed to promptly
make and publish suitable rules and
regulations to carry this law into effect
and to regulate the business herein
licensed.
SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the
provisions of this Act, or of any rule or
regulation made and issued by the
Collector of Customs for the Philippine
Islands, under and by authority of this
Act, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall
be punished by imprisonment for not
more than six months, or by a fine of not
more than one hundred dollars, United
States currency, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, at the discretion of the
court; Provided, That violations of law
may be punished either by the method
prescribed in section seven hereof, or by
that prescribed in this section or by both.
- Counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of
paragraph 70 on two grounds: First that it is
unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and,
second, that if the acts of the Philippine
Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing
the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are
void, as constituting an illegal delegation of
legislative power.
ISSUE
WON Act No. 1136 is valid (as far as Sections 5
and 8 are concerned)
HELD
YES
Dean Carlota
- The necessity confiding to some local authority
the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor
regulations is recognized throughout the world, as
each region and each a harbor requires peculiar
use more minute than could be enacted by the
central lawmaking power, and which, when kept
within the proper scope, are in their nature police
regulations not involving an undue grant of
legislative power.
The complaint in this instance was framed with
reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and 319
[19 and 311] at No. 355 of the Philippine Customs
Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos. 1235
and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not
only empowered to make suitable regulations, but
also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not
exceeding a fine of P500.
- This provision of the statute does, indeed,
present a serious question.
One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is,
that the power conferred upon the legislature to
make laws can not be delegated by that
department to any body or authority. Where the
sovereign power of the State has located the
authority, there it must remain; only by the
constitutional agency alone the laws must be
made until the constitution itself is changed. The
power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism
this high prerogative has been intrusted can not
relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other
agencies upon which the power shall be
developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for
those to which alone the people have seen fit to
confide this sovereign trust. (Cooley's
Constitutional limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.)
- This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that
such a delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate
by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not
through the intervening mind of another. In the
case of the United States vs. Breen (40 Fed. Phil.
Rep. 402), an Act of Congress allowing the
Secretary of War to make such rules and
regulations as might be necessary to protect
improvements of the Mississipi River, and
providing that a violation thereof should constitute
a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that
the misdemeanor was declared not under the
delegated power of the Secretary of War, but in
the Act of Congress, itself. So also was a grant to
him of power to prescribe rules for the use of
64
A2010
canals. (U.S. vs. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep. 207.) but a
law authorizing him to require alteration of any
bridge and to impose penalties for violations of his
rules was held invalid, as vesting in him upon a
power exclusively lodged in Congress (U.S. vs.
Rider, 50 Fed. Rep., 406.) The subject is
considered and some cases reviewed by the
Supreme Court of the United States, in re Kollock
(165 U.S. 526), which upheld the law authorizing a
commissioner of internal revenue to designate and
stamps on oleomargarine packages, an improper
use of which should thereafter constitute a crime
or misdemeanor, the court saying (p. 533):The
criminal offense is fully and completely defined by
the Act and the designation by the Commissioner
of the particular marks and brands to be used was
a mere matter of detail. The regulation was in
execution of, or supplementary to, but not in
conflict with the law itself.
- In the case of The Board of Harbor
Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior
Redwood Company (88 Cal. 491), it was ruled that
harbor commissioners can not impose a penalty
under statues authorizing them to do so, the court
saying: Conceding that the legislature could
delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make
rules and regulation with reference to the
navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the
violation of such rules and regulations is a matter
purely in the hands of the legislature.
Disposition judgment of the CFI as convicts the
defendant of a violation of Acts Nos. 355 and 1235
is revoked, and is hereby convicted of a
misdemeanor and punished by a fine of $25
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), v BOARD
OF COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. L-43653
MARTIN; Nov 29, 1977
NATURE
Petition for review by certiorari
FACTS
- This involves 2 cases consolidated by the Court
for decision.
- In the first case, Diego Morales claims that while
he was in Manila his daughter sent him a telegram
on October 15, 1974 from Santiago, Isabela,
Administrative Law
informing him of the death of his wife, Mrs. Diego
T. Morales. The telegram sent thru the petitioner
RCPI however never reached him. He had to be
informed personally about the death of his wife
and so to catch up with the burial of his wife, he
had to take the trip by airplane to Isabela. In its
answer petitioner RCPI claims that the telegram
sent by respondent was transmitted from
Santiago, Isabela to its Message Center at Cubao,
Quezon City but when it was relayed from Cubao,
the radio signal became intermittent making the
copy received at Sta. Cruz, Manila unreadable and
unintelligible. Because of the failure of the RCPI to
transmit said telegram to him, respondent
allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional
expenses and prays for damages.
- In the second case, Pacifico Innocencio claims
that on July 13, 1975 Lourdes Innocencio sent a
telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of
the petitioner RCPI to him at Barrio Lomot, Cavinti,
Laguna for the purpose of informing him about the
death of their father. The telegram was never
received by Pacifico Innocencio. Inspite of the non-
receipt and/or non-delivery of the message sent to
said address, the sender (Lources Innocencio) has
not been notified about its non-delivery. As a
consequence Pacifico Innocencio was not able to
attend the internment of their father at Moncada,
Tarlac. Because of the failure of RCPI to deliver to
him said telegram he allegedly was "shocked when
he learned about the death of their father when he
visited his hometown Moncada, Tarlac on August
14, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguish and
personal inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for
damages.
- After hearing, the respondent Board in both cases
held that the service rendered by petitioner was
inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon
the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine of
P200 pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act
146, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 1
and Letter of Implementation No. 1. Hence, this
appeal
ISSUE
WON the Board can impose a disciplinary fine on
RCPI
HELD
NO.
RATIO The Board exceeded its authority when it
imposed a fine on RCPI since its enabling law does
not authorize it to do so. Its power is limited only
Dean Carlota
to management of the facilities and system of
transmission of messages by radio companies.
REASONING The charge does not relate to the
management of the facilities and system of
transmission of messages by petitioner in
accordance with its certificate of public
convenience. If in the two cases before Us
complainants Diego Morales and Pacifico
Innocencio allegedly suffered injury due to
petitioner's breach of contractual obligation arising
from negligence, the proper forum for them to
ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of
damages against petitioner should be in the courts
and not in the respondent Board of
Communications. Much less can it impose the
disciplinary fine of P200 upon the petitioner.
- In Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29236)
and Constancio Langan vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-
29247), this Court speaking thru Justice Enrique
Fernando, ruled: "There can be no justification
then for the Public Service Commission (now the
Board of Communications as successor in interest)
imposing the fines in these two petitions. The law
cannot be any clearer. The only power it
possessed over radio companies as noted
was fix rates. It could not take to task a
radio company for any negligence or
misfeasance. It was not vested with such
authority. What it did then in these two
petition lacked the impress of validity.
- In the face of the provision itself, it is rather
apparent that the Board lacked the required power
to proceed against petitioner. There is nothing
in Section 21 thereof which empowers it to
impose a fine that calls for a different
conclusion.
Disposition both decisions of Board of
Communications reversed, set aside, declared null
and void for lack of jurisdiction
PEREZ V LPG REFILLERS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC
492 SCRA 638
QUISUMBING; Aug 28, 2007
Facts
- Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes
illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration,
underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum
products, as well as possession for trade of
65
A2010
adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. The said
law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a
minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.4
- On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was
issued by the DOE to implement B.P. Blg. 33,
which provides among others (pls see original for
list of offenses and penalties)
SECTION 6. NO TARE WEIGHT OR INCORRECT TARE
WEIGHT MARKINGS. (REQUIREMENT ON ENGRAVED TARE
WEIGHT SHALL TAKE EFFECT TWO (2) YEARS AFTER
EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CIRCULAR)
A. LPG Refiller/Marketer
1st Offense – Fine of P3,000 for
each cylinder
2nd Offense – Fine of P5,000 for
each cylinder
3rd Offense – Recommend
business closure to the proper local government unit
- It is alleged that Circular No. 2000-06-010 (the
“assailed Circular”) listed prohibited acts and
punishable offenses which are brand-new or which
were not provided for by B.P. Blg. 33, as amended;
and that B.P. Blg. 33 enumerated and specifically
defined the prohibited/punishable acts under the
law and that the punishable offenses in the
assailed Circular are not included in the law.
Issue
WON the circular is valid
Held
Yes
- For an administrative regulation, such as the
Circular in this case, to have the force of penal
law, (1) the violation of the administrative
regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for
such violation must be provided by the statute
itself.
1.The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P.
Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading,
adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and
overpricing of petroleum products. Under this
general description of what constitutes criminal
acts involving petroleum products, the Circular
merely lists the various modes by which the said
criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no
price display board, no weighing scale, no tare
weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no
authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded
LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing
color, no embossed identifying markings on
Administrative Law
cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG
cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG
cylinders. These specific acts and omissions are
obviously within the contemplation of the law,
which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of
some petroleum merchants.
2.As for the second requirement, we find that the
Circular is in accord with the law. Under B.P. Blg.
33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any
person who commits any of the acts aforestated is
limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum
of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum
pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an
amount within the range allowed by law.
However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers,
the Circular is silent as to any maximum
monetarry penalty. This mere silence,
nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the
aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the
mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a
per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to
the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are
the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
- Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which
defines what constitute punishable acts involving
petroleum products and which set the minimum
and maximum limits for the corresponding
penalties. The Circular merely implements the
said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum
pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and
dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the
law.
C. JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF
SUFFICIENCY OF STANDARDS
1. Interest of Law and Order
RUBI, ET AL. v THE PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF MINDORO
39 PHIL 661
MALCOLM, J.:March 7, 1919
Nature:
An application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi
and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro.
Facts:
- It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally
deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials
Dean Carlota
of that province. Rubi and his companions are said
to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for
having run away form the reservation.
- Administration Code authorizes the
establishment of settlement area for non-
Christians. A Resolution was passed by the
Provincial Board of Mindoro providing a selected
public Land in Tigbao as site for permanent
sewttlement of the Mangyans.
-The resolution was approved by the Secretary of
Interior and it was ordered that Mangyans who
refuses to comply shall be imprisoned. Rubi and
other Mangyans were arrested; thus, they applied
for Habeas Corpus.
Issue
WON there was invalid delegation of legislative
power
HELD
NO
- There is distinction between delegation of power
to make law which necessarily involves discretion
as to what it shall be and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law. The Legislature
merely conferred upon the Provincial Government
with approval of the Provincial Board the power to
execute the law. The Provincial Government and
the Provincial Board are best fitted to select the
most favorable site for improving the lives of the
Mangyans. The Government must guarantee
peace and order to encourage immigrants to
invest in Mindoro and to protect crops and persons
of settlers of Mindoro from predatory men.
Disposition: Petitioners are not unlawfully
imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas
corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the true
ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against
petitioners.
2. Public Interest
PEOPLE V ROSENTHAL AND OSMEÑA
68 Phil 328
66
A2010
LAUREL; June 12, 1939
NATURE
Appeal from judgment of the CFI
FACTS
- Rosenthal and Osmeña (appellants) were
charged and found guilty of violating Act 2581,
commonly known as the Blue Sky Law, in the CFI.
They both appealed to the IAC, but since the
appeal also questions the constitutionality of Act
2581, the case was referred to the SC
- the law essentially requires corporations who
want to offer securities (shares of stocks) to obtain
a certificate or license from the Insular Treasurer.
The Treasurer is to issue the same if, upon his
examination of documents, he deems it advisable
and satisfactory that the stocks be sold in the
Philippines. The Act also gives the Treasurer the
authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the
public interest, to cancel the permit. The decision
of the Treasurer was appealable to the Sec. of
Finance
- the acts complained of consisted in buying and
selling of the stocks at high and speculative prices
(they bought at P5/share and sold at P100-
P300/share). Also, they allegedly were not licensed
to sell stocks.
- on appeal, the appellants contend that the law
was unconstitutional on 3 grounds: undue
delegation of legislative power (for although it
empowers the treasurer to issue and cancel
certificates or permits, no standard or rule was
fixed which can guide said official in determining
the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to
be issued, thereby making his opinion the sole
criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the
result that, legislative powers being unduly
delegated to the Treasurer); does not afford equal
protection before the law; and that it is vague and
ambiguous
ISSUE
WON the law is unconstitutional on any of the
three grounds
HELD
NO
Ratio Act 2581 is not unconstitutional for not
setting a standard for the exercise of discretion,
violating equal protection of laws, nor for being
vague and ambiguous.
Administrative Law
Reasoning
On fixing no standard to guide issuance/
cancellation of permits:
- The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the
Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision
regarding the issuance or cancellation of a
certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be
issued under the Act must recite that the person,
partnership, association or corporation applying
therefor “has complied with the provisions of this
Act”, and this requirement, construed in relation to
the other provisions of the law, means that a
certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular
Treasurer when the provisions of Act 2581 have
been complied with. Upon the other hand, the
authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a
certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon
a finding that such cancellation “is in the public
interest.” In view of the intention and purpose of
Act 2581 to protect the public against “speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many
feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of stock in
fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant
gold mines, and other like fraudulent
exploitations”, we hold that “public interest” in this
case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular
Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter
pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of
certificates or permits.
- Act 2581 allows appeal from the decision of the
Treasurer to the Sec of Finance. Hence, it cannot
be contended that the Treasurer can act and
decide without any restraining influence.
- The theory of the separation of powers is
designed by its originators to secure action and at
the same time to forestall over action which
necessarily results from undue concentration of
powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent
despotism. Thereby, the “rule of law” was
established which narrows the range of
governmental action and makes it subject to
control by certain legal devices. As a corollary, we
find the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative
authority, and from the earliest time American
legal authorities have proceeded on the theory
that legislative power must be exercised by the
legislative alone. It is frankness, however, to
confess that as one delves into the mass of judicial
pronouncements, he finds a great deal of
confusion.
- the maxim “delegatus non potest delegare or
delegata potestas non potest delegare” has been
made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
Dean Carlota
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of “subordinate
legislation”, in practically all modern governments.
Difficulty lies in fixing the limit and extent of the
authority. While courts have undertaken to lay
down general principles, the safest is to decide
each case according to its peculiar environment,
having in mind the wholesome legislative purpose
intended to be achieved.
- Hall v Geiger-Jones: it is well-settled principle of
law in this state that by legislative act a
commission or board may be empowered to
ascertain the existence of facts, upon the finding
of which may depend the right to continue in the
practice of a profession or a regulated business.
