Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
RESEARCH
www.sagepublications.com
DOI: 10.1177/0262728005058762
VOL 25 NO 2 NOVEMBER 2005
Vol. 25(2): 183200; 058762
Copyright 2005
SAGE Publications
New Delhi,
Thousand Oaks,
London
INNER SELF, OUTER INDIVIDUAL: A
BENGALI BAUL PERSPECTIVE
Jeanne Openshaw
EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY, UK
Introduction
Writing of India in 1960, an India from which Muslims and others are excluded,
Louis Dumont (1960: 47) infamously contrasted the man-in-the-world, who is
not an individual with the renouncer, who is an individual-outside-the-world.
The latter thinks as an individual and this is the distinctive trait which opposes
him to the man-in-the-world and brings him closer to the western thinker (1960:
46). In his corollary that the agent of development in Indian religion and
speculation, the creator of values has been the renouncer, Dumont (1960: 47)
restricts sub-continental agency to non-worldly, spiritual realms, and thus joins
the ranks of those who implicitly condone interventionist imperial agendas.
Dumonts arguments triggered off a decades-long labyrinthine debate on the
individual and, by extension, the self in the South Asian context. Notable
184 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)
contributors have been Marriott (1976), who broadly supported Dumont with his
notion of the dividual, a concept subsequently deployed beyond the subcontinent
by Marilyn Strathern (1988, 1994). Against or at least qualifying Dumonts
arguments, we find a whole array of scholars, such as Beteille (1986), Burghart
(1983a, 1983b), Thapar (1978, 1979, 1982), Das (1982), Khare (1984) and
Mines (1988, 1994, 1999).
Such are the siren attractions of this body of material that subsequent
contributors to these topics have tended to be lured on to the rocks of the
original, arguably misleading, terms of the debate. Not only does this framing of
the subject inevitably dwarf any new material brought to bear on it, simply
because of the sheer volume of the collected contributions; it also inevitably
subordinates it to its own terms.
In this article I propose to consider the concept of the I or the self as
interpreted by a Bengali Baul guru, Raj Khyapa (18691946) and one of his
disciples, commonly known as Sats Das (1885c.1965),2 in their songs and other
writings. Oral historical accounts from other descendants by initiation, as well as
non-initiates, are also brought to bear on the subject.
My aim is to consider the subject in the context of Bengali theories of various
provenances, Hindu and Muslim, householder and renouncer, rather than
highlighting its distinctiveness in relation to presumed western assumptions and
models, as Dumont and others tend to do (Searle-Chatterjee and Sharma, 1994:
56). This is conducive to a less essentialized and homogenized perspective on
what in fact is the subject of overt debate and dispute concerning the status and
identity of the self.
An especially valuable source in this respect is a unique prose manuscript
(Text X) by Sats. In contrast to typical univocal bartaman-panth verse texts
which aspire to polished, closed ideological positions, Satss text follows a
question-answer rubric based on dialogue between guru and disciple. It thus
reflects the frankness typical of such oral interchanges. Alternative and even
opposing views are placed in the mouth of a sometimes reluctant disciple, to be
countered by a barrage of rational argument, analogy and textual legitimization
from the guru (Sats). This format serves to contextualize the teachings of Raj
(and Sats) against a background of various local and pan-Indian traditions.
Emphasis is therefore on active deployment, manipulation and creation of ideas by
actors, as opposed to the Dumontian portrayal of them as passive and un-
comprehending recipients of their culture.
First some background. In the early 1980s, I began what was to be lengthy
fieldwork on the so-called Bauls in West Bengal, India. It soon dawned on me
that one of my few advantages was that, in contrast to almost every Bengali, and
not a few foreigners, who knew exactly what Bauls are, I knew I did not know.
