Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

ADDITIONAL CASES ON 1

ARREST
1. PERTILLOS VS. GENEROSO.. 2
2. MENDOZA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.. 16
3. LUMBOS VS. JUDGE BALIGUAT.. 21
4. OCAMPO VS. HON. ABANDO. 28
5. BORLONGAN JR. VS. PENA... 39
6. RONTOS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. 51
7. LUZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL... 54
8. PEOPLE VS. VASQUEZ 61
9. PEOPLE VS. YAU... 71
10. VILLANUEVA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL 81
11. PEOPLE VS DELOS REYES... 84
12. SANCHEZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.. 106
13. PEOPLE VS. LAGUIO... 115
14. PEOPLE VS. LAGOS. 131
15. COLORADO VS. MCTC OF LAUR 135

G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES,
JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ, Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court challenging the decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and
the resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CAG.R. SP No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey
M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and
Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation, as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around
3: 15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners
and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street,
Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty.
Generoso reside.3
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an
Hills Police Station) to report the incident.4 Acting on this report,
Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched
SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime
and to render assistance.5 SP02 Javier, together with augmentation
personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel
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Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the 2
alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled
him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go
to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.8 The petitioners
went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the
inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the
petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty.
Generoso fortunately survived the attack.10
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were
indicted for attempted murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with
evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt
acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y
FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to
perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own
spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to parry
the attack, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation12 on the ground that they had not been
lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took
place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they
were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were
just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was
improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation
should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court.13

On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners'
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.14 The court
likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.15
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a
Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC
for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation.16
The Assailed CA Decision
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the
petition for lack of merit.17 The CA ruled that the word "invited" in
the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of
a command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the
petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also
recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest
so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus,
the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order
denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is
void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it
was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the
grounds for the denial of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the
motion in its Resolution of April 17, 2008;18 hence, the present
petition.
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
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3
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED
WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY
ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE
PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE
THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested.
No arrest warrant was ever issued; they went to the police station
only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited
the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place
under the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers
actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not have
undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no personal
knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it
was not properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order.
The criminal proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.

It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has
to reach this Court for its resolution. The thought is very tempting
that the motion was employed simply to delay the proceedings and
that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than
compensated by fully examining in this case the legalities
surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper
interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar.
These Rules have evolved over time, and the present case presents to
us the opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the
current applicable interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of
1902,19 and the 1935,20 197321 and 198722 Constitutions all
protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term
"seizure. "23
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States. The Fourth Amendment
traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke24 and The Great
Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed
under oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames near
Windsor, England on June 15, 1215.25 The Magna Carta Libertatum
limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to
proclaim certain liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil
war.27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta
Libertatum later became the foundational component of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.28 It provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his
Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or
any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor
condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man 4
either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis supplied]
In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held
that this constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests, searches
and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are
unreasonable.32 With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure,
which must also satisfy the test of reasonableness.33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the
validity of warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the
common law of America and England that, according to the Court,
were not different from the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings
likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the provisions of
separate laws then existing in the Philippines.35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section
3737 of Act No. 183, or the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting
officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City
of Manila was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the
absence of any provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police
officer who held similar functions as those of the officers established
under the common law of England and America, also had the power
to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules
on warrantless arrest were based on common sense and reason.40 It
further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then
Administrative Code41 which directed municipal policemen to
exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28,
29 and 3043 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal
Code which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.

These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our
Rules of Court and jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a
warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which
states that: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forth with delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under
Section 5(a) above has been denominated as one "in flagrante
delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot
pursuit" arrest.44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) the
provision applicable in the present case. This provision has
undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but
also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the
applicable American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand
its roots and its appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
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5
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and
English common law principle on warrantless arrests but also on
laws then existing in the Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited
Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code
which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to
cause to be detained, persons whom there is reasonable ground to
believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as
well as of their agents, to arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule
27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a
penalty greater than that of confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a
penalty less than that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the
circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption that he
would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however,
to a defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the
authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably
be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court
competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding
paragraph may be arrested, although no formal complaint has been
filed against him, provided the following circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe
that an unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been committed.

Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe
that the person arrested participated in the commission of such
unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the
Charter of Manila, which provided that certain officials, including
police officers may, within the territory defined in the law, pursue
and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or
under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that
such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or
breach of the peace.
In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a
peace officer may arrest persons walking in the street at night when
there is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime,
although there is no proof of a felony having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that
there was a probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. The
Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to
warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty.
Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is
another requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the
peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned out to be
innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940
Rules of Court, it was not necessary for the arresting officer to first
have knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What was
necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to
believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime;
and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to
be detained participated in it. In addition, it was also established
under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion"
was tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless
arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for
its breach.48
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6
In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest
of a Chinaman because the arresting person did not state in what
way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or
circumstance which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of
Court of the rules on warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid
warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion
(probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought
to be arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left
so much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer.
However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court
(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the
Penal Code were substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of
the 1940 Rules of Court as follows:50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the
1964 Rules of Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have
deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules,
the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in
determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting
officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion)
applied both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether
the person to be arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules
required that there should be actual commission of an offense, thus,
removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion
of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of
probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the
determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed
the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court
restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests
under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent
substantial changes and was re-worded and re-numbered when it
became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped 7
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In
cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court
retained the restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court.
More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the
commission of the offense should not only have been "committed" but
should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting officer's
time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering
information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was
further amended with the incorporation of the word "probable cause"
as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on whether the
person to be arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it
appears that for purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the
notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the
word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest
of a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause
to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal

knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously
subjective determination of the arresting officer as to the (1)
commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be
arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were
adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay.51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just
been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately
below, starting with the element of probable cause, followed by the
elements that the offense has just been committed, and the arresting
officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the
determinant on how the arresting officer shall proceed on the facts
and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of
determining whether the person to be arrested has committed the
crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not prohibit
arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable.
According to State v. Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person
who was discovered in the act of violating the law is not a violation of
due process.
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8
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United
States54 that the Fourth Amendment limited the circumstances
under which warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry
is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get
one, but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The
term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and
"reasonable grounds."55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer
should make a thorough investigation and exercise reasonable
judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting
a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless
arrest situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a
judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless
arrest is based on information that the arresting officer possesses at
the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired later.56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the
determinant of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.
Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and
practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and
prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in
each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular
offense involved.57
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all
the information in his possession, his fair inferences therefrom,
including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the
requirements of showing probable cause to arrest without warrant
especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest
on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal
knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on information
supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the
circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such
information.58

In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in
the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge
of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion
are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in
preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for
triat.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable
cause as the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge
of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable
cause as to the guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted
documents of the complainant, the respondent and his witnesses.62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the 9
person sought to be arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied
that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a
crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the
judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted
during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally
evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause63 to issue a
warrant of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed
the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw
evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged,64 or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion,
based on actual facts.65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable
cause" is invariable for the officer arresting without a warrant, the
public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial,
as the case may be.

However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the
judge all determine "probable cause," within the spheres of their
respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the
available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short,
although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man,
they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by
the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer
should base his determination of probable cause on his personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the
judge must base their determination on the evidence submitted by
the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more
limited facts, evidence or available information that he must
personally gather within a limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations
of determining probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the
urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that
one should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not
presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer.
Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but
must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the
criminal.67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two
elements as our jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken
together in the Court's determination of the validity of the
warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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10
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina
happened on December 8, 1994. It was only on December 11, 1994
that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis
of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted
to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days
after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be
said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested committed the
crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos
forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat
of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of
PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing
the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only
information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the
information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case
that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that
an offense has just been committed means that there must be a large
measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed
and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time
between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of
arrest must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with
these requirements because he was arrested only a day after the
commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally,
the arresting officers were not present and were not actual
eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the
offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of
the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.

In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after
the killing of the victim and only on the basis of information obtained
from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the
commission of the crime was held invalid because the crime had not
just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the
gunman who had shot the victim. The information upon which the
police acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to
the shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman; another
was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number
which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife.
That information did not constitute "personal knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on
the same day was held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had
knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his
investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about
three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed the
victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of
the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente
and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after
the arresting officers received information from the victim of the
crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting
officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim
herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time
of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v.
Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were
summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. The informants
pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the
shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis
of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless 11
arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and
the policemen immediately responded to the report of the crime. One
of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one
of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the
policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in
different directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning
a robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers,
who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio
message. When they reached the place, they met with the
complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the
officers' invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of
the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based
on the reported statements of the complainants, he was identified as
a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was
held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to
personally witness the commission of the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone
call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He
dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the
incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was
wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident,
and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked
for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the
incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to
the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the
incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and
proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he
was about to run towards his house.

The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside
the driver's seat as Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a
shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers
confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that
the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident
report which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of
probable cause. Based on these discussions, it appears that the
Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been
committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that
the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular
circumstances of the case. However, we note that the element of
''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances.
According to the Black's Law Dictionary,80 "circumstances are
attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions. "
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual
perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at
the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not
seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless
arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at
the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable
cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of
facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the
commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of
immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within
which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required
time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers
have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very
limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or 12
circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap
from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of
information gathered are prone to become contaminated and
subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the
other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police
officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited
to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they
were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds
another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the
standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police
officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our
jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be
present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been
just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is
limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the
facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The
requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the
reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance
with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the
warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be
resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been
committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners
committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances
that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners'
arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that

the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the
petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has
misapprehended the facts in its decision.81 From a review of the
records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined
probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against the
petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts in
the present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the
validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February
20, 2005, the date that the alleged crime was committed, the
petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills
Police Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was
committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St.,
Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15
a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police
station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one hour
from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding
that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the
crime is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's
bruises when they arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated
by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered
blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph
Macapanas,83 although they asserted that they did it in self-defense
against Atty. Generoso.
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Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal 13
Certificate84 that was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the
same date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty.
Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident,
showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal
Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital
hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right
forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of
ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible
abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier,
diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and
traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime
upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the
police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1)
hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a
community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty.
Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for
his mauling and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86
lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the
petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not
deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although
they narrated a different version of what transpired.87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered
and which they have personally observed less than one hour from the
time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of
the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that
the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances
were well within the police officers' observation, perception and
evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as
the police officers' personal observation, which are within their
personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless
arrests.

Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in
the present case saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As
the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the persons who
mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in
Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where
Tonog did not flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More
than this, the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have
been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had
another version of what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is
incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police officers have
complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement
of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of
probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the
crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred,
SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02
Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim.90 This fact alone
negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have
personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police
immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had
been committed.1wphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the
terms of the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence
at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that
evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this
case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has recently committed the crime.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the 14
locality where it took place, its occasion, the personal circumstances
of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took
place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were
proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City
Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to
mean as an authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the
discussion of the petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest
is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is
made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.91 Thus,
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical
restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough
that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest
the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.92
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02
Javier could not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners
following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not need to
apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the
petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a similar
effect. In other words, the application of actual force would only be an
alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending
policemen have acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the
crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners
as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random
act but was in connection with a particular offense. Furthermore,
SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest,
of the charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills
Police Station for investigation.94
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

15
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid

In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R

TC Order denying the petitioners' urgent motion for regular
preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation
of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution95 and Rule 16,
Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.96

The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the
Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in
the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and
convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on
the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to
the speedy disposition of the case."

We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in

this Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state
all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary
matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial
of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.

Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is

the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only
required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A
contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which was
precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity
of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the
petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition,
and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the
resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED
to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 197293 April 21, 2014
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC.,
Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a
crime is the sole function of the. prosecutor, the trial court may, in
the protection of one's fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the case
if, upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it finds that the
evidence does not establish probable cause.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Court of
Appeals' decision2 dated January 14, 2011, which reversed the
Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the complaint against petitioner
Alfredo C. Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa.
This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno Cars, Inc.
through its representative, Raul C. Evangelista, on January 8, 2008
for qualified theft and estafa against Alfredo.3
In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007, it
hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. On November 19,
2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia, conducted a partial audit
of the used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and
released by Alfredo without Rolandos or the finance managers
permission.4
The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made
payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the payments totalling
886,000.00. It was further alleged that while there were 20 cars
under Alfredos custody, only 18 were accounted for. Further
investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the files of a
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged 16
that taking into account the unremitted amounts and the acquisition
cost of the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of
1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage.5
In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno Cars
supposed failure to prove ownership over the five (5) cars or its right
to possess them with the purported unremitted payments. Hence, it
could not have suffered damage.6
On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a
Resolution7 finding probable cause and recommending the filing of
an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.8 He
then filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice on May
16, 2008.9
While Alfredos motion for reconsideration was still pending before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations
for qualified theft10 and estafa11 were filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. On March 31, 2008, Alfredo
filed a motion for determination of probable cause12 before the trial
court. On April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to defer arraignment.
Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not
conducted.13 On February 4, 2009, the parties agreed to submit all
pending incidents, including the clarificatory hearing, for
resolution.14
On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina
Capco-Umali, issued an order15 dismissing the complaint, stating
that:
After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on
record which includes the assailed Resolution dated 04 March 2008,
the court holds that the evidence adduced does not support a finding

of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. x x
x.16
Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court
denied on July 3, 2009.17
Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, arguing that the trial court acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
complaint. It argued that "the determination of probable cause and
the decision whether or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully
belongs to the public prosecutor."18
On January 14, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,19
reversed the trial court, and reinstated the case. In its decision, the
appellate court ruled that the trial court acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction "in supplanting the public prosecutors findings of
probable cause with her own findings of insufficiency of evidence and
lack of probable cause."20
Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this
court. In essence, he argued that the trial court was correct in finding
that there was no probable cause as shown by the evidence on
record. He argued that "judicial determination of probable cause is
broader than [the] executive determination of probable cause"21 and
that "[i]t is not correct to say that the determination of probable
cause is exclusively vested on the prosecutor x x x."22
In its comment,23 Juno Cars argued that Alfredo presented
questions, issues, and arguments that were a mere rehash of those
already considered and passed upon by the appellate court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent,
stated in its comment24 that the appellate court correctly sustained
the public prosecutor in his findings of probable cause against
Alfredo. Since there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado, the trial court should respect
his determination of probable cause.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
17
In his reply,25 Alfredo reiterated that "judicial determination of
probable cause[,] while not a superior faculty[,] covers a broader
encompassing perspective in the disposition of the issue on the
existence of probable cause."26 He argued that the findings of the
trial court should be accorded greater weight than the appellate
courts. It merely reviewed the findings of the trial court.
The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss an
information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its own
independent finding of lack of probable cause.
Time and again, this court has been confronted with the issue of the
difference between the determination of probable cause by the
prosecutor on one hand and the determination of probable cause by
the judge on the other. We examine these two concepts again.
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified theft27 and
estafa under Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c)28 of the Revised
Penal Code. Since qualified theft is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
a preliminary investigation must first be conducted "to determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial," in accordance with Rule
112, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the
subsequent determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely
within the discretion of the public prosecutor.29 If upon evaluation of
the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable
cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information with
the court.
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence"30 to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable
cause exists.

In People v. Castillo and Mejia,31 this court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive
and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one
made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly
pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom
he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus
should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-
judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must
be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made
a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case,
is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is
one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself
that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing
the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be
forced to issue the arrest warrant.32
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause
concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an
Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause,
on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued. In People v. Inting:33
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial
or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of
one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about
the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper 18
whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused
is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he
should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of
trialis the function of the Prosecutor.34 (Emphasis supplied)
While it is within the trial courts discretion to make an independent
assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of
determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge
does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no
capacity to review the prosecutors determination of probable cause;
rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause
independent of the prosecutors finding.
People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo35 discussed the
rationale. In that case, Jonathan Cerbo allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy
in the presence of his father, Billy Cerbo. An information for murder
was filed against Jonathan Cerbo. The daughter of Rosalinda Dy, as
private complainant, executed a complaint-affidavit charging Billy
Cerbo with conspiracy. The prosecutor then filed a motion to amend
the information, which was granted by the court. The information
was then amended to include Billy Cerbo as one of the accused, and
a warrant of arrest was issued against him.
Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant arguing that it was
issued without probable cause. The trial court granted this motion,
recalled the warrant, and dismissed the case against him. The Court
of Appeals affirmed this dismissal. This court, however, reversed the
Court of Appeals and ordered the reinstatement of the amended
information against Billy Cerbo, stating that:
In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or
the guilt or innocence of Private Respondent Billy Cerbo. We are
simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is valid on its
face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of
discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts
should not dismiss it for want of evidence, because evidentiary
matters should be presented and heard during the trial. The

functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor
in "the proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system
should be clearly understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an
"oppressive" exercise of government prosecutorial powers do need to
be protected when circumstances so require. But just as we recognize
this need, we also acknowledge that the State must likewise be
accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious
irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public
prosecutors duties, courts ought to refrain from interfering with such
lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in
the public prosecutors finding of probable cause, the accused can
appeal such finding to the justice secretary and move for the
deferment or suspension of the proceedings until such appeal is
resolved.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor Rey F.
Delgado found that the facts and evidence were "sufficient to warrant
the indictment of [petitioner] x x x."37 There was nothing in his
resolution which showed that he issued it beyond the discretion
granted to him by law and jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge
Capco-Umali still had the discretion to make her own finding of
whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of the accused and
proceed with trial.
Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest
is served. Absent this, the court cannot hold the accused for
arraignment and trial.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search 19
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or
warrants of arrest where the judge has not personally determined the
existence of probable cause. The phrase "upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce"
allows a determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte.
For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure mandates the judge to "immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record fails to establish probable cause."
Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 reads:
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional
Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest,
or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was
filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint of information.
In People v. Hon. Yadao:38
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three
options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable 20

cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter,
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days Judge Capco-Umali correctly dismissed the case against Alfredo.
from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence always proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to lack of
is not mandatory.1wphi1 The courts first option under the above is probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence
for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand
clearly fails to establish probable cause." That is the situation here: absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable
against the respondents.39 (Emphasis supplied) cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and
trial in order that justice may be served.
It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January
conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 110774 is
discretion of the court."40 REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11604-05
against Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.
In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of
the evidence on record and concluded that "the evidence adduced SO ORDERED.
does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of
qualified theft and estafa."41 Specifically, she found that Juno Cars
"failed to prove by competent evidence"42 that the vehicles alleged to
have been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned by
them, or that these vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to
substantiate the charge of qualified theft. She also found that the
complaint "[did] not state with particularity the exact value of the
alleged office files or their valuation purportedly have been removed,
concealed or destroyed by the accused,"43 which she found crucial to
the prosecution of the crime of estafa under Article 315, fourth
paragraph, no. 3(c) of the Revised Penal Code. She also noted that:

x x x As a matter of fact, this court had even ordered that this case be
set for clarificatory hearing to clear out essential matters pertinent to
the offense charged and even directed the private complainant to
bring documents relative to the same/payment as well as affidavit of
witnesses/buyers with the end view of satisfying itself that indeed
probable cause exists to commit the present case which private
complainant failed to do.44
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

Notan Lumbos, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1641 witnesses i.e., Jose Orlando Acharon (Acharon) and Edwin Yagat 21
Complainant, (formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-1756-MTJ) (Yagat) even without prior application for the issuance of warrant of
Present: arrest; with the object of issuing a warrant of arrest against all
accused, respondent propounded a series of suggestive rather than
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson, searching questions on Acharon, who did not actually witness the
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, alleged crime; the purported eye witness Yagat never categorically
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, named the alleged malefactors and their specific participation in the
CALLEJO, SR., and alleged crimes; respondent merely tried to confirm her preconceived
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. presumption of guilt of all accused via suggestive questions;
Judge Marie Ellengrid S.L. respondent issued an Order for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
Baliguat, Municipal Trial Court against complainant and his co-accused without giving them a fair
in Cities, Branch 1, General Santos chance to file their respective counter-affidavits; he with his co-
City, Promulgated: accused, filed two motions dated July 24, 2004 and August 17, 2004,
Respondent. July 27, 2006 respectively, for purposes of lifting the warrant of arrest and proper
x---------------------------------------------- referral of subject cases to the Office of the City Prosecutor so they
----x can file their respective counter-affidavits; attached to the motion is
an excerpt from the police blotter certifying that on July 11, 2004 at
8:30 in the evening, complainant was in Philippine National Police-
RESOLUTION Camp Lira, which is approximately 25 kilometers from Bawing,
Tambler where the alleged crimes were committed; his presence in
Camp Lira was precipitated by the suspicious apprehension of some
relatives who were detained in the said camp; on September 1, 2004,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. the Provincial Office of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples intervened through a Manifestation dated August 30, 2004,
praying for the dismissal of the subject cases stating that Acharon,
Before us is an administrative complaint[1] dated July 28, 2005 filed the complainant in the said cases, has no real right or interest to
by Notan Lumbos (complainant) against Judge Marie Ellengrid S.L. protect, none of his rights were violated, he (Acharon) is even
Baliguat (respondent), Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), vulnerable to criminal prosecution under Republic Act No. 947, and,
Branch 1, General Santos City, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave the filing of the subject cases in an effort to restrain the legitimate
Abuse of Authority, Dereliction of Duty, Grave Misconduct, claimants appears to be a mockery of the judicial process;
Oppression and Disbarment (under Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, respondent issued an Order dated October 26, 2004 holding in
October 1, 2002). abeyance the prayer for the lifting of the warrant of arrest, pending
the submission of counter-affidavits within 10 days from receipt of
Complainant alleges that: he is one of the accused in a complaint for the Order.
arson and robbery in Criminal Cases Nos. 46246 and 46247 filed by
P/Insp. Richie Siong Bucol on July 14, 2004 before respondents sala; In her Comment[2] dated September 9, 2005, respondent avers that:
instead of dismissing the case for patent lack of jurisdiction, the criminal cases subject of this complaint were filed before the
respondent propounded a series of leading questions on the MTCC, General Santos City, for Preliminary Investigation (PI); on July

15, 2004, being the Executive Judge and by virtue of Sections 84 and
86, Republic Act No. 5412,[3] otherwise known as the City Charter of
General Santos City, Acharon (the complainant in the said cases) and
Yagat (the eye witness to the alleged crimes) were duly examined
under oath and through searching questions; finding probable cause,
a warrant of arrest was issued against all the accused; the accused
were directed to file their counter-affidavits but, instead of doing so,
the defense filed a Motion to Correct Caption and to Lift the Warrant
of Arrest issued; the first prayer was granted but the resolution of the
second motion was held in abeyance until the counter-affidavits of all
the accused are submitted; no counter-affidavits were filed so
respondent resolved the cases and forwarded its records to the City
Prosecutors Office for the filing of proper Information.
Respondent claims that: the conduct of the PI and the subsequent
issuance of the warrant of arrest are well within the authority given
in the City Charter which remains valid and enforceable until revoked
by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of General Santos City; there was no
usurpation of authority of an RTC Judge when she issued the
assailed warrant of arrest as she has authority to do so under the
City Charter; she examined only Acharon and Yagat because they
were the witnesses to the alleged crimes and the questions
propounded were never leading; there was no grave abuse of
discretion when she held in abeyance the resolution of the prayer for
the lifting of the warrant of arrest because the primary reason why it
was withheld was the complainants failure to submit a counter-
affidavit; she did not personally know Acharon as she did not grow
up in General Santos City; there is no conflict that the Rules on
Criminal Procedure had undergone amendments but it would be very
safe to say that the General Santos City Charter is not yet amended,
hence, it still stands; and she believes that she did her duty to her
very best in accordance with law and feels strongly offended and
harassed by the filing of the instant case.
For her defense, respondent avers that: in clean conscience she
conducted the PI and thereafter issued the warrant of arrest in good
faith and in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the rules and
procedures; as a government employee since 1979, she had
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
maintained a clean reputation; she even sacrificed and left her post 22
as Senior Legal Officer of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR) in 1990 on the ground that
she could not take the corruption around her; she had always kept
her impartiality in making her decisions and never looked into the
persons behind the party litigants; she rose through the ranks asking
no favors from anyone and relied on her own skills, abilities,
knowledge of the Constitution, laws, rules, regulations and
jurisprudence and most especially her unblemished reputation; and
with utmost dignity and head held high, respondent reiterates that
she had not violated any of the provisions of the Constitution, or the
Lawyers' and Judges' Oath, or any of the provisions of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, Code of Professional Responsibility, or Canons of
Professional Ethics; and she had observed due process and did not
misuse it to defeat the ends of justice.
In its Memorandum[4] dated November 21, 2005, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its evaluation and
recommendation, to wit:
EVALUATION: After a careful perusal and consideration of the parties
respective positions and arguments, this Office finds no reasonable
ground to hold the respondent administratively liable.
Paragraph (5) Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleadings, practice and [enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading practice and] procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of

special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Under the City Charter of General Santos City, the city court may
also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense without regard
to the limits of punishment and may release or commit and bind over
any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance
before the proper court. However, considering the Honorable Courts
power of supervision over all courts, rules of pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts have been promulgated. And as a matter of
policy and procedure, criminal cases covered by the Rule and
initiated by a complaint is being referred to the City Prosecutor for
appropriate action.
In the case of Salcedo vs. Nobles-Banz, 134 SCRA 207, the Supreme
Court ruled that:
There is no question that under the Olongapo City Charter, the
Municipal Trial Court can conduct preliminary investigation of all
offenses. That is substantive law. However, pursuant to our
constitutional supervision over all Courts, as a matter of policy, we
direct the Municipal Trial Court in the City of Olongapo [that]
whenever a criminal case covered by the Rule is initiated by
complaint, to refer the same to the City Fiscal for the filing of the
corresponding Information x x x.
xxx
The primary function of courts is to try and decide cases, not to
conduct preliminary investigation. Thus, in Section 9 of the Rule on
Summary Procedure in Special Cases effective August 1, 1983, the
Court provided expressly that in Metro-Manila and chartered cities,
(criminal) cases shall be commenced only by information at the
instance of the metropolitan municipal trial court judges themselves
who feared that they would be swamped with preliminary
investigation which they would have to conduct (instead of cities
fiscals) if criminal complaints were to be directly filed with them. The
Court has likewise adopted the same rule and policy in the 1985
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
Rules on Criminal Procedure effective January 1, 1985 governing the 23
institution of all other offenses that in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the
fiscal. (Rule 110, sec.1[b]).
Further, it is worthy to state herein that it is the Public Prosecutor
who is given by law direction and control of all criminal actions. It is
he who is primarily responsible for ascertaining through a
preliminary inquiry or proceeding whether there is reasonable ground
to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof. Therefore, the preliminary investigation
proper is not a judicial function, but an executive function, which is
part of the prosecutions job. The assignment of this non-judicial
function to judges of inferior courts was dictated by necessity and
practical considerations because there are not enough fiscals and
prosecutors to investigate crimes in all municipalities all over the
country. In the case of Castillo vs. Villaluz, 171 SCRA 39, citing Salta
vs. Court Administrator, 143 SCRA 228, the Honorable Court ruled
that:
Whenever there are enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct
preliminary investigation, courts are counseled to leave this job
which is essentially executive to them.
It appears that the City of General Santos already has sufficient
number of prosecutors who can handle the preliminary investigation
of criminal cases. Hence, the same should be referred to them for
appropriate action.
It is worth mentioning here that lately, the Honorable Court in A.M.
No. 05-8-26-SC dated 30 August 2005 has already withdrawn the
power to conduct preliminary investigation from the judges of the
first level courts.
Insofar as the issuance of warrant of arrest is concerned, par. (b),
Sec. 6, Rule 112 provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.

xxx
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. When required pursuant to the
second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary
investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal
Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court may be conducted by
either the judge or the prosecutor. x x x. When the investigation is
conducted by the judge himself, he shall follow the procedure
provided in Section 3 of this Rule. If his findings and
recommendations are affirmed by the provincial or city prosecutor, or
by the Ombudsman or his deputy, and the corresponding information
is filed, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. However, without waiting
for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant
of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of
the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody not to
frustrate the ends of justice.
Under the above-quoted rule, the power or authority of the
investigating judge to issue a warrant of arrest is limited to those
instances where there is a necessity of placing him in custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice. In the case of Mantaring vs.
Roman, 254 SCRA 158, the respondent judge was reprimanded for
issuing a warrant without any finding that it was necessary to place
the accused in immediate custody in order to prevent a frustration of
justice. And we quote:
Moreover, we think it was improper for respondent judge to have
issued the warrants of arrest against complainant and his son
without any finding that it was necessary to place them in immediate
custody in order to prevent a frustration of justice. It is now settled
that in issuing warrants of arrest in preliminary investigations, the
investigating judge must:
(a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his
witnesses by searching questions and answers;
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
24
(b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and
(c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
In the instant case, it appears that respondent ordered the issuance
of warrants of arrest against the complainant and his co-accused not
only because of the existence of probable cause, but because of her
finding that it was necessary to place them under immediate custody
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Pertinent portion of the
Order of the court during the preliminary investigation held on 15
July 2004 is hereunder quoted as follows:
ORDER: For preliminary investigation and request for immediate
issuance of warrant of arrest. After a thorough examination of the
complaining witness, Jose Orlando Acharon together with the eye-
witness Edwin Yagat through searching questions under oath, the
undersigned finds that there is reason to believe that the crimes of
arson and robbery and there is a need to place in custody the named
accused herein in order not to frustrate the ends of justice and also
to prevent them from possibly committing the same crime in the
other bunkhouses of the complaining witness, issue warrant of arrest
against all the named accused with bailbond fixed at P200,000.00
each for Robbery and no bail for Arson. x x x
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration
and approval of the Honorable Court our recommendations as
follows:
1. The instant case against Judge Marie Ellengrid S.L.
Baliguat of MTCC, Branch 01 [G]eneral Santos City be DISMISSED
for lack of merit; and
2. Judge Baliguat be ADVISED to refer criminal cases filed
for preliminary investigation to the Office of the City Prosecutor,
General Santos City for appropriate action.[5]

Meanwhile, in a Resolution[6] dated February 22, 2006, respondent
was required to inform the Court as to the action taken by her on
complainant's and his co-accused's motions dated July 24, 2004 and
August 17, 2004, respectively, to lift the warrant of arrest and
referral of Criminal Cases Nos. 46246 and 46247 to the Office of the
City Prosecutor.
In her Compliance[7] dated March 10, 2006, respondent avers that
despite ample time given to the respondents to submit their counter-
affidavit, they failed to do so and attaching thereto the Resolution[8]
dated January 14, 2005, denying the Motion to Quash Warrant of
Arrest for lack of merit and forwarded the records of Criminal Cases
Nos. 46246 and 46247-I to the Office of the City Prosecutor for
further proceedings.
At issue is whether or not the acts committed by respondent judge
constitute gross ignorance of the law, abuse of authority, dereliction
of duty, and oppression warranting dismissal from judicial service
and disbarment.
We adopt the evaluation and recommendation of the OCA.
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial.[9] And prior to the
issuance of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC[10] which took effect on October 3,
2005, among the officers authorized by Sec. 2, Rule 112[11] of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure to conduct preliminary
investigation are the city prosecutors and judges of the MTC and
MCTC.
As provided under Sec. 37 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Judges of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, except those in the National Capital
Region, of Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall have authority to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes
alleged to have been committed within their respective territorial
jurisdictions which are cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts. x x x
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
Provided, however, that, if after the preliminary investigation the 25
Judge finds a prima facie case, he shall forward the records of the
case to the Provincial/City Fiscal for the filing of the corresponding
information with the proper court. No warrant of arrest shall be
issued by the Judge in connection with any criminal complaint filed
with him for preliminary investigation, unless after an examination in
writing and under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his
witnesses, he finds that a probable cause exists. x x x
The Charter of General Santos City, specifically Sec. 84,[12]
authorizes the city court to conduct preliminary investigations for
any offense without regard to the limits of punishment and may
release or commit and bind over any person charge[d] with such
offense to secure his appearance before the proper court.
Under Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may
issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing
and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and
that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate
custody not to frustrate the ends of justice.
And as can be gleaned from the provision of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure,[13] in Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint
shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charters.
Thus, respondent did not commit gross ignorance of the law nor
grave abuse of discretion in conducting the said PI. It is very clear
from the aforementioned provision that city judges are authorized to
conduct preliminary investigation and examination. The conduct by
respondent of the PI and the subsequent issuance of the warrant of
arrest are well within the authority given under the substantive law
as well as the Charter of General Santos City.
Salcedo v. Nobles-Bans,[14] cited by the complainant, is not on all
fours with the present case. In the said case, respondent judge

dismissed the criminal cases covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, instead of referring the same to the City Fiscal for the
filing of the corresponding Informations. In the present case, what is
being questioned was the PI conducted by the respondent and the
subsequent issuance of the warrant of arrest, which is neither
covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure nor dismissed by the
respondent.
In Ribaya v. Binamira-Parcia,[15] we held that as long as the
constitutional mandate was complied with, that is, the warrant of
arrest was issued upon a finding of probable cause personally by the
judge after an examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, the warrant of arrest
was valid. After all, the purpose of issuing the warrant of arrest was
to place the respondents under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice;[16] and whether it is necessary to place
the accused in custody is left to the judges sound judgment.[17] As
aptly found by the OCA in its evaluation,[18] respondent ordered the
issuance of the warrants of arrest not only because of the existence of
probable cause, but because of her finding that it was necessary to
place the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice. We find nothing irregular in the course of action
taken by the respondent.
We held in Jamora v. Bersales,[19] that when a preliminary
investigation is conducted by a municipal court trial judge, he is
obligated, upon conclusion of the preliminary investigation, to
transmit to the provincial or city fiscal, for appropriate action, the
resolution of the case. In this case, immediately after the
determination of a probable cause, respondent judge forwarded the
records of the criminal cases to the Office of the City Prosecutor for
further proceedings which bespeaks of respondents knowledge of the
law, both substantive and procedural.
However, as adverted to earlier, under A.M. No 05-8-26-SC, which
took effect on October 3, 2005, the officers authorized to conduct
preliminary investigations are the: (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors
and their assistants; (b) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
(c) other officers as may be authorized by law. xxx[20] The 26
preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court shall be
conducted by the prosecutor. xxx
The above-mentioned administrative matter included the following
proviso:
All First Level Courts shall continue with the preliminary
investigation of cases pending with them and terminate them not
later than December 31, 2005.
Upon the date of effectivity of these amendments, First Level Courts
shall no longer accept new cases for preliminary investigation, which
fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of other levels.
It must be emphasized that the conduct of respondent in the
handling of the PI and the subsequent issuance of the warrants of
arrest is well within the mandate of the law and not indicative of any
grave abuse of discretion on her part. The criminal cases subject of
this complaint were filed on July 15, 2004 and still governed by Rule
112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in force at the time of
the commission of the crime charged; while A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC
which took effect on October 3, 2005, commanded the first level
courts to continue with the preliminary investigation of cases pending
with them and terminate them not later than December 31, 2005.
It is settled that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be
subjected to liability civil, criminal or administrative for any of his
official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good
faith.[21] To hold, otherwise, would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law
in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.[22] An inquiry into the administrative liability of a judge
may be resorted to only after the available remedies have been
exhausted and decided with finality.[23] For until there is a final
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

declaration by the appellate court that the challenged order or 27

judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude
whether respondent is administratively liable.[24]