On denial of equal protection of the law:
- Another contention is that the Act denies equal
protection of the laws because the law
discriminates between an owner who sells his
securities in a single transaction and one who
disposes of them in repeated and successive
transactions.
- Hall v Geiger-Jones: If a class is deemed to
present a conspicuous example of what the
legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th Amendment
allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and
merely logically not distinguishable from others
not embraced in the law.
On vagueness and uncertainty of the law:
People v Fernandez and Trinidad: An Act will be
declared void and inoperative on the ground of
vagueness and uncertainty only upon a showing
that the defect is such that the courts are unable
to determine, with any reasonable degree of
certainty, what the legislature intended.
- An Act will not be declared inoperative and
ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no
adequate means to secure the purpose for which it
is passed, if men of common sense and reason can
devise and provide the means, and all the
instrumentalities necessary for its execution are
within the reach of those intrusted therewith.
Disposition Decision affirmed with modifications
(lower penalty).
3. Justice, equity and substantial
merits of the case
67
A2010
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND
VENEER CO v PANGIL FEDERATION
OF LABOR
70 PHIL 602
LAUREL; November 25, 1940
NATURE
Petition for a writ of certiorari to review the
resolution of CIR
FACTS
- June 2, 1939 > the Secretary of Labor certified to
the Court of Industrial Relations that an industrial
dispute existed between the HARDWOOD and its
employees who are members of PANGIL and that
the controversy [which involved 2) setting the
minimum daily wages of common laborers at P1
because before P0.70 a day was paid regardless
whether employed in a town or mountain camp; 3)
devising a proper schedule of rate of wages for all
laborers; and 4) rate of wages for the mountain
camps should be higher by 20% over those given
in the town] was a proper one to be dealt with CIR
in the public interest under Sec 4 of CA 103.
- September 19, 1939 > DECISION ADICIONAL of
Leopoldo Rovira of the CIR
"The agreement, the Court said in part justified
claims under 2 and 4 that affect the type of day
laborers, and in consequence ordered the
company to appeal to pay wages to their
workers as a fair and reasonable amount not
lower P1 daily for work in the mountains, and for
those who conduct their work in the plains an
amount not get off of P0.90 per day, based on
eight (8) hours per day, excluding "overtime" no
less than twenty-five (25) percent on the day
laborers as shall be fixed... "
- October 17, 1939 > MFR filed with CIR of the
DECISION ADICIONAL
- November 28, 1939 > while MFR pending,
HARDWOOD filed a motion praying that CIR has no
jurisdiction to decide the question relating to
demands 2 and 4, alleging (1) that the CIR has no
authority to determine minimum wages for an
individual employer in connection with a particular
and specific industrial dispute under Sec 4 of CA
103; (2) that such authority would constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power to the CIR
and would deny HARDWOOD the equal protection
of the laws, thus rendering said section
unconstitutional and void.
Administrative Law
- December 23, 1939 > CIR by resolution in banc,
denied the MFR as well as the motion of November
28
ISSUES
1. WON the CIR has the power to determine
minimum wages for an individual employer in
connection with an industrial dispute which said
court might take cognizance of under Sec 4 of CA
103
2. If it has, WON such grant of power is
unconstitutional and void
HELD
1. YES
Reasoning
- Sec 4 CA103 is designed to provide for
compulsory arbitration in order to prevent non-
pacific methods in the determination of industrial
and agricultural disputes. "This bill," thus begins
the explanatory statement of Bill No. 700,
"creating a Board of Industrial Relations... Provides
compulsory arbitration... In accordance with Article
6, Title XIII of the Constitution, which provides that'
The state may establish binding arbitration."
Incorporating the conclusion reached by a
committee appointed a year or so before, it was
observed that "under the current legislation"
evidently referring to Act no. 4055 "there is no
suitable instrument to avoid strikes.” The
Department of Labor merely occupies the role of
peacemaker between the parties in dispute and its
decisions are not binding for either employers or
workers. The people have reached a level of
industrial development, which makes it imperative
that the government's intervention in these
conflicts to be more effective. . . " (Ang Tibay v
CIR) And in order that this declaration of policy
may not just be an empty gesture, CA 103, in
various sections thereof, has provided the means
towards its realization. Thus in Sec 4, the CIR is
empowered to "take cognizance for purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision, and settlement,
of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from
differences as regard wages, shares or
compensation, dismissals, lay-offs, or suspensions
of employees or laborers, tenants or farm-laborers,
hours of labor, or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between employers and employees
or laborers and between landlords and tenants or
farm-laborers."
Dean Carlota
- The petitioner suggests that if an industrial
dispute between an employer and its employees
causes a strike or lockout arising from differences
as regards a minimum wage, CIR would be without
authority to take cognizance of the dispute for
arbitration and settlement unless the President,
under Sec 5 of CA103, directs it to investigate and
study all pertinent facts related to the industry
concerned, with a view to determining the
necessity and fairness of fixing a minimum wage
which shall apply generally to all the employers
engaged in such industry. To adopt such a narrow
construction would be to set at naught the plenary
powers conferred upon the Court to enable it to
"settle all question, matters, controversies, or
disputes arising between, and/or affecting
employers and employees" and to frustrate the
very objective of the law, namely, to create an
instrumentality through which the intervention of
the Government could be made effective in order
to prevent non-pacific methods in the
determination of industrial or agricultural disputes.
It is fundamental that the intention and policy of
the National Assembly, as expressed in the
enactment, should be effectuated, and the Act
should receive a construction that will lead to this
result.
2. NO
Reasoning
- The contention that Sec 4 CA 103 is
unconstitutional as constituting an undue
delegation of legislative power to the court and
depriving HARDWOOD equal protection of the laws
because the provision "does not indicate in what
manner, by what standards, or in accordance with
what rules, the Court of Industrial Relations shall
determine minimum wages under said section" is
without merit.
- Sec 20 CA103 prescribes that in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or
controversy and in exercising any duties and
power under this Act, the court shall act according
to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal
forms. The National Assembly has by this section
furnished a sufficient standard by which the court
will be guided in exercising its discretion in the
determination of any question or controversy
before it, and we have already ruled that the
discretionary power thus conferred is judicial in
character and does not infringe upon the principle
of separation of powers, the prohibition against the
delegation of legislative function, and the equal
68
A2010
protection clause of the Constitution. (Antamok
Gold Fields Mining Company v CIR, June 28, 1940.)
Disposition Petition for certiorari is denied
4. What is moral, educational or
amusing
MUTUAL FILMS v INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
236 U.S. 230
McKenna, J.; February 23, 1915
NATURE
Appeal from an order
FACTS
- Complainant is engaged in the business of
purchasing, selling, and leasing films, the films
being produced in other states than Ohio, and in
European and other foreign countries. Complainant
has on hand at its Detroit exchange at least 2,500
reels of films which it intends to and will exhibit in
Ohio, and which it will be impossible to exhibit
unless the same shall have been approved by the
board of censors. The board has demanded of
complainant that it submit its films to censorship,
and threatens, unless complainant complies with
the demand, to arrest any and all persons who
seek to place on exhibition any film not so
censored or approved by the censor congress on
and after November 4, 1913, the date to which the
act was extended. It is physically impossible to
comply with such demand and physically
impossible for the board to censor the films with
such rapidity as to enable complainant to proceed
with its business, and the delay consequent upon
such examination would cause great and
irreparable injury to such business, and would
involve a multiplicity of suits.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the statute violates the freedom of
speech and publication guaranteed by the
Ohio Constitution
2. WON the statute is a permitted delegation of
legislative power
HELD
1. NO.
It seems not to have occurred to anybody in the
Administrative Law
cited cases that freedom of opinion was repressed
in the exertion of the police power of the State.
The rights of property were only considered as
involved. It cannot be put out of view that the
exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure
and simple, originated and conducted for profit,
like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor
intended to be regarded by the Ohio Constitution,
we think, as part of the press of the country, or as
organs of public opinion. They are mere
representations of events, of ideas and sentiments
published and known; vivid, useful, and
entertaining, no doubt, but, as we have said,
capable of evil, having power for it, the greater
because of their attractiveness and manner of
exhibition. It was this capability and power, and it
may be in experience of them, that induced the
state of Ohio, in addition to prescribing penalties
for immoral exhibitions, as it does in its Criminal
Code, to require censorship before exhibition, as it
does by the act under review. We cannot regard
this as beyond the power of government.
2. YES.
The next contention of complainant is that the
Ohio statute is a delegation of legislative power,
and void for that if not for the other reasons
charged against it, which we have discussed.
While administration and legislation are quite
distinct powers, the line which separates exactly
their exercise is not easy to define in words. It is
best recognized in illustrations. Undoubtedly the
legislature must declare the policy of the law and
fix the legal principles which are to control in given
cases; but an administrative body may be invested
with the power to ascertain the facts and
conditions to which the policy and principles apply.
If this could not be done there would be infinite
confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and
to particularize, they would miss sufficiency both
in provision and execution.
The objection to the statute is that it furnishes no
standard of what is educational, moral, amusing,
or harmless, and hence leaves decision to arbitrary
judgment, whim, and caprice; or, aside from those
extremes, leaving it to the different views which
might be entertained of the effect of the pictures,
permitting the 'personal equation' to enter,
resulting 'in unjust discrimination against some
propagandist film,' while others might be approved
without question. But the statute by its provisions
guards against such variant judgments, and its
terms, like other general terms, get precision from
the sense and experience of men, and become
Dean Carlota
certain and useful guides in reasoning and
conduct. The exact specification of the instances of
their application would be as impossible as the
attempt would be futile. Upon such sense and
experience, therefore, the law properly relies.
- The next contention of complainant is that the
Ohio statute is a delegation of legislative power,
and void for that if not for the other reasons
charged against it, which we have discussed.
While administration and legislation are quite
distinct powers, the line which separates exactly
their exercise is not easy to define in words. It is
best recognized in illustrations. Undoubtedly the
legislature must declare the policy of the law and
fix the legal principles which are to control in given
cases; but an administrative body may be invested
with the power to ascertain the facts and
conditions to which the policy and principles apply.
If this could not be done there would be infinite
confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and
to particularize, they would miss sufficiency both
in provision and execution.
The objection to the statute is that it furnishes no
standard of what is educational, moral, amusing,
or harmless, and hence leaves decision to arbitrary
judgment, whim, and caprice; or, aside from those
extremes, leaving it to the different views which
might be entertained of the effect of the pictures,
permitting the 'personal equation' to enter,
resulting 'in unjust discrimination against some
propagandist film,' while others might be approved
without question. But the statute by its provisions
guards against such variant judgments, and its
terms, like other general terms, get precision from
the sense and experience of men, and become
certain and useful guides in reasoning and
conduct. The exact specification of the instances of
their application would be as impossible as the
attempt would be futile. Upon such sense and
experience, therefore, the law properly relies.
Disposition Petition is denied.
5. What is sacrilegious
JOSEPH BURSTYN, INC. v WILSON
343 U.S. 495
CLARK; May 26, 1952
NATURE
Appeal from decision of CA of New York
69
A2010
FACTS
- A statute makes it unlawful "to exhibit, or to sell,
lease or lend for exhibition at any place of
amusement for pay or in connection with any
business in the state of New York, any motion
picture film or reel, unless there is at the time in
full force and effect a valid license or permit
therefor of the education department . . . ." The
statute further provides:
"The director of the [motion picture] division [of
the education department] or, when authorized by
the regents, the officers of a local office or bureau
shall cause to be promptly examined every motion
picture film submitted to them as herein required,
and unless such film or a part thereof is obscene,
indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of
such a character that its exhibition would tend to
corrupt morals or incite to crime, shall issue a
license therefor. If such director or, when so
authorized, such officer shall not license any film
submitted, he shall furnish to the applicant
therefor a written report of the reasons for his
refusal and a description of each rejected part of a
film not rejected in toto."
- Appellant is a corporation engaged in the
business of distributing motion pictures. It owns
the exclusive rights to distribute throughout the
United States a film produced in Italy entitled "The
Miracle."
- After having examined the picture, the motion
picture division of the New York education
department, acting under the statute, issued to
appellant a license authorizing exhibition of "The
Miracle," with English subtitles, as one part of a
trilogy called "Ways of Love.”
- For a period of approximately eight weeks, "Ways
of Love" was exhibited publicly in a motion picture
theater in New York City under an agreement
between appellant and the owner of the theater
whereby appellant received a stated percentage of
the admission price.
- The New York State Board of Regents, which by
statute is made the head of the education
department, received "hundreds of letters,
telegrams, post cards, affidavits and other
communications" both protesting against and
defending the public exhibition of "The Miracle."
- The Chancellor of the Board of Regents requested
three members of the Board to view the picture
and to make a report to the entire Board. After
viewing the film, the committee reported that in its
Administrative Law
opinion there was basis for the claim that the
picture was "sacrilegious."
- Appellant brought the present action in the New
York courts to review the determination of the
Regents. Among the claims advanced by appellant
were (1) that the statute violates the Fourteenth
Amendment as a prior restraint upon freedom of
speech and of the press; (2) that it is invalid under
the same Amendment as a violation of the
guaranty of separate church and state and as a
prohibition of the free exercise of religion; and, (3)
that the term "sacrilegious" is so vague and
indefinite as to offend due process.
- The Appellate Division rejected all of appellant's
contentions and upheld the Regents'
determination. The New York Court of Appeals, two
judges dissenting, affirmed the order of the
Appellate Division.
ISSUE
WON a New York statute which permits the
banning of motion picture films on the ground that
they are "sacrilegious" is constitutional.
HELD
NO.
- To hold that liberty of expression by means of
motion pictures is guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, however, is not the end
of our problem. It does not follow that the
Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit
every motion picture of every kind at all times and
all places. But the basic principles of freedom of
speech and the press, like the First Amendment's
command, do not vary. Those principles, as they
have frequently been enunciated by this Court,
make freedom of expression the rule. There is no
justification in this case for making an exception to
that rule.
- The statute involved here does not seek to
punish, as a past offense, speech or writing falling
within the permissible scope of subsequent
punishment. On the contrary, New York requires
that permission to communicate ideas be obtained
in advance from state officials who judge the
content of the words and pictures sought to be
communicated. This Court recognized many years
ago that such a previous restraint is a form of
infringement upon freedom of expression to be
especially condemned.
