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VALENTE RAYMUNDO, Petitioner, vs. TEOFISTA ISAGON VDA.

DE SUAREZ, DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ,


MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR, EVELYN SUAREZ, ET AL, Respondents.

G.R. No. 149017, November 28, 2008

NACHURA, J.:

Facts of the Case:

Herein respondents are children of spouses Marcelo and Teofista


Isagon Suarez. After the death of Marcelo Sr. in 1955, Teofista and herein
respondents, as well as Elpidio Suarez, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate, partitioning Marcelo Sr.s estate. Despite the partition, title to the
foregoing properties, explicitly identified in the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate as forming part of Marcelos and Isagons property regime, remained
in the couples name. Teofista continued to administer and manage these
properties. On the whole, apart from those now owned exclusively by
Teofista, all the properties were held pro indiviso by Teofista and her
children; and respective titles thereto were not changed, with Teofista as de
facto administrator thereof.

In 1975, Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal Realty) and Teofista, the


latter owning ninety percent (90%) of the formers shares of stock, were
sued by petitioner Valente Raymundo, his wife Violeta, Virginia Banta and
Maria Concepcion Vito (plaintiffs) in consolidated cases for Rescission of
Contract and Damages. The then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal,
Branch 1, rendered judgment: (1) rescinding the respective contracts of
plaintiffs with Rizal Realty and Teofista, and (2) holding the two defendants
solidarily liable to plaintiffs for damages.

When the judgment of the CFI became final and executory, herein
subject properties were levied and sold on execution to satisfy the judgment
against Teofista and Rizal Realty. The aforementioned plaintiffs were the
highest bidder, and bought the levied properties. As a result, a certificate of
sale was issued to them and registered in their favor.

Issue of the Case:

Whether the levy on execution was valid considering that it has been
issued against properties which forms part of the legitime of herein
respondents children of the deceased.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:

Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and Maria


Concepcion, became owners of the subject properties only by virtue of an
execution sale to recover Teofistas judgment obligation. This judgment
obligation is solely Teofistas, and payment therefor cannot be made through
an execution sale of properties not absolutely owned by her. These
properties were evidently conjugal properties and were, in fact, even titled in
the name of Marcelo, Sr. married to Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.s
death, by virtue of compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.s share in the
conjugal partnership was transmitted by operation of law to his compulsory
heirs.

Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not


categorized as such in Article 778 of the Civil Code. It reserves a portion of
the net estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or
combination of heirs, prevailing over all kinds of succession. The portion
that is so reserved is the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code defines
legitime as that part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of
because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called
compulsory heirs. Herein respondents are primary compulsory heirs.

Even without delving into the Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo


Sr.s estate in 1957, it must be stressed that herein respondents rights to the
succession vested from the moment of their fathers death. Herein
respondents ownership of the subject properties is no longer inchoate; it
became absolute upon Marcelos death, although their respective shares
therein remained pro indiviso. Ineluctably, at the time the subject properties
were sold on execution sale to answer for Teofistas judgment obligation,
the inclusion of herein respondents share therein was null and void.

In fine, Teofistas ownership over the subject properties is not


absolute. Significantly, petitioner Valente does not even attempt to dispute
the conjugal nature of the subject properties. Since Teofista owns only a
portion of the subject properties, only that portion could have been, and was
actually, levied upon and sold on auction by the provincial sheriff of Rizal.