North by property of Felisa Belmonte; on the East by Sapang Dalagot; complaint filed in Civil Case No. 16 of the C.F.I.
of the C.F.I. of N.E. now pending for
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14127 August 21, 1962
ISIDORO M. MERCADO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEON C. VIARDO and PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA
ECIJA, defendants-appellants.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-14128 August 21, 1962
LEON C. VIARDO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PILAR BELMONTE, PATRICIA DRIZ, JOAQUINA DRIZ, ISIDORO
MERCADO,
TRINIDAD ISIDRO, ZACARIAS BELMONTE, TERESITA FLORES,
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendants-appellees.
No. L-14127:
Agustin C. Bagasao for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel A. Concordia for defendants-appellants.
No. L-14128:
Manuel A. Concordia for plaintiff-appellant.
E. A. Bello, M. Y. Macias and A. A. Reyes for defendant-appellee Philippine
American General Insurance Company, Inc.
Cecilio F. Wycoco for defendants-appellees Pilar Belmonte and Teresita
Flores.
Carlos M. Ferrer for defendants-appellees Patricia Driz, et al.
PADILLA, J.:
In civil case No. 7611 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, entitled
Leon C. Viardo vs. Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte, a writ of execution
was issued and levy was made "upon all the rights, interest and participation
which the spouses Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte have or might have" in
a parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484 of the
Registrar of Deeds in and for the province of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit A, p.3).
This certificate of title covers a parcel of land (Lot No. 1, Psu-14371) in the
barrios of Nieves and Santo Rosario, municipality of Zaragoza, province of
Nueva Ecija, containing an area of 1,192,775 square meters, more or less.
The land is registered in the names of "Leonor Belmonte, Felisa Belmonte,
Pilar Belmonte and Ines de Guzman, subject . . . to the condition that share
[that] belongs to Ines de Guzman is usufructuary "correspondiendo la nuda
propiedad a sus tres hijas arriba citadas en participaciones iguales quienes
se consolidara el dominio despues del fallecimiento de su madre' " (Exhibit A,
p. 2).
On 25 February 1941, by virtue of the writ of execution above mentioned, the
provincial sheriff of Nueva Ecija sold at public auction one-half () of the
following property:
TAX DECLARATION NO. 11313 OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF ZARAGOZA,
PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA AND COVERED BY ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3484 OF THE LAND RECORDS OF NUEVA
ECIJA.
A parcel of land, situated in the sitio of Valdez, barrio Sto. Rosario,
municipality of Zaragoza, Province of Nueva Ecija. Bounded on the
on the Southeast by Ines de Guzman; on the South by the property of
Felisa Belmonte; and on then West by the property of Cirilo Acosta;
containing an area of THIRTY (30) HECTARES, more or less. Declared
under tax No. 11313 in the name of Pilar Belmonte with an assessed
value of P8,400.00.
The highest bidder at the auction sale was the judgment creditor, Leon C.
Viardo, who paid P2,125.64 for the interest sold and P83.15 for the land tax
corresponding to such interest (Exhibit B). When the judgment debtors failed
to redeem the property within the statutory period of one year from the date of
sale (21 February 1941), the provincial sheriff of Nueva Ecija executed on 12
May 1943 a Final Bill of Sale of the property described in Exhibit B in favor of
Leon C. Viardo (Exhibit C). On 3 May 1943 a co-owner's copy of the
certificate of title was issued to Leon C. Viardo (Exhibit A, p. 3).
On 28 December 1945 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Land
Registration Case No. 918, G.L.R.O. Record No. 17910, acting upon a
verified petition of Leon C. Viardo, ordered the Registrar of Deeds in and for
Nueva Ecija
to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 3484 and to issue another in
lieu thereof in the name of and in the proportion as follows: LEONOR
BELMONTE share; FELISA BELMONTE, share; PILAR
BELMONTE, /8 share; LEON C. VIARDO, /8 share; and INES DE
GUZMAN, share, upon the payment of the corresponding fees
(Exhibit D).
However, it appears from Original Certificate of Title No. 3484 (Exhibit A) that
the above-mentioned order was not carried out and that said original
certificate of title was not cancelled.
On 27 May 1946 Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte filed in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija a complaint against Leon C. Viardo (civil case No.
161) praying that judgment be rendered against the defendant:
(a) Ordering the defendant to reconvey the property in question in favor
of plaintiffs herein upon payment by the latter of the lawful redemption
price in accordance with law, or the sum of P2,125.64 with interest at the
rate of one per centum (1%) per month for twelve (12) months from
February 27, 1941 to February 27, 1942. (Exhibit E.)
On 4 June 1946 Patricia Blando, attorney for the plaintiffs Bartolome Driz and
Pilar Belmonte, requested the Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija for
the annotation of a Notice of LIS PENDENS on the back of ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3484 of the Office of the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija, affecting the undivided one-half
() portion of the property of the plaintiffs in the above-entitled cause,
situated in the Sitio of Valdez, Barrio of Sto. Rosario, Municipality of
Zaragoza, which is involved in the said controversy against the
defendant LEON C. VIARDO, and which is more particularly described
under paragraph (4) of the plaintiffs' complaint a copy of which is hereby
presented, hereunto attached. (Exhibit F.)
On 6 June 1946 the Registrar of Deeds made the following annotation on the
back of original certificate of title No. 3484:
Entry No. 3347/0-3484: Kind Lis Pendens Executed in favor of
Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte; Conditions Al the rights, interests,
and participation of Leon C. Viardo in this title is the subject of a
action. Date of the instrument June 4, 1946; Date of the inscription
June 6, 1946 at 3:18 (?) p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. Cuizon, Acting Register of
Deeds. (Exhibit A, p. 3.)
While the above-mentioned case was pending in the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija, Pilar Belmonte, one of the plaintiffs, entered into the following
contracts involving her interest or rights over the parcel of land covered by
original certificate of title No. 3484:
(1) Entry No. 10984: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of Isidro M.
Mercado & Trinidad Isidro; Conditions--Pilar Belmonte sold a portion of
Seven and One-Half (7-) hectares of the property described in this title
for the sum of P5,500.00 (D-126: P-90: B-11: S-1948, Herminio E.
Algas, N. E.) Date of the Inst. June 28, 1948 at 1:30 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(2) Entry No. 10985/0-3484: Kind Sale with right of repurchase:
Executed in favor of Federico Aquino; Conditions Pilar Belmonte
sold with a right of repurchase seven and one-half (7-) hectares of her
share, interest and participation in this title for the sum of P3,600.00 (D-
127: P-90: B-11: S-48. H. Algas, N. E.) Date of the Inst. June 28,
1948; Date of the Inscription June 28, 1948 at 1:30 p.m. (Sgd.) F. C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(3) Entry No. 15110/0-3484: Kind Resale: Executed in favor of
Pilar Belmonte; Conditions Federico Aquino resold his share in this
title consisting of 7- Has. for the sum of P3,600.00 (D-63: P-15: B-6: S-
1949, Jose E. Castaeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. March 8, 1958:
Date of the Inscription April 8, 1949 at 11:30 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(4) Entry No. 15111/0-3484: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of
Dominador Asuncion and Tomasita Dansil: Pilar Belmonte sold a portion
of seven (7) Has. of her share and participation in this title for the sum of
P7,000.00. (D-64: P-15: B-6: S-1949, J. E. Castaeda, Manila) Date of
the Inst. March 9, 1949; Date of the Inscription April 8, 1949 at
11:30 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds. (Exhibit A, p. 4)
On 11 April 1950 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered
judgment in civil case No. 161, as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court absolves the defendant from the
complaint of the plaintiffs, in the same manner that plaintiffs are absolved
from the counter complaint of the defendant. Defendant is the legal owner of
the land in question and the right of redemption of the plaintiff of said land
had already elapsed. With costs to the plaintiff. (Exhibit G.)
Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his counter-claim, the defendant
Leon C. Viardo appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the appeal was
pending, the following transactions involving the interest or rights of Pilar
Belmonte over the parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No.
3484 took place:
(1) Entry No. 7967/NT-15162: Kind Partition: Executed in favor of
Felisa Belmonte, et al.; Conditions By virtue of a deed of partition, the
share of the deceased Ines de Guzman and Isidro Belmonte has been
adjudicated in favor of the heirs of said deceased. (D-891: P-77: B-V: S-
1948, Manuel E. Castaeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. March 31,
1948: Date of the Inscription Feb. 18, 1954 at 10:18 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(2) Entry No. 7968/NT-15162: Kind Agreement: Executed in favor of
Felisa Belmonte, et al; Conditions By virtue of an agreement of the
parties concerned in the partition, Lots Nos. 1-D and 1-J, with an area of
300,000 sq. m. and 80,000 sq.m., more or less, respectively in the
subdivision plan Psd-36340, a portion of lot 1 described on plan Psu-
14371, of this title, have been adjudicated in favor of Felisa Belmonte
and Lot 1-G with an area of 75,000 sq.m., more or less, of the same
subdivision, has been adjudicated in favor of Isidoro Mercado, See TCT
No. 15162 and 15163, Vol. No. 76. (D-211: P-44: B-IV: S-1952, P.
Bautista, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. Jan. 22, 1952: Date of the
Inscription Feb. 18, 1954 at 10:18 a.m.(Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register
of Deeds.
(3) Entry No. 9715/NT-15746: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of Sp.
Zacarias Belmonte and Teresita Flores; Conditions Dominador
Asuncion and Tomasita Dansil sold all their rights and interest in this title
consisting of seven hectares for the sum of P6,000.00. (D-177: P-37: B-
IV: S-1952; R. S. Pengson, N.E.) Date of the Inst. Feb. 4, 1952; Date
of Inscription May 13, 1954 at 10:08 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON,
Register of Deeds.
(4) Entry No. 12168/NT-15162: Kind Project of Partition Executed
in favor of Pilar Belmonte; Conditions By virtue of a project of partition
re-estate of the late Ines de Guzman, a portion of 13.2775 hectares of
the land described in this title has been adjudicated in favor of Pilar
Belmonte. (D-891: P-77: B-V: S-1948, Manuel E. Castaeda, Manila)
Date of the Inst. March 31, 1948: Date of the Inscription Aug. 23,
1954 at 2:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.1wph1.t
(5) Entry No. 12169/NT-16440: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of
Joaquin Driz: Conditions Pilar Belmonte sold Lot 1-B of the
subdivision plan of this title Psd-36340 a portion taken from her
undivided 13.2775 hectares with an area of 52,775 sq.m., more or less,
for the sum of P800.00. See TCT NT-16440, Vol. No. 83. (D-160: P-33:
B-I: S-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. Aug. 23,
1954; Date of the Inscription Aug. 23, 1954 at 2:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(6) Entry No. 12370/NT-16488: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of
Patricia Driz: Conditions Pilar Belmonte sold Lot 1-A of the
subdivision plan Psd-36340 being a portion of Lot 1 described in plan
Psu-14371, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 17910, of this title for the sum of
P1,000.00 with an area of 80,000 sq.m., with respect to her share of
13.2775 hectares. See TCT No. NT-16488, Vol. 83. (D-440: P-90: B-V:
S-1954, H. V. Garcia, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. Aug. 31, 1954: Date
of the Inscription Sept. 2, 1954 at 8:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON,
Register of Deeds.
(7) Entry No. 12512/NT-16546: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of
Patricia Driz: Conditions Pilar Belmonte sold Lots Nos. 1-H and 1-I of
the subdivision plan Psd-30340 of the property described in this title for
the sum of P850.00. See TCT No. NT-16524, Vol. 83. (D-167: P-35: B-I:
S-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. Sept. 9, 1954;
Date of the Inscription Sept. 9, 1954 at 11:50 a.m. (Sgd.) F. C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(8) Entry No. 12569/NT-16546: Kind Sale; Executed favor of
Patricia Driz; Conditions Pilar Belmonte sold Lot I-E of the subdivision
plan Psd-30340 of the property described in this title, with an area of
79,848 sq.m., more or less the subdivision plan of this title, was sold for
the sum of P2,000.00. See TCT No. NT-16546, Vol. 83. (D-172: P-36:
BS-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. Sept. 11,
1954; Date of the Inscription Sept. 13, 1954 at 8:20 am. (Sgd.) F.C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds. (Exhibit A, pp. 4-5.)
On 22 September 1954, a few days after the last transactions mentioned
above, the Court of Appeals passed a resolution granting the prayer of
defendant-appellant Leon C. Viardo that the children and only heirs, namely,
Artemio, Patricia, Mario, Domingo, Joaquina and Catalina, surnamed Driz,
who were all of age, be substituted for the deceased appellee Bartolome Driz
(the husband of Pilar Belmonte). (Exhibit H-1).
On 25 September 1954 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment awarding
damages prayed for in the counterclaim of Leon V. Viardo. The judgment
made the following findings and conclusions:
. . . The area of the contested property is 15 hectares. By computation,
this is capable of producing 750 cavans of palay a year. On the basis of
70-30, defendant is entitled to 225 cavans of palay a year. Therefore,
plaintiffs are under obligation to deliver to defendant this quantity of
palay every agricultural year from the filing of defendant's answer on
August 5, 1946, up to the time he vacates said land, or pay the
equivalent value thereof at P12.00 a cavan.
Having been declared owner of the land in dispute, defendant is entitled
to its possession. Inasmuch as the court below did not order plaintiffs to
restore the possession of the land in question, we hereby order them to
vacate the same and restore possession thereof to defendant. (Exhibit
H.)
This judgment of the Court of Appeals became final and executory and the
records were remanded to the lower court. On 16 December 1954 the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija issued a writ of execution (Exhibit W). The
return made by Chief of Police of the Municipality of Zaragoza on 14
February 1955 states that Leon C. Viardo had been placed in possession of
the parcel of land referred to in the writ and that levy was made on a total of
86 cavans and 74 kilos of palay, and that the same were deposited in a
warehouse (Exhibit X).
On or about 4 January 1955 Isidoro M. Mercado filed a third party claim with
the Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit Y). The affidavit attached to the
claim states that Isidoro M. Mercado and his wife purchased from Pilar
Belmonte on 28 June 1948 seven and one-half hectares of her undivided
share in the land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, that on the
same day the deed of sale was registered, that a transfer certificate of title
was issued in their names, and that since 1948 up to the time of the levy on
execution he had been in actual possession of the parcel of land, paying the
corresponding taxes thereon and had exclusively benefited from the harvests
therein, (Exhibit Y-1). The sheriff was requested not to continue with the levy
on the harvest in the parcel of land they were claiming.
On 2 February 1955 Isidoro M. Mercado filed in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija a complaint docketed as civil case No. 1718, against Leon C.
Viardo and the Provincial Sheriff. The complaint alleged that improper levy
had been made on the harvest in plaintiff's parcel of land and prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to return the palay levied
upon, together with damages. On 26 February 1955 the defendants
answered that plaintiffs' purchase of the parcel of land in question from Pilar
Belmonte was subject to whatever judgment the courts might render in civil
case No. 161 between Pilar Belmonte and Leon C. Viardo. On 17 October
1955 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija entered an order suspending
the trial of the case, in view of the information by counsel for the defendant
that his client Leon C. Viardo would file a complaint against all persons
claiming ownership of or interest in the parcel of land covered by original
certificate of title No. 3484 (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-11).
On 5 December 1955 civil case No. 2004 was filed by Leon V. Viardo against
Pilar Belmonte, Patricia Driz, Joaquina Driz, Isidoro Mercado, Trinidad Isidro,
Zacarias Belmonte, Teresita Flores, Philippine American General Insurance
Co., Inc. and the Philippine National Bank, as parties claiming some right,
participation, share or interest in the parcel of land covered by original
certificate of title No. 3484 or by trader certificates of title derived therefrom.
The defendants filed their answers. After trial,1 on 24 August 1956 the trial
court rendered judgment in civil cases Nos. 1718 and 2004, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, in Civil Case
2004, Leon C. Viardo, Isidoro M. Mercado, Zacarias Belmonte and
Patricia Driz are hereby declared CO-OWNERS PRO-INDIVISO of lots
1-A PSD-16864, which is the share of Pilar Belmonte in Lot 1, PSU
14371, OCT No. 3484 in the following proportions: ONE-HALF for LEON
C. VIARDO; 7 hectares for Isidoro M. Mercado; 7 hectares for
Zacarias Belmonte, and the remainder for Patricia Driz, it being
understood that whatever is adjudicated to Patricia Driz in the partition
shall be subject to the mortgage in favor of the Philippine National Bank;
the deeds of sale executed by Pilar Belmonte in favor of Patricia Driz,
Exhibits R and S are declared NULL AND VOID; the deeds of partition
Exhibits L and N, are set aside, and the certificates of title issued in favor
of Zacarias Belmonte, Isidoro M. Mercado and Patricia Driz, Exhibits P,
Q, R-1 and S-1 are ordered cancelled. And in civil case 1718 Isidoro M.
Mercado is hereby declared to be entitled to the products which had
been levied upon by the Provincial Sheriff. No damages are awarded.
The parties in civil case 2004 shall come to an amicable settlement with
respect to the partition. Upon their failure to arrive at an amicable
settlement, commissioner shall be appointed by this Court in accordance
with a law to make the partition.
With costs against the defendants in both cases.
Only Leon C. Viardo, plaintiff in civil case No. 2004 and defendant in civil
case No. 1718, appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 21 May 1958 the latter
certified and forwarded the appeals to this Court because the facts are not in
dispute and "the questions raised by appellant in his brief are purely legal in
nature."
In his first assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court
"erred in not annulling the sale executed by Pilar Belmonte to Isidoro M.
Mercado, marked as Exhibit I, and to Dominador Asuncion and Teresita
Bansil (Exhibit J) and the sale by Dominador Asuncion to Zacarias Belmonte
and Teresita Flores in a Deed of Sale marked Exhibit M." In support thereof
he argues that the three sales took place and were registered after he had
become the absolute owner of an undivided one-half interest in the parcel of
land owned by Pilar Belmonte and after notice of lis pendens had been
recorded on the title of Pilar Belmonte.
The argument is without merit. It is true that the appellant became the
absolute owner of an undivided one-half interest in the undivided one-fourth
interest owned by Pilar Belmonte in the parcel of land described in original
certificate of title No. 3484; that before Pilar Belmonte sold parts of her
undivided share in the parcel of land to Isidoro M. Mercado and Dominador
Asuncion and the last in turn sold his part to Zacarias Belmonte, there was
notice of lis pendens recorded on the certificate of title; and that this notice is
binding upon all who should acquire an interest in the property subsequent to
the record of the lis pendens. The notice of lis pendens (Exhibit A), however,
was limited to one-half interest acquired by Leon C. Viardo from Pilar
Belmonte. The other one-half undivided interest of the latter was not in
litigation and therefore the trial court correctly held that Pilar Belmonte, as the
owner of this undivided one-half interest, had a right to sell it and could
convey absolute title thereto or to parts thereof. Of course, the deeds of sale
executed by Pilar Belmonte appears to convey definite or segregated parts of
her remaining interest in the parcel of land described in original certificate of
title No. 3484, which she could not do, because this one-fourth in interest had
not yet been subdivided to show the interest acquired by Leon C. Viardo,
amounting to one-half of the said one-fourth interest. This defect, however,
does not result in the nullity of the deeds of sale she had executed relating to
her remaining interest of one-eighth. The sales were valid, subject only to the
condition that the interests acquired by the vendees were limited to the parts
which might be assigned to them in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership (Article 493, Civil Code).
In the second assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court
"erred in not annulling the sales executed by Pilar Belmonte in favor of her
daughters Joaquina and Patricia Driz of lots 1-B and 1-A, Exhibits U and V of
Plan PSD 36340."
Lots 1-B and 1-A of Plan PSD-36340 are taken, not from the original one-
fourth interest of Pilar Belmonte in the parcel of land covered by original
certificate of title No. 3484, which interest was levied upon and thereafter
acquired by Leon C. Viardo to the extent of one-half, but from another one-
fourth interest in the same parcel of land, which belonged originally to Ines de
Guzman, the mother of Pilar Belmonte. This one-fourth interest subsequently
devolved upon Pilar Belmonte and her two sisters. The three sisters
partitioned this one-fourth interest among themselves and lots 1-A and 1-B
were assigned to Pilar Belmonte who, in turn, sold them to her daughters.
These sales, the appellant contends, are fictitious and in fraud of his rights as
creditor.
The only evidence adduced by the appellant in support of this contention is
that the sales were made by the mother to her daughters. This is not enough
evidence to hold the sale fictitious and fraudulent. There is no evidence
whatsoever that Pilar Belmonte, at the time she sold the lots, had outstanding
debts or was in an otherwise embarrasing financial position. Even the credit
of Leon C. Viardo, the appellant, was established only after the sales were
executed, when the Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the trial court
in civil case No. 161 by awarding damages to him. There is no merit,
therefore, in the second assignment of error.
In the third assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court
"erred in declaring that the "product raised in the portion under the occupancy
of Isidoro Mercado, therefore, pertains to him and was not subject to the levy
or execution in favor of Leon C. Viardo in Civil Case No. 161." In support of
this assignment the appellant again harps on the fact that the time Isidoro
Mercado acquired an interest in the property, there was notice of lis pendens,
and therefore Isidoro Mercado "is not a purchaser in good faith."
This contention has been overruled in the first assignment of error when the
notice of lis pendens (Exhibits A and F) was held to refer not to the remaining
one-eighth interest of Pilar Belmonte in the parcel of land described in original
certificate of title No. 3484, but to the one-eighth interest which Leon C.
Viardo had acquired from Pilar Belmonte, and which the latter was trying to
recover from him in civil case No. 161. It was Pilar Belmonte who caused the
notice of lis pendens to be recorded to subject "all the rights, interests and
participation of Leon C. Viardo in this Title" to the result of the litigation in the
aforesaid civil case No. 161. Pilar Belmonte did not thereby subject her
remaining one-eighth interest to the result of civil case No. 161 which she had
filed against Leon C. Viardo. If the latter wanted to subject the remaining one-
eighth interest of Pilar Belmonte to the outcome of his counterclaim in civil
case No. 161, he should have asked for it.