Eventually, I decided to abandon the word Baul itself in favour of another, rather
clumsy, term: bartaman-panth (followers of bartaman). The reasons for this have
been discussed at length elsewhere (Openshaw, 2002: 11317). Here, suffice it to
say that, especially in the case of the community of initiates who became the focus
of my work, that of Raj Khyapa and his followers, the word Baul, unlike
bartaman, is rarely used as an actors category. Moreover, a primary referent of the
Openshaw: Inner Self, Outer Individual 185
word Baul among the influential, educated classes, who are unambiguously not
Baul in any sense, is to otherworldly, itinerant, male mystics and singers, a notion
which not only over-homogenizes an immensely complex field, but in effect masks
a powerful critique of traditional socio-religious theory and practice, concerning,
inter alia, householder, renouncer and even gender hierarchies.
For present purposes, the word bartaman may loosely be rendered the here-
now (more precisely the existent or the living). Specific bartaman-panth
connotations include what is ascertainable by the senses, and therefore based on
ones own judgement. Bartaman is defined, by its followers, in opposition to
another category, anuman, by which they mean: guesswork, hearsay, or even
delusion (Openshaw, 1997b). For bartaman-panths, anuman in effect means
orthodoxy/orthopraxy (Hindu and Muslim), and therefore connotes a wide
variety of practices legitimized with reference to authorized scripture: smarta and
sariyati rituals, as well as social and religious divisions, such as those of caste or
religious community.3 Bartaman-panths recruit adults, largely from the rural poor,
and from both Hindu and Muslim communities. As such they may also be
considered unorthodox Vaishnavas and Fakirs respectively. Technically they may
be householders or renouncers. In contrast to lite Bengali perceptions of the lone,
male Baul, there are necessarily as many women as men, for esoteric practice
(sadhana) involves a partner of the opposite sex.
Bauls (and bartaman-panths) are primarily known to others through their
compelling and often cryptic songs, which thus form an inevitable part of research
on this topic. Songs were never my primary focus, but those of Raj Khyapa,
which I began to encounter after a couple of years work, impressed me for their
uncompromising critique of the guru (see below). This in turn is related to their
high valuation of the female partner in esoteric practice, and by extension to
women in general.
Some of the songs by Raj that I had been hearing concerned the self, or
.
rather, in Bengali: ami, atma, atma, ahan. In standard colloquial Bengali, these
terms have differing yet overlapping parameters, and may roughly be rendered
respectively as I, the self , the Self and the ego. As a concept which shares
meanings with atma (self ), and even atma (Self ), the I (ami) lends itself, in
Bengali, to fruitful ambiguities, creatively drawn on by Raj and others.4 Of
particular importance in the present context is the identity of each individual I
with the high Hindu notion of the Self, uncontroversial, indeed entirely
conventional, at first sight, but in practice developed by bartaman-panths in
extremely radical ways. Replying to his putative disciple as to what is self-
knowledge (atma-jnan), Sats, as the guru, replies: Self-knowledge is to realize that
I am that supreme god (ami-i sei paramesvar, Text X: 39). In fact, Raj and other
bartaman-panths tend to equate all these various terms. Sats is typically
unambiguous in asserting that the I, the self , the Self , and the ego are simply
different words for the same thing (Text X: 149; Text Y: 12).
Ami is the Bengali word for the first person pronoun, I. As such it is clearly
rooted in the experience and action of particular individuals. It thus forms a set
with second and third person pronouns. Of the three grades of second person
(singular) pronoun, the tumi form is traditionally paired with ami in the various
186 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)
debates, considered below, concerning the meaning and relative value of I versus
you. Significantly in the present context, this is the second person form typically
used between lovers, and by devotees of their deity. However, ami also means the
I, in the sense of the self/Self .5 Thus one of Rajs more infamous statements,
ami sab can be translated I am everything or the I/self is everything, an
ambiguity exploited both by bartaman-panths such as Raj, as well as their
opponents. Raj and his followers invoke the latter meaning to deny the
egocentricity and wilfulness which their adversaries attribute to them using the
former meaning.
