Arrest, Searches and Seizures

NOLASCO VS. PANO, 139 SCRA 541 (A search incidental to a valid arrest must
be done at the place where the accused is arrested. As such, if accused was
arrested while inside a jeepney, there is no valid search incidental to a valid
arrest if she will be brought to her residence and thereafter search the said
place); articles seized by void warrants should be retuned to its owners Papa
v. Mago Customs Search search warrant not necessary except if the place to
be searched is a dwelling or house Tariff and Customs Code

People v. CFI of Rizal search of moving vehicle Carroll doctrine search

of moving vehicles or automobiles no search warrant needed

ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 588 (If the accused was arrested in the street
during a buy-bust operation, the search of his house nearby is not a valid
search incidental to a valid arrest)

People v. Evaristo evidence in plain view Harris v. Coolidge, Coolidge v.

New Hampshire no search warrant needed; Malacat v. CA valid waiver
must be made in writing and in the presence of counsel; search incidental to a
lawful arrest v. stop and frisk Terry Case probable cause is not required to
conduct stop and frisk but mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate it. A
genuine reason must exist.

PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA (In order that there is a valid waiver to a
warrantless search, the waiver or consent should be given by the person
affected, not just anybody. Example: The landlady could not give a valid
consent to the search of a room occupied by a tenant. Said tenant himself
should give the consent in order to be valid. The doctrine in Lopez vs.
Commissioner to the effect that it could be given by any occupant of a hotel
room being rented by the respondent is deemed abandoned)

VEROY VS. LAYAGUE, 210 SCRA 97. (If the owner of the house allowed the
policemen to enter his house because they are searching for rebel soldiers but
when inside the house, they instead seized an unlicensed firearm, there is no
consent to a warrantless search)

P vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 (There is a valid warrantless search if a NARCOM
officer arrests the person who owns a bag which contains marijuana which he
found out when he smelled the same. Here , there is a probable cause since he
was personal knowledge due to his expertise on drugs)
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO, July 10, 1994. (After the informant was given by
the police the amount of P100.00, he went to buy marijuana from the accused
then return to the police headquarters with said article. Thereafter, the
policemen went to arrest the accused without warrant. The arrest is not valid
since it does not fall under Section 5 Rule 113)

Likewise, after securing a search warrant authorizing the seizure of shabu and
its paraphernalia and instead, an unlicensed firearm was seized instead, said
gun is inadmissible in evidence.

LATEST CASES ON SEARCH AND SEIZURES

UY VS. BIR, 344 SCRA 36

The following are the requisites of a valid search warrant:

1. The warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

2. The probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by
applicant or any other person;

3. In determining probable cause, the judge must examine under oath and
affirmation the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and

4. The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized.

A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the

warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. Search warrants are not issued on
loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. In this case,
most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity,
especially since the witness had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents
sought to be seized. THE SEARCH WARRANT IS SEPARABLE, AND THOSE
ITEMS NOT PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED MAY BE CUT OFF WITHOUT
DESTROYING THE WHOLE WARRANT.

PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ, 341 SCRA 25

The protection against unreasonable search and seizure covers both

innocent and guilty alike against any form of highhandedness of law
enforces.
 The plain view doctrine, which may justify a search without
warrant, APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE POLICE OFFICER IS NOT SEARCHING FOR
EVIDENCE AGAINS THE ACCUSED, BUT INADVERTENTLY COMES ACROSS AN
INCRIMINATING OBJECT.

Just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot

does nor prevent the appellant from invoking the protection afforded by the
Constitution. The right against unreasonable search and seizure is the
immunity of ones person, which includes his residence, papers and other
possessions. For a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and
seizures, he need not be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or
private place.

PEOPLE VS. BAULA, 344 SCRA 663

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional

guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute
waiver, IT MUST APPEAR THAT THE RIGHT EXISTS; THE PERSONS INVOLVED HAD
KNOWLEDGE, EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE, of the existence of such
right. The third condition did not exist in the instant case. Neither was the
search incidental to a valid warrantless arrest. (PEOPLE VS. FIFUEROA, July
6, 2000) An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be
based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty. THE PRESUMPTION BY ITSELF, CANNOT PREVAIL AGAINST THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL, AND ZEAL IN
THE PURSUIT OF CRIMINALS CANNOT ENNOBLE THE USE OF ARBITRARY
METHODS THAT THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF ABHORS.