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the

subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance
of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but,
most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty,
or corruption.[25] Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives
or improper considerations, are sufficient defenses in which a judge
charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.[26] In this case, we
are convinced that respondent conducted the PI and the subsequent
issuance of the warrants of arrest in clean conscience, in good faith
and in accordance with law, jurisprudence, rules and procedures.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative case against

Judge Marie Ellengrid S.L. Baliguat, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 1, General Santos City is DISMISSED. And in line with A.M.
No. 05-8-26-SC, withdrawing the power to conduct preliminary
investigation from judges of first level courts, she is ADVISED to refer
criminal cases filed for preliminary investigation to the Office of the
City Prosecutor, General Santos City for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR
M. MERIN, in. his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-
in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating
Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 185587
RANDALL B. ECHANIS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYl-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON.
EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M.
MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-
Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating
Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 185636
RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON.
EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M.
MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-
Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of 28
the Department of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190005
VICENTE P. LADLAD, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the
43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco,
Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1 The mass grave contained
skeletal remains of individuals believed to be victims of "Operation
Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched by members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National
Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their
ranks of suspected military informers.
While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally precludes a direct
invocation of this Courts jurisdiction, we take cognizance of these
petitions considering that petitioners have chosen to take recourse
directly before us and that the cases are of significant national
interest.
Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too insubstantial
to require consideration. Accordingly, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion and economy, this Court will pass primarily upon the
following:

1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be
dismissed under the political offense doctrine.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition2 seeking the
annulment of the orders and resolutions of public respondents with
regard to the indictment and issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners for the crime of multiple murder.
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (P C/Insp. Almaden) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge
Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry
Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).3 The letters
requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits
attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the Communist
Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic
Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including
petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members.
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd
Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site
of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan,
Inopacan, Leyte.4 Recovered from the grave site were 67 severely
deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation VD.5
The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team based in
Regional Office 8 was immediately dispatched to the mass grave site
to conduct crime investigation, and to collect, preserve and analyze
the skeletal remains.6 Also, from 11-17 September 2006, an
investigation team composed of intelligence officers, and medico-legal
and DNA experts, conducted forensic crime analysis and collected
from alleged relatives of the victims DNA samples for matching.7
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29
The Initial Specialist Report8 dated 18 September 2006 issued by the
PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was
inconclusive with regard to the identities of the skeletal remains and
even the length of time that they had been buried. The report
recommended the conduct of further tests to confirm the identities of
the remains and the time window of death.9
However, in a Special Report10 dated 2 October 2006, the Case
Secretariat of the Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal Action
Group (IALAG) came up with the names of ten (10) possible victims
after comparison and examination based on testimonies of relatives
and witnesses.11
The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims
of Operation VD. All of them swore that their relatives had been
abducted or last seen with members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and were
never seen again.
They also expressed belief that their relatives remains were among
those discovered at the mass grave site.
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,12
Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio
Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were former
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.13 According to them, Operation VD
was ordered in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.14
Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo),15 Randall B.
Echanis (Echanis),16 Rafael G. Baylosis (Baylosis),17 and Vicente P.
Ladlad (Ladlad)18 were then members of the Central Committee.
According to these former members, four sub-groups were formed to
implement Operation VD, namely, (1) the Intel Group responsible for
gathering information on suspected military spies and civilians who
would not support the movement; (2) the Arresting Group charged
with their arrests; (3) the Investigation Group which would subject
those arrested to questioning; and (4) the Execution Group or the

"cleaners" of those confirmed to be military spies and civilians who
would not support the movement.19
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied,
tortured and executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDF20 pursuant
to Operation VD.21
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor
Vivero issued a subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners to
submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses.22
Petitioner Ocampo submitted his counter-affidavit.23 Petitioners
Echanis24 and Baylosis25 did not file counter-affidavits because they
were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner Ladlad made a formal
entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the preliminary
investigation.26 However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-
affidavit because he was allegedly not served a subpoena.27
In a Resolution28 dated 16 February 2007, Prosecutor Vivero
recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of multiple
murder against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including
petitioners herein, for the death of the following: 1) Juanita Aviola, 2)
Concepcion Aragon, 3) Gregorio Eras, 4) Teodoro Recones, Jr., 5)
Restituto Ejoc, 6) Rolando Vasquez, 7) Junior Milyapis, 8) Crispin
Dalmacio, 9) Zacarias Casil, 10) Pablo Daniel, 11) Romeo Tayabas,
12) Domingo Napoles, 13) Ciriaco Daniel, 14) Crispin Prado, and 15)
Ereberto Prado.29
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo
Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna be dropped as
respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were
vital to the success of the prosecution.30 The Resolution was silent
with regard to Veronica Tabara.
The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge
Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando) on 28 February 2007, and
docketed as Criminal Case No. H-1581.31 Petitioner Ocampo filed an
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Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Hearing dated 5 March 30
2007 prior to receiving a copy of the Resolution recommending the
filing of the Information.32
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable
cause "in the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime
charged."33 He ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against
them with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty.34
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court and docketed as G.R. No. 176830 seeking the annulment of
the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the 16 February 2007
Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero.35 The petition prayed for the
unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as well
as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the conduct of further proceedings during the
pendency of the petition.36
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and
44 others (including petitioners Echanis and Baylosis37 and
Ladlad38) docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was then pending
before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati).39 Putting forward
the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common
crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the
crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in
connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.40
We required41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment
on the petition and the prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction, and set42 the case
for oral arguments on 30 March 2007. The OSG filed its Comment on
27 March 2007.43
The following were the legal issues discussed by the parties during
the oral arguments:

1. Whether the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is the
proper remedy of petitioner Ocampo;
2. Assuming it is the proper remedy, whether he was denied due
process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the
warrant of arrest;
3. Whether the murder charges against him are already included in
the rebellion charge against him in the RTC.44
Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their memoranda
within 10 days.45 On 3 April 2007, the Court ordered the provisional
release of petitioner Ocampo under a 100,000 cash bond.46
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral arguments
that the single Information filed before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte was
defective for charging 15 counts of murder, the prosecution filed a
Motion to Admit Amended Information and New Informations on 11
April 2007.47 In an Order dated 27 July 2007, Judge Abando held in
abeyance the resolution thereof and effectively suspended the
proceedings during the pendency of G.R. No. 176830 before this
Court.48
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was
arrested on 28 January 2008 by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued
by Judge Abando on 6 March 2007.49 On 1 February 2008,
petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial
Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to
Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend
Service of Warrant.50
On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order denying the
motion.51 Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for
Reconsideration52 dated 30 May 2008, but before being able to rule
thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order dated 12 June 2008
transmitting the records of Criminal Case No. H-1581 to the Office of
the Clerk of Court, RTC Manila.53 The Order was issued in
compliance with the Resolution dated 23 April 2008 of this Court
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granting the request of then Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales to 31
transfer the venue of the case.
The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila)
presided by Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina (Judge Medina) and re-
docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-262163.54 Petitioner Echanis was
transferred to the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame, Quezon
City. On 12 August 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their
Supplemental Arguments to Motion for Reconsideration.55
In an Order56 dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the
proceedings of the case pending the resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by
this Court.
On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a
Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss.57
On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court seeking the annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge
Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge Medina.58 The
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185587, prayed for the unconditional
and immediate release of petitioner Echanis, as well as the issuance
of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain his further incarceration.59
On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court also seeking the annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of
Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge Medina.60
The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185636, prayed for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the implementation of the warrant of arrest against
petitioner Baylosis.61
The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 185587 and 185636 on 12 January
2009.62

On 3 March 2009, the Court ordered the further consolidation of
these two cases with G.R. No. 176830.63 We required64 the OSG to
comment on the prayer for petitioner Echaniss immediate release, to
which the OSG did not interpose any objection on these conditions:
that the temporary release shall only be for the purpose of his
attendance and participation in the formal peace negotiations
between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and
the CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to begin in August 2009; and that his
temporary release shall not exceed six (6) months.65 The latter
condition was later modified, such that his temporary liberty shall
continue for the duration of his actual participation in the peace
negotiations.66
On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional release of
petitioner Echanis under a 100,000 cash bond, for the purpose of
his participation in the formal peace negotiations.67
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its Opposition68 to
petitioner Ladlads motion to quash before the RTC Manila. The trial
court conducted a hearing on the motion on 13 February 2009.69
On 6 May 2009, Judge Medina issued an Order70 denying the
motion to quash. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Ladlad was also denied on 27 August 2009.71
On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the
annulment of the 6 May 2009 and 27 August 2009 Orders of Judge
Medina.72 The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 190005.
On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No.
190005 with G.R. Nos. 176830, 185587 and 185636.73 We also
required the OSG to file its comment thereon. The OSG submitted its
Comment74 on 7 May 2010.
On 27 July 2010, we likewise required the OSG to file its Comment in
G.R. Nos. 185636 and 185587.75 These Comments were filed by the
OSG on 13 December 201076 and on 21 January 2011,77
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respectively. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their Consolidated 32
Reply78 on 7 June 2011.
On 2 May 2011, petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix
Bail.79 On 21 July 2011, petitioner Baylosis filed A Motion to Allow
Petitioner to Post Bail.80 The OSG interposed no objection to the
grant of a 100,000 cash bail to them considering that they were
consultants of the NDFP negotiating team, which was then holding
negotiations with the GRP peace panel for the signing of a peace
accord.81
On 17 January 2012, we granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad
and Baylosis and fixed their bail in the amount of 100,000, subject
to the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the
period of their actual participation in the peace negotiations.82
Petitioner Ladlad filed his Reply83 to the OSG Comment on 18
January 2013.
OUR RULING
Petitioners were accorded due
process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.
A. Preliminary Investigation
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair."84 It is conducted
to protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety
of a public trial.85 While the right to have a preliminary investigation
before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive
right and a component of due process in the administration of
criminal justice.86
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process
of law entails the opportunity to be heard.87 It serves to accord an
opportunity for the presentation of the respondents side with regard

to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide
whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that
a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who
committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss
the complaint.
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit evidence in support of one's defense."88 What is
proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard.89 Thus, one who has
been afforded a chance to present ones own side of the story cannot
claim denial of due process.90
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a
copy of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.91
Petitioner Ladlad claims that he was not served a subpoena due to
the false address indicated in the 12 undated letters of P C/Insp.
Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to Prosecutor Vivero.92 Furthermore,
even though his counsels filed their formal entry of appearance before
the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner Ladlad was still not sent a
subpoena through his counsels addresses.93 Thus, they were
deprived of the right to file counter-affidavits.
Petitioner Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in collusion with P
C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu, surreptitiously inserted the
Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records of the case
without furnishing petitioner Ocampo a copy.94 The original affidavit
of Zacarias Piedad dated 14 September 2006 stated that a meeting
presided by petitioner Ocampo was held in 1984, when the launching
of Operation VD was agreed upon.95 Petitioner Ocampo refuted this
claim in his Counter-affidavit dated 22 December 2006 stating that
he was in military custody from October 1976 until his escape in May
1985.96 Thereafter, the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad
dated 12 January 2007 admitted that he made a mistake in his
original affidavit, and that the meeting actually took place in June
1985.97 Petitioner Ocampo argues that he was denied the
opportunity to reply to the Supplemental Affidavit by not being
furnished a copy thereof.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
Petitioner Ocampo also claims that he was denied the right to file a 33
motion for reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor
Vivero, because the latter deliberately delayed the service of the
Resolution by 19 days, effectively denying petitioner Ocampo his right
to due process.98
As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis, we quote the
pertinent portion of Prosecutor Viveros Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure[,] the respondents were issued and served with
Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their
counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits
because they could no longer be found in their last known address,
per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo
@ Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted
their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin
Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite
entry of appearance by their respective counsels.99
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero
to resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a
respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a
respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present
countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains
valid.100 The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded
attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.101
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to
serve subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known
addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a
majority of them could no longer be found at their last known
addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the
attached documents or evidence.

Petitioner Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to the
nonexistent address "53 Sct. Rallos St., QC,"102 which had never
been his address at any time.103 In connection with this claim, we
take note of the fact that the subpoena to Fides Lim, petitioner
Ladlads wife,104 was sent to the same address, and that she was
among those mentioned in the Resolution as having timely submitted
their counter-affidavits.
Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena, petitioner Ladlads
counsel filed a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006.105
Prosecutor Vivero had a reason to believe that petitioner Ladlad had
received the subpoena and accordingly instructed his counsel to
prepare his defense.
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to
secure copies of the complaint after his counsels formal entry of
appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary
investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.
We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel
should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await
the outcome of their case."106 Having opted to remain passive during
the preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel
cannot now claim a denial of due process, since their failure to file a
counter-affidavit was of their own doing.
Neither do we find any merit in petitioner Ocampos allegation of
collusion to surreptitiously insert the Supplemental Affidavit of
Zacarias Piedad in the records. There was nothing surreptitious
about the Supplemental Affidavit since it clearly alludes to an earlier
affidavit and admits the mistake committed regarding the date of the
alleged meeting. The date of the execution of the Supplemental
Affidavit was also clearly stated. Thus, it was clear that it was
executed after petitioner Ocampo had submitted his counter-affidavit.
Should the case go to trial, that will provide petitioner Ocampo with
the opportunity to question the execution of Zacarias Piedads
Supplemental Affidavit.
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Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampos contention that he was 34
denied the right to be heard. For him to claim that he was denied due
process by not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit
of Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire case of the prosecution
rested on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that the
indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits
of several other witnesses107 attesting to the allegation that he was a
member of the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had
ordered the launch of Operation VD.
As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for
reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due
to the 19-day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must be
pointed out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or
an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of
receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the
resolution. This is clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National
Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:
Sec. 3. Period to appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the resolution, or of the denial of the motion
for reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor
Vivero on 12 March 2007,108 the former had until 27 March 2007
within which to file either a motion for reconsideration before the
latter or an appeal before the Secretary of Justice. Instead, petitioner
Ocampo chose to file the instant petition for certiorari directly before
this Court on 16 March 2007.
B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under

oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce."
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners.109
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been
defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested."110 Although
the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by
the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not
necessary for the determination thereof.111 In fact, the judges
personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not
mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing
a warrant of arrest.112
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors
report and supporting documents showing the existence of probable
cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable
cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the
submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
determining its existence.113
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando
painstakingly examined the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero,
the judge would have inevitably dismissed the charge against
them.114 Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando
did not point out facts and evidence in the record that were used as
bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest.115
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of
Judge Abando as the trial judge.116 Further elucidating on the wide
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
latitude given to trial judges in the issuance of warrants of arrest, 35
this Court stated in Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan117 as follows:
x x x. The trial court's exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as
a general rule, be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion. Indeed, certiorari will not lie to cure errors in the trial
court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the conclusion of
facts it reached based on the said findings, as well as the conclusions
of law. x x x.
Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants
for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact based on the
allegations in the Informations, the Resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor, including other documents and/or evidence appended to
the Information.
Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated
in the affidavits of the complainants and witnesses as bases for the
contention that there was no probable cause for petitioners
indictment for multiple murder or for the issuance of warrants for
their arrest. As stated above, the trial judges appreciation of the
evidence and conclusion of facts based thereon are not interfered
with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Again, "he
sufficiently complies with the requirement of personal determination
if he reviews the [I]nformation and the documents attached thereto,
and on the basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is probably
guilty of the crime with which he is being charged."118
Judge Abandos review of the Information and the supporting
documents is shown by the following portion of the judges 6 March
2007 Order:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as submitted
and filed by the Provincial Prosecution of Leyte Province supported by
the following documents: Affidavits of Complainants, Sworn
Statements of Witnesses and other pertinent documents issued by
the Regional Crime Laboratory Office, PNP, Region VIII and Camp
Crame, Quezon City, pictures of the grave site and skeletal remains,

this court has the findings [sic] of probable cause in the commission
by all mentioned accused of the crime charged.119
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an
indictment and issuance of a warrant of arrest, as petitioners are
doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact that are normally not
within the purview of a petition for certiorari,120 such as the
petitions filed in the instant consolidated cases.
The political offense doctrine is not a
ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination
by the trial court that the murders
were committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as
"common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot
be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with
the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty."121
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the
crime of rebellion.122 Thus, when a killing is committed in
furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder.
Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its
mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion
alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to
consistently charge respondents with simple rebellion instead of
common crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in
criminal procedure that the institution of criminal charges, including
whom and what to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of the
public prosecutor.123
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But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the 36
trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the
act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the
political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.124
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were
committed in furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that
the political motivation behind the alleged murders can be clearly
seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political
motivation must be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state
of mind which only the accused knows.125 The proof showing
political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is
assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It
is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant
petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA,126 if during trial, petitioners are able to
show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance
of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the
remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave
of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea
and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with
leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to
the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature
of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint
or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor,
with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court
shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order
shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n)

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119,
provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The
court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at
the trial. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should
have been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder
charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long
as petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1)
a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a
second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.127
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent, by a competent court in a valid
indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during
arraignment.128
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37
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion,
as defined and penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135
of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was
filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several
others.129
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-
944.1awp++i1 Even before the indictment for rebellion was filed
before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad had
already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of
the Orders of the DOJ denying their motion for the inhibition of the
members of the prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality and
independence.130 When the indictment was filed, petitioners
Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin
the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.131 We eventually
ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first
jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the
100,000 cash bond posted before the Office of the Clerk of Court. He
shall remain on provisional liberty until the termination of the
proceedings before the RTC Manila.1wphi1
The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of
petitioners Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad in view of the ongoing peace
negotiations. Their provisional release from detention under the cash
bond of 100,000 each shall continue under the condition that their
temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual
participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with
the government or until the termination of the proceedings before the
RTC Manila, whichever is sooner. It shall be the duty of the
government to inform this Court the moment that peace negotiations
are concluded.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED.
The RTC of Manila, Branch 32, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with
dispatch with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

Saturnino C. Ocampo shall remain on temporary liberty under the 38

same bail granted by this Court until the termination of the
proceedings before the RTC Manila. Petitioners Randall B. Echanis,
Rafael G. Baylosis and Vicente P. Ladlad shall remain on temporary
liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until their actual
participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with
the government are concluded or terminated, or until the termination
of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner.

SO ORDERED.

TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO
E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN
DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALES, JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR.,
Petitioners,
- versus -
MAGDALENO M. PEA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as
Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago
City, Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals,
in its Decision[1] dated 20 June 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is
correct when it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E.
Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C.
Gonzales, Jr., Eric L. Lee and Ben Yu Lim, Jr., and ruled that the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City, did not gravely
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reinvestigation and
recall of the warrants of arrest in Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684,
6685, and 6686.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea (Atty. Pea) instituted a civil case
for recovery of agents compensation and expenses, damages, and
attorneys fees[2] against Urban Bank and herein petitioners, before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. The
case was raffled to Branch 62 and was docketed as Civil Case No.
754. Atty. Pea anchored his claim for compensation on the Contract
of Agency[3] allegedly entered into with the petitioners, wherein the
former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any
intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Banks
property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed
a Motion to Dismiss[4] arguing that they never appointed the
respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the motion were the
following documents: 1) a Letter[5] dated 19 December 1994 signed
by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property; 2) an 39
unsigned Letter[6] dated 7 December 1994 addressed to Corazon
Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a Letter[7] dated 9 December 1994
addressed to Teodoro Borlongan, Jr. and signed by Marilyn G. Ong;
and 4) a Memorandum[8] dated 20 November 1994 from Enrique
Montilla III. Said documents were presented in an attempt to show
that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by
Urban Bank or by the petitioners.
In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, Atty.
Pea filed his Complaint-Affidavit[9] with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Bago City.[10] He claimed that said documents were
falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their
signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers
and employees of ISCI.[11] Worse, petitioners introduced said
documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were
falsified.
In a Resolution[12] dated 24 September 1998, the City Prosecutor
found probable cause for the indictment of petitioners for four (4)
counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents, penalized by
the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The
City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because
the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal
of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were
falsified considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and
that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754
where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their
motion to dismiss, and then adopted in their answer and in their Pre-
Trial Brief.[13] Subsequently, the corresponding Informations[14]
were filed with the MTCC, Bago City. The cases were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge
Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants[15] for the arrest of the
petitioners.
On 1 October 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash,
Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation.[16] Petitioners
insisted that they were denied due process because of the non-
observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation

prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they
were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. Then
they argued that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting
documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely
relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent
in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention with the Rules
of Court. Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed
for lack of probable cause. Moreover, one of the accused, i.e., Ben
Lim, Jr., is not even a director of Urban Bank, contrary to what
complainant stated. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal cases
should have been suspended on the ground that the issue being
threshed out in the civil case is a prejudicial question.
In an Order[17] dated 13 November 1998, the MTCC denied the
omnibus motion primarily on the ground that preliminary
investigation was not available in the instant case which fell within
the jurisdiction of the first-level court. The court, likewise, upheld the
validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Besides, the court added,
petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since
they already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue
involved in the civil case was not a prejudicial question, and, thus,
denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal proceedings. Lastly,
the court was convinced that the Informations contained all the facts
necessary to constitute an offense.
Petitioners immediately instituted a special civil action for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the Court of Appeals,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in issuing and not recalling the
warrants of arrest, reiterating the arguments in their omnibus
motion.[18] They, likewise, questioned the courts conclusion that by
posting bail, petitioners already waived their right to assail the
validity of the warrants of arrest.
On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.[19]
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issues:
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
40
A.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, is the finding of probable cause required for the filing of
an Information in court?
If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable
cause, should not the investigating prosecutor dismiss the complaint,
or at the very least, require the respondent to submit his counter-
affidavit?
B.
Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within
the personal knowledge of the complainant be sufficient basis for the
finding of probable cause?
C.
Where there is offense charged in a criminal complaint is not
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, and the record of the preliminary investigation
does not show the existence of probable cause, should not the judge
refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and dismiss the criminal case, or
at the very least, require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit
in order to aid the judge in determining the existence of probable
cause?
D.
Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?
E.
Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable
cause?[20]
On the other hand, respondent contends that the issues raised by the
petitioners had already become moot and academic when the latter
posted bail and were already arraigned.

On 2 August 2000, this Court issued a TRO[21] enjoining the judge of
the MTCC from proceeding in any manner with Criminal Case Nos.
6683 to 6686, effective during the entire period that the case is
pending before, or until further orders of, this Court.
We will first discuss the issue of mootness.
The issues raised by the petitioners have not been mooted by the fact
that they had posted bail and were already arraigned.
It appears from the records that upon the issuance of the warrant of
arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid
embarrassment, being then the officers of Urban Bank. On the
scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the petitioners refusal to
enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of Not Guilty for them.
The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes
a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is
precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after
arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and
participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections
thereto.[22]
As held in Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez:[23]
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings
of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by
the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the
warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities
thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in
People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it
was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules.
Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative
statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides,
procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of their 41
effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of
their effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its decision on
January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was
already in effect. It behoved the appellate court to have applied the
same in resolving the petitioners petition for certiorari and her
motion for partial reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her
personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to
question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of
arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be
clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention
to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause.
When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act
should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent
to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that
no other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x.
Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall
Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on the same day that
they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a
stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the
validity of their arrest.[24] On the date of their arraignment,
petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on
the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when
the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no
valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same
with the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was
a matter of imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it should
not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest. The
ruling to which we have returned in People v. Red[25] stated:
x x x The present defendants were arrested towards the end of
January, 1929, on the Island and Province of Marinduque by order of
the judge of the Court of First Instance of Lucena, Tayabas, at a time
when there were no court sessions being held in Marinduque. In view

of these circumstances and the number of the accused, it may
properly be held that the furnishing of the bond was prompted by the
sheer necessity of not remaining in detention, and in no way implied
their waiver of any right, such as the summary examination of the
case before their detention. That they had no intention of waiving this
right is clear from their motion of January 23, 1929, the same day on
which they furnished a bond, and the fact that they renewed this
petition on February 23, 1929, praying for the stay of their arrest for
lack of the summary examination; the first motion being denied by
the court on January 24, 1929 (G.R. No. 33708, page 8), and the
second remaining undecided, but with an order to have it presented
in Boac, Marinduque.
Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived the
right granted to them by section 13, General Order No. 58, as
amended by Act No. 3042.
The rest of the issues raised by the petitioners may be grouped into
two, which are: (1) the procedural aspect, i.e., whether the
prosecution and the court a quo properly observed the required
procedure in the instant case, and, (2) the substantive aspect, which
is whether there was probable cause to pursue the criminal cases to
trial.
THE PROCEDURAL ASPECT:
Petitioners contend that they were denied due process as they were
unable to submit their counter-affidavits and were not accorded the
right to a preliminary investigation. Considering that the complaint of
Atty. Pea was filed in September 1998, the rule then applicable was
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure relevant to
the issue are Sections 1, 3(a) and 9(a) of Rule 112, to wit:
Section 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent 42
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no
complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent
and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of
copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official
file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or,
in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify
that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
(a) Where filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed directly with
the fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3(a)
of this Rule shall be observed. The fiscal shall take appropriate action
based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted
by the complainant. (underscoring supplied)
The crime to which petitioners were charged was defined and
penalized under second paragraph of Article 172 in relation to Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified
documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications
enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial
document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent
to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of
the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial
proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to
cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced
in the next preceding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of
this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
Prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods translates
to imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day.[26] The next lower
in degree to prision correccional is arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period which translates
to 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months[27] of imprisonment.
Since the crime committed is not covered by the Rules of Summary
Procedure,[28] the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
first level courts but applying the ordinary rules. In such instance,
preliminary investigation as defined in Section 1, Rule 112 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable since such
section covers only crimes cognizable by the RTC. That which is
stated in Section 9(a) is the applicable rule.
Under this Rule, while probable cause should first be determined
before an information may be filed in court, the prosecutor is not
mandated to require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavits
to oppose the complaint. In the determination of probable cause, the
prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint, affidavits and other
supporting documents submitted by the complainant. If he does not
find probable cause, the prosecutor may dismiss outright the
complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient reason to
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
proceed with the case, he shall issue a resolution and file the 43
corresponding information.
The complaint of respondent, verbatim, is as follows:
COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT
I, MAGDALENO M. PEA, Filipino, of legal age, with address at Brgy.
Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, after having been sworn in
accordance with law hereby depose and state:
1. I am the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 754 pending with the
Regional Trial Court of Bago City entitled Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea v.
Urban Bank, et al Impleaded therein as defendants of the board of
the bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin
De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim Jr., Corazon Bejasa and
Arturo Manuel.(underlining ours)
2. I filed the said case to collect my fees as agent of Urban
Bank, Inc.(hereinafter referred to as the bank) in ridding a certain
parcel of land in Pasay City of squatters and intruders. A certified
true copy of the Complaint in the said case is hereto attached as
Annex A.
3. In the Motion to Dismiss dated 12 March 1996 (a
certified true copy of which is attached as Annex B), Answer dated 28
October 1996 (Annex C), and Pre-Trial Brief dated 28 January 1997
(Annex D) filed by the bank and the respondent members of the
board, the said respondents used as evidence the following
documents:
a. Letter dated 19 December 1994 supposedly signed by a certain
Herman Ponce and Julie Abad for Isabela Sugar Company (ISC) (a
copy of which is attached as Annex E), which states:
December 19, 1994
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

HERMAN PONCE 44
Urban Bank
Urban Avenue, Makati JULIE ABAD
Metro Manila

Gentlemen: b. Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 supposedly executed by a

certain Marilyn Ong on behalf of ISC, a copy of which is hereto
This has reference to your property located among Roxas Boulevard, attached as annex F, which states:
Pasay City which you purchased from Isabela Sugar Company under
a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on December 1, 1994. December 7, 1994

In line with our warranties as the Seller of the said property and our To: ATTY. CORA BEJASA
undertaking to deliver to you the full and actual possession and From: MARILYN G. ONG
control of said property, free from tenants, occupants or squatters
and from any obstruction or impediment to the free use and RE: ISABELA SUGAR CO., INC.
occupancy of the property and to prevent the former tenants or
occupants from entering or returning to the premises. In view of the Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea, who has been assigned by Isabela Sugar
transfer of ownership of the property to Urban Bank, it may be Company inc. to take charge of inspecting the tenants would like to
necessary for Urban Bank to appoint Atty. Pea likewise as its request an authority similar to this from the Bank to new owners.
authorized representative for purposes of holding/maintaining Can you please issue something like this today as he (unreadable)
continued possession of the said property and to represent Urban this.
Bank in any court action that may be instituted for the
abovementioned purposes.
b. Letter dated 9 December 1994 supposedly executed by the
It is understood that any attorneys fees, cost of litigation and any same Marilyn Ong, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex G,
other charges or expenses that may be incurred relative to the which states:
exercise by Atty. Pea of his abovementioned duties shall be for the
account of Isabela Sugar Company and any loss or damage that may December 9, 1994
be incurred to third parties shall be answerable by Isabela Sugar
Company. Atty. Ted Borlongan
URBAN BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
MAKATI, METRO MANILA
Very truly yours,

Isabela Sugar Company Attention: Mr. Ted Borlongan

Dear Mr. Borlongan
By:

I would like to request for an authority from Urban Bank per
attached immediately as the tenants are questioning authority of the
people who are helping us to take possession of the property.
Marilyn Ong
c. Memorandum dated 20 November 1994, copy of which is
attached as annex H, which states:
MEMORANDUM
To: Atty. Magadaleno M. Pea
Director
From: Enrique C. Montilla III
President
Date: 20 November 1994
You are hereby directed to recover and take possession of the
property of the corporation situated at Roxas Boulevard covered by
TCT No. 5382 of the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, immediately
upon the expiration of the contract of lease over the said property on
29 November 1994. For this purpose, you are authorized to engage
the services of security guards to protect the property against
intruders. You may also engage the services of a lawyer in case there
is a need to go to court to protect the said property of the corporation.
In addition, you may take whatever steps or measures are necessary
to ensure our continued possession of the property.
ENRIQUE C. MONTILLA III
President
4. The respondent member of the board of the bank used and
introduced the aforestated documents as evidence in the civil case
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
knowing that the same are falsified. They used thae said documents 45
to justify their refusal to pay my agents fees, to my damage and
prejudice.
5. The 19 December 1994 letter (Annex E) is a falsified document,
in that the person who supposedly executed the letter on behalf of
ISC, a certain Herman Ponce and Julie Abad did not actually affix
their signatures on the document. The execution of the letter was
merely simulated by making it appear that Ponce and Abad executed
the letter on behalf of ISC when they did not in fact do so.
6. No persons by the name of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad were
ever stockholders, officers, employees or representatives of ISC. In
the letter, Herman Ponce was represented to be the President of ISC
and Julie Abad, the Corporate Secretary. However, as of 19 December
1994, the real President of plaintiff was Enrique Montilla, III and
Cristina Montilla was the Corporate Secretary. A copy of the Minutes
of the Regular Meeting of ISC for the year 1994, during which
Montilla, et al. Were elected is hereto attached as Annex I. On the
otherhand, a list of the stockholders of ISC on or about the time of
the transaction is attached as Annex J.
7. The same holds true with respect to the Memorandum dated 7
December 1994 and athe letter dated 9 December 1994 allegedly
written by a ceratin Marilyn Ong. Nobody by the said name was ever
a stockholder of ISC.
8. Lastly, with respect to the supposed Memorandum issued by
Enrique Montilla, III his signature thereon was merely forged by
respondents. Enrique Montilla III, did not affix his signature on any
such document.
9. I am executing this affidavit for the purpose of charging
Teodoro C. Borlongan, Corazon M. Bejasa and Arturo E. Manuel,
Delfin C. Gonzales Jr., Benjamin L. De Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon and
Eric Lee, with the crime of use of falsified documents under Artilce
172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.(underlining ours)

10. I am likewise executing this affidavit for whatever legal purpose it
may serve.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Sgd. MAGDALENO M. PEA
It is evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically in paragraph
1, respondent merely introduced and identified the board of the
bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin
De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa and
Arturo Manuel, Sr. However, in the accusatory portion of the
complaint which is paragraph number 9, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not
included among those charged with the crime of use of falsified
documents under Article 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code. The omission indicates that respondent did not intend to
criminally implicate Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., even as he was acknowledged
to be a member of the board. And there was no explanation in the
Resolution and Information by the City Prosecutor why Mr. Ben Lim,
Jr. was included. Moreover, as can be gleaned from the body of the
complaint and the specific averments therein, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was
never mentioned.
The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the complaint to
determine whether there were inconsistencies which ought to have
been brought to the attention of the respondent or, on his own,
considered for due evaluation. It is a big mistake to bring a man to
trial for a crime he did not commit.
Prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that they may
properly fulfill their assigned role in the administration of justice. It
should be realized, however, that when a man is hailed to court on a
criminal charge, it brings in its wake problems not only for the
accused but for his family as well. Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor
to weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
the existence of a prima facie case before filing the information in 46
court. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty.[29]
Atty. Pea, in his Second Manifestation[30] dated 16 June 1999,
averred that petitioners, including Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., were already
estopped from raising the fact that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not a
member of the board of directors of Urban Bank, as the latter
participated and appeared through counsel in Civil Case No. 754
without raising any opposition. However, this does not detract from
the fact that the City Prosecutor, as previously discussed, did not
carefully scrutinize the complaint of Atty. Pea, which did not charge
Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. of any crime.
What tainted the procedure further was that the Judge issued a
warrant for the arrest of the petitioners, including, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr.
despite the filing of the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of
Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation raising among others the issue
that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., was not even a member of the board of
directors. With the filing of the motion, the judge is put on alert that
an innocent person may have been included in the complaint. In the
Order[31] dated 13 November 1998, in denying the motion to quash,
Judge Primitivo Blanca ruled that:
Courts in resolving a motion to quash cannot consider facts contrary
to those alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face
of the information because said motion is hypothethical admission of
the facts alleged in the information x x x. (citations omitted.)
We cannot accept as mere oversight the mistake of respondent judge
since it was at the expense of liberty. This cannot be condoned.
In the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the mandate of the
Constitution is for the judge to personally determine the existence of
probable cause:
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Corollary thereto, Section 9(b) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
(a) x x x.
(b) Where filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court. If the
complaint or information is filed directly with the Municipal Trial
Court, the procedure provided for in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall
likewise be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold
the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or
information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of arrest after
personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant and
his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that [n]o x x x warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing x x x the persons x x x to be seized.[32]
Interpreting the words personal determination, we said in Soliven v.
Makasiar[33] that it does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to
conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses themselves. To require thus would be to unduly laden
them with preliminary examinations and investigations of criminal
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases 47
filed before them. Rather, what is emphasized merely is the exclusive
and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as
to the existence of probable cause. To this end, he may: (a) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof
he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in determining its existence. What he is never allowed to do is to
follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certification as to the existence of
probable cause. Much more is required by the constitutional
provision. Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the
transcript of stenographic notes if any, and other documents
supporting the prosecutor's certification. Although the extent of the
judge's personal examination depends on the circumstances of each
case, to be sure, he cannot just rely on the bare certification alone
but must go beyond it. This is because the warrant of arrest issues
not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of
the records which sustain it.[34] He should even call for the
complainant and the witnesses to answer the court's probing
questions when the circumstances warrant.[35]
An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a
person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be
intruded by the State.[36]
Measured against the constitutional mandate and established
rulings, there was here a clear abdication of the judicial function and
a clear indication that the judge blindly followed the certification of a
city prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest with respect to all of the petitioners. The
careless inclusion of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., in the warrant of arrest gives
flesh to the bone of contention of petitioners that the instant case is a
matter of persecution rather than prosecution.[37] On this ground,
this Court may enjoin the criminal cases against petitioners. As a
general rule, criminal prosecutions cannot be enjoined. However,

there are recognized exceptions which, as summarized in Brocka v.
Enrile,[38] are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused;[39]
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;[40]
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;[41]
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;[42]
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;[43]
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;[44]
g. Where the court had no jurisdiction over the offense;[45]
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;[46]
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust
for vengeance;[47] and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.[48]
THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT:
Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code or Introduction of Falsified Document in a
judicial proceeding. The elements of the offense are as follows:
1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by
another person.
2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or
in any subdivisions Nos. 1 or 2 of Article 172.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any 48
judicial proceeding.[49]
The falsity of the document and the defendants knowledge of its
falsity are essential elements of the offense. The Office of the City
Prosecutor filed the Informations against the petitioners on the basis
of the Complaint-Affidavit of respondent Atty. Pea, attached to which
were the documents contained in the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
petitioners in Civil Case No. 754. Also included as attachments to the
complaint were the Answers, Pre-Trial Brief, the alleged falsified
documents, copy of the regular meetings of ISCI during the election of
the Board of Directors and the list of ISCI Stockholders.[50] Based on
these documents and the complaint-affidavit of Atty. Pea, the City
Prosecutor concluded that probable cause for the prosecution of the
charges existed. On the strength of the same documents, the trial
court issued the warrants of arrest.
This Court, however, cannot find these documents sufficient to
support the existence of probable cause.
Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense
charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances
without restoring to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which
he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than
suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify
conviction.[51]
As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,[52] the task of the presiding
judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused.

The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable
cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start
those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial.[53]
We do not see how it can be concluded that the documents
mentioned by respondent in his complaint-affidavit were falsified. In
his complaint, Atty. Pea stated that Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and
Marilyn Ong, the alleged signatories of the questioned letters, did not
actually affix their signatures therein; and that they were not actually
officers or stockholders of ISCI.[54] He further claimed that Enrique
Montillas signature appearing in another memorandum addressed to
respondent was forged.[55] These averments are mere assertions
which are insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint or worse
the issuance of warrants of arrest. These averments cannot be
considered as proceeding from the personal knowledge of herein
respondent who failed to, basically, allege that he was present at the
time of the execution of the documents. Neither was there any
mention in the complaint-affidavit that herein respondent was
familiar with the signatures of the mentioned signatories to be able to
conclude that they were forged. What Atty. Pea actually stated were
but sweeping assertions that the signatories are mere dummies of
ISCI and that they are not in fact officers, stockholders or
representatives of the corporation. Again, there is no indication that
the assertion was based on the personal knowledge of the affiant.
The reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on
personal knowledge is to guard against hearsay evidence. A witness,
therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others
either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of
the truth of what he has learned.[56] Hearsay is not limited to oral
testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as
evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.[57]
The requirement of personal knowledge should have been strictly
applied considering that herein petitioners were not given the
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
opportunity to rebut the complainants allegation through counter- 49
affidavits.
Quite noticeable is the fact that in the letter dated 19 December 1994
of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad, neither of the two made the
representation that they were the president or secretary of ISCI. It
was only Atty. Pea who asserted that the two made such
representation. He alleged that Marilyn Ong was never a stockholder
of ISCI but he did not present the stock and transfer book of ISCI.
And, there was neither allegation nor proof that Marilyn Ong was not
connected to ISCI in any other way. Moreover, even if Marilyn Ong
was not a stockholder of ISCI, such would not prove that the
documents she signed were falsified.
The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the
exercise of the public prosecutors function without any showing of
grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in his findings.[58]
Considering, however, that the prosecution and the court a quo
committed manifest errors in their findings of probable cause, this
Court therefore annuls their findings.
Our pronouncement in Jimenez v. Jimenez[59] as reiterated in
Baltazar v. People is apropos:
It is x x x imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be,
to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie
case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to
the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed
rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be
decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations
and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding
should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the
clear dictates of reasons. The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go
on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence
might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation
of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by visualizing and 50

not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should
continue to be so.
On the foregoing discussion, we find that the Court of Appeals erred
in affirming the findings of the prosecutor as well as the court a quo
as to the existence of probable cause. The criminal complaint against
the petitioners should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated 20 June 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order dated
2 August 2000 is hereby made permanent. Accordingly, the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Negros Occidental, Bago City, is
hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685
and 6686.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188024 June 5, 2013
RODRIGO RONTOS y DELA TORRE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the Decision1 dated 28 October 2008 and
Resolution2 dated 29 May 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 30412. The CA Decision affirmed the Decision3 in
Criminal Case No. C-69394 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, Branch 123 (RTC) finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act).
At 4:00 p.m. on 19 October 2003, PO2 Emil Masi (PO2 Masi) of the
Caloocan North City Police Station dispatched PO1 Joven Pacis (PO1
Pacis) and PO1 Greg Labaclado (PO1 Labaclado) of the Station Anti-
Illegal Drugs Task Force to conduct surveillance in Sampaloc St.,
Camarin, Caloocan City because of reports of illegal drug activity in
the said area.4 When they got there around 5:00 p.m., PO1 Pacis and
PO1 Labaclado noticed petitioner standing about five meters away
from them, apparently preoccupied with scrutinizing two plastic
sachets in his hand.
Upon coming closer, they saw that the plastic sachets appeared to
contain a white crystalline substance similar to shabu.5 PO1 Pacis
approached petitioner and confiscated the plastic sachets. Thereafter,
he introduced himself as a police officer and informed petitioner of
the offense the latter had committed.6 The two police officers
informed petitioner of his constitutional rights, while he just
remained silent.7 PO1 Pacis marked the plastic sachets with his
initials "JCP-1" and JCP-2" and placed them in a makeshift
envelope.8
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
51
They then brought petitioner to the station and turned him over to
PO2 Masi together with the plastic sachets.9 PO2 Masi conducted an
investigation and prepared a request for a laboratory examination10
of the contents of the plastic sachets.11 PO1 Pacis brought the
request and the plastic sachets to the crime laboratory, and forensic
chemist Police Inspector Jessie dela Rosa (P/Insp. dela Rosa)
conducted the examination.12 The tests on the contents of the plastic
sachets yielded a positive result for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug more commonly known as shabu.13
A Complaint14 for violation of Section 11 (possession of dangerous
drugs), Article II of R.A. 9165, was drawn up and referred15 to the
city prosecutor for the filing of charges before the court.
On the other hand, petitioner narrated a different version of the
incident. According to him, on the date and time mentioned, he was
at home with his parents, sister, nephews and a visitor named
Cassandra Francisco (Cassandra) when PO1 Pacis and PO1
Labaclado suddenly barged in.16 The police officers searched the
house, claiming that they were looking for something.17 When the
search proved fruitless, they arrested petitioner and Cassandra and
detained them at the Drug Enforcement Unit in Camarin, Caloocan
City.18 Cassandra was later released when her uncle allegedly gave
money to the police officers.19
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision20 dated 23
August 2006, the dispositive portion of which states:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused RODRIGO RONTOS Y DELA TORRE guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 11, Article II, RA
9165 and hereby sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of TWELVE
YEARS AND ONE DAY TO THIRTEEN YEARS, NINE MONTHS AND
TEN DAYS and to pay a fine of 500,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.21

Through the testimonies of PO1 Pacis, PO1 Labaclado and P/Insp.
dela Rosa, the RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish
the concurrence of all the elements of possession of dangerous drugs:
(a) an item or object identified to be a dangerous drug was in a
persons possession; (b) the possession was not authorized by law;
and (c) the person freely and consciously possessed the dangerous
drug. The RTC also found no evil motive on the part of the police
officers to testify falsely against petitioner. Despite the defenses of
denial, frame-up and evidence-planting interposed by petitioner, the
RTC held that his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner contended that, since his warrantless
arrest was illegal, the allegedly confiscated items were inadmissible in
evidence. He further claimed that the police officers failed to faithfully
comply with the procedure for ensuring the identity and integrity of
the plastic sachets containing shabu.
The CA ruled22 that the question over the legality of the arrest was
deemed waived by petitioner when he voluntarily submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea of "Not Guilty" and
participating in the trial of the case.23 In any case, the CA explained
that while the arrest was without a warrant, it was with probable
cause since petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto. He committed
a crime in plain view of the police officers, as he was spotted in the
act of holding and examining plastic sachets containing shabu.
While the CA admitted that no photograph or inventory of the
confiscated items was taken or made, it entertained no doubt that the
dangerous drugs presented in court were the same ones confiscated
from petitioner. Furthermore, the failure of the police officers to
observe the proper procedure for handling confiscated dangerous
drugs may only result in administrative liability on their part. That
failure does not cast doubt on the identity and integrity of the illegal
drugs.24
Thus, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC with the modification
that the fine imposed was reduced from 500,000 to 300,000.25 As
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
the motion for reconsideration26 of petitioner was denied,27 he now 52
comes before us raising the same issues presented before the CA.
OUR RULING
We acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. We cannot
uphold the contention of petitioner that his warrantless arrest was
illegal. The CA correctly ruled that his failure to question the legality
of his arrest before entering his plea during arraignment operated as
a waiver of that defense. "It has been ruled time and again that an
accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity with regard to his
arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before his arraignment."28
In his arraignment before the trial court, petitioner never raised any
issue and instead "freely and voluntarily pleaded Not Guilty to the
offense charged."29 Thus, he was estopped from raising the issue of
the legality of his arrest before the trial court, more so on appeal
before the CA or this Court.
However, on the basis of the nonobservance of the rules of procedure
for handling illegal drug items, we resolve to acquit petitioner on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
In illegal drugs cases, the identity and integrity of the drugs seized
must be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that
required to arrive at a finding of guilt.30 The case against the
accused hinges on the ability of the prosecution to prove that the
illegal drug presented in court is the same one that was recovered
from the accused upon his arrest.
The procedure set forth in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is intended
precisely to ensure the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs
seized.31 This provision requires that upon seizure of illegal drug
items, the apprehending team having initial custody of the drugs
shall (a) conduct a physical inventory of the drugs and (b) take
photographs thereof (c) in the presence of the person from whom
these items were seized or confiscated and (d) a representative from

the media and the Department of Justice and any elected public
official (e) who shall all be required to sign the inventory and be given
copies thereof.
This Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as a matter of
substantive law that mandates strict compliance.32 It was laid down
by Congress as a safety precaution against potential abuses by law
enforcement agents who might fail to appreciate the gravity of the
penalties faced by those suspected to be involved in the sale, use or
possession of illegal drugs.33 Under the principle that penal laws are
strictly construed against the government, stringent compliance
therewith is fully justified.34
Here, the procedure was not observed at all. Where it is clear that
Section 21 was not observed, as in this case, such noncompliance
brings to the fore the question of whether the illegal drug items were
the same ones that were allegedly seized from petitioner.
The direct testimony of PO1 Pacis in connection with his
identification of the envelope where he placed the two plastic sachets
allegedly confiscated from petitioner does not really inspire
confidence, to wit:
Q: What did you do with the plastic sachet that you have confiscated
from the accused?
A: After confiscating them, I marked them and placed them in an
envelope in order to preserve the evidence, maam.
Q: I am showing toy [sic] you this white envelope, will you please have
a look at it and tell the Honorable Court if this is the same envelope
which contained the two plastic sachets?
A: I am not sure, maam, it is not actually an envelope but an
improvised envelope.35
We cannot, in good conscience, affirm the conviction of petitioner for
possession of illegal drugs if the police officer charged with the
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
preservation of the evidence cannot even be certain in the 53
identification of the envelope that was presented in court. As held in
Dolera v. People,36 there also exists in the present case a reasonable
likelihood of substitution, in that the two plastic sachets that tested
positive for shabu and were presented in court were not the items
allegedly seized from petitioner.1wphi1 This possibility of
substitution is fatal for the prosecution,37 for there is then a failure
to prove the identity of the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt.38
We are not unaware of the rule that justifiable grounds may excuse
noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.39 The problem in this case is that the police officers
presented no justifiable reason why they neglected to observe the
proper procedure. Considering that PO1 Pacis himself expressed
misgivings on the identity of the envelope shown to him in court, with
the envelope that he had placed the confiscated illegal drug items in,
neither can we confirm that the chain of custody had been
sufficiently established.
Corpus delicti is the "actual commission by someone of the particular
crime charged."40 In illegal drug cases, it refers to the illegal drug
item itself.41 When courts are given reason to entertain reservations
about the identity of the illegal drug item allegedly seized from the
accused, the actual commission of the crime charged is put into
serious question. In those cases, courts have no alternative but to
acquit on the ground of reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 28 October 2008 in CA-G.R. CR
No. 30412 of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
RODRIGO RONTOS y DELA TORRE is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act) on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE petitioner from custody, unless he is detained
for some other lawful cause.

RODEL LUZ y ONG,
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,[1]
Respondent.
G. R. No. 197788
February 29, 2012
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to
set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516
dated 18 February 2011[2] and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which
sustained the version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station
1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially
testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the
morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of
Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a
motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the
accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor
vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station
since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front
of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante
were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he
noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something
from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to
take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out 54
the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or
metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two
(2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that
upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that
after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover
and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused
spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned
out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty
while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.[3]
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a
plea of Not guilty to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which,
trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic
chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner
testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and
extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,[4] the RTC convicted petitioner of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs[5] committed on 10 March
2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he
had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to
a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic
sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense
of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and
unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL
LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen
(13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (300,000.00).

The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and
destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a
Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to
file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its
Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED
SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE
RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE
ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).[7]
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure,
because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that
there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even
issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never 55
consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested,
the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and
apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the
use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the
City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The
accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the
time when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he
had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the
part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused
because the latter was actually committing a crime in their presence,
that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the
accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said
Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the
apprehending officers. x x x.[8]
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the
particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the
entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can
correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even
reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those
that the parties raised as errors.[9]
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged
down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and
solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.[10] It is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the
arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the

body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of
the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part
of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.[11]
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the
general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest
of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and
peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall,
in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any
regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and
regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the
license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and
issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to
operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours
from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in
the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter.
Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the
date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or
revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual[12]
provides the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the
conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While
in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot
pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the
following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation
Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or 56
any of the vehicles occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation
ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There
was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him
of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the
ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station
may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the
trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went
to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down
almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to
take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,[13] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court
discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist
detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered
custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does
not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a
formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time
the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly
curtails the freedom of action of the driver and the passengers, if any,
of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime
either to ignore a policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having
stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the
Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine
announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only
in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the
decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop
exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his

free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that
he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a
person questioned will be induced to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First,
detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively
temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last
only a few minutes. A motorists expectations, when he sees a
policemans light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to
spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while
the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be
given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to
continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an
ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse
interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the
detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he
provides his interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not
such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To
be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed
officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in
deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some
pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects
of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree.
xxx
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to
a so-called Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a
formal arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of
detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our
opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The
similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to
hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are
not in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
xxxxxxxxx 57
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will
not come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by
Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action
is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. California v.
Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who
has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to
treatment that renders him in custody for practical purposes, he will
be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.
See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).
(Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist
therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the
scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under
custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda
rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized
as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can
petitioner here be considered under arrest at the time that his traffic
citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which
was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while
riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of
Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be
stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made
for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic
violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police
officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into
custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In
this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic

citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same
violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was
deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and
while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a
valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be
the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for
the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any.
Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could
be used against them.[14] It may also be noted that in this case,
these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police
officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession
of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings
must also be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure
that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing,
to relieve the inherently compelling pressures generated by the
custodial setting itself, which work to undermine the individuals will
to resist, and as much as possible to free courts from the task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact,
whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are
implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected
of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of
felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he
was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his
ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for
a second timeafter the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas
he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that
resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: 58
(i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of
evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search;
and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.[15] None of the
above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful
arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be
inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually
concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly,
the evidence was not immediately apparent.[16]
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and
convincing evidence.[17] It must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal,
specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the
instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to
prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that
petitioner was merely told to take out the contents of his pocket.[18]
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given:
(1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a
public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to
the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence
of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6)
the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found;
(7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which
the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective
state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent
was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given.[19] In this case,
all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station
at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a
warrantless search.

Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While
the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or
unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act
may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search
of outer clothing for weapons.[20]
In Knowles v. Iowa,[21] the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a
police officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues
a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not
authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court
therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search
when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers
may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist
to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the
search incident to arrest exception: (1) the need to disarm the
suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to
preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these
underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is
sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis both
legitimate and weighty, x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing
a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a
custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest
involves danger to an officer because of the extended exposure which
follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to
the police station. 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that [t]he
danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its
attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the
grounds for arrest. Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the
other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and is more analogous to a
so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest. Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412
U. S. 291, 296 (1973) (Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person
might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take
conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence).
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the
case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at
110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
safety in this context may justify the minimal additional intrusion of 59
ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself
justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full
fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges,
officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and
protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a
vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers,
Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a patdown of a driver and any
passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and
dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a Terry
patdown of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable
suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate
control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983);
and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment,
including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New
York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to
search incident to arrestthe need to discover and preserve evidence.
Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the
evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No
further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on
the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the
car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may
have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest
opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not,
however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.[22]
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.[23] Any evidence obtained in violation of said
right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While
the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without
contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement
of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basic principles of government.[24]
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are 60

inadmissible.[25] The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility
precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.[26]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming
the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional
Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal
Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
immediately released from detention, unless his continued
confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON," Accused-Appellant,
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The case before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May
31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201.
Said decision affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated
August 6 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
41, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-164174 and 98-164175, which
convicted the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of
illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs under Sections
15 and 16 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 stemmed from a charge of violation of
Section 15 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,3 which
was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there
[willfully], unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute 45.46 grams, 44.27 grams, 45.34
grams, 51.45 grams, 41.32 grams and 20.14 grams or with a total
weight of TWO HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN POINT NINETY-EIGHT
(247.98) grams contained in six (6) transparent plastic sachets of
white crystalline substance known as "Shabu" containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.4
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, on the other hand, arose from an
alleged violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended,5 which was said to be committed in this manner:
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
61
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused without being authorized by law to possess or use any
regulated drug, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
1.61 grams, 0.58 grams, 0.29 grams, 0.09 [grams], 0.10 grams, 0.17
grams, 0.21 grams, 0.24 grams, 0.12 grams, 0.06 grams, 0.04 grams,
[0].51 grams or all with a total weight of four point zero three grams
of white crystalline substance contained in twelve (12) transparent
plastic sachets known as "SHABU" containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or
prescription thereof.6
Initially, Criminal Case No. 98-164175 was raffled to the RTC of
Manila, Branch 23. Upon motion7 of the appellant, however, said
case was allowed to be consolidated with Criminal Case No. 98-
164174 in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41.8 On arraignment, the
appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.9 The pre-trial
conference of the cases was held on July 27, 1998, but the same was
terminated without the parties entering into any stipulation of
facts.10
During the trial of the cases, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of the following witnesses: (1) Police Inspector (P/Insp.)
Jean Fajardo,11 (2) P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito,12 and (3) Police Officer
(PO) 2 Christian Trambulo.13 Thereafter, the defense presented in
court the testimonies of: (1) the appellant Donald Vasquez y
Sandigan,14 (2) Angelina Arejado,15 and (3) Anatolia Caredo.16
The Prosecutions Case
The prosecutions version of the events was primarily drawn from the
testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo.
P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a
confidential informant went to their office and reported that a certain
Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug activity. This alias Don
supposedly claimed that he was an employee of the National Bureau

of Investigation (NBI). According to the informant, alias Don promised
him a good commission if he (the informant) would present a
potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the information to
Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito Domantay, the commanding
officer of their office. P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed to form a
team and conduct a possible buy-bust against alias Don. She formed
a team on the same day, which consisted of herself, PO2 Trambulo,
PO1 Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa, PO1 Sisteno, and PO1 De la Rosa.
P/Insp. Fajardo was the team leader. With the help of the informant,
she was able to set up a meeting with alias Don. The meeting was to
be held at around 9:00 p.m. on that day at Cindys Restaurant
located in Welcome Rotonda. She was only supposed to meet alias
Don that night but she decided to bring the team along for security
reasons.17
At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went
to the meeting place with the informant. The members of her team
positioned themselves strategically inside the restaurant. The
informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of
shabu. She asked alias Don if he was indeed an employee of the NBI
and he replied in the affirmative. They agreed to close the deal
wherein she would buy 250 grams of shabu for 250,000.00. They
also agreed to meet the following day at Cindys Restaurant around
10:00 to 11:00 p.m.18
In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went
back to Cindys Restaurant. Alias Don was already waiting for her
outside the establishment when she arrived. He asked for the money
and she replied that she had the money with her. She brought five
genuine 500.00 bills, which were inserted on top of five bundles of
play money to make it appear that she had 250,000.00 with her.
After she showed the money to alias Don, he suggested that they go
to a more secure place. They agreed for the sale to take place at
around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998 in front of alias Dons
apartment at 765 Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. The team proceeded
to the Western Police District (WPD) Station along U.N. Avenue for
coordination. Afterwards, the team held their final briefing before
they proceeded to the target area. They agreed that the pre-arranged
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair, which would 62
signify that the deal had been consummated and the rest of the team
would rush up to the scene. The team then travelled to the address
given by alias Don.19
When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m. on April
3, 1998, the two vehicles they used were parked along the corner of
the street. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the
apartment of alias Don and stood in front of the apartment gate.
Around 1:45 a.m., alias Don came out of the apartment with a male
companion. Alias Don demanded to see the money, but P/Insp.
Fajardo told him that she wanted to see the drugs first. Alias Don
gave her the big brown envelope he was carrying and she checked the
contents thereof. Inside she found a plastic sachet, about 10x8
inches in size, which contained white crystalline substance. After
checking the contents of the envelope, she assumed that the same
was indeed shabu. She then gave the buy-bust money to alias Don
and scratched her hair to signal the rest of the team to rush to the
scene. P/Insp. Fajardo identified herself as a narcotics agent. The two
suspects tried to flee but PO2 Trambulo was able to stop them from
doing so. P/Insp. Fajardo took custody of the shabu. When she asked
alias Don if the latter had authority to possess or sell shabu, he
replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her initials "JSF" on the
genuine 500.00 bills below the name of Benigno Aquino. After the
arrest of the two suspects, the buy-bust team brought them to the
police station. The suspects rights were read to them and they were
subsequently booked.20
P/Insp. Fajardo said that she found out that alias Don was in fact
the appellant Donald Vasquez. She learned of his name when he
brought out his NBI ID while he was being booked. P/Insp. Fajardo
also learned that the name of the appellants companion was
Reynaldo Siscar, who was also arrested and brought to the police
station. P/Insp. Fajardo explained that after she gave the buy-bust
money to the appellant, the latter handed the same to Siscar who
was present the entire time the sale was being consummated. Upon
receiving the buy-bust money placed inside a green plastic bag,
Siscar looked at the contents thereof and uttered "okey na to."