The view held by this Court in passing upon the third assignment of error
renders it unnecessary for the Court to discuss the respective rights and
liabilities of co-owners when one co-owner, without the knowledge and/or
consent of the other co-owners, plants or builds on the property owned in
common.
The appellant further contends that the trial court erred "in concluding that the
heirs of Bartolome Driz could not be held personally liable for the judgment
rendered against the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 161 and therefore Lots 1-A
and 1-B cannot be subject to the payment of the judgment in favor of Leon C.
Viardo."
The only ground of appellant for this contention is that the present owners of
these lots are the children of the spouses Pilar Belmonte and Bartolome Driz,
the plaintiffs in civil case No. 161, and that, upon the death of Bartolome Driz
during the pendency of the appeal in civil case No. 161, these children were
substituted as parties. This assignment of error is without merit. The
substitution of parties was made obviously because the children of Bartolome
Driz are his legal heirs and therefore could properly represent and protect
whatever interest he had in the case on appeal. But such a substitution did
not and cannot have the effect of making these substituted parties personally
liable for whatever judgment might be rendered on the appeal against their
deceased father. Article 774 of the Civil Code provides:
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a
person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by
his will or by operation of law. (Emphasis supplied.)
The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the remedy of Leon C. Viardo,
the creditor, was to proceed against the estate of Bartolome Driz.
Moreover, it appears from the evidence that Bartolome Driz was only a formal
party to civil case No. 161, the real party in interest being his wife Pilar
Belmonte. The subject matter in litigation was Pilar Belmonte's interest in the
parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, which appears
to be paraphernal property.
The appellant's fifth and last assignment of error is that "the trial court erred in
not awarding damages to the plaintiff Leon C. Viardo in Civil Case No. 2004."
Obviously the appellant refers to the prayer in his complaint that P5,000 be
awarded to him against Pilar Belmonte for attorney's fees. He maintains that
appellee Pilar Belmonte had disposed of all her property with the intent of
avoiding payment of her liability or debt to him.
A review of the record lends credence to the appellant's claim. Appellee Pilar
Belmonte had one-fourth interest in a parcel of land containing an area of
119.2775 hectares. On 12 May 1943 Leon C. Viardo acquired one-half
interest of Pilar Belmonte's one-fourth interest. In a partition, where the
appellant did not participate but which he does not impugn, Pilar Belmonte's
original one-fourth interest was segregated and delimited. She was assigned
in that partition and subdivision, Lot 1-A of Plan PSD-16864, containing an
area of 30 hectares (Exhibit K). Upon the death of her mother, she acquired
another 13.2775 hectares. These 13.2775 hectares she sold to her two
daughters and the validity of the sales has been upheld by this Court. With
the original 30 hectares, however, Pilar Belmonte did not act in good faith
when she sold more than 15 hectares to her daughter Patricia Driz. Knowing
that one-half of said 30 hectares or a total of 15 hectares belonged to the
appellant Leon C. Viardo, she nevertheless proceeded to enter into the
following transactions: (1) sale of seven and one-half hectares to Isidoro
Mercado, dated 28 June 1948, Exhibit A; (2) sale of seven hectares to
Dominador Asuncion, who later sold the same parcel or interest to Zacarias
Belmonte, dated 9 March 1949, Exhibit A; (3) subdivision and partition of her
lot 1-A, PSD-16864, into lots 1-E, 1-F, 1-G, 1-H and 1-I, without the
knowledge of her co-owner Leon C. Viardo, Plan PSD-36340, Exhibit O; (4)
sale in favor of her daughter Patricia Driz of lots 1-H and 1-I, Plan PSD-
36340, containing an area of 20,000 and 55,152 sq. meters, respectively,
dated 9 September 1954, Exhibits R and A; and (5) sale in favor of her
daughter Patricia Driz of lot 1-E; Plan PSD-36340, containing an area of
79,848 sq. meters, dated 11 September 1954, Exhibits S and A.
It will thus be seen that on 9 March 1949, after Pilar Belmonte had sold seven
hectares to Dominador Asuncion, she had only one-half hectare left to
dispose of, since out of her original thirty hectares (Lot 1-A, PSD-16864) the
appellant Leon C. Viardo had acquired one-half or fifteen hectares, Isidoro
Mercado, seven and one-half hectares, and Dominador Asuncion, seven
hectares.
Fully aware that one-half hectare remained her only property, Pilar Belmonte
nevertheless proceeded to sell to her daughter Patricia Driz three lots
containing a combined area of more than fifteen hectares. It is obvious,
therefore, that the sales to Patricia Driz cannot be sustained, regardless of
whether Pilar Belmonte was aware or suspected that she would be held liable
for damages to Leon C. Viardo in civil case No. 161, as in fact she was held
liable by the Court of Appeals about two weeks after she had executed the
sales in favor of her daughter. The sales above referred to stand on a
different footing from the sales made in favor of Isidoro Mercado and
Dominador Asuncion, because in the latter sales Pilar Belmonte still had
something to sell, namely, her remaining fifteen hectares. But after she had
disposed of fourteen and one-half hectares to Mercado and Asuncion she
had only one-half hectare left and therefore could not sell another fifteen
hectares.
The trial court, however, did not completely annul the sales made by Pilar
Belmonte in favor of her daughter. It merely reduced the sale of fifteen
hectares to a sale of one-half hectare, obviously in the belief that the sales
should be sustained to the extent of Pilar Belmonte's remaining interest. The
record shows that both Pilar Belmonte and her daughter Patricia Driz knew
that one-half hectare only remained as the former's property, but they
nevertheless proceeded to sell and purchase more than fifteen hectares.
When it is considered further that the final judgment in civil case No. 161
awarded damages to Leon C. Viardo amounting to 225 cavans of palay from
1946 (Exhibit H) and that when this judgment was executed in 1954 no
property of Pilar Belmonte could be found to satisfy the damages (p. 11,
t.s.n.), it is evident that Pilar Belmonte and her daughter Patricia Driz had
conspired to dispose of all the property of Pilar Belmonte in order to frustrate
any award of damages the Court of Appeals might make in favor of Leon C.
Viardo and that this conspiracy must have taken place at the latest on 9
September 1954 when Pilar Belmonte proceeded to sell to her daughter
Patricia Driz parcels of land which no longer belonged to her.
The judgment appealed from is modified by holding and declaring that (1)
Leon C. Viardo, Isidoro M. Mercado, Zacarias Belmonte and Pilar Belmonte
(not Patricia Driz) are the co-owners pro-indiviso of lot 1-A, Plan PSD-16864,
which is the one-fourth share of Pilar Belmonte in lot 1, PSD-14371, original
certificate of title No. 3484, in the following proportion: one-half or fifteen
hectares owned by Leon C. Viardo, seven and one-half hectares by Isidoro
M. Mercado, seven hectares by Zacarias Belmonte, and one-half hectares by
Pilar Belmonte, subject to the rights of Leon C. Viardo to the balance of his
judgment credit against Pilar Belmonte; and (2) Leon C. Viardo is awarded
damages of P1,000 against Pilar Belmonte. In all other respects, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellees Pilar
Belmonte and Patricia Driz.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 On 30 June 1956 the complaint against the Philippine American
General Insurance Company. Inc. was dismissed because the
company no longer had any interest in the parcel of and in
dispute. It was made a defendant because it was the mortgagee
of a part of the land. When the mortgage debt was paid, it
released the mortgage.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980
CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA
ONTE, petitioners,
vs.
VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO, MARCELO
MORETO, PAULINA MORETO, ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO,
SEVERINA MENDOZA, PABLO MENDOZA, LAZARO MENDOZA,
VICTORIA TUIZA, JOSEFINA MORETO, LEANDRO MORETO and
LORENZO MENDOZA, respondents.
E.P. Caguioa for petitioners.
Benjamin C. Yatco for respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the decision of the Court
of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 35962-R, entitled "Vivencio Moreto, et al.,
Plaintiff-Appellees vs. Cornelio Pamplona, et al., Defendants-Appellants,"
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I at
Bian.
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show that:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their
marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the
Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, containing 781-544
and 1,021 square meters respectively and covered by certificates of title
issued in the name of "Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega."
The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their
marriage six (6) children, namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and
Leandro, all surnamed Moreto.
Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein
plaintiffs Vivencio, Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all
surnamed Moreto.
Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff
Victoria Tuiza.
La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs,
namely, herein plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed
Mendoza.
Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein
plaintiff Josefina Moreto.
Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his
heirs his brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the other plaintiffs herein.
On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna.
On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife
Monica Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said
deceased wife Monica, and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership
of Monica and Flaviano could be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano
Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale
(Exh. "1") covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed of sale (Exh. "1")
contained a description of lot No. 1495 as having an area of 781 square
meters and covered by transfer certificate of title No. 14570 issued in the
name of Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was
acquired during their marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of
title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was
issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona married to Apolonia Onte (Exh.
"A").
After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale (Exh. "1"), the
spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on
the eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale,
pointed to it as the land which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly
thereafter, Rafael Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and
Apolonia Onte, also built his house within lot 1496 about one meter from its
boundary with the adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano Moreto and the vendee
Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781 square
meters which was the subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495
and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale (Exh.
"1") although the fact is that the said portion sold thought of by the parties to
be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte
enlarged their house and they even constructed a piggery corral at the back
of their said house about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary
of lot 1496.
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs
demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their
house and piggery on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the
lot which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as the same belongs to the
conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was
already dead when the sale was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs
who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and
Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied by them and hence,
this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale of July 30, 1952 above-mentioned
as regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed; to declare the
plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other half of said lot; to allow the
plaintiffs to redeem the one-half portion thereof sold to the defendants. "After
payment of the other half of the purchase price"; to order the defendants to
vacate the portions occupied by them; to order the defendants to pay actual
and moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs; to order the
defendants to pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year from August 1958 until they have
vacated the premises occupied by them for the use and occupancy of the
same.
The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is
valid as the lot sold is registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are
purchasers believing in good faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the
lot sold.
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the
parties, it was found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto
and the defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because while the
said deed recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the
parties is that it was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496
which was the subject matter of their sale transaction.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part thereof
being as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs
declaring the deed of absolute sale dated July 30, 1952
pertaining to the eastern portion of Lot 1496 covering an area of
781 square meters null and void as regards the 390.5 square
meters of which plaintiffs are hereby declared the rightful owners
and entitled to its possession.
The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half
(1/2) of 1781 square meters of Lot 1496 measuring 390.5 square
meters of which defendants are declared lawful owners and
entitled to its possession.
After proper survey segregating the eastern one-half portion with
an area of 390.5 square meters of Lot 1496, the defendants shall
be entitled to a certificate of title covering said portion and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9843 of the office of the Register
of Deeds of Laguna shall be cancelled accordingly and new titles
issued to the plaintiffs and to the defendants covering their
respective portions.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of the office of the Register
of Deeds of Laguna covering Lot No. 1495 and registered in the
name of Cornelio Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte, is by
virtue of this decision ordered cancelled. The defendants are
ordered to surrender to the office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
5671 within thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become
final for cancellation in accordance with this decision.
Let copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for
the province of Laguna for his information and guidance.
With costs against the defendants. 2
The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with said judgment, appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment, hence they now come
to this Court.
The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar is whether under the
facts and circumstances duly established by the evidence, petitioners are
entitled to the full ownership of the property in litigation, or only one-half of the
same.
There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property on July
30, 1952 from Flaviano Moreto for the price of P900.00, his wife Monica
Maniega had already been dead six years before, Monica having died on
May 6, 1946. Hence, the conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano
Moreto and Monica Maniega had already been dissolved. (Article 175, (1)
New Civil Code; Article 1417, Old Civil Code). The records show that the
conjugal estate had not been inventoried, liquidated, settled and divided by
the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The necessary proceedings for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership were not instituted by the heirs either in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act
3176 amending Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an extra-judicial
partition between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse
nor was an ordinary action for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly,
the estate became the property of a community between the surviving
husband, Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica
Maniega in the concept of a co-ownership.
 The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this
bond by the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the
legal partnership and becomes the property of a community, by
operation of law, between the surviving spouse and the heirs of
the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the widower or
the widow, it he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse.
Every co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and in the
fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and he therefore may
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question.
(Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, 17 Phil. 107)
In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme Court said that "(t)here
is no reason in law why the heirs of the deceased wife may not form a
partnership with the surviving husband for the management and control of the
community property of the marriage and conceivably such a partnership, or
rather community of property, between the heirs and the surviving husband
might be formed without a written agreement." In Prades vs. Tecson, 49 Phil.
230, the Supreme Court held that "(a)lthough, when the wife dies, the
surviving husband, as administrator of the community property, has authority
to sell the property withut the concurrence of the children of the marriage,
nevertheless this power can be waived in favor of the children, with the result
of bringing about a conventional ownership in common between the father
and children as to such property; and any one purchasing with knowledge of
the changed status of the property will acquire only the undivided interest of
those members of the family who join in the act of conveyance.
It is also not disputed that immediately after the execution of the sale in 1952,
the vendees constructed their house on the eastern part of Lot 1496 which
the vendor pointed out to them as the area sold, and two weeks thereafter,
Rafael who is a son of the vendees, also built his house within Lot 1496.
Subsequently, a cemented piggery coral was constructed by the vendees at
the back of their house about one and one-half meters from the eastern
boundary of Lot 1496. Both vendor and vendees believed all the time that the
area of 781 sq. meters subject of the sale was Lot No. 1495 which according
to its title (T.C.T. No. 14570) contains an area of 781 sq. meters so that the
deed of sale between the parties Identified and described the land sold as Lot
1495. But actually, as verified later by a surveyor upon agreement of the
parties during the proceedings of the case below, the area sold was within
Lot 1496.
Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona
and Apolonia Onte as well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the
concrete piggery coral adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to
the filing of the complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a
period of over nine (9) years. And during said period, the private respondents
who are the heirs of Monica Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also
died intestate on August 12, 1956, lived as neighbors to the petitioner-
vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the occupation, possession and
ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are
persuaded and convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel by
laches to claim half of the property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by
laches is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from presenting his claim
when, by reason of abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long time to
elapse without presenting the same. (International Banking Corporation vs.
Yared, 59 Phil. 92)
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership
was already dissolved six years before and therefore, the estate became a
co-ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs
of his deceased wife, Monica Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil Code is
applicable and it provides a follows:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involve. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-
ownership when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area
and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-vendees on
which the latter built their house and also that whereon Rafael, the son of
petitioners likewise erected his house and an adjacent coral for piggery.
Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica
Maniega owned three parcels of land denominated as Lot 1495 having an
area of 781 sq. meters, Lot 1496 with an area of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot
4545 with an area of 544 sq. meters. The three lots have a total area of 2,346
sq. meters. These three parcels of lots are contiguous with one another as
each is bounded on one side by the other, thus: Lot 4545 is bounded on the
northeast by Lot 1495 and on the southeast by Lot 1496. Lot 1495 is
bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot 1496 is bounded on the west by Lot
4545. It is therefore, clear that the three lots constitute one big land. They are
not separate properties located in different places but they abut each other.
This is not disputed by private respondents. Hence, at the time of the sale,
the co-ownership constituted or covered these three lots adjacent to each
other. And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the
entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and
lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona
spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters
belonging to him at the time of the sale.
We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and
invalid as to the other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto,
the vendor, had the legal right to more than 781 sq. meters of the communal
estate, a title which he could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-
petitioners. The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-
owner as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries
over which the fences were to be erectd without objection, protest or
complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and
tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, We rule that a factual
partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created,
and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the
private respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees-petitioners
any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said vendor
Flaiano Moreto.
Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the
deceased spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to
impugn the sale executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the
consideration of P900.00 and which he, including his children, benefitted from
the same. Moreover, as the heirs of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano
Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to comply with the provisions of
Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of the vendor of
the property of delivering and transfering the ownership of the whole property
sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein private
respondents. The articles cited provide, thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing, and the other part to pay therefore a price
certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditionial.
Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and
deliver, as well as warrant the thing which is the object of the
sale.
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents
received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest
included all the property rights and obligations which were not extinguished
by their parents' death. And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code,
the contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect
between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private respondents
herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted the obligation to
deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners
(which was the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and
not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said
obligation.
The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by
petitioners for more than 9 years already as of the filing of the complaint in
1961 had been re-surveyed by private land surveyor Daniel Aranas.
Petitioners are entitled to a segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the
issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in their name based on the
relocation survey.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from
is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that the sale made and
executed by Flaviano Moreto in favor of the petitioners-vendees is hereby
declared legal and valid in its entirely.
Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full ownership of the 781 sq.
meters at the eastern portion of Lot 1496 now occupied by said petitioners
and whereon their houses and piggery coral stand.
The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to segregate the area of
781 sq. meters from Certificate of Title No. 9843 and to issue a new Transfer
Certificate of Title to the petitioners covering the segregated area of 781 sq.
meters.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y
BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,3 dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision
of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the
defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and
interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja
Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner,
Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters
of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The
said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings
No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in
my name according to the records of the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the
aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set forth
hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the
children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and
Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No.
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon
of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he
dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75)
(sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar,
until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of
the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002
(10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in
the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza
on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event
that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell,
lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also
the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of
sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December,
SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of
Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the
mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my addition
(Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this
Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my
near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the
ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further
command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot
No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to sell, lease,
mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and
my sister."4
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued
in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and
children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed
Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought
a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the
Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The
Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the
Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank
and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's
specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near
descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver
one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25
piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y
Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the
complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated
demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the
Codicil which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or
mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall
likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per
crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs
to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja
Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of
the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on
March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant
Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan
Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and
acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable
settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation
to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of
TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more
specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our
names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of
each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered
compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will
compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88,
will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned
therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the
composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the total
amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered
cash installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar
crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91;
and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."5
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of
Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding
to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision,
dismissing the complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the
action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has
as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of
the command as mandated exaction from them simply because they are the
children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does
not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall.
Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined
that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the
heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to
her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."6
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's
right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No.
1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs
of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-
appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said
obligation since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the
codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the
estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it
proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates
of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant
must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure
the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja
Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the
codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the
produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one
entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to
reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the
estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."7
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
found his way to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court
of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the
testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling
that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution
within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in
accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and
in deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of
the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find
application as there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a
mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to
be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to
deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not complied with. And since
the testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution
and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the
reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are
merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or
reference as to who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles
8438 and 8459 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as
not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that
the Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the
propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of
cause of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found
that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the
private respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner
pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in
accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent10 and compulsory heirs
are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or
widower, are compulsory heirs.11 Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters,
as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the
latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the
successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the
decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property,
rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject
Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And
since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon
his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be
delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over
the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to
deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such
obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private
respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now
being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar.
Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and
the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal
institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a
substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near
descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the
piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take
the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the
testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the
property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her,
renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution,12 or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express
charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommissary substitution.13 The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of
the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the
first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.14 In the case
under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the
Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and
turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point,
petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly
mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the
second heir.15 In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact
allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is
with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important
element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly
imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its
transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly
imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary
substitution."16 Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is
not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or
his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private
respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing
here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or
the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is
not related by first degree to the second heir.17 In the case under scrutiny, the
near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and
therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point.
Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the
property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be
considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that
the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of
the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together
with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the
preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the
testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in
conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is
known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal
institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the
institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or
(3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.18 A "mode" imposes an
obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his
rights to the succession.19 On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary
disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be
entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not
obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.20 To some extent, it
is similar to a resolutory condition.21
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly
that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation
on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one
hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the
Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555
not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear,
though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be SO ORDERED.
turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature
because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however,
affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an
obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless
it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the
testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and
not conditional.22
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private
respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property
itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited
to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the
Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to
be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made.23 Such construction as will sustain
and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.24
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver
One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such
obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and
their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or
otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in
the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena
Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's
near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with
the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's
near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the
testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest,
the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said
obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-
interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the
amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been
assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the
obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial
and constructive compliance of his obligation through the consummated
settlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and having
consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private
respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable settlement
and not the seizure of subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.25 Since
the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties
be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed.
Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would
thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953
MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA,
DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-
appellants.
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5)
parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of
Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four
children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed
Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in
1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other
heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took
possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and
enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21,
1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a
public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and,
in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by
way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other
property that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court
rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the
ownership and possession of the lands in dispute without special
pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of
Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the
present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the
defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino
Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-
defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much
prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is
evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he
was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only
heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly
said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them
a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil.,
321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson
over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over
the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future
property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed
of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be
entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject
of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino
on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41
Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants
are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil
Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new
Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status
and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which
the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code),
and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the
new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253,
new Civil Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed
that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect
even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the
former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any
vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if
a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at
once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been
done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new
right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same
origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of
ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945
upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative
provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new
right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of
the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested
right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying
in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in
question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while
the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage
somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart
from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said
assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property,
inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be
valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in
the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code).
Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the
alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA,
administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO
DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased)
as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate
Estate of Francisco de Borja, appellant. .
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O.
VDA. DE DE BORJA, special Administratrix appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
the late Francisco de Borja, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late
Josefa Tangco, defendant-appellant.
L-28040
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.
Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.
Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.
Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.
L-28568
Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.
L-28611
Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of the testate estate of
Francisco de Borja, 1 from the approval of a compromise agreement by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its Special Proceeding No. R-
7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja,
Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the
disapproval of the same compromise agreement by the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special Proceeding No. 832,
entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja,
Special Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No.