RICARDO VALMONTE VS. GEN RENATO DE VILLA, GR No. 83988,

September 29, 1989

Warrantless searches and seizures;

validity of checkpoints

Padilla, J.

Facts:

1. On January 20, 1987, the National Capital Region District Command

(NCRDC) was activated with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility for the purpose of maintaining peace and
order. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners claim that because of these checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela, MM are worried of being harassed and of their safety being
placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military
authorities manning the checkpoints considering that their cars and vehicles
are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night
or dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.

2. On July 9, 1988 at dawn, the apprehensions of the residents of

Valenzuela increased because Benjamin Parpon, the supply officer of the
Municipality of Valenzuela was gunned down in cold blood by the military
men manning the checkpoints for ignoring or refusing to submit himself to
the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspite of several warning
shots fired in the air.

Issue:

Whether or not the existence of said checkpoints as well as the periodic

searches and seizures made by the military authorities without search
warrant valid?

Held:

Petitioners concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by

the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare
the checkpoints as per se illegal.

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable
are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on a public fair grounds (People vs. Case, 190 MW
289), or simply looks into a vehicle (State vs. Gaina, 97 SE 62), or flashes a
light therein (Rowland vs. Commonwealth, 259 SW 33), these do not
constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila may be

considered as security measure to effectively maintain peace and order and
to thwart plots to destabilize the government. In this connection, the Court
may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of
the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in
cities of police and military men by NPAs sparrow units, not to mention
the abundance of unlicensed firearms.
BETWEEN THE INHERENT RIGHT OF THE STATE TO PROTECT ITS EXISTENCE
AND PROMOTE PUBLIC WELFARE AND AN INDIVIDUALS RIGHT AGAINST A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH WHICH IS HOWEVER REASONABLY CONDUCTED, THE
FORMER SHALL PREVAIL.

True, the manning of these checkpoints by the military is susceptible of

abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental
power is susceptible to abuse. BUT , AT THE COST OF OCCASIONAL
INCONVENIENCE, DISCOMFORT AND EVEN IRRITATION TO THE CITIZEN, THE
CHECKPOINTS DURING THESE ABNORMAL TIMES ARE PART OF THE PRICE WE
PAY FOR AN ORDERLY SOCIETY AND PEACEFUL COMMUNITY.

Finally, it must be emphasized that on July 17, 1988, the military

checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and
refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning
the checkpoints upon order of the NCRDC Chief.

Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ., dissenting:

The bland declaration by the majority that individual rights must yield to
the demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was
intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the
ground of national security.

RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, JUNE 15, 1990

Very Important:

The Supreme Court in its Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration

dated 15 June, 1990, held that military and police checkpoints are not
illegal as these measures to protect the government and safeguards the
lives of the people. The checkpoints are legal as where the survival of the
organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of
the people are in grave peril. However, the Supreme Court held further
that the military officers manning the checkpoints may conduct VISUAL
SEARCH ONLY, NOT BODILY SEARCH.
Webb v De Leon
GR No. 121234
August 23, 1995

FACTS:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a
letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian,
Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of
Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister
Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes,
Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.

Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.

Petitioners: fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail
the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to
her inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown
statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did
not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.

charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita
Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the
required preliminary examination.

Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the
prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:

(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is
probable cause to charge accused with crime of rape and homicide?

(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion
when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants
of arrest against the accused?

(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process
during their preliminary investigation?

(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed
to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused?
HELD:

(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt.

(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a
crime has been committed and that the person arrested committed it.

Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filing of an information, the RTC
may issue a warrant for the accused.

Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should
have conducted searching examination of witnesses before issuing warrants
of arrest against them.

(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all
the opportunities to be heard.

The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in
their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.

(4) NO.

Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the
decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of
courts and beyond executive and legislative interference.

In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department

whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully
executed. A necessary component of this right is to prosecute their violators.

Padilla vs CA
G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997

Facts: High-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the

possession of petitioner Robin Padilla:
(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
ammunitions;

(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one
(1) short magazine with ammunitions;

(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8)
ammunitions; and

(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.

Appellant voluntarily surrendered item no. 3. and a black bag containing two
additional long magazines and one short magazine.