Raj opens one of his songs (No. 94) with the familiar question: Who am I? [or
who is the I?], Ke ami . . . ?, to which we will return below.6 This and similar
inner-oriented queries are common approaches to metaphysical realities, both in
Bengali and wider sub-continental culture from at least the Upanishadic era. Another
song begins: O bird of my mind, let me see you consider the truth (or the theory) of
the self. (Atmatattva bicar kara dekhi ore man pakhi . . .) (Song 93).
At the same time as hearing and reading such songs, I was collecting oral
histories on Raj himself and was eventually to find Rajs own handwritten verse
autobiography, his Jban-carit. In conversations about Raj, particularly with non-
disciples, two subjects constantly recurred. One was his scandalous love affair and
elopement with a lower caste woman and disciple (Raj was born Brahmin and by
then was a renouncer of otherwise indeterminate status). The other was his notion
of the self (the ami), a clearly problematic issue, even for his disciples, connected
as it is with a perceived iconoclasm, specifically a destruction of the hierarchies of
both householder and renouncer life.
Eventually, I realized that these two topics were connected in interesting ways.
These links became clear from Rajs manuscript, not only in the connections
between the autobiography and the songs, but especially in texts intermediate to,
and more personal than these public compositions. It seems likely that it was, at
least in part, Rajs love for Rajesvar (literally Lord of Raj a male name
apparently given to her by Raj) which propelled him from a position of Vedantic/
Tantric eclecticism as a guru, to an unambiguous commitment to the path of
bartaman. His new Vais.n.ava/bartaman milieu was particularly favourable to the
identification of their love affair with the legendary illicit relationship of the
Brahmin Can.d.das and the low caste washerwoman Ram, or even with the
adulterous affair of the divine lovers, Kr.s.n.a and Radha. This kind of extra-social
love, free from the constraints governing householder conjugal relationships, gains
legitimacy precisely to the extent that it transcends and violates social structures,
another integral feature of the path of bartaman.
However this did not solve all of Rajs problems, because not all bartaman-
panths accepted this equation. After all, he and his lover had transgressed the
boundaries not only of householder society, but also of renouncer society; for
Rajesvar was commonly seen as Rajs disciple. Attack from this latter quarter was
no doubt conducive to the extension and sharpening of Rajs critique, which
began to encompass the structures of renouncer and even bartaman-panth society,
along with those of householder society. I have previously argued (Openshaw,
1998) that, of the three gurus taken by Hindu bartaman-panths in particular, the
Openshaw: Inner Self, Outer Individual 187
boundaries (see also Marriott, 1976). For Raj, Sats and others, on the contrary, it
is deployed in such a way as to valorize individual selves and indeed to legitimize
their self-determination. After all, according to them, each human being is that
one self , if only s/he could realize it.
As a corollary of turning inwards, Raj and other Bauls therefore emphasize
interiority and subjectivity (the I) in the sense of relying on ones own experience
and judgement as opposed to that of others. A corollary of this interpretation is
that control of ones destiny is thereby withdrawn from powerful beings such as
God/deities and the religious and social lite and restored to oneself. So while in
one sense this assimilation of everything to oneself is consonant with the
Vaishnava culture of interiority, the affective tone of the I concept is not at all
consonant with orthodox Vaishnavism, which recommends devotees to be
humble as grass and patient as a tree (Dimock, 1966: 111). These are qualities
diametrically opposite to those implied by the ami concept, at least as interpreted
by the more conventional. On a common sense level, Raj in particular can hardly
be said to have been humble or patient. Outside the realm of certain strands of
lite and folk philosophical theory, as is evident from the material considered
below, this kind of inner-directedness can at times be interpreted by others as
egotism or arrogance. Thus, in realizing and affirming the self, those in bartaman
can at times appear to others to be very individualistic.
Rajs treatment of the I relates specifically to the bartaman-panth esteem for
the human being as opposed to invisible, transcendent deities on the one hand,
and to icons on the other. Thus, instead of worshipping Kr.s.n.a, the idea is that, in
the local Vais.hn.ava idiom, every man is Kr.s.n.a and every woman Radha, or
alternatively, every person is both together.