P/Insp. Fajardo marked the drug specimen and brought the same to
the Crime Laboratory. She was accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo
and PO1 Agravante. She handed over the drug specimen to PO1
Agravante who then turned it over to P/Insp. Taduran, the forensic
chemist on duty. The police officers previously weighed the drug
specimen. Thereafter, the personnel at the crime laboratory weighed
the specimen again. P/Insp. Fajardo and her team waited for the
results of the laboratory examination.21
P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of shabu
seized during the buy-bust operation were actually contained in a
self-sealing plastic envelope placed inside a brown envelope. When
the brown envelope was confiscated from the appellant, she put her
initials "JSF" therein and signed it. She noticed that there were
markings on the envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y
Sunga" but she did not bother to check out what they were for or who
made them. When she interrogated the appellant about the brown
envelope, she found out that the same was submitted as evidence to
the NBI Crime Laboratory. She also learned that the appellant
worked as a Laboratory Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory. She
identified in court the six plastic sachets of drugs that her team
recovered, which sachets she also initialed and signed. P/Insp.
Fajardo also stated that after the appellant was arrested, PO2
Trambulo conducted a body search on the two suspects. The search
yielded 12 more plastic sachets of drugs from the appellant. The 12
sachets were varied in sizes and were contained in a white envelope.
P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials and signature on the envelope. As
to the 12 sachets, the same were initialed by P/Insp. Fajardo and
signed by PO2 Trambulo.22
The testimony of PO2 Trambulo corroborated that of P/Insp.
Fajardos. PO2 Trambulo testified that in the morning of April 1,
1998, a confidential informant reported to them about the illegal drug
activities of alias Don. P/Supt. Domantay then tasked P/Insp.
Fajardo to form a buy-bust team. P/Insp. Fajardo was able to set up
a meeting with alias Don at Cindys Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda,
Quezon City. At that meeting, PO2 Trambulo saw P/Insp. Fajardo
talk to alias Don. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the members of the team
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
that she convinced alias Don that she was a good buyer of shabu and 63
the latter demanded a second meeting to see the money. After the
initial meeting, P/Insp. Fajardo briefed P/Supt. Domantay about
what happened. PO2 Trambulo stated that on April 2, 1998, P/Insp.
Fajardo was furnished with five genuine 500.00 bills together with
the boodle play money. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials in the
genuine bills below the name "Benigno Aquino, Jr." Afterwards, the
team left the office. When they arrived at Cindys Restaurant past
10:00 p.m., alias Don was waiting outside. P/Insp. Fajardo showed
the boodle money to alias Don and after some time, they parted ways.
P/Insp. Fajardo later told the team that alias Don decided that the
drug deal would take place in front of alias Dons rented apartment
on Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. After an hour, the team went to
Valdez St. to familiarize themselves with the area. They then
proceeded to the WPD station to coordinate their operation.
Thereafter, P/Insp. Fajardo conducted a final briefing wherein PO2
Trambulo was designated as the immediate back-up arresting officer.
The agreed pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch
her hair to indicate the consummation of the deal. PO2 Trambulo
was to signal the same to the other members of the team.23
The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30 to 2:00
a.m. on April 3, 1998. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked
towards the direction of alias Dons apartment, while PO2 Trambulo
positioned himself near a parked jeepney about 15 to 20 meters from
the apartment gate. The rest of the team parked their vehicles at the
street perpendicular to Valdez St. Later, alias Don went out of the
gate with another person. PO2 Trambulo saw alias Don gesturing to
P/Insp. Fajardo as if asking for something but P/Insp. Fajardo
gestured that she wanted to see something first. Alias Don handed
P/Insp. Fajardo a big brown envelope, which the latter opened.
P/Insp. Fajardo then handed to alias Don a green plastic bag
containing the buy-bust money and gave the pre-arranged signal.
When PO2 Trambulo saw this, he immediately summoned the rest of
the team and rushed to the suspects. He was able to recover the buy-
bust money from alias Dons male companion. Upon frisking alias
Don, PO2 Trambulo retrieved 12 pieces of plastic sachets of
suspected drugs. The same were placed inside a white envelope that

was tucked inside alias Dons waist. PO2 Trambulo marked each of
the 12 sachets with his initials "CVT" and the date. The police officers
then informed the suspects of their rights and they proceeded to the
police headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.24
As regards the brown envelope that alias Don handed to P/Insp.
Fajardo, the latter retained possession thereof. The envelope
contained six pieces of plastic bags of white crystalline substance.
When they got back to their office, the team reported the progress of
their operation to P/Supt. Domantay. The arrested suspects were
booked and the required documentations were prepared. Among such
documents was the Request for Laboratory Examination of the drug
specimens seized. PO2 Trambulo said that he was the one who
brought the said request to the PNP Crime Laboratory, along with the
drug specimens.25
P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on the results
of her examination of the drug specimens seized in this case. She
explained that P/Insp. Macario Taduran, Jr. initially examined the
drug specimens but the latter was already assigned to another office.
The results of the examination of P/Insp. Taduran were laid down in
Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98. P/Insp. Dequito first studied
the data contained in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98 and
retrieved the same from their office. She entered that fact in their
logbook RD-17-98. She then weighed the drug specimens and
examined the white crystalline substance from each of the plastic
sachets. She examined first the specimens marked as "A-1," "A-2,"
"A-3," "A-4," "A-5" and "A-6." P/Insp. Dequitos examination revealed
that the white crystalline substances were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.26 She also examined the contents
of 12 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that also contained
crystalline substances. The 12 plastic sachets were marked "B-1" to
"B-12." The white crystalline powder inside the 12 plastic sachets
also tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. P/Insp.
Dequitos findings were contained in Physical Science Report No. RD-
17-98.27
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
The prosecution, thereafter, adduced the following object and 64
documentary evidence: (1) photocopies of the five original 500.00
bills28 used as buy-bust money (Exhibits A-E); (2) Request for
Laboratory Examination29 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit F); (3) Initial
Laboratory Report30 dated April 3, 1998, stating that the specimen
submitted for examination tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (Exhibit G); (4) Court Order31 dated September 2,
1998 (Exhibit H); (5) Physical Sciences Report No. D-1071-9832
dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit I); (6) Drug specimens A-1 to A-6
(Exhibits J-O); (7) Big brown envelope (Exhibit P); (8) Small white
envelope (Exhibit Q); (9) Drug specimens B-1 to B-12 (Exhibits R-CC);
(10) Physical Sciences Report No. RD-17-9833 (Exhibit DD); (11)
Joint Affidavit of Arrest34 (Exhibit EE); (12) Play money (Exhibit FF);
(13) Booking Sheet and Arrest Report35 (Exhibit GG); (14) Request
for Medical Examination36 (Exhibit HH); (15) Medico Legal Slip37 of
Donald Vasquez (Exhibit II); and (16) Medico Legal Slip38 of Reynaldo
Siscar (Exhibit JJ).
The Defenses Case
As expected, the defense belied the prosecutions version of events.
The appellants brief39 before the Court of Appeals provides a concise
summary of the defenses counter-statement of facts. According to
the defense:
Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a
Laboratory Aide II at the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. His
duties at the time included being a subpoena clerk, receiving
chemistry cases as well as requests from different police agencies to
have their specimens examined by the chemist. He also rendered day
and night duties, and during regular office hours and in the absence
of the laboratory technician, he would weigh the specimens. As
subpoena clerk, he would receive subpoenas from the trial courts.
When there is no chemist, he would get a Special Order to testify, or
bring the drug specimens, to the courts.
On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in Managerial
Statistics between 6:00 to 9:00 oclock p.m. Thereafter, he took a

jeepney and alighted at Stop and Shop at Quiapo. From there, he
took a tricycle to his house, arriving at 9:45 oclock that evening,
where he saw Reynaldo Siscar and Sonny San Diego, the latter a
confidential informant of the narcotics agents.
On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 oclock in the morning, Donalds household
help, Anatolia Caredo, who had just arrived from Antipolo that time,
was eating while Donald was asleep. She heard a knock on the door.
Reynaldo Siscar opened the door and thereafter two (2) men entered,
poking guns at Reynaldo. They were followed by three (3) others. The
door to Donalds room was kicked down and they entered his room.
Donald, hearing noise, woke up to see P./Insp. Fajardo pointing a
gun at him. He saw that there were six (6) policemen searching his
room, picking up what they could get. One of them opened a cabinet
and got drug specimens in [Donalds] possession in relation to his
work as a laboratory aide. The drugs came from two (2) cases and
marked as DD-93-1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392
owned by SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen contained in
the envelope marked as DD-93-1303 was intended for presentation
on 3 April 1998. Aside from the drug specimens, the policemen also
took his jewelry, a VHS player, and his wallet containing 2,530.00.
Angelina Arejado, Donalds neighbor, witnessed the policemen
entering the apartment and apprehending Donald and Reynaldo from
the apartment terrace.40 (Citations omitted.)
The defense then offered the following evidence: (1) NBI Disposition
Form41 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit 1); (2) Sworn Statement of Idabel
Bernabe Pagulayan42 (Exhibit 2); (3) Photocopy of the buy-bust
money43 (Exhibit 3); (4) List of Hearings44 attended by Donald
Vasquez (Exhibit 4); (5) Authorization Letter45 prepared by Acting
Deputy Director Arturo A. Figueras dated March 27, 1998 (Exhibit 5);
and (6) List of Evidence46 taken by Donald Vasquez from 1996-1998
(Exhibit 6).
The Decision of the RTC
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes 65
charged. The RTC gave more credence to the prosecutions evidence
given that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. The trial
court held that the appellant did not present any evidence that would
show that the police officers in this case were impelled by an evil
motive to charge him of very serious crimes and falsely testify against
him. Also, the trial court noted that the volume of the shabu involved
in this case was considerable, i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for
illegal sale and illegal possession, respectively. To the mind of the
trial court, such fact helped to dispel the possibility that the drug
specimens seized were merely planted by the police officers.
Furthermore, the RTC ruled that the positive testimonies of the police
officers regarding the illegal drug peddling activities of the appellant
prevailed over the latters bare denials.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was merely
framed up by the police, the trial court pointed out that:
[T]he accused should have reported the said incident to the proper
authorities, or asked help from his Acting Chief [Idabel] Pagulayan
from the NBI to testify and identify in Court the xerox copy of the
Disposition Form which she issued to the accused and the Affidavit
dated April 17, 1998 (xerox copy) executed by her or from Mr. Arturo
A. Figueras, Acting Deputy Director, Technical Services of the NBI to
testify and identify the Letter issued by the said Acting Deputy
Director in order to corroborate and strengthen his testimony that he
was indeed authorized to keep in his custody the said shabu to be
presented or turned over to the Court as evidence, and he should
have filed the proper charges against those police officers who were
responsible for such act. But the accused did not even bother to do
the same. Further, the pieces of evidence (Disposition Form, Affidavit
of [Idabel] Pagulayan and Letter dated March 27, 1998 issued by
Acting Deputy Director) presented by the accused in Court could not
be given weight and credence considering that the said persons were
not presented in Court to identify the said documents and that the
prosecution has no opportunity to cross-examine the same, thus, it
has no probative value.47

The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD
VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III in Relation to Sec.
2 (e), (f), (m), (o), Art. I of R.A. No. 6425 and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of 5,000,000.00;
and 2. In Crim. Case No. 98-164175, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III
in Relation to Sec. 2 (e-2) Art. I of R.A. 6425 as Amended by Batas
Pambansa Bilang 179 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and a fine
of FOUR THOUSAND (4,000.00) PESOS.
The subject shabu (247.98 grams and 4.03 grams, respectively) are
hereby forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of
Court is hereby directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the
said shabu to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), upon
the finality of this Decision.48
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals
On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the
appellant. The appellate court ruled that the prosecution sufficiently
proved the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession
of shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo on the conduct of the
buy-bust operation was found to be clear and categorical. As the
appellant failed to adduce any evidence that tended to prove any ill
motive on the part of the police officers to falsely charge the
appellant, the Court of Appeals held that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties on the part of the
police officers had not been controverted in this case.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision stated: 66
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DENIED. The August 6, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 41 of the City of Manila in Criminal Cases No. 98-164174-75,
finding appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes of Violation of Section 15 and Section
16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-164175, appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months and one day
of prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum.50
The Ruling of the Court
The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again impugn
his conviction on two grounds: (1) the purported illegality of the
search and the ensuing arrest done by the police officers and (2) his
supposed authority to possess the illegal drugs seized from him.51
He argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a
warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite
the fact that the police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a
warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the
appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was
inadmissible in court. As the corpus delicti of the crime was rendered
inadmissible, the appellant posits that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant further insists that he was able
to prove that he was authorized to keep the drug specimens in his
custody, given that he was an employee of the NBI Forensic
Chemistry Laboratory who was tasked with the duty to bring drug
specimens in court.
After an assiduous review of the evidence adduced by both parties to
this case, we resolve to deny this appeal.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail
the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that
"[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be

made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having
failed to move for the quashing of the information against them
before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured
upon their voluntary submission to the trial courts jurisdiction."53
Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover
police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within
the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed
lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in
this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal
drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People v.
Cabugatan55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however,
is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long
been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search
of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4)
waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a
valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of
Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of
escaped prisoners. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly
the invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent search upon his
person.
We now rule on the substantive matters.
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or
prohibited drugs, the following elements should be satisfactorily
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.56 As held in People v. Chua Tan Lee,57 in a prosecution of
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
illegal sale of drugs, "what is material is proof that the accused 67
peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti." On the other hand, the elements of illegal possession
of drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.58
In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2
Trambulo established that a buy-bust operation was legitimately
carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap the appellant.
P/Insp. Fajardo, the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant
as the one who sold to her six plastic bags of shabu that were
contained in a big brown envelope for the price of 250,000.00. She
likewise identified the six plastic bags of shabu, which contained the
markings she placed thereon after the same were seized from the
appellant. When subjected to laboratory examination, the white
crystalline powder contained in the plastic bags tested positive for
shabu. We find that P/Insp. Fajardos testimony on the events that
transpired during the conduct of the buy-bust operation was detailed
and straightforward. She was also consistent and unwavering in her
narration even in the face of the opposing counsels cross-
examination.
Apart from her description of the events that led to the exchange of
the drug specimens seized and the buy-bust money, P/Insp. Fajardo
further testified as to the recovery from the appellant of another 12
pieces of plastic sachets of shabu. After the latter was arrested,
P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search
on the appellant. This search resulted to the confiscation of 12 more
plastic sachets, the contents of which also tested positive for shabu.
The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo was amply corroborated by PO2
Trambulo, whose own account dovetailed the formers narration of
events. Both police officers also identified in court the twelve plastic
sachets of shabu that were confiscated from the appellant.
In People v. Ting Uy,59 the Court explains that "credence shall be
given to the narration of the incident by prosecution witnesses

especially so when they are police officers who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence
to the contrary." In the instant case, the appellant failed to ascribe,
much less satisfactorily prove, any improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses as to why they would falsely incriminate him.
The appellant himself even testified that, not only did he not have any
misunderstanding with P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to
his arrest, he in fact did not know them at all.60 In the absence of
evidence of such ill motive, none is presumed to exist.61
The records of this case are also silent as to any measures
undertaken by the appellant to criminally or administratively charge
the police officers herein for falsely framing him up for selling and
possessing illegal drugs. Such a move would not have been a
daunting task for the appellant under the circumstances. Being a
regular employee of the NBI, the appellant could have easily sought
the help of his immediate supervisors and/or the chief of his office to
extricate him from his predicament. Instead, what the appellant
offered in evidence were mere photocopies of documents that
supposedly showed that he was authorized to keep drug specimens
in his custody. That the original documents and the testimonies of
the signatories thereof were not at all presented in court did nothing
to help the appellants case. To the mind of the Court, the evidence
offered by the appellant failed to persuade amid the positive and
categorical testimonies of the arresting officers that the appellant was
caught red-handed selling and possessing a considerable amount of
prohibited drugs on the night of the buy-bust operation.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the
trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it
gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial
courts assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses
since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the
evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual
findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are
binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such
findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable
error.62
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
68
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the
prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the appellant of the
crimes charged.
The Penalties
Anent the proper imposable penalties, Section 15 and Section 16,
Article III, in relation to Section 20(3) of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, state:
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any regulated drug. Notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense
under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of
Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses
under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far
beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by
the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings
conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity. (Emphases
supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 98-164174 involving the crime of illegal sale of
regulated drugs, the appellant was found to have sold to the poseur-
buyer in this case a total of 247.98 grams of shabu, which amount is
more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law for the
imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating
circumstances, the death penalty.
Pertinently, Article 6363 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that
when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty
shall be applied.1wphi1 Thus, in this case, considering that no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the appellants
violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial courts
imposition of reclusion perpetua. The 5,000,000.00 fine imposed by
the RTC on the appellant is also in accord with Section 15, Article III
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
69
As to the charge of illegal possession of regulated drugs in Criminal
Case No. 98-164175, the Court of Appeals properly invoked our
ruling in People v. Tira64 in determining the proper imposable
penalty. Indeed, we held in Tira that:
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the
imposable penalty of possession of a regulated drug, less than 200
grams, in this case, shabu, is prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of the
offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:
QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua
(Emphases ours.)
Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the
possession of the appellant amounted to 4.03 grams, the imposable
penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance in this case, the imposable penalty on the appellant
should be the indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as
maximum. The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, thus, falls
within the range of the proper imposable penalty. In Criminal Case
No. 98-164175, no fine is imposable considering that in Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, a fine can be imposed as a conjunctive
penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.65
Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted
that the appellant was a regular employee of the NBI Forensics
Chemistry Division. Such fact, however, cannot be taken into
consideration to increase the penalties in this case to the maximum,
in accordance with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.66 Such a special aggravating circumstance, i.e., one that
which arises under special conditions to increase the penalty for the
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

offense to its maximum period,67 was not alleged and charged in the 70
informations. Thus, the same was properly disregarded by the lower
courts.

All told, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of the
appellant.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 31, 2011 in

CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PETRUS YAU
A.K.A. JOHN AND RICKY AND SUSANA YAU Y SUMOGBA
A.K.A. SUSAN, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03446, which affirmed the
December 14, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
214, Mandaluyong City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. MC-04-7923.
The RTC found accused-appellant Petrus Yau (Petrus) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom
and serious illegal detention, as defined and penalized in Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, (R.A. No. 7659), and convicted accused-appellant Susana Yau
y Sumogba (Susana) as an accomplice to the commission of the same
crime.
The Facts
Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For
Ransom in the Information,3 dated February 13, 2004, the
accusatory portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the
vicinity of Shoemart Mega Mall, Mandaluyong City, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with the use of a sleeping substance, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away ALASTAIR
JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM in the following manner, to wit: while said
ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM was on board a white Toyota
taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 being driven by the above-
named accused Petrus Yau a.k.a. John and Ricky and the taxi
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
cab was travelling along Epifanio Delos Santos (EDSA) Avenue, he 71
suddenly fell unconscious and upon regaining consciousness he was
already handcuffed and in chains inside a house located at B23, L2,
Ponsettia St., Camilla Sorrento Homes, Panapaan IV, Bacoor, Cavite,
where he was kept for twenty two (22) days, which house is owned by
accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and while therein he was
maltreated; that ransom in the amount of SIX HUNDRED
THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$600,000.00) and TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (Php20,000.00) for each day of detention was demanded in
exchange for his safe release until he was finally rescued on February
11, 2004, by PACER operatives of the Philippine National Police.
CONTRARY TO LAW.chanrobleslaw
Version of the Prosecution
In the Appellees Brief,4 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
presented the following narration of the
kidnapping:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private
complainant Alastair Onglingswam, who is a practicing lawyer and
businessman from the United States, went out of Makati Shangrila
Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with
plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said hotel to Virra Mall
Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While the said taxicab
was plying along EDSA, and within the vicinity of SM Megamall,
private complainant received a phone call from his associate Kelly
Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that while he was on the phone
conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted
to have short black hair, a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses,
would from time to time turn to him and talk as if he was also being
spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up his
phone. He no longer knew what transpired except that when he woke
up lying down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and
he was handcuffed and chained.

When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too
tight, a man who was wearing a red mask and introduced himself as
John approached him and removed the plastic bag from his head
and loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was being
kidnapped for ransom and that he will be allowed to make phone
calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with
telephony equipment, tape recorder, phone and a special antennae
cap for the cellphone. With these equipment, private complainant
was allowed to call his girlfriend and father and asked them for the
PIN of his ATM cards and for money, however, with instructions not
to inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after, he was told by
his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell them that he was still
alive as well as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom
and his kidnappers were demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars
(US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.
The private complainants family, girlfriend (Iris Chau) and friends
received a text message purportedly from the former informing them
that he was kidnapped and ransom for his liberty was demanded.
On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United
States Embassy in Manila about the situation and a meeting with the
representatives of the Philippine National Police was arranged.
Subsequently, Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper
demanding US$2,000.00. Chau then wired US$1,000.00, upon
instructions, to Ong Kwai Ping thru Metro Bank and Trust Company.
Likewise, private complainants brother Aaron Onglingswam made
eight (8) deposits to Ong Kwai Pings account in Metro Bank,
amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), to
ensure his brothers safety and eventual release.
During private complainants twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while
he was allowed to communicate with his family almost daily to prove
that he was still alive and was served with meals almost five times a
day either by John or the other accused Susan Yau, he was also
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
maltreated i.e. beaten with sticks, made to lay-down biting a piece of 72
wood which was made as target for a rifle.
On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi
with plate number PVD 115 plying along Bacoor was victimizing
passengers. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Isagani Nerez, members of
the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response Task Force (PACER)
were ordered to proceed to Bacoor, Cavite to look for Toyota Corolla
White Taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115.
On February 11, 2004, at around 4:00 oclock in the morning, the
PACER group proceeded to Bacoor and positioned themselves along
Aguinaldo Highway under the overpass fronting SM Bacoor. Not
having caught sight of the taxi, after three hours, the group moved to
a different location along the Aguinaldo Highway where they were
able to chance upon the said vehicle. Thus, they followed it, then
flagged it down and approached the driver. The driver was asked to
scroll down his window and was told that the vehicle was being used
to victimize foreign nationals. Appellant did not offer to make any
comment. Hence, this prompted the officers to ask for his name and
since he answered that he was Petrus Yau, a British national, they
asked him for his drivers license and car registration but appellant
was not able to produce any. Since he could not produce any drivers
license and car registration, they were supposed to bring him to the
police station for investigation, however, when shown a picture of
private complainant and asked if he knew him, he answered that the
man is being kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he
was being placed under arrest for kidnapping private complainant
Alastair Onglingswam after being informed of his constitutional
rights. Thereafter, appellants cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and Sony
Erickson were confiscated. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Nerez,
[appellant] was brought to the parking lot of SM City Bacoor for a
possible rescue operations of the victim.
Appellant led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his
residence, he was led back to the police car. The rest of the members
of PACER proceeded inside the house and found a man sitting on the

floor chained and handcuffed. The man later identified himself as
Alastair Onglingswam.
During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified
Petrus Yau as his captor and the taxi driver. Test conducted by the
United States Federal Bureau of Investigation reveals that the DNA
found in the mask used by private complainants captor matched
that of appellant Petrus Yau.5
Version of the Defense
Petrus and Susana denied the accusation, and stated the following in
their Brief6 to substantiate their claim of
innocence:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime. He averred
that the supposed kidnap victim coordinated with the police to set up
the subject case against him and his family. He is a British national.
He had been in the Philippines for many times since he was 14 years
old. He came to the country in July 2001 for a vacation and had not
left since then. On September 2001, he got married to Susana Yau.
Prior thereto, he was in Singapore running some businesses.
On January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon (the
date and time the victim was kidnapped), Petrus Yau was at home
sleeping.
On February 11, 2004 (the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at
around 8:30 9:00 oclock in the morning, he went to his wife
Susana in her shop and got money to be deposited to the Asia Trust
Bank. He parked his car outside the bank. After he alighted from his
car, three (3) men bigger than him held his hands: one (1) of them
held his neck. They pushed him inside their van. They tied his hands
with packing tape, covered his eyes with the same tape, and his head
with a plastic bag. They kicked and beat him until he became
unconscious.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
When he regained consciousness, he was inside an air-conditioned 73
room. His hands were handcuffed and he felt very cold because his
body was wet. His head was still being covered. He shouted asking
where he was. People came in and he heard them talking in Tagalog.
They kicked him for about twenty (20) seconds. Later, he was made
to sit, as he was lying on the floor. He said that he could not see
anything, thus, someone removed the cover of his head. They
accused him of being a kidnapper, to which he replied that he was
not. He pleaded to them to allow him to make a call to the British
Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to no avail.
When he was taken into custody, he had his wedding ring, watch and
a waist bag containing his British passport, alien certificate, drivers
license, Asia Trust bankbook in the name of Susana Yau, ATM Cards
(in his name) of Metrobank, PCI Equitable Bank and Banco de Oro,
VISA Card, and some cash given to him by his wife . He lost those
personal properties.
After four (4) to five (5) hours, he was transferred to another room
without a window. The following day, he was brought to and detained
at the PACER Custodial Center.
Petrus Yau can speak English but he is better in the Chinese
language, both Mandarin and Cantonese. He bought the taxi he was
driving in August 2003 for Eighty Five Thousand Pesos
(Php85,000.00) for personal use and/or for resale. It had a defective
engine (usually overheats), without an aircon and cannot travel for
long journey. He does not drive a taxi to earn a living. He had police
friends who told him that he cannot drive a taxi as an occupation
since his drivers license is non-professional.
Sometime on June 2003, he and his wife Susana had a heated
argument over his womanizing. Hence, she decided to live separately
from him (though she was pregnant at that time) and moved to
another house (Block 5, Lot 4, Tulip Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor,
Cavite). Sometimes, she would visit him.

Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary to
the victims testimony that he was placed in the basement. He was
not in his house when the police officers allegedly rescued the
kidnapped victim. He left his house in good condition in the morning
before his arrest. The white Toyota Corolla taxi he was driving had
markings of faded grey, not black, as claimed by Alastair.
During the inquest proceedings, Petrus Yau was not assisted by a
counsel and was not informed of his constitutional rights.
Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the
company of the kidnapper every time the latter served Alastairs food
(lunch and dinner). She is legally married to Petrus Yau. They have
two (2) children named Charlie and Vivian. On February 11, 2004,
she lived at Block 5, Lot 4, Tulips Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor,
Cavite, while Petrus Yau lived at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia Street,
Sorrento Town Homes, Bacoor, Cavite, with his girlfriend. Susana
and Petrus were separated since June 2003.
On February 11, 2004, she called him to pick up the amount of
Php7,000.00 (earnings of her sari-sari store) and to deposit it in her
account at Asia Trust Bank. She would request Petrus to do such
errand for her as she does not trust her househelp. Petrus came to
her at around 7:00 oclock in the morning. At around 11:00 oclock
a.m. of the same day, four (4) to five (5) policemen arrived at her
residence and told her to come with them to the hospital where
Petrus was brought because he met a vehicular accident along
Aguinaldo Highway.
Susana, together with her children and helpers, went with them, and
rode in their van. They, however, were not brought to the hospital but
to an office. Thereat, Susana saw her husband (almost dead) inside a
small room with a one-way mirror. She was not able to talk to him.
She, together with her children and helpers, were detained for three
(3) days inside a small room. After three (3) days, her children and
helpers were released and they went home. At that time, she was not
provided with the assistance of a counsel.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
Susana stated that her husbands name is Petrus Yau. He is not 74
known either as John or Ong Kwai Ping. He is engaged in the
business of buying cars for resale. They owned three (3) houses and
lots, all registered in her name. At the time she was taken into
custody by the police, she had with her Five Thousand Pesos cash,
Allied Bank passbook and ATM Cards (Allied Bank and Asia Trust
Bank), VISA card, passport, wedding ring, necklace and cellphone,
which were taken away by persons whom she does not know.7
The Ruling of the RTC
In its judgment, dated December 14, 2007, the RTC convicted Petrus
Yau, as principal, of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious
illegal detention, and Susana Yau, as an accomplice to the
commission thereof. The RTC found the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses credible and sufficient, with their versions of
the incident dovetailing with each other even on minor details. It
observed that Petrus failed to rebut his positive identification by the
victim, Alastair and his brother Aaron John Onglingswam (Aaron
John), with whom he talked for several times over the phone. It
stated that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution
had adequately reinforced its theory that Petrus was the perpetrator
of the heinous act.
With respect to Susana, the RTC wrote that she was positively
identified by Alastair as the Filipino woman who fed him or
accompanied Petrus in bringing him food during his 22 days of
captivity and, for said reason, should be held liable as an accomplice.
The RTC rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted
by Petrus and Susana because the same were unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence. The dispositive portion of the said
decision states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment finding the accused
Petrus Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, he is hereby sentenced to suffer

the prison term of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The court also finds the
accused Susana Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as
accomplice to the commission of the crime of kidnapping for ransom
and serious illegal detention and applying to her the benefit of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law wherein her minimum penalty shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree of the imposable penalty
of RECLUSION TEMPORAL which is prision mayor, she is hereby
therefore sentenced to suffer the prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR MINIMUM AS MINIMUM to TWELVE
(12) YEARS and TEN (10) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL
MINIMUM AS MAXIMUM. Accused are credited in full of the
preventive imprisonment they have already served in confinement.
Further, both accused are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the
victim ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM actual damages of Two
Hundred Seventy Three Thousand and One Hundred Thirty Two
Pesos (P273, 132.00) plus interest from the filing of the information
until full payment, moral damages of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), and exemplary damages of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00).
SO ORDERED.8
Unfazed, Petrus and Susana appealed the RTC judgment of
conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana. 9 The appellate
court likewise lent credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, who were able to establish with certitude the commission
of the crime and the identities of the culprits thereof.
Hence, this appeal.
ASSIGNED ERRORS:
I The Courts Ruling
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
75
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH,
THE PIECES OF OBJECT EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ARE
INADMISSIBLE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
WAS POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS
THE ALLEGED KIDNAPPER.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.10
Susana insisted that the trial court erred: 1] in not giving credence to
her claim that she was living separately with her husband, Petrus
Yau; 2] in not considering that she was not mentioned in the sworn
statement executed by Alastair, dated February 12, 2004, even when
said victim was asked if there was another person assisting Petrus in
the perpetration of the crime; 3] in not considering the Resolution of
the Department of Justice, dated February 13, 2004, finding probable
cause against her because she is the registered owner of the house
where Alastair was held captive and not because she served food on
the victim; and 4] in convicting her as an accomplice.11cralawred
On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution12 notifying
the parties that they could file their respective supplemental briefs if
they so desire. The People of the Philippines, represented by the OSG,
opted not to file any supplemental brief, maintaining its positions and
arguments in its brief earlier filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446.13
Petrus filed his Supplemental Brief14 on December 27, 2013 in
amplification of his arguments raised in his brief filed before the CA.

The appeal is bereft of merit.
Encapsulated, the issues herein focus on: (a) the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses; (b) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence
to prove the commission of kidnapping for ransom and the identity of
the culprits thereof; and (c) the degree of responsibility of each
accused-appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Worth reiterating on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses is the
ruling of the Court in People v. Maxion15
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of
witness, which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a
better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and
observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the
sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the
face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the
entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with
reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness
to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not
be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to
materially affect the disposition of the case.16
It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial
courts factual findings, such as its assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the
conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded great
respect and have even conclusive effect. Such factual findings and
conclusions assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by
the CA.17cralawred
In the case at bench, the RTC gave more weight and credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses compared to those of the
accused-appellants. After a judicious review of the evidence on
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
record, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual 76
findings of the RTC and the CA, and their respective assessment and
calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold,
that is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the
crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantum of proof
the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because,
even if the commission of the crime is a given, there can be no
conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly
ascertained.18 Here, the prosecution was able to satisfactorily
discharge this burden.
Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white
Toyota Corolla taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115 which he boarded
before he lost consciousness on the afternoon of January 20, 2004.
He claimed that while he was conversing with his business associate
Kelly Wei over his phone inside the taxicab, Petrus would turn his
face towards him, from time to time, and would talk as if he was
being spoken to. Alastair claimed that he had a good look and an
ample opportunity to remember the facial features of the driver as to
be able to recognize and identify him in court. It is the most natural
reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their
accosters and the manner in which the craven acts are
committed.19cralawred
Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his
kidnapper as belonging to Petrus. It was established that from the
first to the twentieth day of Alastairs captivity, his kidnapper would
meet him five times a day and would talk to him for an hour, thus,
enabling him to remember the culprits voice which had a unique
tone and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair declared with certainty
that it was the voice of Petrus. Witness Aaron John insisted that the
person who introduced himself as Ong Kwai Ping and with whom he
had talked over the phone for three weeks, demanding necessity
money and ransom for the release of his brother Alastair, was Petrus
because of the distinct tone of his voice with Chinese accent. There
was no showing that Alastair and Aaron John had any ill motive to

falsely testify against Petrus. As a rule, absent any evidence showing
any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their
testimonies are, thus, worthy of full faith and credit.20cralawred
Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of
circumstantial evidence that led to the inescapable and reasonable
conclusion that Petrus committed the crime charged. The settled rule
is that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence
can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.21 The
corollary rule is that the circumstances proven must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.22cralawred
The combination of the following established facts and circumstances
affirm the findings of guilt by the RTC and the
CA:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1] The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by
Petrus and Susana, located at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia St., Camella
Sorrento Homes, Bacoor, Cavite;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2] The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which
the victim recalled boarding in going to Virra Mall Greenhills
Shopping Center on the afternoon of January 20, 2004 and where he
lost consciousness, was found in the possession of the accused-
appellant Petrus on February 11, 2004;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3] The drivers license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong
Kwai Ping were recovered inside the Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus
Yau;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4] In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence
were found: one (1) chain with padlock; handcuffs; short broken
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
chain; checkered pajama; black blazer; one (1) Onesimus black coat; 77
two (2) video camera cartridges, one showing the victim in lying down
position and family footages, and the other one labeled sex scandal;
eight (8) pieces of cellphones; notebook; two (2) Talk n Tex SIM cards;
Globe SIM card; two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title for two pieces of
land in Bacoor, Cavite, under the name of Susana Sumogba; original
copy of the Official Receipts and Certificate of Registration of a
Suzuki 1993 motorcycle bearing Plate No. 2M9748; business license
and mayors permit issued to Susana Yau; marriage contract of
Petrus Yau and Susana Yau; birth certificate of Susana Sumogba;
birth certificates of their children; ACR of Petrus Yau; Meralco bills;
Asia Trust deposit slips; five ATM deposit slips; and PLDT
bills;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
5] Two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were
found in the possession of Petrus. Incidentally, it was reported that
the owner of the QTEK Palmtop cellphone was a certain Jasper
Beltran, also a kidnapped victim whose whereabouts had not been
known yet; andChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
6] The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that
was recovered inside the house and on the buccal swab taken from
Petrus showed that both DNA profiles matched.23
The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the
foregoing pieces of circumstantial evidence, when analyzed and taken
together, definitely lead to no other conclusion than that Petrus was
the author of the kidnapping for ransom. When viewed as a whole,
the prosecution evidence effectively established his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the
RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are as follows: (a) intent on the
part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual
deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused,
which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.24cralawred

All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial
and documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench.
First, Petrus is a private individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped
Alastair by using sleeping substance which rendered the latter
unconscious while inside a taxicab driven by the said accused-
appellant. Third, Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house
owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor, Cavite, where said victim
was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty.
Fourth, Alastair was taken against his will. And fifth, Petrus made
demands for the delivery of a ransom in the amount of
US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.
Anent the criminal liability of each accused-appellant, there is no
doubt that Petrus is liable as principal of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom. Susana, on the other hand, is liable only as an accomplice to
the crime as correctly found by the lower courts. It must be
emphasized that there was no evidence indubitably proving that
Susana participated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The
only evidence the prosecution had against her was the testimony of
Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the woman who gave
food to him or who accompanied his kidnapper whenever he would
bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner.
Jurisprudence25 is instructive of the elements required, in
accordance with Article 18 of the RPC, in order that a person may be
considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be a community of
design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he
cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the
crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between
the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.
In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her
husband, Petrus, but she kept quiet and never reported the incident
to the police authorities. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the
house and gave food to the victim or accompanied her husband when
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
he brought food to the victim. Susana not only countenanced Petrus 78
illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has
been held that being present and giving moral support when a crime
is being committed make a person responsible as an accomplice in
the crime committed.26 As keenly observed by the RTC, the act of
giving food by Susana to the victim was not essential and
indispensable for the perpetration of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom but merely an expression of sympathy or feeling of support to
her husband.27 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in
People v. De Vera,28 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the
participation of the offender will be considered as that of an
accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Alastairs positive identification of Susana is not in any bit prejudiced
by his failure to mention her name in his sworn statement, dated
February 12, 2004. It is well-settled that affidavits, being ex parte,
are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, but do not really
detract from the credibility of witnesses.29 Oftentimes, the
allegations contained in affidavits involved mere passive mention of
details anchored entirely on the investigators questions. The
discrepancies between a sworn statement and a testimony in court
do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused, as testimonial
evidence carries more weight than an affidavit.30 Testimonies given
during the trial are more exact and elaborate. Besides, sworn
statements are often executed when an affiants mental faculties are
not in such a state as to afford the affiant a fair opportunity of
narrating in full the incident which transpired.31cralawred
Given the overwhelming picture of their complicity in the crime, this
Court cannot accept the defenses of alibi and frame-up interposed by
the accused-appellants. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is
easy to contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi must be proven by the
accused with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters. 32 The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has
been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be
concocted but is difficult to prove. In order to prosper, the defense of
frame-up must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing

evidence.33 Apart from their bare allegations, no competent and
independent evidence was adduced by the accused-appellants to
substantiate their twin defenses of alibi and frame-up and, thus,
remain self-serving and do not merit any evidentiary value. More
importantly, nowhere in the records does it show of any dubious
reasons or improper motive that could have impelled the prosecution
witnesses, particularly victim Alastair Onglingswam, to falsely testify
and fabricate documentary or object evidence just to implicate
accused-appellants in such a heinous crime as kidnapping for
ransom. Their only motive was to see to it that the kidnapper be
brought to justice and sentenced with the appropriate penalty.
As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal
culpability, the accused-appellants questioned the legality of their
warrantless arrests. This too must fail.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the
acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived.34 The accused-appellants never objected
to or questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests or the
acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before they
entered their respective pleas to the kidnapping for ransom charge.
Considering this lapse and coupled with their full and active
participation in the trial of the case, accused-appellants were deemed
to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests. The
accused-appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
RTC thereby curing whatever defects that might have attended their
arrest. It bears stressing that the legality of the arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over their persons.35 Their warrantless
arrests cannot, by themselves, be the bases of their acquittal.
Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely
objection to their warrantless arrests, jurisprudence is replete with
rulings that support the view that their conviction was proper despite
being illegally arrested without a warrant. In People v. Manlulu,36
the Court ruled that the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot
deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
facts on record point to their culpability. Indeed, the illegal arrest of 79
an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from
error.37cralawred
With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct
in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of
parole against Petrus as principal in the charge of kidnapping for
ransom in view of R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the death penalty. Also,
the Court finds that the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and ten (10) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, meted out against Susana, an
accomplice, to be proper.
The Court also sustains the RTC in awarding actual damages in the
amount of P273,132.00 plus interest committed from the filing of the
information until fully paid. As regards the moral damages against
the accused-appellants, the Court finds the award of P1,000,000.00
to be exorbitant. Hence, the same is being reduced to P200,000.00,
as the reasonable compensation for the ignominy and sufferings that
Alastair and his family endured because of the accused-appellants
inhumane acts of detaining him in handcuffs and chains, and
mentally torturing him and his family to raise the ransom money.
The fact that they suffered the trauma from mental, physical and
psychological ordeal which constitutes the basis for moral damages
under Article 2219 of the Civil Code is too obvious to still require its
recital at the trial through the superfluity of a testimonial charade.
The Court also finds the award of exemplary damages to be in order
in view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of demand for
ransom, and to serve as an example and deterrence for the public
good. The Court, however, reduces the amount from P200,000.00 to
P100,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.38cralawred
The RTC, however, erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable
with Petrus for the payment of damages. This is an erroneous
apportionment of the damages awarded because it does not take into
account the difference in the nature and degree of participation
between the principal, Petrus, and the accomplice, Susana. The
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros39 is instructive on the 2] Susana Yau y Sumogba is directed to pay actual damages in the 80
apportionment of civil liabilities among all the accused-appellants. amount of P91,044.00, moral damages in the amount of ?66,666.67
The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among and exemplary damages in the amount of P33,333.33.
all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to
the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual
participation. Accordingly, Petrus should shoulder a greater share in
the total amount of damages than Susana who was adjudged only as
an accomplice.

