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Political Law Part VII: Article VII The Executive Department

POLITICAL LAW PART VII

ARTICLE VII THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

1. a. Define executive power

b. May the President refuse to enforce a law on the ground that in his opinion it is unconstitutional?

No. Otherwise, he will be violating the doctrine of separation of powers because by doing so, he will be arrogating unto
himself the power to interpret the law, not merely to implement it.

Read:

1) L.S. MOON & CO. VS. HARRISON, 43 Phil.38

2) GOVT. VS. SPRINGER, 50 Phil. 529, read also the separate opinion.

3) What is the extent of the executive or administrative orders that may be issued by the President as the Chief
Executive, under the Administrative Code of 1987?

BLAS OPLE VS. RUBEN TORRES, ET AL.

G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998

Puno, J.

Facts:

On December 12, 1996, then President FIDEL V. RAMOS issued Administrative Order No. 308 entitled ADOPTION
OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM.

The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a Population Reference Number (PRN)
generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY .

The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the following grounds:

1. The establishment of the PRN without any law is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the
Congress of the Philippines;

2. The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the said AO is unconstitutional since Congress has
the exclusive authority to appropriate funds for such expenditure; and

3. The AO violates the citizens right to privacy protected by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.
Held:

1. The AO establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of
every Filipino citizens and foreign residents and therefore, it is supposed to be a law passed by Congress that
implements it, not by an Administrative Order issued by the President. Administrative Power, which is supposed to be
exercised by the President, is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by
proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check
the official conduct of his agents. Prescinding from the foregoing precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an Administrative Order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of the government. It must be in harmony with the law
and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The subject of AO
308 therefore is beyond the power of the President to issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power.

2. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to provide a common reference number
to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY. Biometry is the
science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of a biological data. It is
the confirmation of an individuals identity through a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features.
Through the PRN, the government offices has the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through
the electronic linkage of the files of every citizen. The data, however, may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to
misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.

Further, the AO does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how these informations gathered shall be
handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data and under what circumstances and for what
purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. The
computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. YET, THERE ARE NO CONTROLS TO
GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS. WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF THE CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE
PARTICULAR COMPUTER SYSTEM IS BROKEN, AN INTRUDER, WITHOUT FEAR OF SANCTION OR PENALTY, CAN
MAKE USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, OR WORSE, MANIPULATE THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE
SYSTEM.

AO No. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuring that personal information gathered about our people will
be used only for specified purposes thereby violating the citizens right to privacy.

Sections 2. No person shall be elected President unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years o f age on the day of the election, and a resident o f the Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding the election.

Section 3. There shall be a Vice President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected
with and in the same manner as the President. He may be removed from Office in the same manner as the President.

The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.

Note: Section 13, Art. VII. The President, Vice President, the members of the cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure

Section 8, Article VIII. The Judicial and Bar CouncilSecretary of Justice..

Section 2, Article XI. The President, VP, may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.

Section 4. The President and the Vice President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years
which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election and shall end at noon of the same date
six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President
and has served as such for more than 4 years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.

No Vive President shall serve for more than 2 successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.

The returns of every election for President and Vice President duly certified by the Board of canvassers of each
province or city shall be transmitted to the congress.

The candidate having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an
equal number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the members of both
Houses of Congress voting separately.

Section 5Oath

Section 6. ResidenceSalary may not be decreasednot increased until after the expiration of his termsshall not
received any other emolument from the government of from any source during their tenure.

Section 7. ..shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.

P & VP not qualified, the Senate President shall act as President or the Speaker, if SP is not yet qualified..

Congress shall pass a law if the SP & Speaker are not qualified to act as President

Section 9. VP is vacant, the President shall nominate from the Senate of HR and who shall become VP upon
confirmation of majority vote of the members of the Senate & H of R voting separately.

Section 10. In case of vacancy in the office of the President and VP, Congress shall convene on the 3rd day after the
vacancy to enact a law calling for special election to be held not later than 60 daysthe law is deemed certified under
Section 26, par. 2 of Art. VI and shall become a law upon 3rd reading.. Special elections cannot be postponed but no
special election if the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the next presidential election.

Section 11. When President transmits to Congress his written declaration of inability to perform his duties, the VP
shall be acting President until the President transmits another declaration to the contrary.

When majority of the members of the cabinet transmit to the Senate President a written declaration that the
President is unable to perform his duties, the VP shall act as the President.

If the President transmits to the SP his declaration that there is no disability, he shall reassume his post but if the
majority of all the members of the Cabinet still insists that the President is unable to discharge his powers, CONGRESS
SHALL DECIDE THE ISSUE. IT MUST CONVENE WITHIN 48 HOURS if not in session without need of a call.

If 2/3 of both Houses, voting separately, determines that the President is unable to discharge his powers, the VP shall
act as President. Otherwise, the President shall continue exercising his powers and duties of his office.

Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The
members of the cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of the AFP shall not be
denied access to the President.

a. Qualifications, disqualifications, term of office, etc., of the President and Vice-President.

b. See: Sec. 17 of Art. XVIII.

c. Read: PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION VS. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 453 (The snap presidential election case)

3. Sections 7-12

a. Note the order of succession to the office of the President and Vice President
b. Query: Is President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo a de jure or a de facto President? If de jure, how did she succeed?
Resignation or permanent disability of former President Estrada?

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and 146738, March 2, 2001

Puno, J [En Banc]

F A C T S:

1. On 13 November 2000, the Speaker of the House of Representatives transmitted to the Senate the Articles of
Impeachment charging petitioner Joseph Estrada with bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust and
culpable violation of the Constitution. The impeachment of petitioner resulted from disclosures made by Ilocos Sur
Governor, Luis Chavit Singson in October, 2000 that petitioner had received payments from illegal jueteng operations
and excise taxes;

The impeachment trial began on 07 December 2000. A highlight of the December 2000 hearings was the testimony of
CLARISSA OCAMPO of the Equitable PCI Bank that she witnessed petitioner affixing the signature of JOSE
VELARDE on bank documents involving a P500 M investment agreement;

2. On 16 January 2001, the issue of whether or not to open what has been dubbed as the Second Envelope
arose before the impeachment court. The envelope allegedly contained proof that petitioner held P3.3 B in a secret
bank account under the name JOSE VELARDE. The motion to open the said envelope was struck down by the
senator-judges by a vote of 11-10. The public and private prosecutors walked out of the trial to protect the ruling. Hours
after the controversial ruling, the public began to rally at the EDSA SHRINE; the rally continued in the following days;

3. On January 17, 2001, the public prosecutors tendered their collective resignation to the Speaker. They also filed
a Manifestation of WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE with the Impeachment Court. Thereafter, Senator Roco moved for
the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings. Chief Justice Davide granted the same;

4. In the afternoon of 19 January, 2001, the Chief of Staff of the AFP withdrew his support to President Estrada.
The same is true with the PNP Chief and majority of the members of the Estrada Cabinet;

5. In early hours of 20 January 2001, negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power began between
petitioners representatives and that of respondent GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, then Vice President. Later in the
morning, Arroyo reportedly requested the Chief Justice to administer her oath. The letter, sent through fax was quoted
thus by Justice Vitug in his concurring opinion, as follows:

The undersigned respectfully informs this Honorable Court that Joseph Ejercito Estrada is permanently incapable of
performing the duties of his office resulting in his permanent disability to govern and serve his unexpired term. Almost
all of his cabinet members have resigned and the Philippine National Police have withdrawn their support for Joseph
Ejercito Estrada. Civil society has likewise refused to recognize him as President.