PNP Chief Espino, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office issued a
Certification which stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant,
an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and
Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in
the name of Robin C. Padilla. A second Certification stated that the three
firearms were not also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla.

Issue: Whether or not his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and
ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under
the exclusionary rule

Held: No. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of
petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge
illegal.

Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed
or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person. Both
elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioners vehicle
figured in a hit and run an offense committed in the presence of Manarang,
a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at
this point that presence does not only require that the arresting person sees
the offense, but also when he hears the disturbance created thereby AND
proceeds at once to the scene. As testified to by Manarang, he heard the
screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim
(balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase
to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its
driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang
proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2
Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the
actual arrest of petitioner.

Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that
the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and
run. We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the
policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in
effecting petitioners arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the
apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have
taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are
unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a
suspect (like herein petitioner) who , in all probability, could have put up a
degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain
without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing
lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration
with private citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense
herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list
of unreported and unsolved crimes.

It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein,

cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for
want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid
or take action. The exigent circumstances of hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a
moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime all created a
situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. The Court
acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more
than mere reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupant of the
vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, when caught
in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson)
and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioners warrantless arrest was proper as
he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm
and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.
Besides, the policemens warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be
justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an
offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time
between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having
stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarangs report,
the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its
dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented
hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting police officers
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioners Pajero was indeed
the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting
police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable
hearsay information.

Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect

or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters
his plea. Petitioners belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to
quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his
evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his
arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such
irregularities and defects.

We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a

search warrant, the admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.

The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of
property is valid, are as follows:

1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section

12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence,
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;

(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d). plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further

search.

3. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the

vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
 suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity.
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.

In conformity with respondent courts observation, it indeed appears that the

authorities stumbled upon petitioners firearms and ammunitions without even
undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying
into hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the Smith &
Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within
plain view of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and
magazine tucked in petitioners waist and back pocket respectively, when he
raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies
to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately
apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw
said rifle lying horizontally near the drivers seat. Thus it has been held that:

(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal

offense, the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense
being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their
duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the
taking of the corpus delicti.

Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain

view are subject to seizure even without a warrant.

With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted
magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This
latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the
alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information
estopped him from assailing any purported defect.

Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active
search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their
seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a
search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest
was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger
compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within petitioners
grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied the
two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle)
was within the arrestees custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the
search was contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of that search are
admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another
justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection
therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this
case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like
herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of
the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds
of some criminal offense.

HO vs PEOPLE (1997) Panganiban, J.

FACTS
On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, represented by
its chief prosecutor Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a complaint against Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso
(petitioners in G.R. Nos. 106632 and 106678, respectively), Anthony Marden,
Arsenio Benjamin Santos and Leonardo Odoo. The complaint was for alleged
violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019 prohibiting a public officer from
entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the government if it is
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby. According to the information, Rolando
Narciso, being then the Vice-President of the National Steel Corporation (NSC),
a government-owned or controlled corporation organized and operating under
the Philippine laws, and Doris Ho, the President of National Marine Corporation
(NMC), a private corporation organized and operating under our Corporation
law, was said to have entered without legal justification into a negotiated
contract of affreightment disadvantageous to the NSC for the haulage of its
products at the rate of P129.50/MT, from Iligan City to Manila. Such contract
was entered into despite their full knowledge that the rate they have agreed
upon was much higher than those offered by the Loadstar Shipping Company,
Inc. (LSCI) and Premier Shipping Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in the amounts of P109.56
and P123.00 per Metric Ton, respectively, in the public bidding, thereby giving
unwarranted benefits to the National Marine Corporation. Ho and Narciso
alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for the issuance
of the warrant for their arrest, merely relied on the information and the
resolution attached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without other supporting
evidence, in violation of the requirements of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution, and settled jurisprudence. They contend that a judge, in
personally determining the existence of probable cause, must have before him
sufficient evidence submitted by the parties, other than the information filed
by the investigating prosecutor, to support his conclusion and justify the
issuance of an arrest warrant. Such evidence should not be merely described
in a prosecutors resolution. Sandiganbayans Denial: Considering, therefore,
that this Court did not rely solely on the certification appearing in the
information in this case in the determination of whether probable cause exists
to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest but also on the basis
predominantly shown by the facts and evidence appearing in the
resolution/memorandum of responsible investigators/ prosecutors, then the
recall of the warrant of arrest, or the reconsideration sought for, cannot be
granted. More so, when the information, as filed, clearly shows that it is
sufficient in form and substance based on the facts and evidence adduced by
both parties during the preliminary investigation. To require this Court to have
the entire record of the preliminary investigation to be produced before it,
including the evidence submitted by the complainant and the accused-
respondents, would appear to be an exercise in futility.