Since the tendency is for bartaman-panths of Hindu origin to orient their
critique to Hindu practices, and for those of Muslim origin to focus on Islamic
practices, the brunt of Rajs attack was on icons. Faced with conventional
religiosity, he was wont to throw down the gauntlet: Who [the hell] is your Kal?
Who is your Siva? (Ke tor Kal? Ke tor Sib?). I am Kal! [The I is Kal!] (Ami
Kal). Not unexpectedly, local Hindus often disliked this in-your-face iconoclasm.
Such statements apparently led to at least one of his ashrams being razed to the
ground, and contributed to his lack of acceptance in the Birbhum village he
settled in with his lover. I was told by a local deed writer, not unsympathetic to
Raj: He didnt respect images and deities. He would challenge people: Show me
where your deity is! [The implication here is of course that what is not
perceptible to the senses, or living that is, bartaman is worthless]. He would
add: I am Brahma, I am everything (or, The I is Brahma. The I is
everything). People here are of the opposite path, continued the deed-writer.
We didnt agree with him (Openshaw 2002: 121).
Rajs opponents in this case were householders, but many renouncers would
have reacted in the same way. The Vaishnava espousal of modesty, described
above, is consonant with an orientation to authority figures such as (male) gurus,
as well as deities, and the power of their grace or at least their ability to raise the
disciple to their own elevated state. The total rejection of hierarchy implied in the
I am everything/ the I is everything (ami sab) stance of Raj and some other
190 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)
Raja, a popular Muslim composer of Baul songs from Sylhet, was more even-
handed. Although his preference seems to lie with the I (see below), he
nevertheless included some songs extolling the superiority of the you (tumi). For
example (Cakrabart 1992: 73):
Hasan Raja says, I am nothing [or the I is nothing] . . .
I look without and within and see only the merciful one . . ..
Hasan rajay kay, ami kichu nayre, ami kichu nay
Antare baire dekhi, (kebal) dayamay . . .
Interestingly, in Rajs case, there are no songs extolling the you (tumi) position.
The complexities of Lalans position on the I, which differ from Rajs, cannot be
dealt with here. Suffice it to say that for both composers, the essential question in
life is Who am I? [Who is the I?]. However Lalan tends either to
discriminate between different kinds or levels of the I (or to shroud the answer
in mystery), while Raj and Sats clearly state the unity (or rather non-duality) of
the I.
The concept of I (ami) is used by Raj to dissolve distinctions between
human and divine, and between person and person and also between I and thou
(here man and woman respectively). Song 94 concerning Knowledge of the self
(Atmatattva) opens with the traditional question Who am I? (Ke ami?). Raj
immediately establishes his credentials by evoking authoritative texts and ideas:
Who am I? I roam the universe, wandering in the form of the inner Self
[conventionally God antaryyam].
[The I] is everywhere in the three worlds, and within everyone in the form of the
Self (atma).
Ke ami jagate bhrami, antaryyam rupe phere,
Trijagatmay sarbbatre ray atma rupe sarbbantare.
Gradually, however, the tone changes. Rajs own arguments take over, and the
focus shifts to socio-religious structures and hierarchies:
. . . You, s/he, this person, that person, we hear many names [terms of address and
reference];
We know it is the same supreme self which has taken many forms.
Everyone whom I approach and ask says I, I.
There is nothing else apart from I, the one I is everywhere.
Go and ask Hindu, Muslim and Christian one by one,
In reply you will get nothing but I.
Father son, guru disciple, Brahmin Kshatriya Vaisya,
All are merged in the I. The pure and the impure, all will be one . . .
Tumi tini ini uni bahu nam hayeche suni,
Eki paramatma jani bahu rupe dharan kare.
Ami yar kache yai yare sudhai ami ami bale sabai
Ami bhinna ar anya nai, ek ami ache sarbbatre.
Hindu musalman khr.s.t.ane jijnas yao jane jane
Tar pratyuttare ami bine ar anya kichu pabe nare.
Pita putra guru sis.ya brahman ks.atriya baisya
Amite mise sarbbasya suci muci sab ek habe re.