In view of this, I am assuming the position of the President of the Philippines. Accordingly, I would like to take my oath
as President of the Republic before the Honorable Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. today, 20 January 2001, 12:00 noon
at EDSA SHRINE, Quezon City, Metro Manila.

May I have the honor to invite the members of the Honorable Court to attend the oath-taking.

6. At 12 noon, Arroyo was sworn in by Chief Justice Davide as the 14th President of the Republic of the
Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family left Malacanang Palace. Petitioner issued the following statement:

At 12 oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality of her Proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of
unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacanang Palace, the seat of the Presidency of this country, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the palace of our people with gratitude for the
opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in
the same service of our country.

I call all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.

Mabuhay

(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada

7. Petitioner also sent copies of the following letter to the Senate President and Speaker of the House of
Representatives on 20 January 2001. The copy for the House Speaker was sent at 8:30 a.m.. Another copy was
transmitted to the Senate President and received only at 9:00 p.m.

Sir:

By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Art. VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am
unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President
shall be Acting President.

(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada

8. Prior to the events of January, 2001, 6 cases had been filed before the Office of the Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto. A special panel was created to investigate these cases. On January 22, 2001, petitioner was directed to file
his counter-affidavit and affidavit of his witnesses;

9. On February 5, 2001, petitioner filed these cases to prohibit the respondent from investigating the charges of
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption on the ground that he is immune from suit;

10. On February 6, 2001, the petitioner filed the petition docketed as GR No. 146738 for quo warranto against
Arroyo praying that he be declared the lawful President of the Philippines and respondent GMA merely as acting
President on account of his temporary disability.

I S S U E S:

1. DO THE CASES AT BAR INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION AND ARE BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE?

2. DID PETITIONER ESTRADA RESIGN AS PRESIDENT?

3. IS THE PETITIONER TEMPORARILY UNABLE TO ACT AS PRESIDENT?

4. DOES THE PETITIONER ENJOY IMMUNITY FROM SUIT? IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

5. SHOULD THE PROSECUTION OF ESTRADA BE ENJOINED DUE TO PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY?

H E L D:

No, the cases do not involve political question. In Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 [1957], it was held that political
questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative and executive branches
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality of a particular measure.

The 1987 Constitution narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial
review of the court, not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.

IN support of the contention that the cases involve political questions, the respondents cited the cases of LAWYER
LEAGE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON AQUINO, May 22, 1986 and related cases. The court
pointed out that in those cases, it held that the government of President Aquino was the result of a successful but
peaceful revolution by the Filipino people. The Freedom Constitution itself declared that the Aquino government was
installed through the direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people in defiance of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended. IN contrast, the Arroyo government is not revolutionary in character. The oath of President Arroyo took at
the EDSA Shrine is an oath under the 1987 Constitution where she swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution.

The EDSA 1 that installed President Aquino and EDSA II which installed Arroyo are different because the first involves
the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people
power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only
affected the Office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that
resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the
sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review.
EDSA I presented a political question, EDSA II involves legal questions.

Therefore, the present cases involve legal questions requiring the proper interpretation of provisions of the 1987
Constitution on the scope of presidential immunity from suit and the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against
prejudicial publicity.

II

Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner Estrada resigned as President.

Resignation is not a high level abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be
an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

Since Estrada did not write a letter of resignation before evacuating the Malacanang Palace on January 20, 2001, the
determination of whether he resigned should be based on his acts and omission before, during and after 20 January
2001. THIS IS THE TOTALITY TEST, THE TOTALITY OF PRIOR, CONTEMPORANEOUS AND POSTERIOR FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BEARING MATERIAL RELEVANCE TO THE ISSUE.

The diary of former Executive Secretary Angara as serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001 gives
an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. These are:

a. On January 19, 2001 at the height of the EDSA protest, Estrada called for a snap presidential election in May
2001 and made it on record that he will not be a candidate. It is an indication that he had given up the presidency even
at that time since his term is supposed to be up to 2004;

b. Estrada did not object to the suggestion that he consider a dignified exit and that he be allowed to go abroad
with enough funds;

c. Estradas statement that he was guaranteed by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes that he would be given a 5-day
grace period in the palace which shows that he had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign;

d. During the negotiations between the Estrada and Arroyo groups in the early morning of January 20, 2001, the
resignation of the petitioner was treated as a fact;

e. During the 1st round of negotiations, Estrada said Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko masyado nang masakit.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, intriga. The court held that this was a high grade evidence that he had resigned. The SC
held that ayoko na are words of resignation.

f. The Presidents act of leaving the palace on January 20, 2001 confirmed his resignation. Petitioners press
release, his final act and farewell, acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo as President, his reservation about its
legality. He said he was leaving the palace for the sake of peace and order. He did not say that he was leaving as a
result of a disability and was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability appears

III

NO.

The court held that the petitioner has in fact resigned and his claim of inability was laid to rest by Congress. The
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President, made by a co-equal branch of the government, cannot be
reviewed by the Court.

Both Houses of Congress had recognized that Arroyo is the President when they passed Resolution expressing their
support to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, President of the Philippines which was
passed on January 24, 2001; another resolution dated January 24, 2001 expressing full support to the assumption
into office by VP Arroyo as President of the Philippines; and the Resolution dated February 7, 2001 confirming
President Arroyos nomination of Senator Teopisto Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Philippines.

Both Houses also sent bills for the New President (GMA) to sign into law. Therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction to
review the claim of temporary disability and could not revise the decision of Congress recognizing Arroyo as President
without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

IV

NO.

As a non-sitting President, Estrada enjoys no immunity from the criminal charges of plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption filed against him. Likewise, the argument that he should first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings
before he could be charged criminally is without merit since the impeachment court has adjourned indefinitely insofar
as the case against him is concerned. To follow his line of argument would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. In fact, the Constitutional Commission in its deliberations show that even if the case against an
impeachable officer has become moot as a result of his resignation, the proper criminal and civil cases may be filed
against him.

Also, as held in RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ, 145 SCRA 160, an incumbent President is immune from suit or from being
brought to court BUT NOT BEYOND. In NIXON VS. FITSGERALD, 457 US 731, the US Supreme Court held that the
immunity of the President from civil damages covers only official acts. In the 1997 case of CLINTON VS. JONES, 520
US 681, the US Supreme Court held that the presidents immunity from suits for money damages arising out of official
acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.

Finally, the constitutional provision that a public office is a public trust would be devalued if we sustain petitioners
claim that a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.

NO.

The SC held that the evidence presented by the petitioner is insufficient for the Court to rule that the preliminary
investigation by respondent Desierto be enjoined. The claim of the petitioner, based on news reports, that the
Ombudsman had prejudged his case is not sufficient ground to stop the investigation. As held in MARTELINO VS.
ALEJANDRO, 32 SCRA 106, to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be an actual prejudicethere must
be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced. The accuracy of the reports cited by the petitioner
could not be the subject of judicial notice since the Ombudsman is entitled to the presumption of good faith and
regularity in the performance of official duty.

(NOTE: On April 7, 2001, the Motion for Reconsideration of Estrada of the above decision was denied for lack of merit.)

4. Section 13. The President, VP, Members of the Cabinet or their assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.. They shall not during their tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any profession, participate in any business or be financially interested in any contract withthe
government or any government owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict
of interest in the conduct of their office.