- New York's highest court says there is "nothing
mysterious" about the statutory provision applied
in this case: "It is simply this: that no religion, as
Dean Carlota
that word is understood by the ordinary,
reasonable person, shall be treated with contempt,
mockery, scorn and ridicule . . . ." This is far from
the kind of narrow exception to freedom of
expression which a state may carve out to satisfy
the adverse demands of other interests of society.
- In seeking to apply the broad and all-inclusive
definition of "sacrilegious" given by the New York
courts, the censor is set adrift upon a boundless
sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of
religious views, with no charts but those provided
by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies. New
York cannot vest such unlimited restraining control
over motion pictures in a censor. Under such a
standard the most careful and tolerant censor
would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring
one religion over another, and he would be subject
to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression of
unpopular sentiments sacred to a religious
minority.
- Application of the "sacrilegious" test, in these or
other respects, might raise substantial questions
under the First Amendment's guaranty of separate
church and state with freedom of worship for all.
However, from the standpoint of freedom of
speech and the press, it is enough to point out that
the state has no legitimate interest in protecting
any or all religions from views distasteful to them
which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon
the expression of those views. It is not the
business of government in our nation to suppress
real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious
doctrine, whether they appear in publications,
speeches, or motion pictures.
- Since the term "sacrilegious" is the sole standard
under attack here, it is not necessary for us to
decide, for example, whether a state may censor
motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute
designed and applied to prevent the showing of
obscene films. That is a very different question
from the one now before us.
6. Adequate and efficient
instruction
PACU v SECRETARY
97 Phil 806
(Ajang)
70
A2010
7. Reasonableness as an implied
standard
WISCONSIN INSPECTION BUREAU v
WHITMAN
196 Wis 427
(Giulia)
8. To promote simplicity, economy
or efficiency
CERVANTES vs. THE AUDITOR
GENERAL
91 SCRA 359
REYES; May 26, 1952
NATURE
Petition to review a decision of the Auditor
General.
FACTS
- Cervantes is the manager of the NAFCO with a
salary of P15,000 a year. By a resolution of the
Board of Directors, grant to him of quarters
allowance of not exceeding P400 a month was
approved. Submitted to the Control Committee of
the Government Enterprises Council for approval,
the said resolution was disapproved by the said
Committee on the strength of the recommendation
of the NAFCO auditor, concurred in by the Auditor
General, (1) that quarters allowance constituted
additional compensation prohibited by the charter
of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general
manager thereof at a sum not to exceed P15,000 a
year, and (2) that the precarious financial
condition of the corporation did not warrant the
granting of such allowance.
- NAFCO is a government controlled corporation,
therefore subject to the provisions of RA 51 and EO
93. RA 51 was approved authorizing the President
of the Philippines, among other things, to effect
such reforms and changes in government-owned
and controlled corporations for the purpose of
promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in
their operation. Pursuant to this authority, the
President, promulgated EO 93 creating the
Government Enterprises Council. The council was
to advise the President in the exercise of his power
of supervision and control over these corporations
Administrative Law
and to formulate and adopt such policy and
measures as might be necessary to coordinate
their functions and activities.
- The petitioner filed this petition for review after
his motion for reconsideration was denied for the
same reasons.
ISSUES
1. WON EO 93 is null and void because it is based
on a law that is unconstitutional as an illegal
delegation of legislative power to the executive
2. WON quarters allowance is not compensation
and so the granting of it to the petitioner by the
NAFCO board of directors does not contravene the
provisions of the NAFCO charter that the salary of
the chairman of said board who is also to be
general manager shall not exceed P15,000 per
annum.
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio So long as the Legislature lays down a
policy and a standard is established by the statute
there is no undue delegation.
Reasoning Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the
President of the Philippines, among others, to
make reforms and changes in government-
controlled corporations, lays down a standard and
policy that the purpose shall be to meet the
exigencies attendant upon the establishment of
the free and independent Government of the
Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy
and efficiency in their operations. The standard
was set and the policy fixed. The President had to
carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating
the executive order in question which, tested by
the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power.
2. Ratio Regardless of whether quarters
allowance should be considered as compensation
or not, the resolution of the board of directors
authorizing payment thereof to the petitioner
cannot be given effect since it was disapproved by
the Control Committee in the exercise of the
powers granted to it by Executive Order No. 93.
DISPOSITION Petition dismissed.
9. Maintain monetary stability,
promote rising level of production
and real income
Dean Carlota
PEOPLE v JOLIFFE
(Kiyo)
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
A. BOOK VII, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
OF 1987
(Please see separate copy)
B. IN RULE-MAKING, PRICE, WAGE
OR RATE FIXING
C. IN ADJUDICATION OF CASES
1. Rules of Procedure
2. Due Process
a. Cardinal Primary Rights
ANG TIBAY v COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS
69 Phil 635
LAUREL; February 27, 1940
FACTS
- The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. prayed
for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the
majority of this Court and the remanding of the
case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new
trial. The union avers that: Teodoro's claim that
there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY
making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off
the members of the union is entirely false and
unsupported by the records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather; that the National Worker's
Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or
employer union dominated by Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal; that
the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair
labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring
the National Workers' Brotherhood; that important
documents attached are inaccessible to the
respondents.
ISSUE
71
A2010
WON the union was denied procedural due process
by the CIR
HELD
NO.
The CIR, a special court created under CA 103, is
more an administrative than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is
essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that
are presented to it by the parties litigant, the
function of the CIR is more active, affirmative and
dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-
judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its
functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far
more comprehensive and expensive. It has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting employers and employees or
laborers, and regulate the relations between them.
It may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur
to the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration in order
to determine specific controversies between labor
and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in
reality here a mingling of executive and judicial
functions, which is a departure from the rigid
doctrine of the separation of governmental
powers.
The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound
by any technical rules of legal evidence but may
inform its mind in such manner as it may deem
just and equitable." It shall not be restricted to the
specific relief claimed or demands made by the
parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but
may include in the award, order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling
the dispute or of preventing further industrial or
agricultural disputes. And in the light of this
legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been
Administrative Law
especially regulated by the rules recently
promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by
this Court to carry into the effect the avowed
legislative purpose.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be
free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in
justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.
There are primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen
shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support it is a nullity, a place
when directly attached. This principle emanates
from the more fundamental is contrary to the
vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both
a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be substantial. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected. Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed
to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
right to know and meet the case against them. It
should not, however, detract from their duty
actively to see that the law is enforced, and for
that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods
of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of
Dean Carlota
inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of
investigating and determining the facts in any
given case, but their report and decision are only
advisory. (6) The CIR or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.
(7) The CIR should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
- In the right of the foregoing fundamental
principles, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's
Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not
satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
- This result, however, does not now preclude the
concession of a new trial prayed for the by
respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest
of justice would be better served if the movant is
given opportunity to present at the hearing the
documents referred to in his motion and such
other evidence as may be relevant to the main
issue involved. The legislation which created the
CIR is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental
issue involved is not entirely attributable to the
parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is granted,
and the entire record of the case shall be
remanded to the CIR.
ASPREC V ITCHON
15 SCRA 921
SANCHEZ, April 30, 1966
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
-Private respondent Jacinto Hernandez
(Hernandez) filed an administrative complaint
against Cleto Asprec for unprofessional conduct
with the Respondent Board of Examiners for
Surveyors. Allegedly, Hernandez and Asprec
entered into an agreement wherein Asprec would
72
A2010
survey Hernandez’ lot in Camarines Sur and would
deliver to the latter a plan approved by the
Director of Lands w/n 3 months after completion of
the survey, and procure the issuance of a CTC to
the lot w/n 6 months after the plan’s approval.
However, even if Hernandez paid the agreed
amount, Asprec did not deliver the plan, and the
alleged plan duly delivered and approved was for
one Damian Alhambra, and the plan submitted
was merely a certified copy of the plan. It should
also be noted that during the proceedings in the
Board of Examiners, Asprec/his counsel had many
times been absent, late, sick…which caused the
delay of the proceedings.
-Respondent Board: For Hernandez: (1) no actual
survey of the land made; (2) money was paid;
Asprec was guilty of deceit and thus violated
the Code of Ethics for surveyors, his
certificate of registration as private land
surveyor REVOKED and required to be
surrendered.
-Asprec filed petition with the CFI of Camarines Sur
for certiorari to annul the orders revoking his
surveyor’s certificate of registration; mandamus to
compel the Board to conduct a formal hearing of
the complaint against him; and prohibition, to stop
execution of the orders to surrender said
certificate. The preliminary injunction prayed for
was rejected below
-CFI: dismiss with costs
ISSUES
1. WON Asprec was denied due process in not
being able to participate in the hearing
2. WON the proceedings before the Board, being
quasi-criminal in nature, was valid granted Asprec
absented himself from it
3. WON the decision of the Board rendered upon a
motion for judgment on the pleadings valid
(other issues were more on Civpro than Admin so
not included)
HELD
1. NO
Ratio. Presence of a party at a trial is not always
the essence of due process. Really all that the law
requires to satisfy adherence to this Constitutional
precept is that the parties be given notice of the
trial, an opportunity to be heard.
Reasoning. Petitioner has had more than ample
opportunity to defend himself before the Board. As
he and counsel did not appear at the last and
stipulated date of hearing, he cannot look to the
Administrative Law
law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw the Board
into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his
voice in protest against the act of the Board in
proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And
this because without cause or reason, without any
excuse at all, counsel and client have chosen to
shy away from the trial.
2. YES
Ratio. Where the respondent in a petition for
contempt failed to appear on the date set for the
hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was
held that he was not deprived of his day in court
when the judge ordered him arrested unless he
pay the support he was adjudged to give, he
having been given an opportunity to be heard.
Similarly, the defendant's failure to appear with
the counsel of his choice at the trial,
notwithstanding repeated postponements and the
warning that failure to so appear would be deemed
a waiver of the right to present evidence in his
defense and the case will be submitted for
decision on the evidence submitted by the
prosecution, was a sufficient justification for the
court to proceed and render judgment upon
evidence before it.
3. YES
Ratio. A rule so long respected, because it is
buttressed upon reason and authority, is that
technical rules of court practice, procedure and
evidence are not to be applied with rigidity in
administrative proceedings. We should have in
mind the nature of administrative bodies, the
character of the duties they are required to
perform, the purposes for which they are
organized, the persons who compose them. Here,
we are concerned with members of a board of
surveyors — technical men but not necessarily
trained law men. In this posture, it is quite
reasonable to assume that their proceedings may
not be conducted with that degree of exactness or
with such scrupulous observance of the complex
technical rules expected in a legal battle before a
court of justice. Their acts should not be measured
by the same yardstick exacted of a judge in a
court of law. So much leeway is given an
investigating administrative body.
Reasoning. The plan allegedly made by Asprec
was not the plan of an original survey but a mere
copy from another plan. Both the plans were
submitted to the Board. So it is, that when counsel
for Hernandez manifested that all the evidence
against petitioner was submitted to the Board and
that for that reason he was resting his case, he
Dean Carlota
evidently had in mind the admissions in the
pleadings and the plans and decisions and report
here noted. And, the motion for judgment on the
pleadings was a mere follow-up of the
manifestation just adverted to. As the trial court
well observed, counsel for respondent Hernandez
did not present a motion for judgment on the
pleadings in the strict sense of the word, but "a
motion which for lack of another expression, he
called a motion for judgment on the pleadings."
Lack of observance of this technicality which does
not quarrel with a fair concept of justice should be
overlooked.
Disposition. Upon the view we take of this case,
the decision is hereby affirmed. Costs against
petitioner.
VINTA MARITIME V NLRC
(Basconcillo)
284 SCRA 656
PANGANIBAN; January 3, 1998
NATURE
Special civil action of certiorari
FACTS
- Leonides C. BASCONCILLO, filed a complaint with
the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) Workers’ Assistance and
Adjudication Office for illegal dismissal against
Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. and Elkano Ship
Management, Inc.
- The employers alleged that he was dismissed for
his gross negligence and incompetent
performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay.
They claim that he was given fair warning and
enough opportunity to explain his side, not to
mention all the chances given to him to improve
his substandard work performance before he was
dismissed.
- The employee denied the allegations against
him; contrary to his employer’s claim, he was
actually surprised when he was told of his
dismissal. This occurred after he had a verbal
altercation with a British national, regarding the
lack of discipline of the Filipino crew under the
engineer’s supervision. No inquiry or
investigation, however, regarding his
supposed incompetence or negligence was
ever conducted; neither was private respondent
furnished with a notice or memorandum regarding
73
A2010
the cause of his dismissal.
- POEA considered the case submitted for
resolution by mutual agreement of the parties
after submission of their respective position
papers and supporting documents. POEA
Administrator Achacoso ruled that private
respondent was illegally dismissed.
- On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA.
ISSUE/S
1. WON trial is indispensable in administrative
proceedings
2. WON the employee was illegally dismissed
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Although bound by law and practice to
observe due process, administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial powers are nonetheless
free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements.
DUE PROCESS- Cardinal Primary Rights
- In labor cases, this Court has consistently held
that due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or a
right to be heard. The requirements of due
process are deemed to have been satisfied when
parties are given the opportunity to submit
position papers. The holding of an adversarial trial
is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties
cannot demand it as a matter of right.
- These rules equally apply to cases filed with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Adjudication Office. Proceedings before a POEA
hearing officer are non-litigious, although they are
still subject to the requirements of due process.
Reasoning Petitioners were given their chance to
be heard. Their answer, position paper and
supporting documents had become parts of the
records and were considered by the POEA and by
the NLRC.
2. YES
Ratio Where there is no showing of a clear, valid,
and legal cause for the termination of
employment, the law considers the matter a case
of illegal dismissal. Verily, the burden is on the
employer to prove that the termination was for a
valid or authorized cause.
- Due process, the second element for a valid
dismissal, requires NOTICE and HEARING. The
employer must furnish the worker with two written
notices before termination can be legally effected:
(1) notice which apprises the employee of the
Administrative Law
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal
is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs
the employee of the employer’s decision to
dismiss him.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. V CIR
(RURAL TRANSIT EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION)
86 SCRA 27
MUÑOZ-PALMA; October 30, 1978
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
-In 1958 the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. was in the
transportation business and operated what was
then known as the "Rural Transit".