In fine, the accused-appellants are ordered to pay the victim, Alastair

Onglingswam actual damages in the amount of P273,132.00; moral
damages in the amount of P200,000.00; and exemplary damages in
the amount of P100,000.00, or a total amount of P573,132.00.
Taking into consideration the degree of their participation, the
principal, Petrus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total
amount of the damages (P573,132.00 x 2/3) or P382,088.00; and the
accomplice, Susana, should be ordered to pay the remaining one-
third (1/3) or P191,044.00. Specifically, Petrus shall be liable for
actual damages in the amount of P182,088.00; moral damages in the
amount of P133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount of
P66,666.67; and Susana for the amount of P91,044.00 as actual
damages; P66,666.67 as moral damages; and P33,333.33 as
exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that accused-appellants Petrus Yau and Susana
Yau y Sumogba are ordered to pay the victim Alastair Joseph
Onglingswam moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00. The award of
actual damages in the amount of P273,132.00 is maintained. The
civil liabilities of the accused-appellants shall be apportioned as
follows:

1] Petrus Yau is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of

P182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of P133,333.33; and
exemplary damages in the amount of P66,666.67; and

G.R. No. 199042 November 17, 2014
DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition1 filed by Danilo Villanueva y Alcaraz from the
Decision2 dated 4 May 2011 and Resolution3 dated 18 October 2011
issued by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. C.R. No. 32582.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Information4 reads:
That on or about the 15th day of June 2004 in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu)
weighing 0.63 gram knowing the same to [be a] dangerous drug
under the provisions of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 15 July 2004, the accused, duly assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.5
PROSECUTIONS VERSION
Four witnesses testified for the prosecution: (1) Police Senior
Inspector (PSI) Albert Arturo, (2) Police Officer (PO) 3 Jonathan
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
Coralde, (3) PO2 Reynante Mananghaya, and (4) Senior Police Officer 81
1 (SPO1) Antonio Asiones.6 Their testimonies reveal that a Complaint
was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo Villanueva for allegedly
shooting the former along C-3 Road, Navotas City. After recording the
incident in the police blotter, PO3 Jonathan Coralde, SPO3 Enrique
de Jesus, SPO2 Henry Martin and SPO1 Anthony Asiones, together
with Resco, proceeded to the house of Villanueva. They informed
Villanueva about the Complaint lodged against him. They invited him
to the police station. There, he was subjected to a body search and,
in the process, a plastic sachet of shabu was recovered from the left
pocket of his pants. PO3 Coralde marked the sachet with the initial
"DAV 06-15-04", and PO2 Reynante Mananghaya brought it to the
National Police District Scene of the Crime Operatives (NPD-SOCO)
for examination.7 DEFENSES VERSION
The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at home
watching TV when PO3 Coralde, along with three others, invited him
to go with them to the police station. Informed that he had been
identified as responsible for shooting Resco, the accused was then
frisked and detained at the police station.8
RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 127 of Caloocan City, in its
Decision9 dated 6 April 2009, convicted petitioner of the offense
charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring accused DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation of Section
11, Article II,R.A. 9165. Henceforth, this Court hereby sentences him
to suffer an imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as the
minimum to seventeen (17) years and eight (8) months as the
maximum and to pay the fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(300,000.00).

The drugs subject matter of this case is ordered confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance
with the law.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA reviewed the appeal, which hinged on one issue, viz:
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS ILLEGAL
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WARRANTLESS ARREST AND
SEARCH.11
RULING OF THE CA
On 4 May 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 6, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City in Criminal Case No.
70854 finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
On 27 May 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13
which the CA denied in a Resolution14 dated 18 October 2011.
Hence, the instant Petition, which revolves around the following lone
issue:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DESPITE THE
ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST AND THE LAPSES ON THE PART OF
THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE HANDLING OF THE CONFISCATED
DRUG.15
Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within the purview of
valid warrantless arrests, since it took place on the day of the alleged
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
shooting incident. Hence, to "invite" him to the precinct without any 82
warrant of arrest was illegal. The evidence obtained is, consequently,
inadmissible. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment16
stating that the shabu confiscated from petitioner was admissible in
evidence against him; that the search conducted on him was valid;
and that he cannot raise the issue regarding the apprehending
officers non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 for
the first time on appeal.
OUR RULING
We find the instant appeal meritorious.
Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his
arrest.
Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic
rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a
private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and
the arresting officer show none of the above that would make the

warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-
appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He actively
participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is considered as one
who had properly and voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to question the
validity of his arrest.17
The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by law.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal
search.18 Records have established that both the arrest and the
search were made without a warrant. While the accused has already
waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed
to have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a
warrantless search can be conducted.1wphi1 These searches
include: (1) search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view; (3)
customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk
situation; (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstance.19
The search made was not among the enumerated instances.
Certainly, it was not of a moving vehicle, a customs search, or a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. There could not have been a
seizure in plain view as the seized item was allegedly found inside the
left pocket of accused-appellants pants. Neither was it a stop-and-
frisk situation. While thistype may seemingly fall under the
consented search exception, we reiterate that "[c]onsent to a search is
not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing
evidence."20
Consent must also be voluntary inorder to validate an otherwise
illegal search; that is, the consent mustbe unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.21
In this case, petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out the contents
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
of his pocket. The testimony of the police officer on the matter is 83
clear:
Q: And what did you do when you frisked a small plastic sachet?
A: When I felt something inside his pocket, I ordered him to bring out
the thing which I felt.
Q. : And what did Danilo Villanueva do when you instructed him to
bring out the contents of his pocket?
A: He took out the contents of his pocket and I saw the plastic
containing shabu.22
The evidence obtained is not admissible.
Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is
thus inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. Obviously,
this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant
with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution: "Any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."23 Without the
seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused appellant cannot be
sustained. This being the case, we see no more reason to discuss the
alleged lapses of the officers in the handling of the confiscated drug.
As a final word, we reiterate that "[ w ]hile this Court appreciates and
encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to
preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish
them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by
the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the
means."24
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 4
May 2011 and Resolution dated 18 October 2011 issued by the
Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No.
32582 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus -
ROLANDO S. DELOS REYES, alias Botong, and RAYMUNDO G.
REYES, alias Mac-Mac,
Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 174774
August 31, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01733, which affirmed with
modification the Decision[2] dated September 23, 2003 of Branch 214
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City in Criminal
Case No. MC-00-2375-D. The Court of Appeals found accused-
appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes (Reyes)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 21 of Article IV,
in relation to Section 16 of Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing
upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The following antecedent facts are culled from the records:
On February 17, 2000, accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes
and Raymundo G. Reyes, Emmanuel de Claro, and Mary Jane
Lantion-Tom (Lantion-Tom) were all arrested for illegal possession,
sale, delivery, distribution, and/or transportation of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known
as shabu. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, in
its Resolution dated March 3, 2000, found probable cause to indict
accused-appellants, together with Emmanuel de Claro, for violation
of Republic Act No. 6425, and resolved to continue the preliminary
investigation in so far as Lantion-Tom was concerned. The criminal
information against accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro,
filed with the RTC, reads:
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor accuses ROLANDO 84
DELOS REYES y SANTOS @ BOTONG, RAYMUNDO REYES y
GUINZON @ MAC-MAC and EMMANUEL DE CLARO y ENRIQUEZ @
COCOY of the crime of VIOLATION OF SEC. 21 ART. IV IN REL. TO
SEC. 16 ART. III OF R.A. 6425 AS AMENDED, committed in the
manner herein narrated as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of February, 2000, in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess any regulated drug, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another,
commit to sell, deliver, distribute and/or transport a carton of ten
(10) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance with the following grams, to wit: 99.2, 94.9, 99.6, 93.5,
98.3, 99.5, 99.6, 99.5, 98.4 and 98.4 grams or a total of 980.9 grams,
which substance when submitted for drug examination, were found
positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly
known as shabu, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license
and prescription.[3]
On March 7, 2000, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes,
Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom, insisting on their innocence,
moved for a reinvestigation of their case before the RTC, which said
trial court granted in an Order[4] dated March 15, 2000.
After the reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a
Resolution dated April 3, 2000, recommending that the RTC proceed
with the indictment of accused-appellant Reyes and Emmanuel de
Claro, and dismiss the charges against accused-appellant Rolando
delos Reyes and Lantion-Tom. The Office of the City Prosecutor
considered the different versions of events presented by the parties
during the preliminary investigation and reinvestigation (except
accused-appellant Reyes who did not participate in the proceedings),
which it summarized as follows:

In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the arresting officers, members of
the Intelligence and Investigation of the Regional Mobile Group (RMG)
of the National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) claims that on
17 February 2000 a confidential informant called up relative to a
narcotics drug deal to commence at the vicinity of the parking area of
Shangrila Plaza Hotel, Mandaluyong City; that they were dispatched
to verify the reports and conduct police operations; that about 2:00
p.m. after meeting with the confidential agent, they strategically
positioned themselves at the vicinity parking area of said hotel; that
about 10:00 p.m., accused/respondent Reyes a.k.a. Mac-Mac, on
board a white Toyota Corolla, and accused/respondent [Rolando]
delos Reyes, a.k.a. Botong, on board a red Toyota Corolla, arrived
with accused/respondent Reyes subsequently proceeding inside
Whistletop Bar and Restaurant, and accused/respondent [Rolando]
delos Reyes calling accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro
through his cellular phone; that accused/respondent [Rolando] delos
Reyes and [Emmanuel] de Claro then proceeded to the latters parked
Mazda car where respondent Lantion-Tom was waiting; from the
parked car, a box in transparent plastic bag was taken, which
accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro handed-over to
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes; accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes in turn handed the box in a plastic bag to
accused/respondent Reyes; that the arresting officers accosted the
accused/respondents who according to the arresting officers
admitted having in their possession illegal drugs; that the recovered
items containing ten (10) pcs. of heat sealed transparent plastic bags
of white crystalline substance with a total weight of 980.9 grams
turned positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug.
In his Sinumpaang Kontra-Salaysay, accused/respondent [Rolando]
delos Reyes claims that on 17 February 2000, he went to Buenas
Market, Manggahan, Pasig City, together with a neighbor, one Marlon
David, to talk to Raymundo Reyes who was to pay his indebtedness;
that while looking for a parking space, several men with firearms
suddenly appeared, with one shouting, buksan mo ang pintuan ng
sasakyan at kung hindi babasagin ko ito; that he and Marlon David
were forced out of their vehicle with one of the armed men bringing
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
out a plastic shopping bag of Shoe Mart, asking where the said bag 85
allegedly containing shabu came from; that accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes answered hindi ko alam, that he and Marlon
David were blindfolded when forcibly taken to the groups vehicle and
continuously asked who the source of the shabu was, with
respondent/accused [Rolando] delos Reyes replying, hindi ko alam at
wala akong kinalaman diyan; that Marlon David was separated from
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and later released on 18
February 2000; that when accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes
blindfold was removed, he found himself at Camp Bagong Diwa,
Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
xxxx
To confirm respondent/accused [Rolando] delos Reyes claim, that he
was arrested in Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, and not in the vicinity
of Whistletop Bar and Restaurant in Mandaluyong City,
respondent/accused [Emmanuel] de Claros spouse submitted a
certified true xerox copy of barangay blotter of Barangay Manggahan,
Pasig City, reflecting the entry on 19 February 2000 made by Mrs.
Delos Reyes, on the incident reported to by Marlon David thus:
BLOTTER
Dumulog po rito sa himpilan ng Punong Barangay si Gng. Virginia
Delos Reyes, upang ipagbigay alam ang pagkawala ng kanyang
asawa na si Mr. Rolando delos Reyes, nuong petsa 17 ng Pebrero
taong dalawang libo (2000) na ayon sa batang pamangkin na si
Marlon David, ay hinuli ng mga hindi kilalang lalaki sa Buenas
Market, Manggahan, Pasig City nais niyang alamin kung ang
nasabing insidente ay coordinated dito sa himpilan o tanggapan ng
Barangay.
(Sgd) Virginia delos Reyes
Nagpapahayag
The blotter was apparently made after Marlon David informed Mrs.
[Virginia] Delos Reyes of the incident upon his release on 18 February

2000. Another witness, one Joel Navarro, claims having seen the
actual incident confirming the events as narrated to by
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and Marlon David.
Accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro and his common law wife,
respondent Lantion-Tom, submitted their separate Counter-Affidavits
jointly denying the charges and claiming that they were at the
Whistlestop Bar and Restaurant to talk to respondent Lantion-Toms
accountant Ms. Daisy Milan regarding the Mayors Permit, Business
Location Clearance issued by the Office of the Barangay Captain,
insurance documents, BIR Certificate of Registration of her business;
that they were with accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claros
brother, Roberto and a friend, James, with the two remaining outside
the restaurant; that respondent Lantion-Tom went to accompany Ms.
Milan, while accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro was left
inside; that after Ms. Milan left, respondent Lantion-Tom was
suddenly surrounded by men who introduced themselves as police
officers and were arresting them for being the source of shabu in a
drug deal; that all of them, accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de
Claro, Roberto and James were likewise arrested and continuously
questioned on their complicity in the drug deal; that they were taken
to Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila and subjected to further
investigation; that Roberto and James were released the following
day. Both respondents maintain that the allegations of the arresting
officers as to the circumstances on the alleged drug deal leading to
their arrest are unfounded and purely fabricated.
During the preliminary investigation proceedings on 21 March 2000,
the arresting officers manifested that they are going to submit reply-
affidavit on 29 March 2000. However, no such reply-affidavit was
submitted.[5]
The Office of the City Prosecutor pointed out that the arresting police
officers failed to refute accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes
counter-allegation that he was not arrested at Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City, but he was illegally arrested without warrant at
Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, as corroborated by Marlon David
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
and Joel Navarro (Navarro) in their respective sworn statements 86
(Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated March 14, 2000. The Office of the City
Prosecutor also observed that Lantion-Tom was merely in the
company of the other respondents without performing any overt act
showing her to be part of the illicit transaction and her drug test
revealed negative results. On the other hand, it considered the
conflicting claims of Emmanuel de Claro (i.e., that he was illegally
arrested and that the drug deal was a mere fabrication) and the
arresting officers (i.e., that Emmanuel de Claro was the seller/pusher
in the drug deal and the shabu was seized from his vehicle) would be
best ventilated during the trial on the merits.
In accordance with the foregoing resolution, the prosecution filed
with the RTC a motion with leave of court to admit amended
information.
In its Order[6] dated April 4, 2000, the RTC denied the prosecutions
motion. Contrary to the finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor,
the RTC adjudged that probable cause exists not only against
accused-appellant Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro, but accused-
appellant Rolando delos Reyes as well.
Accused-appellants were arraigned on May 23, 2000,[7] while
Emmanuel de Claro was arraigned on July 12, 2000.[8] All three
pleaded not guilty. After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of Police
Officer (PO) 3 Virgilio Santiago,[9] Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Eraldo
Lectura,[10] PO3 Angel Yumul,[11] and SPO1 Benjamin David,[12]
members of the Regional Mobile Group (RMG) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO)
who apprehended and/or investigated the case against accused-
appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom; and P/Insp.
Benjamin Cruto, Jr.[13] (Cruto), the forensic chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory.
PO3 Santiago was one of the police officers who arrested Emmanuel
de Claro and Lantion-Tom on February 17. 2000. He testified that at
around 10:30 a.m., their operation chief, Major Arnold Aguilar,

received information from a confidential informant regarding an
illegal drug deal that would take place between Botong and Mac-Mac
at the parking lot of Shangri-La Plaza in Madaluyong City. Botong
and Mac-Mac were identified during the investigation as accused-
appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Reyes, respectively.
As narrated by PO3 Santiago, a team to bust the illegal drug deal was
organized by Major Aguilar, composed of PO3 Santiago himself, SPO1
Lectura, and PO3 Yumul, along with PO3 Elmer Corbe, PO3 Marcelo
Arcancia, Jr., PO3 Randy Fuentes, PO3 Dennis Padpad, and PO3
Edwin dela Cruz. At around 1:00 p.m. of the same day, the police
team was dispatched, using four vehicles, to the location of the drug
deal and upon arrival, they waited for the confidential informant to
arrive. When the confidential informant arrived at around 3:30 p.m.,
he told the police team that the drug deal would possibly take place
between 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., and that the suspects would
utilize a red Toyota Corolla with plate number TRP-868 and a white
Toyota Corolla with plate number ULF-706. The police team then
positioned their cars strategically in such a way that they could see
the vehicles coming from St. Francis Street and EDSA.
PO3 Santiago further recounted that at around 10:00 p.m., the
suspected vehicles arrived, both stopping along the driveway of
Shangri-La Plaza. The drivers of the vehicles alighted and talked to
each other. The confidential informant recognized the driver of the
white Toyota car as Mac-Mac and the driver of the red Toyota car as
Botong. After a few minutes, Botong made a call on his cellular phone
and then proceeded inside Whistle Stop Restaurant, leaving Mac-Mac
behind. Inside the restaurant, Botong talked to another person, who
was identified during the investigation as Emmanuel de Claro alias
Cocoy. PO3 Santiago was about three to five meters away. Thereafter,
Botong and Cocoy went out of the restaurant and approached a car
parked right outside. The person at the back seat of the car, later on
identified as Lantion-Tom, handed to Cocoy a white plastic bag
containing a box. Cocoy gave the bag to Botong, who, in turn, handed
the same bag to Mac-Mac. In the meantime, Cocoy went back inside
the restaurant.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
PO3 Santiago related that their team leader sensed that the drug deal 87
had already been consummated, so the police team immediately
effected the arrest of the suspected drug dealers. PO3 Santiago and
PO3 Yumul arrested Cocoy and Lantion-Tom, while SPO1 Lectura
and the remaining police team members arrested Botong and Mac-
Mac. The plastic bag containing the box was seized from Mac-Mac.
The arrested suspects were brought to the police office for
investigation. The plastic bag, the box, and the 10 heat-sealed
sachets of white crystalline substance inside the box, were marked
for identification and physical examination at the police office.
According to PO3 Santiago, the physical examination of the contents
of each of the 10 heat-sealed sachets yielded positive test results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. PO3 Santiago then
signed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000 together
with the other arresting police officers, namely, SPO1 Lectura, PO3
Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, PO3 Fuentes, and PO3 Nelson Gene Javier.
On cross-examination, PO3 Santiago admitted that he did not
actually see what was inside the plastic bag and that he did not even
see Botong hand over such plastic bag to Mac-Mac. From PO3
Santiagos position, he could not conclude that the suspects were
committing an illegal drug deal as he had no prior knowledge of the
contents of the plastic bag, and that he and the other arresting
officers just relied on the information relayed by the confidential
informant. Also, the police team did not recover any money from the
arrested suspects. The confidential informant merely informed the
police the following morning that the money for the illegal drugs was
already deposited in the bank. The police, however, failed to make
further queries from the confidential informant about the bank.
SPO1 Lectura related that their office received a telephone call from a
confidential informant about an illegal drug deal involving Cocoy,
Botong, and Mac-Mac in the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City on February 17, 2000. SPO1 Lectura was
designated as the leader of the team that will bust said illegal drug
deal. After the briefing, SPO1 Lecturas team proceeded to the subject
location.

The confidential informant arrived and met SPO1 Lecturas team at
around 3:30 p.m. SPO1 Lectura conducted a short briefing then
positioned his team strategically within the vicinity. The confidential
informant told the police team that the drug deal would take place
between 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. At around 10:00 p.m., the
confidential informant identified the suspected drug dealers Botong
and Mac-Mac, who were arriving in two cars. After conversing for a
moment with Mac-Mac, Botong went inside Whistle Stop Restaurant
to talk to Cocoy. Botong and Cocoy then went outside the restaurant
and approached another car. Cocoy took a white plastic bag from the
car, which he handed to Botong. Thereafter, Cocoy went back inside
the restaurant, while [Botong] proceeded to his car near [Mac-Mac].
SPO1 Lectura was positioned at the other lane of the road,
approximately 10 to 15 meters away from the suspects. At that
moment, SPO1 Lectura sensed that the drug deal had been
consummated, so he decided to already arrest the suspects. SPO1
Lectura arrested Mac-Mac, from whom he seized the white plastic
bag. PO3 Yumul and PO3 Padpad arrested Botong; and PO3 Santiago
apprehended Cocoy. The police team brought the arrested suspects
to the police office for investigation.
SPO1 Lectura submitted to SPO1 David the white plastic bag
containing a box with 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets inside. In front
of SPO1 Lectura, SPO1 David marked the said articles with his
initials. After physical and chemical examinations revealed that the
contents of the sachets were shabu, SPO1 Lectura signed the Joint
Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000.
During cross-examination, SPO1 Lectura initially denied that Marlon
David was with Botong when the latter was arrested, but he later
admitted that the police also arrested Marlon David. Marlon David
was brought to Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, together with the other
arrested suspects, for verification, and was released the following
day. SPO1 Lectura also admitted that during the preliminary
investigation, he and PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, and PO3 Javier,
answered that it was PO3 Santiago who seized the shabu from Mac-
Mac; but SPO1 Lectura explained that what the investigating
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
prosecutor actually asked during preliminary investigation was who 88
saw where the shabu came from and that he signed the minutes of
the preliminary investigation without reading the same. SPO1
Lectura maintained that it was he who recovered the shabu from
Mac-Mac. Lastly, SPO1 Lectura acknowledged that his team heavily
relied on the information given by the confidential informant in
identifying the suspects in the illegal drug deal, who were eventually
arrested.
PO3 Yumul substantially narrated the same version of events as that
of PO3 Santiago and SPO1 Lectura. On February 17, 2000, he was
assigned at the Intelligence Investigation Division of the RMG based
in Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig. He was with SPO1 Lectura,
PO3 Santiago, PO3 Fuentes, PO3 Padpad, and several other police
officers at the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City,
conducting surveillance operation regarding the tipped-off illegal drug
deal. He was with SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Padpad in the car parked in
front of Shangri-La Plaza, while PO3 Fuentes, PO3 Dela Cruz, and
their confidential informant were in another car also parked along the
driveway of Shangri-La Plaza. PO3 Santiago, PO3 Arcancia, and PO3
Corbe were in the car stationed in front of Whistle Stop Restaurant.
PO3 Yumul could not recall where the other members of the team
were located.
At around 10:00 p.m., the suspects Botong and Mac-Mac arrived in
separate cars, stopping in front of Shangri-La Plaza. Botong and Mac-
Mac alighted from their cars and talked to each other. At that time,
PO3 Yumul was about five meters away from the two suspects.
Moments later, Botong called someone on his cellular phone, and
then went inside Whistle Stop Restaurant, leaving Mac-Mac behind.
PO3 Yumul followed Botong inside the restaurant and saw the latter
talking to Cocoy. PO3 Yumul though did not hear the conversation
between Botong and Cocoy. Afterwards, Botong and Cocoy went out
of the restaurant and approached a parked car. From his position
about three meters away, PO3 Yumul saw the passenger at the back
seat of the car, Lantion-Tom, opening the window and handing over a
white plastic bag with carton inside to Cocoy, who, in turn, gave the
plastic bag to Botong. Cocoy then returned inside the restaurant and

[Botong] went back to [Mac-Mac]. PO3 Yumul followed Cocoy inside
the restaurant. A few minutes later, PO3 Santiago also went inside
the restaurant informing PO3 Yumul that they would be arresting
Cocoy, and that Botong and Mac-Mac were already arrested outside
the restaurant. PO3 Santiago, assisted by PO3 Yumul, approached
Cocoy and arrested him. The police team proceeded to the police
office with all the arrested suspects for further investigation. PO3
Yumul, however, failed to join the other arresting officers in signing
the Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000.
SPO1 David was an investigator at the Intelligence and Investigation
Section of the RMG at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, assigned
to the instant case following the arrests of accused-appellants,
Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom. He also referred the case for
inquest to the Office of the City Prosecutor.
SPO1 David testified that on February 17, 2000, he received from
SPO1 Lectura a plastic bag containing a box with 10 heat-sealed
sachets of suspected shabu inside. SPO1 Lectura told SPO1 David
that the articles were seized from the suspected drug dealers. SPO1
David marked his initials BSD on the confiscated articles, then
prepared a request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination of
the specimens. SPO1 David disclosed that he prepared the Affidavit of
Arrest of the arresting officers.
The last witness for the prosecution was P/Insp. Cruto of the PNP
Crime Laboratory. P/Insp. Cruto was the forensic chemist who
conducted the physical, chemical, and confirmatory examinations of
the contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets submitted by the
RMG-NCRPO on February 18, 2000.
P/Insp. Cruto conducted the physical examination by weighing the
contents of each sachet, revealing that two sachets weighed 99.6
grams each; two sachets, 99.5 grams each; one sachet, 99.2 grams;
two sachets, 98.4 grams each; one sachet, 98.3 grams; one sachet,
94.9 grams; and one sachet, 93.5 grams. P/Insp. Cruto then took a
representative sample from each plastic sachet and proceeded with
his chemical and confirmatory examinations. The contents of the 10
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
heat-sealed plastic sachets all tested positive for methamphetamine 89
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu. P/Insp. Cruto recorded
the result of the examinations in his Physical Sciences Report No. D-
097-2000.[14]
The prosecution submitted the following object and documentary
evidence: the Joint Affidavit of Arrest[15] dated February 18, 2000
signed by SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia,
PO3 Dela Cruz and PO3 Javier; the Sketch prepared in open court by
SPO1 Lectura;[16] the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets recovered from
the possession of accused-appellants;[17] the PNP-RMG Request for
Laboratory Examination of the contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic
sachets;[18] the PNP Crime Laboratory Physical Sciences Report No.
D-097-2000 dated February 18, 2000 which revealed that the
contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets positively tested for
methamphetamine hydrochloride;[19] and the Letter (Referral of the
case to the Office of the City Prosecutor)[20] dated February 18,
2000. The RTC admitted all the aforementioned evidence for the
prosecution in its Order[21] dated March 1, 2001.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Marlon
David,[22] accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes,[23] Emmanuel de
Claro,[24] Roberto de Claro,[25] and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom.[26]
Accused-appellant Reyes did not testify.
Marlon David was 17 years old and a fourth year high school student
of Rizal High School in Pasig City. He recalled that on February 17,
2000, at about 1:00 p.m., he accompanied accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes, whom he referred to as Kuya Botong, to the
Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, to collect some money.
While accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David were
inside their car at the parking area of said market, another car
suddenly arrived, from which an armed male passenger alighted and
approached them. Four other armed men followed and poked their
guns at accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David.
The armed men, in civilian attire, were carrying an SM plastic
shopping bag and questioned accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes

if he knew the owner of said plastic bag. Accused-appellant Rolando
delos Reyes denied any knowledge about the plastic bag. Marlon
David was also asked and he answered that he knew nothing about
the plastic bag.
Thereafter, the armed men, who later introduced themselves as police
officers, pulled accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes from the
driver seat of the latters car, transferred him and Marlon David to the
back seat of said car, and blindfolded both of them. Two of the armed
men sat in the front seats of the car, while one of them sat at the
back, beside accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon
David. The armed men drove the car around (paikot-ikot). The armed
men then separated accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes from
Marlon David. They ordered Marlon David to alight from the car and
transfer to another vehicle. While in the other car, the armed men
boxed and mauled Marlon David to force him to admit to be the
source of the plastic bag. Each question was accompanied with one
punch. Marlon David remained blindfolded until they arrived at the
police camp in Bicutan, Taguig, where he again saw accused-
appellant Rolando delos Reyes. Marlon David was released the
following morning, leaving accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes
behind at the police camp. Marlon David went home and told Virginia
delos Reyes, the wife of accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes,
about the incident.
Marlon David, during his cross examination, denied knowing any
person with the name Mac-Mac. Marlon David additionally relayed
that he was told by accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes that the
latter was likewise mauled by the armed men.
Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes or Botong gave a similar
account of the incident that took place at 1:00 p.m. on February 17,
2000, while he and Marlon David were at the Buenas Market in
Cainta, Rizal. Their car was surrounded by four armed men. The
armed men poked their guns at him and Marlon David, shouting at
them to open the car doors. He lowered the car window and the
armed men opened the car door. The armed men forced him and
Marlon David to get down from the front seats of the car and to
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
transfer to the back seat, blindfolded them, and asked them who 90
were the owners of the SM plastic bag. After they left Buenas Market,
he noticed that they were just driving around. The car stopped only
when Marlon David was taken out and transferred to another car. It
was already late in the evening when the car finally stopped. He then
realized, after his blindfold had been removed, that he was at Camp
Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig.
Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes denied the accusation of the
police that he was selling or delivering shabu to anyone. He asserted
that he was not arrested at Whistle Stop restaurant in Mandaluyong
City, rather, he was illegally arrested at Buenas Market in Cainta,
Rizal. Accused-appellant Reyes or Mac-Mac was his friend who owed
him money. He and accused-appellant Reyes agreed to meet at
Buenas Market for the settlement of the latters loan, but the meeting
did not take place because the armed men arrived. He further
claimed that he only met Emmanuel de Claro at Camp Bagong Diwa
in Bicutan, Taguig. He never knew Emmanuel de Claro before that
time, and he found out the latters name only when they were already
detained at the Mandaluyong City Jail.
Emmanuel de Claro or Cocoy testified that on February 17, 2000 at
around 10:00 a.m., he was at the Department of Trade and Industry
in Buendia, Makati City, with his common-law wife Mary Jane
Lantion-Tom to follow up their application for business permit. At
around 1:00 p.m., they had lunch at Glorietta. Emmanuel de Claro
was no longer feeling well so he and Lantion-Tom passed by the
house of his brother Roberto de Claro to request the latter to drive for
them. James, Roberto de Claros friend, also went with them.
The vehicle driven by Emmanuel de Claro was a rented car because
his own car was in the auto shop. Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom,
Roberto de Claro, and James first went to Las Pias City to check on
Emmanuel de Claros car at the auto shop. From there, they
proceeded to Libertad in Pasay City and ate dinner at the Duty Free
Philippines. Afterwards, the group made their way to Mandaluyong
City where Lantion-Tom had a scheduled appointment with Daisy
Milan (Milan), her accountant. Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom

met Milan at Whistle Stop Restaurant located at Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City. Milan and Lantion-Tom discussed matters
pertaining to the business permit. Emmanuel de Claro stepped
outside the restaurant for a moment to smoke a cigarette, then,
returned inside to wait for the meeting between Lantion-Tom and
Milan to finish. After their meeting, Lantion-Tom walked Milan
outside the restaurant, while Emmanuel de Claro waited for Lantion-
Tom inside.
Three male persons suddenly approached Emmanuel de Claro and
introduced themselves as police officers. They warned Emmanuel de
Claro not to make a scene and just go with them peacefully.
Emmanuel de Claro obeyed. He was brought outside the restaurant
and was forced to get into a waiting car. For about three hours inside
the car, he was punched, handcuffed, blindfolded, and told to bow
down his head. He was likewise being forced to admit something
about the shabu, but he denied knowing anything about it. He heard
from the radio inside the car that the police officers were waiting for
another car. After three hours of traveling, the car finally stopped and
when his blindfold was removed, he learned that they were already at
Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig.
Emmanuel de Claro was placed in one room where he stayed for
almost an hour, until he was called into another room where he met
his co-accused for the first time. He later saw Lantion-Tom at the
office of one of the police officers. They were interrogated by the police
and being forced to admit that the drugs being shown to them
belonged to them. They asked for a lawyer but their plea was ignored.
The police told Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom that somebody
should be held responsible for the shabu so they were made to
choose whether both of them or only one of them would be charged.
Emmanuel de Claro was compelled to choose the latter option.
Roberto de Claro corroborated Emmanuel de Claros testimony. On
February 17, 2000, Roberto de Claro was at home playing video
games when his brother Emmanuel de Claro and the latters wife,
Lantion-Tom, arrived and requested him to drive their car because
Emmanuel was not feeling well. James, Roberto de Claros friend,
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
rode with them. They first went to Las Pias City to check on 91
Emmanuel de Claros car at the auto shop, then they proceeded to
Libertad, Pasay City, where they had dinner at Duty Free Philippines.
They next drove to Whistle Stop Restaurant at Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City to meet Ms. Milan. Only Emmanuel de Claro and
Lantion-Tom went inside the restaurant. Roberto de Claro and James
stayed in the car.
Two hours later, Roberto de Claro saw Lantion-Tom and Ms. Milan
walking towards them. As the two women were approaching, armed
men suddenly appeared, surrounded their car, and pointed guns at
them. Roberto de Claro got terrified. It was as if an armed robbery
(hold-up) was taking place. The armed men knocked at the car
window. Out of fear, Roberto de Claro opened the window, then the
door of the car. Roberto de Claro, James, and Lantion-Tom were
made to sit at the back seat of the car. Two of the armed men sat on
the front seats of the car, while one sat at the back with Roberto de
Claro, James, and Lantion-Tom. The armed men introduced
themselves as police officers.
Inside the car, the police officers mauled (siniko, sinuntok sa ulo)
Roberto de Claro, James, and Lantion-Tom, all the while ordering
them to keep their heads bowed down. The police officers drove the
car for two hours, stopping at a gas station for about five minutes. At
this moment, Roberto de Claro was able to raise his head but was
immediately told to bow down his head again. Roberto de Claro also
heard from the police officers radio that they were still waiting for
somebody. They travelled again for quite a long time and stopped in a
dark place. The police officers took Roberto de Claros wallet
containing P7,000.00 cash. Early in the following morning, they
arrived at the police station where Roberto de Claro saw his brother
Emmanuel de Claro once more. They stayed in one room until
Roberto de Claro and James were released by the police the next day.
When Lantion-Tom was called to testify, the prosecution and the
defense agreed to consider her Counter Affidavit dated March 23,
2000 and Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2000 as her direct
examination.