Read: 1. PUNZALAN VS. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153

2. ADAZA VS. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431

3. Opinion No. 155, Series of 1988 by the Secretary of Justice

4. Executive Order No. 284

5. Civil Liberties Union vs. Exec. Sec., February 22, 1991

Sections 14 Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected
President within 90 days from his assumption of office.

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential election and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

(NOTE: Section 9, Article VIII. The President shall issue the appointments within 90 days from the submission of the
list)

Read:

1) AYTONA VS. CASTILLO, 4 SCRA 1

2) PAMANTASAN VS. IAC, 140 SCRA 22

6. Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint
the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary
or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

a. Read:

Temporary Appointments for members of the Cabinet; Ad interim appointments.

SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, et al., vs. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, et al., 472 SCRA 587
Carpio, J.

Facts:

1. On July 26, 2004, Congress commenced its Regular Session. On August 25, 2004, the Commission on
appointments was constituted;

2. While Congress was in session, the President issued appointments as Acting Secretaries to the following:

a. Arthur Yap to the Department of Agriculture;

b. Alberto Romulo to the Department of Foreign affairs;

c. Raul Gonzales to the Department of Justice;

d. Florencio Abad to the Department of Education;

e. Avelino Cruz, Jr. to the Department of National Defense;

f. Rene Villa to the Department of Agrarian Reform;

g. Joseph Durano to the Department of Tourism; and

h. Michael Defensor to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

3. On September 8, 2004, the petitioners questioned said appointments as Acting Secretary as

UNCONSTITUTIONAL since Congress was in session and it was an act of circumventing the power of the Commission
on Appointments confirm the said appointments. They claimed that while Congress is in session, there can be no
appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.

4. On September 22, 2004, Congress adjourned its session;

5. On September 23, 2004, the president issued ad-interim appointments to the above-named appointees to the
departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity;

6. Thereafter, the respondents moved for the dismissal of this case on the ground that it is now moot and
academic considering the issuance of ad-interim appointments and subsequent submission of the appointments of the
above-named members of the cabinet to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.

I s s u e s:

1. Shall the case be dismissed since it is already moot and academic?

2. Do all the petitioners have the personality to sue?

3. Were the temporary appointments made while Congress was in session to positions subject of confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments unconstitutional?

H e l d:

1. While it is a rule that courts should not decide moot cases, the courts, as an exception, will rule on it if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review (TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 420 SCRA 438; ACOP VS. SECRETARY
GUINGONA, 383 SCRA 577; VIOLA VS. HON. ALUNAN III, 277 SCRA 409; ALUNAN III VS. MIRASOL, 276 SCRA 501).

2. Only those members of the Commission on Appointments have the personality to sue and not the other
petitioners who are not. While it was held in SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 421 SCRA 656 that members of
Congress have the personality to sue if the Presidents act has the effect of impairing the powers of Congress, the
same is not applicable in this case. This is so because the Commission on Appointments is independent from
Congress itself. President Arroyos issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in session impairs no power of
Congress.

3. The temporary appointments are valid. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature and the
legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution
expressly allows it to interfere. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-
gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In
case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the
President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of
her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law cannot impose on the President the obligation of
automatically appointing the Undersecretary as her alter ego. He must be of the Presidents confidence and provided
that the temporary appointment does not exceed one (1) year.

There is a need to distinguish ad interim appointments and appointments in an acting capacity. While both are
effective upon acceptance, ad interim appointments are extended only during the recess of Congress, whereas acting
appointments may be extended any time that there is a vacancy. Moreover, ad interim appointments are submitted to
the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily circumventing the need of confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.

1. CALDERON VS. CARALE, April 23, 11992

1-a) ULPIANO SARMIENTO III VS. SALVADOR MISON, G.R. No. 79774, Dec. 17, 1987, 156 SCRA 549

2. MARY CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS. THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, April, 13,1989

2-A TERESITA DELES, ET AL. VS. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, September 4, 1989

3 RAFAEL VS. EMBROIDERY AND APPAREL CONTROL BOARD, 21 SCRA 336

4 OLIVEROS-TORRE VS. BAYOT, 58 SCRA 272;

5 . TARROSA VS. SINGSON, May 25, 1994;

6 NIERE VS. CFI, 54 SCRA 165

b. Distinguish adjournment from recess.

c. Differentiate the status of an appointment made by the President while Congress is in session compared to that
when it is in recess.

7. Section 17, The President shall have control of all the executive departments , bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Presidents Control over the executive department; usurpation of legislative powers and infringement on the citizens
right to privacy

KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., April 19, 2006 & June 20, 2006

BAYAN MUNA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., April 19, 2006 & June 20, 2006

Carpio, J.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 420 that mandates the Adoption of a Unified,
Multi-purpose Identification System by all Government Agencies in the Executive Department. This is so despite the
fact that the Supreme Court held in an En Banc decision in 1998 OPLE VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES
Administrative Order No. 308[National computerized Identification Reference System] issued by then President Fidel V.
Ramos that the same is unconstitutional because a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a
new national data collection and card issuance system, where none existed before. The Supreme Court likewise held
that EO 308 as unconstitutional for it violates the citizens right to privacy.

Based on the Ople ruling, the petitioners claimed that Proclamation No. 420 is unconstitutional on two (2) grounds:

a. usurpation of legislative powers; and

b. it infringes on the citizens right to privacy

Held:

1. The issuance by the President of Proclamation No. 420 is not a usurpation of legislative powers. This is so
because EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to
their regular functionsand does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already posses under
existing laws. It is not similar to AO 308 because it does not create a notional ID system since it the same applies only
to the executive branch of the government, including government owned and controlled corporations but not the
judiciary nor the independent constitutional commissions. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID
system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system which is compulsory to all branches of the
government. EO 420 makes existing sectoral card systems of the government entities like the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and
Land Transportation Office less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public. Finally, the issuance of
Proclamation No. 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the President constitutional power of control
over government entities in the executive department as well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed.

2. The said Executive Order No. 420 does not violate the citizens right to privacy since it does not require all the
citizens to be issued a national ID as what happened in AO 308. Only those dealing or employed with the said
government entities who are required to provide the required information for the issuance of the said ID.

a. Distinguish the power of control over the power of supervision

b. Read:

1. Santos vs. Exec. Sec., April 10, 1992

1-a. Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr., 197 SCRA 771

1-b. Echeche vs. CA, 198 SCRA 577

The act of the Executive Secretary in reversing the decision of the Secretary of the DENR allowing the payment of
the backwages of petitioner is considered an act of the President and therefore valid in accordance with the doctrine of
qualified political agency.

1-c. Ganzon vs. CA, 200 SCRA 271

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him
by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave
misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary
detention. 1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her
husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan
Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and
Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod.

Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram.
On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was
arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other
detainees thereby causing injuries He was released only the following day.

Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last
until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.

Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked for a postponement to
September 26,1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their
respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these hearings which were held in
Mala the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299. He was again ordered suspended.

We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can
suspend and/or remove local officials.

It is the petitioners argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both
petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the
phrase 21 as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is a view,
so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as
follows:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with
respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays
shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:

Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of as may be provided by law) is significant, as their argument goes, since:
(1) the power of the President is provided by law and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.

It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in
consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:

Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of local Government, or the
sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven
days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after
receipt of such answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an
election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the said period. If preventive suspension has been
imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted.

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government
if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal
official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase
as may be provided by law intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or
remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What
is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?