-In that year, the Rural Transit Employees
Association went on strike and the dispute
between the management and the union reached
the Court of Industrial Relations, which
immediately ordered the strikers to return to work
and the management to take them back under the
terms and conditions existing before the dispute
arose.
-While the labor dispute was pending with the CIR,
Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority to
discharge driver Maximo Jacob from the service”
for alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law
resulting in damage to property and injuries to
third parties, the latest of which resulted in the
"total destruction of bus 170" of the company.
-The Rural Transit Employees Association denied
the charges and alleged that the last incident was
due to a mechanical defect of the bus which was
beyond the control of the driver Jacob
-During the hearing of Bachrach’s petition, Mr.
Joseph Kaplin, general manager of Rural Transit,
was presented as the lone witness
-After Mr. Kaplin concluded his direct testimony,
the hearing was scheduled for another date for
purposes of cross-examination of the witness. The
case was reset on various dates but Mr. Kaplin
failed to appear because he had left for abroad.
-The employee's association filed a motion praying
that:
(a) the testimony of Mr. Joseph Kaplin be stricken
from the records
Dean Carlota
(b) the petition of the Company for authority to
dismiss Maximo Jacob from the service be denied:
and
(c) the Company be ordered to reinstate Maximo
Jacob immediately with backwages from June 9,
1961 up to the date of his actual reinstatement.
-The CIR dismissed the company's petition, lifted
the suspension of driver Jacob, and ordered his
reinstatement with backwages
-Bachrach's motion for reconsideration having
been denied, it filed the instant Petition for
certiorari
ISSUE
WON the CIR erred in ordering the dismissal of
Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob
HELD
NO
Ratio
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine
opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it
criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers,
is a fundamental right which is part of due process.
Reasoning
-CIR did not err in ordering the dismissal of
Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob.
Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph
Kaplin, to prove its case against driver Jacob. The
witness failed however to appear at the scheduled
hearings for his cross-examination for the simple
reason that he left for abroad. Having been
deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to
cross-examine Kaplin, respondent association was
entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness
stricken off the record.
-In Ortigas Jr. v. Luftansa German Airlines, 1975,
this Court held inter alia: Oral testimony may be
taken into account only when it is complete, that
is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined
by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine
is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such
adverse party. But when cross-examination is not
and cannot be done or completed due to causes
attributable to the party offering the witness, the
uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered
incompetent.
-The right of a party to cross-examine the witness
of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in
civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in
criminal cases. The express recognition of such
right of the accused in the Constitution does not
74
A2010
render the right thereto of parties in civil cases
less constitutionally based, for it is an
indispensable part of the due process guaranteed
by the fundamental law. ... Until such cross-
examination has been finished, the testimony of
the witness cannot be considered as complete and
may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the
evidence to be considered by the court in deciding
the case.
-Inasmuch as the testimony of Joseph Kaplin is
stricken off the record and the contents of Exhibits
"1" to "8-F" are hearsay, and there is no other
evidence which substantiates the charges against
Maximo Jacob, the dismissal of the company's
petition to discharge Jacob from its service is in
order.
Disposition Petition is dismissed.
UP BOARD OF REGENTS V. CA
(AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM
MARGARET CELINE)
G.R. No. 134625.
MENDOZA; August 31, 1999
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
-Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret
Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a
Philippine visitor’s visa. she enrolled in the
doctoral program in Anthropology of the University
of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and
Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City.
-After completing the units of course work required
in her doctoral program, private respondent went
on a two-year leave of absence to work as Tamil
Programme Producer of the Vatican Radio in the
Vatican and as General Office Assistant at the
International Right to Life Federation in Rome. She
returned to the Philippines to work on her
dissertation entitled, "Tamil Influences in Malaysia,
Indonesia and the Philippines."
-Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P.
Department of Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr.
Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and
Graduate Program Director, certifying that private
respondent had finished her dissertation and was
ready for her oral defense. She was allowed to give
an oral defense.
Administrative Law
-After going over private respondent’s dissertation,
Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo Joaquin-
Paz that there was a portion in private
respondent’s dissertation that was lifted, without
proper acknowledgment, from Balfour’s
Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and Southern
Asia (1967) and from John Edye’s article entitled
"Description of the Various Classes of Vessels
Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the
Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of
Ceylon for their Coasting Navigation" in the Royal
Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal.
-Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to
defend her dissertation. Four (4) out of the five (5)
panelists gave private respondent a passing mark
for her oral defense by affixing their signatures on
the approval form.
-The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved
private respondent’s graduation pending
submission of final copies of her dissertation.
-The University Council met to approve the list of
candidates for graduation for the second semester
of school year 1992-1993. The list, which was
endorsed to the Board of Regents for final
approval, included private respondent’s name.
-Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs, requesting the
exclusion of private respondent’s name from the
list of candidates for graduation, pending
clarification of the problems regarding her
dissertation.
-Dean Paz’s letter did not reach the Board of
Regents on time, because the next day, the Board
approved the University Council’s recommendation
for the graduation of qualified students, including
private respondent. Two days later, private
respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Anthropology.
-Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent
with plagiarism and recommended that the
doctorate granted to her be withdrawn.
-Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee to
investigate the plagiarism charge against private
respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P.
Diliman Chancellor, Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the
Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondent be
withdrawn.
-In a letter Dean Paz informed private respondent
of the charges against her.
-The CSSP College Assembly unanimously
approved the recommendation to withdraw private
respondent’s doctorate degree and forwarded its
recommendation to the University Council. The
Dean Carlota
University Council, in turn, approved and endorsed
the same recommendation to the Board of
Regents on August 16, 1993.
-Meanwhile, in a letter, U.P. Diliman Chancellor
Emerlinda Roman summoned private respondent
to a meeting on the same day and asked her to
submit her written explanation to the charges
against her.
-During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed
private respondent of the charges and provided
her a copy of the findings of the investigating
committee. Private respondent, on the other
hand, submitted her written explanation in a letter.
-Another meeting was held between Chancellor
Roman and private respondent to discuss her
answer to the charges. A third meeting was
scheduled but private respondent did not
attend it, alleging that the Board of Regents
had already decided her case before she
could be fully heard.
-BOR withdrew degree
-TC dismissed petition for mandamus filed by
Arokiaswamy. CA reversed ordering BOR to restore
her doctoral degree.
ISSUE
WON Arokiaswamy was denied due process
HELD
NO.
Reasoning In this case, the trial court dismissed
private respondent’s petition precisely on grounds
of academic freedom but the Court of Appeals
reversed holding that private respondent was
denied due process. It said:
It is worthy to note that during the proceedings
taken by the College Assembly culminating in its
recommendation to the University Council for the
withdrawal of petitioner’s Ph.D. degree, petitioner
was not given the chance to be heard until after
the withdrawal of the degree was consummated.
Petitioner’s subsequent letters to the U.P.
President proved unavailing.
As the foregoing narration of facts in this case
shows, however, various committees had been
formed to investigate the charge that private
respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all
the investigations held, she was heard in her
defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of
the university proceedings before private
respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is
that there were too many committee and
individual investigations conducted, although all
75
A2010
resulted in a finding that private respondent
committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral
dissertation on the basis of which she was
conferred the Ph.D. degree.
Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence
of due process is simply the opportunity to explain
one’s side of a controversy or a chance to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to
present his position cannot tenably claim to have
been denied due process.
In this case, private respondent was informed in
writing of the charges against her and afforded
opportunities to refute them. She was asked to
submit her written explanation, which she
forwarded. Private respondent then met with the
U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla
committee to discuss her case. In addition, she
sent several letters to the U.P. authorities
explaining her position.
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue
that she was entitled to have an audience before
the Board of Regents. Due process in an
administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in the courts of
justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not
require the attendance of persons whose cases are
included as items on the agenda of the Board of
Regents.
Disposition Petition for mandamus DISMISSED
ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO.
V. CA (SEC. OF AGRI AND NATURAL
RESOURCES)
G.R. No. L-49711.
AQUINO; November 7, 1979
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
-This is a mining case. The petitioners appealed
from the second decision of the Court of Appeals,
reversing its first decision and holding that it was
improper for Benjamin M. Gozon, as Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, to affirm his
own decision as Director of Mines.
-The Court of Appeals further held that the trial
court's judgment, confirming the Secretary's
decision, should be set aside and that the
Minister of Natural Resources should review anew
Administrative Law
the decision of the Director of Mines "and,
thereafter, further proceedings will be taken in the
trial court". The antecedental proceedings are as
follows:
(1) In Mines Administrative Case No. V-227,
Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5,
1960 wherein he dismissed the case filed by the
petitioners or protestants (Zambales Chromite
Mining Co., Inc. or the group of Gonzalo P. Nava).
In that case, they sought to be declared the
rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty-
nine mining claims located in Santa Cruz,
Zambales.
On the basis of petitioners' evidence (the private
respondents did not present any evidence and
they filed a demurrer to the evidence or motion to
dismiss the protest), Director Gozon found that the
petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked
and located mining claims in accordance with law.
In that same order, Director Gozon ruled that the
mining claims of the groups of Gregorio Martinez
and Pablo Pabiloña, now the private respondents-
appellees, were duly located and registered (pp.
224-231, Record on Appeal).
(2) The petitioners appealed from that order
to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. While the appeal was pending, Director
Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he
decided the appeal, DANR Case No. 2151, on
August 16, 1963 as if he was adjudicating the case
for the first time. Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised
appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had
decided as Director of Mines. He acted as
reviewing authority in the appeal from his own
decision. Or, to use another analogy, he acted as
trial judge and appellate judge in the same case.
ISSUE
WON Gozun correctly reviewed his own decision
HELD
NO.
Reasoning Secretary Gozon acted with grave
abuse of discretion in reviewing his decision as
Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of
a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is
a mockery of administrative justice. The Mining
Law, Commonwealth Act No. 137, provides:
"SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out
of mining locations shall be submitted to the
Director of Mines for decision:
Dean Carlota
"Provided, That the decision or order of the
Director of Mines may be appealed to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
within thirty days from the date of its receipt.
"In case any one of the parties should disagree
from the decision or order of the Director of Mines
or of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the matter may be taken to the court
of competent jurisdiction within thirty days from
the receipt of such decision or order; otherwise the
said decision or order shall be final and binding
upon the parties concerned." (As amended by
Republic Act No. 746 approved on June 18, 1952).
Undoubtedly, the provision of section that the
decision of the Director of Mines may be appealed
to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources contemplates that the Secretary should
be a person different from the Director of Mines.
In order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a
farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other
than the officer whose decision is under review;
otherwise, there could be no different view or
there would be no real review of the case. The
decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased
view; inevitably, it would be the same view since
being human, he would not admit that he was
mistaken in his first view of the case.
That is the obvious, elementary reason behind the
disqualification of a trial judge, who is promoted to
the appellate court, to sit in any case wherein his
decision or ruling is the subject of review (Sec. 1,
Rule 137, Rules of Court; secs. 9 and 27, Judiciary
Law).
A sense of proportion and consideration for the
fitness of things should have deterred Secretary
Gozon from reviewing his own decision as Director
of Mines. He should have asked his Undersecretary
to undertake the review.Petitioners-appellants
were deprived of due process, meaning
fundamental fairness.
Disposition Order of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources SET ASIDE
RIVERA V CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
240 SCRA 43
VITUG; JAN 4, 1995
NATURE
76
A2010
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Petitioner Rivera was the Manager of Corporate
Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines
("LBP"). On the basis of the affidavits of Lao and
Perez, petitioner was charged by the LBP President
with having committed the following offenses:
"(1) Dishonesty;
"(2) Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or
other valuable thing, in the course of official duties
or in connection therewith when such fee, gift, or
other valuable thing is given by any person in the
hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better
treatment than that accorded other persons;
"(3) Committing acts punishable under the
Anti-Graft laws;
"(4) Pursuit of private business vocation or
profession without the permission required by Civil
Service Rules and regulations;
"(5) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337;
resulting to misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service."
- Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing
Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan
application with LBP, that he could facilitate the
processing, approval and release of the loan if he
would be given a ten percent (10%) commission.
Rivera was said to have subsequently received a
P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00
loan proceeds from the LBP. From Lao, who had
substantial investments in Wynner, Rivera
supposedly likewise received the amount of
approximately P20,000.00 pocket money for his
trip to the United States, as well as additional
funds for his plane ticket, hotel accommodations
and pocket money for still another trip to
Hongkong.
- Rivera was further charged with, among other
things, having served and acted, without prior
authority required by Civil Service Rules and
Memorandum Circular No. 1025 of the Office of the
President of the Philippines, as the personal
consultant of Lao and as consultant in various
companies where Lao had investments. He drew
and received salaries and allowances
approximately P20,000.00 a month evidenced by
vouchers of Edge Apparel, Inc., J & M Clothing
Corporation, and JME Trading Corporation.
- Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed
under preventive suspension. After a formal
investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave
misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best
Administrative Law
interest of the service in accepting employment
from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving
salaries and allowances in violation of Section 12,
Rule XVIII, of the Revised Civil Service Rules. He
was also found to have transgressed the
prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No.
3019, as amended). The penalty of forced
resignation, without separation benefits and
gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera. On
appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit
Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") which held
Rivera guilty only of committing acts prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. The LBP filed a
motion for the reconsideration of MSPB's decision.
In its resolution, the MSPB denied the motion.
- Rivera and the LBP both appealed to the CSC.
The CSC dismissed the appeal of Respondent
George Rivera, finding him guilty of Grave
Misconduct for which he is meted out the penalty
of dismissal from the service. Rivera filed a motion
for reconsideration, which the CSC denied in its
Resolution No. 94-1276.
- Petitioner averred that the CSC committed grave
abuse or discretion in imposing the capital penalty
of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated
finding and conclusions. The SC Court resolved to
dismiss the petition for petitioner's failure to
sufficiently show that CSC acted with grave abuse
of discretion in issuing its questioned resolution.
Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Court's dismissal of the petition, now strongly
asserting that he was denied due process when
Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity
as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the
latter had taken action on LBP's motion for
reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC
Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's
motion for reconsideration with the CSC.
ISSUE
WON petitioner was denied due process when
Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity
as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the
latter had taken action on LBP's motion for
reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC
Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's
motion for reconsideration with the CSC
HELD
YES.