7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion, which is the main object of
the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and exclusive property
of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with
his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to
his testate estate, which is under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832
of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa
Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which
was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946,
Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their
son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on
14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate estate of his
mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took
unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death,
Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special administratrix. The validity
of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana
Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits;
including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases remain pending
determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has
been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to
all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October
1963, 2 by and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first
marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the
Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of
Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and
conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and
between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first
marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa
Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja
by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton
Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein
terminate and settle, with finality, the various court
litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc.,
between them in connection with the administration,
settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution of
the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse
of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have
agreed voluntarily and without any reservations to
enter into and execute this agreement under the
following terms and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion
portion of the Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala,
Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate
Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal),
more specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio
Puwang que la separa de la
jurisdiccion del Municipio
de Pililla de la Provincia de
Rizal, y con el pico del
Monte Zambrano; al Oeste
con Laguna de Bay; por el
Sur con los herederos de
Marcelo de Borja; y por el
Este con los terrenos de la
Familia Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313
hectares at the amount of P0.30 per square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself
to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total
amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash, which
represent P200,000 as his share in the payment and
P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto,
Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and
this shall be considered as full and complete
payment and settlement of her hereditary share in
the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as
the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-
Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal,
respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or
devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja
by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter
Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to
her for consideration or otherwise. The funds for this
payment shall be taken from and shall depend upon
the receipt of full payment of the proceeds of the
sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby
assumes payment of that particular obligation
incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of
the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now
Development Bank of the Philippines, amounting to
approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes
payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and
Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco
de Borja or the sum of P3,500.00, more or less,
which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala,
"Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2 of this
Agreement and paid directly to the Development
Bank of the Philippines and the heirs-children of
Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is
hereby authorized to pay directly to Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the
payment due her under paragraph 2 of this
Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue
in the name of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
corresponding certified checks/treasury warrants,
who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to
Jose de Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate
of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs,
successors, executors, administrators, and assigns,
hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw, waive,
remise, release and discharge any and all manner of
action or actions, cause or causes of action, suits,
debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages,
claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity,
which they ever had, or now have or may have
against each other, more specifically Sp.
Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-Rizal, and
Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033,
CFI Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal,
as well as the case filed against Manuel Quijal for
perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the
intention being to completely, absolutely and finally
release each other, their heirs, successors, and
assigns, from any and all liability, arising wholly or
partially, directly or indirectly, from the
administration, settlement, and distribution of the
assets as well as liabilities of the estates of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse
of Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically
renounce absolutely her rights as heir over any
hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon
receipt of the payment under paragraph 4 hereof,
shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers,
titles and documents belonging to Francisco de
Borja which are in her possession and said heir Jose
de Borja shall issue in turn the corresponding
receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon
the fulfillment of the sale of the properties mentioned
under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon
receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds
of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion",
otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will
render this instrument NULL AND VOID AND
WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have
her unto set their hands in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement
of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special
Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the
compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and
unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja
appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case
No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of
disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12
October 1963 is not disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by
Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such
kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2)
that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between
Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid,
it has ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana
Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision
in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's majority held the
view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the
settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the
decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed
out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised
Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a
decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the
decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors
are represented by their judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of
Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still
pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those circumstances,
it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement,
Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October
1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of
Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a
deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on
the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil.
479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties have already divided
the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is a
useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner,
the probate of the will is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at
bar. This is apparent from an examination of the terms of the agreement
between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said
agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to
Tasiana Ongsingco
shall be considered as full complete payment
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of
the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of
Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed
or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja
by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter
Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to
her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is
not applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or
distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the
probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor
in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) 3 there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of
such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate. 4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to
what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory
character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither
does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the
parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them,
Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be dismissed,
although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the
character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only
because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of
Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article
995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or
valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of
Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will
were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the
will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the
case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between
"Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their
individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without
previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only difference
between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved
by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art.
2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the
effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be
no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the
agreement Annex A expressed no definite period for
its performance, the same was intended to have a
 resolutory period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In
support of such contention, it is averred that such a
limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in
similar terms entered into by said Ongsingco with
the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit,
Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de
Borja, except that the consideration was fixed at
P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-
28040, pp. 39- 46) and which contained the following
clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon
the consummation of the sale of the property
mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and
full payment of the proceeds of the sale by the
herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja,
namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all
surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the
said property mentioned herein is consummated, or
the non-receipt of the purchase price thereof by the
said owners within the period of sixty (60) days from
the date hereof, this agreement will become null and
void and of no further effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja
was not a party to this particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same
appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no date, the day being left
blank "this day of October 1963"; and while signed by the parties, it was
not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a
proposed notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract
with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed
that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco,
P600,000 represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and
Matilde all surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the consideration of
P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof that the duly
notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963
(Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalize
agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory
term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being repeated in Annex A,
can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover
manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to
be made within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose de
Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and
ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to
raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the
estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized by the
Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in
approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the
finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for
the terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no
jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because
Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of Josefa Tangco pending
settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja,
whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was
sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the estate of her
late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share
she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija
could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share,
Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such
alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the
present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary
rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of
the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale
thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja
(Annex "A") is void because it amounts to a compromise as to her status and
marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the
very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex "A")
describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his
second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself
definite admission of her civil status. There is nothing in the text of the
agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the
surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the
cession of her hereditary rights.
part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special
Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in L-28568, page 157),
that the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been
abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared that
"no amicable settlement had been arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de
Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the proposed
amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in
the order and motion above-mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13
October 1963, which already had been formally signed and executed by the
parties and duly notarized. What the record discloses is that some time after
its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out from the
compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition
to the Court's approval of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23):
that the same was invalid because of the lapse of the allegedly intended
resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not preceded by
the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevarra
vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting
Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which
objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in view of the
widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or
novatory agreement before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of
Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately entail a longer delay in
attaining final remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is
apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in
pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it is
more than probable that the order of 21 September 1964 and the motion of
17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a more
satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not
invalidate the original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de
Borja in finally seeking a court order for its approval and enforcement from
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed
that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality
of the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law,
and, therefore, its order should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the
appeal has affected her unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the
agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the value of the Jalajala property
has increased. But the fact is that her delay in receiving the payment of the
agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to
nullify the agreement (Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the
advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And as to the devaluation de
facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30
June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were
to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of
currency and properties of the estate", is particularly opposite in the present
case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion), concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his
marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the husband's private property (as
contended by his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms
First Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that
there was adequate evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of its
conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and
Jose de Borja has become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion
reached by this Court in the two preceding cases (G.R. No. L-28568),
upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in the
estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with
the accompanying reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the
question may affect the rights of possible creditors and legatees, its
resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had
been originally acquired jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and
Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was duly registered in their names as
co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in
1931, the Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section
went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja, and
the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja (V.
De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N.
Puang River; E. Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs of
Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay; containing an
area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at
P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose de Borja, in his
capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first wife),
seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private
property of Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de
Borja claimed that it was conjugal property of his parents (Francisco de Borja
and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption established by Article
160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of
1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory,
moral and exemplary, as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano,
held that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) to be the
exclusive private property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his
Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its
possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of
the Hacienda in question as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-
Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco de Borja no less than
two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory that, as executor of the estate of
his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No.
7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and
again, in the Reamended Accounting of the same date, also filed in the
proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de
Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein
an inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property
among the "Conjugal Properties of the Spouses Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco". And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the
Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an
inventory wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading
"Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate
Estate of the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain
admissions against interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the
Administratrix of his estate, in the course of judicial proceedings in the Rizal
and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor of the
conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) was not conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of
the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the strength of the following
evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951
(Exhibit "F") that
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya
delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337 hectareas)
adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion
de Jalajala, Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the
entire Hacienda had been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of
which amount P25,100 was contributed by Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. weight than the self-serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the
by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent demand from the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de
provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually
brother Bernardo that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co- confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the
owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the proposal, Marcelo issue a check Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal
for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount would partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The
witness further testified that No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that
claims for damages should be ventilated in the corresponding special
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased, the same
to him by Francisco de Borja when he was still a requires no pro announcement from this Court.
bachelor and which he derived from his business
transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First
pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied) Instance of Rizal in Case No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those
involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are reversed and set aside.
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3)
overweighed the admissions in the inventories relied upon by defendant- cases.
appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not finally determine
questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the testimony of Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo,
Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
original Hacienda with his private funds, for which reason that share can not
Fernando, J., took no part.
be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as exclusive property of the
buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4) of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
Footnotes
xxx xxx xxx
1 She died during the pendency of these appeals,
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of being substituted by Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.,
the wife or of the husband. administrator of the estate (S.C. Resolution, 27
February 1970).
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place,
witness Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by 2 Annex A, Record on Appeal, G.R. No. L-28040,
Francisco for his share was plain hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no pp. 16-21.
probative value, since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja had
told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the 3 Also: Osorio vs. Osorio Steamship Co., 41 Phil.
statement, since both Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead 531; Baun vs. Heirs of Baun, 53 Phil. 654; Barretto
when Gregorio testified. In addition, the statement itself is improbable, since vs. Tuason, 59 Phil. 845; Cuevas vs. Abesamis, 71
there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio Phil. 147; Jayme vs. Gamboa, 75 Phil. 479; Iballe vs.
how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Po.
Marcelo. A ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's
4 Garcia vs. David, 67 Phil. 279; Jakosalem vs.
testimony. Rafols, 73 Phil. 628.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof
(ante, page 14) does not clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y
exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers precisely to the Hacienda in
question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there were two real
properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m.,
assessed at P44,600, and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which
is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did
the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In addition,
Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo"
is plainly self-serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross
examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant
(Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7") are not conclusive on the conjugal character of
the property in question; but as already noted, they are clear admissions
against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and his
executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and
PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the
minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA,
MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and
HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of
Abra, respondents.
Federico Paredes for petitioners.
Demetrio V. Pre for private respondents.
MARTIN, J:
This is a petition for review 1 of the Order of the Court of First Instance of
Abra in Civil Case No. 856, entitled Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et
al., denying the motions for reconsideration of its order dismissing the
complaint in the aforementioned case.
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and
Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the
Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land
located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint,
but before the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff
moved to amend the complaint in order to include certain allegations therein.
The motion to amend the complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975,
plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has
no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14,
1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of
Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her
husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing immediately
dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party
in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order
dismissing the complaint and on August 23, 1975, he moved to set aside the
order of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court. 2
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
counsel for the plaintiff for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for
deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio
Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother,
but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order,
counsel for the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of
the order dismissing the complaint claiming that the same is in violation of
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing
the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for
reconsideration of said order of dismissal. While it is true that a person who is
dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing
the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of
Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed
on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March
31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had
acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of
Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the
pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the
duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give
the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other
legal representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for the
deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that
Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution
of parties in the case. The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the
substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has
no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code
provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent,
the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights
and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights
thereto except by the methods provided for by law. 3 The moment of death is
the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs
to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration
of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. 5 When Fortunata
Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in
Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to
her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the
properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is,
therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as
parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice,
the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the
deceased, within such time as may be granted ... ." The question as to
whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. 6 In the causes of action which survive the wrong
complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the
injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action
which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property
and rights of property affected being incidental. 7 Following the foregoing
criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title
over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property
and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It
is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal
representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for
her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel
for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the
complaint. This should not have been done for under the same Section 17,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal
representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. In the instant case the
respondent Court did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased because
her counsel has not only asked that the minor children be substituted for her
but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for
them because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family. But
the respondent Court refused the request for substitution on the ground that
the children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is another grave
error because the respondent Court ought to have known that under the
same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint
a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the
counsel for the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that
the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as guardian ad litem for them.
Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not
complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the
complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of
parties in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 of the Court of First Instance
of Abra and the motions for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of said
complaint are set aside and the respondent Court is hereby directed to allow
the substitution of the minor children, who are the petitioners therein for the
deceased plaintiff and to appoint a qualified person as guardian ad litem for
them. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Which this Court treats as special civil action as per its Resolution
dated February 11, 1976.
2 Section 16. Duty of Attorney upon which death, incapacity or
incompetency of party. - Whenever a party to a pending case dies,
becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his
attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or
incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representative.
Section 17. Death of party.After a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may
be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the
court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest
of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for
the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 129008 January 13, 2004
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her
husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA
O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA UNGOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P.
ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO
JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P.
ORFINADA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the
appointment of an administrator is the issue in this case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeks to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
42053 dated January 31, 1997, as well as its Resolution2 dated March 26,
1997, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City
leaving several personal and real properties located in Angeles City,
Dagupan City and Kalookan City.3 He also left a widow, respondent
Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he
had seven children who are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P.
Orfinada, Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden,
Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P.
Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada.4
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his
paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who
became a part of his life when he entered into an extra-marital relationship
with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in
1965, and co-petitioners Veronica5, Alberto and Rowena.6
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada
discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her
children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person
with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in
Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued
Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners
Teodora Rioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and
Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents also found out that petitioners were
able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc.
by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-
judicial settlement.7
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed
a Petition for Letters of Administration docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118
before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, praying that letters of
administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued
to him.8
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the
Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased
Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related
Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan,
Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.9
On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint
interposing the defense that the property subject of the contested deed of
extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging to the
parents of Teodora Riofero10 and that the titles thereof were delivered to her
as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in
his name.11 Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents
are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O.
Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.12 On
April 29, 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for
Hearing13 on the aforesaid ground.
The lower court denied the motion in its Order14 dated June 27, 1996, on the
ground that respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in
the absence of an administrator who is yet to be appointed in S.P. Case No.
5118. Petitioners moved for its reconsideration15 but the motion was likewise
denied.16
This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as CA G.R. S.P. No.
42053.17 Petitioners averred that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed order which denied the dismissal of the case
on the ground that the proper party to file the complaint for the annulment of
the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased is the estate of the
decedent and not the respondents.18
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision19 dated January 31,
1997, stating that it discerned no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent judge when he denied
petitioners motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing in view of its
discretionary nature.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was
denied.20 Hence, the petition before this Court.
The issue presented by the petitioners before this Court is whether the heirs
have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased
subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceedings.21
Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the
case for preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense that the proper party
to bring the action is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. It
must be stressed that the holding of a preliminary hearing on an affirmative
defense lies in the discretion of the court. This is clear from the Rules of
Court, thus:
SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of the
grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper venue,
may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary
hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been
filed.22 (Emphasis supplied.)
Certainly, the incorporation of the word "may" in the provision is clearly
indicative of the optional character of the preliminary hearing. The word
denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory
effect.23Subsequently, the electivity of the proceeding was firmed up beyond
cavil by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the inclusion of the phrase "in
the discretion of the Court", apart from the retention of the word "may" in
Section 6,24 in Rule 16 thereof.
Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower courts
doorstep for not hearing petitioners affirmative defense, it cannot likewise be
faulted for recognizing the legal standing of the respondents as heirs to bring
the suit.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have
legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he
rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the
property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a
person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by
operation of law.25
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs
may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is
the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the
rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 326 and Section 2, Rule
8727 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,28 this
Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and
properties of the decedent under administration pending the appointment of
an administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules,29 while permitting an executor or administrator
to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit
the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily
applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been
appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in
which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have
already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In
such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment
of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed
would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of
the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the
properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two
exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to
bring suit;30 and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in
the act complained of31 and he is made a party defendant.32 Evidently, the
necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate
is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as
where there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring
suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the
recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of administration
proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed
administrator such as in this case.
As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in upholding the order of
the lower court, recourse to this Court is not warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149017 November 28, 2008
VALENTE RAYMUNDO,petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTA ISAGON VDA. DE SUAREZ, DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA
SUAREZ, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR, EVELYN SUAREZ, ET
AL., respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assails the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision1and Resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58090 which
reversed, set aside and recalled the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Orders3 in
Civil Case No. 51203.
First, the long settled facts.
Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez'4 marriage was blessed with both
material wealth and progeny in herein respondents, namely,
Danilo,5 Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr., Evelyn, and Reggineo,6 all surnamed Suarez.
During their marriage, governed by the conjugal partnership of gains regime,
they acquired numerous properties, which included the following: (1) a parcel
of land situated in Barrio Caniogan, Pasig with an area of 348 square meters
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 30680; (2) property located
in Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, with an area of 1,020 square meters under Tax
Declaration No. A-016-01003; and (3) Lot Nos. 5, 6 & 7, Block 2 covered by
Tax Declaration No. A-01700723 (subject properties).
After the death of Marcelo Sr. in 1955, Teofista and herein respondents, as
well as Elpidio Suarez,7executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate,8 partitioning Marcelo Sr.'s estate, thus:
WHEREAS, the said deceased is survived by the parties hereto
who are his only legal heirs: TEOFISTA ISAGON, being the
surviving spouse, and EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, ELPIDIO
SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ, EVELYN SUAREZ, MARCELO
SUAREZ, JR. and REGGINEO SUAREZ, being the legitimate
children of the deceased with the said TEOFISTA ISAGON;
WHEREAS, the minors ELPIDIO, SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ,
EVELYN SUAREZ, MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and REGGINEO
SUAREZ are represented herein by EUFROCINA S. ANDRES,
in her capacity as the guardian and legal administrator of the
property of the said minors;
WHEREAS, there are no known debts or financial obligations of
whatever nature and amount against the estate of the deceased;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises,
the Parties have agreed to settle and liquidate the assets of the
conjugal partnership between the deceased and TEOFISTA
ISAGON, and to settle and adjudicate the estate of the said
deceased, by and pursuance to these presents, in the following
manner, to wit:
1. That TEOFISTA ISAGON, as the surviving spouse and partner
of the deceased, shall receive in absolute and exclusive
ownership the following properties as her lawful share in the
assets of the conjugal partnership of gains between her and the
deceased, to wit:
(a) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel
of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6938,
situated at Sitio Pantayan, Municipality of Taytay,
Province of Rizal;
(b) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel
of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6939,
situated at Sitio Pantayan, Municipality of Taytay,
Province of Rizal;
(c) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel
of land covered by TCT No. 38291, situated at Barrio
Rosario, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal;
(d) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel
of land covered by TCT No. 38290, situated at Barrio
Rosario, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal;
(e) TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY
PESOS AND NINETY (P12,530.90) deposited with
the Commercial Bank and Trust Company of the
Philippines, and THIRTY-NINE PESOS (P39.00)
deposited with Prudential Bank.
2. That the Parties TEOFISTA ISAGON, EUFROCINA S.
ANDRES, ELPIDIO SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ, EVELYN
SUAREZ, MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and REGGINEO SUAREZ,
shall each and all receive and be entitled to a share equivalent to
one-seventh (1/7) of the estate of the deceased MARCELO
SUAREZ, which estate is comprised of the following properties,
to wit:
(a) A parcel of land covered by TCT No. 30680,
situated at Barrio Kaniogan, Municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal, with an assessed value
of P4,150.00.
(b) Three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
33982, 33983 and 33984, situated at Barrio Pineda,
Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, with an
assessed value of P560.00.
(c) A parcel of land covered by TCT 33986, situated
at Barrio Pineda, Municipality of Pasig, Province of
Rizal, with an assessed value of P440.00.
(d) Two (2) parcels of land, being Lots Nos. 42 and
44 of the amendment-subdivision plan TY-4653-
Amd., being a portion of Lot 2 described on the
original plan II-4653, G.L.R.O. Record No. _____,
situated at Barrio Santolan, Municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal, with a total assessed value
of P590.00.
(e) Two parcels of land, being Lots Nos. 43 and 45
of the amendment-subdivision plan TY-4653-Amd.,
being a portion of Lot 2 described on the original
plan II-4653, G.L.R.O. Record No. _______, situated
at Barrio Santolan, Municipality of Pasig, Province of
Rizal, with a total assessed value of P1,190.00.
(f) A parcel of land, being Lot No. 6, Block 269 of the
subdivision plan pos-112, being a portion of Lot 2,
Block 348, Psd-3188, G.L.R.O. Record Nos.
375,699 and 917, situated at San Felipe Neri,
Province of Rizal, with an assessed value
of P6,340.00.
(g) A parcel of land covered by OCT No. 391,
situated in the Municipality of Taytay, Province of
Rizal, with an assessed value of P1,840.00.
(h) TWELVE THOUSAND (12,000) shares of stock
of the Consolidated Mines, Inc. represented by
Certificate No. 71-5-B (for 1,000 shares) and
Certificate No. 12736 (for 11,000 shares).
PROVIDED, that their title to the properties hereinabove
mentioned shall be in common and the share of each heir
being pro indiviso.
Curiously, despite the partition, title to the foregoing properties, explicitly
identified in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate as forming part of Marcelo's
and Isagon's property regime, remained in the couple's name. Not
surprisingly, Teofista continued to administer and manage these properties.
On the whole, apart from those now owned exclusively by Teofista, all the
properties were held pro indiviso by Teofista and her children; and respective
titles thereto were not changed, with Teofista as de facto administrator
thereof.
In 1975, Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal Realty) and Teofista, the latter
owning ninety percent (90%) of the former's shares of stock, were sued by
petitioner Valente Raymundo, his wife Violeta, Virginia Banta and Maria
Concepcion Vito (plaintiffs) in consolidated cases for Rescission of Contract
and Damages, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 21736 to 21739. Thereafter, in
1975, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 1, rendered
judgment: (1) rescinding the respective contracts of plaintiffs with Rizal Realty
and Teofista, and (2) holding the two defendants solidarily liable to plaintiffs
for damages in the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000.00.9
When the judgment of the CFI became final and executory, herein subject
properties were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 to satisfy the
judgment against Teofista and Rizal Realty. The aforementioned plaintiffs
were the highest bidder, and bought the levied properties for the amount
of P94,170.00. As a result, a certificate of sale was issued to them and
registered in their favor on August 1, 1983. On July 31, 1984, the Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal issued a final deed of sale over the subject properties.