On cross-examination, Lantion-Tom confirmed that she was among
those arrested on February 17, 2000 at the vicinity of Shangri-La
Plaza in Mandaluyong City for her alleged involvement in an illegal
drug deal. At the time of the arrest, she was with Emmanuel de
Claro, Roberto de Claro, and James. She was also brought to Camp
Bagong Diwa in Taguig where she was interrogated without a lawyer.
She was shown a box containing shabu which she had never seen
before. Lantion-Tom insisted that she was in Mandaluyong City to
meet her accountant, Milan, regarding her application for a business
permit. Lantion-Tom pointed out that the charge against her was
eventually dismissed.
The documentary evidence for the defense consisted of Emmanuel de
Claros Counter Affidavit dated March 23, 2000,[27] Lantion-Toms
Counter Affidavit dated March 23, 2000,[28] Emmanuel de Claro and
Lantion-Toms Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2000,[29]
Roberto de Claros Witness Affidavit dated March 29, 2000,[30]
Marlon Davids Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,[31]
Virginia delos Reyes Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14,
2000,[32] Navarros Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,[33]
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes Sinumpaang Kontra Salaysay
dated March 14, 2000,[34] and a Barangay Blotter dated February
19, 2000 by Virginia delos Reyes.[35] The RTC admitted all these
documentary evidence for the defense in its Order[36] dated
September 13, 2002.
In its Decision dated September 23, 2003, the RTC found accused-
appellants and Emmanuel de Claro guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged, and decreed:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having successfully proved the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt for unlawfully
possessing/selling, delivering, transporting and distributing
methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a
regulated drug, without lawful authority in violation of Sections 15
and 16 of Article III in relation to Section 21 of Article IV of R.A. No.
6425, as amended, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 each and the 92
costs of suit.
Further, all the methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) taken and
seized from the accused during the aforesaid operation are forfeited
and confiscated in favor of the government shall be turned over to the
PDEA pursuant to law for proper disposal without delay.[37]
Emmanuel de Claro filed his notice of appeal[38] on October 23,
2003. Accused-appellants Roberto delos Reyes and Reyes each filed
his notice of appeal[39] on October 29, 2003 and December 30, 2003,
respectively.
Emmanuel de Claro, however, subsequently moved to withdraw his
notice of appeal,[40] instead, filing before the RTC an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and to Re-Open Proceedings Pursuant [to]
Section 24, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court[41] on October 30, 2003,
and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration[42] on November 3,
2003. Emmanuel de Claro asked the RTC to review its judgment of
conviction based on the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE ACCUSED DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP IS A MERE
ALIBI AND HAS THUS ERRED IN ADOPTING THE THEORY OF THE
PROSECUTION THAT ALL THE THREE (3) ACCUSED WERE
PICKED-UP AT THE VICINITY OF EDSA SHANGRI-LA PLAZA HOTEL.
II. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS LAWFUL SINCE
THE ACCUSED WERE CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE THREE (3) ACCUSED
IN THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF UNLAWFUL
SALE, DELIVERY AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE PROHIBITED
DRUG.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
BOTH ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION ON THE BASIS MAINLY
OF A DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF LACK OF IMPROPER MOTIVE
ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS.
V. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
ITS FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT ACCUSED
EMMANUEL DE CLARO WAS NOT AFFORDED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.[43]
Emmanuel de Claro principally contended that the accusation that
he was engaging in an illegal drug deal, levied against him by
prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul
was suspicious, if not incredible. Emmanuel de Claro pointed out
that although these police officers testified that Lantion-Tom, from
the car, handed to him the plastic bag containing the box with
sachets of shabu, the prosecution still dropped the criminal charges
against Lantion-Tom. Emmanuel de Claro also strongly argued that
the prosecution failed to contradict his well-supported alibi that he,
his wife, and his brother went to Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong
City to meet his wifes accountant, so they could attend to several
documents pertaining to a business permit. Emmanuel de Claro
further insisted that the RTC should have highly regarded accused-
appellant Rolando delos Reyes testimony which directly contradicted
the police officers statements.
In its Order[44] dated November 11, 2003, the RTC granted
Emmanuel de Claros motion to withdraw his notice of appeal and
required the prosecution to comment to his motions for
reconsideration.
The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition[45] on December 19,
2003, objecting to Emmanuel de Claros motions for reconsideration
and maintaining that its police-witnesses categorical, consistent, and
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
straight-forward testimonies were sufficient to convict Emmanuel de 93
Claro.
In a complete turnabout from its previous findings and conclusion,
the RTC, in its Order[46] dated January 12, 2004, acquitted
Emmanuel de Claro of the crime charged. The RTC explicitly
admitted that it erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3
Yumul, and in entirely rejecting the alibi of the defense. Thus, the
RTC disposed:
WHEREFORE, the motion of accused-movant Emmanuel De Claro is
hereby GRANTED and a new one entered, ACQUITTING him of the
crime charged. Consequently, his immediate release from detention is
hereby ordered unless he is detained for other cause or causes.[47]
Nevertheless, in view of the pending notices of appeal of accused-
appellants, the RTC forwarded the complete records of the case to us
on March 29, 2004, and we gave due course to the said appeals in
our Resolution[48] dated June 21, 2004.
Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes filed his Appellants Brief[49]
on September 15, 2004, while accused-appellant Reyes filed his
Appellants Brief[50] on November 26, 2004. Pursuant to our
pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[51] we transferred the case to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.[52]
Accordingly, the plaintiff-appellee, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed before the appellate court its
Consolidated Brief[53] on January 21, 2005.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 12, 2006, sustained
the conviction of accused-appellants, and merely modified the penalty
imposed upon them, from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua.
According to the appellate court, the police officers testimonies
deserve credence than accused-appellants defenses of denial and
alibi, there being no evidence to rebut the presumption that the
police officers regularly performed their official duties.

The case was then elevated to us for final review. In our
Resolution[54] dated January 31, 2007, we required the parties to
submit their supplemental briefs. Plaintiff-appellee and accused-
appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Reyes filed their
manifestations[55] on March 14, 2007, April 10, 2007, and April 13,
2007, respectively, opting to stand by the briefs they had already filed
before the Court of Appeals.
In his Appellants Brief, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes
assigned the following errors of the RTC:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO RESOLVE
THE CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONY AS TO THE PLACE OF THE
ARREST IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING [THE]
TESTIMONIES OF PO3 VIRGILIO SANTIAGO CREDIBLE.
III. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE
THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY
CATEGORIZE[D] AS WEAK WHEN THE COURT A QUO GRANTED
BAIL TO THE ACCUSED.[56]
Accused-appellant Reyes cited these errors in his Appellants Brief:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE
WARRANTLESS ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAYMUNDO
REYES AS UNLAWFUL.
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE WARRANTLESS
ARREST WAS VALID, ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAYMUNDO REYES
CANNOT BE CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425.[57]
Accused-appellants essentially assert that the charge of illegal drug
deal lodged against them by the police is a complete fabrication and
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
frame-up. Accused-appellants called attention to the material 94
inconsistencies in the prosecutions evidence. PO3 Santiago testified
during direct examination that accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes handed the plastic bag with box inside to accused-appellant
Reyes, but he admitted during cross-examination that he did not see
such transfer. The prosecution was unable to present any evidence to
prove the source of the plastic bag containing the box with sachets of
shabu, and the money paid as consideration for the illegal drugs. The
prosecution likewise failed to rebut accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes straightforward, coherent, and truthful narration, corroborated
by Marlon David, that he was illegally arrested at Buenas Market in
Cainta, Rizal, and not at Shangri-la Plaza in Mandaluyong City.
Accused-appellants additionally argued that even the prosecutions
version of the arrests of the suspects and seizure of the shabu shows
that the same were effected in violation of accused-appellants
fundamental rights. The arrests were executed without any warrant
or any of the exceptional circumstances to justify a warrantless
arrest. The suspects, including accused-appellants, were arrested
without warrants based on a mere tip from a confidential informant
and not because of any apparent criminal activity. A tip does not
constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search and
seizure incidental thereto. Thus, the shabu allegedly seized from
accused-appellants is inadmissible in evidence.
Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, stand by the convictions of
accused-appellants, maintaining that:
I. THE POSITIVE AND CREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES HAVE ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF
APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE WARRANTLESS ARREST CONDUCTED BY THE
POLICE IS VALID SINCE IT FALLS SQUARELY UNDER RULE 113,
SECTION 5(A) OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.

III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION
MORE THAN SUFFICE TO CONVICT APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.
IV. CONSPIRACY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE
OFFENSE.
V. MERE DENIAL AND HULIDAP, WITHOUT MORE,
CANNOT EXCULPATE APPELLANTS FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY.
VI. THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY UNDER SECTION 3(M) OF
RULE 131 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT HAD NOT BEEN
OVERCOME BY DEFENSE EVIDENCE.
VII. CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE REGARDING THE
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES COMMANDS GREAT RESPECT AND
CONSIDERATION.[58]
Plaintiff-appellee avers that the inconsistencies in the police officers
statements, as pointed out by accused-appellants, are trivial and do
not affect the weight of their testimonies; while accused-appellants
defenses of denial and frame-up could be easily concocted and, thus,
should be looked upon with disfavor. Moreover, there is no need for
proof of consideration for the illegal drug deal, since consideration is
not an element of the crime charged.
Plaintiff-appellee avows that accused-appellants were caught while in
the commission of a crime or in flagrante delicto, which justifies their
warrantless arrests under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. Accused-appellants were arrested while in possession and in
the act of distributing, without legal authority, a total of 980.9 grams
of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, on the night of
February 17, 2000 at the parking area of Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City. In addition, in the absence of satisfactory proof to
the contrary, the warrantless arrests executed by the police officers
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
enjoy the presumption that official duty has been regularly 95
performed.
We grant the appeal and reverse the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals.
At the outset, we observe that the prosecutors and the RTC both
displayed uncertainty as to the facts surrounding accused-appellants
arrest on the night of February 17, 2000.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, after
preliminary investigation and reinvestigation, recommended that the
RTC drop accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Lantion-Tom
from the criminal charge. The RTC only partially adopted the
recommendations of the Office of the City Prosecutor: dropping the
criminal charge against Lantion-Tom, but still finding probable cause
against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes.[59]
Even after trial, the RTC wavered in its findings and conclusion. In its
Decision[60] dated September 23, 2003, the RTC initially convicted
accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro, but acting on
Emmanuel de Claros motions for reconsideration, said trial court, in
its Order[61] dated January 12, 2004, totally reversed itself and
acquitted Emmanuel de Claro. This time, the RTC gave more weight
to the evidence presented by the defense.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, refused to consider the subsequent
acquittal of Emmanuel de Claro by the RTC. Instead, the appellate
court upheld the earlier ruling of the RTC giving absolute credence to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and convicted accused-
appellants of the crime charged. Despite the varying judgments of the
RTC, the Court of Appeals speciously ratiocinated in its assailed
decision that when the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the
trial courts assessment is entitled to great weight.[62]
Guided by the settled rule that where the inculpatory facts admit of
several interpretations, one consistent with accused's innocence and
another with his guilt, the evidence thus adduced fail[ed] to meet the
test of moral certainty,[63] we find that the findings and conclusion of
the RTC in its subsequent Order[64] dated January 12, 2004 (in

which it acquitted Emmanuel de Claro) is more in keeping with the
evidence on record in this case. It bears to stress that the very same
evidence were presented against Emmanuel de Claro and accused-
appellants; if the evidence is insufficient to convict the former, then it
is also insufficient to convict the latter.
Indeed, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3
Santiago, and PO3 Yumul are unreliable and suspiciously fabricated.
In its Order dated January 12, 2004, the RTC correctly observed that:
Viewed vis--vis the peculiar factual milieu of this case, not to say the
insistence by the accused-movant [Emmanuel de Claro] that a
reevaluation or reassessment of the evidence by the prosecution be
considered, this court has decided to revisit the evidence put forward
by the prosecution through the crucible of a severe testing by taking
a more than casual consideration of every circumstance of the case.
It is noted that the testimony given by the witnesses for the
prosecution and that of the defense are diametrically opposed to each
other. While this court had already made its conclusion that the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO3 Santiago, SPO1 Lectura
and PO3 Yumul are given full faith and credit and reject the frame-up
and alibi story of the accused-movant [Emmanuel de Claro],
nonetheless, upon reassessment of the same it appears that the court
erred.
In sum, the conveniently dovetailing accounts of the prosecution
eyewitnesses, all of them police officers, with regard to the material
facts of how the crime was allegedly committed engenders doubt as to
their credibility. Firstly, the court noted that these police officers gave
identical testimonies of the events that happened from the moment
they arrived at 2 oclock in the afternoon until the arrest of the
accused at 10:30 oclock in the evening at the EDSA Shangri-La
premises. This uniform account given by these witnesses cannot but
generate the suspicion that the material circumstances testified to by
them were integral parts of a well thought-out and prefabricated
story. Because of the close camaraderie of these witnesses who
belong to the same police force it is not difficult for them to make the
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
same story. Furthermore, their testimonies are so general which 96
shows only too clearly that they testified uniformly only as to material
facts but have not given the particulars and the details having
relation with the principal facts. While they testified that they were at
Shangri-La from 2 in the afternoon to 10 in the evening, they were
not able to tell the court how their group positioned strategically at
the premises without being noticed by their target. They could not
also gave (sic) an explanation how their confidential informant was
able to obtain information regarding the drug deal that was supposed
to take place on that date involving several personalities. Except for
their bare allegation that they have that information regarding the
drug deal they were not able to present any proof of such report, say,
entry in their logbook of such confidential report and a spot report.
Even their operation is not recorded as no documentary evidence was
presented. Worth remembering in this regard is People v. Alviar, 59
SCRA 136, where it is said that: . . . [i]t often happens with fabricated
stories that minute particulars have not been thought of. It has also
been said that an honest witness, who has sufficient memory to state
one fact, and that fact a material one, cannot be safely relied upon as
such weakness of memory not only leaves the case incomplete, but
throws doubt upon the accuracy of the statements made. Such a
witness may be honest, but his testimony is not reliable.[65]
(Emphasis supplied.)
There are also material inconsistencies between the police-witnesses
sworn statements following accused-appellants arrest and their
testimonies before the RTC. The police officers attested in their Joint
Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000 that upon sensing
suspicious transactions being undertaken thereat, team leader thru
hand signaled immediately accosted the suspects and introduced
themselves as Police Officers and after that, subject persons
deliberately admitted that they have in their possession illegal drugs
and thereafter showed the same to the herein undersigned arresting
officers thus they were placed under arrest.[66] Yet, during trial
before the RTC, the police officers uniformly testified that they
brought accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom to

the police office after arresting the four suspects in flagrante delicto,
without mention at all of the suspects purported admission.
We also consider the fact that Lantion-Tom was never charged with
any criminal involvement even when, according to the prosecutions
version of events, she was the first person to deliver the shabu. This
seriously dents the prosecutions sequence of events on the night of
February 17, 2000.
In contrast, accused-appellants presented clear and convincing
evidence in support of their defenses, which the prosecution failed to
rebut. Specifically, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes testified
that he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market,
Cainta, Rizal, not at Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City; and that
he and Marlon David were coerced to incriminate themselves for
possession of shabu. His claims were corroborated by Marlon Davids
testimony and Navarros Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14,
2000. Also, Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom, and Roberto de Claro
consistently testified that they were at Shangri-La Plaza to meet
Milan, Lantion-Toms accountant, regarding documents for a
business permit (photocopies of the said documents were presented
during trial); and that they were illegally arrested without warrant
and forced to admit criminal liability for possession of shabu. These
pieces of evidence are overwhelmingly adequate to overthrow the
presumption of regularity in the performance by the arresting police
officers of their official duties and raise reasonable doubt in accused-
appellants favor.
Furthermore, even assuming that the prosecutions version of the
events that took place on the night of February 17, 2000 were true, it
still failed to establish probable cause to justify the in flagrante
delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of accused-
appellants persons, incidental to their arrests, resulting in the
seizure of the shabu in accused-appellants possession.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 97
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementary to the above provision is the exclusionary rule
enshrined in Section 3, paragraph 2 of Article III of the Constitution,
which solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, thus:
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Emphases
supplied.)
The foregoing constitutional proscription is not without exceptions.
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1)
search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence
in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk
situations.[67]
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance,
the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can
be made the process cannot be reversed. As a rule, an arrest is

considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The
Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.
Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest
a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped
prisoners).[68]
In People v. Molina,[69] we cited several cases involving in flagrante
delicto arrests preceding the search and seizure that were held illegal,
to wit:
In People v. Chua Ho San, the Court held that in cases of in flagrante
delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have
personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to,
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative
or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria,
probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense,
is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable
information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting 98
officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin, it
was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his
arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do
so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like
any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel.
It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension."
Likewise, in People v. Mengote, the Court did not consider "eyes . . .
darting from side to side . . . [while] holding . . . [one's] abdomen," in
a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and
circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of
probable cause. According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an
offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or
was at least being attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence." So
also, in People v. Encinada, the Court ruled that no probable cause is
gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic
baby chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, the trial court concluded
that petitioner was attempting to commit a crime as he was
"'standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with
his eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic)
nearer (sic) to them."' In declaring the warrantless arrest therein
illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the
part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part
of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was
being committed or was going to be committed.

It went on to state that
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which
could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that
his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation which leaves us
incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near
petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk.
Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner
and were not creating any commotion or trouble . . .
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe
that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to
Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside
the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the
distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that
petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to
Yu.
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[70] (Emphases
supplied.)
Similar to the above-cited cases in Molina, there is a dearth of
evidence in this case to justify the in flagrante delicto arrests of
accused-appellants and search of their persons incidental to the
arrests.
A close examination of the testimonies of SPO1 Lectura, PO3
Santiago, and PO3 Yumul reveal that they simply relied on the
information provided by their confidential informant that an illegal
drug deal was to take place on the night of February 17, 2000 at
Shangri-la Plaza in Mandaluyong City. Without any other
independent information, and by simply seeing the suspects pass
from one to another a white plastic bag with a box or carton inside,
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
the police team was already able to conclude that the box contained 99
shabu and sensed that an illegal drug deal took place.
SPO1 Lectura testified on direct examination as follows:
Q: What was the information gathered by your informant?
A: That there will be a drug deal between 6 to 11 in the evening, sir.
Q: You were there as early as 2:00 p.m.?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do after briefing?
A: We positioned ourselves strategically, we waited for the arrival of
the subject, sir.
xxxx
Q: When you are already positioned in your respective area at the
vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza, what happened next, if any?
A: At around 10:00 p.m. two (2) cars arrived and they were identified
by the informant that they were the personalities involved.
xxxx
Q: When this two (2) cars arrive what happened next?
A: They talked for a while after few minutes Botong entered, sir.
xxxx
Q: Do you know this Botong prior this incident?
A: No, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that he is Botong?
A: Through our informant, sir.
Q: When Botong went to the Whistle Stop, what happened next?
A: According to my other companion he talked to another person
then after that they went out, sir.
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

A: I arrested Mac-Mac, sir. 100

xxxx
xxxx
Q: How long did Botong stay in Whistle Stop Restaurant?
A: One (1) minute, sir. Q: Who of your companion apprehended Botong or Rolando delos
Reyes?
xxxx A: Botong was arrested by Yumul and Padpad, sir.

Q: When you say they who is the companion? Q: How about De Claro?
A: Cocoy, sir. A: Arrested by Santiago, sir.

xxxx xxxx

Q: What happened next after they went out to the car? Q: Then what did you do after apprehending these people?
A: They went to another car and Cocoy got something from his car A: We brought them to our office for investigation, sir.[71] (Emphases
and handed to Botong, sir. supplied.)

xxxx
PO3 Santiagos testimony also did not offer much justification for the
Q: Did you see that something that was taken inside that car? warrantless arrest of accused-appellants and search of their persons:
A: White plastic bag, sir. Q: When these two (2) persons went out of the restaurant and went to
the place where blue Mazda car was parked, what happened next?
Q: What happened after that? A: The person inside the Mazda car, from the backseat, handed a
A: Cocoy went inside the Whistle Stop, sir. white plastic bag with a box inside to Emmanuel de Claro [Cocoy],
sir. Then, Emmanuel de Claro [Cocoy] gave it to Rolando Delos Reyes
Q: With the bag? [Botong], sir.
A: No, it was left with Botong, sir.
Q: You mentioned about somebody handling box to De Claro [Cocoy]
Q: What happened next after that? from inside that Mazda car?
A: Botong proceeded to his car near Mac-Mac, sir. A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened next after that? Q: Who was this somebody handling that box?
A: We already sensed that drug deal has transpired, sir. We accosted A: It was Mary Jane Lantion, sir.
him.
xxxx
xxxx
Q: When you see De Claro [Cocoy] handling the box to Botong, what
Q: What did you do? happened after that?

A: Botong proceeded to the place of Mac-Mac and Emmanuel De
Claro [Cocoy] returned back inside the said restaurant, sir.
Q: Where was Mac-Mac then at that time?
A: Near their car, sir. He was waiting for Botong.
Q: After that what happened next?
A: When Botong returned to Mac-Mac, he gave white plastic bag with
box inside to Mac-Mac, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: Our team leader, sensing that the drug deal have been
consummated, we apprehended them, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that there was a drug deal at that
particular place and time?
A: Because of the information given to us by the informant, sir.
Q: Are you aware of the contents of that box at that time?
A: No, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that there was a consummation of a
drug deal?
A: Because of the information given to us by the informant that there
will be a drug-deal, sir.
xxxx
Q: Then what did you do?
A: We brought them to our office for proper investigation, sir.
Q: At your office, what else did you do?
A: We confiscated the evidence, marked them and a request for
laboratory examination was made and other pertaining papers
regarding the arrest of the accused.
Q: You mentioned about the confiscated evidence. What is that
confiscated evidence that you are saying?
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
A: Ten (10) pieces of white plastic transparent plastic bag with white 101
crystalline substance suspected to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride, sir.
Q: How were these evidences confiscated by your group?
A: They were confiscated from Mac-Mac, sir.
Q: In what condition were they at that time that they were
confiscated from Mac-Mac?
A: They were placed inside the box, sir.[72] (Emphases supplied.)
PO3 Yumuls narration of events was not any different from those of
SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Santiago:
Q: When did you meet the confidential informant?
A: At the vicinity of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza, sir.
Q: And what was the information that was relayed to you by the
confidential informant?
A: The identities of the persons, sir.
Q: What did he particularly tells you in that particular time you meet
the confidential informant at the vicinity of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza?
A: That there will be a drug-deal and the people involved will arrived
together with their car, sir.
xxxx
Q: And what happened after the confidential informant relayed to you
the information?
A: After we were brief by the confidential informant, we strategically
positioned ourselves in the place where the drug-deal will occur, sir.
xxxx

Q: So what did you do after positioning yourselves in that place of
EDSA Shangri-La Plaza and Whistle Stop restaurant, what happened
next after that?
A: At around 10:00, one car arrived, a white Toyota corolla . . .
Q: 10:00 what? In the morning or in the evening?
A: In the evening, sir, of February 17, 2000, sir.
Q: And you stated that two vehicles arrived?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: So what happened when this vehicle arrived?
A: The red Toyota corolla follows, sir.
xxxx
Q: Then what happened? What did you do, if any?
A: Our confidential informant told us that, that is our subject, sir.
xxxx
Q: What happened next, if any, were they alighted from the car?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Then, what happened next, if any?
A: They talked after they alighted from their car, sir.
Q: When you say nag-usap sila to whom are you referring?
A: To Mac-Mac and Botong, sir.
xxxx
Q: What happened next after you see them talking to each other?
A: When they talk Mac-Mac called through cellphone, sir.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
102
Q: By the way, did you hear the conversation of this two?
A: No, sir.
xxxx
Q: How about the one calling over the cellphone, did you hear also
what was the subject of their conversation?
A: No, sir.
Q: So what happened next after seeing them having a conversation
with each other?
A: Botong immediately walked and proceeding to the Whistle Stop,
sir.
xxxx
Q: Then what happened when Botong went to Whistle Stop?
A: He talked to somebody inside, sir.
xxxx
Q: And did you hear what was the subject of their conversation?
A: No, sir.
Q: Then what happened next when Botong talked to somebody inside
the Whistle Stop?
A: The companion stood up and they went outside and both of them
went to the side of Whistle Stop in front of the blue car, sir.
xxxx
Q: What did you do then?
A: Somebody opened the window in back of the blue car, sir.
Q: And then what happened next, if any?
A: A white plastic bag was handed to him with carton inside, sir.
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

xxxx 103
Q: So what did you do when PO3 Santiago told you that?
Q: And who received that item or article from the car? A: PO3 Santiago approached Cocoy and I am just assisting him, PO3
A: Cocoy, sir. Santiago to avoid commotion, sir.

xxxx Q: Then what did you do next after that?

A: We were able to get Cocoy and we went outside, sir.
Q: Were you able to know the person inside that car and who handed
to Cocoy the white plastic bag? Q: And then what did you do, if any?
A: Yes, sir. A: After arresting them we boarded to the car and we went to the
office, sir.[73] (Emphases supplied.)
Q: Who was that person?
A: Mary Jane Lantion, sir.
Evident from the foregoing excerpts that the police officers arrested
xxxx accused-appellants and searched the latters persons without a
warrant after seeing Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro
Q: And when this white plastic bag with carton placed inside handed momentarily conversing in the restaurant, and witnessing the white
to Cocoy, what did you do? plastic bag with a box or carton inside being passed from Lantion-
A: It was first handed by Cocoy to Botong, the plastic bag and then Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to accused-appellant Rolando delos
they walked in different direction, Cocoy went back inside the Whistle Reyes, and finally, to accused-appellant Reyes. These circumstances,
Stop and then Botong went back to Mac-Mac, sir. however, hardly constitute overt acts indicative of a felonious
enterprise. SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no
xxxx prior knowledge of the suspects identities, and they completely relied
on their confidential informant to actually identify the suspects. None
Q: And then what happened next after that? of the police officers actually saw what was inside that box. There is
A: I followed Cocoy inside the Whistle Stop, sir. also no evidence that the confidential informant himself knew that
the box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to confirm that
xxxx the arrested suspects actually knew that the box or carton inside the
white plastic bag, seized from their possession, contained shabu. The
Q: So what did you do then? police officers were unable to establish a cogent fact or circumstance
A: I observed him inside but after a few minutes PO3 Virgilio Santiago that would have reasonably invited their attention, as officers of the
went inside and told me that we will going to get them, sir. law, to suspect that accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and
Lantion-Tom has just committed, is actually committing, or is
Q: Why are you going to get them? attempting to commit a crime, particularly, an illegal drug deal.
A: Because the two were already arrested outside the Whistle Stop,
Mac-Mac and Botong, sir. Finally, from their own account of the events, the police officers had
compromised the integrity of the shabu purportedly seized from
xxxx accused-appellants.

In People v. Sy Chua,[74] we questioned whether the shabu seized
from the accused was the same one presented at the trial because of
the failure of the police to mark the drugs at the place where it was
taken, to wit:
Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized
from accused-appellant were the very same items presented at the
trial of this case. The record shows that the initial field test where the
items seized were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP
headquarters of Angeles City. The items were therefore not marked at
the place where they were taken. In People v. Casimiro, we struck
down with disbelief the reliability of the identity of the confiscated
items since they were not marked at the place where they were
seized, thus:
The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as
marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime, but
only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt as to
whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same
brick of marijuana marked by the policemen in their headquarters
and given by them to the crime laboratory.[75] (Emphases supplied.)
In the instant case, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul
uniformly testified before the RTC that they brought the arrested
suspects to the police office for investigation. SPO1 Lectura and PO3
Santiago were vague as to how they ascertained as shabu the
contents of the box inside the white plastic bag, immediately after
seizing the same from accused-appellant Reyes and before proceeding
to the police office; while PO3 Yumul explicitly testified on cross-
examination[76] that he saw the shabu for the first time at the police
office. At any rate, all three police officers recounted that the shabu
was marked by SPO1 Benjamin David only at the police office.
Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of
accused-appellants, the search of accused-appellants persons
incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu from
accused-appellants possession, are also considered unlawful and,
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
thus, the seized shabu is excluded in evidence as fruit of a poisonous 104
tree. Without the corpus delicti for the crime charged, then the
acquittal of accused-appellants is inevitable.
As we aptly held in People v. Sy Chua[77]:
All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team
cannot simply validate, much more cure, the illegality of the arrest
and consequent warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither can
the presumption of regularity of performance of function be invoked
by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an
encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In People v.
Nubla, we clearly stated that:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellant's conviction
because, first, the presumption is precisely just that a mere
presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, . . . [it]
cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxx
The government's drive against illegal drugs needs the support of
every citizen. But it should not undermine the fundamental rights of
every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional
guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches
and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous
police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the constitution
and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds,
otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because
they have blundered. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the
law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence.[78]
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

105
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01733 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Raymundo
Reyes are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt and they
are ORDERED forthwith released from custody, unless they are being
lawfully held for another crime.