- In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court
of Appeals, the decision of the Secretary of
Dean Carlota
Agriculture and Natural Resources was set aside
by this Court after it had been established that the
case concerned an appeal from the Secretary's
own previous decision he handed down while he
was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. Calling
the act of the Secretary a "mockery of
administrative justice," the Court said:
“In order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a
farce, then reviewing officer must perforce be
other than the officer whose decision is under
review; otherwise, there could be no different view
or there would be no real review of the case. The
decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased
view; inevitably, it would be the same view since
being human, he would not admit that he was
mistaken in his first view of the case."
- Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it
should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to
inhibit herself totally from any participation in
resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give
full meaning and consequence to a fundamental
aspect of due process. The argument that
Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in
MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990 is
unacceptable. It is not denied that she did
participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's
resolution of 03 March 1994, denying the motion
for reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29
August 1990. cdrep
Dispositive Resolution set aside, case remanded
to CSC
AMERICAN INTER-FASHION
CORPORATION v. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, GARMENTS & TEXTILE
EXPORT BOARD & GLORIOUS SUN
FASHION GARMENTS
MANUFACTURING CO. (PHILS.), INC.
187 SCRA 409
GUTIERREZ, JR.; May 23, 1991
Nature: Appeal
Facts:
- GLORIOUS was found guilty of dollar-salting and
misdeclaration of importations by the GTEB and,
as a result of which, the export quotas allocated to
it were cancelled. Soon after the rendition of the
GTEB decision, GLORIOUS filed a petition for
77
A2010
certiorari and prohibition with the Court,
contending that its right to due process of law was
violated, and that the GTEB decision was not
supported by substantial evidence.
- Giving credence to the allegations of respondent
GLORIOUS, the Court issued a resolution ordering
GTEB to conduct further proceedings in the
administrative case against respondent GLORIOUS.
- However, GLORIOUS filed a manifestation of its
intention to withdraw the petition which the Court
granted
- GLORIOUS filed another motion to dismiss with
prejudice, which was duly noted by the Court in a
resolution.
- More than 2 years later, GLORIOUS filed with the
GTEB a petition for the restitution of its export
quota allocation and requested for a
reconsideration of the GTEB decision dated April
27, 1984.
- GLORIOUS again alleged that the charges against
it were not supported by evidence.
- Moreover, it alleged that the GTEB decision
canceling its export quotas was rendered as a
result of duress, threats, intimidation and undue
influence exercised by former Minister Roberto V.
Ongpin in order to transfer GLORIOUS' export
quotas to "Marcos crony-owned" corporations De
Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation [DSA]
and AIFC.
- GLORIOUS further alleged that it was coerced by
Mr. Roberto Ongpin to withdraw its petition and to
enter into joint venture agreements paving the
way for the creation of DSA and petitioner AIFC
which were allowed to service GLORIOUS' export
quotas and to use its plant facilities, machineries
and equipment.
- GTEB denied the petition of GLORIOUS. An appeal
was then taken to the Office of the President.
- At this point, AIFC sought to intervene in the
proceedings and filed its opposition to GLORIOUS'
appeal claiming that the GTEB decision has long
become final, and that a favorable action on the
appeal would result in the forfeiture of the export
quotas which were legally allocated to it.
- The Office of the President ruled in favor of
GLORIOUS, finding the proceedings before the
GTEB in 1984 irregular, and remanded the case to
GTEB for further proceedings.
- The MR of AIFC was subsequently denied.
Issues:
1. WON the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION and
Administrative Law
2. WON the final judgment constitutes res judicata
on the ground that the final judgment in was a
judgment on the merits.
Held:
1. NO. In finding that GTEB proceedings were
irregular, the OP didn’t commit GAD as GTEB
indeed violated the right to due process of
Glorious. GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by
it in rendering the resolution against Glorious Sun.
The decision penned by Deputy Executive
Secretary Magdangal B. Elma and the resolution
penned by Acting Deputy Executive Secretary
Mariano Sarmiento II are not tainted in the
slightest by any grave abuse of discretion. They
outline in detail why the private respondent was
denied due process when its export quotas were
cancelled by GTEB The findings are supported by
the records.
RATIO: Evidence on record must be fully
disclosed to the parties.
2. NO. - The dismissal of the first petition was
clearly based on a technical matter rather than on
the merits of the petition. Hence, the dismissal of
the petition with the factual issues hanging in mid-
air cannot, under the circumstances, constitute res
judicata.
Reasoning:
- For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case,
the following requisites must concur:
. . . (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) the court
which resolved it had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment
on the merits; and (4) there must be identity
between the two cases, as to the parties, subject
matter and cause of action.
- The well-entrenched principle is that "a judgment
on the merits is one rendered after a
determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon
preliminary or final or merely technical point."
(Deang v. IAC).
- The protestation of Glorious Sun of non-disclosure
of evidence had been effectively remedied by the
subsequent accommodation by the GTEB of its
request for copies of the relevant documents.
- The petitioner claims that the subsequent
disclosure of the documents by GTEB to Glorious
Sun in 1987 cured the defect of non-disclosure of
evidence in 1984 under the constitutional
provision of due process enunciated in the
landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR and other
subsequent cases.
Dean Carlota
- The documents used by the GTEB in its 1984
decision and referred to in the 1987 decision as
being "intact" relates to what the GTEB labeled as
Documents used by GTEB and "Additional
Documents" which, as earlier discussed, were
either not disclosed to Appellant for being
privileged or unmarked as exhibits or not
presented in evidence.
- At any rate, the conclusions of GTEB as to the
excessiveness of Appellant's import prices drew a
controverting statement from its own Raw
Materials Importation Regulation Division,
- Findings of administrative agencies are accorded
respect and finality, and generally should not be
disturbed by the courts. This general rule,
however, is not without exceptions.
- As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially
settled that absent a clear, manifest and grave
abuse of discretion amount to want of jurisdiction,
the findings of the administrative agency on
matters falling within its competence will not be
disturbed by the courts.
- Specifically with respect to factual findings, they
are accorded respect, if not finality, because of the
special knowledge and expertise gained by these
tribunals from handling the specific matters falling
under their jurisdiction.
- Such factual findings may be disregarded only if
they "are not supported by evidence; where the
findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or
collussion; where the procedures which lead to the
factual findings are irregular; when palpable errors
are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion
arbitrarines or capriciousness is manifest." (Mapa
v. Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76 [1989])
- In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given
the chance to present its side before its export
quota allocations were revoked and its officers
suspended. While it is true that such allocations as
alleged by the Board are mere privileges which it
can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these
privileges have been accorded to petitioner for so
long that they have become impressed with
property rights especially since not only do these
privileges determine the continued existence of
the petitioner with assets of over P80,000,000.00
but also the livelihood of some 700 workers who
are employed by the petitioner and their families .
-Finally, American Inter-Fashion is hardly the
proper party to question the Malacañang decision.
It was incorporated after the incidents in this case
happened. It was created obviously to be the
recipient of export quotas arbitrarily removed from
78
A2010
the rightful owner. It was sequestered precisely
because of the allegation that it is a crony
corporation which profited from an act of injustice
inflicted on another private corporation.
Dispositive: MFR is GRANTED. The instant
petition is DISMISSED. The question decision and
resolution of the Office of the President are hereby
AFFIRMED.
Separate Opinion
FELICIANO-concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the Court, that is,
that petitioner American Inter-fashion Corporation
has failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or
act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the public respondent Office of the President in
rendering its decision in OP Case No. 3781 dated 7
September 1989.
PEFIANCO V. MORAL
322 SCRA 439
BELLOSILLO; Jan 19, 2000
NATURE
Petition for review of decision of CA
FACTS
- Sec Pefianco of DECS seeks to nullify CA decision.
- Ex-Sec Gloria filed complaint against Moral, Chief
Librarian of National Library for dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The complaint charged
respondent Moral with the pilferage of some
historical documents.
- DoJ Special Prosecutor represented Sec Gloria in
the administrative case. Moral was represented by
her private counsel. Sec Gloria issued resolution
finding Moral guilty. She was ordered dismissed.
- Moral did not appeal but filed a Petition for
Production of DECS Investigation Committee
Report. Her petition was twice denied.
- Moral instituted an action for mandamus and
injunction before regular courts against Sec Gloria
praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS
Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of
dismissal until she received a copy of the said
report.
- Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the
mandamus case principally for lack of cause of
action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus,
Administrative Law
he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on
certiorari. CA sustained TC.
- Sec Gloria filed instant petition. Sec Gloria was
replaced by Sec Pefianco.
ISSUES
1. WON the order of the TC is proper
2. WON Moral is entitled to a copy of the Report
HELD
1. NO.
- Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure mandatorily requires that the resolution
on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly
state the reasons therefor.
- The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23
April 1997 falls short of the requirements
prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed
the general concept of mandamus and the trial
court’s jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of
administrative agencies without stating the basis
why petitioner’s motion to dismiss was being
denied.
- Judges should take pains in crafting their orders,
stating therein clearly and comprehensively the
reasons for their issuance, which are necessary for
the full understanding of the action taken. Where
the court itself has not stated any basis for its
order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion
for reconsideration before resort to higher courts
on certiorari may be had, would be to expect too
much. Since the judge himself was not precise and
specific in his order, a certain degree of liberality
in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with
the rules was justified.
2. NO.
- Mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty,
this being its main objective. It does not lie to
require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is
essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus
that petitioner should have a clear legal right to
the thing demanded and it must be the imperative
duty of the respondent to perform the act
required.
- In her petition for mandamus, respondent
miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a
clear legal right to the DECS Investigation
Committee Report and that it is the ministerial
duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her
with a copy thereof.
- Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil
Service Commission the DECS resolution
Dean Carlota
dismissing her from the service. By her failure to
do so, nothing prevented the DECS resolution from
becoming final.
- Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a
legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with
a copy of the investigation report. On the
contrary, it was held in Ruiz v. Drilon that a
respondent in an administrative case is not
entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee
created to inquire into charges filed against him.
He is entitled only to the administrative decision
based on substantial evidence made of record, and
a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and
the evidence presented against her during the
hearings of the investigation committee.
Respondent no doubt had been accorded these
rights.
- More importantly, the DECS resolution is
complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the
Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains
sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law
upon which respondent’s removal from office was
grounded.
Disposition Petition is granted.
NAPOLCOM V POLICE CHIEF
INSPECTOR LEONARDO BERNABE
G.R. No. 129914
PARDO; May 12, 2000
NATURE
Appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- A newspaper published an article saying that
Bernabe headed a syndicate encashing treasury
warrants of PC soldiers, policemen, firemen and
jail personnel who were already dead, on awol,
suspended and separated from the service.
- President Ramos instructed the DILG Secretary to
conduct an investigation and prosecute
respondent if necessary. The Secretary referred
the directive to the PNP Director General, who
ordered the Criminal Investigation Service
Command to investigate the charges.
- Respondent was informed of the article and
S/Supt. Romeo Acop ordered him to explain
through affidavit.
- Respondent submitted his affidavit alleging that
all the cases against him were either dismissed by
79
A2010
the Ombudsman or pending resolution, except one
which was pending before the Sandiganbayan
involving the encashment of 7 treasury warrants.
CICS Director Angel Quizon submitted to the Chief,
PNP, a memorandum confirming respondent’s
allegations.
- By command of the Police Deputy Director
General, respondent was suspended from the
police service for 90 days. Subsequently, he was
given notice of complaint/charge and order to
answer within 5 days from receipt of the
complaint.
- Respondent filed a motion for bill of particulars.
- The CICS submitted a manifestation asserting
that the technical procedures obtained in the
regular courts are strictly applicable to
administrative proceedings; hence, the allegations
in the complaint are sufficient to enable
respondent to file an intelligent answer.
- The Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer issued a
resolution recommending for respondent's
dismissal from the PNP service. The PNP Inspector
General concurred with the recommendation of
the Summary Dismissal Officer.
- The Chief PNP ordered the dismissal of
respondent from the police service because of
heading a payroll syndicate, unexplained assets or
wealth, and falsification of public documents
(falsified his transcript of records with PUP)
- Respondent appealed to the NAPOLCOM National
Appellate Board, which sustained the summary
dismissal of respondent from the PNP.
- Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review challenging his dismissal from
the police service on the ground of lack of due
process and the unconstitutionality of Section 42,
R. A. 6975.
- After due proceedings, the CA promulgated its
decision upholding the constitutionality of Section
42, R. A. 6975, but setting aside the decision of the
National Appellate Board for failure to comply with
the due process requirement of the Constitution.
ISSUE
WON the CA erred in setting aside the decision of
the National Appellate Board, National Police
Commission, on the ground that respondent was
denied due process in the conduct of the
investigation of the charges filed against him
HELD
YES, the requirements of due process were
sufficiently complied with.
Administrative Law
Ratio Due process as a constitutional precept
does not always and in all situations require a trial-
type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a
person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself.
The essence of due process is simply to be heard,
or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.
Reasoning
- Record shows that respondent was given notice
of the complaints/charges against him and an
opportunity to answer. He submitted an affidavit
answering point by point the charges against him.
He even appealed from the decision of the Chief,
PNP dismissing him from the police service to the
National Appellate Board, and submitted a
memorandum. Consequently, he was given more
than adequate opportunity to explain his side.
Hence, there was no violation of his right to
procedural and substantive due process.
Disposition Petition GRANTED.
MONTEMAYOR V BUNDALIAN
GR No. 149335
PUNO; July 1, 2003
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- An unverified letter-complaint, was received from
LUIS BUNDALIAN by the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California. It accused
EDILLO MONTEMAYOR, then OIC-Regional Director,
Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating
unexplained wealth. Montemayor and his wife
purchased a house and lot in California, making a
down payment of US$100,000. His in-laws in
California had a poor credit standing due to a
number of debts and they could not have
purchased such an expensive property. It accused
Montemayor of amassing wealth from lahar funds
and other public works projects.
- Montemayor submitted his counter-affidavit
before the Philippine Commission Against Graft
and Corruption (PCAGC) alleging that the real
owner of the property was his sister-in-law Estela
Fajardo. They were advised by an immigration
lawyer (they wanted to emigrate) that it would be
Dean Carlota
an advantage if they had real property in the US.
He claimed that Fajardo offered to buy the
Burbank property and put the title in the names of
Montemayor and his wife to support their
emigration plans and to enable her at the same
time to circumvent a provision in her mortgage
contract prohibiting her to purchase another
property pending full payment of a real estate she
earlier acquired in Palmdale, Los Angeles. He also
attached a Consolidated Investigation Report of
the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for
insufficiency of evidence.