Parenthetically, before expiration of the redemption period, or on June 21,
1984, herein respondents filed a revindicatory action against petitioner
Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, docketed as Civil Case No.
51203, for the annulment of the auction sale and recovery of ownership of the
levied properties. Essentially, respondents alleged in their complaint that they
cannot be held liable for the judgment rendered against their mother,
Teofista, not having been impleaded therein; and consequently, the subject
properties, which they own pro indiviso with their mother, can neither be
levied nor be sold on execution.
Meanwhile, the RTC, Branch 151, formerly the CFI, Branch 1, in Civil Case
Nos. 21376 to 21379, issued an Order10 directing Teofista: (1) to vacate the
subject properties, (2) to desist from despoiling, dismantling, removing or
alienating the improvements thereon, (3) to place petitioner Valente, Violeta,
Virginia and Maria Concepcion in peaceful possession thereof, and (4) to
surrender to them the owner's duplicate copy of the torrens title and other
pertinent documents. Herein respondents, joined by their mother, Teofista,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the subject properties are co-
owned by them and further informing the RTC of the filing and pendency of
Civil Case No. 51203. Nonetheless, the trial court denied Teofista's and
herein respondents' motion, reiterated its previous order, which included,
among others, the order for Teofista and all persons claiming right under her,
to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale.
Undaunted, Teofista and herein respondents filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA to annul the foregoing orders. The appellate court,
on July 6, 1987, dismissed Teofista's and herein respondents' petition, thus:
We believe this petition cannot prosper for two reasons. First, as
purported case for certiorari it fails to show how the respondent
judge had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. The two orders being assailed were
preceded by a final judgment, a corresponding writ of execution,
a levy on execution and a judicial sale, all of which enjoy a strong
sense presumption of regularity.
Secondly, as far as [petitioner] Teofista Suarez is concerned, she
cannot complain about the levy because she was a party in the
consolidated cases where judgment was rendered against her in
her personal capacity. Since she did not appeal from the
decision, she cannot say that the judgment is erroneous for an
obligation that belong to the corporation. And with respect to the
children of Teofista Suarez, who are co-petitioners in this
proceedings [herein respondents], suffice it to point out that not
being parties in the consolidated cases, what they should have
done was to immediately file a third party claim. The moment
levy was made on the parcels of land, which they claim are theirs
by virtue of hereditary succession, they should have seasonably
filed such claim to protect their rights. As the record discloses,
however, the children chose to remain silent, and even allowed
the auction sale to be held, filing almost a year later a half-
hearted complaint to annul the proceedings which they allowed
to be dismissed by not diligently prosecuting it.
In Santos v. Mojica (10 SCRA 318), a partition case with third-
party claimants, the Supreme Court came out with the following
ruling: "The procedure (a petition for certiorari) followed by him (a
petitioner not party to the original partition case) in vindicating his
right is not the one sanctioned by law, for he should have filed a
separate and independent action making parties therein the
sheriff and the plaintiffs responsible for the execution xxx. It can,
therefore, be said that (he) acted improperly in filing the present
petition because his remedy was to file a separate and
independent action to vindicate his ownership over the land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied and the restraining order
previously issued is DISSOLVED, with costs against
petitioners.11
On the other litigation front concerning Civil Case No. 51203, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by the RTC Pasig, Branch 155, on February
25, 1985, enjoining petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion
from transferring to third parties the levied properties based on its preliminary
finding that the auctioned properties are co-owned by Teofista and herein
respondents. Subsequently, however, Civil Case No. 51203 was dismissed
by the RTC, Branch 155, at the instance of petitioner Valente for failure of
herein respondents to prosecute. But in yet another turn of events, the RTC,
Branch 155, lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed the issuance of
alias summons.
Thus, it was now petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's and Maria
Concepcion's turn to file a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the
various orders of the RTC, Branch 155, which all rejected their bid to dismiss
Civil Case No. 51203. The CA granted their petition, thus:
And the fact that herein private respondents, as the legal heirs of
Teofista Vda. de Suarez and supposedly not parties in Civil Case
Nos. 21376 - 21379 does not preclude the application of the
doctrine of res judicata since, apart from the requisites
constitutive of this procedural tenet, they were admittedly the
children of Teofista Suarez, who is the real party-in-interest in the
previous final judgment. As successors-in-interest of Teofista
Suarez, private respondents merely stepped into the shoes of
their mother in regard to the levied pieces of property. Verily,
there is identity of parties, not only where the parties in both
actions are the same, but where there is privity with them as in
the cases of successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or where there is substantial
identity.
Finally, the action to annul the judicial sale filed by herein private
respondents is not the reinvindicatory suit, much less the third
party claim contemplated by Section 17 of Rule 39.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and
the questioned orders dated February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989
and February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are
hereby annulled; further respondent judge is ordered to dismiss
Civil Case No. 51203.12
From this ruling, herein respondents appealed to the Supreme Court. In
Suarez v. Court of Appeals,13we reversed the appellate court, thus:
Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both
petitioner [herein respondents] and private respondents
[petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion] and
the developments subsequent to the filing of the complaint, [w]e
cannot but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.
It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the
validity of the execution and the manner of publicly selling en
masse the subject properties for auction. To start with, only one-
half of the 5 parcels of land [subject properties] should have
been the subject of the auction sale.
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law
applicable at the time of the institution of the case:
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent."
Article 888 further provides:
"The legitime of the legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the
rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as
hereinafter provided."
Article 892, par. 2 likewise provides:
"If there are two or more legitimate children or
descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled
to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the
legitimate children or descendants."
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is
equal to the legitime of each child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners [herein respondents] in the
levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to
that of their mother [Teofista]. Petitioners [herein respondents]
became co-owners of the property not because of their mother
[Teofista] but through their own right as children of their
deceased father [Marcelo Sr.]. Therefore, petitioners [herein
respondents] are not barred in any way from instituting the action
to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
27, 1990 as well as its Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby
REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is
reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to
petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to said portion.
It was at this point when another series of events transpired, culminating in
the present petition.
Upon our reinstatement of Civil Case No. 51203, each and every pleading
filed by herein respondents, as plaintiffs therein, was hotly contested and
opposed by therein defendants, including petitioner Valente. Moreover, even
at that stage, when the case had been remanded with a directive to
"determine that portion which belongs to [herein respondents] and to annul
the sale with regard to said portion," Civil Case No. 51203 had to be re-raffled
and transferred, for varied reasons, to the different court branches in Pasig
City. In between all these, petitioner Valente, along with the other defendants,
repeatedly filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 for the purported
failure of herein respondents to prosecute the case. Most of these Motions to
Dismiss were denied.
With each transfer of Civil Case No. 51203, the judge to which the case was
raffled had to study the records anew. Expectedly, part of the records went
missing and were lost. On April 12, 1993, the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch
71, to which Civil Case No. 51203 was remanded, filed a report on the
records of the case, to wit:
1. The first volume of the record in the above-entitled case was
recorded as received on June 20, 1990, by Sheriff Alejandro O.
Loquinario;
2. That the staff of Branch 71 at this time was sharing a small
room with Branch 161 at the First Floor of the Justice Hall, and
 as the Branch was newly formed, it had no equipment or
furniture of its own, and was still undermanned;
3. That sometime in August 1990, Branch 71 moved to the
staffroom of Branch 159 at the Second Floor of the Justice Hall;
4. That on October 25, 1990, this Court received a Notice of
Judgment dated October 22, 1990 from the Court of Appeals that
ruled the dismissal of the above-entitled case, and as per
standing instructions of Judge Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall,
the same was bound as volume 2 of the case;
5. That just before the Christmas vacation in 1991, the branch
was forced to hastily move all of its records and equipment to
branch 69, because of the unexpected notice we received that
the room we were occupying was to be demolished in order to
meet the schedule for the renovation of the building;
6. That unfortunately, the room was demolished before the
undersigned could make a last check to see if everything was
transferred;
7. That it was only later on that this office discovered that
important documents were indeed lost, including transcripts of
stenographic notes in a case that was submitted for decision;
8. That sometime in May 1992, the branch moved its Office to its
present location;
9. That on March 8, 1993, this Court received a copy of a
Decision of the Supreme Court reversing the earlier ruling of the
Court of Appeals;
10. That it was at this time that the first volume of this case,
which was bundled along with other cases which were decided
and/or archived, was reported as missing;
11. That from the time the same was found to be missing, Judge
Claravall ordered that a search for the same be made in all of the
offices wherein this branch was forced to share a room with, as
well as the Court of Appeals, in the event that the same was
transmitted to said Court;
12. That all the efforts were in vain, as said record could not be
located anywhere;
13. That the undersigned now concludes that the first volume of
the above-entitled case was probably lost during the renovation
of the Justice Hall Building, and will have to be reconstituted with
the use of documents in the possession of the parties, or
documents entered as exhibits in other Courts.14
In this regard, herein respondents filed a Motion for Reconstitution of
Records15 of the case. Initially, petitioner Valente, and the other defendants --
Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion -- opposed the motion.16 However, the
trial court eventually granted the motion for reconstitution, and ordered
petitioner Valente and the other defendants to submit a copy of their Answer
filed thereat and copies of other pleadings pertinent to the case.17
Thereafter, three (3) incidents, among numerous others, set off by the parties'
pleadings, are worth mentioning, to wit:
1. A Motion for Leave to File and Admit Supplemental Complaint18 filed by
herein respondents. The Supplemental Complaint additionally prayed that the
levy and sale at public auction of the subject properties be annulled and set
aside, as the bid price was unconscionable and grossly inadequate to the
current value of the subject properties. The Supplemental Complaint further
sought a re-bidding with respect to Teofista's share in the subject properties.
Finally, it prayed that TCT No. 6509 in the name of petitioner Valente, Violeta,
Virginia and Maria Concepcion be cancelled and TCT No. 30680 in the name
of Marcelo Suarez, married to Teofista Isagon, be reinstated.
2. A Manifestation and Motion (to Execute/Enforce Decision dated September
4, 1992 of the Supreme Court)19 filed by herein respondents pointing out that
the Supreme Court itself had noted the current increased value of the subject
properties and that petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion
unjustly enriched themselves in appropriating the subject properties worth
millions then, for a measly bid price of P94,170.00, for a judgment obligation
worth only P70,000.00.
3. An Urgent Motion [to direct compliance by plaintiffs (herein respondents)
with Supreme Court Decision or to consider the matter submitted without
evidence on the part of plaintiffs]20 filed by therein defendants, including
herein petitioner Valente, pointing out that plaintiffs (herein respondents)
have yet to comply with the RTC, Branch 67 Order commanding them to
submit (to the RTC) any evidence showing settlement of the estate of the
deceased Marcelo Suarez, in order for the court to determine the portion in
the estate which belongs to Teofista. The Urgent Motion stated in paragraph
2, thus:
2. The defendants [including herein petitioner Valente] did
everything possible to expedite the disposition of this case while
the plaintiffs [herein respondents] did everything possible to
DELAY the disposition of the same obviously because the
plaintiffs [herein respondents] are in full possession and
enjoyment of the property in dispute. In its decision of September
4, 1992, the SUPREME COURT nullified TWO final and
executory DECISIONS of the Court of Appeals in an
unprecedented action. In said decision, the Supreme Court
ordered the plaintiffs [herein respondents] to establish with
evidence their personality as heirs of Marcelo Suarez, and after
being able to do so, to adduce evidence that would determine
what portion belongs to plaintiffs hence the above matters need
be litigated upon before the RTC can "annul the sale with regard
to said portion" (belonging to the plaintiffs alleged heirs).
On these incidents, the records reveal the following Orders issued by the
different branches of the RTC:
1. Order dated March 17, 1995, issued by Presiding Judge Rodrigo B.
Lorenzo of Branch 266, Pasig City, admitting herein respondents'
Supplemental Complaint.21
2. Order dated January 22, 1996, issued by Judge Apolinario B. Santos
resolving: (a) herein respondents' Manifestation and Motion (to
execute/enforce Decision dated September 4, 1992 of the Supreme Court),
and (b) therein defendants' (including herein petitioner Valente's) Request for
Answer to Written Interrogatories.22 The RTC, Branch 67, resolved the
incidents, thus:
From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, this Court is convinced
beyond a shadow of doubt that the Decision of the Supreme
Court of September 4, 1992, being the final arbiter in any judicial
dispute, should be implemented for the following reasons:
xxxx
On the request for Answers to Written Interrogatories filed by the
defendants, it is obvious that at this stage of the proceedings
where the Supreme Court had already pronounced the
undisputed facts, which binds this court, the answer sought to be
elicited through written interrogatories, therefore, are entirely
irrelevant, aside from having been filed way out of time.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court, implements the
decision of the Supreme Court dated September 4, 1992 which
mandates that:
"xxx and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to
determine that portion which belongs to petitioner
and to annul the sale with regard to said portion."
In order to enforce such mandate of the Supreme
Court, this court orders that:
a. The auction sale of the five (5) parcels of land and
all prior and subsequent proceedings in relation
thereto are declared null and void.
b. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6509 in the name
of defendant Valente Raymundo is also declared null
and void, and the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Pasig
City, is ordered to issue a new one in the name of
the deceased Marcelo Suarez or to reinstate
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30680 in the name of
Marcelo Suarez.
c. Teofista Suarez is ordered to reimburse the
amount of P94,170.00, plus legal interest from the
date of issuance of this order, and failing which, the
portion of the estate of Marcelo Suarez belonging to
the surviving spouse, Teofista Suarez, may be levied
on execution.
d. [Herein respondents], including Teofista Suarez,
are hereby ordered to submit to this court any
evidence showing settlement of the estate of the
deceased, Marcelo Suarez, in order for this court to
determine the portion in the estate which belongs to
Teofista Suarez.
Therein defendants, including petitioner Valente, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the trial court denied on May 29, 1996.
3. Order dated September 10, 1996, issued by Judge Santos denying the
appeal interposed by petitioner Valente from the January 22, 1996 and May
29, 1996 Orders, ruling that these are interlocutory orders, and, therefore, not
appealable.23
4. Order dated April 8, 1999, issued by Pairing Judge Santiago Estrella which
declared, thus:
Considering that counsel for the plaintiffs does not have the birth certificates
of the heirs of the plaintiff to prove their affiliation with the deceased which is
one of the matters written in the decision of the higher court which must be
complied with, and in order for counsel for the plaintiffs [herein respondents]
to have the opportunity to complete all documentary evidence and in view of
abbreviating the proceedings and as prayed for, today's scheduled pre-trial is
re-set for the last time to May 19, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.
In this connection, counsel for plaintiffs [herein respondents] is
advised to secure all the documentary evidence she needs
material to this case which will expedite the disposition of this
case.24
This last Order and therein defendants' Urgent Motion spawned another
contentious issue between the parties. In this connection, Judge Estrella
issued an Order25 requiring the parties to file their respective position papers
due to the "divergent views on the nature of the hearing that should be
conducted in compliance with" our decision in Suarez. Both parties duly filed
their position papers, with herein respondents attaching thereto a copy of the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate executed by the heirs of Marcelo Suarez in
1957.
In resolving this latest crossfire between the parties, the RTC, Branch 67,
issued an Order dated January 11, 2000, which reads, in part:
This Court is of the view that the Honorable Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts, precisely it directed that the records of this
case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further
proceedings.
xxxx
It is a matter of record that there was no trial on the merits
completed in the Regional Trial Court. xxx The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and ordered the
reinstatement of Civil Case No. 51203. Naturally, there was no
trial on the merits before this Court that allowed the parties to
adduce evidence to establish their respective claims in the
plaintiffs' [herein respondents] complaint and in the defendants'
[including petitioner Valente] counter-claim, respectively. It is in
this context that the Honorable Supreme Court reinstated the
"action [of herein respondents] to annul the auction sale to
protect their [herein respondents] own interest.
While this Court is of the view that trial on the merits is necessary
for the purpose of giving the plaintiffs [herein respondents] a
chance to adduce evidence to sustain their complaint and the
defendants [including petitioner Valente] to prove their defense,
consistent with the directive of the Honorable Supreme Court (in
its Decision promulgated on September 4, 1992), the Court is,
however, confronted with the very recent decision of the
Honorable Supreme Court in "Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay, et al.
vs. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999" where it
held that -
The declaration of heirship must be made in an
administration proceeding, and not in an
independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated
in Solve vs. Court of Appeals (182 SCRA 119, 128).
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship
in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as
"one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special
proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is
then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship
can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch
as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In as much as the leading case on the matter is that of "Heirs of
Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999" it is
left with no choice but to obey said latter doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, this Court
holds that in the light of the doctrine laid down in the case of
"Heirs of Yaptinchay vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320, March 2,
1999" this case is dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs'
[herein respondents'] filing a special proceeding consistent with
said latest ruling.26
Herein respondents moved for reconsideration thereof which, however, was
denied by the RTC, Branch 67 on March 14, 2000.27
Consequently, herein respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
alleging grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's order dismissing Civil
Case No. 51203 without prejudice. All the defendants in the trial court were
impleaded as private respondents in the petition. Yet, curiously, only
petitioner Valente filed a Comment thereto. The appellate court granted the
petition, recalled and set aside RTC, Branch 67's Orders dated January 11,
2000 and March 14, 2000, and reinstated Judge Santos' Orders dated May
29, 1996 and September 6, 1996. It disposed of the petition, thus:
We agree with [herein respondents].
On September 4, 1992, the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 94918)
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and mandates that
Civil Case No. 51203 be reinstated in order to determine the
portion in the estate which belongs to Teofista Suarez. The sale
of the parcels of land was declared null and void. Necessarily,
the title (TCT No. 5809) in the name of respondents was also
declared null and void. xxx
xxxx
Hon. Apolinario Santos of Br. 67, Regional Trial Court, Pasig
City, on January 22, 1996 and on motion of [herein respondents],
issued an order to execute/enforce the decision of the Supreme
Court xxx.
xxxx
[Petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion] filed
a notice of appeal on the order of Judge Santos. The appeal, on
motion of [herein respondents] was denied on September 10,
1996. Obviously, the decision of the Supreme Court had become
final and executory. Likewise, both orders of Judge Santos dated
May 29, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration and the
denial of the notice of appeal dated September 6, 1996 had also
become final and executory.
The denial of petitioner Valente's Motion for Reconsideration prompted the
filing of this present petition for certiorari.
Petitioner Valente posits that the appellate court committed grave abuse of
discretion in recalling and setting aside the Orders of Judge Estrella and
reinstating those of Judge Santos because:
1. The CA ruled that the Orders dated May 29, 1996 and
September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos were final and
executory, and yet the latter did not allow an appeal to be taken
therefrom ratiocinating that the questioned orders were
interlocutory, and therefore, not appealable; and
2. The CA ignored and violated the Supreme Court's ruling in
Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario28 which held that a declaration
of heirship must be made in a special proceeding and not in a
civil action.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
At the outset, we note that petitioner Valente incorrectly filed a petition
for certiorari to appeal the CA decision. Petitioner should have filed a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Simply imputing
in a petition that the decision sought to be reviewed is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion does not magically transform a petition into a special civil
action for certiorari. The CA decision disposed of the merits of a special civil
action, an original petition, filed thereat by herein respondents. That
disposition is a final and executory order, appealable to, and may be
questioned before, this Court by persons aggrieved thereby, such as
petitioner Valente, via Rule 45.
On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright.
However, we have disregarded this procedural flaw and now resolve this
case based on the merits or lack thereof.
Petitioner asseverates that the assailed CA ruling "is unfair and it amounts to
a trickery to prevent an appeal against a final order by claiming that the
appealed order is merely interlocutory and later maintain that the same order
has become final after declaring it to be interlocutory."
We reject petitioner's paltry contention. Petitioner apparently does not
comprehend the distinction between an interlocutory order which is final and
executory, and a final order which disposes of the controversy or case; much
less, understand the available remedies therefrom.
We have defined an interlocutory order as referring to something between the
commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or matter
but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy.29 It does not terminate
or finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be
done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.30 Upon the
other hand, a final order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do
to resolve the case.31
On more than one occasion, we laid down the test to ascertain whether an
order is interlocutory or final i.e., "Does it leave something to be done in the
trial court with respect to the merits of the case?" If it does, it is interlocutory;
if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is
something more to be done on the merits of the case.32 The Orders dated
May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos are
interlocutory, and therefore, not appealable, as they leave something more to
be done on the merits of the case. In fact, in paragraph (d) of Judge Santos'
Order dated May 29, 1996, herein respondents were directed to submit
evidence showing settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo Sr.
Contrary to petitioner Valente's stance, there is no trickery or chicanery in the
CA's distinction between an interlocutory and a final order. Indeed, as ruled
by the CA, the RTC Order denying petitioner Valente's Notice of Appeal
attained finality when he failed to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
We cannot overemphasize the rule that the correct identification of the nature
of an assailed order determines the remedies available to an aggrieved party.
The old Rules of Court in Section 2, Rule 41 reads, thus:
SEC. 2. Judgments or orders subject to appeal.-Only final
judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal. No interlocutory
or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an
action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until final judgment or
order is rendered for one party or the other.
xxxx
With the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1, Rule 41 now
provides for the appropriate remedy to be taken from an interlocutory order,
thus:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or
of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is
not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65.
Clearly, the denial of therein defendants' (including petitioner Valente's)
appeal from the Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 was in
order. Thus, the CA decision affirming the RTC's denial was correct.
Further, on this crucial distinction as applied to this case, petitioner Valente
filed a petition for certiorari from the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 58090,
which is not an interlocutory order. It is a final order which completely
disposed of the merits of the case with nothing more left to be done therein.