G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014
RIZALDY SANCHEZ Y CAJILI, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to reverse and
set aside the July 25, 2012 Decision1 and the November 20, 2012
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742
filed by petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili (Sanchez), affirming the
April 21, 2005 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite,
Branch 20 (RTC), which convicted him for Violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. The dispositive portion of
the RTC decision reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting
accused Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of Section 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine
of Php300,000.00.
SO ORDERED.4
Sanchez was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, in the Information,5 dated March 20, 2003, filed before
the RTC and docketed as Criminal Case No. 10745-03. The
accusatory portion of the Information indicting Sanchez
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 19th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of
Imus, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody, 0.1017 gram
of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
When arraigned, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 106
During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on
the existence and due execution of the following pieces of evidence: 1]
the request for laboratory examination; 2] certification issued by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); 3] Dangerous Drugs Report;
and 4] transparent plastic sachet containing small transparent
plastic sachet of white crystalline substance.6 Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecutions version of the events as summarized by the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Comment7 on the petition is as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Around 2:50 pm of March 19, 2003, acting on the information that
Jacinta Marciano, aka Intang, was selling drugs to tricycle drivers,
SPO1 Elmer Amposta, together with CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU
Jose Tagle, Jr., and CSU Samuel Monzon, was dispatched to
Barangay Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite to conduct an operation.
While at the place, the group waited for a tricycle going to, and
coming from, the house of Jacinta. After a few minutes, they spotted
a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The
group chased the tricycle. After catching up with it, they requested
Rizaldy to alight. It was then that they noticed Rizaldy holding a
match box.
SPO1 Amposta asked Rizaldy if he could see the contents of the
match box. Rizaldy agreed. While examining it, SPO1 Amposta found
a small transparent plastic sachet which contained a white
crystalline substance. Suspecting that the substance was a regulated
drug, the group accosted Rizaldy and the tricycle driver. The group
brought the two to the police station.
On March 20, 2003, Salud M. Rosales, a forensic chemist from the
NBI, submitted a Certification which
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This certifies that on the above date at 9:25 a.m. one PO1 Edgardo
Nario of Imus, Mun. PS, PNP, Imus, Cavite submitted to this office for
laboratory examinations the following specimen/s to wit:
White crystalline substance contained in a small plastic sachet,
marked RSC, placed in a plastic pack, marked Mar. 19, 2003. (net On April 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision11 finding that
wt. = 0.1017 gm)
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen/s gave
POSITIVE RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE.
Said specimen/s were allegedly confiscated from RIZALDY SANCHEZ
y CAJILI and DARWIN REYES y VILLARENTE.
Official report follows:
This certification was issued upon request for purpose of filing the
case.8
Version of the Defense
In the present petition,9 Sanchez denied the accusation against him
and presented a different version of the events that transpired in the
afternoon of March 19, 2003, to substantiate his claim of
innocence:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 24 February 2005, the accused Rizaldy Sanchez took the witness
stand. He testified that on the date and time in question, he, together
with a certain Darwin Reyes, were on their way home from Brgy.
Alapan, Imus, Cavite, where they transported a passenger, when
their way was blocked by four (4) armed men riding an owner-type
jeepney. Without a word, the four men frisked him and Darwin. He
protested and asked what offense did they commit. The arresting
officers told him that they had just bought drugs from Alapan. He
reasoned out that he merely transported a passenger there but the
policemen still accosted him and he was brought to the Imus Police
Station where he was further investigated. The police officer,
however, let Darwin Reyes go. On cross-examination, the accused
admitted that it was the first time that he saw the police officers at
the time he was arrested. He also disclosed that he was previously
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
charged with the same offense before Branch 90 of this court which 107
was already dismissed, and that the police officers who testified in
the said case are not the same as those involved in this case.10
The Ruling of the RTC
Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto , in actual possession of
shabu. It stated that the police operatives had reasonable ground to
believe that Sanchez was in possession of the said dangerous drug
and such suspicion was confirmed when the match box Sanchez was
carrying was found to contain shabu. The RTC lent credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness, SPO1 Elmer Amposta (SPO1
Amposta) because there was no showing that he had been impelled
by any ill motive to falsely testify against Sanchez. The dispositive
portion of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting
accused Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of Section 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine
of Php300,000.00.
SO ORDERED.12
Unfazed, Sanchez appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before
the CA. He faulted the RTC for giving undue weight on the testimony
of SPO1 Amposta anchored merely on the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duty of the said arresting officer. He insisted
that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify the findings of
facts and conclusions reached by the RTC and, thus, upheld the
conviction of the accused for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165. According to the CA, there was probable cause for the
police officers to believe that Sanchez was then and there committing
a crime considering that he was seen leaving the residence of a
notorious drug dealer where, according to a tip they received, illegal
drug activities were being perpetrated. It concluded that the

confiscation by the police operative of the subject narcotic from
Sanchez was pursuant to a valid search. The CA then went on to
write that non-compliance by the police officers on the requirements
of Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, particularly on
the conduct of inventory and photograph of the seized drug, was not
fatal to the prosecutions cause since its integrity and evidentiary
value had been duly preserved. The fallo of the decision
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Imus, Cavite dated April 21, 2005 and Order dated October 1, 2007
in Criminal Case No. 10745-03 finding accused-appellant Rizaldy C.
Sanchez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.13
Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 25, 2012
Decision, but it was denied by the CA in its November 20, 2012
Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
Bewailing his conviction, Sanchez filed the present petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and anchored on the
following
GROUNDS:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE
RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT HELD THAT ACCUSED WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO,
HENCE, A SEARCH WARRANT WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY; AND
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21, PARAGRAPH 1, ARTICLE II
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY RENDER
THE SEIZED ITEMS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.14
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
Sanchez insists on his acquittal. He argues that the warrantless 108
arrest and search on him were invalid due to the absence of probable
cause on the part of the police officers to effect an in flagrante delicto
arrest under Section 15, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. He also
contends that the failure of the police operatives to comply with
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 renders the seized
item inadmissible in evidence and creates reasonable doubt on his
guilt.
By way of Comment15 to the petition, the OSG prays for the
affirmance of the challenged July 25, 2012 decision of the CA. The
OSG submits that the warrantless search and seizure of the subject
narcotic were justified under the plain view doctrine where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
The Courts Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that this petition suffers from
procedural infirmity. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the proper remedy to question the CA judgment, final order or
resolution, as in the present case, is a petition for review on
certiorari, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process
over the original case.16 By filing a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65, Sanchez therefore clearly availed himself of the wrong
remedy.
Be that as it may, the Court, in several cases before, had treated a
petition for certiorari as a petition for review under Rule 45, in
accordance with the liberal spirit and in the interest of substantial
justice, particularly (1) if the petition was filed within the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review; (2) errors of
judgment are averred; and (3) there is sufficient reason to justify the
relaxation of the rules.17 The case at bench satisfies all the above
requisites and, hence, there is ample justification to treat this
petition for certiorari as a petition for review. Besides, it is axiomatic
that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or petition and the character of the relief sought.18 Here,

stripped of allegations of grave abuse of discretion, the petition
actually avers errors of judgment rather than of jurisdiction, which
are the appropriate subjects of a petition for review on certiorari.
Going now into the substance of the petition, the Court finds the
same to be impressed with merit.
Although it is true that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and not to
be disturbed on appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast
one. It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court
with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost
respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the
prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of
the declarants in the course of their testimonies. But an exception
exists if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance that would have affected the case.19 After going over
the records of the case at bench, the Court finds some facts of weight
and substance that have been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied by the trial court which cast doubt on the guilt of
Sanchez.
In sustaining the conviction of Sanchez, the CA ratiocinated that this
was a clear case of an in flagrante delicto arrest under paragraph (a)
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. In this
regard, the CA wrote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at Bar, the acquisition of the regulated drug by the police
officers qualifies as a valid search following a lawful operation by the
police officers. The law enforcers acted on the directive of their
superior based on an information that the owner of the residence
where Sanchez came from was a notorious drug dealer. As Sanchez
was seen leaving the said residence, the law enforcers had probable
cause to stop Sanchez on the road since there was already a tip that
illegal drug-related activities were perpetrated in the place where he
came from and seeing a match box held on one hand, the police
officers action were justified to inspect the same. The search
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
therefore, is a sound basis for the lawful seizure of the confiscated 109
drug, arrest and conviction of Sanchez.
The case of People vs. Valdez (G.R. No. 127801, March 3, 1999) is
instructive. In that case, the police officers, by virtue of an
information that a person having been previously described by the
informant, accosted Valdez and upon inspection of the bag he was
carrying, the police officers found the information given to them to be
true as it yielded marijuana leaves hidden in the water jug and lunch
box inside Valdezs bag. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial
courts ruling convicting Valdez declared
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was carrying
marijuana at the time of his arrest. A crime was actually being
committed by the appellant, thus, the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of the foregoing provisions
of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest.
While it is true that SPO1 Mariano was not armed with a search
warrant when the search was conducted over the personal effects of
appellant, nevertheless, under the circumstances of the case, there
was sufficient probable cause for said police officer to believe that
appellant was then and there committing a crime.
The cited case is akin to the circumstances in the instant appeal as
in this case, Sanchez, coming from the house of the identified drug
dealer, previously tipped by a concerned citizen, walked to a parked
tricycle and sped towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. The search
that gave way to the seizure of the match box containing shabu was a
reasonable course of event that led to the valid warrantless arrest
since there was sufficient probable cause for chasing the tricycle he
was in. (Underscoring supplied)
A judicious examination of the evidence on record belies the findings
and conclusions of the RTC and the CA.
At the outset, it is observed that the CA confused the search
incidental to a lawful arrest with the stop-and-frisk principle, a well-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Albeit it did not
expressly state so, the CA labored under the confused view that one
and the other were indistinct and identical. That confused view

guided the CA to wrongly affirm the petitioner's conviction. The Court
must clear this confusion and correct the error.
It is necessary to remind the RTC and the CA that the Terry20 stop-
and-frisk search is entirely different from and should not be confused
with the search incidental to a lawful arrest envisioned under Section
13, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The distinctions
have been made clear in Malacat v. Court of
Appeals21:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether
an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In
this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed. At
bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the
person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach
for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or
property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or
the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or
which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence.
xxxx
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a
stop-and-frisk as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself
as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing
in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons 110
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment x x x x.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a stop-and-frisk, it nevertheless holds that
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-
frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that
a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit
the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.22
In the case at bench, neither the in flagrante delicto arrest nor the
stop- and-frisk principle was applicable to justify the warrantless
search and seizure made by the police operatives on Sanchez. An
assiduous scrutiny of the factual backdrop of this case shows that
the search and seizure on Sanchez was unlawful. A portion of SPO1
Ampostas testimony on direct examination is revelatory,
viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Pros. Villarin:
Q:
On March 19, 2003 at around 2:50 p.m., can you recall where were
you?
A:
Yes, Mam.
Q:
Where were you?
A:
We were in Brgy. Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite.
Q:
What were you doing at Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite?
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

A: Court: 111
We were conducting an operation against illegal drugs. Q:
Q: Who, the driver or the passenger?
Who were with you? A:
A: The passenger, sir.
CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr. and CSU Samuel Pros. Villarin:
Monzon. Q:
Q: After that what did you find out?
Was the operation upon the instruction of your Superior? A:
A: I opened the match box and I found out that it contained a small
Our superior gave us the information that there were tricycle drivers transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.23
buying drugs from Intang or Jacinta Marciano. A search as an incident to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules
Q: of Court.24 It bears emphasis that the law requires that the search
What did you do after that? be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a
A: lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings;
We waited for a tricycle who will go to the house of Jacinta Marciano. the process cannot be reversed.25
Q:
After that what did you do? Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest
A: prior to the conduct of the search. Arrest is defined under Section 1,
A tricycle with a passenger went to the house of Intang and when Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody
the passenger boarded the tricycle, we chase[d] them. that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
Q: Under Section 2, of the same rule, an arrest is effected by an actual
After that, what happened next? restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission
A: to the custody of the person making the arrest.26
When we were able to catch the tricycle, the tricycle driver and the
passenger alighted from the tricycle. Even casting aside the petitioners version and basing the resolution
Q: of this case on the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, no
What did you do after they alighted from the tricycle? arrest was effected by the police operatives upon the person of
A: Sanchez before conducting the search on him. It appears from the
I saw the passenger holding a match box. above quoted testimony of SPO1 Amposta that after they caught up
Q: with the tricycle, its driver and the passenger, Sanchez, alighted from
What did you do after you saw the passenger holding a match box? it; that he noticed Sanchez holding a match box; and that he
A: requested Sanchez if he could see the contentsof the match box, to
I asked him if I can see the contents of the match box. which the petitioner acceded and handed it over to him. The arrest of
Q: Sanchez was made only after the discovery by SPO1 Amposta of the
Did he allow you? shabu inside the match box. Evidently, what happened in this case
A: was that a search was first undertaken and then later an arrest was
Yes, mam. He handed to me voluntarily the match box. effected based on the evidence produced by the search.

Even granting arguendo that Sanchez was arrested before the search,
still the warrantless search and seizure must be struck down as
illegal because the warrantless arrest was unlawful. Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on
lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private
person, as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actuallly committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx
For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in flagrante
delicto arrest) to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.27 On the other hand, paragraph (b) of
Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) requires for its application
that at the time of the arrest, an offense has in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be apprehended has committed it. These
elements would be lacking in the case at bench.
The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be
properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of
the police operatives that he had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen by the police
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
operatives leaving the residence of a known drug peddler, and 112
boarding a tricycle that proceeded towards the direction of Kawit,
Cavite. Such acts cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In
fact, even if Sanchez had exhibited unusual or strange acts, or at the
very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been
considered overt acts in order for the police officers to effect a lawful
warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
It has not been established either that the rigorous conditions set
forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5 have been complied with in this
warrantless arrest. When the police officers chased the tricycle, they
had no personal knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought shabu
from the notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the illegal
drug when he boarded the tricycle. Probable cause has been held to
signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.28 The police officers in this case had no inkling whatsoever
as to what Sanchez did inside the house of the known drug dealer.
Besides, nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it show that the
drug dealer was conducting her nefarious drug activities inside her
house so as to warrant the police officers to draw a reasonable
suspicion that Sanchez must have gotten shabu from her and
possessed the illegal drug when he came out of the house. In other
words, there was no overt manifestation on the part of Sanchez that
he had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to
engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of shabu. Verily,
probable cause in this case was more imagined than real.
In the same vein, there could be no valid stop-and-frisk search in
the case at bench. Elucidating on what constitutes stop-and-frisk
operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v.
Chua29 wrote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and
make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests
unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer

clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police
officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police
officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband)
concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search
and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.30
In this jurisdiction, what may be regarded as a genuine reason or a
reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop-and-frisk search had
been sufficiently illustrated in two cases. In Manalili v. Court of
Appeals and People,31 a policeman chanced upon Manalili in front of
the cemetery who appeared to be high on drugs as he was observed
to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen and when
approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to
resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court
held that the policeman had sufficient reason to accost Manalili to
determine if he was actually high on drugs due to his suspicious
actuations, coupled with the fact that the area was a haven for drug
addicts.
In People v. Solayao,32 the Court also found justifiable reason for the
police to stop and frisk the accused after considering the following
circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his
companions; the fact that his companions fled when they saw the
policemen; and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an
intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons where
roaming the vicinity. Seemingly, the common thread of these
examples is the presence of more than one seemingly innocent
activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity. It was not so in the case at bench.
The Court does not find the totality of the circumstances described by
SPO1 Amposta as sufficient to incite a reasonable suspicion that
would justify a stop-and-frisk search on Sanchez. Coming out from
the house of a drug pusher and boarding a tricycle, without more,
were innocuous movements, and by themselves alone could not give
rise in the mind of an experienced and prudent police officer of any
belief that he had shabu in his possession, or that he was probably
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
committing a crime in the presence of the officer. There was even no 113
allegation that Sanchez left the house of the drug dealer in haste or
that he acted in any other suspicious manner. There was no showing
either that he tried to evade or outmaneuver his pursuers or that he
attempted to flee when the police officers approached him. Truly, his
acts and the surrounding circumstances could not have engendered
any reasonable suspicion on the part of the police officers that a
criminal activity had taken place or was afoot.
In the recent case of People v. Cogaed,33 where not a single
suspicious circumstance preceded the search on the accused, the
Court ruled that the questioned act of the police officer did not
constitute a valid stop-and-frisk operation. Cogaed was a mere
passenger carrying a blue bag and a sack and travelling aboard a
jeepney. He did not exhibit any unusual or suspicious behavior
sufficient to justify the law enforcer in believing that he was engaged
in a criminal activity. Worse, the assessment of suspicion was made
not by the police officer but by the jeepney driver, who signaled to the
police officer that Cogaed was suspicious. In view of the illegality of
the search and seizure, the 12,337.6 grams of marijuana confiscated
from the accused was held as inadmissible.
The OSG characterizes the seizure of the subject shabu from Sanchez
as seizure of evidence in plain view. The Court disagrees.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an
officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.34 The plain
view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.35
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that
the seizure of the subject shabu does not fall within the plain view

exception. First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed,
Sanchez was illegally arrested. Second, subject shabu was not
inadvertently discovered, and third, it was not plainly exposed to
sight. Here, the subject shabu was allegedly inside a match box being
then held by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or transparent to
the police officers. In fact, SPO1 Amposta had to demand from
Sanchez the possession of the match box in order for him to open it
and examine its content. The shabu was not in plain view and its
seizure without the requisite search warrant is in violation of the law
and the Constitution.
In the light of the foregoing, there being no lawful warrantless arrest
and warrantless search and seizure, the shabu purportedly seized
from Sanchez is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very
corpus delicti of the crime charged, the accused must be acquitted
and exonerated from the criminal charge of violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Furthermore, the Court entertains doubts whether the shabu
allegedly seized from Sanchez was the very same item presented
during the trial of this case. The Court notes that there were several
lapses in the law enforcers handling of the seized item which, when
taken collectively, render the standards of chain of custody seriously
breached.
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements
and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.36 The function
of the chain of custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so
that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are
removed.37 Thus, the chain of custody requirement has a two-fold
purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items, and (2) the removal of unnecessary doubts as to the
identity of the evidence.38
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
In this case, the prosecution failed to account for each and every link 114
in the chain of custody of the shabu, from the moment it was
allegedly confiscated up to the time it was presented before the court
as proof of the corpus delicti. The testimony of SPO1 Amposta was
limited to the fact that he placed the marking RSC on the seized
drug; and that he and the three other police officers brought Sanchez
and the subject shabu to their station and turned them over to their
investigator. The prosecution evidence did not disclose where the
marking of the confiscated shabu took place and who witnessed it.
The evidence does not show who was in possession of the seized
shabu from the crime scene to the police station. A reading of the
Certification, dated March 20, 2003, issued by Forensic Chemist
Salud Rosales shows that a certain PO1 Edgardo Nario submitted the
specimen to the NBI for laboratory examination, but this piece of
evidence does not establish the identity of the police investigator to
whom SPO1 Amposta and his group turned over the seized shabu.
The identities of the person who received the specimen at the NBI
laboratory and the person who had the custody and safekeeping of
the seized marijuana after it was chemically analyzed pending its
presentation in court were also not disclosed.
Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, a serious uncertainty
hangs over the identity of the seized shabu that the prosecution
introduced in evidence. The prosecution failed to establish an
unbroken chain of custody, resulting in rendering the seizure and
confiscation of the shabu open to doubt and suspicion. Hence, the
incriminatory evidence cannot pass judicial scrutiny.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2012
Decision and the November 20, 2012 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili is ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, the Court orders the immediate release of the
petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause;
and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or reason for his
continued confinement, within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.

G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN,
Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has
directly come to this Court via this petition for review on certiorari to
nullify and set aside the Resolution1 dated 13 March 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-
149990 to 96-149992, entitled People of the Philippines v. Lawrence
Wang y Chen, granting private respondent Lawrence C. Wangs
Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the three (3) charges
filed against him, namely: (1) Criminal Case No. 96-149990 for
Violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2(e)(2), Article
I of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act); (2) Criminal
Case No. 96-149991 for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms); and (3) Criminal Case No. 96-149992
for Violation of Comelec Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No.
7166 (COMELEC Gun Ban).
The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in
the court of origin respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control a bulk of white and yellowish crystalline substance known as
SHABU contained in thirty-two (32) transparent plastic bags weighing
approximately 29.2941 kilograms, containing methamphetamine
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or 115
prescription therefor.
Contrary to law.2
Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic pistol with one loaded
magazine and one AMT Cal. .380 9mm automatic backup pistol with
magazine loaded with ammunitions without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Contrary to law. 3
Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm automatic pistol with one loaded
magazine and one (1) AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic backup pistol
with magazine loaded with ammunitions, carrying the same along
Maria Orosa St., Ermita, Manila, which is a public place, on the date
which is covered by an election period, without first securing the
written permission or authority from the Commission on Elections,
as provided by the COMELEC Resolution 2828 in relation to Republic
Act 7166.
Contrary to law. 4
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all
the Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. Thus,
the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him.5
Thereafter, joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases followed.

The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public
Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the Department of Interior
and Local Government, namely, Captain Margallo, Police Inspector
Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal, arrested SPO2 Vergel
de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug
popularly known as shabu. In the course of the investigation of the
three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph
Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment
operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call
their source and pretend to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio were arrested while they were about to hand over another bag
of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned, Redentor Teck
and Joseph Junio informed the police operatives that they were
working as talent manager and gymnast instructor, respectively, of
Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck
and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted
that they were working for Wang.6 They also disclosed that they
knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of
17 May 1996, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the
Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives
decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and
his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the
same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at
about 2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996, Wang, who was described to the
operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a
parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with
Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang,
introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and,
upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
and asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car.7 116
When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang
and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm
automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same
time, the other members of the operatives searched the BMW car and
found inside it were the following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic
bags containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of
29.2941 kilograms, which substance was later analyzed as positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally known
as shabu; (b) cash in the amount of 650,000.00; (c) one electronic
and one mechanical scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm
Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless
arrest and search.8
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon
motion, accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date within
which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence.9 On 19 December
1996, the prosecution filed a Manifestation10 to the effect that it had
rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned,
and not as regards the two cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms
(Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and Violation of the Comelec Gun Ban
(Crim. Case No. 96-149992). Accordingly, trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence,11
praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases
against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the
inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against him. Considering
that the prosecution has not yet filed its Opposition to the demurrer,
Wang filed an Amplification12 to his Demurrer of Evidence on 20
January 1997. On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its
Opposition13 alleging that the warrantless search was legal as an
incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is
now time for the defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S.
Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed Resolution14 granting Wangs

Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of
evidence, thus:
WHEREFORE, the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence is
hereby granted; the accused is acquitted of the charges against him
for the crimes of Violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of Firearms, and Violation of Comelec
Gun Ban, for lack of evidence; the 32 bags of shabu with a total
weight of 29.2941 kilograms and the two unlicensed pistols, one AMT
Cal. .380 9mm and one Daewoo Cal. 9mm. are ordered confiscated in
favor of the government and the branch clerk is directed to turn over
the 32 bags of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board in Intramuros,
Manila, and the two firearms to the Firearms and Explosive Units,
PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for proper disposition, and the
officer-in-charge of PARAC, Department of Interior and Local
Government, is ordered to return the confiscated amount of
P650,000.00 to the accused, and the confiscated BMW car to its
registered owner, David Lee. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition15 for review on certiorari by the People,
submitting that the trial court erred -
I In its Resolution16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due
XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE
WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION, AND IN HOLDING THAT SUCH FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER JUSTIFIED THE WARRANTLESS
SEARCH OF ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE
CONTRABAND THEREIN.
ll
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XXX IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS 117
CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWABLE AND CAN ONLY BE VALID AS AN
INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
lII
XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE
ACCUSED AND THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS HANDGUNS
UNLAWFUL.
IV
XXX IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING WAIVED, AS A
RESULT OF HIS SUBMISSION AND FAILURE TO PROTEST THE
SEARCH AND HIS ARREST, HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND HIS OBJECTION TO
THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED.
V
XXX IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED
AND OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION AND IN NOT DENYING
ACCUSED'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
course to the petition, required the public and private respondents to
comment thereon within ten days from notice. Private respondent
Wang filed his comment17on 18 August 1997.
On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file a
reply,18 which the Office of the Solicitor General did on 5 December
1997, after several extensions.19
On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda,20 which they did.

The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may
appeal the trial courts resolution granting Wangs demurrer to
evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him without
violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy; and
(b) whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police
operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest
and/or a search warrant.
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal
filed directly with this Court via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph (c) of the
Rules of Court raising only pure questions of law, ordinary appeal by
mere filing of a notice of appeal not being allowed as a mode of appeal
directly to this Court. Then, too, it bears stressing that the right to
appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it being
merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the
manner provided for by law (Velasco v. Court of Appeals21). Although
Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that
any party may appeal, the right of the People to appeal is, in the very
same provision, expressly made subject to the prohibition against
putting the accused in double jeopardy. It also basic that appeal in
criminal cases throws the whole records of the case wide open for
review by the appellate court, that is why any appeal from a
judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double
jeopardy. In effect, the very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, disallows appeal by the People from
judgments of acquittal.
An order granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence is a resolution
of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally,
any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would
violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this
general rule, however, the Court has previously made some
exceptions.
The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan22 presents one
exception to the rule on double jeopardy, which is, when the
prosecution is denied due process of law:
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
118
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions"
from the very President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only
at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition
challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the
Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as
mandatorily required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing
for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses
committed by military men) made it possible to refer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence
of due process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over
cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the
Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means
of predetermining the outcome of individual cases." This criminal
collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public
respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only
after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely
disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its
verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive
arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and
Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no
evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous
conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an
accessory of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and
evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and
suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all these
arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases
herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and
travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under
its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no
reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of
injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth,
instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and
committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a
wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of

politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people
and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our
judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military
tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled
to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the
victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the
relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once
more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court
with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the
sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century and that the
predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy
cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial
courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution
which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due
process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar,
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute
and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over
or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of
due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that
right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370
[May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49
SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing,
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null 119
and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a
proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58
Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due
process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of
the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower
courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accuseds
demurrer to evidence. In point is the fairly recent case of People v.
Uy,23 which involved the trial courts decision which granted the two
separate demurrers to evidence filed by the two accused therein, both
with leave of court, resulting in their acquittal of their respective
charges of murder due to insufficiency of evidence. In resolving the
petition for certiorari filed directly with this Court, we had the
occasion to explain:
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is
final and unappealable. People v. Court of Appeals explains the
rationale of this rule:
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard
against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first
enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case, verdicts of
acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The
cases of United States v. Yam Tung Way, People v. Bringas,

Gandicela v. Lutero, People v. Cabarles, People v. Bao, to name a few,
are illustrative cases. The fundamental philosophy behind the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the
defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him
from government oppression through the abuse of criminal
processes. As succinctly observed in Green v. United States "(t)he
underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he
may be found guilty." (Underscoring supplied)
The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence
is granted. As held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is
"filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is
granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,
tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a
criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be
appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double-
jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
(Italics in the original)
Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By
way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the
assailed judgment void. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
In Sanvicente v. People,24 the Court allowed the review of a decision 120
of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the accuseds acquittal
upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with leave of court,
the CA ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution
and authenticity of certain letter marked therein as Exhibit "LL,"
which supposedly "positively identified therein petitioner as the
perpetrator of the crime charged." The Court, in a petition for
certiorari, sustained the CAs power to review the order granting the
demurrer to evidence, explaining thus:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed
by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving accuseds
demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain
whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be
disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly,
once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate
the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes
an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made
with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars
a plea of double jeopardy. The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed
thus in People v. Velasco:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal
by the trial court cuts deep into the "humanity of the laws and in
jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizens, when brought in
unequal contest with the State xxx. Thus Green expressed the
concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at
least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense

thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he
may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an
acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy
underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is
"part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches
to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The
interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to
verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose",
a desire to know the exact extent of ones liability. With this right of
repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure
that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jurys
leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds right against double
jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of
evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not
attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where
the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to
correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial
court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive
it of its very power to dispense justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review
dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accuseds demurrer to
evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order,
being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus,
when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the 121
accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through
then Secretary of Justice Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and then Solicitor
General Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed with the Court in the present case
is an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 raising a pure question of law, which is different from a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
In Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,25 we
have enumerated the distinction between the two remedies/actions,
to wit:
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial
distinctions which shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods
Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in
this light:
"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when
the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court
would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment
would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The
administration of justice would not survive such a rule.
Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original
civil action of certiorari."
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of
certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the
intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the basis
either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal

soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are
incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction
is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not
one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of
judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its
appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the
higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its
power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower
courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a
petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was
not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment
or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original
parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for
certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the
petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the
prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents,
respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those
that the Rules of Court so declared are appealable. Since the issue is
jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against
an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the
judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within
fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice
of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said
notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed
and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the
decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition
should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or
final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
122
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later
than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed,
the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for
reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for
certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the
alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate
remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not
required before appealing a judgment or final order.
Also in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of certiorari
and appeal are two different remedies mutually exclusive; they are
neither alternative nor successive. Where appeal is available,
certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal case upon
demurrer to evidence, appeal is not available as such an appeal will
put the accused in double jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is allowed.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the
Philippines in this case, this petition is outrightly dismissible. The
Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial court by
appeal without violating private respondents right against double
jeopardy.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil
action of certiorari, which definitely this Court has the power to do,
when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion committed
by the lower court, the instant petition will nevertheless fail on the
merits as the succeeding discussion will show.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the
warrantless arrest and the warrantless search. There is no question
that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid
warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest
before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.26
However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and

seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently
committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante
delicto27 without need for a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search
in the case at bar, the trial court granted private respondent's
demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for
lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the
inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless
search. The trial courts ratiocination is quoted as follows:
The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to
Evidence is whether his warrantless arrest and search were lawful as
argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as asserted by the defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer
may arrest a person without a warrant: (a) when in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it, and (c) when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while being transferred from one confinement to
another. None of these circumstances were present when the accused
was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa
Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the
police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The
accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of his
arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a
crime or that he had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT
Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that the accused had in his
possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants.
And the handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not give
an outward indication of a concealed gun if placed inside the pant's
side pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting officers had no
information and knowledge that the accused was carrying an
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him in possession thereof 123
immediately prior to his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal.
9mm Pistol with magazine that were found and seized from the car.
The contraband items in the car were not in plain view. The 32 bags
of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the Daewoo handgun
was underneath the drivers seat of the car. The police officers had no
information, or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the
car, or that the accused had placed them there. The police officers
searched the car on mere suspicion that there was shabu therein.
On this matter, pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police
Inspector Cielito Coronel and SP03 Reynaldo are hereunder quoted:
POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONELS TESTIMONY
"PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination
Q. Mr. Witness, what was your role or participation in this case?
A. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Where did you make that arrest, Mr. Witness?
A. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along Maria
Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila.
Q. What date was that when you arrested the accused?
A. It was on May 17, 1996, at about 2:10 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen
effected the arrest of the accused?

A. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by one of
those whom we have previously apprehended in connection with the
delivery of shabu somewhere also in Ermita, Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa,
what did you do?
A. We waited for him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself during
that time?
A. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear.
Q. What about your other companions where were they?
A. They were position in strategic places within the area.
Q. What happened when you and your companions were positioned
in that place?
A. That was when the accused arrived.
Q. How many of your approached him.
A. Inspector Margallo, myself and two other operatives.
Q. What happened when you approached the accused, Mr. Witness?
A. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him and
we asked him to open the back compartment of his car.
Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that?
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
124
A. He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one loaded
magazine and likewise when the compartment was opened several
plastic bags containing white crystalline substance suspected to be
shabu (were found).
Q. What did you do when you found out Mr. Witness?
A. When the car was further search we later found another firearm, a
Daewoo Pistol at the place under the seat of the driver.
Q. Then what happened?
A. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for further
investigation.
Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did you
do with that?
A. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the NBI
for laboratory examination.
Q. Did you come to know the results?
A. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (TSN,
pp. 3-8, November 15, 1996).
ATTY. LOZANO TO WITNESS: CROSS
Q. You arrested Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck for alleged
transporting of shabu on May 16, 1996, at 11:00 p.m., is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

xxx xxx xxx Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and 125
search were made, is it not?
Q. Redentor Teck told you that he is a talent manager at the
Glenmore Modeling Agency, is it not? A. He was likewise outside, Sir.

A. Yes, Sir. Q. Lawrence Wang did resist arrest and search is it not?

.Q. The Glenmore Modeling Agency is owned by Lawrence Wang, is it A. Yes, Sir.
not?
Q. When you effected the arrest, there was no warrant of arrest, is it
A. I supposed, Sir. not?