192 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)
The song concludes with an attack not just on the gurus of householder and
renouncer worlds, but clearly on the specifically bartaman-panth training guru
also, an example of Raj burning the house of anyone who wants to follow him:
. . . Whoever says that the guru pervades the world is lost in delusion.
Why does your guru refer to himself as I, just as you do?
If truly there is no one in the three worlds apart from the guru,
then why do you wish to be delivered from this earthly life?
Guru, guru is forever on your lips, but tell me, who labours [in esoteric practice]
for the guru?
The I predominates in everyone. One always thinks what will become of me?
Whats the use of practice (sadhana) to one who is ignorant of the theory of the
.
self (ahan)?
Raj exhorts himself: Get to know the reality of the self (atma tattva).
Guru jagat may ye bale, se ache bhrantite bhule
Tumar guru kena ami bale (ar) tumio ami bala re.
Yadi satya guru bine ar keha nai tribhubane
Tabe kena bhaba mane ami kise yai bhabapare.
Mukhe guru guru kebal, gurur janye ke sadhe bala
(Sabar) antare amit.a prabal, sada bhabe amar ki habe re.
.
Ahan tattva ye na jane tar ki prayojan sadhane (ache)
Raj bale ekatra mane atma tattva jene nere.
With these notions of the supreme self, and of all being merged in the I etc.,
bartaman-panths draw on folk versions of high Hindu (Vedantic) philosophy, and
indeed such views are identified by bartaman-panths and non-initiates as non-
dualism. Equally this philosophy of non-dualism is brought to bear on social and
economic as well as religious and metaphysical spheres, and can thus be used to
legitimate a highly radical agenda. I have often heard even uninitiated rural
Bengalis, Muslims as well as Hindus, explain non-dualism as non-differentiation
and non-discrimination in a highly radical sense, for example, in terms of lack of
possessiveness (for example, of land, wealth and women).
The more conventionally religious would rarely draw such radical corollaries of
course. Even where theoretical or ultimate identity between cosmic and individual
being is affirmed, they prefer to maintain some kind of distinction. They talk about
the small versus the big I, or (partly in order to differentiate disciple from guru) the
undeveloped self versus the developed (guru) self (ka ca ami versus paka ami), a
distinction affirmed by the Bengali sage Ramakrishna. A fundamental mistrust of
ones own judgement, at least for the present, is therefore retained.
Sats, on the other hand, stridently rejects incipient hierarchies reintroduced
into a basically non-dual framework (Text X: 150). In this he was clearly reflecting
the ideas of his guru, Raj. He tells his hypothetical disciple: All Is are one and
. .
the same. Many say that the I which is the sohahan [sohan] is not this I.10
This is an error. The I is always the same. This I and that I are never two.
And he also firmly denies any distinction between the undeveloped and developed
self (ka ca ami and paka ami).
The lack of differentiation between selves (even human and cosmic) the ami
sab, ami svar position allows one to validate ones own experience and agency,
Openshaw: Inner Self, Outer Individual 193
and formed part of Rajs argument (with himself and others) for his eventual
elopement with his lover. This also connects with an emphasis on the here-now
(bartaman): here, in the sense of ones own body and its experiences; now, in that
it is present experience and agency which is validated, rather than an anticipated
perfection attained through esoteric practice.
As pointed out earlier, this philosophy of the I is not confined to Bauls of
Hindu origin. To cite a recent incident, a member of the CPI-ML (Communist
Party of India Marxist-Leninist) was extolling the virtues of Mao Tse Tung to a
group of villagers a couple of years ago. A Muslim Baul who happened to be in
the audience retorted, in words exactly like those reported of Raj: Who [the hell]
is your Mao Tse Tung? (ke tomar Mao Tse Tung). I am Mao Tse Tung (ami Mao
Tse Tung!). Here again there is a creative ambiguity between I am Mao Tse Tung
and The I is Mao Tse Tung. Although either way the import is to bring to
earth a revered figure, the first interpretation (I am . . . rather than The I
is . . .) has a different affective tone of challenge, and, to others, of an
inappropriate lack of humility. The crucial issue in all this, concerning autonomy,
emerges clearly in a verse by Sats (Text Y: 30):
I shall believe in my own knowledge, my own wisdom. I shall never follow
hearsay (suna katha) and guesswork/inference (anuman). . . . Because of delusion
(maya), I forget that I am the lord (bhagaban). I think I am a wretched being
(ks.udra jb) and that god is invisible and far away in the sky. I imagine god in the
void, raise my hands to heaven and ask him to save me. The one who can save me
is not far away. It is only I (ami-i) who can save myself.