It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did
not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to
provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of as may be provided by
law) signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments autonomy from congress and to break Congress
control over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to
deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.

The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which
supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary
authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as
this Court has held

It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss the
scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power
of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms,
control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that
case the Court has made the following digression: In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government
officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as
postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code.

xxx xxx xxx

Control has been defined as the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter. 36
Supervision on the other hand means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. 37 As we held, 38 however, investigating is not inconsistent with overseeing, although
it is a lesser power than altering. The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Courts pronouncements in at least
three cases, Lacson v. Roque, 39 Hebron v. Reyes, 40 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 41 and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v.
Auditor General.42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision as may
be provided by law, 43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President may not . .
. suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal
from a decision of the corresponding provincial board. 44 However, neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano
categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise
control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson:

The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well
taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper
construction subject to constitutional limitations.

In Hebron we stated:

Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed
mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary-which does not et with
respect to municipal officers

In Mondano, the Court held:

The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the
provincial governor who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final
judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious, he shall submit written charges
touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by
registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the
board, if in his opinion the charge by one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Section 86 of the
Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over
the administration of municipalities . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority
as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power
must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l), Article VII of the Constitution.

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to
defeat the Presidents powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because
although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, Commissioner Blas
Ople would not.

The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas
Blg. 37. As we said, supervision and removal are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other
notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of
the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect.

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization.

NOTE: The successive suspensions of the Mayor, however, was declared invalid by the Supreme Court.

1-d) MONDANO VS. SILVOSA, 97 Phil. 143

The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 February
1954 Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee
accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her
daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the
complaint to the respondent provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April
the petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons and was served with a copy of the
complaint filed by the provincial governor with provincial board. On the same day, the provincial governor issued
Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear
the charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection.

The Constitution provides: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only
the power of general supervision as may be provided by law.

The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same
control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his
authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his
department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over
which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions
of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding
department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for the reason he may
order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be
contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution.

If general supervision over all local governments is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department
Head in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference
between the power of control and that of supervision.

In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code and 37 of Act No. 4007. The
Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial
governor who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for
neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of
any crime involving moral turpitude. 2 And if the charges are serious, he shall submit written charges touching the
matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail,
and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his
opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. 3 Section 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the
administration of . . . municipalities . . .. If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority
as that vested in the Department Head by section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional
power must be deemed to have been abrogated by section 10 (1), Article VII, of the Constitution.

In Lacson vs. Roque, 49 Off. Gaz. 93, this Court held that the power of the President to remove officials from office as
provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be done conformably to law; and only for
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority
under the Government of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines. Again, this power of removal must be exercised
conformably to law.

In the endorsement to the provincial governor the Assistant Executive Secretary requested immediate investigation,
appropriate action and report on the complaint indorsed to him, and called his attention to section 2193 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides for the institution of judicial proceedings by the provincial fiscal upon direction of
the provincial governor.

If the endorsement of the Assistant Executive Secretary be taken as a designation of the provincial governor to
investigate the petitioner, then he would only be acting as agent of the Executive, but the investigation to be conducted
by him would not be that which is provided for in sections 2188, 2189 and 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The charges preferred against the respondent are not malfeasances or any of those enumerated or specified in section
2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, because rape and concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of
his duties as mayor nor do they constitute or involve neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form of
maladministration of office.

True, they may involve moral turpitude, but before the provincial governor and board may act and proceed in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code referred to, a conviction by final judgment must
precede the filing by the provincial governor of charges and trial by the provincial board. Even the provincial fiscal
cannot file an information for rape without a sworn complaint of the offended party who is 28 years of age and the
crime of concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon sworn complaint of the offended spouse. 4 The charges
preferred against the petitioner, municipal mayor of Mainit, province of Surigao, not being those or any of those
specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board
is unauthorized and illegal. The suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the municipality of Mainit is, consequently,
unlawful and without authority of law.

1-e. Carpio vs. Exec. Sec., 206 SCRA 290

1-f. Malayan vs. CA, 213 SCRA 640

1) LACSON-MAGALLANES VS. PANO, 21 SCRA 895

Sec. 10. The President shall have control of the ministries. (1973 Constitution, Art. VII)

Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify, or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. (Hebron vs. Reyes,
104 Phil. 175) The President can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision
of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus or offices under him. (Oliveros-Torre vs. Bayot, 58 SCRA 272;
Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, et al., 118 Phil. 1468). He can exercise this power motu proprio without need of any appeal from
any party. (Oliveros-Torre vs. Bayot, supra).

The President is not expected to perform in person an the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The
Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxillary unit which assists the President. Under our constitutional set-up, the
Executive Secretary acts for and in behalf of the President: and by authority of the President, he has undisputed
jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order of the Secretary of Natural Resources and other Cabinet
Secretaries. Where the Executive Secretary acts by authority of the President his decision is that of the President.
(Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Pano, 21 SCRA 895).

3) LACSON VS. ROQUE, 92 Phil. 456

4) VILLALUZ VS. ZALDIVAR, 15 SCRA 710

5) VILLENA VS. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR, 67 Phil. 451

6) ALAJAR VS. ALBA, 100 Phil. 683

7) FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. OPLE, 108 SCRA 757

8) OLIVEROS TORRE VS. BAYOT, 58 SCRA 272

c. What is the doctrine of Qualified Political agency? (see the separate opinion of Former Chief Justice FERNANDO in
the LACSON- MAGALLANES VS. PANO CASE)

d. Powers which must be exercised personally by the President and could and could not be delegated to any cabinet
member?

Doctrine of qualified political agency; personality to sue; when the said doctrine does not apply

CONSTANTINO and the FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION VS. CUISIA, et al., 472 SCRA 505

Tinga, J.

F a c t s:

The petition seeks to stop the respondents from executing additional debt-relief contracts or foreign borrowings in
connection with the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992 and to compel the Secretary of Justice to
institute criminal and administrative cases against respondents.

The respondents negotiated with the foreign commercial bank creditors a multi-option financing package in connection
with the countrys foreign debt. This includes a cash buyback of portions of the Philippine foreign debt at a discount.
The second option allows creditors to convert existing Philippine debt instruments into bonds or securities. Petitioners
characterize the Financing Program as beyond the powers of the President under Section 20, Article VII of the
Constitution.

I s s u e s:

1. Do the petitioners have the personality to sue?

2. May the respondents contract and guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines? Stated
otherwise, may the President delegate such power to her subordinates?

H e l d:

1. The petitioners as tax payers have the personality to sue. They are suing as citizens of the Philippines and a s
taxpayers. The recent trend on locus standi has veered towards a liberal treatment in taxpayers suits. In Tatad vs.
Garcia, Jr. [243 SCRA 436] the supreme Court held that taxpayers are allowed to question contracts entered into by the
national government or government owned and controlled corporations ALLEGEDLY IN CONTRAVENTION OF LAW.

2. The petitioners claim that the President alone and personally can validly bind the country in contracting
foreign debt under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution. The contention is without merit. The Secretary of Finance,
as alter ego of the President regarding the sound and efficient management of the financial resources of the
government, has the power to implement the policy which was publicly expressed by the president herself. This is in
connection with the doctrine of qualified political agency. While there are instances where the President must act
personally and not through his secretaries like the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, proclamation of
martial law or pardoning power [Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451], negotiation with foreign creditors may be
done by the Secretary of Finance or the Governor of Central Bank.

The petition was therefore dismissed.