Q. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that he
is an employee of the Glenmore Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence
Wang, naturally, you and your companions look for Lawrence Wang
to shed light on the transporting of shabu by Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Thereafter, you spotted a person previously described by Redentor
Teck as Lawrence Wang, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When the search was made on the BMW car, there was no search
warrant, is it not?
A. Yes, none, Sir. (TSN, pp. 3-12, November 15, 1996)
SPO3 REYNALDO CRISTOBALS TESTIMONY
PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: DIRECT EXAMINATION

A. Yes, Sir. Q. What is you role or participation in this case?

Q. While you were arresting Lawrence Wang, your companions at the A. I was one of the arresting officers and investigator, Sir.
same time searched the BMW car described in your affidavit of arrest,
is it not? xxx xxx xxx

A. Yes, Sir. Q. What kind of specific offense did the accused allegedly do so that
you arrested him, Mr. Witness?
xxx xxx xxx
A. He was arrested on the basis of the recovered drugs in his
Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same was possession placed inside his car.
searched, is it not?
xxx xxx xxx
A. He was outside, Sir.

Q. Mr. witness, you said that you recovered drug from the car of the
accused, please tell us the antecedent circumstances which led you
to recover or confiscate these items?
A. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested one
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio.
COURT: Where did you arrest these people?
A They were arrested in Metro Manila also.
COURT: The same date?
A. May 16, about 11:00 p.m. They were arrested and when they were
investigated, Teck mentioned the name of Lawrence Wang as his
employer.
COURT: Why were these people, arrested?
A. For violation of R.A. 6425.
COURT: How were they arrested?
A. They were arrested while in the act of transporting shabu or
handling shabu to another previously arrested person. It was a series
of arrest.
COURT: So, this involved a series of operation?
A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested three
(3) persons, SPO2 Vergel de Dios, a certain Arellano and a certain
Rogelio Noble. When they were arrested they divulged the name of the
source.
COURT: They were arrested for what, for possession?
A. Yes, Your Honor. For unlawful possession of shabu . Then they
divulged to us the name of the person from whom they get shabu.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
126
COURT: Whose name did they mention:
A. One Alias Frank, who turned out to be Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio. We let them call Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio thru the
cellphone and pretend and to order another supply of shabu.
COURT: So there was an entrapment?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: So, these two (2) were arrested?
A. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to Noble
and company.
COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to you as
to the source of the shabu?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: What was the information?
A. Teck told us that he is an employee of Lawrence Wang.
COURT: What did you do when you were told about that?
A. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu on
that morning.
COURT: When?
A. Of that date early morning of May 17, 1996.
COURT: At what place?
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

A. We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck lead CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONING OF SPO3 CRISTOBAL BY THE 127
us to Maria Orosa Apartment where we conducted a stake out which COURT
lasted up to 2:00 a.m.
COURT: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito
xxx xxx xxx Coronel, this Court has gathered that prior to the arrest of the
accused there were three (3) men that your team arrested. One of
COURT: What happened during the stake out? whom is a police officer.

A. When the person of the accused was identified to us, we saw him A: Yes, Sir.
opening his car together with his driver.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: So, he was about to leave when you saw him?
COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu
A. Probably, Sir. were confiscated from them?

COURT: What did you do? A: Yes, Sir.

A. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men, you were
was a shabu inside the compartment of the car. able to discover that Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were the
source of the regulated drug that were confiscated from the three
xxx xxx xxx men that you have arrested?

COURT: All right, when you saw the accused opened his car, what A: Yes, Sir.
did you do?
Q: Now, thru entrapment base[d] on your testimony you were able to
A. We approached him. apprehend also these two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio?

COURT: What happened when you approached him? A: Yes, Sir.

A. We suspected the shabu inside the compartment of his car. xxx xxx xxx

COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also
car, what did you do with that? investigated by your team?

A. Well, he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt. Coronel A: Yes, Sir.
while I was the one who inspected and opened the compartment of
the car and saw the shabu. (TSN, pp. 15-24, December 16, 1996). Q: You were present while they were investigated?

A: I was the one whom investigated them.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you
confiscated from them at the time of the (their) arrest?
A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me that
they were working for the accused.
Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was
another delivery of shabu scheduled that morning of (stop) was it
May 16 or 17? The other delivery that is scheduled on?
A: On the 17th.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?
A: No, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him
to shed light on the matter concerning the arrest of these two
employees in possession of shabu. Did you and did your team
suspect the accused as being involved in the transaction that lead
(led) to the arrest of Redentor and Joseph?
A: Yes, Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know
whether he was carrying a gun?
A: No, Sir. It cannot be seen.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
128
Q: It was concealed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was in
possession of the gun is when he was bodily search?
A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when
Capt. Margallo handed to me the gun.
Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing
anything else?
A: None, Sir.
Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was
intending to do something unlawful or illegal?
A: No, Sir.
Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to
prevent your team from searching his car?
A: No, Sir." (TSN pp. 3-16, Feb. 26, 1997)
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the
search of his person and the car were without probable cause and
could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under any of
the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule
113, Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his
constitutional right of liberty. x x x
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the
arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a
lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful.
Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are

inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for
lack of evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now
posits that "inasmuch as it has been shown in the present case that
the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed
firearms in the accuseds possession had been validly made upon
probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then the
warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be
regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission of
the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and
statutorily permissible and lawful."28 In effect, the People now
contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless
arrest. Since the case falls under an exception to the general rule
requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure, the
police officers were justified in requiring the private respondent to
open his BMW cars trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.
The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the search
or vice versa, is a matter of credibility of evidence. It entails
appreciation of evidence, which may be done in an appeal of a
criminal case because the entire case is thrown open for review, but
not in the case of a petition for certiorari where the factual findings of
the trial court are binding upon the Court. Since a dismissal order
consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal and
reviewable only by certiorari, the factual finding that the arrest
preceded the search is conclusive upon this Court. The only legal
basis for this Court to possibly reverse and set aside the dismissal
order of the trial court upon demurrer to evidence would be if the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in excess of
jurisdiction when it ruled that there was no legal basis to lawfully
effect a warrantless arrest.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure on warrantless arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
129
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless
arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of
the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was
the author of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto
under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.291awphi1.nt
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not
manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent
Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the
police. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and
was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives
arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him
to open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be
owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible
offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in
flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that

"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the
arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that
would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.30
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of
Section 5. What is clearly established from the testimonies of the
arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the
information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport
of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to
be their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante
delicto. Upon the duos declaration that there will be a delivery of
shabu on the early morning of the following day, May 17, which is
only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria
Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers
conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said apartment, hoping
to find a person which will match the description of one Lawrence
Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not
sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on
personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph
(c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that
the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search
incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
In People v. Aminnudin,31 the Court declared as inadmissible in
evidence the marijuana found in appellants possession during a
search without a warrant, because it had been illegally seized, in
disregard of the Bill of Rights:
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of
his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to
do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like 130
any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel.
It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became a suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the fugitive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification of the informer was the probable cause as determined
by the officer (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
The Peoples contention that Wang waived his right against
unreasonable search and seizure has no factual basis. While we
agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal
search, however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his
arrest and the search on his person and belongings.32 The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been
more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.33 Moreover, the
continuing objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of
record during the arraignment bolsters Wangs claim that he resisted
the warrantless arrest and search.
We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who
are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price
for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes once said, "I think it is less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to
violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself.34
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 184658 March 6, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE RAFAEL R. LAGOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 79,
JONATHAN DY y RUBIC, CASTEL VINCI ESTACIO y TOLENTINO,
AND CARLO CASTRO y CANDO, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before this Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
seeking to reverse the following Orders in Criminal Case No. Q-07-
146628 issued by public respondent Judge Rafael R. Lagos (Judge
Lagos), presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 79:
1. The Order issued on 23 April 2008, granting respondents' Petition
for Bail and Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence;1
2. The Order issued on 24 June 2008 granting the demurrer to
evidence filed by respondents and acquitting them of the crime of
illegal sale of drugs punishable under Section 5, Article II, Republic
Act 9165;2
3. The Order issued on 24 July 2008, which: a) denied petitioner's
Motion for Inhibition, b) denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the 24 July 2008 Order; and c) granted
respondents Motion to withdraw their cash bonds.3
On 30 March 2007, at 11:00 a.m., a confidential informant (CI)
appeared before the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force
(AIDSOTF) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp Crame,
Quezon City. The CI relayed to Police Senior Inspector Fidel
Fortaleza, Jr. (P S/Insp. Fortaleza) that an individual using the alias
"Brian" was engaged in the illegal sale of the prohibited drug
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
"ecstasy" in BF Homes, Paraaque City.4 The CI further reported that 131
"Brian," who was later identified as herein private respondent Castel
Vinci Estacio y Tolentino (Estacio), promised a commission from any
transaction the former would help arrange. P S/Insp. Fortaleza, as
team leader of the AIDSOTF, assembled and briefed the team that
would conduct the buy-bust operation. Police Officer (PO) 2 Marlo V.
Frando (PO2 Frando) was assigned to act as the poseur-buyer and
PO2 Ruel P. Cubian (PO2 Cubian) as back-up, while the rest of the
team members were to serve as perimeter security. P S/Insp.
Fortaleza and PO2 Leonard So prepared and dusted two 500 bills for
use as buy-bust money. The CI then called respondent Estacio,
informing him that a prospective buyer wished to purchase thirty (30)
tablets of ecstasy with a total value of 50,000.5 That afternoon,
respondent Estacio instructed them to proceed to Tandang Sora
Avenue, Quezon City, where the transaction was to take place.6
At 11:00 p.m. of the same day, Estacio alighted from a Toyota Vios
car at the Jollibee branch located at the corner of Commonwealth
Avenue and Tandang Sora. PO2 Frando, accompanied by the CI,
approached Estacio. After PO2 Frando was introduced to Estacio as
the prospective buyer, the latter demanded to see the payment.
However, PO2 Frando asked him to first show the ecstasy pills.7
Estacio then opened the doors of the vehicle and introduced his two
companions, Carlo and Jonathan (later identified as herein
respondents Jonathan Dy and Carlo Castro), to PO2 Frando and the
CI. Respondent Castro handed PO2 Frando one sealed plastic sachet
containing several pink pills. The latter gave the "boodle" money to
respondent Dy and immediately removed his baseball cap. The
removal of the cap was the prearranged signal to the rest of the buy-
bust team that the transaction was complete.8
PO2 Frando introduced himself as a police officer and informed
respondents of their constitutional rights.9 PO2 Cubian frisked
respondent Dy and was able to recover the buy-bust money.10
Respondents were then escorted to the AIDSOTF office in Camp
Crame, where they identified themselves as Castel Vinci Estacio y
Tolentino, Carlo Castro y Cando, and Jonathan Dy y Rubic. As officer
in charge of the inventory of the evidence seized, PO2 Cubian turned

over the plastic sachet to PO3 Jose Rey Serrona, who was in charge
of the investigation.11 On 31 March 2007, forensic chemist and
Police Senior Inspector Yelah C. Manaog (P S/Insp. Manaog)
conducted a laboratory examination of the contents of the sachet,
which was completed at 10:50 a.m. that same day.12 The 30 pink
pills were found positive for methylenedioxymethamphetamine
(MDMA) hydrochloride, commonly known as ecstasy, a dangerous
drug.13
An Information dated 3 April 2007 was filed against respondents for
the sale of dangerous drugs, in violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165. The case was raffled to the sala of
Judge Fernando Sagum, Jr. of the Quezon City RTC. Upon
arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty to the charges. Trial
ensued, and the prosecution presented its evidence, including the
testimonies of four witnesses: PO2 Marlo V. Frando, PO2 Ruel P.
Cubian, Police Senior Inspector Yelah C. Manaog, and PO3 Jose Rey
Serrona. After the prosecution submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence
on 17 November 2007, respondents filed a Motion for leave of court to
file their demurrer, as well as a Motion to resolve their Petition for
Bail. On 2 January 2008, Judge Sagum issued a Resolution denying
both the Petition for Bail and the Motion for leave of court to file a
demurrer. Respondent Estacio then sought the inhibition of Judge
Sagum, a move subsequently adopted by respondents Dy and Castro.
On 15 January 2008, Presiding Judge Sagum inhibited himself from
the case. On 31 January 2008, the case was re-raffled to public
respondent Judge Lagos.
Judge Lagos issued the first assailed Order on 23 April 2008 granting
respondents Petition for Bail and allowing them to file their
demurrer. On 24 June 2008, he issued the second assailed Order,
acquitting all the accused. On Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
People, he issued the third assailed Order denying the above motion
and granting the Motion to Withdraw Cash Bonds filed by the
accused.
Before this Court, the prosecution argues that Judge Lagos
committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
jurisdiction in granting the demurrer despite clear proof of the 132
elements of the illegal sale, the existence of the corpus delicti, and
the arrest in flagrante delicto.14 Private respondents counter that the
Petition is dismissible on the ground of double jeopardy and is
violative of the principle of hierarchy of courts.
We grant the petition.
Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
the demurrer.
It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to
an acquittal. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose
as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal.15 This rule,
however, is not without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is
subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary
writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme
Court is endowed with the power to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.16 Here, the party asking for the review must show the
presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an
exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so
grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to
dispense justice.17 In such an event, the accused cannot be
considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.18
The trial court declared that the testimonies of PO2 Frando, PO2
Cubian, P S/Insp. Manaog, and AIDSOTF Chief Leonardo R. Suan
were insufficient to prove the culmination of the illegal sale, or to
show their personal knowledge of the offer to sell and the acceptance
thereof. In granting the demurrer filed by the accused, respondent
judge surmised that it was the CI who had initiated the negotiation of
the sale and should have thus been presented at trial.

Accused were caught in flagrante delicto; AIDSOTF police officers
witnessed the actual sale.
The trial courts assessment that the witnesses had no personal
knowledge of the illegal sale starkly contrasts with the facts borne out
by the records. PO2 Frando was present during the negotiation and
the actual buy-bust operation. PO2 Frando himself acted as the
poseur-buyer and testified in open court. PO2 Cubian frisked the
accused and recovered the buy-bust money; he also testified in court.
P S/Insp. Manaog testified as to the corpus delicti of the crime; and
the 30 pills of ecstasy were duly marked, identified, and presented in
court. The validity of buy-bust transactions as an effective way of
apprehending drug dealers in the act of committing an offense is
well-settled.19
The only elements necessary to consummate the crime of illegal sale
of drugs is proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence.20 In buy-bust operations, the delivery of the contraband to
the poseur-buyer and the sellers receipt of the marked money
successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction between the
entrapping officers and the accused. Unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were
inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing
their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve faith and credit.
21
The Court has held that when police officers have no motive to testify
falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold the
presumption of regularity accorded to them in the performance of
their official duties.22 In the present case, there is no contention that
the members of AIDSOTF who conducted the buy-bust operation
were motivated by ill will or malice. Neither was there evidence
adduced to show that they neglected to perform their duties properly.
Hence, their testimonies as to the conduct of the buy-bust operation
deserves full faith and credence.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
Respondent judge harps on the fact that it was the CI who had 133
personal knowledge of the identity of the seller, the initial offer to
purchase the ecstasy pills, and the subsequent acceptance of the
offer. It is clear from the testimonies of PO2 Frando and the other
arresting officers that they conducted the buy-bust operation based
on the information from the CI. However, the arrest was made, not on
the basis of that information, but of the actual buy-bust operation, in
which respondents were caught in flagrante delicto engaged in the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Due to the investigative work of the
AIDSOTF members, the illegal sale was consummated in their
presence, and the elements of the sale the identity of the sellers, the
delivery of the drugs, and the payment therefor were confirmed.
That the CI initially provided this information or "tip" does not negate
the subsequent consummation of the illegal sale.
In the Courts Resolution on People v. Utoh, the accused was caught
in flagrante delicto selling 36,000 worth of shabu in a buy-bust
operation conducted by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA). The accused argued that mere reliable information from the
CI was an insufficient ground for his warrantless arrest. The Court
stated:
Utoh was arrested not, as he asserts, on the basis of "reliable
information" received by the arresting officers from a confidential
informant. His arrest came as a result of a valid buy-bust operation,
a form of entrapment in which the violator is caught in flagrante
delicto. The police officers conducting a buy-bust operation are not
only authorized but also duty-bound to apprehend the violators and
to search them for anything that may have been part of or used in
the commission of the crime.
The testimonies of arresting officers IOI Apiit and IOI Mosing were
straightforward, positive, and categorical. From the time they were
tipped off by the confidential informant at around 9:00 a.m. of
November 22, 2008 or up to the time until the informant confirmed
Utohs impending arrival at a very late hour that night, and the
latter's eventual arrest, the intelligence officers credibly accounted for
the briefings held, the preparations, and actions taken by them.23
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

prohibited drug was already established by the direct testimony of 134

It is well-settled that the testimony of the CI in the sale of illegal
drugs is not indispensable.
Given the foregoing, respondent Judge Lagos erred in requiring the
testimony of the CI.1wphi1 Respondent judge based his ruling on a
2004 case, People v. Ong, the facts of which purportedly "mirror"
those of the present case. However, there is no basis for this
conclusion, as Ong involved a conviction based on the lone testimony
of one apprehending officer, Senior Police Officer (SPO1) Gonzales.
The Court found that SPO1 Gonzales was merely the deliveryman,
while the CI was the one who acted as the poseur-buyer. In this case,
one of the witnesses, PO2 Frando, was a buy-bust team member who
also acted as the poseur-buyer. He participated in the actual sale
transaction. His testimony was a firsthand account of what
transpired during the buy-bust and thus stemmed from his personal
knowledge of the arrest in flagrante delicto.
Requiring the CI to testify is an added imposition that runs contrary
to jurisprudential doctrine, since the Court has long established that
the presentation of an informant is not a requisite for the prosecution
of drug cases. The testimony of the CI is not indispensable, since it
would be merely corroborative of and cumulative with that of the
poseur-buyer who was presented in court, and who testified on the
facts and circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited
drug.24
SP04 Jamisolamin who actively took part in the transaction. If the
prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, it need
not present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet
the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt."26
Similarly, in the present case, the fact of the illegal sale has already
been established by testimonies of the members of the buy-bust
team. Judge Lagos need not have characterized the Cl's testimony as
indispensable to the prosecution's case. We find and so hold that the
grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not supported by
prevailing jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion.
The prosecution's evidence was, prima facie, sufficient to prove the
criminal charges filed against respondents, subject to the defenses
they may present in the course of a full-blown trial.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders of the
Regional Trial Court dated 23 April 2008, 24 June 2008, and 24 July
2008 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The RTC is ORDERED to
reinstate Criminal Case No. Q-07-146628 to the court's docket and
proceed with trial.
SO ORDERED.

Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to

hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the
police. Except when the accused vehemently denies selling prohibited
drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the officers had
motives to falsely testify against the accused, or that it was the
informant who acted as the poseur-buyer, the informant's testimony
may be dispensed with, as it will merely be corroborative of the
apprehending officers' eyewitness accounts.25 In People v. Lopez, the
Court ruled that the "informant's testimony, then, would have been
merely corroborative and cumulative because the fact of sale of the

MIGUEL E. COLORADO, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1658
Complainant, [Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1014-MTJ]
Present:
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
JUDGE RICARDO M. AGAPITO, NACHURA, JJ.
Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Laur, Nueva Ecija, Promulgated:
Respondent. July 3, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before us is a sworn letter-complaint[1] dated January 31, 2001 of
Miguel E. Colorado (complainant) charging Judge Ricardo M. Agapito
(respondent), Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Laur, Nueva
Ecija, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority
relative to Criminal Case Nos. 3461-G and 3462-G, entitled People v.
Miguel Colorado, with Grave Slander and Grave Threats.
Complainant alleges: He is the accused in the aforementioned
criminal cases. The cases were directly filed with the court without
first passing the Office of the Barangay Chairman, although he and
private complainants are permanent residents of Barangay Bagong
Sikat, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. Respondent ignored the glaring
deficiency in private complainants filing of the cases without
attaching the requisite certifications to file action from the barangay.
On the date the two cases were filed, respondent immediately issued
two warrants for his arrest. He was arrested on a Friday and
languished in the municipal jail for two days and two nights. He
posted bail and filed a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the
case, but the same was not acted upon. He received an envelope from
the court with nothing inside and found out later that the same was
supposed to be a notice of hearing; thus, he was ordered arrested in
view of his non-appearance in court.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
On February 22, 2001, respondent compulsorily retired from the 135
judiciary.
In a 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2001, respondent was directed to
file his comment on the complaint. A 1st Tracer dated October 17,
2001 was sent to respondent giving him a non-extendible period of
five days to file his comment. However, the said tracer was returned
unserved due to respondents retirement from the judiciary. Another
Tracer dated July 30, 2002 was sent to respondent in his residential
address giving him a chance to file his comment, but none was filed.
Acting on the complaint, the Court, in its Resolution of March 24,
2003, required respondent to manifest whether he was willing to
submit the administrative matter against him for resolution without
his comment. Respondent failed to comply with the Court Resolution.
Thus, in the Resolution of January 26, 2005, the Court ordered
respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with or held in contempt for failure to manifest and to comply with
the Resolution of March 24, 2003. Still, respondent failed to comply
with the Resolution of January 26, 2005. In the Resolution of August
24, 2005, the Court imposed upon respondent a fine of P1,000.00
and deemed respondent to have waived the filing of a comment on
the complaint.
In the Agenda Report[2] dated October 12, 2005, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent guilty as charged and
recommended that he be fined in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
On November 8, 2005, respondent paid the fine of P1,000.00 imposed
on him in the Resolution of August 24, 2005 and submitted his
Comment on the complaint.
In his Comment[3] dated October 31, 2005, respondent denied the
allegations contained in the complaint reasoning that he acted in
good faith and within the scope of his duties. He further contends:
Based on Administrative Circular No. 140-93, the crimes committed
by the accused are not within the Katarungan Pambarangay Law

because the imposable penalty exceeds one year. Both cases are
within the original jurisdiction of the court and, finding a probable
cause against the accused, the court issued the warrant of arrest.
There is no law or circular issued by this Court that a court cannot
issue a warrant of arrest on Friday. If the accused was not able to
post bail on time, it is not his fault or of the court. The motion for
inhibition filed by complainant must be set for hearing. But in spite
of several settings to hear the motion, complainant failed to appear.
In the hearing of both cases, complainant failed to appear in court;
thus, the assistant provincial prosecutor moved for the arrest of the
complainant. At the hearing of November 17, 2000 and January 5,
2001, complainant failed to appear in court, and orders of arrest were
issued against him, but said orders were reconsidered by the court.
In spite of all the orders of the court for the arrest of complainant,
none of the orders were implemented. Neither was the accused
arrested and detained in jail. And if the complainant received an
envelope from the MCTC of Laur without content, complainant
should have immediately informed the court of the said circumstance
so that proper action may be done on the employee in charge of the
mailing of notices.
In the Resolution of March 29, 2006, the Court referred back the
instant administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
In a letter[4] dated November 21, 2005, respondent requested the
Court that his retirement benefits be released subject to the
withholding of P20,000.00 pending resolution of the present
complaint.
In the Resolution[5] of June 28, 2006, the Court granted the partial
release of respondent's compulsory retirement benefits and withheld
therefrom the amount of P20,000.00 to answer for whatever liability
respondent may incur in the present administrative case.
In the Agenda Report dated August 30, 2006, the OCA submitted its
evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
The charges against respondent judge are summarized as follows:
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
136
1. Gross Ignorance of the law for his failure to remand or dismiss
the case in view of the absence of the requisite certificate to file action
issued by the Barangay as a mandatory requirement of the
Katarungan Pambarangay Law and the Local Government Code.
2. Grave abuse of authority for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
on a Friday to ensure complainants incarceration for two days.
3. Grave abuse of authority and bias in continuing the hearing of
the cases and for failure to act on the motion for inhibition.
4. An intention on the part of respondent to prevent complainants
appearance in court by sending an envelope, with a supposed notice
of hearing but with nothing inside.
xxxx
Respondent judge argued that under Administrative Circular No. 14-
93 dated August 3, 1993 issued by this Court as Guidelines for the
Implementation of the Barangay Conciliation Procedure, based on the
Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. 7160, which took effect on
January 1, 1992, one of the exceptions to the coverage of the circular
is Offense[s] for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of
imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine over five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00). Considering that the offenses for which accused
was charged have corresponding penalties of more than one year
there is no need for a certification to file action from the Barangay.
There was likewise no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of
warrant of arrest. The subject criminal cases were within the original
jurisdiction of the MTC and after finding probable cause against the
accused, respondent issued the questioned warrant of arrest.
Respondent pointed out that there is no law or circular issued by the
Honorable Court prohibiting the issuance of a warrant of arrest on
Friday.

With regard to the charge of grave abuse of discretion relative to the
motion for inhibition, respondent submitted that there should be a
hearing on the motion before it could be acted upon. But in spite of
the several settings of said motion the complainant as accused failed
to appear.
Respondent contended that if it were true that complainant received
an envelope from the MCTC of Laur, Nueva Ecija, without any
contents, he should have immediately informed the court about it so
that the proper action could have been done.
Lastly, respondent invited the Courts attention to the fact that
complainant was also accused of Grave Slander by Darlito Urbano
and Violeta Urbano which case were docketed as Criminal Case No.
3648-G and 3649-G, MCTC Laur-Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. It is argued
that this shows the character of Miguel Colorado.
After careful evaluation of the record of the case, the undersigned
finds merit in the neglect of respondent judge to resolve the pending
issue of the motion for inhibition which was not acted upon up to the
time of his compulsory retirement from the service.
It should be noted that respondent never gave any valid justification
for the delay in the filing of his comment. It seems that he believed
that the mere payment of the fine obliterated the charge of
contumacious refusal to obey the order of this Court. Respondent's
conduct cannot be left unnoticed by the Court. Judges are the visible
representations of law and justice, from whom the people draw the
will and inclination to obey the law (Moroo v. Lomeda, 316 Phil. 103,
July 14, 1995) How can the respondent judge expect others to
respect the law when he himself cannot obey orders as simple as the
show-cause resolution? {Longboan v. Hon. Polig (A.M. No. R-704-RTJ,
June 14, 1990, 186 SCRA 557) cited in the case of Bonifacio Guintu
v. Judge Aunario L. Lucero, A.M. No. MTJ-93-794, August 23, 1996}.
In a catena of cases this Court has unhesitatingly imposed the
penalty of dismissal on those who have persistently failed to comply
with orders requiring them either to file comment or to show cause
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
and comply. Respondent's belated filing of his comment cannot cure 137
or obliterate[d] his shortcomings with this Court. The fact remains
that he ignored the lawful directive of the Court and in fact offered no
valid justification or excuse for it. This Court could have imposed the
penalty of dismissal and forfeiture of all of respondent's retirement
benefit had it not been for this Courts compassion in allowing him to
retire with the mere retention of P20,000.00. Respondents comment
should not have been received in the first place as the same was
already considered waived pursuant to the Resolution of the
Honorable Court dated 24 August 2005.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned respectfully
recommends to the Honorable Court that:
1. Judge Ricardo M. Agapito, former judge of MCTC, Laur, Nueva
Ecija be found guilty of gross neglect for failure to act on the motion
for inhibition filed by accused-complainant and for his failure to
promptly comply with the lawful order of Court and not offering a
valid excuse therefor and should be FINED in the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000); and
2. The withheld amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000)
shall be considered the payment of the fine.[6]
We agree in toto with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
First of all, we deem it necessary to determine the applicability of
A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, a Resolution Prescribing Measures to Protect
Members of the Judiciary from Baseless and Unfounded
Administrative Complaints, which took effect on November 3, 2003.
Recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious
administrative or criminal cases against members of the judiciary for
purposes of harassment, we issued said Resolution, which provides:
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the
compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause
of action that occurred at least a year before such filing; and (c)

shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it
must forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the
case, the Office of the Court Administrator must require the
respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the
complaint, and submit to the Court a report and recommendation not
later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the comment. The Court
shall act on the recommendation before the date of compulsory
retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within
six (6) months from such date without prejudice to the release of the
retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be
withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of action
alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring
judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the complaint must have been filed within six
months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or justice; (2)
the cause of action must have occurred at least a year before such
filing; and (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass
the respondent.
In the present case, the first two requisites are present. The sworn
letter-complaint was received by the Office of the Court Administrator
on January 31, 2001. The respondent retired compulsorily from the
service barely three weeks after or on February 22, 2001; and the
ground for disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by the
respondent occurred five months before the respondents separation
from the service.
As to the third requirement, although the first and second charges
against respondent are outrightly without merit as aptly found by the
OCA, the complaint that respondent failed to act on his motion for
inhibition and intentionally prevented complainant from appearing in
a scheduled hearing was not prima facie shown to be without merit;
nor was the filing thereof shown to be intended merely to harass the
respondent.[7] Thus, the OCA correctly proceeded with the
administrative case against respondent.
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
Moreover, the fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been 138
separated from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the
complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of the
bench. As we held in Gallo v. Cordero,[8] citing Zarate v. Judge
Romanillos:[9]
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The
Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public
official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A
contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with
dreadful and dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public
official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the
government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he
deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper
and imposable under the situation.
We now go to the four charges against respondent.
1. Gross Ignorance of the law for his failure to remand or dismiss the
case in view of the absence of the requisite certificate to file action
issued by the barangay as a mandatory requirement of the
Katarungan Pambarangay Law and the Local Government Code.
As we earlier stated, the Court finds that the OCA is correct in not
finding respondent administratively liable therefor. Complainant is
charged with grave slander, the maximum penalty for which is 2
years and 4 months under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, respondent is not guilty of gross ignorance of the law in taking
jurisdiction over said criminal case, considering that prior recourse to
barangay conciliation is not required where the law provides a
maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one year.
2. Grave abuse of authority for the issuance of a warrant of arrest on
a Friday to ensure complainants incarceration for two days.

Complainant faults respondent for having been arrested on a Friday,
causing him to languish in jail for two days and two nights.
Respondent cannot be held administratively liable for this particular
matter.
Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that an arrest may be made on any day and at any time of
the day or night.
It is of no moment that the warrant of arrest was issued by
respondent on a Friday, because it is clear from the foregoing that an
arrest may be made on any day regardless of what day the warrant of
arrest was issued. Nowhere in the Rules or in our jurisprudence can
we find that a warrant of arrest issued on a Friday is prohibited.
Granting that complainant was arrested on a Friday, he was not
without recourse, as he could have posted bail for his temporary
liberty in view of Supreme Court Circular No. 95-96[10] dated
December 5, 1996, providing for a skeletal force on a Saturday from
8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. primarily to act on petitions for bail and other
urgent matters. And on Saturday afternoons, Sundays and non-
working holidays, any judge may act on bailable offenses. Thus, we
agree with the OCA that respondent did not commit grave abuse of
authority for issuing the warrant of arrest on a Friday, the same not
being prohibited by law.
3. Grave abuse of authority and bias in continuing the hearing of the
cases and for failure to act on the motion for inhibition.
While there is no evidence in support of the claim that respondent
committed grave abuse of authority and bias in continuing the
hearing of cases, we find respondent liable for failure to act upon
complainants motion for inhibition.
As borne by the records, complainant filed his motion for
respondent's inhibition sometime in September 2000 but up to the
time of respondents compulsory retirement from the judiciary on
February 22, 2001, the same remained unacted upon. Verily, the
Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST
undue delay of respondent by five months in resolving the pending 139
incident before his court erodes the peoples faith in the judiciary and
the same is tantamount to gross inefficiency. Respondents
explanation that despite the fact that the motion was set for hearing
several times, complainant repeatedly failed to appear thereat, is
untenable. Respondent must know that he may act motu proprio on
the motion for inhibition without requiring the attendance of
complainant. A judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, may
disqualify himself from sitting on a case for just or valid reasons.[11]
Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary,[12] mandates judges to perform all judicial
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly
and with reasonable promptness. Similarly, Supreme Court Circular
No. 13 dated July 1, 1987 directs judges to observe unscrupulously
the periods prescribed by the Constitution in the adjudication and
resolution of all cases or matters submitted to their court.
In Visbal v. Buban,[13] the Court held that failure to decide cases
and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction
against the erring magistrate.[14] Delay in resolving motions and
incidents pending before a judge within the reglementary period of
ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and the law is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.[15] Further, such delay
constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which mandates that a judge should dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. As a
trial judge, respondent is a frontline official of the judiciary and
should at all times act with efficiency and with probity.[16] Undue
delay in the disposition of cases and motions erodes the faith and
confidence of the people in the judiciary and unnecessarily blemishes
its stature.[17]
4. An intention on the part of respondent to prevent complainants
appearance in court by sending an envelope, with a supposed notice
of hearing but with nothing inside.
 Additional cases on Rule 113 - ARREST

Suffice it to be stated that in the absence of evidence to show that the 140
sending of an empty envelope to complainant was malicious on the
part of respondent, he cannot be held liable therefor.
Section 9 (1) and 11 (B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies gross neglect or undue delay in
rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge which carries
any of the following sanctions: suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00. We adopt the recommendation of the OCA that
respondent should be imposed a fine in the amount of
P20,000.00.[18]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Ricardo M. Agapito
guilty of gross neglect and is FINED in the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). The withheld amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.0) from respondents retirement benefits is
considered as payment of the fine.

SO ORDERED.