As in the case of the Muslim Baul, here is the same resistance to authority, divine
or otherwise. The anti-deferential sentiment, the strident affirmation of autonomy
is exactly the same.
These attitudes are and were widely known through instruction, discussion
and debate, including songs. Unsurprisingly, they are contested by more conven-
tional opponents. In the 1980s, a Vaishnava tract called Sahajiya Dalan, claiming
to draw on much older works, attacks those, such as Sahajiyas and Bauls, who
refuse to worship Lord Kr.s.n.a, but claim to be God themselves (nijerai svar sajiye
basibe, SD II: 51). It continues: They do not wish to admit that Srsr Caitanya
Mahaprabhu is lord (bhagaban). Instead, in order to establish their own opinion
(mat), they assert I am that lord . . . I am that god, I am that revered Krishna-
Caitanya (Das Brahmacar,1389 B.S., II: 59).
Hasan Raja, a Baul of Muslim origin mentioned earlier, reveals that the
reaction of orthodox Muslims and Hindus to such ideas tended to be alike. He
writes in a song (Cakrabart, 1992: 72, Song no. 23):
After due thought, I see clearly that all is I . . .
[For this] people speak ill of me.
From I Allah and his prophet come; . . .
From I come the heavens and earth; everything comes from I; . . .
I shall surely be killed if my countrymen take me at my word; . . .
See, whoever knows ones self knows God.
Bicar kari caiya dekhi sakale-i ami . . .
Amare karilay bad-nami.
194 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)
conception, experience and value of the self for example gender, age, class,
caste and education have usually been subordinated or ignored in favour of
over-homogenized, oppositional models of East and West.
Proponents of such models (for example Dumont and, to a lesser extent,
Marriott) have generally dismissed evidence of individualism in South Asian
householder society as the product of modernity. While there is little doubt of the
association with modernity of individualism of certain kinds, the material in this
article supplements a mass of evidence from South Asian philosophic traditions,
generally ignored by social scientists, that many of its roots are more traditional,
more diverse and far older. The debates outlined above are in fact relatively recent,
popular or folk-philosophical Bengali equivalents of a long-standing concern with
the person, the self and the individual on the part of Indian philosophy.
Of course there is another reason for the apparent modernity of individualism
in South Asia, namely the limitations of our sources. Any constructions of the
individual of the anti-structural sort outlined above, more usually transmitted
through oral rather than written traditions, would clearly be vulnerable to the
typical evanescence of sources of this kind and provenance. Where written
materials are concerned, the manuscripts used in this article were discovered
through sheer serendipity. Even Sats, who laboured to produce a finished bound
volume, lamented his inability to publish the work owing to penury (Text X:
introduction). The fate of heterodox South Asian schools of materialism
(Lokayata), now known almost entirely through the work of their opponents, is
probably not untypical of many other radical ideologies and interpretations, of
which there is no trace at all.
Conclusion
Finally, a return to notions of the I and the self. As shown above, from the
perspective of antaranga (inner reality), Raj and others articulate an all-
encompassing self without limits or boundaries. However, those who looked at
him from the perspective of bahiranga (outer reality) saw him as an obdurate
individual whose will opposed that of others. For them, he was a self, isolated
from, and ranged against, other selves, and, more importantly, against social
entities such as caste and lineage.