7. Section 18. The President shall be the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding 60
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress voting jointly, , by a vote of at least a
majority of all its members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within 24 hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
3 days, otherwise, he shall be released.

a. Take special notice of the grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus declaration of
Martial Law.

b. Compare it with the provisions of the 1935 and 1973 Constitution on this subject.

What are the restrictions imposed on the President in the exercise of such emergency powers? What are the effects of
exercises of emergency powers to the judicial system?

Commander-in-chief provision; Legal standing to question a presidential proclamation; moot and academic cases
when courts still has to decide it; state of rebellion and state of national emergency distinguished

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID*, LORENZO TAADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN,
ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG VS. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE,

NIEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC.,

G.R. No. 171396

May 3, 2006

versus

HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The cases:

These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and
preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the
Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.

The Facts:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued
PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces
to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

She cited the following facts as bases:

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the
extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists the
historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted
and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004;

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;
WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance including hindering the
growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in government and their faith in the future of this
country;

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify
their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;

WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic
institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear
and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus:

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the
extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists the
historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a
concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in
May 2004;

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;

WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including hindering the
growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this
country;

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify
their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;

WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions
and the State the primary duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear
and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of National Emergency;

NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as
President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant
to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;

I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and
PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence.

On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions
had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017
dated February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national emergency;

WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of
Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), were
directed to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well
as any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary;

WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and
rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th
anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the Presidents mind were
organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that
warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented.[1]

Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters
(members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]),
marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were
already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen
used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and
scatter the massed participants. The same police action was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao,
Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up
an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.[2]

According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.

During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald
Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team
confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from
Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen
from the Manila Police District were stationed outside the building.[3]

A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another
pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.

The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is meant to show a strong presence, to tell media
outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government. The PNP warned
that it would take over any media organization that would not follow standards set by the government during the state
of national emergency. Director General Lomibao stated that if they do not follow the standards and the standards
are if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5
and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover. National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis
urged television and radio networks to cooperate with the government for the duration of the state of national
emergency. He asked for balanced reporting from broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the coup
attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any
broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security is threatened.[4]
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and
Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his
arrest dated 1985. Beltrans lawyer explained that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed
during the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions.

When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted
because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed by the
police.

Retired Major General Ramon Montao, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife
and golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmarias, Cavite.

Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna
Representative Teodoro Casio and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador
was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of
Representatives where the Batasan 5 decided to stay indefinitely.

Hence, these Petitions.

I s s u e s:

A. PROCEDURAL:

1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.

2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et
al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.

B. SUBSTANTIVE:

1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.

2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

a. Facial Challenge

b. Constitutional Basis

c. As Applied Challenge

1. PROCEDURAL

I- Moot and Academic Principle

Courts may exercise the power of judicial review only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an
actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of unconstitutionality; third, the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution. It is definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest; a real and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or
controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered moot and academic by President Arroyos issuance
of PP 1021.

Such contention lacks merit.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,[5]
so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such
case[6] or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.
During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal
acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts?
These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that an unconstitutional
act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation,
inoperative.

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

First, there is a grave violation of the Constitution (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, .R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429
SCRA 736).

Second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved (Lacson vs. Perez, G.R.
No. 147780, May 10, 2001, 357 SCRA 756);

Third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo); and

Fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review (Albaa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July
23, 2004, 435 SCRA 98, Acop v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577, Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656. )

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant
petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no
question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to
freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar,
and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional
guarantees.[7] And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject
to judicial review.

II- Legal Standing

In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have a more than
passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi.

Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.[8] In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[9] Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right
to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who
is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or
taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he
has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions. The distinction was
first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,[10] where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category
from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the
latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel
Case v. Collins:[11] In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not
the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan[12] held that the right of a citizen and a
taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he
disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State
Supreme Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt,[13] later reaffirmed in Tileston v.
Ullman.[14] The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not
sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,[15] it held that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the
Senate,[16] Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente,[17] Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works[18] and
Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.[19]

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the
exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,[20] where the
transcendental importance of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor
accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec,[21] this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the far-reaching
implications of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file
the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens,
members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations and rulings.[22]

Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been
allowed to sue under the principle of transcendental importance. Pertinent are the following cases:

(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[23] where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional right to
information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the
petitioner with locus standi;

(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[24] wherein the Court held that given the transcendental importance of
the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of
direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review of the Visiting Forces Agreement;

(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,[25] while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as
taxpayers absent a showing that Balikatan 02-01 involves the exercise of Congress taxing or spending powers,
it reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[26] that in cases of transcendental
importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be relaxed.

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
1. the cases involve constitutional issues;

2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;

3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and

5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.

Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Courts attitude toward legal standing.

In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,[27] the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a peoples organization does not give it
the requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so where it does not raise any issue
of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused.
Nor can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered.

In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,[28] the Court reiterated the direct
injury test with respect to concerned citizens cases involving constitutional issues. It held that there must be a
showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official
act.

In Lacson v. Perez,[29] the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real
party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters.

In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[30] the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have
standing to sue, as they claim that the Presidents declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency
powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and
Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson.

Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.

The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds
true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged direct injury
resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so,
the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.

It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper
exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the liberality doctrine on legal standing. It cannot be
doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the
Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of
this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the transcendental importance
doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the PP 1017 cases.

This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.

Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,[31] may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of
State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. However, this does not mean that the President
is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people[32] but he may be removed
from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.[33]
B. SUBSTANTIVE

I. Review of Factual Bases

The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the Presidents exercise of his Commander-in-Chief
power has reached its distilled point from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker and Montenegro v. Castaneda to
the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia, Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile. The tug-of-war always cuts
across the line defining political questions, particularly those questions in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison
in declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his decision is
final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous
in the conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine
their constitutional sufficiency. From the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks
and balances, under which the President is supreme, x x x only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by
the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In 1973, the unanimous Court of Lansang was
divided in Aquino v. Enrile. There, the Court was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the
imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable question. Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly diluted
Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that in times of war or national
emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and the government is in great
peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the People, and God.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar echoed a
principle similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. This ruling is mainly a result of the Courts reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which
fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable
the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments
of the government. It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.

As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that judicial inquiry
can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the Presidents decision is correct, but that the President did not
act arbitrarily. Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
this Court further ruled that it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of
factual basis and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then this Court cannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings.

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft
of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed
narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.
Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was
also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.

Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do
nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of
such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision:

by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well any act of insurrection or rebellion

Second provision:

and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction;

Third provision:

as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

First Provision: Calling-Out Power

The first provision pertains to the Presidents calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 159085,
February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656) this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution reproduced as follows:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign,
these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[34] the Court ruled that the only criterion for
the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As
stated earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017.
Owing to her Offices vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the
country.

Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence,
invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out
power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He
cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution,
the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.

It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the Presidents authority to declare a state of
rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyos authority
to declare a state of rebellion emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas
was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a
state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision
calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article
XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with
public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be
deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.

Second Provision: Take Care Power

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is
based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested,[35] the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws
as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials
and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect
that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, execute its laws.[36] In the exercise of such function, the
President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces
of the country,[37] including the Philippine National Police[38] under the Department of Interior and Local Government.
[39]

Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio,
Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to
enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in
Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

Petitioners contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted[40] from
Former President Marcos Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1,
Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: to
enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction. Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees?

PP 1017 states in part: to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction.