- While Montemayor participated in the
proceedings and submitted various pleadings and
documents, Bundalian could not be located as his
Philippine address could not be ascertained.
PCAGC repeatedly required Montemayor to submit
his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
(he did not file his SALN from 1992-1994), Income
Tax Returns (ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet. He
ignored these directives and submitted only his
Service Record.
- The Office of the President, concurring with the
findings and adopting the recommendation of the
PCAGC, ordered Montemayor’s dismissal from
service with forfeiture of all government benefits.
His MFR was denied and his appeal to the CA was
dismissed.
ISSUES
1. WON Montemayor was denied due process in
the investigation before the PCAGC
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is the opportunity to
explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. As long as the
parties are given the opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered, the demands of due
process are sufficiently met.
Reasoning The PCAGC exerted efforts to notify
Bundalian of the proceedings but his Philippine
residence could not be located. Be that as it may,
Montemayor cannot argue that he was deprived of
due process because he failed to confront and
cross-examine the complainant. He voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by
participating in the proceedings before it. He was
duly represented by counsel. He filed his counter-
affidavit, submitted documentary evidence,
attended the hearings, moved for a
80
A2010
reconsideration of the Administrative Order issued
by the President and eventually filed his appeal
before the CA. His active participation in every
step of the investigation effectively removed any
badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any,
and satisfied the due process requirement.
- The lack of verification of the administrative
complaint and the non-appearance of the
complainant did not divest the PCAGC of its
authority. Under Section 3 of EO 151 creating the
PCAGC, complaints involving graft and corruption
may be filed before it in any form or manner
against presidential appointees in the executive
department. It is not uncommon that a
government agency is given wide latitude in the
scope and exercise of its investigative powers. The
Ombudsman, under the Constitution, is directed to
act on any complaint likewise filed in any form and
manner concerning official acts or omissions. The
Court Administrator of this Court investigates and
takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but even
anonymous complaints filed against court
employees or officials for violation of the Code of
Ethical Conduct. This policy has been adopted in
line with the serious effort of the government to
minimize, if not eradicate, graft and corruption in
the service.
- In administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense
for it is enough that the party is given the chance
to be heard before the case against him is
decided.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
SHOPPES MANILA INC v NLRC
419 SCRA 354
(Sarah)
AUTENCIO V MANARA
449 SCRA 46
PANGANIBAN; January 19, 2005
NATURE
Administrative Law
Petition for Review under Rule 45
FACTS
- Manara lodged a complaint against Autencio for
dishonesty and misconduct in office.
- after hearing, the Office for Legal Services of the
City of Cotobato declared Autencio guilty of
misconudct in office for allowing irregularities to
happen which led to illegal payment of salaries to
casuals.
- petitioner appealed to the Civil Service
Commission, which modified the decision to grave
misconduct, and imposed the penalty of dismissal
for cause with all its accessories
- petitioner, in her motion for reconsideration,
alleged that she had waived her right to present
her evidence at a formal hearing to submit the
case for resolution, only because of the
manifestation of the
complainant and the hearing officer that she could
be held liable only for the lesser offense of simple
negligence.
- petitioner elevated the case to the CA, which
affirmed the CSC resolutions; CA denied
reconsideration.
ISSUE/S
1. WON petitioner was deprived of substantial due
process because she was made to believe that she
would be liable for the lesser offense of simple
negligence.
HELD
1. NO
Reasoning On the formal charge against her,
petitioner had received sufficient information
which, in fact, enabled her to prepare her defense.
She filed her Answer controverting the charges
against her and submitted Affidavits of personnel
in the Assessor’s Office to support her claim of
innocence. A pre-hearing conference was
conducted by the legal officer, during which she --
assisted by her counsel -- had participated. Finally,
she was able to appeal the ruling of City Mayor
Badoy to the CSC, and then to the CA In
administrative cases, a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet
the requirements of due process. A formal or trial-
type hearing is not always necessary. For the
purpose of ascertaining the truth, an investigation
will be conducted, during which technical rules
applicable to judicial proceedings need not always
be adhered to. And where the party has the
opportunity to appeal or seek reconsideration of
Dean Carlota
the action or ruling complained of, defects in
procedural due process may be cured.
Settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that the
findings of fact of an administrative agency must
be respected, so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. It is not the task of this Court
to weigh once more the evidence submitted before
the administrative body and to substitute its own
judgment for that of the latter in respect of the
sufficiency of evidence. In any event, the Decisions
of the CSC and the Court of Appeals finding
petitioner guilty of the administrative charge
prepared against her are supported by substantial
evidence.
Disposition Petition is denied and the assailed
Decision and Resolution affirmed.
SAMALIO V CA (CSC, DOJ, BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION)
454 SCRA 462
CORONA; March 31, 2005
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the May 24, 1999
decision, as well as the September 1, 1999
resolution, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 48723 which in turn affirmed the November
26, 1997 resolution of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The aforementioned CSC
resolution upheld the August 30, 1996 1st
Indorsement of then Justice Secretary Teofisto T.
Guingona confirming the penalty of dismissal from
service imposed by the Bureau of Immigration
upon petitioner on the ground of dishonesty,
oppression, misconduct and conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service in
connection with his act of extorting money from
Ms. Weng Sai Qin, a foreign national.
FACTS
- Petitioner was formerly an Intelligence Officer of
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
- In Resolution No. 0-93-0224 dated February 4,
1993, the City Prosecutor�s office of Pasay City
recommended that petitioner Samalio be
prosecuted for the crimes of Robbery and Violation
of Section 46 of the Immigration Law before the
Sandiganbayan under the following facts:
"x x x that on 2 February 1993, Ms. Weng Sai Qin
arrived at the NAIA from Saipan. While waiting for
81
A2010
her turn at the arrival immigration counter, her
passport was examined by Immigration Officer
Juliet Pajarillaga. Noting that Ms. Weng, a Chinese,
was holding a Uruguayan passport, Ms. Pajarillaga
suspected that the former�s passport was fake.
Ms. Weng was taken out of the queue and brought
to Respondent who was the duty intelligence
officer. Ms. Weng, who could only speak in
Chinese, asked respondent by sign language that
she wanted to meet a friend who was waiting at
the NAIA arrival area. Respondent approved the
request and accompanied Ms. Weng to the arrival
area. Thereafter, Respondent, with Ms. Weng and
her male friend in tow, returned to the immigration
area. While inside the office of Respondent, Ms.
Weng asked that her passport be returned.
Sensing a demand for money in exchange for her
passport, Ms. Weng flashed $500.00 in front of
Respondent. The money was grabbed by
Respondent. Shortly, her passport was returned
ans [sic] she was allowed to leave. When Ms.
Weng checked her passport later, she discovered
that it did not bear an immigration arrival stamp.
Thereafter, Ms. Weng complained against
Respondent."
- Then BID Commissioner, Zafiro L. Respicio,
issued Personnel Order No. 93-179-93
commencing an administrative case against
petitioner Augusto R. Samalio for Violation of
CSMC No. 46, Rule 2, Section 1, for dishonesty,
oppression, misconduct, disgraceful and immoral
conduct, inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
- During the pendency of the administrative case,
petitioner was convicted of robbery before the
Sandiganbayan regarding the same incident.
- Petitioner filed motion to dismiss admin case.
Denied. Indorsement mentioned (SEE NATURE)
was issued.
ISSUE/S
1. WON petitioner was denied due process
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio Administrative bodies are not bound by the
technical niceties of law and procedure and the
rules obtaining in courts of law. Administrative
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are
unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural
Administrative Law
requirements, subject to the observance of
fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in justiciable cases presented before
them. In administrative proceedings, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied and administrative due process cannot be
fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense.
Reasoning Due process in an administrative
context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in courts of justice. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral
arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there
is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or
trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy
at hand. The standard of due process that must be
met in administrative tribunals allows a certain
degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored. In other words, it is not legally
objectionable for being violative of due process for
an administrative agency to resolve a case based
solely on position papers, affidavits or
documentary evidence submitted by the parties as
affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their
direct testimony.
The CSC decision and resolution which upheld the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice confirming
the decision of the Commissioner of the BID are
supported by substantial evidence. The CSC, as
well as the Secretary of Justice and the
Commissioner of the BID, decided the case on the
basis of the pleadings and papers submitted by
the parties, and relied on the records of the
proceedings taken. In particular, the decision was
based on the criminal complaint filed by Weng Sai
Qin against petitioner before the City Prosecutor’s
Office of Pasay City, as well as a resolution of the
same office recommending the prosecution of
petitioner at the Sandiganbayan for the crimes of
robbery and violation of Section 46 of the
Immigration Law.
The CSC, as well as the Secretary of Justice, also
took cognizance of the testimony of Weng Sai Qin
in the Sandiganbayan Criminal Case and the fact
of petitioner’s conviction in that case. Thus, there
was ample evidence which satisfied the burden of
proof required in administrative proceedings ―
substantial evidence or that quantum of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion ― to support the
Dean Carlota
decision of the CSC.
In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in
the administrative proceedings before the BID
because she left the country even before the
administrative complaint against petitioner was
instituted. Petitioner does not deny that the
testimony of Weng Sai Qin was given in the
Sandiganbayan criminal case which sprang from
the information filed pursuant to Resolution No. 0-
93-0224 of the City Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay
City, the very same resolution used by
Commissioner Respicio as basis for filing the
administrative complaint. Hence, the issue
testified to by Weng Sai Qin was the same issue in
the administrative case, that is, whether petitioner
extorted money from Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner also
had the opportunity to face and cross-examine his
accuser Weng Sai Qin, and to defend and vindicate
his cause before the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, all
the requisites for the proper application of the rule
on former testimony, as embodied in Section 47,
Rule 130, were satisfied. Thus, the CSC and the
Secretary of Justice committed no error when they
applied it and took cognizance of the former
testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan
Criminal Case No. 18679 where petitioner was
convicted.
Disposition ]petition is DENIED.
GOSS V LOPEZ
419 U.S. 565
WHITE; January 22, 1975
FACTS:
-for various reasons, 9 high school students were
suspended by their respective school
administrators. They mostly participated in
demonstrations in their schools. Due to this, school
administrators suspended them for ten days.
-Ohio law provides for free education to all children
between the ages of six and 21. Section 3313.66
of the Code empowers the principal of an Ohio
public school to suspend a pupil for misconduct for
up to 10 days or to expel him. In either case, he
must notify the student's parents within 24 hours
and state the reasons for his action. A pupil who is
expelled, or his parents, may appeal the decision
to the Board of Education and in connection
therewith shall be permitted to be heard at the
board meeting. No such procedure is available for
cases of suspension.
82
A2010
-The nine named appellees, each of whom alleged
that he or she had been suspended from public
high school in Columbus for up to 10 days without
a hearing pursuant to § 3313.66, filed an action
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the Columbus
Board of Education and various administrators of
the CPSS. The complaint sought a declaration that
§ 3313.66 was unconstitutional in that it permitted
public school administrators to deprive plaintiffs of
their rights to an education without a hearing of
any kind, in violation of the procedural due process
component of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also
sought to enjoin the public school officials from
issuing future suspensions pursuant to § 3313.66
and to require them to remove references to the
past suspensions from the records of the students
in question.
ISSUE
WON the Ohio Law is unconstitutional
HELD:
YES.
-It is true that § 3313.66 of the Code permits
school principals to suspend students for up to 10
days; but suspensions may not be imposed without
any grounds whatsoever. All of the schools had
their own rules specifying the grounds for
expulsion or suspension.
-Although Ohio may not be constitutionally
obligated to establish and maintain a public school
system, it has nevertheless done so and has
required its children to attend. Those young people
do not "shed their constitutional rights" at the
schoolhouse door. . "The Fourteenth Amendment,
as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures --
Boards of Education not excepted."
- Appellants proceed to argue that even if there is
a right to a public education protected by the Due
Process Clause generally, the Clause comes into
play only when the State subjects a student to a
"severe detriment or grievous loss." The loss of 10
days, it is said, is neither severe nor grievous and
the Due Process Clause is therefore of no
relevance.
-in determining WON due process is applicable, the
weight of the deprivation is not the determinative
factor but that of the nature of the interest at
stake. A 10 day educational suspension bears a lot
of consequences for students.
Administrative Law
-when it is determined that due process is
applicable, what has to be known then is what
process should be due.
-in this case, to impose a standard process for
suspension of 10 days might well overwhelm
administrative facilities in many places and, by
diverting resources, cost more than it would save
in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further
formalizing the suspension process and escalating
its formality and adversary nature may not only
make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but
also destroy its effectiveness as part of the
teaching process.
-The Court held that a standard should be
available only in cases exceeding 10 days.
Dissenting, Powell
- The decision unnecessarily opens avenues for
judicial intervention in the operation of our public
schools that may affect adversely the quality of
education. Moreover, to the extent that there may
be some arguable infringement, it is too
speculative, transitory, and insubstantial to justify
imposition of a constitutional rule...
MATTHEWS V. ELDRIDGE
424 U.S. 319
POWELL: 1976
FACTS:
Cash benefits are provided to workers during
periods in which they are completely disabled
under the disability insurance benefits program
created by the 1956 amendments to Title II of
the Social Security Act.
Respondent Eldridge was first awarded benefits in
June 1968. In March 1972, he received a
questionnaire from the state agency charged
with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge
completed the questionnaire, indicating that his
condition had not improved and identifying the
medical sources, including physicians, from
whom he had received treatment recently. The
state agency then obtained reports from his
physician and a psychiatric consultant. After
considering these reports and other information
in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter
that it had made a tentative determination that
his disability had ceased in May 1972. The letter
included a statement of reasons for the
proposed termination of benefits, and advised
Dean Carlota
Eldridge that he might request reasonable time
in which to obtain and submit additional
information pertaining to his condition.
In his written response, Eldridge disputed one
characterization of his medical condition and
indicated that the agency already had enough
evidence to establish his disability. [n2] The
state agency then made its final determination
that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972.
This determination was accepted by the Social
Security Administration (SSA), which notified
Eldridge in July that his benefits would terminate
after that month. The notification also advised
him of his right to seek reconsideration by the
state agency of this initial determination within
six months.
Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge
commenced this action challenging the
constitutional validity of the administrative
procedures established by the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing
whether there exists a continuing disability. He
sought an immediate reinstatement of benefits
pending a hearing on the issue of his disability.