The correct and available remedy available to petitioner Valente was, as
previously discussed, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
In fine, petitioner Valente erroneously sought relief through reversed
remedies. He tried to appeal the interlocutory orders of the RTC which are
unappealable. Thus, the RTC properly denied his Notice of Appeal, and the
CA correctly upheld the RTC. He should have filed a petition for certiorari;
under Rule 65. On the other hand, from the final order of the CA, he comes
before this Court on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper
remedy is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
In the recent case of Jan-Dec Construction Corporation v. Court of
Appeals33 we ruled in this wise:
As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is
appeal via petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules.
Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in
any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, may be appealed to the Court by filing a
petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case. It seeks to correct
errors of judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or officer. In
contrast, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an
independent action based on the specific grounds therein
provided and proper only if there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is
an extraordinary process for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost
remedy of an ordinary appeal.
Independently of this procedural infirmity, even on the merits of the case, the
petition does not fare otherwise. It must be dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner Valente insists that, following our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v.
Del Rosario,34 herein respondents must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr.
before they can file an action to annul the judicial sale of what is,
undisputedly, conjugal property of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.
We disagree. Our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay is not applicable.
Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista
and thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs has been firmly established, and
confirmed by this Court in Suarez v. Court of Appeals.35 True, this Court is not
a trier of facts,36 but as the final arbiter of disputes,37 we found and so ruled
that herein respondents are children, and heirs of their deceased father,
Marcelo Sr. This having been settled, it should no longer have been a
litigated issue when we ordered a remand to the lower court. In short,
petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's, and Maria Concepcion's
representation in the RTC that our ruling in Suarez required herein
respondents to present evidence of their affiliation with the deceased,
Marcelo Sr., is wrong.
As was set forth in the dispositive portion of Suarez, "Civil Case No. 51203 is
reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to [herein
respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion." There is
clearly no intimation in our decision for the RTC to have to determine an
already settled issue i.e., herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr.
Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or indirectly, the status of
herein respondents as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and
likewise demand that herein respondents first prove their filiation to Marcelo
Sr. The following records bear out Marcelo, Sr.'s and Teofista's paternity of
herein respondents, and the latter's status as legitimate children:
1. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 10646 to 10649 where Teofista,
along with herein respondents, questioned the RTC, Branch 151's Orders
dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986. Although the CA ruled against
Teofista and herein respondents, it explicitly recognized the latter's status as
legitimate children of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.; and38
2. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 20320 which incorrectly ruled that
herein respondents were, as children of Teofista, merely successors-in-
interest of the latter to the property and by virtue thereof, bound by the
judgment in Civil Case Nos. 21376 to 21379 consistent with the doctrine
of res judicata.39 We subsequently reversed this ruling on the wrong
application of res judicata in the conclusive case of Suarez. We retained and
affirmed, however, the CA's factual finding of herein respondents' status as
heirs of Marcelo Sr. We categorically held therein that "the proprietary interest
of [herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned [properties] is different
from and adverse to that of [Teofista]. [Herein respondents] became co-
owners of the property not because of [Teofista] but through their own right
as children of their deceased father [, Marcelo Sr.]."
Clearly, herein respondents' long possessed status of legitimate children of
Marcelo Sr. and Teofista cannot be indirectly or directly attacked by petitioner
Valente in an action to annul a judicial sale.
Articles 262,40 263,41 265 and 26642 of the Civil Code, the applicable law at
the time of Marcelo's death, support the foregoing conclusion, to wit:
Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may impugn the legitimacy of
the child only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of
the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If the husband should die after the filing of the
complaint, without having desisted from the same;
(3) If the child was born after the death of the
husband.
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be
brought within one year from the recording of birth in the Civil
Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a
proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months
if they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If
the birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be
counted from the discovery of the fraud.
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the
record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic
document or a final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding
article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession
of status of a legitimate child.
In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration of
nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed for failure of the petitioners to
demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance of it" that they had been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In
stark contrast, the records of this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein
respondents as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs. The same
document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofista's
paraphernal properties, and separates the properties she owns in common
with her children, herein respondents. Plainly, there is no need to re-declare
herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case
interminably.
Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion,
became owners of the subject properties only by virtue of an execution sale
to recover Teofista's judgment obligation. This judgment obligation is solely
Teofista's, and payment therefor cannot be made through an execution sale
of properties not absolutely owned by her. These properties were evidently
conjugal properties and were, in fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr.
married to Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.'s death, by virtue of compulsory
succession, Marcelo Sr.'s share in the conjugal partnership was transmitted
by operation of law to his compulsory heirs.
Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not categorized
as such in Article 77843of the Civil Code. It reserves a portion of the net estate
of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or combination of
heirs, prevailing over all kinds of succession.44 The portion that is so reserved
is the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code defines legitime as "that part of
the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has
reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs."
Herein respondents are primary compulsory heirs,45 excluding secondary
compulsory heirs,46 and preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in the
distribution of the decedent's estate.47
Even without delving into the Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate
in 1957, it must be stressed that herein respondents' rights to the succession
vested from the moment of their father's death.48 Herein respondents'
ownership of the subject properties is no longer inchoate; it became absolute
upon Marcelo's death, although their respective shares therein remained pro
indiviso. Ineluctably, at the time the subject properties were sold on execution
sale to answer for Teofista's judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein
respondents' share therein was null and void.
Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a
person dies leaving property, it should be judicially administered
and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator,
in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein.
xxx
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property
of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,
to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a
special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious,
just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only
impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceedings. And it is superfluous
in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case-subject of the
present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence
before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case
upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there
being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal's estate
to administration proceedings since a determination of
petitioners' status as heirs could be achieved in the civil
case filed by petitioners xxx.53

In fine, Teofista's ownership over the subject properties is not absolute. All told, under the circumstances, in addition to the already settled status of
Significantly, petitioner Valente does not even attempt to dispute the conjugal herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., there is no need to dismiss Civil
nature of the subject properties. Since Teofista owns only a portion of the Case No. 51203 and require herein respondents to institute a separate
subject properties, only that portion could have been, and was actually, levied special proceeding for a declaration of their heirship.
upon and sold on auction by the provincial sheriff of Rizal. Thus, a separate WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
declaration of heirship by herein respondents is not necessary to annul the the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58090 is AFFIRMED. The Orders
judicial sale of their share in the subject properties. dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos
We note the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,49 where we are REINSTATED. Costs against the petitioner.
scrutinized our rulings in Heirs of Yaptinchay and the cited cases of Litam v. SO ORDERED.
Rivera50 and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,51 and Guilas v. CFI Judge of
Pampanga52 cited in Solivio. We ruled thus:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which
the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent
or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if
the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the
case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other
issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special
proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but
had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative
heirs has lost the right to have himself declared in the special
proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-
opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his
declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the
partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties
belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that
she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February
15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the
second sentence of Rule 74, Section of the Revised Rules of
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992.]
DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I.
SUAREZ, JR., EVELYN SUAREZ-DE LEON and REGINIO I.
SUAREZ, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, VALENTE
RAYMUNDO, VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA. CONCEPCION VITO and
VIRGINIA BANTA, Respondents.
Villareal Law Offices, for Petitioners.
Nelson Loyola for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; PROPRIETARY
INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN, DIFFERENT AND ADVERSE FROM THEIR
MOTHER. The legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of
each child. The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned
property is different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners
became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through
their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are
not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to
protect their own interest.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
The ultimate issue before Us is whether or not private respondents can
validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-owned by petitioners and
registered in the name of petitioners deceased father. Marcelo Suarez,
whose estate has not been partitioned or liquidated, after the said properties
were levied and publicly sold en masse to private respondents to satisfy the
personal judgment debt of Teofista Suarez, the surviving spouse of Marcelo
Suarez, mother of herein petitioners.chanrobles law library
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and
since then his estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig,
Metro Manila has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners
widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases
for rescission of contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to
pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate principal amount
of about P70,000 as damages. 1
The judgment against petitioners mother and Rizal Realty Corporation
having become final and executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig,
Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then) were levied and sold on execution
on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private respondents as the highest bidder for
the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a
certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.
On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners
filed a reinvindicatory action 2 against private respondents and the Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the
annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied
pieces of property. Therein, they alleged, among others, that being strangers
to the case decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable therefor
and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither
be levied nor sold on execution.
On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to private respondents
a final deed of sale 3 over the properties.
On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein petitioners filed with
Branch 151 a Motion for Reconsideration 4 of the Order dated October 10,
1984, claiming that the parcels of land are co-owned by them and further
informing the Court the filing and pendency of an action to annul the auction
sale (Civil Case No. 51203), which motion however, was
denied.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
On February 25, 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining
private respondents from transferring to third parties the levied parcels of land
based on the finding that the auctioned lands are co-owned by petitioners.
On March 1, 1985, private respondent Valente Raymundo filed in Civil Case
No. 51203 a Motion to Dismiss for failure on the part of the petitioners to
prosecute, however, such motion was later denied by Branch 155, Regional
Trial Court, Pasig.
On December 1985, Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 an Ex-Parte
Motion to Dismiss complaint for failure to prosecute. This was granted by
Branch 155 through an Order dated May 29, 1986, notwithstanding
petitioners pending motion for the issuance of alias summons to be served
upon the other defendants in the said case. A motion for reconsideration was
filed but was later denied.
On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-
21739 an Order directing Teofista Suarez and all persons claiming right
under her to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale; to desist from
removing or alienating improvements thereon; and to surrender to private
respondents the owners duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent
documents.
Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari to annul the Orders of Branch 151 dated October 10, 1984 and
October 14, 1986 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739.
On December 4, 1986 petitioners filed with Branch 155 a Motion for
reconsideration of the Order 5 dated September 24, 1986. In an Order dated
June 10, 1987, 6 Branch 155 lifted its previous order of dismissal and
directed the issuance of alias summons.chanrobles law library : red
Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
orders dated February 25, 1985, 7 May 19, 1989 8 and February 26, 1990 9
issued in Civil Case No. 51203 and further ordering respondent Judge to
dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The appellate court rendered its decision on
July 27, 1990, 10 the dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the
questioned orders dated February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989 and February 26,
1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby annulled, further respondent
Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203." 11
Hence, this appeal.
Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner
and private respondents and the developments subsequent to the filing of the
complaint, We cannot but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.
It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the
execution and the manner of publicly selling en masse the subject properties
for auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of land should have
been the subject of the auction sale.
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time
of the institution of the case.
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article 888 further provides:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half
of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter
provided."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving
spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the
legitimate children or descendants."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the
legitime of each child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is
different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-
owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right
as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in
any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their
own interest.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as
well as its Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and set
aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion
which belongs to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to said
portion.chanrobles law library
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47799 June 13, 1941
Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO
NERI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN, respondents.
Ozamiz & Capistrano for petitioners.
Gullas, Leuterio, Tanner & Laput for respondents.
MORAN, J.:
Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on December 12, 1931, had by his first
marriage six children named Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario
and Celerina; and by his second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five children
named Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta, Estela Maria, and Emma. Getulia,
daughter in the first marriage, died on October 2, 1923, that is, a little less
than eight years before the death of said Agripino Neri y Chavez, and was
survived by seven children named Remedios, Encarnacion, Carmen,
Trinidad, Luz, Alberto and Minda. In Agripino Neri's testament, which was
admitted to probate on March 21, 1932, he willed that his children by the first
marriage shall have no longer any participation in his estate, as they had
already received their corresponding shares during his lifetime. At the hearing
for the declaration of heirs, the trial court found, contrary to what the testator
had declared in his will, that all his children by the first and second marriages
intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to one-half of the
improvements introduced in the properties during the existence of the last
conjugal partnership, which should belong to Ignacia Akutin. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision with the modification that the will
was "valid with respect to the two-thirds part which the testator could freely
dispose of. "This judgment of the Court of Appeals is now sought to be
reviewed in this petition for certiorari.
The decisive question here raised is whether, upon the foregoing facts, the
omission of the children of the first marriage annuls the institution of the
children of the first marriage as sole heirs of the testator, or whether the will
may be held valid, at least with respect to one-third of the estate which the
testator may dispose of as legacy and to the other one-third which he may
bequeath as betterment, to said children of the second marriage.
The Court of Appeals invoked the provisions of article 851 of the Civil Code,
which read in part as follows:
Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, or for a
cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proven, ... shall
annul the institution of the heir in so far as it prejudices the
person disinherited; but the legacies, betterments, and other
testamentary dispositions, in so far as they do no encroach upon
the legitime, shall be valid.
The appellate court thus seemed to have rested its judgment upon the
impression that the testator had intended to disinherit, though ineffectively,
the children of the first marriage. There is nothing in the will that supports this
conclusion. True, the testator expressly denied them any share in his estate;
but the denial was predicated, not upon the desire to disinherit, but upon the
belief, mistaken though it was, that the children by the first marriage had
already received more than their corresponding shares in his lifetime in the
form of advancement. Such belief conclusively negatives all inference as to
any intention to disinherit, unless his statement to that effect is prove to be
deliberately fictitious, a fact not found by the Court of Appeals. The situation this mistake, the testator's intention, as may be clearly inferred from his will,
contemplated in the above provision is one in which the purpose to disinherit would have been to divide his property equally among all his children.
is clear, but upon a cause not stated or not proved, a situation which does not
obtain in the instant case. Judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court
affirmed, without prejudice to the widow's legal usufruct, with costs against
The Court of Appeals quotes Manresa thus: respondents.
En el terreno de los principios, la solucion mas justa del
problema que hemos hecho notar al comentar el articulo, seria
distinguir el caso en que el heredero omitido viviese al otorgarse
el testamento, siendo conocida su existencia por el testador, de
aquel en que, o naciese despues, o se ignorase su existencia,
aplicando en el primer caso la doctrina del articulo 851, y en el
segundo la del 814. (6 Manresa, 354-355.)
But it must be observed that this opinion is founded on mere principles (en el
terreno de los principios) and not on the express provisions of the law.
Manresa himself admits that according to law, "no existe hoy cuestion alguna
en esta materia: la pretericion produce siempre los mismos efectos, ya se
refiera a personas vivas al hacer el testamento o nacidas despues. Este
ultimo grupo solo puede hacer relacion a los descendientes legitimos,
siempre que ademas tengan derecho a legitima." (6 Manresa, 381.)
Appellants, on the other hand, maintain that the case is one of voluntary
preterition of four of the children by the first marriage, and of involuntary
preterition of the children by the deceased Getulia, also of the first marriage,
and is thus governed by the provisions of article 814 of the Civil Code, which
read in part as follows:
The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the
legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are not
inofficious.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited.(Cf. 6 Manresa, 346.) In the instant case, while the children of the
first marriage were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any share in
the heriditary property, without expressly being disinherited. It is, therefore, a
clear case of preterition as contended by appellants. The omission of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a
preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least
manifest.
Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as they
are not inofficious" (art. 814 of the Civil Code), preterition avoids the
institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession. (Art. 814, Civil
Code; Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 17, 1908 and
February 27, 1909.) In the instant case, no such legacies or betterments have
been made by the testator. "Mejoras" or betterments must be expressly
provided, according to articles 825 and 828 of the Civil Code, and where no
express provision therefor is made in the will, the law would presume that the
testator had no intention to that effect. (Cf. 6 Manresa, 479.) In the will here in
question, no express betterment is made in favor of the children by the
second marriage; neither is there any legacy expressly made in their behalf
consisting of the third available for free disposal. The whole inheritance is
accorded the heirs by the second marriage upon the mistaken belief that the
heirs by the first marriage have already received their shares. Were it not for
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of
Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS
PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII,
which admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of
Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein
private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father,
petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C.
Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As
Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit
of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he
adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased
Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition
for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was
allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the
time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on
January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza,
Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and
testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the
testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed,
and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed
after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor in
favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that
therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to
administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the
Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by
herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to
believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the
will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would
work injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty.
Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or
Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the
will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter
Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of
the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established
that Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a
citizen of the United States of America with a
permanent residence at 4633 Ditman Street,
Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when alive,
Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and
Testament in the county of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat
(Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while in temporary
sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos
died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property
both in the Philippines and in the United States of
America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late
Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted
probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the Court
of Common Pleas, the probate court of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration
were issued in favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in
accordance with the laws of the said foreign country
on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-
10); and that the petitioner is not suffering from any
disqualification which would render her unfit as
administratrix of the estate in the Philippines of the
late Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the
late Adoracion C. Campos is hereby admitted to and
allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita
Campos Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix
of the estate of said decedent; let Letters of
Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of
said Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the
amount of P5,000.00 conditioned under the
provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming
the withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary
act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that
the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of
his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means. According
to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the papers
which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he
executed with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal
of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special proceedings
case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear.
He made several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May
29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate
and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for
hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning for
submission for reconsideration and resolution of the
Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I
also request for the future setting of the case for
hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside
previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980.
When the case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner
tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of
the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing
the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the
same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a
will, which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children
and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication,
appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament.
Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the
instant case which was granted by the court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner
Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the
respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was
denied on September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge
acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court
deprived the Right to Notice (sic) upon the filing of
the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of
rights or interests against the estate of deceased
Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the
hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of
decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or
repudiate (not made in a public or authenticated
instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the
court but by way of a motion presented prior to an
order for the distribution of the estate-the law
especially providing that repudiation of an
inheritance must be presented, within 30 days after it
has issued an order for the distribution of the estate
in accordance with the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his
legitime can be divested by a decree admitting a will
to probate in which no provision is made for the
 forced heir in complete disregard of Law of
Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the
ground that no evidence was adduced to support the
Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was
set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of his
petition a denial of the due process and a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case,
the fact that the Testator at the time of death was a
usual resident of Dasmarias, Cavite, consequently
Cavite Court of First Instance has exclusive
jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R.
No. L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation
that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the
will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No
proof was adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to
withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola
was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the firing of the
contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein
he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and
deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former
counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had
been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The
present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of
record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal
was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of
the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a
general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge
allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the
private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the
time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and
1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit
that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the
estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary
to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the
specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national
law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case
of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis,
was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot
be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief,
the records wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing
on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief
and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no
reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The
court even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his
petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due
process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for
hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would
be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore,
such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of
hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction
utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is
provided that:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons
settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly
filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since
it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a
citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America
and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover,
petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate
court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and
after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
(See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284,
April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL
RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF
VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR
and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
D. Taedo, Jr. for appellants.
J. Palanca, Sr. for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of
ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty-
four hectares That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual
Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who
would study for the priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands,
appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative
(Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-
G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan,
died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which
was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December
5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives,
namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto
and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin,
Fortunato Gamalinda.
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest
(paragraphing supplied to facilitate comprehension of the testamentary
provisions):
Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS
de terreno palayeros situados en el municipiooo de
Guimba de la provinciaaa de NUEVA ECIJA, cuyo
num. de CERTIFICADO DE TRANSFERENCIA DE
TITULO SON; Titulo Num. 6530, mide 16,249 m.
cuadrados de superficie Titulo Num. 6548, mide
242,998 m. cuadrados de superficie y annual 6525,
mide 62,665 m. cuadrados de superficie; y Titulo
Num. 6521, mide 119,251 m. cuadrados de
superficie; a cualquier pariente mio varon mas
cercano que estudie la carrera eclesiatica hasta
ordenarse de Presbiterado o sea Sacerdote; las
condiciones de estate legado son;
(1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la venta de estos terrenos
arriba situados objectos de este legado;
(2.a) Que el legatario pariente mio mas cercano
tendra derecho de empezar a gozar y administrar de
este legado al principiar a curzar la Sagrada
Teologio, y ordenado de Sacerdote, hasta su
muerte; pero que pierde el legatario este derecho de
administrar y gozar de este legado al dejar de
continuar sus estudios para ordenarse de
Presbiterado (Sacerdote).
Que el legatario una vez Sacerdote ya estara
obligado a celebrar cada ao VEINTE (20) Misas
rezadas en sufragio de mi alma y de mis padres
difuntos, y si el actual legatario, quedase
excomulgado, IPSO FACTO se le despoja este
legado, y la administracion de esto pasara a cargo
del actual Parroco y sus sucesores de la Iglecia
Catolica de Victoria, Tarlac.
Y en intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado segun lo arriba queda expresado,
pasara la administracion de este legado a cargo del
actual Parroco Catolico y sus sucesores, de Victoria,
Tarlac.
El Parroco administrador de estate legado,
acumulara, anualmente todos los productos que
puede tener estate legado, ganando o sacando de
los productos anuales el CINCO (5) por ciento para
su administracion, y los derechos correspondientes
de las VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas que debiera el
Parroco celebrar cada ao, depositando todo lo
restante de los productos de estate legado, en un
banco, a nombre de estate legado.
To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix in 1940 submitted a
project containing the following item:
5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy
purported to be given to the nearest male relative
who shall take the priesthood, and in the interim to
be administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the
Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac,
Philippines, or his successors, the real properties
hereinbelow indicated, to wit:
Title No. Lot No. Area in Has. Tax Dec. Ass. Value
T-6530 3663 1.6249 18740 P 340.00
T-6548 3445-C 24.2998 18730 7,290.00
T-6525 3670 6.2665 18736 1,880.00
T-6521 3666 11.9251 18733 3,580.00
Total amount and value 44.1163 P13,090.00
Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the project
of partition, directed that after payment of the obligations of the estate
(including the sum of P3,132.26 due to the church of the Victoria parish) the
administratrix should deliver to the devisees their respective shares.
It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to
analyze the meaning and implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his
nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no
nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the
legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer
the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate
proceeding remained pending.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on
February 19, 1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate
proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new administrator
(succeeding the deceased administration Florencia Rigor), who should
deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the
possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The
probate court granted the petition. A new administrator was appointed. On
January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for the delivery of the
ricelands to the church as trustee.
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25,
1957 praying that the bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as
the persons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish
priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the testator "has ever studied
for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition was
opposed by the parish priest of Victoria.
Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge
Bernabe de Aquino, declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the
ricelands to the testator's legal heirs in his order of June 28, 1957. The parish
priest filed two motions for reconsideration.
Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order
of December 10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew
named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a
seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City.
The administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of
Victoria as trustee.
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It
held that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male
relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for
twenty years because to enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule
against perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands within
twenty years after the testator's death, the same should pass to his legal
heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article 870 of
the new Civil Code.
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
not finding that the testator created a public charitable trust and in not liberally
construing the testamentary provisions so as to render the trust operative and
to prevent intestacy.
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the bequest
inoperative because no one among the testator's nearest male relatives had
studied for the priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable
trust. According to the legal heirs, that factual finding is binding on this Court.
They point out that appellant priest's change of theory cannot be
countenanced in this appeal .
In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory
construction, where the intention of the contracting parties or of the
lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the determination
of the testator's intention which is the law of the case (dicat testor et erit lex.
Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-
28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546).
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any
interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his
words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was different
from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333).
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is
"the life and soul of a will It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the
polestar, in giving effect to a will". (See Dissent of Justice Moreland in Santos
vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 223, 237-8.)
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the wilt taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was made", but excluding the
testator's oral declarations as to his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following
re-statement of the provisions of his will.
1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives
who would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest.
2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.
3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could
enjoy and administer the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could
continue enjoying and administering the same up to the time of his death but
the devisee would cease to enjoy and administer the ricelands if he
discontinued his studies for the priesthood.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate
every year twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father
Rigor and his parents.
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy
and the administration of the riceland would pass to the incumbent parish
priest of Victoria and his successors.
6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee as
contemplated above, the administration of the ricelands would be under the
responsibility of the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors,
and
7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate
annually the products thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce
five percent thereof for his administration and the fees corresponding to the
twenty masses with prayers that the parish priest would celebrate for each
year, depositing the balance of the income of the devise in the bank in the
name of his bequest.
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the
testator intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who
would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would
lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having
been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be
obligated to say annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the
souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would
administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time
that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood
and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was
excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya
legatario acondicionado", or how long after the testator's death would it be
determined that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical
vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that has brought about the controversy
between the parish priest of Victoria and the testator's legal heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male
relative who would study for the priesthood should be determined. Did the
testator contemplate only his nearest male relative at the time of his
death? Or did he have in mind any of his nearest male relatives at anytime
after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male
relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter.
"In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be
living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation,
when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably
construed. To construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male
relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to
apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not
have been his intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three sisters
or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs.
Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male relative,
he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his
third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not
prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with certitude what category
of nearest male relative would be living at the time of his death, he could not
specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephews
(the son of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male
relative".
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended
for Ramon Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son
of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs
presented in the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal
grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father Rigor's
death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise,
although he was studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary,
because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for his
nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on
Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G.
Cunanan, was not the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that
Edgardo's father told her that he was not consulted by the parish priest of
Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which
was based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was
studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be
a seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of
Appeals that the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish
priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to
evidence aliunde as to the testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no
probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the testator's
nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his succession was
opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a
judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano
que estudie la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his
nearest male relatives born after his death, he could have so specified in his
will He must have known that such a broad provision would suspend for an
unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya
legatario acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a
situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to
become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in
the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the
ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the
testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy
and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the
trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the
time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the
priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical
career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant
priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He
unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father)
Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on
Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a
priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was
ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the
parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by
the testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee
That contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions
regarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of
Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator
was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a
trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who
desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been
ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not
arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the
testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a
priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of
the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any
reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in
cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el
legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la
herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article
960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does
not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor
accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among the
testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition
as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly
intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the
indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional
legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the
property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51
Phil. 267).
We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145545 June 30, 2008
PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA, petitioner,
vs.
LUCIA D. ABENA, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to reverse the Decision1dated October 13, 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41756, which affirmed the
Decision2 dated March 2, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66,
Makati City. The RTC had declared the last will and testament of Margarita S.
Mayores probated and designated respondent Lucia D. Abena as the
executor of her will. It also ordered the issuance of letters testamentary in
favor of respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita
S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent was the decedents lifelong
companion since 1929.
On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor
descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her.
She was survived by her first cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay,
Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner.
Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament3 on
February 2, 1987 where she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a
real property located at Singalong Manila, consisting of 209.8 square meters,
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1343 to respondent,
Norma A. Pahingalo, and Florentino M. Abena in equal shares or one-third
portion each. She likewise bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a
real property located at San Antonio Village, Makati, consisting of 225 square
meters, and covered by TCT No. 68920 to respondent, Isabelo M. Abena,
and Amanda M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. Margarita
also left all her personal properties to respondent whom she likewise
designated as sole executor of her will.
On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of
the estate of Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as
SP Proc. No. M-1531.
On October 27, 1987, respondent filed a petition for probate of the will of
Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No.
M-1607 and consolidated with SP Proc. No. M-1531.
On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and
testament of Margarita probated and respondent as the executor of the will.
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) declaring the will as probated;
2) declaring Lucia Abena as the executor of the will who will
serve as such without a bond as stated in paragraph VI of the
probated will;
3) ordering the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of Lucia
Abena.
So ordered.4
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. But the Court
of Appeals, in a decision dated October 13, 2000, affirmed in toto the RTC
ruling. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal
having no merit in fact and in law, is hereby ORDERED
DISMISSED and the appealed Decision of the trial
court AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with cost to oppositors-appellants.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, the instant petition citing the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT INVALIDATING THE WILL
SINCE IT DID NOT CONFORM TO THE FORMALITIES
REQUIRED BY LAW;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
ERROR IN NOT INVALIDATING THE WILL BECAUSE IT WAS
PROCURED THROUGH UNDUE INFLUENCE AND
PRESSURE[;] AND
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT DECLARING PETITIONER, HER SIBLINGS
AND COUSIN AS THE LEGAL HEIRS OF MARGARITA S.
MAYORES AND IN NOT ISSUING LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION TO HER.6
Briefly stated, the issues are (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in not
declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with the formalities required by
law, (2) whether said court erred in not declaring the will invalid because it
was procured through undue influence and pressure, and (3) whether it erred
in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita, and
in not issuing letters of administration to petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum,7 argues that Margaritas will failed to comply
with the formalities required under Article 8058 of the Civil Code because the
will was not signed by the testator in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses and in the presence of one another. She also argues that the
signatures of the testator on pages A, B, and C of the will are not the same or
similar, indicating that they were not signed on the same day. She further
argues that the will was procured through undue influence and pressure
because at the time of execution of the will, Margarita was weak, sickly,
jobless and entirely dependent upon respondent and her nephews for
support, and these alleged handicaps allegedly affected her freedom and
willpower to decide on her own. Petitioner thus concludes that Margaritas
total dependence on respondent and her nephews compelled her to sign the
will. Petitioner likewise argues that the Court of Appeals should have
declared her and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita since they are
her only living collateral relatives in accordance with Articles 10099 and
101010 of the Civil Code.
Respondent, for her part, argues in her Memorandum11 that the petition for
review raises questions of fact, not of law and as a rule, findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal
to the Supreme Court. She also points out that although the Court of Appeals
at the outset opined there was no compelling reason to review the petition,
the Court of Appeals proceeded to tackle the assigned errors and rule that
the will was validly executed, sustaining the findings of the trial court that the
formalities required by law were duly complied with. The Court of Appeals
also concurred with the findings of the trial court that the testator, Margarita,
was of sound mind when she executed the will.
After careful consideration of the parties contentions, we rule in favor of
respondent.
We find that the issues raised by petitioner concern pure questions of fact,
which may not be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The issues that petitioner is raising now i.e., whether or not the will was
signed by the testator in the presence of the witnesses and of one another,
whether or not the signatures of the witnesses on the pages of the will were
signed on the same day, and whether or not undue influence was exerted
upon the testator which compelled her to sign the will, are all questions of
fact.
This Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 112 of Rule 45 limits this
Courts review to questions of law only.
Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. When
supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this
Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.13
We find that this case does not involve any of the abovementioned the oppositors. The picture (Exhibit "H-3") shows that the testator
exceptions. was affixing her signature in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to show that the
Nonetheless, a review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by the Court of first signature was procured earlier than February 2, 1987.
Appeals, reveal that petitioners arguments lack basis. The RTC correctly
held: Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was
exerted on the testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the
With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors [Paz picture reveals that the testator was in a good mood and smiling
Samaniego-Celada, et al.] that the testator [Margarita Mayores] with the other witnesses while executing the subject will (See
was not mentally capable of making a will at the time of the Exhibit "H").
execution thereof, the same is without merit. The oppositors
failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of
and contradict the presumption that the testator was of sound making the will at the time of its execution, that the notarial will
mind (See Article 800 of the Civil Code). In fact, witness for the presented to the court is the same notarial will that was executed
oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions, and that all the formal requirements (See Article 805 of the Civil
attended to the testator months before her death, testified that Code) in the execution of a will have been substantially complied
Margarita Mayores could engage in a normal conversation and with in the subject notarial will.14 (Emphasis supplied.)
he even stated that the illness of the testator does not warrant
hospitalization. Not one of the oppositors witnesses has Thus, we find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC.
mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the testator Since, petitioner and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent
during her lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation of under Article 88715 of the Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of
mental incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be physically her properties in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal
weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound right to claim any part of the decedents estate.
mind. [The] testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October
aforethought. 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41756 is AFFIRMED.
Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective Costs against petitioner.
for the reason that its attestation clause states that the will is
composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will SO ORDERED.
consists of two (2) pages only because the attestation is not a
part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true
that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after
examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that
error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the
attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It
must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively
lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard
from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The
error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the
will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages
inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement.
The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of
liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code
which reads:
"In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or
undue [and] improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of
attestation or in the language used therein shall
not render the will invalid if it is proved that the
will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements
of Article 805."
The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the
signatures of the testator were affixed on different occasions
based on their observation that the signature on the first page is
allegedly different in size, texture and appearance as compared
with the signatures in the succeeding pages. After examination of
the signatures, the court does not share the same observation as
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44837 November 23, 1938
SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Adriano T. de la Cruz for appellants.
Simeon Bitanga for appellees.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This case is before us by virtue of an appeal taken by the defendants
Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo Quitco, Jr., Sabina Quitco, Rafael Quitco and
Marcela Quitco, from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Negros, the dispositive part of which reads:
For the foregoing considerations, the court renders judgment in
this case declaring Ana Quitco Ledesma an acknowledged
natural daughter of the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, for legal
purposes, but absolving the defendants as to the prayer in the
first cause of action that the said Ana Quitco Ledesma be
declared entitled to share in the properties left by the deceased
Eusebio Quitco.
As to the second cause of action, the said defendants are
ordered to pay to the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, jointly and
severally, only the sum of one thousand five hundred
pesos(P1,500), with legal interest thereon from the filing of this
complaint until fully paid. No pronouncement is made as to the
costs. So ordered.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following errors allegedly
committed by the trial court in its aforesaid decision:
1. That the trial court erred in holding, that the action for the
recovery of the sum of P1,500, representing the last installment
of the note Exhibit C has not yet prescribed.
2. That the trial court erred in holding that the property inherited
by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by the right of
representation is subject to the debts and obligations of their
deceased father who died without any property
whatsoever.lawphi1.net
3. That the trial court erred in condemning the defendants to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma the sum of
P1,500.
The only facts to be considered in the determination of the legal questions
raised in this appeal are those set out in the appealed decision, which have
been established at the trial, namely:
In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally
with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter was still single, of which
relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter who is
the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it seems hat the
relation between Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came
to an end, but the latter executed a deed (Exhibit A),
acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural
daughter and on January 21, 1922, he issued in favor of the
plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note (Exhibit C), of the
following tenor:
P2,000. For value received I promise to pay Miss Socorro
Ledesma the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000). Philippine
currency under the following terms: Two hundred and fifty pesos
(P250) to be paid on the first day of March 1922; another two
hundred and fifty pesos (P250)to be paid on the first day
of November 1922; the remaining one thousand and five
hundred (P1,500) to be paid two years from the date of the
execution of this note. San Enrique, Occ. Negros, P. I., Jan. 21,
1922.
Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant
Conchita McLachlin, with whom he had four children, who are
the other defendants. On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died
(Exhibit 5), and, still later, that is, on December 15, 1932, his
father Eusebio Quitco also died, and as the latter left real and
personal properties upon his death, administration proceedings
of said properties were instituted in this court, the said case
being known as the "Intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco,"
civil case No. 6153 of this court.
Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio
Quitco and the appointment of the committee on claims and
appraisal, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, on August 26, 1935,
filed before said committee the aforequoted promissory note for
payment, and the commissioners, upon receipt of said
promissory note, instead of passing upon it, elevated the same to
this court en consulta (Exhibit F), and as the Honorable Jose
Lopez Vito, presiding over the First Branch, returned said
consulta and refrained from giving his opinion thereon (Exhibit
C), the aforesaid commissioners on claims and appraisal,
alleging lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim, denied he
same (Exhibit H).
On November 14, 1933 (Exhibit I), the court issued an
order of declaration of heirs in the intestate of the deceased
Eusebio Quitco, and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included
among the declared heirs, Socorro Ledesma, as mother of Ana
Quitco Ledesma, asked for the reconsideration of said order, a
petition which the court denied. From the order denying the said
petition no appeal was taken, and in lieu thereof there was filed
the complaint which gives rise to this case.
The first question to be decided in this appeal, raised in the first assignment
of alleged error, is whether or not the action to recover the sum of P1,500,
representing the last installment for the payment of the promissory note
Exhibit C, has prescribed.
According to the promissory note Exhibit C, executed by the deceased
Lorenzo M. Quitco, on January 21, 1922, the last installment of P1,500
should be paid two years from the date of the execution of said promissory
note, that is, on January 21, 1924. The complaint in the present case was
filed on June 26, 1934, that is, more than ten years after he expiration of the
said period. The fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, on
August 26, 1933, with the committee on claims and appraisal appointed in the
intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does not suspend the running of the prescriptive
period of the judicial action for the recovery of said debt, because the claim
for the unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note should no have
been presented in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not
being the one who executed the same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo M.
Quitco, which should have been instituted by the said Socorro Ledesma as
provided in section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a creditor
to institute said case through the appointment of an administrator for the
purpose of collecting his credit. More than ten years having thus elapsed from
the expiration of the period for the payment of said debt of P1,500, the action
for its recovery has prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The first assignment of alleged error is, therefore, well-founded.
As to the second assignment of alleged error, consisting in that the trial court
erred in holding that the properties inherited by the defendants from their
deceased grandfather by representation are subject to the payment of debts
and obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving any
property, while it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the
Civil Code, a children presents his father or mother who died before him in
the properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation
does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his
deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the
inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs
only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The herein
defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father
Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father
from whom they did not inherit anything.
The second assignment of alleged error is also well-founded.
Being a mere sequel of the first two assignments of alleged errors, the third
assignment of error is also well-founded.
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That
the filing of a claim before the committee on claims and appraisal, appointed
in the intestate of the father, for a monetary obligation contracted by a son
who died before him, does not suspend the prescriptive period of the judicial
action for the recovery of said indebtedness; (2) that the claim for the
payment of an indebtedness contracted by a deceased person cannot be
filed for its collection before the committee on claims and appraisal,
appointed in the intestate of his father, and the propertiesinherited from the
latter by the children of said deceased do not answer for the payment of the
indebtedness contracted during the lifetime of said person.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendants are
absolved from the complaint, with the costs to the appellees. So ordered.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165300 April 23, 2010
ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ and IMELDA DIAZ, REINA COMANDANTE
and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO PANGAN and ELIZABETH
PANGAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The basic questions to be resolved in this case are: Is a waiver of hereditary
rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still
living valid? Is an adverse claim annotated on the title of a property on the
basis of such waiver likewise valid and effective as to bind the subsequent
owners and hold them liable to the claimant?
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the December 12, 2003 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 70888.3 Said Decision modified the June 14, 2001 Summary
Judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No.
Q-99-38876 by holding respondents Spouses Bienvenido and Elizabeth
Pangan (the Pangans) not solidarily liable with the other respondents,
Spouses Alfredo and Imelda Diaz (the Diazes) and Reina Comandante
(Comandante), to petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer). Likewise
assailed is the CA Resolution5 dated September 10, 2004 which denied
petitioners as well as respondents Spouses Diaz and Comandantes
respective motions for reconsideration.
The parties respective versions of the factual antecedents are as follows:
Version of the Petitioner
Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint6 that on May 7, 1999,
the Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante, through a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA),7 obtained from him a loan of P1,118,228.00. The
loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract8 by way of second
mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-66049 and a
Promissory Note10 payable within six months or up to November 7, 1999.
Comandante also issued to petitioner postdated checks to secure payment of
said loan.
Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante,
for a valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the
abovementioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still
Undivided),11 the pertinent portions of which read:
I, REINA D. COMANDANTE, of legal age, Filipino, married, with residence
and postal address at No. 6, Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, for a valuable consideration of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P600,000.00) which constitutes my legal obligation/loan to Pedro M.
Ferrer, likewise of legal age, Filipino, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, with
residence and postal address at No. 9, Lot 4, Puerto Rico Street, Loyola
Grand Villas, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, by virtue of these
presents, do hereby WAIVE, and/or REPUDIATE all my hereditary rights and
interests as a legitimate heir/daughter of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G.
Diaz in favor of said Pedro M. Ferrer, his heirs and assigns over a certain
parcel of land together with all the improvements found thereon and which
property is more particularly described as follows:
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887
xxxx
and which property is titled and registered in the name of my parents Alfredo
T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT 6604 (82020) PR-18887.
(sgd.)
REINA D. COMANDANTE
Affiant
On the basis of said waiver, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim12 which he caused to be annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 on
May 26, 1999.
The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by
Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated
demands, said respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus,
petitioner filed on September 29, 1999 a Complaint13 for Collection of Sum of
Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and
Comandante docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 and raffled to Branch
224 of RTC, Quezon City.
Petitioner twice amended his complaint. First, by including as an alternative
relief the Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage14 and, second, by impleading as
validly executed by her; that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests
additional defendants the Pangans as the mortgaged property covered by
TCT No. RT-6604 was already transferred under their names in TCT No. N-
209049. Petitioner prayed in his second amended complaint that all the
respondents be ordered to jointly and solidarily pay him the sum
of P1,118,228.00, exclusive of interests, and/or for the judicial foreclosure of
the property pursuant to the Real Estate Mortgage Contract.
Version of the Respondents
In her Answer15 to petitioners original complaint, Comandante alleged that
petitioner and his wife were her fellow members in the Couples for Christ
Movement. Sometime in 1998, she sought the help of petitioner with regard
to the mortgage with a bank of her parents lot located at No. 6, Rd. 20,
Project 8, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. RT-6604. She also sought
financial accommodations from the couple on several occasions which
totaled P500,000.00. Comandante, however, claimed that these loans were
secured by chattel mortgages over her taxi units in addition to several
postdated checks she issued in favor of petitioner.
As she could not practically comply with her obligation, petitioner and his
wife, presented to Comandante sometime in May 1998 a document
denominated as Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) pertaining to a waiver of her hereditary share over
her parents abovementioned property. Purportedly, the execution of said
waiver was to secure Comandantes loan with the couple which at that time
had already ballooned to P600,000.00 due to interests.
A year later, the couple again required Comandante to sign the following
documents: (1) a Real Estate Mortgage Contract over her parents property;
and, (2) an undated Promissory Note, both corresponding to the amount
of P1,118,228.00, which petitioner claimed to be the total amount of
Comandantes monetary obligation to him exclusive of charges and interests.
Comandante alleged that she reminded petitioner that she was not the
registered owner of the subject property and that although her parents
granted her SPA, same only pertains to her authority to mortgage the
property to banks and other financial institutions and not to individuals.
Petitioner nonetheless assured Comandante that the SPA was also
applicable to their transaction. As Comandante was still hesitant, petitioner
and his wife threatened to foreclose the formers taxi units and present the
postdated checks she issued to the bank for payment. For fear of losing her
taxi units which were the only source of her livelihood, Comandante was thus
constrained to sign the mortgage agreement as well as the promissory note.
Petitioner, however, did not furnish her with copies of said documents on the
pretext that they still have to be notarized, but, as can be gleaned from the
records, the documents were never notarized. Moreover, Comandante
claimed that the SPA alluded to by petitioner in his complaint was not the
same SPA under which she thought she derived the authority to execute the
mortgage contract.
Comandante likewise alleged that on September 29, 1999 at 10:00 o clock in
the morning, she executed an Affidavit of Repudiation/Revocation of Waiver
of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A (Still Undivided) Real
Property,16 which she caused to be annotated on the title of the subject
property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on the same day.
Interestingly, petitioner filed his complaint later that day too.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, Comandante asserted in her
Answer to the amended complaint17 that said complaint states no cause of
action against her because the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the
waiver referred to by petitioner in his complaint were not duly, knowingly and
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) is a useless document as its execution
is prohibited by Article 1347 of the Civil Code,18 hence, it cannot be the
source of any right or obligation in petitioners favor; that the Real Estate
Mortgage was of doubtful validity as she executed the same without valid
authority from her parents; and, that the prayer for collection and/or judicial
foreclosure was irregular as petitioner cannot seek said remedies at the same
time.
Apart from executing the affidavit of repudiation, Comandante also filed on
October 4, 1999 a Petition for Cancellation of Adverse Claim (P.E. 2468)
Under The Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-
1888719 docketed as LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) and raffled to Branch 220
of RTC, Quezon City. Petitioner who was impleaded as respondent therein
moved for the consolidation of said case20 with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876.
On June 24, 2000, Branch 220 of RTC, Quezon City ordered the
consolidation of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) with Civil Case No. Q-99-
38876. Accordingly, the records of the former case was forwarded to Branch
224.