President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to executive orders, proclamations, administrative orders, etc. She
cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are
laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the
exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.[41]

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?

As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void
and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain
laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the
like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Third Provision: Power to Take Over

The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:

x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national
emergency.

The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the
military not only to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees x x x but also to act pursuant to the provision
of Section 17, Article XII which reads:

Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest.

During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without any
authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.

This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the martial law thinking of the 1971
Constitutional Convention.[42] In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos Letter of Instruction No. 2
dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over the management, control and
operation of the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient
Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present national
emergency.

Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyos inclusion of
Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatures emergency powers.

A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state of national emergency and to
exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such
power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues
arise.

Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.

It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to other national
emergency. If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to
declare a state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress
(like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not
intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a state of national emergency. The
logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency
even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.

But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.

Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated,
different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed
together and considered in the light of each other.[43] Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of
Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of
the exercise of emergency powers.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and
exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to
the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.[44]

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules
that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The
President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances
have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected
with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the
powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However,
the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees
promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring
national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does
not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
prior legislation.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any
form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its
articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

1) Read:

2) The Habeas Corpus Cases

a. BARCELON VS. BAKER, 5 Phil. 87 (1905)

b. MONTENEGRO VS. CASTANEDA, 91 Phil. 882 (1952)

c. LANSANG VS. GARCIA, 42 SCRA 448

d. GARCIA-PADILLA VS. PONCE ENRILE, 121 SCRA 472 April 20, 1983

e. MORALES VS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, 121 SCRA 472 April 26, 1983

f. OLAGUER VS. MILITARY COMMISSION, G.R. No. 54558, May 22, 1987

g. ROLANDO ABADILLA VS. GEN. RAMOS, 156 SCRA 97

h. JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. JUDGE SALAZAR, June 5, 1990

i. People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 120

2) The Martial Law cases

a. AQUINO VS. ENRILE, 59 SCRA 183

b. AQUINO VS. MILITARY COMMISSION, 63 SCRA 546

c. GUMAUA VS. ESPINO, 96 SCRA 402

d. LEGASPI VS. MINISTER 115 SCRA 418 (on the possible options available to the president in case of lawful
violence)

8. Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.

a. Define: reprieve, commutation, pardon, amnesty

b. See Article IX-C, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution and Article 5 of the Revised Penal (Act 386)

Section 5, Art. IX-C. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
c. Read:

1) BARRIOQUINTO VS. FERNANDEZ, 82 Phil. 642

Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.

[1] Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the
person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with
the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.

[2] Pardon is granted to one after conviction (of ordinary crimes) ; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution
and sometimes after conviction.

[3] Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the restoration of the
rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,
and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence
article 36, Revised Penal Code). while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it
so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before
the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (section 10[6], Article VII, Philippine Constitution; State vs.
Blalock, 62 N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs, 135 N.C., 118; 47 S.E. 402., 403; Ex parte Law, 35 GA., 285, 296; State ex rel
AnheuserBusch Brewing Assn. vs. Eby, 170 Mo., 497; 71 S.W 52, 61; Burdick vs United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267; 271;
236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.)

[4] Pardon is complete with the act of the President while Amnesty is valid only with the concurrence of the majority of
the members of all the members of Congress.

2) VERA VS. PEOPLE, 7 SCRA 152

Before one may validly apply for executive clemency (pardon or amnesty) he MUST ADMIT HAVING COMMITTED THE
ACTS WHICH RESULTED IN HIS IMPRISONMENT.

3) CRISTOBAL VS. LABRADOR, 71 Phil. 34

4) PEOPLE VS. JOSE, 75 Phil. 612

5) PELOBELO VS. PALATINO, 72 Phil. 441

6) PEOPLE VS. PASILAN, 14 SCRA 694

7) LEGASPI VS. MINISTER, 115 SCRA 418

8) MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN,February, 1989

The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a New
appointment.

In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then
assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of
public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500.
They were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the
balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a
motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then
President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.

By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former
post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.

Petitioners letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the provision of the Local
Government Code transferring the power of appointment of treasurers from the city governments to the said Ministry.
In its 4th Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position
without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also
directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required to be
indemnified in favor of the government as well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied.

Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April 17, 1985 stressing that the full
pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been
interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension
which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not
be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50. 2

The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioners letter to the Office of the President for further review and action.
On April 15, 1986, said Office, through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held:

We disagree with both the Ministry of Finance and the petitioner because, as borne out by the records, petitioner was
convicted of the crime for which she was accused. In line with the governments crusade to restore absolute honesty in
public service, this Office adopts, as a juridical guide (Miranda v. Imperial, 77 Phil. 1966), the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, in People v. Lising, Crim. Case No. 6675, October 4, 1985, that acquittal, not absolute
pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to
payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.

n fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his former
position.

Anent the civil liability of Monsanto, the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that a pardon shall in no case exempt
the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. (Sec. 36, par. 2).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office holds that Salvacion A. Monsanto is not entitled to an automatic
reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to her former position
and that, notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous
conviction.

Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition in her behalf We
gave due course on October 13, 1987.

Petitioners basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she was
extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final
judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated
or forfeited. In other words, without that final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did
not attach and the status of her employment remained suspended. More importantly, when pardon was issued before
the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the President has
declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has accordingly dismissed the same.

It is well to remember that petitioner had been convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents and sentenced to imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional as minimum,
to ten years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during
the term of the principal penalty. Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or
employment, such disqualification to last during the term of the sentence. Even if the offender be pardoned, as to the
principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same have been expressly remitted by the pardon. The
penalty of prision correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties, suspension from public office.

The propositions earlier advanced by petitioner reveal her inadequate understanding of the nature of pardon and its
legal consequences. This is not totally unexpected considering that the authorities on the subject have not been wholly
consistent particularly in describing the effects of pardon.

The benign mercy of pardon is of British origin, conceived to temper the gravity of the Kings wrath. But Philippine
jurisprudence on the subject has been largely influenced by American case law.

Pardon is defined as an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which
exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is
the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended,
and not communicated officially to the Court. A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and
delivery is not complete without acceptance.

At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power was governed by the 1973
Constitution as amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The pertinent provision reads:

The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and
forfeitures, and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.

The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final conviction,
implying that clemency could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioners unconditional pardon was granted
even as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former
limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material
when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having
accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the
Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.

Having disposed of that preliminary point, we proceed to discuss the effects of a full and absolute pardon in relation to
the decisive question of whether or not the plenary pardon had the effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed
by the Revised Penal Code.

In Pelobello v. Palatino, We find a reiteration of the stand consistently adopted by the courts on the various
consequences of pardon: we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador, G.R. No. 47941, December 7,
1940, that subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction. (W)e are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional
grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after an inquiry
into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the
party concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction.

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is
full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
capacity.
Such generalities have not been universally accepted, recognized or approved. The modern trend of authorities now
rejects the unduly broad language of the Garland case (reputed to be perhaps the most extreme statement which has
been made on the effects of a pardon). To our mind, this is the more realistic approach. While a pardon has generally
been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though
he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or
remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offenders innocence) as relieving the
party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the
finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. To say, however, that the offender is a new man, and as
innocent as if he had never committed the offense; is to ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. A
person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment,
though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime,
though it places no restraints upon him following his conviction.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has
been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has
been suffered. Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered
while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be
required. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings
and benefits.

Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence.
The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation
of sentence. Petitioners civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code,
namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation .

9. Lllamas vs. Exec. Sec. Orbos, Oct. 15, 1991

The case before Us calls for a determination of whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to grant
executive clemency in administrative cases. In connection therewith, two important questions are also put in issue,
namely, whether or not the grant of executive clemency and the reason therefore, are political questions beyond judicial
review, and whether or not the questioned act was characterized by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

Petitioner Rodolfo D. Llamas is the incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province of Tarlac and, on March 1, 1991 he
assumed, by virtue of a decision of the Office of the President, the governorship (p. 1, Petition). Private respondent
Mariano Un Ocampo III is the incumbent Governor of the Province of Tarlac and was suspended from office for a
period of 90 days. Public respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary at the time of the filing of this petition
and is being impleaded herein in that official capacity for having issued, by authority of the President, the assailed
Resolution granting executive clemency to respondent governor.

By virtue of the aforequoted Resolution, respondent governor reassumed the governorship of the province, allegedly
without any notification made to the petitioner.

Petitioner posits that the issuance by public respondent of the May 15, 1991 Resolution was whimsical, capricious and
despotic, and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting lack of jurisdiction, (p. 6, petition) basically on the
ground th executive clemency could be granted by the President only in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute
books or even in the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases. Petitioner also contends that
since respondent governor refused to recognize his suspension (having reassumed the governorship in gross defiance
of the suspension order), executive clemency cannot apply to him; that his rights to due process were violated because
the grant of executive clemency was so sudden that he was not even notified thereof; and that despite a finding by
public respondent of impropriety in the loan transaction entered into by respondent governor, the former failed to justify
the reduction of the penalty of suspension on the latter. Petitioner further alleges that the executive clemency granted
by public respondent was the product of a hocus-pocus strategy (p. 1, Manifestation with Motion, etc.) because there
was allegedly no real petition for the grant of executive clemency filed by respondent governor.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides:

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the
respondent is a provincial or city official,

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground
to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong,
when the gravity of the offense s warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent coul influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive
suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation the proceedings against him until its termination. (Emphasis supplied)

Let us first deal with the issue on jurisdiction. Respondent govemor avers that since under the Constitution
discretionary authority is granted to the President on the exercise of executive clemency, the same constitutes a
political question which is beyond judicial review.

Such a rule does not hold true in the case at bar. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the
Presidents discretionary powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the
issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits
prescribed by the Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review. And such review does not
constitute a modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions
of the President. In this connection, the case of Tanada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et al., 103 Phil. 1051, is very
enlightening, and We quote:

Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of
the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers
are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial
review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these
discretionary powers.

As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments
of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political
policy. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional
provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by statute, but, within these
limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a
given status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be
traversed in the courts. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326).

In the case at bar, the nature of the question for determination is not purely political. Here, we are called upon to decide
whether under the Constitution the President may grant executive clemency in administrative cases. We must not
overlook the fact that the exercise by the President of her power of executive clemency is subject to constitutional
limitations. We will merely check whether the particular measure in question has been in accordance with law. In so
doing, We will not concern ourselves with the reasons or motives which actuate the President as such is clearly beyond
our power of judicial review.

Petitioners main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases, based on Article
VII, Section 19 of the Constitution which reads:

Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise pro vided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
(Emphasis supplied)

According to the petitioner, the qualifying phrase after conviction by final judgment applies solely to criminal cases,
and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been convicted in an
administrative case, allegedly because the word conviction refers only to criminal cases (par. 22-b, c, d, Petition).
Petitioner, however, describes in his very own words, respondent governor as one who has been convicted in an
administrative case (par. 22-a, petition). Thus, petitioner concedes that the word conviction may be used either in a
criminal case or in an administrative case. In Layno, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 136 SCRA 536, We ruled:

For misfeasance or malfeasance any [elective official] could be proceeded against administratively or criminally.
In either case, his culpability must be established

Moreover, applying the doctrine Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos, We cannot sustain petitioners
view. In other words, if the law does not distinguish, so We must no distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish
between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment
cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be
unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution. Following petitioners proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded
inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive
clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise of the executive clemency in administrative
cases.

d. Is breach of the condition of pardon subject to judicial review?

Read: TORRES VS. GONZALES, 152 SCRA 272

On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition
that petitioner would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he
will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was
consequently released from confinement.

On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the Board) resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its recommendation to the President, the
Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons (68 Phil. 154 [1939]) and Espuelas vs.
Provincial Warden of Bohol (108 Phil. 356 [1960]). The evidence before the Board showed that on 22 March 1982 and
24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with twenty counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756,
which cases were then (on 21 May 1986) pending trial before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City). The
record before the Board also showed that on 26 June 1985, petitioner had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal (Quezon City) of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926; this conviction was then pending appeal
before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The Board also had before it a letter report dated 14 January 1986 from the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), addressed to the Board, on the petitioner. Per this letter, the records of the NBI
showed that a long list of charges had been brought against the petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide
assortment of crimes including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of
firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of
Presidential Decree No. 772 (interfering with police functions). Some of these charges were Identified in the NBI report
as having been dismissed. The NBI report did not purport to be a status report on each of the charges there listed and
Identified.

On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner.

On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued by authority of the President an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence.

Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his
conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the twenty (20) counts of estafa charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756 nor of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926. 3 Petitioner also
contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and
accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.

The issue that confronts us therefore is whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary
before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

This issue is not novel. It has been raised before this Court three times in the past. This Court was first faced with this
issue in Tesoro Director of Prison. Tesoro, who had been convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents,
was granted a parole by the then Governor-General. One of the conditions of the parole required the parolee not [to]
commit any other crime and [to] conduct himself in an orderly manner. Two years after the grant of parole, Tesoro
was charged before the Justice of the Peace Court of San Juan, Rizal, with the crime of adultery said to have been
committed with the wife of Tesoros brother-in-law. The fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance the corresponding
information which, however, was dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant. The complainant then went before
the Board of Indeterminate Sentence and charged Tesoro with violation of the conditions of his parole. After
investigation by the parole officer, and on the basis of his report, the Board recommended to the President of the
Philippines the arrest and recommitment of the petitioner. Tesoro contended, among other things, that a judicial
pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a crime is necessary before he could properly be adjudged as
having violated his conditional parole.

Addressing this point, this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Moran, held that the determination of whether the
conditions of Tesoros parole had been breached rested exclusively in the sound judgment of the Governor-General and
that such determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on parole
upon the judgment of the power that had granted it, we held that he [could not] invoke the aid of the courts, however
erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. Thus, this Court held that by accepting the
terms under which the parole had been granted, Tesoro had in effect agreed that the Governor-Generals determination
(rather than that of the regular courts of law) that he had breached one of the conditions of his parole by committing
adultery while he was conditionally at liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him.

In Sales vs. Director of Prisons, the petitioner had been convicted of the crime of frustrated murder. After serving a little
more than two years of his sentence, he was given a conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines, the
condition being that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines and that, should this condition be
violated, he shall be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. 8 Eight years after the grant of his conditional
pardon, Sales was convicted of estafa and sentenced to three months and eleven days of arresto mayor. He was
thereupon recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence. Sales raised before this Court
two principal contentions. Firstly, he argued that Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code had been repealed
by Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. He contended, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was in any case repugnant to the
due process clause of the Constitution (Article III [1], 1935 Constitution). This Court, through Mr. Justice Ozaeta
speaking for the majority, rejected both contentions of Sales.