ISSUE: May a judge determine probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest
solely on the basis of the resolution of the prosecutor (in the instant case, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) who conducted the
preliminary investigation, without having before him any of the evidence (such
as complainants affidavit, respondents counteraffidavit, exhibits, etc.) which
may have been submitted at the preliminary investigation?

DECISION & RATIO NO. Art III Section 2, 1987 Constitution: The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. (Art III Section 2, 1987 Constitution) The word
personally does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous
Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present Constitutions intent to place a
greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under the
previous Charters. Soliven vs. Makasiar: In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if
on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

People vs. Inting: There is a difference between the judges goal from that of
the prosecutors. First, the determination of probable cause is a function of
the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor or for the Election
Supervisor to ascertain. Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor
does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of
probable cause. Third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two
inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about the objectives. The Court, in this case,
reiterated and elaborated on the doctrine laid down in People vs. Inting and
ruled that: First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by
the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the
judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty
of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor
passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity
for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same
proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct
objectives. Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely
solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of
the prosecutors report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to
charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge
must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other
than the prosecutors bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own
findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest
order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the
existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than
the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the
burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the
latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause,
but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His
Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a
warrant of arrest Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records
of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined
by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them
to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the
purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that
the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint,
affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or,
at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on
the prosecutors recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case.
Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report
the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the
judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of
arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if
he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.
IN THE INSTANT CASE, the public respondent relied fully and completely upon
the resolution of the graft investigation officer and the memorandum of the
reviewing prosecutor, attached to the information filed before it, and its
conjecture that the Ombudsman would not have approved their
recommendation without supporting evidence. It had no other documents from
either the complainant (the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines) or the People
from which to sustain its own conclusion that probable cause exists.
Respondent Court palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto
issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors
findings and recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of
probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and
recommendation.

ESMENA VS. POGOY [102 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-54110; 20 FEB 1981]

Facts:
Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of
Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of
money worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them because the priest lost
in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded Not Guilty. No
trial came in after the arraignment due to the priests request to move it on
another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial
Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it received a telegram
stating that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right to
speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial was
already dragging the accused and that the priests telegram did not have a
medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to recognize the
complainants reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing.
After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the
medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed
sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed
earlier due to complainants failure to appear at the trial, would place the
accused in double jeopardy

Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the
very reason that the case has been dismissed already without the consent of
the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the case filed. The
dismissal was due to complainants incapability to present its evidence due to
non appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar
further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. For double jeopardy
to exist these three requisites should be present, that one, there is a valid
complaint or information filed second, that it is done before a court of
competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been arraigned and has
pleaded to the complaint or information. In the case at bar, all three
conditions were present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed in a court
of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the
accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information.
When these three conditions are present then the acquittal, conviction of the
accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his express
consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged. In the case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked
their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its
termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed consent to
the dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res judicata and has
been dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the respondents as
well for their right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the
respondents which would be a bar to further prosecution.

PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING, 193 SCRA 122

FACTS:

In July 1987, the Special Operations Group of the CIS received a tip from one of
its informers about an organized group engaged in importation of illegal drugs
and smuggling of contraband items. To infiltrate the crime syndicate, they
recruited confidential men and deep penetration agents under OPLAN
SHARON 887. One such agent was Reynaldo Tia (the dicharged/accused). As an
agent, he submitted regular reports of undercover activities of suspected
syndicates. CAPTAIN PALMERA, head of oplan sharon 887, in turned informed
the Dan

gerous Drugs Board of Tias activities.

Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat by another agent named
George. Lim wanted a male travelling companion for his business trips abroad.
Tia offered his services and was hired by Lim. Later, Tia was introduced to
Peter Lo (alias of accused/appellant Lo Ho Wing), the later turning out to be
Tias intended companion.

Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left for Hongkong on October 4, 1987. Tia
telephoned Capt. Palmera that they would return to the Philippines on October
6. From Hongkong, the two proceeded to Guangzhou in mainland China. There,
appeallant Lo Ho Wing bought six (6) cans of tea.Tia saw these 6 bags when
they were opened for examination. That evening, they went to Lo Ho Wings
room and he saw two other men with him. One was fixing the tea bags, while
the other was burning a substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a lighter.
Appellant Lo Ho Wing joined the second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by
the burning substance. When Tia asked Lo Ho Wing what cargo they would
bring to Manila, the latter replied that they would be bringing Chinese drugs.

The next day en route to Manila, customs examiners inspected the bags
containing the tin cans of tea. Since the bags were not closely examined,
appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia were cleared. In Manila, They were met by Lim
Cheng Huat. Appelant Lo Ho Wing and Tia boarded a taxi from the airport and
loaded their luggage in the taxis compartment. Lim Cheng Huat followed them
in another taxi.

Meamwhile, a team composed by Capt. Palmera positioned themselves in

strategic areas around the airport. The CIS men who first saw Lo Ho and Tia
followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the CIS car overtook the taxi ridden by Lo
Ho Wing and Tia , forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. The CIS team
asked the taxi driver to open the baggage compartment. The CIS team asked
permission to search their luggage.

A tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment. Sgt. Cayabyab of the CIS
pried the lid open and pressed it in the middle to pull out the contents.
Crystalline white powder resmbling crushed alum came out. Suspecting the
crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three travelling bags
opened for inspection. All the bags threshed out a total of six tin cans. Tia and
appellant were taken to the CIS headquarters for questioning. Meanwhile, the
second taxi carrying Lim Cheng Huat sped in attempt to escape. However, they
were later captured.

Samples from the bag tested positive for metamphetamine. The three suspects
were indicted for violating Art. III, sec.15 of the Dangerous Drug Act. Appellant
Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng Huat were sentenced to suffer life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P25,000 each. Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state
witness. The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of government
agents since the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
were in their favor.

ISSUES:

1. Was the warrantless search valid?

2. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence?

HELD:

1. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle which is one of the well-known

exceptions to the valid warrantless search and seizure. To stilol get a search
warrant from a judge would allow the accused go scot-free.
2. Since the search and seizure are valid, the evidence obtained is admissible
as evidence in any proceeding.

PEOPLE V. ROBERT FIGUEROA

G.R. NO. 134056

Accused was convicted of violating Sec 14-A of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 972
Unauthorized manufacture of regulated drugs. He contends that since his
alleged co-conspirator was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence to prove
that she conspired with him, he should likewise be acquitted.

HELD:

Once a conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and each of
the conspirators is liable for the crimes committed by the other conspirators.
It follows then that if the prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged
conspirators should be held individually responsible for their own respective
acts. Accordingly, appellants criminal liability in this case must be judged on
the basis of his own acts as established by the quantum of proof required in
criminal cases.

People. V. Lo Ho Wing - exception to the issuance of search warrant: 1)

search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2) search of moving vehicle; 3) seizure of
evidence in plain view

People v. Lo Ho Wing (alias Peter Lo), Lim Cheng Huat (alias Antonio Lim)
and Reynaldo Tia
Reynaldo Tia, a deep penetration agent of the SOG, reported of his
undercover activities on the suspected criminal syndicate led by Lo and Lim.
Moreover, Tia informed his superior regarding their return to the country.
Upon arrival in the Philippines, Lo and Tia rode in one taxi cab while Lim rode
in another. They were pursued by the members of the NARCOM and were
stopped. With permission of Lo and Tia, a tin can of tea was taken out of the
red travel bag and, upon examination by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory,
contained metamphetamine. Petitioner contend that a warrant was needed.