At first sight, the association of bahiranga with householders or rather non-
initiates, presents an interesting contradiction with Dumonts denial of in-
dividuality to precisely these sections of society, in contrast with his parallel
attribution of individuality to renouncers of the world. The sense of contradiction
is diminished if one recalls Dumonts defence against critics: that the term
individuality should only be applied to the individual as a value (rather than as
experienced, for example) a prescription that Dumont himself conspicuously
failed to follow, as the quotes at the beginning of this article reveal. On the other
side of the equation, Dumonts characterization of the renouncer is more
problematic for, from the emic point of view, the ideal renouncer represents or
even is the supreme self. In this respect, contra Dumont, he is not valued as an
Openshaw: Inner Self, Outer Individual 197
individual at all, but as one who recognizes the delusion involved in the very
notion of individuality.
Interestingly Rajs opponents share much in common with him as he portrays
himself in the first, householder section of his autobiography. As a conventional
householder, he too was against anything that caused separation or division within
the we unit of householder life. The anguish felt by Raj at the flight of his
younger uncle to become a renouncer, at the departure of his older uncle to set up
a separate household, along with his attempts to rectify this situation, form the
bulk of the autobiography. The other main theme, the death of various members
of the we group, is simply another kind of separation. The same logic lay behind
the opposition of Rajs critics to his role in the separation of a woman from her
husband and young children.
The difference between this early Raj and the later Raj of the songs is that
whereas the concern of the former was for the conventional kin unit, the latter
Raj had expanded his horizons to include, in some sense, the entire macrocosm.
In this sense therefore, Raj was consistent throughout in opposing division, and
.
discrimination (hinsa), whether in householder or renouncer society. For this
reason, the later Raj opposes precisely the householder structures he was
previously so bound to for it is these, which, viewed from this new perspective,
divide person and person.
For bartaman-panths, the totality or the macrocosm may be replicated at
various levels, including the individual and the malefemale pair, in this case Raj
and his lover, Rajesvar. Significantly, of course, it excludes conventional units such
as caste, lineage and religious community. Raj opposes all those who separate him
from Rajesvar; unlike him, they are restricted by householder/renouncer hier-
archies and conventions.
Scholars, such as Dumont, are compelled by their theory to identify
renunciation with a total transformation of the person (from non-individual to
individual), and indeed, this reflects indigenous ideas of the death of the social
being at this juncture. However, this model is commonly acknowledged, by
participants and outsiders, to be an ideal (that is, something to be worked at,
through change of name and abode, separation from kith and kin, etc.) rather
than a ready-made reality. The argument here is that consideration of the notions
of I and the self from the perspective of outer and inner realities reflects the
continuity of experience between householders and renouncers. For in both
statuses the value is the same: against division, or alienation within the unit. The
difference is in the constitution of the unit, from the social kin/group, to the
individual or paired body or the totality of being. This continuity between
householder and renouncer is, in my view, more plausible than the radical
discontinuity envisaged by Dumont. For the same reason, there is no need to
posit a new development, or a disruption of a primordial culture, along with
modernity, in order to explain cases of apparently increasing degrees of in-
dividualism among householders. Finally, the perspective of inner and outer
realities also enables consideration of commonalities in Hindu and Muslim theory
and practice, whereas Dumonts focus on the renouncer as the essence of
Hinduism precludes Muslims from the analysis.
198 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)
Notes
1 Except where otherwise stated, quotations are from my field notes, or from various
unpublished manuscripts written by Raj Khyapa and his followers. Quotations from
these sources retain the spelling of the original. Where secondary sources are cited, the
diacritical mark system (or lack of it) of these sources is reproduced. The standard
system of transliteration (as exemplified by Anderson, 1962) has otherwise been
followed, with minor modifications.
2 Sats was technically of Jat-Vais.n.ava caste (where Vais.n.ava functions as a caste
identity). He preferred the name Sats Majumdar (his fathers surname) or (Svam)
Saccidananda, the name given him by Raj along with the robes of renunciation.