The Secretary moved to dismiss on the grounds
that Eldridge's benefits had been terminated in
accordance with valid administrative regulations
and procedures and that he had failed to
exhaust available remedies. In support of his
contention that due process requires a
pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied
exclusively upon this Court's decision in
Goldberg v. Kelly, which established a right to
an "evidentiary hearing" prior to termination of
welfare benefits. The Secretary contended that
Goldberg was not controlling since eligibility for
disability benefits, unlike eligibility for welfare
benefits, is not based on financial need and
since issues of credibility and veracity do not
play a significant role in the disability
entitlement decision, which turns primarily on
medical evidence.
The District Court concluded that the
administrative procedures pursuant to which the
Secretary had terminated Eldridge's benefits
abridged his right to procedural due process.
ISSUE:
WON the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment requires that prior to the termination
of Social Security disability benefit payments the
recipient be afforded an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing.
83
A2010
HELD:
NO, the present procedure in claiming
benefits under the Social Security is
sufficient to meet the due process
requirement
Reasoning
- The specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
- Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due
process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to
a temporary deprivation. It was emphasized
there that welfare assistance is given to persons
on the very margin of subsistence: "The crucial
factor in this context a factor not present in the
case of . . . virtually anyone else whose
governmental entitlements are ended is that
termination of aid pending resolution of a
controversy over eligibility may deprive an
eligible recipient of the very means by which to
live while he waits."
- Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is
not based upon financial need. Indeed, it is
wholly unrelated to the worker's income or
support from many other sources, such as
earnings of other family members, workmen's
compensation awards, tort claims awards,
savings, private insurance, public or private
pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps, public
assistance, or the "many other important
programs, both public and private, which contain
provisions for disability payments affecting a
substantial portion of the work force . . . ." As
Goldberg illustrates, the degree of potential
deprivation that may be created by a particular
decision is a factor to be considered in assessing
the validity of any administrative decision-
making process. The potential deprivation here
is generally likely to be less than in Goldberg,
although the degree of difference can be
overstated. As the District Court emphasized, to
remain eligible for benefits a recipient must be
Administrative Law
"unable to engage in substantial gainful
activity."
b. Notice and Hearing
1. When required
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO. V
COLLECTOR
G.R. No. L-19180
BAUTISTA ANGELO; October 31,
1963
NATURE
Special civil action of certiorari with preliminary
injunction
FACTS
- The Collector of Customs sent a notice to C. F.
Sharp & Company informing it that a vessel it
operates was apprehended and found to have
committed a violation of the customs laws and
regulations and that it carried an unmanifested
cargo consisting of one RCA Victor TV set 21" in
violation of Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs
Code.
- C. F. Sharp & Company, not being the agent or
operator of the vessel, referred the notice to A. V.
Rocha, the agent and operator thereof, who
answered the notice stating, among other things,
that the television set referred to therein was not a
cargo of the vessel and, therefore, was not
required by law to be manifested. Rocha stated
further: "If this explanation is not sufficient, we
request that this case be set for investigation and
hearing in order to enable the vessel to be
informed of the evidence against it to sustain the
charge and to present evidence in its defense."
- The Collector of Customs replied to Rocha stating
that the television set in question was a cargo on
board the vessel and that he does not find his
explanation satisfactorily enough to exempt the
vessel from liability for violating Section 2521 of
the Tariff and Customs Code. In said letter, the
collector imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on the vessel
and ordered payment thereof within 48 hours with
a threat that he will deny clearance to said vessel
and will issue a warrant of seizure and detention
against it if the fine is not paid.
- Petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari
with preliminary injunction before the Court of First
A2010
Dean Carlota
Instance, which was granted. Respondent 88 SCRA 121
interposed present appeal.
MAKASIAR; January 31, 1979
ISSUE
NATURE
WON the requirements of administrative due
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
process have already been complied with
respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission
HELD
FACTS
NO
- Petitioner Consolacion Bautista is the surviving
- Rocha was not given an opportunity to prove that
spouse and the only heir of the late Andres
the television set complained of is not a cargo that
Bautista, who died while his disability
needs to be manifested as required by Section
compensation claim was pending review by the
2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Under said
respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission
section, in order that an imported article or
(WCC). In his lifetime, Andres Bautista was
merchandise may be considered a cargo that
employed a switchman by respondent Philippine
should be manifested it is first necessary that it be
National Railways (PNR) since 1945. In August
so established for the reason that there are other
1973, he filed his application for retirement on the
effects that a vessel may carry that are excluded
ground of disability, which was likewise pending
from the requirement of the law, among which are
action at the time of his death.
the personal effects of the members of the crew.
- In August 1974, Andres Bautista filed a notice of
The fact that the set in question was claimed by
injury or sickness and claim for compensation
the customs authorities not to be within the
dated July 29, 1974 with the Department of Labor
exception does not automatically make the vessel
in Dagupan City all that he is sick of PTB and
liable. It is still necessary that the vessel, its owner
Rheumatism that the date of accident was August
or operator, be given a chance to show otherwise.
10, 1973, that he stopped working on August 16,
This is precisely what petitioner Rocha has
1973 and that he orally named his employer of the
requested in his letter. Not only was he denied this
fact of his sickness. He attached to the claim for
chance, but respondent collector immediately
compensation a physician's report dated July 28,
imposed upon the vessel the huge fine of
1974 with a diagnostic finding that claimant was
P5,000.00. This is a denial of the elementary rule
suffering from PTB, far advanced; prognosis Poor,
of due process.
which required hospitalization. His employer filed
- True it is that the proceedings before the
its Employer's Report of Accident or Sickness.
Collector of Customs insofar as the determination
- Hearing officer dismissed the compensation claim
of any act or irregularity that may involve a
of claimant for the reasons that: In view of the
violation of any customs law or regulation is
repeated non-appearance of the claimant and
concerned, or of any act arising under the Tariff
counsel during the scheduled hearings of this case
and Customs Code, are not judicial in character,
despite due notice to the and it appearing that the
but merely administrative, where the rules of
evidence adduced was not enough to warrant an
procedure are generally disregarded, but even in
immediate award in favor of the claimant let this
the administrative proceedings due process should
case be dismissed and respondent PNR is absolved
be observed because that is a right enshrined in
from any liability
our Constitution. The right to due process is not
- Counsel for claimant Bautista filed MFR saying
merely statutory. It is a constitutional right. That
that the hearing of the case was delayed by
this principle applies with equal force to
reason of the repeated non-appearance and
administrative proceedings was well elaborated
motions for postponement on the part of counsels
upon by this Court in the Ang Tibay case.
for employer PNR and the consequent withdrawal
Disposition The decision appealed from is
of the original counsel; that his failure to appear at
affirmed.
the last 2 scheduled hearings was excusable for
the reason that he received the notice of hearing 2
days after the scheduled date of hearing and he
BAUTISTA V WORKMEN’S informed the clerk of the hearing officer of this
COMPENSATION fact; that the counsel of employer PNR was
likewise not present at the last scheduled hearing.
84
Administrative Law
Counsel also informed hearing officer of the fact
that claimant is already dead without however
stating the date and cause of death.
- MFR was denied but hearing officer ordered the
elevation of the entire records of the case to the
respondent Commission for review. Respondent
Commission, on the basis of the evidence on
record, affirmed the order of dismissal. Hence, this
petition, which the Court subsequently treated as a
special civil action
ISSUE
WON the late Andres Bautista, represented by his
surviving spouse herein, was denied due process
in his claim for compensation
HELD
YES
(NOTE: On discussion on the merits, see Original
case)
- Respondent WCC gravely abused its discretion in
ignoring and in not passing upon the issue of
denial of due process squarely presented by
claimant's counsel.
- The very rules of the Commission require the
giving of reasonable notice of hearing to each
party interested by service upon him personally or
by registered mail of a copy thereof at his last
known post office address or if he is represented
by a counsel, through the latter, so as to ensure
observance and protection of an interested party's
right to a hearing. Patent therefore is the failure of
the hearing officer to observe these rules.
- Under the circumstances, claimant was clearly
deprived of his day in court. Consequently, the
dismissal of the claim premised on claimant and
his counsel's "repeated non-appearance" at the
said hearings cannot stand.
- The hearing officer tilted his discretion in favor of
the employer and to the prejudice of the laborer,
the late claimant Andres Bautista, as
demonstrated by his obdurate handling of
claimant's excusable non-appearances at
scheduled hearings, on one hand, and his mild
treatment of respondent employer's repeated
failure to appear at scheduled hearings and its
motions for postponement, on the other. The
records clearly show that while respondent had
asked for and was granted at least 5
postponements; claimant, on the other hand, only
moved for postponement once and that was even
on a joint motion with respondent employer
Disposition Petition is granted.
Dean Carlota
EQUITABLE BANKING CORP v. NLRC
273 SCRA 352
Vitug ; June 13, 1997
Nature
Special civil action of certiorari
Facts
-Sadac was appointed VP for the Legal Department
of Equitable.
-Nine lawyers 3 of the bank's Legal Department
under Equitable, addressed a "letter-petition" to
the Chairman of the Board of Directors, accusing
Sadac of abusive conduct, inefficiency,
mismanagement, ineffectiveness and
indecisiveness. Private respondent was furnished
with a copy of the letter.
-Morales, Chairman of the Board of Directors,
called the contending lawyers to a conference in
his office in an attempt to resolve their differences,
it failed. Board of Directors, apprised of the
situation, adopted a resolution directing one of its
directors, Banico, to look further into the matter
and to "determine a course of action for the best
interest of the bank." Banico met with the
complaining nine lawyers, he was warned that if
private respondent were to be retained in his
position, the lawyers would resign en masse.
-Mr. Banico submitted a report to the Board of
Directors and said that there was abusive conduct
and mismanagement and was inefficient and
ineffective.The Board asked Sadac to voluntarily
resign. They emphasized that they are just saying
that the Board has lost its confidence on him and
they are waiting for his voluntary resignation.
Sadac again made a request for a full hearing and
cautioned that, under Section 31 of the
Corporation Code, individual members of the
Board could be held accountable for voting or
assenting to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation.
-Sadac persisted in his request for a formal
investigation. Unheeded he filed a complaint in the
NLRC for illegal dismissal and damages.
-Board of Directors terminated Sadac and
reiterated that it was one between client and
lawyer. He also is disentitled from his
compensation. The Board instructed management
to take the necessary steps to "defend itself and
85
A2010
all the members of the Board of Directors" from
private respondent's complaint.
-Labor-Arbited sided with Equitable, the involved
lawyer was a "mere legal assistant" tasked with
certain duties not all that related to the practice of
law. The Labor Arbiter concluded that the
complaint stated no cause of action because a
lawyer-client relationship should instead be
governed by Section 26, Rule 138, of the Rules of
Court. Also, there were valid grounds and he was
not denied due process, holding that private
respondent was "heard exhaustively on the matter
of the charge lodged against him" and that, "for
valid practical reasons," petitioners "were not in a
position to accede" to the demand for a formal
hearing.
-NLRC concluded differently. The NLRC ruled that
private respondent was denied the right to due
process.
-Equitable filed a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution.
Issues
1. WON there was an employer-employee
relationship requiring the procedural requirements
2. WON the corporation is solely liable
HELD
1.Yes, there was.
"A lawyer, like any other professional, may very
well be an employee of a private corporation or
even of the government. It is not unusual for a big
corporation to hire a staff of lawyers as its in-
house counsel, pay them regular salaries, rank
them in its table of organization, and otherwise
treat them like its other officers and employees. At
the same time, it may also contract with a law firm
to act as outside counsel on a retainer basis. The
two classes of lawyers often work closely together
but one group is made up of employees while the
other is not. A similar arrangement may exist as to
doctors, nurses, dentists, public relations
practitioners, and other professionals."
The existence of an employer-employee
relationship, between the bank and private
respondent brings the case within the coverage of
the Labor Code. Under the Code, an employee may
be validly dismissed if these requisites are
attendant: (1) the dismissal is grounded on any of
the causes stated in Article 282 of the Labor Code,
and (2) the employee has been notified in writing
and given the opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself as so required by Section 2 and
Administrative Law
Section 5, Rule XIV, Book V, of the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code.
Article 282(c) of the Labor Code provides that
"willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer" is a cause for the
termination of employment by an employer.
Ordinary breach of trust will not suffice, it must be
willful and without justifiable excuse. This ground
must be founded on facts established by the
employer who must clearly and convincingly prove
by substantial evidence the facts and incidents
upon which loss of confidence in the employee
may fairly be made to rest; otherwise, the
dismissal will be rendered illegal.
Petitioners' stated loss of trust and confidence on
private respondent was spawned by the
complaints leveled against him by the lawyers in
his department.
-The act complained of must be related to the
performance of the duties of the employee such as
would show him to be thereby unfit to continue
working for the employer. Here, the grievances of
the lawyers, in main, refer to what are perceived
to be certain objectionable character traits of
private respondent. Although petitioners have
charged private respondent with allegedly
mishandling two cases in his long service with the
bank, it is quite apparent that private respondent
would not have been asked to resign had it not
been for the letter-complaint of his associates in
the Legal Department.
Confident that no employer-employee existed
between the bank and private respondent,
petitioners have put aside the procedural
requirements for terminating one's employment,
i.e., (a) a notice apprising the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought, and (b) another notice
informing the employee of the employer's
decision to dismiss him. Failure to comply
with these requirements taints the dismissal
with illegality. This procedure is mandatory,
any judgment reached by management
without that compliance can be considered
void and inexistent. While it is true that the
essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied in
administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain one's side, meetings in the nature
of consultation and conferences such as the
case here, however, may not be valid
substitutes for the proper observance of
notice and hearing.
Dean Carlota
2. Yes, a corporation is a juridical entity with legal
personality separate and distinct from those acting
for and in its behalf and, in general, from the
people comprising it. The rule is that obligations
incurred by the corporation, acting through its
directors, officers and employees, are its sole
liabilities. Nevertheless, being a mere fiction of
law, peculiar situations or valid grounds can exist
to warrant, albeit done sparingly, the disregard of
its independent being and the lifting of the
corporate veil. As a rule, this situation might arise
when a corporation is used to evade a just and due
obligation or to justify a wrong, to shield or
perpetrate fraud, to carry out similar other
unjustifiable aims or intentions, or as a subterfuge
to commit injustice and so circumvent the law.