In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol, the petitioner had been convicted of the crime of inciting to sedition. While
serving his sentence, he was granted by the President a conditional pardon on condition that he shall not again violate
any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Espuelas accepted the conditional pardon and was released from
confinement. Sometime thereafter, he was convicted by the Justice of the Peace Court in Tagbilaran, Bohol, of the
crime of usurpation of authority. He appealed to the Court of First Instance. Upon motion of the provincial fiscal, the
Court of First Instance dismissed the case provisionally, an important prosecution witness not having been available on
the day set for trial. A few months later, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the President
ordered his recommitment to prison to serve the unexpired period of his original sentence.

The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following propositions:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of
such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon
under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction
therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict
had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally
pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

The petitioner challenges his recommitment, claiming he has not violated the condition of his pardon that he shall not
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. The government bases its stand on the case of Espuelas v.
Provincial Warden of Bohol, 108 Phil. 353, where it was held, in connection with a similar condition, that mere
commission of a crime, as determined by the President, was sufficient to justify recommitment. Conviction was
considered not necessary.

I would grant the petition.

There is no question that the petitioner is facing a long list of criminal charges, but that certainly is not the issue. The
point is that, as many as such charges may be, none of them so far has resulted in a final conviction, without which he
cannot be recommitted under the condition of his pardon.

Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59). A prima facie case only justifies the
filing of the corresponding information, but proof beyond reasonable doubt is still necessary for conviction. Manifestly,
an allegation merely accuses the defendant of a crime: it is the conviction that makes him a criminal. In other words, a
person is considered to have committed a crime only if he is convicted thereof, and this is done not by his accuser but
by the judge.

That this conviction must be pronounced by the judge and no other is too obvious a proposition to be disputed. The
executive can only allege the commission of crime and thereafter try to prove it through indubitable evidence. If the
prosecution succeeds, the court will then affirm the allegation of commission in a judgment of conviction.

e. Amnesty to rebels

Read:
Proclamation No. 80, February 28, 1987

10. Sections 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided for by law. The
Monetary Board shall, within 30 days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a
complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the government or
government owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and
containing other matters as may be provided for by law.

Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate.

(NOTE: Please see Section 25, Art. 18. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the USA concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by
the other contracting State.)

Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within 30 days from the opening of every regular session, as the
basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from
existing and proposed revenue measures.

Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before
it at any other time.

Read: Distinctions between Treaty and executive agreements.

1) GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA, 9 SCRA 280

2) TAN SIN VS. DEPORTATION BOARD, 104 Phil. 868

3) COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. EASTERN, 3 SCRA 351

4. Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155

11. Under the present Constitution, is the president immune from suit in relation to acts performed by him or by his
subordinates by virtue of his specific orders during his tenure considering that the immunity from suit provision under
the 1973 Constitution was already deleted?

Read:

1) Section 17, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution with the 1984 amendments.

2) HIDALGO VS. MARCOS, 80 SCRA 538

3) CARILLO VS. MARCOS, April 6, 1981

4. MAXIMO SOLIVEN VS. JUDGE MAKASIAR, Nov. 15, 1988

Reference:

Political Law Reviewer by Atty. Larry D. Gacayan

College of Law, University of the Cordilleras

Baguio City


* Consolidated with six (6) other Petitions

[1] Petition in G.R. No. 171396, p. 5.

[2] Police action in various parts of Metro Manila and the reactions of the huge crowds being dispersed were
broadcast as breaking news by the major television stations of this country.

[3] Petition in G.R. No. 171400, p. 11.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736.

[6] Royal Cargo Corporation v. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. Nos. 103055-56, January 26, 2004, 421 SCRA 21; Vda. De
Dabao v. Court of Appeals, supra.

[7] Salonga v. Cruz Pao, et al., No. L- 59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438.

[8] Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. 1991, p. 941.

[9] Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., 88 Phil. 125 (1951).

[10] 275 Ky 91, 120 SW2d 765 (1938).

[11] 19 Wend. 56 (1837).

[12] 232 NC 48, 59 SE2d 359 (1950).

[13] 302 U.S. 633.

[14] 318 U.S. 446.

[15] 65 Phil. 56 (1937).

[16] G.R. No. 117, November 7, 1945 (Unreported).

[17] G.R. No. 2947, January 11, 1959 (Unreported).

[18] 110 Phil. 331 (1960).

[19] 77 Phil. 1012 (1947).

[20] 84 Phil. 368 (1949) The Court held: Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.

[21] L-No. 40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275.

[22] Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27, where the Court held that where the question
is one of public duty and the enforcement of a public right, the people are the real party in interest, and it is sufficient
that the petitioner is a citizen interested in the execution of the law;

Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530, where the Court held that in
cases involving an assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the
petitioner is a citizen and part of the general public which possesses the right.

Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, L. No. 81311, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 371,
where the Court held that objections to taxpayers lack of personality to sue may be disregarded in determining the
validity of the VAT law;

Albano v. Reyes, G.R. No. 83551, July 11, 1989, 175 SCRA 264, where the Court held that while no expenditure of
public funds was involved under the questioned contract, nonetheless considering its important role in the economic
development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved, public interest was definitely
involved and this clothed petitioner with the legal personality under the disclosure provision of the Constitution to
question it.

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989,
175 SCRA 343, where the Court ruled that while petitioners are strictly speaking, not covered by the definition of a
proper party, nonetheless, it has the discretion to waive the requirement, in determining the validity of the
implementation of the CARP.

Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990, 191 SCRA 452, where the Court held that it enjoys the
open discretion to entertain taxpayers suit or not and that a member of the Senate has the requisite personality to
bring a suit where a constitutional issue is raised.

Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr., G.R. No. 88291, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 771, where the Court held that petitioner as a
taxpayer, has the personality to file the instant petition, as the issues involved, pertains to illegal expenditure of public
money;

Osmea v. Comelec, G.R. No. 100318, 100308, 100417,100420, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750, where the Court held
that where serious constitutional questions are involved, the transcendental importance to the public of the cases
involved demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedures;

De Guia v. Comelec, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 420, where the Court held that the importance of the
issues involved concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment,
necessitates the brushing aside of the procedural requirement of locus standi.

[23] G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152.

[24] G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572, 138587, 138680, 138698, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449.

[25] G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 739.

[26] Supra.

[27] G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 130.

[28] G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998, 289 SCRA 337.

[29] G.R. No. 147780, 147781, 147799, 147810, May 10, 2001, 357 SCRA 756.

[30] G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656.

[31] From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of
the President from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. (De Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, Vol.
2, 2004 Ed., p. 302).

[32] Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution provides: Public Office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

[33] Ibid., Sec. 2.

[34] Supra.


[35] Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution.

[36] Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution.

[37] Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.

[38] Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution.

[39] See Republic Act No. 6975.

[40] Ironically, even the 7th Whereas Clause of PP 1017 which states that Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes
the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government replicates
more closely Section 2, Article 2 of the 1973 Constitution than Section 4, Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that, [t[he prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.

[41] Agpalo, Statutory Construction, Fourth Edition, 1998, p. 1, citing Legaspi v. Ministry of Finance, 115 SCRA 418
(1982); Garcia-Padilla v. Ponce-Enrile, supra. Aquino v. Commission on Election, supra.

[42] Section 17, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution reads: In times of national emergency when the public interest
so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest.

[43] Antieau, Constitutional Construction, 1982, p.21.

[44] Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1998, p. 94.

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