For their part, the Diazes asserted that petitioner has no cause of action
against them. They claimed that they do not even know petitioner and that
they did not execute any SPA in favor of Comandante authorizing her to
mortgage for the second time the subject property. They also contested the
due execution of the SPA as it was neither authenticated before the
Philippine Consulate in the United States nor notarized before a notary public
in the State of New York where the Diazes have been residing for 16 years.
They claimed that they do not owe petitioner anything. The Diazes also
pointed out that the complaint merely refers to Comandantes personal
obligation to petitioner with which they had nothing to do. They thus prayed
that the complaint against them be dismissed.21
At the Pangans end, they alleged that they acquired the subject property by
purchase in good faith and for a consideration of P3,000,000.00 on
November 11, 1999 from the Diazes through the latters daughter
Comandante who was clothed with SPA acknowledged before the Consul of
New York. The Pangans immediately took actual possession of the property
without anyone complaining or protesting. Soon thereafter, they were issued
TCT No. N-209049 in lieu of TCT No. RT-6604 which was cancelled. 22
However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being informed
by petitioner that the subject land had been mortgaged to him by the Diazes.
Upon inquiry from Comandante, the latter readily admitted that she has a
personal loan with petitioner for which the mortgage of the property in
petitioners favor was executed. She admitted, though, that her parents were
not aware of such mortgage and that they did not authorize her to enter into
such contract. Comandante also informed the Pangans that the signatures of
her parents appearing on the SPA are fictitious and that it was petitioner who
prepared such document.
As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that the annotation of
petitioners adverse claim on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot impair their rights as
new owners of the subject property. They claimed that the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) upon
which petitioners adverse claim is anchored cannot be the source of any
right or interest over the property considering that it is null and void under
paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the Pangans asserted that the Real Estate Mortgage Contract
cannot bind them nor in any way impair their ownership of subject property
because it was not registered before the Register of Deeds.23
All the respondents interposed their respective counterclaims and prayed for
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees in varying amounts.
After the parties have submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the Diazes
filed on March 29, 2001 a Motion for Summary Judgment24 alleging that: first,
since the documents alluded to by petitioner in his complaint were defective,
he was not entitled to any legal right or relief; and, second, it was clear from
the pleadings that it is Comandante who has an outstanding obligation with
petitioner which the latter never denied. With these, the Diazes believed that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact against them and, hence,
they were entitled to summary judgment.
On May 7, 2001, petitioner also filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment,25 claiming that his suit against the respondents is meritorious and
well-founded and that same is documented and supported by law and
jurisprudence. He averred that his adverse claim annotated at the back of
TCT No. RT-6604, which was carried over in TCT No. 209049 under the
names of the Pangans, is not merely anchored on the Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
Comandante, but also on the Real Estate Mortgage likewise executed by her
in representation of her parents and in favor of petitioner. Petitioner insisted
that said adverse claim is not frivolous and invalid and is registrable under
Section 70 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. In fact, the Registrar of
Deeds of Quezon City had already determined the sufficiency and/or validity
of such registration by annotating said claim, and this, respondents failed to
question. Petitioner further averred that even before the sale and transfer to
the Pangans of the subject property, the latter were already aware of the
existence of his adverse claim. In view of these, petitioner prayed that his
Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After the filing of the parties respective Oppositions to the said motions for
summary judgment, the trial court, in an Order dated May 31, 2001,26 deemed
both motions for summary judgment submitted for resolution. Quoting
substantially petitioners allegations in his Motion for Summary Judgment, it
thereafter rendered on June 14, 2001 a Summary Judgment27 in favor of
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, summary judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of plaintiff and against defendants by:
a) ORDERING all defendants jointly and solidarily to pay plaintiff
the sum of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS
(P1,118,228.00) which is blood money of plaintiff;
b) ORDERING the Honorable Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City
that the rights and interest of the plaintiff over subject property be
annotated at the back of T.C.T. No. N-209049;
c) SENTENCING all defendants to pay plaintiffs expenses of
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) and to pay the costs of
suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.28
The Pangans, the Diazes, and Comandante appealed to the CA.29 The
Pangans faulted the trial court in holding them jointly and severally liable with
the Diazes and Comandante for the satisfaction of the latters personal
obligation to petitioner in the total amount of P1,118,228.00. The Diazes and
Comandante, on the other hand, imputed error upon the trial court in
rendering summary judgment in favor of petitioner. They averred that
assuming the summary judgment was proper, the trial court should not have
considered the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the Promissory Note as
they were defective, as well as petitioners frivolous and non-registrable
adverse claim.
In its Decision30 dated December 12, 2003, the CA declared Comandantes
waiver of hereditary rights null and void. However, it found the Real Estate
Mortgage executed by Comandante on behalf of her parents as binding
between the parties thereto.
As regards the Pangans, the CA ruled that the mortgage contract was not
binding upon them as they were purchasers in good faith and for value. The
property was free from the mortgage encumbrance of petitioner when they
acquired it as they only came to know of the adverse claim through
petitioners phone call which came right after the formers acquisition of the
property. The CA further ruled that as Comandantes waiver of hereditary
rights and interests upon which petitioners adverse claim was based is a
nullity, it could not be a source of any right in his favor. Hence, the Pangans
were not bound to take notice of such claim and are thus not liable to
petitioner.
Noticeably, the appellate court did not rule on the propriety of the issuance of
the Summary Judgment as raised by the Diazes and Comandante. In the
ultimate, the CA merely modified the assailed Summary Judgment of the trial
court by excluding the Pangans among those solidarily liable to petitioner, in
effect affirming in all other respects the assailed summary judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 is
hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses
Diaz to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the sum of Php 1,118,
228.00; and
2. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses
Diaz to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the amount of
Php10,000.00 plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.31
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration32 having been denied by the CA in its
Resolution33 dated September 10, 2004, he now comes to us through this
petition for review on certiorari insisting that the Pangans should, together
with the other respondents, be held solidarily liable to him for the amount
of P1,118,228.00.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner merely reiterates his contentions in the Motion for Summary
Judgment he filed before the trial court. He insists that his Adverse Claim
annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 is not merely anchored on
Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A Real
Property (Still Undivided) but also on her being the attorney-in-fact of the
Diazes when she executed the mortgage contract in favor of petitioner. He
avers that his adverse claim is not frivolous or invalid and is registrable as the
Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City even allowed its annotation. He also
claims that even prior to the sale of subject property to the Pangans, the latter
already knew of his valid and existing adverse claim thereon and are,
therefore, not purchasers in good faith. Thus, petitioner maintains that the
Pangans should be held, together with the Diazes and Comandante, jointly
and severally liable to him in the total amount of P1,118,228.00.
Petitioners contentions are untenable.
The Affidavit of Adverse Claim executed by petitioner reads in part:
xxxx
1. That I am the Recipient/Benefactor of compulsory heirs share
over an undivided certain parcel of land together with all the
improvements found therein x x x as evidenced by Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A Real Property, executed
by REINA D. COMANDANTE (a compulsory/legitimate heir of
Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz), x x x.
2. That in order to protect my interest over said property as a
Recipient/Benefactor, for the registered owners/parents might
dispose (of) and/or encumber the same in a fraudulent manner
without my knowledge and consent, for the owners duplicate title
was not surrendered to me, it is petitioned that this Affidavit of
Adverse Claim be ANNOTATED at the back of the said title
particularly on the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on file with the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City.
3. That I am executing this Affidavit in order to attest (to) the truth
of the foregoing facts and to petition the Honorable Registrar of
Deeds, Quezon City, to annotate this Affidavit of Adverse Claim
at the back of the said title particularly the original copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887
 which is on file with the said office, so that my interest as
Recipient/Benefactor of the said property will be protected
especially the registered owner/parents, in a fraudulent manner
might dispose (of) and/or encumber the same without my
knowledge and consent. (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, petitioners Affidavit of Adverse Claim was based solely on the waiver
of hereditary interest executed by Comandante. This fact cannot be any
clearer especially so when the inscription of his adverse claim at the back of
TCT No. RT-6604 reads as follows:
P.E. 2468/T-(82020)RT-6604 - - AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM - -
Executed under oath by PEDRO M. FERRER, married to Erlinda B.
Ferrer, claiming among others that they have a claim, the interest over
said property as Recipient/Benefactor, by virtue of a waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest over a real property x x x34 (Emphasis
ours)
Therefore, there is no basis for petitioners assertion that the adverse claim
was also anchored on the mortgage contract allegedly executed by
Comandante on behalf of her parents.
The questions next to be resolved are: Is Comandantes waiver of hereditary
rights valid? Is petitioners adverse claim based on such waiver likewise valid
and effective?
We note at the outset that the validity of petitioners adverse claim should
have been determined by the trial court after the petition for cancellation of
petitioners adverse claim filed by Comandante was consolidated with Civil
Case No. Q-99-38876.35 This is in consonance with Section 70 of PD 1529
which provides:
Section 70. Adverse Claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in
registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the
date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this
Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully
his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to
the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse
claimants residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon
him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on
the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty
days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition
therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, That after cancellation,
no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by
the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a
petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the
cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing
upon the question of validity of such adverse claim, and shall render
judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be
invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the
court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim thus
registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than
one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion.
Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim
by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect. (Emphasis
ours)
Pursuant to the third paragraph of the afore-quoted provision, it has been
held that the validity or efficaciousness of an adverse claim may only be
determined by the Court upon petition by an interested party, in which event,
the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper
adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And, it is only when such
claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claim may be
cancelled.36
As correctly pointed out by respondents, the records is bereft of any showing
that the trial court conducted any hearing on the matter. Instead, what the trial
court did was to include this material issue among those for which it has
rendered its summary judgment as shown by the following portion of the
judgment:
x x x it will be NOTED that subject Adverse Claim annotated at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887, and carried over
to defendants-Sps. Pangans Title No. N-20909, is not merely anchored on
defendant Reina Comandantes "Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest
Over a Real Property" but also on her being the Attorney-In-Fact of the
previous registered owners/parents/defendants Sps. Alfredo and Imelda Diaz
about the Real Estate Mortgage Contract for a loan of P1,118,228.00 which is
a blood money of the plaintiff. Moreover, subject Adverse Claim in LRC Case
No. Q-12009 (99) is NOT frivolous and invalid and consequently,
REGISTRABLE by virtue of Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (now
Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529). 37 (Emphasis ours)
It does not escape our attention that the trial court merely echoed the claim of
petitioner that his adverse claim subject of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is not
frivolous, invalid and is consequently registrable. We likewise lament the
apparent lack of effort on the part of said court to make even a short
ratiocination as to how it came up with said conclusion. In fact, what followed
the above-quoted portion of the summary judgment are mere recitals of the
arguments raised by petitioner in his motion for summary judgment. And in
the dispositive portion, the trial court merely casually ordered that petitioners
adverse claim be inscribed at the back of the title of the Pangans. What is
worse is that despite this glaring defect, the CA manifestly overlooked the
matter even if respondents vigorously raised the same before it.
Be that as it may, respondents efforts of pointing out this flaw, which we find
significant, have not gone to naught as will be hereinafter discussed.
All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante is null and
void for being violative of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, hence, petitioners
adverse claim which was based upon such waiver is likewise void and cannot
confer upon the latter any right or interest over the property.
We agree with the respondents.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no
contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered "future", the
succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract
may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the
second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance;
and,
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an
expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.38
In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of
Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property
(Still Undivided), succession to either of her parents properties has not yet
been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the other two
requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject
matter of Comandantes waiver concededly forms part of the properties that
she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy
of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a
contract involving the formers future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver
of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided)
executed by her in petitioners favor.
In Taedo v. Court of Appeals,39 we invalidated the contract of sale between
Lazaro Taedo and therein private respondents since the subject matter
thereof was a "one hectare of whatever share the former shall have over Lot
191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by
Title T-13829 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac." It constitutes a part of
Taedos future inheritance from his parents, which cannot be the source of
any right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties.
Guided by the above discussions, we similarly declare in this case that the
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still
Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and
that same cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation between
them for being violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil
Code.
Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioners adverse claim, it is provided in
Section 70 of PD 1529, that it is necessary that the claimant has a right or
interest in the registered land adverse to the registered owner and that it must
arise subsequent to registration. Here, as no right or interest on the subject
property flows from Comandantes invalid waiver of hereditary rights upon
petitioner, the latter is thus not entitled to the registration of his adverse claim.
Therefore, petitioners adverse claim is without any basis and must
consequently be adjudged invalid and ineffective and perforce be cancelled.
Albeit we have already resolved the issues raised by petitioner, we shall not
stop here as the Diazes and Comandante in their Comment40 call our
attention to the failure of the CA to pass upon the issue of the propriety of the
issuance by the trial court of the Summary Judgment in favor of petitioner
despite the fact that they have raised this issue before the appellate court.
They argue that summary judgment is proper only when there is clearly no
genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. Thus, where the defendant
presented defenses tendering factual issue which call for presentation of
evidence, as when he specifically denies the material allegations in the
complaint, summary judgment cannot be rendered.
The Diazes and Comandante then enumerate the genuine issues in the case
which they claim should have precluded the trial court from issuing a
summary judgment in petitioners favor. First, the execution of the SPA in
favor of Comandante referred to by petitioner in his complaint was never
admitted by the Diazes. They assert that as such fact is disputed, trial should
have been conducted to determine the truth of the matter, same being a
genuine issue. Despite this, the trial court merely took the word of the plaintiff
and assumed that said document was indeed executed by them. Second,
although Comandante acknowledges that she has a personal obligation with
petitioner, she nevertheless, did not admit that it was in the amount
of P1,118,228.00. Instead, she claims only the amount of P500,000.00
or P600,000.00 (if inclusive of interest) as her obligation. Moreover, the
Diazes deny borrowing any money from petitioner and neither did the
Pangans owe him a single centavo. Thus, the true amount of the obligation
due the petitioner and how each of the respondents are responsible for such
amount are genuine issues which need formal presentation of
evidence. Lastly, they aver that the trial court ignored factual and material
issues such as the lack of probative value of Comandantes waiver of
hereditary rights as well as of the SPA; the fact that Comandante signed the
mortgage contract and promissory note in her personal capacity; and, that all
such documents were prepared by petitioner who acted as a lawyer and the
creditor of Comandante at the same time.
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides for summary judgment, the pertinent
provisions of which are the following:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at
any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in
his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Section 2. Summary Judgment for the defending party. A party against whom
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is
sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at
least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse
party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three
(3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and
admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
As can be deduced from the above provisions, summary judgment is a
procedural devise resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and
useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine
issues of facts to be tried, the Rules of Court allows a party to obtain
immediate relief by way of summary judgment. That is, when the facts are not
in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the
law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine
issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is such fact which
requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
contrived or false claim.41
Here, we find the existence of genuine issues which removes the case from
the coverage of summary judgment. The variance in the allegations of the
parties in their pleadings is evident.
Petitioner anchors his complaint for sum of money and/or judicial foreclosure
on the alleged real estate mortgage over the subject property allegedly
entered into by Comandante in behalf of her parents to secure payment of a
loan amounting to P1,118,228.00. To support this claim, petitioner attached
to his complaint (1) the SPA alleged to have been executed by the Diazes;
(2) the Real Estate Mortgage Contract pertaining to the amount
of P1,118,228.00; and, (3) a Promissory Note.
Comandante, in her Answer to petitioners Amended Complaint, assailed the
validity and due execution of the abovementioned documents. She asserted
that the same were not duly, knowingly and validly executed by her and that it
was petitioner who prepared all of them. Also, although she admitted owing
petitioner, same was not an absolute admission as she limited herself to an
obligation amounting only to P600,000.00 inclusive of charges and interests.
She likewise claimed that such obligation is her personal obligation and not of
her parents.
The Diazes, for their part, also denied that they executed the SPA authorizing
their daughter to mortgage their property to petitioner as well as having any
obligation to the latter.
Clearly, there are genuine issues in this case which require the presentation
of evidence. For one, it is necessary to ascertain in a full blown trial the
validity and due execution of the SPA, the Real Estate Mortgage and the
Promissory Notes because the determination of the following equally
significant questions depends on them, to wit: (1) Are the Diazes obligated to
petitioner or is the obligation a purely personal obligation of Comandante?
and, (2) Is the sum of P1,118,228.00 as shown in the Real Estate Mortgage
and the Promissory Note, the amount which is really due the petitioner?
To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments
and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material
fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.42 From the
foregoing, it is apparent that the trial court should have refrained from issuing
the summary judgment but instead proceeded to conduct a full blown trial of
the case. In view of this, the present case should be remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings and proper disposition according to the
rudiments of a regular trial on the merits and not through an abbreviated
termination of the case by summary judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated December 12, 2003 insofar as it excluded the respondents
Spouses Bienvenido Pangan and Elizabeth Pangan from among those
solidarily liable to petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer, is AFFIRMED. The
inscription of the adverse claim of petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer on T.C.T.
No. N-209049 is hereby ordered CANCELLED. Insofar as its other aspects
are concerned, the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED. The
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179859 August 9, 2010
IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
BASILIO SANTIAGO,
MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE SANTIAGO, Petitioners,
vs.
ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS OF
RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF
TOMAS SANTIAGO, Respondents.
FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS SOCO, URBANO SOCO,
GERTRUDES SOCO AND HEIRS OF CONSOLACION SOCO, Oppositors.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriagesthe first to Bibiana
Lopez, the second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio
and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of herein
oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes,
all surnamed Soco.
Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo,
respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed
Santiago.
Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner
Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago.1
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the second
marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bulacan2 a petition for the probate of Basilios will, docketed as SP No. 1549-
M. The will was admitted to probate by Branch 10 of the RTC and Ma. Pilar
was appointed executrix.
The will contained the following provisions, among others:
4. Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay INIWAN,
IPINAGKAKALOOB, IBINIBIGAY, at IPINAMAMANA ko sa aking mga
nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya ng sumusunod:
xxxx
c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang magpapalakad at
mamamahala ng balutan na nasa Santiago, Malolos, Bulacan,
na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(y);
d) Sa pamamahala ng bigasan, pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop
at lupat bahay sa Maynila, ang lahat ng solar sa danay ng daang
Malolos-Paombong na nasa Malolos, Bulacan, kasali at kasama
ang palaisdaan na nasa likuran niyon, ay ililipat sa pangalan nila
Ma. Pilar at Clemente; ngunit ang kita ng palaisdaan ay siyang
gagamitin nila sa lahat at anomang kailangang gugol, maging
majora o roperacion [sic], sa lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila
na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c);
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa
itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at
Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang
pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman
sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang
panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa
Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.
f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop
ay ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga
anak na Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia,
Clemente, at Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Ngunit, sa loob ng
dalawampong (20) taon mula sa araw ng aking kamatayan, hindi
nila papartihin ito at pamamahalaan ito ni Clemente at ang
maghahawak ng salaping kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang
magpaparte. Ang papartihin lamang ay ang kita ng mga iyon
matapos na ang gugol na kakailanganin niyon, bilang reparacion,
pagpapalit o pagpapalaki ay maawas na. Ninais ko ang ganito sa
aking pagmamahal sa kanila at pagaaring ibinubuhay ko sa
kanila lahat, bukod sa yaon ay sa kanila ding kapakinabangan at
kabutihan.
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng
Maynila, ay ipinapamana ko sa aking nasabing asawa, Cecilia
Lomotan, at mga anak na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo,
Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente at Cleotilde nang pare-
pareho. Datapwat, gaya din ng mga bigasan, makina at gawaan
ng pagkain ng hayop, ito ay hindi papartihin sa loob ng
dalawampong (20) taon mula sa aking pagpanaw, at
pamamahalaan din nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente. Ang mapaparte
lamang ay ang kita o ani ng nasabing mga pag-aari matapos
bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig at iba pang mga gugol na
kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din ang hahawak ng ani o salaping
manggagaling dito. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)3
The oppositors-children of Marta, a daughter of Basilio and his first wife,
were, on their motion, allowed to intervene.4
After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a "Final Accounting, Partition and
Distribution in Accordance with the Will,"5 the probate court approved the will
by Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the registers of deeds of Bulacan
and Manila to register the certificates of title indicated therein.6 Accordingly,
the titles to Lot Nos. 786, 837, 7922, 836 and 838 in Malolos, Bulacan and
Lot No. 8-C in Manila were transferred in the name of petitioners Ma. Pilar
and Clemente.7
The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-Intervention8 with the probate
court, alleging that Basilios second wife was not Irene but a certain Maria
Arellano with whom he had no child; and that Basilios will violates Articles
979-981 of the Civil Code.9
The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention, citing its previous
approval of the "Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution in Accordance
with the Will."10
The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed a complaint for
completion of legitime before the Bulacan RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
562-M-90,11 against the heirs of the second and third marriages.
In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first marriage essentially maintained
that they were partially preterited by Basilios will because their legitime was
reduced.12 They thus prayed, inter alia, that an inventory and appraisal of all
the properties of Basilio be conducted and that Ma. Pilar and Clemente be
required to submit a fresh accounting of all the incomes of the properties from
the time of Basilios death up to the time of the filing of Civil Case No. 562-M-
90.13
RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for completion of legitime)
in favor of the oppositors-heirs of the first marriage.
On appeal (docketed as CA G.R. No. 45801), the Court of Appeals, by
Decision of January 25, 2002,14 annulled the decision of RTC-Branch 17,
holding that the RTC Branch 17 dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention in
SP No. 1549-M and its August 14, 1978 Order approving the probate of the
will constitute res judicata with respect to Civil Case No. 562-M-90.15 Thus the
appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision in Civil Case No. 562-M-90 is hereby ANNULLED on the ground of
res judicata. Let the Decree of Distribution of the Estate of Basilio Santiago
remain UNDISTURBED.
SO ORDERED.16 (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Oppositors-heirs of the first marriage challenged the appellate courts
decision in CA G.R. No. 45801 by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No.