The case of petitioner is way off these exceptional
instances. It is not even shown that petitioner has
had a direct hand in the dismissal of private
respondent enough to attribute to him (petitioner)
a patently unlawful act while acting for the
corporation. Neither can Article 289 of the Labor
Code be applied since this law specifically refers
only to the imposition of penalties under the Code.
...
UY V COA
G.R. No. 130685
PUNO; March 21, 2000
NATURE
Special civil action for certiorari
FACTS
- Petitioners were among the employees of the
Provincial Engineering Office who were dismissed
by Gov. Paredes, allegedly to scale down
operations.
- Petitioners filed a petition for reinstatement to
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). MSPB
found that the reduction in work force was not
done in accordance with civil service rules and
regulations, and ordering the reinstatement of
petitioners. It held that while reduction in force
due to lack of funds is a valid ground for
termination, employees to be terminated must be
determined after being found to be the least
qualified (in terms of relative fitness, efficiency
and length of service)
86
A2010
- MSPB later issued an order directing the
Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur pay
petitioners their back salaries and other money
benefits.
- At first, the Governor did not want to comply with
said orders. The matter was brought up to the
CSC, wherein indirect contempt proceedings were
held. This prompted the Governor to finally comply
with the order of reinstatement. The provincial
treasurer also partially released some of the
backwages.
- But the problems did not stop there. Later, the
Provincial Administrator, for and in behalf of
Governor Plaza, wrote a letter to respondent
Commission on Audit. It claims that COA is the
proper authority to determine disbursement as
regards the backwages. In its decision, COA ruled
that the payment of backwages has become the
personal liability of former Governor Paredes, it
appearing that the illegal dismissal was done in
bad faith.
- Pursuant to the ruling of COA, the provincial
treasurer stopped the payment of backwages.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the COA, in the exercise of its power to
audit, can disallow the payment of back wages of
illegally dismissed employees by the Provincial
Government of Agusan del Sur which has been
decreed pursuant to a final decision of the Civil
Service Commission
HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning
- First, COA based its ruling on the MSRB decision.
A careful perusal of said Decision will disclose that
the MSPB never made a categorical finding of fact
that former Governor Paredes acted in bad faith
and hence, is personally liable for the payment of
petitioners' back wages. Indeed, the MSPB even
found that there was lack of funds which would
have justified the reduction in the workforce were
it not for the procedural infirmities in its
implementation
- (important according to the syllabus) Second, the
fundamental requirements of procedural due
process were violated in proceedings before the
COA. In the case at bar, former Governor Paredes
was never made a party to nor served a notice of
the proceedings before the COA. While
administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial
powers are not hide bound by technical
Administrative Law
procedures, nonetheless, they are not free to
disregard the basic demands of due process.
Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to
present evidence is not a mere technicality or a
trivial matter in any administrative proceedings
but an indispensable ingredient of due process. It
would be unfair for COA to hold former Governor
Paredes personally liable for the claims of
petitioners amounting to millions of pesos without
giving him an opportunity to be heard and present
evidence in his defense. Our rulings holding that
public officials are personally liable for damages
arising from illegal acts done in bad faith are
premised on said officials having been sued both
in their official and personal capacities
- Third, the MSRB decision became final and
executory. Final judgments may no longer be
reviewed or in any way modified directly or
indirectly by a higher court, not even by the
Supreme Court, much less by any other official,
branch or department of Government
Disposition Decision of COA set aside
2. When not required
SUNTAY v PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-9430
PADILLA, J.; June 29, 1957
NATURE
Petition for a writ of certiorari
FACTS
- Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor
of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against
Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of
Quezon City, as follows: The accused took Alicia
Nubla from St. Paul's Colleges in Quezon City with
lewd design and took her to somewhere near the
U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and was
then able to have carnal knowledge of her. Alicia
Nubla is a minor of 16 years.
- Petitioner applied for and was granted a passport
by the DFA. Petitioner left the Philippines for San
Francisco where he is at present enrolled in school.
The offended girl subscribed and swore to a
complaint charging the petitioner with seduction
which was filed in the CFI of Quezon City after
preliminary investigation had been conducted. The
private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court
Dean Carlota
to issue an order "directing such government
agencies as may be concerned, particularly the
NBI and the DFA, for the purpose of having the
accused brought back to the Philippines so that he
may be dealt with in accordance with law." The
Court granted the motion.
- Respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to
the United States instructing him to order the
Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the
passport issued to the petitioner and to compel
him to return to the Philippines to answer the
criminal charges against him. The Embassy was
likewise directed to make representation with the
State Department that Emilio Suntay's presence
outside the Philippines is considered detrimental to
the best interest of this Government, that his
passport has been withdrawn, and that he is not
considered under the protection of the Philippines
while abroad. However, this order was not
implemented or carried out in view of the
commencement of this proceedings in order that
the issues raised may be judicially resolved.
Counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent
Secretary requesting that the action taken by him
be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a
motion praying that the respondent Court
reconsider its order. The respondent Secretary
denied counsel's request and the Court denied the
motion for reconsideration.
- Petitioner contends that as the order of the
respondent Court may be carried out only "through
the cancellation of his passport," the said order is
illegal because "while a Court may review the
action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in
cancelling a passport and grant relief when the
Secretary's discretion is abused, the court cannot,
in the first instance, take the discretionary power
away from the Secretary and itself order a
passport to be cancelled."
- Petitioner further contends that while the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the
cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot
be exercised until after hearing," because the right
to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within
the meaning and protection of the Constitution
and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty
without due process of law.
ISSUES
1. WON the order of the respondent Court is
beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction
2. WON petitioner is entitled to hearing before his
passport can be cancelled
87
A2010
HELD
1. NO
Ratio When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such court or
officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the
exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically
pointed out by these rules, any suitable process or
mode of proceeding may be adopted which
appears most conformable to the spirit of said
rules. (Section 6, Rule 124.) Moreover, the
respondent Court did not specify what step the
respondent Secretary must take to compel the
petitioner to return to the Philippines to answer the
criminal charge preferred against him. In issuing
the order in question, the respondent Secretary
was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would
result by his inaction and as he issued it in the
exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be
enjoined from carrying it out.
2. NO
Ratio Hearing would have been proper and
necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or
cancellation of the passport were not clear but
doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is
facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the
country to evade criminal prosecution, the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his
discretion to revoke a passport already issued,
cannot be held to have acted whimsically or
capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such
passport. Due process does not necessarily mean
or require a hearing.
Disposition Petition is denied
DE BISSCHOP V GALANG
8 SCRA 244
REYES; May 31, 1963
NATURE
Appeal from an order of CFI.
FACTS
- American citizen George de Bisschop (petitioner-
appellee) was allowed to stay in the Philippines for
3 years as a prearranged employee of the Bissmag
Production, Inc., of which he is president and
general manager.
Administrative Law
- He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau
of Immigration. This was denied when Immigration
Officer Benjamin de Mesa discovered that Bissmag
Inc. was a gambling front, and that de Bisschop is
suspect of evading payment of his income tax. In a
letter dated September 5, 1959, the Board of
Commissioners advised him to depart within 5
days. De Bisschop requested for a copy of the
decision, but the legal officer of Bureau of
Immigration replied that no formal decision, order
or resolution is promulgated by the Board for
reasons of practicability and expediency.
- To forestall his arrest and the filing of the
corresponding deportation proceedings, de
Bisschop filed the present case.
ISSUES
1. WON Commissioners of immigration are
required by law to conduct formal hearings on
all applications for extension of stay of aliens;
2. WON Commissioners are enjoined to
promulgate written decisions.
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Extension of stay of aliens is purely
discretionary on the part of immigration authority.
Administration of immigration laws is the primary
and exclusive responsibility of the Executive
branch of the government.
Reasoning
- Courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely
administrative practice of immigration authorities
of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as
the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of
practicability and expediency.
- This is not a violation of the due process clause;
the letter advising Bisschop to depart in 5 days
was a mere formality, and far from final, because
the requirement to leave before the start of the
deportation proceedings is only an advice to party
unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be
compelled to take steps for his expulsion.
- It is a settled rule that a day in court is not a
matter of right in administrative proceedings. As
per Judge Cooley: “due process of law is not
necessarily judicial process; much of the
process by means of which the Government
is carried on, and the order of society
maintained, is purely executive or
administrative, which is as much due process
of law, as is judicial process. Xxx In certain
proceedings of administrative character, it
Dean Carlota
may be stated without fear of contradiction,
that the right to a notice and hearing are not
essential to due process of law.”
2. NO
Ratio Decision as employed in the law refers to
the number of “votes” necessary to constitute the
decision of the said Board.
Reasoning There is nothing in immigration law
which provides that the Board of Commissioners
must render decisions on petitioners for extension
of stay.
Obiter
Prohibition is not favored by the Courts. It will
issue only if there is no other plain, speedy , and
adequate remedy. The use of habeas corpus to
test the legality of aliens’ confinement and
proposed expulsion from the Philippines is now a
settled practice. Habeas corpus affords prompt
relief from unlawful imprisonment of any kind, and
under all circumstances. The existence of habeas
corpus will bar the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
DISPOSITION The order appealed from is
reversed. The petition for prohibition is dismissed.
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD V
CA
(Solar Textile Finishing Corp)
195 SCRA 112
FELICIANO; March 11, 1991
NATURE
Petition to review
FACTS
-22 Sept 1988: the Board issued an ex parte Order,
signed by Board Chairman Fulgencio Factoran, Jr.,
directing Solar immediately to cease and desist
from utilizing its wastewater pollution source
installations which were discharging untreated
wastewater directly into a canal leading to the
adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River.
-Said order, issued pursuant to Sec7 of P.D. 984
and Sec38 of its IRR, was based on findings of
several inspections of Solar's plant:
a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and
12 November 1986 by the National Pollution
Control Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of
the Board; and
b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988
by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources ("DENR").
88
A2010
-A copy of the above Order was received by Solar
on 26 Sept 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the
Board was received by Solar on 31 March 1989.
Meantime, Solar filed MFR appeal with prayer for
stay of execution of the Order dated 22 Sept 1988.
-Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order
dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate
temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct
another inspection and evaluation of Solar's
wastewater treatment facilities. In the same Order,
the Board directed the Regional Executive Director
of the DENR NCR to conduct the inspection and
evaluation within thirty (30) days.
-21 April 1989: Solar went to RTC QC on petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction against
the Board. RTC dismissed Solar's petition upon two
(2) grounds: that appeal and not certiorari from
the questioned Order of the Board as well as the
Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that
the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to
operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition
moot and academic.
-Solar went on appeal to the CA. CA reversed the
Order of dismissal of TC and remanded the case to
that court for further proceedings. CA also
declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the
same time, the CA said that the decision was
without prejudice to whatever action the Board
may take relative to the projected 'inspection and
evaluation' of Solar's water treatment facilities.
-CA, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper
remedy since the Orders of the Board may result
in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that
while the case might be moot and academic,
"larger issues" demanded that the question of due
process be settled. The Board’s MFR was
dismissed. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The Board’s argues:
-that its ex parte Order dated 22 Sept 1988 and
the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance
with law (PD984, Sec7(a)) and were not violative of
due process; and
-that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution
are not the proper subjects of a petition for
certiorari.
Solar contends that under the Board's own rules
and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only
if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate
threat to life, public health; safety or welfare, or to
animal and plant life." In the instant case,
according to Solar, the inspection reports before
the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater
discharged posed such a threat.
Administrative Law
ISSUE
WON the CA erred in reversing the RTC on the
ground that Solar had been denied due process by
the Board.
HELD
NO.
-Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 9842 authorized the Board
to issue ex parte cease and desist orders (a)
whenever the wastes discharged by an
establishment pose an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or
plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or
wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the
[NPCC]."
-It is not essential that the Board prove that an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an
ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It
is enough if the Board finds that the wastes
discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set
by the [NPCC]."
-Sec5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 sets out
the max permissible levels of physical and
chemical substances which effluents from
domestic wastewater treatment plants and
industrial plants must not exceed when discharged
into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D,
SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC
Rules and Regulations. Tullahan-Tinejeros River is
classified as inland waters Class D (for agriculture,
irrigation, live stock watering, industrial cooling
and processing)
-Note: the plant under its previous owner, Fine
Touch Finishing Corporation, was issued a Notice
of Violation on 20 Dec 1985 directing same to
cease and desist from conducting dyeing operation
until such time the waste treatment plant is
2
"P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
(a) Public Hearing . . . Provided, That whenever the
Commission finds prima facie evidence that the
discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to
life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant
life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the
Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte
order directing the discontinuance of the same or the
temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the
establishment or person generating such sewage or
wastes without the necessity of a prior public hearing. The
said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and
shall remain in force until said establishment or person
prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable
standards or modified or nullified by a competent court.".
A2010
Dean Carlota
already completed and operational. The new vital public interests like those here involved,
owner Solar Textile Corporation, after informing through the exercise of police power.
the Commission of the plant acquisition, was
summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986
based on the adverse findings during the
inspection/water sampling test conducted on 08
August 1986.
-The inspection reports of November 1986 and
September 1988 make clear that there was at
least prima facie evidence before the Board that
the effluents emanating from Solar's plant
exceeded the max allowable levels of physical and
chemical substances set by the NPCC and that
accordingly there was adequate basis supporting
the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the
Board.
-The Board refrained from issuing an ex parte
cease and desist order until after the November
1986 and September 1988 re-inspections were
conducted and the violation of applicable
standards was confirmed. The Board appears to
have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to
enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar.
Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual
about its continued discharge of untreated,
pollutive effluents into the Tullahan-Tinejeros
River, presumably loath to spend the money
necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant
("WTP") in an operating condition.
-In Technology Developers, Inc. v. CA, the SC
upheld the summary closure ordered by the Acting
Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a pollution-
causing establishment. In the instant case, the ex
parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a
local government official but by the Pollution
Adjudication Board, the very agency of the
Government charged with the task of determining
whether the effluents of a particular industrial
establishment comply with or violate applicable
anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions.
-Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by
law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the
continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated
effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of
the Philippines cannot be made to wait until
protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness
or propriety of such orders has run its full course,
including multiple and sequential appeals such as
those which Solar has taken, which of course may
take several years. It is a constitutional common
place that the ordinary requirements of procedural
due process yield to the necessities of protecting
89