Facts:
1. The Special Operations Group received a tip from one of its informers
about an organized group engaged in the importation of illegal drugs,
smuggling of contraband goods and gunrunning. As part of the operations, the
recruitment of confidential men and deep penetration agents was carried
out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited was Reynaldo Tia.
2. Tia was introduced to Lim Cheng Huat (Antonio Lim) where the latter
expressed a desire to hire a male travel companion for his business trips
abroad. Tia offered his services and was hire. Together with Lim, Tia, in one
of the meetings in China, was introduced to Lo Ho Wing (Peter Lo) whom tia
found out to be the person he was to accompany to China in lieu of Lim.
3. As deep penetration agent, Tia regularly submitted reports of his
undercover activities on the suspected criminal syndicate to Capt. Luisito
Palmera, head of Oplan Sharon 887 the group created in order to bus the
suspected syndicate. Tia informed Palmera of their return to the Philippines
after they (Lo and Tia) left for Hong Kong.
4. Upon arrival in the Philippines, they were met by Lim. After Lim and Lo
finished their conversation, Lo hailed a taxicab. Lo and Tia boarded the
taxicab while Lim followed in another taxi cab. Meanwhile, the operatives of
the NARCOM (Narcotics Command), having been notified by Palmera, stationed
themselves in strategic places around the arrival area. Upon seeing Lo and Tia
leave the airport, the operatives followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the car
of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by Lo and Tia and cut into its
path which forced the taxi driver to stop. The other tax cab carrying Lim,
however, sped away but was later caught on Retiro Street, Quezon City.
5. Going back to Lo and Tia, the operatives approached the taxicab and
asked the driver to open the baggage compartment. Three pieces of luggage
were retrieved from the back compartment of the vehicle. The operatives
requested from Lo and Tia permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea
was taken out of the red travel bag owned by Lo. A certain Sgt. Cayabyab, one
of the operatives, pried the lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the can
and pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline white
powder resembling crushed aluminium came out of the bag. The sergeant then
opened the tea bag and examined its content more closely. He had the three
travel bags opened for inspection. From the red travel bag, 6 tin cans were
found, including the one previously opened and nothing else was recovered
from the other bags.
6. The tea bag contained metamphetamine after examination by the PC-
INP Crime Laboratory. One of metamphetamines derivatives is
metamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu/poor mans cocaine).
7. The three were charged with violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
8. Lo contends that the search and seizure was illegal. He contends that
the officers concerned could very well have procured a search warrant since
they had been informed of the date and time of arrival of the accused at the
NAIA well ahead of time. Moreover, as claimed by Lo, the fact that the search
and seizure in question were made on a moving vehicle does not automatically
make the warrantless search fall within the coverage of exceptions of the
necessity of a valid warrant to effect search.

Ruling:
1. The search and seizure supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
rule. As set forth in Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, there are at least 3 well-
recognized exceptions, namely: (a) a search incidental to an arrest, (b) a
search of a moving vehicle, and (c) seizure of evidence in plain view. In the
case at bar, there is a clear showing that the search in question, having been
made in a moving vehicle, does not need a valid warrant to effect search.
2. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that
it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

[G.R. No. 126005. January 21, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALYNN PLEZETTE DY, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BILLY CERBO and JONATHAN CERBO, respondents.

The determination by the prosecutor of probable cause is for the purpose

of either filing an information in court or dismissing the charges against
the respondent, which is an executive function. The determination by the
judge of probable cause begins only after the prosecutor has filed the
information in court and the latters determination of probable cause is
for the purpose of issuing an arrest warrant against the accused, which is
judicial function (People vs. CA, 301 SCRA 475).

SYNOPSIS

Jonathan Cerbo was charged in an information for murder in connection with

the fatal shooting of Rosalinda Dy inside the office of his father, Billy Cerbo.
The information was amended to include Billy Cerbo as one of the accused and
a warrant for his arrest was correspondingly issued. Respondent judge, in a
motion to quash warrant of arrest, dismissed the case against Billy for
insufficieny of evidence, recalled the warrant issued, and ordered the
prosecution to withdraw its amended information and to file a new one
charging Jonathan Cerbo only. The private prosecutors motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence, his resort to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, in affirming the trial court held that the trial court RTC has
authority to reverse the prosecutors finding of probable cause and dismiss the
information on the ground that the evidence presented did not substantiate the
charge. Hence, this recourse.
The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial is a function
that belongs to the public prosecutor, the correctness of the exercise of which
is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to
pass upon. The judge should not override the public prosecutors determination
of probable cause on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate
the issuance of a warrant of arrest was insufficient.