155606, which this Court denied.17 The denial became final and executory on
April 9, 2003.18
In the interregnum, or on October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of the second
marriage filed before the probate court (RTC-Branch 10) a Motion for
Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the
Names of the Legatees.19 Citing the earlier quoted portions of Basilios will,
they alleged that:
x x x x the twenty (20) year period within which subject properties should be
under administration of [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago expired
on September 16, 1993.
Consequently, [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have
ceased as such administrator[s] way back on September 16, 1993 and they
should have transferred the above said titles to the named legatees in the
Last Will and Testament of the testator by then. Said named legatees in the
Last Will and Testament are no[ne] other than the following:
xxxx
Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have also rendered
an accounting of their administration from such death of the testator up to the
present or until transfer of said properties and its administration to the said
legatees.
x x x x20
Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered:
1) To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their
names to [the] Honorable Court and to transfer the same in the
names of the designated legatees in the Last Will and
Testament, to wit:
1) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na
2) Tomas
3) Zoilo
4) Ma. Pilar
5) Ricardo
6) Cipriano
 7) Felicidad
8) Eugenia
9) Clemente at
10) Cleotilde
(all surnamed SANTIAGO)
2) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of
subject properties, including any and all improvements thereon,
to said legatees.
3) To render an accounting of their administration of said
properties and other properties of the testator under their
administration, from death of testator Basilio Santiago on
September 16, 1973 up to the present and until possession and
administration thereof is transferred to said legatees.21
Opposing the motion, petitioners argued that with the approval of the Final
Accounting, Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will, and with
the subsequent issuance of certificates of title covering the properties
involved, the case had long since been closed and terminated.22
The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be transferred
to petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente for purposes of administration only,
granted the motion, by Order of September 5, 2003,23 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Termination of
Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the
Legatees dated October 3, 2000 filed by some heirs of the testator Basilio
Santiago xxx is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the administratrix [sic] Ma.
Pilar Santiago and Mr. Clemente Santiago are hereby DIRECTED, as follows:
a.) To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their
names to this Honorable Court and to transfer the same in the
names of the designated legatees in the Last Will and
Testament, to wit: 1.) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan at mga anak na 2.)
Tomas 3). Zoilo 4.) Ma. Pilar 5.) Ricardo 6.) Cipriano 7.)
Felicidad 8.) Eugenia 9.) Clemente and 10.) Cleotilde all named
SANTIAGO.
b.) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of
subject properties including any and all improvements thereon, to
said legatees; and
c.) To render an accounting of their administration of subject
properties, including any and all improvements thereon, to said
legatees; and
d.) To submit an accounting of their administration of the above-
mentioned estate of the testator or all the above said lots
including the rice mill, animal feeds factory, and all improvements
thereon from August 14, 1978 up to the present.
e.) To submit a proposed Project of Partition, indicating how the
parties may actually partition or adjudicate all the above said
properties including the properties already in the name of all the
said legatees xxx.
x x x x.
Further, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan are hereby DIRECTED to cancel
and consider as no force and effects Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
249177 (RT-46294) [Lot No. 786], T-249175 (RT-46295) [Lot No. 837], T-
249174 (RT-46296) [Lot No. 7922], T-249173 (RT-46297) [Lot No. 836], and
T-249176 (RT-46293) [Lot No. 838] in the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and
Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones in the lieu thereof in the names of
Cecilia Lomotan-Santiago, Tomas Santiago, Zoilo Santiago, Ma. Pilar
Santiago, Ricardo Santiago, Cipriano Santiago, Felicidad Santiago, Eugenia
Santiago, Clemente Santiago, and Cleotilde Santiago.
Moreover, the Register of Deeds of Manila is hereby DIRECTED to cancel
and consider as no force and effect Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131044
[Lot No. 8-C] in the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago and
to issue new ones in lieu thereof in the names of the Heirs of Bibiana Lopez,
the Heirs of Irene Santiago, and the Heirs of Cecilia Lomotan.
The Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Filemon, Leonila, Ma.
Concepcion, Ananias, Urbano and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco, dated
December 3, 2002, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.24
Respecting petitioners argument that the case had long been closed and
terminated, the trial court held:
x x x x [I]t is clear from the Last Will and Testament that subject properties
cannot actually be partitioned until after 20 years from the death of the
testator Basilio Santiago x x x x. It is, therefore, clear that something more
has to be done after the approval of said Final Accounting, Partition, and
Distribution. The testator Basilio Santiago died on September 16, 1973,
hence, the present action can only be filed after September 16, 1993.
Movants cause of action accrues only from the said date and for which no
prescription of action has set in.
The principle of res judicata does not apply in the present probate proceeding
which is continuing in character, and terminates only after and until the final
distribution or settlement of the whole estate of the deceased in accordance
with the provision of the will of the testator. The Order dated August 14, 1978
refers only to the accounting, partition, and distribution of the estate of the
deceased for the period covering from the date of the filing of the petition for
probate on December 27, 1973 up to August 14, 1978. And in the said
August 14, 1978 order it does not terminate the appointment of petitioner[s]
Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago as executrix and administrator,
respectively, of the estate of the deceased particularly of those properties
which were prohibited by the testator to be partitioned within 20 years from
his death. Since then up to the present, Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente
Santiago remain the executor and administrator of the estate of the deceased
and as such, they are required by law to render an accounting thereof from
August 14, 1978 up to the present; there is also now a need to partition and
distribute the aforesaid properties as the prohibition period to do so has
elapsed. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)25
Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a motion for
reconsideration,26 which the probate court denied, drawing them to appeal to
the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. No. 83094.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court,27 hence, the
petition28 which raises the following grounds:
I.
"CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSE ITSELF"
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT BINDING
ITSELF WITH ITS PREVIOUS DECISION INVOLVING THE
SAME PARTIES AND SAME PROPERTIES;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RTC AS IT AGREED WITH THE RTC THAT THIS CASE IS NOT
BARRED BY RES JUDICATA;
C. IN C.A.-G.R. NO. 45801, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS HELD THAT THERE WAS RES JUDICATA; IN C.A.-
G.R. CV NO. 83094, THERE WAS NO RES JUDICATA.
II.
"GRANTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALL THE
COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION TO REVERSE ITSELF, STILL THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTCS ORDER TO
TRANSFER THE MANILA PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. 131004 TO
THE NAMES OF CECILIA LOMOTAN, TOMAS, ZOILO, MA. PILAR,
RICARDO, CIPRIANO FELICIDAD, EUGENIA, CLEMENTE AND
CLEOTILDE, ALL SURNAMED SANTIAGO."29 (emphasis in the original)
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners argument that the decision of the appellate court in the earlier
CA-G.R. NO. 45801 (upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 155606) constitutes res
judicata to the subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of the present
petition for review) fails.
Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Sections 47 (b) and 47
(c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.30 The first, known as "bar by
prior judgment," proscribes the prosecution of a second action upon the same
claim, demand or cause of action already settled in a prior action.31 The
second, known as "conclusiveness of judgment," ordains that issues actually
and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future
case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.32
Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in the present
case. The final judgment regarding oppositors complaint on the reduction of
their legitime in CA-G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the present petition, which
solely tackles the propriety of the termination of administration, accounting
and transfer of titles in the names of the legatees-heirs of the second and
third marriages. There is clearly no similarity of claim, demand or cause of
action between the present petition and G.R. No. 155606.
While as between the two cases there is identity of parties, "conclusiveness
of judgment" cannot likewise be invoked. Again, the judgment in G.R. No.
155606 would only serve as an estoppel as regards the issue on oppositors
supposed preterition and reduction of legitime, which issue is not even a
subject, or at the very least even invoked, in the present petition.
What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata insofar as the
judgment in G.R. No. 155606 is concerned against the oppositors only. The
records reveal, however, that the oppositors did not appeal the decision of
the appellate court in this case and were only impleaded pro forma parties.
Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of the appellate court in
CA G.R. No. 45801 that the decree of distribution of the estate of Basilio
should remain undisturbed. But this directive goes only so far as to prohibit
the interference of the oppositors in the distribution of Basilios estate and
does not pertain to respondents supervening right to demand the termination
of administration, accounting and transfer of titles in their names.
Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the probate court granting
respondents Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for
Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees is a proper and necessary
continuation of the August 14, 1978 Order that approved the accounting,
partition and distribution of Basilios estate. As did the appellate court, the
Court notes that the August 14, 1978 Order was yet to become final pending
the whole settlement of the estate. And final settlement of the estate, in this
case, would culminate after 20 years or on September 16, 1993, when the
prohibition to partition the properties of the decedent would be lifted.
Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in Manila,
covered by TCT No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the legatees-
heirs as it would contravene the testators intent that no one is to own the
same.1avvphi1
The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilios will that he intended the
house and lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners names for
administration purposes only, and that the property be owned by the heirs in
common, thus:
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa
itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at
Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang
pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman
sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang
panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa
Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa medaling salita, ang bahay
at lupang itoy walang magmamay-ari bagkus ay gagamitin
habang panahon ng sinomang magnanais sa aking
kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng karunungan sa paaralan sa
Maynila at katabing mga lunsod x x x x33 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
But the condition set by the decedent on the propertys indivisibility is subject
to a statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with the ruling of the
appellate court, viz:
For this Court to sustain without qualification, [petitioners]s contention, is to
go against the provisions of law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083
of the Civil Code, which provide that the prohibition to divide a property in a
co-ownership can only last for twenty (20) years x x x x
xxxx
x x x x Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a
property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to
sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil
Code x x x x34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES
LIMITED, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29,
1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its Resolution dated February
28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are
as follows:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner],
then Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied
for employment with defendant company [herein private respondent]
through its Area Manager in Manila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant
wrote to plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-
707 captain for an original period of two (2) years commencing on
January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced working
on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-month probation period,
plaintiffs appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B",
p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year
contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984
subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the contract of
employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while
in command of a flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich
Airport, for which plaintiff apologized.(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein
the tail of the aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He
was suspended for a few days until he was investigated by board
headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded.
On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300
conversion training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's
expense. Having successfully completed and passed the training
course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as captain of
the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300
fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia.
(Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting
measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were
found in excess of the defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p.
11). Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots including
plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh.
"15", p. 466, Rec.)
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant
decided to terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It
did not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed
their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the
17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified.
Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the twelve.
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination
effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months
salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.).
Because he could not uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff
requested a three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible
avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2)
months notice and one (1) month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on
jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was
withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to
illegal termination of contract of services before the court a
quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss
alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction
over the instant case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal
dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of
plaintiffs employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who
have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that,
since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his
employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus,
defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts
thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the
items demanded in a complaint are the natural consequences flowing
from a breach of an obligation and not labor benefits, the case is
intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is
beyond the field of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the
complaint is grounded not on the employee's dismissal per se but on the
manner of said dismissal and the consequence thereof, the case falls
under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to
dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. (p. 95 ibid.)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the
grounds relied upon in its motion to dismiss and further arguing that
plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel from instituting the
complaint and that he has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff.
The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Menandro Laureano and against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited,
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current
rate of exchange at the time of payment, as and for unearned
compensation with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully
paid;
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current
rate of exchange at the time of payment; and the further amounts of
P67,500.00 as consequential damages with legal interest from the filing
of the complaint until fully paid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for
exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.2
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised
the issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial
court, thus,
. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination
was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four
(4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982.
Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration
were denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH
PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE
RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS
UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE
RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY
FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN
FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9.
The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is
legal under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to
show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As
substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine
Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The
defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case
has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore,
the Philippine law should be applied.4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its
appeal before said court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct when
it barred defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of
jurisdiction.6
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article
1144 or on Article 1146 of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of
employment effective November 1, 1982, was based on an employment
contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10
years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate
court based on Article 1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an
error. The appellate court concluded that the action for illegal dismissal
originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was
withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had
already prescribed.
In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here
pertinent. What is applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:
Art. 291. Money claims. All money claims arising from
employee-employer relations accruing during the effectivity of
this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the
cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
xxx xxx xxx
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been
decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year
prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked
by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the
prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is
a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from employee-employer
relations.9
More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim
was based on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the
Court held:
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its
application only to "money claims specifically recoverable under
said Code" but covers all money claims arising from an
employee-employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA
Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a
special law applicable to money claims arising from employer-
employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144
of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that "where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefore
should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's
conclusion that petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed
again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective date
of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.
In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal
termination was filed by plaintiff-appelle only on January 8, 1987
or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's
action has already prescribed.
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the
sets the prescription period at three (3) years and which governs under this Court of Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when
he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the
National Labor Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves scant
consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International,
Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a
civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its
dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff leaves in exactly the
same position as though no action had been commenced at all."12
Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to
retrenchment was valid, the appellate court found that the employment
contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of employment. We agree
with the Court of Appeals when it said,
It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between
the parties. From the moment the same is perfected, the parties
are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus,
when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was
bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract,
among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three
months written notice or by payment of three months salary.
Such provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there
is no room for interpretation.
xxx xxx xxx
Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the
provisions of the Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto,
deserves no merit. It must be noted that when plaintiff-appellee's
employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with the
Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to
the aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is
estopped from questioning the legality of the said agreement or
any proviso contained therein.13
Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent
court's decision is amply supported by evidence and it did not err in its
findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:
When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide
recession of the airline industry resulting in a slow down in the
company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian
Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to
adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down services,
number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number of
flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18).
As a result, defendant-appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots,
including plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in excess of what
is reasonably needed.14
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude
that petitioner's termination from employment was for an authorized cause,
for which he was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by
respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could
be attributed to respondent appellate court.1wphi1.nt
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 159240 February 4, 2008
GREGORIO SILOT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ESTRELLA DE LA ROSA, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 dated July 9, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68062 entitled "Estrella de la Rosa v. Gregorio
Silot, Jr." The appellate court had affirmed with modification the Joint
Decision2 dated May 24, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61,
Naga City, in Civil Case Nos. 97-3736 and 97-3750, and decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Joint Decision
dated May 24, 2000 of the RTC, Branch 61, Naga City in Civil
Cases Nos. 97-3736 and 97-3750 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION, deleting the award for nominal damages and
reducing the award of attorney's fees to Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos.
Other awards not otherwise modified or deleted stand.
SO ORDERED.3
As culled from the records by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts of
this case are as follows:
On January 19, 1996, petitioner Gregorio Silot, Jr. and respondent Estrella de
la Rosa entered into a contract for the construction of a dormitory-apartment
building on Lot 1-A-9-D, Bagumbayan Sur, Naga City. They expressly agreed
that Silot shall supply the labor and de la Rosa shall pay 33% of the total
value of the materials purchased for the project. Upon turnover in February
1997 of the completed structure, the total cost of materials actually purchased
was P2,504,469.65, 33% of which is P826,474.98. Silot required de la Rosa
to pay a total of P1,018,000.00, or P191,525.02 more than the amount due.
Through her son-in-law, de la Rosa confronted Silot about the overpayment
but the latter refused to return the overpayment. After her repeated demands
fell on deaf ears, de la Rosa filed a suit against Silot.
Silot, in retaliation, sued de la Rosa for insufficient payment, claiming that he
was supposed to receive P1,281,872.404 but was only paid P1,008,000.00,
thus still leaving a balance of P273,872.40.
The two cases were consolidated by the trial court.
During trial, however, Atty. San Jose, counsel for Silot, dispensed with the
testimony of Ariel Goingo, a witness for de la Rosa. Atty. San Jose admitted
Goingo's proposed testimony to the effect that in consideration of the 33% as
mentioned in the contract, all the material supplies during the making of the
additional works mentioned were already accounted for; that Silot was paid
for all works that were performed as well as all materials supplied; that the
total sum was P2,504,469.65, so that 33% of which is only P826,474.98; that
de la Rosa paid the amount of P1,018,000.00; hence, there was an excess
payment of P191,525.02; and that de la Rosa never received any demand
from nor was she confronted by Silot regarding an alleged balance.5
Consequently, after trial, the RTC ruled in favor of de la Rosa and ordered
Silot to return the overpaid amount, decreeing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, Civil Case No. 3736 is hereby
ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit; while in Civil Case No. 97-
3750, defendant Gregorio Silot is hereby ordered to return the
amount of P191,525.02 to the plaintiff, Estrella de la Rosa; to
pay P100,000.00 for [a]ttorney's fees and P50,000.00 as nominal
damages.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Hence, the instant petition wherein Silot assigned the following errors:
I.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in construing the
admission ma[d]e by Atty. San Jose on the purpose for the
testimony of witness Ariel [Goingo] as admission of evidence.
II.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in deciding and ordering
petitioner-appellant to return the amount of P191,525.02 to
respondent appellee and also to pay P20,000.00 attorney[']s
fees.7
Simply stated, petitioner is raising the following issues to be resolved: (1)
whether the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of petitioner Silot,
constituted judicial admission of respondent's evidence; and (2) whether the
appellate court erred in ruling that Silot should return the claimed amount
of P191,525.02 to de la Rosa.
Petitioner Silot contends that his counsel Atty. San Jose merely admitted that
the subject of Goingo's testimony was that stated in the offer of testimony, but
he did not admit the truth or veracity of the testimony. Silot adds that Atty.
San Jose could not and should not have admitted the testimony because he
had no special power of attorney to enter into such stipulations or to
compromise his client's right without the latter's direct intervention.8
Respondent de la Rosa counters that clients are bound by the admissions as
well as the negligence of their counsel. She enumerates several Court
decisions to support her contention, among them the following cases:
(1) Ongson v. People,9 where petitioner was held bound by his unqualified
admission that he received private complainant's demand letter with notice of
dishonor. The admission binds him considering that he never denied receipt
of the notice of dishonor.
(2) Republic v. Sarabia,10 where the Court held that an admission made in the
pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are
conclusive as to him.
(3) People v. Genosa,11 Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran,12 Carandang v. Court of
Appeals,13 in which cases the Court held that judicial admissions are
conclusive upon the party making it and may not be contradicted in the
absence of prior showing that the admission had been made through
palpable mistake, or no admission was in fact made.
(4) People v. Razul14 and Lim v. Jabalde,15 where it was held that stipulations
are recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence,
binding upon the parties.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes
arising from negligence of his own counsel.16 The only exception to this rule
is, as the Court of Appeals itself cited in its decision, when the negligence is
so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court.17
In our considered view, however, that exception does not find any application
in this case. As the records would plainly show, Silot was not deprived of his
day in court. Also, as the appellate court observed, he could have introduced
evidence, testimonial or otherwise, in order to controvert or correct the
admission made by his counsel. Said the appellate court:
As gleaned from the records, defendant-appellant Silot was
not deprived of his day in court. He was given every opportunity
to be heard through his pleadings and manifestations. He was
also presented in open court to testify. As quoted earlier, Atty.
Terbio, counsel for plaintiff-appellee de la Rosa, even repeatedly
asked Atty. San Jose, defendant-appellant Silot's counsel, if he
would admit the purpose for which the witness Ariel Goingo will
testify to dispense with his testimony, and Atty. San Jose
repeatedly answered that "We will admit that." And when asked
by the judge if he will admit it, he answered that they will
admit P2,504,000.00.18
More importantly, Silot's counsel clearly made admissions of the content of
the testimony of witness Goingo, whose presentation was dispensed with.
In People v. Hernandez,19 we held that admissions made for the purpose of
dispensing with proof of some facts are in the nature of judicial admissions, to
wit:
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense
counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into
writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings
had in court. The conformity of the accused in the form of his
signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that:
"[] an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of
a lawsuit [] has prima facie authority to make relevant
admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, [] which
unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive." (Italics
supplied.) In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of
counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose
of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions
are made [] for the purpose of dispensing with proof of
some fact, [] they bind the client, whether made during, or
even after, the trial.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
Worth stressing, in this connection, judicial admissions do not require proof
and may not be contradicted in the absence of a prior showing that the
admissions had been made through palpable mistake.21
Furthermore, in the case of Toh v. Court of Appeals,22 this Court emphasized
the consequence of admitting and dispensing with the testimony of the
proposed witness, thus:
The Court sees no cogent reason why the said witness should
be examined any further since his testimony as summarized in
the offer made by counsel was expressly admitted by opposing
counsel. With the said admission, the testimony of said witness
is uncontroverted and even admitted as fact by opposing
counsel.23
On the issue of insufficient payment, Silot avers that he has rendered or
provided labor for the total amount of P1,281,872.40, and that de la Rosa has
benefited and profited from these labors.24 Without the labors provided by
Silot, the constructed building would not have been painted, provided with
electrical works and other works which were additional works on the building,
and that to sanction de la Rosa's claim would be to allow unjust enrichment
on the part of de la Rosa.25 However, this claim has been belied by the
admission made by his own counsel, as plainly manifest in the transcript:
Atty. Terbio
The purpose for which this witness will testify are the
following: If admitted, we are willing to dispense the
testimony. He will testify that in consideration of
the 33% as mentioned in the contract, all the
material supplies during the making of the
additional works mentioned were all considered;
he will testify that Silot was paid of all works that
was performed as well as all materials supplied
were considered, and that the sum total of which
is P2,504,469.65 and 33% of which
is P826,474.98, and that De la Rosa paid the total
amount of P1,018,000.00, and therefore, there is
an excess payment of P191,525.00; he will testify
that De la Rosa never received the demand or
was confronted by Silot regarding an alleged
balance, now, if the counsel wish to admit this.
ATTY. SAN JOSE
We admit that.
ATTY. TERBIO
Because these are all evidentiary and this has not
been adequately covered.
ATTY. SAN JOSE
We will admit that.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, given the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals did not err
in ordering petitioner to return to respondent the amount of P191,525.02
overpayment.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated July 9, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68062
is AFFIRMED. Petitioner Gregorio Silot, Jr. is hereby ordered to return the
amount of P191,525.02 to respondent Estrella de la Rosa, and to
pay P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.