As a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing
of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the
public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want of evidence because
evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;

DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE, AN EXECUTIVE FUNCTION. The
determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function
that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function, the
correctness of the exercise of which is a matter that the trial court itself does
not and may not be compelled to pass upon. Indeed, the public prosecutor has
broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he or she believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to
determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Therefore, if
the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error,
grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor,
the trial court should respect such determination.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. The primary objective of a preliminary investigation

is to free respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of
defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, UNTIL the reasonable
probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a
competent office designated by law for that purpose. Secondarily, such
summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden of the
unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding
trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE. Such investigation is not part of the trial. A full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence is not required, but only such
as may engender a well-grounded belief than an offense has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. By reason of the abbreviated
nature of preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a result
thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, no
double jeopardy attaches.
4. ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD A PERSON FOR
TRIAL DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT TO ISSUE WARRANT OF ARREST. In light of
the aforecited decisions of this Court, such justification cannot be upheld.
Lest we be too repetitive, we only emphasize three vital matters once more:
First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor
is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The
judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus,
even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or
evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.

5. ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST,

CONSTRUED. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant
of arrest, must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding,
the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during
the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such
evidence in determining probable cause. In Webb v. De Leon, we stressed that
the judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the
accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply
personally reviews the prosecutors initial determination finding probable cause
to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.

6. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; RULING IN ALLADO AND SALONGA

CASES EXCEPTIONS TO GENERAL RULE. The Court of Appeals anchored its
ruling on the pronouncement made in Allado v. Diokno: that there is no reason
to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and public
accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists. Citing Salonga v. Cruz
Pano, the Court of Appeals pointed out that when there was no prima facie
case against a person sought to be charged with a crime, the judge or fiscal,
therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some
credible evidence might later turn out during trial, for this would be a flagrant
violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. In all, the
Court decreed in both cases that there was no basis in law and in fact for the
judicial and executive determination of probable cause. The Court also held
that the government, while vested with the right and the duty to protect itself
and its people against transgressors of the law, must perform the same in a a
manner that would not infringe the perceived violators right as guaranteed by
the Constitution. We stress that Allado and Salonga constitute exceptions to
the general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly
shown to exist. But as the foregoing comparisons show, such similarities are
absent in the instant case. Hence, the rulings in the two aforementioned cases
cannot apply to it.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. However, the present
case is not on all four with Allado and Salonga. First. Elsa Gumban, the
principal eyewitness to the killing of Rosalinda Dy, was not a participant or
conspirator in the commission of said crime. In Allado and Salonga. however,
the main witness were the confessed perpetrators of the crimes, whose
testimonies the Court deemed tainted. Second, in the case at bar, the private
respondent was accorded due process, and no precipitate haste or bias during
the investigation of the case can be imputed to the public prosecutor. On the
other hand, the Court noted Allado the undue haste in the filing of the
Information and the inordinate interest of the government in pursuing the case;
and in Salonga, xxx the failure of the prosecution to show that the petitioner
was probably guilty of conspiring to commit the crime, the initial disregard of
petitioners constitutional rights [and] the massive and damaging publicity made
against him. In other words, while the respective sets of evidence before the
prosecutors in Allado and Salonga were utterly insufficient to support a finding
of probable cause, the same cannot be said of the present case.

8. ID.; ID.; WRITTEN MOTIONS; MUST BE SET FOR HEARING AND SERVE TO
OTHER PARTY; RULE, MANDATORY; RATIONALE. It is settled that every
written motion in a trial court must be set for hearing by the applicant and
served with the notice of hearing thereof, in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party. The provisions on this matter in Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, are categorical and mandatory in character.
Under Section 6 of the said rule, no motion shall be acted upon by the court
without proof of service thereof. The rationale for this rule is simple; unless
the movants set the time and the place of hearing, the court will be unable to
determine whether the adverse parties agree or object to the motions, since
the rules themselves do not fix any period within which they may file their
replies or oppositions.

Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, (G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 55)
The Court ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial and
speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay,
i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the
structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation
of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary
jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court
also considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of
prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
Pecho v. Sandiganbayan 220 SCRA 55
G.R. No. 111399 November 14, 1994
ODON PECHO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The Court en banc defined injury as any wrong or damage done to another,
either in his person, or in his rights, reputation or property; the invasion of
any legally protected interests of another. It must be more than necessary or
are excessive, improper or illegal. It is required that the undue injury caused
by the positive or passive acts of the accused be quantifiable and
demonstrable and proven to the point of moral certainty. Undue means
illegal, immoral, unlawful, void of equity and moderations

Paul G. Roberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 113930, March
5, 1996

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board of Pepsi
Cola Products Phils., Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi Number
Fever promotion by handlers of the supposedly winning 349 Pepsi crowns. Of
the four cases filed against the petitioners, probable cause was found by the
investigating prosecutor only for the crime of estafa, but not for the other alleged
offenses.
On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial court without
anything accompanying it. A copy of the investigating prosecutors Joint
Resolution was forwarded to and received by the trial court only on 22 April
1993. However, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes
of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or other documents
submitted in the course thereof were found in the records of the case as of 19
May 1993.

On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the
Department of Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by
the investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of the
proceedings and the holding in abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest
against them. Meanwhile, the public prosecutor also moved to defer the
arraignment of the accused-appellants pending the final disposition of the appeal
to the Department of Justice.

On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order

(1) denying, on the basis of Crespovs. Mogul, the foregoing motions
respectively filed by the petitioners and the public prosecutor, and directing the
issuance of the warrants of arrest after June 1993 and setting the arraignment
on 28 June 1993. In part, respondent judge stated in his order that since the case
is already pending in this Court for trial, following whatever opinion the Secretary
of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and
integrity his court. To justify his order, he quoted the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Crespo, which stated:

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of
Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent
judge had not the slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest. After finding that a copy of the public
prosecutors Joint Resolution had in fact been forwarded to, and received by, the
trial court on 22 April 1993, the CA denied petitioners application for writ of
preliminary injunction. The CA ruled that the Joint Resolution was sufficient in
itself to have been relied upon by respondent Judge in convincing himself that
probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the corresponding
warrants of arrest and that the mere silence of the records or the absence of
any express declaration in the questioned order as to the basis of such finding
does not give rise to an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in
his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty.
Roberts, et al. sought reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the
finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore
dismissed the petition for mootness.

II. THE ISSUES

1. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in denying, on

the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in
abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after
the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved?
 2. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
issuance of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary
investigation?

3. May the Supreme Court determine in this [sic] proceedings the

existence of probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
the petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, in a 7-5-2 vote, GRANTED the petition. It SET ASIDE the
decision and resolution of the CA, the resolutions of the DOJ 349 Committee,
and the order of respondent judge.]

1. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in

denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend
proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and
to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ
shall have been resolved.

There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking
cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a
criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely
advised the DOJ to, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information
has already been filed in Court.

Whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution
is still a matter of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge
Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment
on the following grounds:

This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the
Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity of
this Court. This Court is still capable of administering justice.

The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is
not the filing of the aforementioned motions [to suspend proceedings and
issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment] at that stage but the
filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis of a
resolution of the petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution of the
investigating prosecutor. However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the
information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to
the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.
 2. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest without examining the records
of the preliminary investigation.

The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the
proposition that the investigating prosecutors certification in an information or his
resolution which is made the basis for the filing of the information, or both, would
suffice in the judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since the respondent Judges
had before them not only the 26-page resolution of the investigating panel but
also the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and even the counter-affidavits of
the respondents, they (judges) made personal evaluation of the evidence
attached to the records of the case.

In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12

April 1993 with the trial court. A copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to,
and received by, the trial court only on 22 April 1993. And as revealed by the
certification of respondent judges clerk of court, no affidavits of the witnesses,
transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary
investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in
the records of this case as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when respondent Judge
Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing, among other
things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended
information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records
or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And strangely
enough, he made no specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the
issuance of warrants of arrest after June 21, 1993. It may, however, be argued
that the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then compliance
with a constitutional requirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot be
left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.

3. NO, the Supreme Court MAY NOT determine in this [sic]

proceedings the existence of probable cause either for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the
crime of estafa.

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this

Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the
executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was
done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that
criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary
or final.
 There are, however, exceptions to the foregoing rule. But the Court
refused to reevaluate the evidence to determine if indeed there is probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest in this case. For the respondent judge did
not, in fact, find that probable cause exists, and if he did he did not have the
basis therefor. Moreover, the records of the preliminary investigation in this case
are not with the Court. They were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City to the DOJ in compliance with the latter's 1st Indorsement of 21
April 1993. The trial court and the DOJ must be required to perform their duty.