3 Anuman is a term in Hindu philosophy meaning inference, one of the means to valid
knowledge (praman.a). For more on anuman-bartaman, see Openshaw (2002: 1147,
192200).
4 In standard colloquial Bengali, all these different terms have a wide range of meanings,
many of which overlap. However, each tends to have certain semantic emphases, which
cannot be reflected here in translation. My main concern in what follows is with the
ways in which Raj and his followers use these terms.
5 The phrase self/Self is dualistic in a way which Raj and others would have rejected.
Where self is used below, this should be understood as also encompassing Self .
6 There is of course an ambiguity in this phrase, which is destroyed in translation, for it
means either, or both, who am I? or who is the I (the self )?.
7 Mines (1994: 1213) has also used a similar contrast in connection with individuality,
but the connotations are different. For example, he associates the distinction with Tamil
culture in general, whereas that invoked by Raj is largely confined to initiates and
renouncers. For Mines, both perspectives are available simultaneously to all persons,
where for Raj and others a presumably permanent shift in perspective is involved,
although those aware of antaranga, such as Raj, clearly recall the bahiranga perspective.
In his discussion of the Hindu concept of the self, Morris (1994: 79) also draws a
distinction between a material or phenomenal self, and an inner self . . ..
8 The Kat.ha Upanishad speaks of the inner self (antaratman) . . . who makes his one
form manifold, and according to the Taittirya Upanishad: He desired: Would that I
were many . . . (Radhakrishnan and Moore, 1957: 48, 60).
9 Muslim Bauls tend to be poor (as their alternative name, Fakir, suggests) and with
little formal education, especially in the classical Islamic languages, Arabic and Persian.
However, they sing both sides of the debate between the merits of these classical
languages versus the vernacular with remarkable impartiality and conviction (the
audience decides who wins) even though all singers are in fact on the side of the
vernacular (Isherwood, 1990).
.
10 Sohan I am that is a famous maxim (mahabakya), indicating non-dual, ultimate
reality.
References
Anderson, J.D. (1962) A Manual of the Bengali Language. New York: Frederick Ungar.
Beteille, A. (1986) Individualism and Equality, Current Anthropology 27(2): 12134.
Bharati, A. (1985) The Self in Hindu Thought and Action, in A.J. Marsella, G. DeVos
and F.L. Hsu (eds) Culture and Self: Asian and Western Perspectives (pp. 185230).
London and New York: Tavistock.
Openshaw: Inner Self, Outer Individual 199
Burghart, Richard (1983a) Renunciation in the Religious Traditions of South Asia, Man
(N.S.) 18: 63553.
Burghart, Richard (1983b) Wandering Ascetics of the Ramanand Sect, History of Religions
22(4): 36179.
Cakrabart, Mr.dul Kanti (ed.) (1992) Hasan Raja, ta r ganer tar. Dhaka: Bangla Academy.
Das Brahmacar, Madan Mohan (ed. and trans.) (1389 B.S.) Sahajiya Dalan: O
.
Srsrcaitanya prem-dharmmer dks.a siks.agurur mmansa (2 vols). Shantipur.
Das, Veena (1982) (1977) Structure and Cognition: Aspects of Hindu Caste and Ritual.
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Dimock Jr, E.C. (1966) The Place of the Hidden Moon: Erotic Mysticism in the Vais.n.ava-
sahajiya Cult of Bengal. Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press.
Dumont, Louis (1960) World Renunciation in Indian Religions, Contributions to Indian
Sociology 4: 3362.
Dumont, Louis (1970) Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and its Implications. London:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
Dumont, Louis (1987) On Individualism and Equality (A Reply to A. Beteille), Current
Anthropology 28(5): 66977.
Geertz, Clifford (2000) (1983) From the Natives Point of View: On the Nature of
Anthropological Understanding, in C. Geertz (ed.) Local Knowledge: Further Essays in
Interpretive Anthropology (pp. 5570). New York: Basic Books.
Gupta, Isvar-candra (1901) Isvar-candra Gupter granthabal.
.
Hai, Muhammad Abdul and Anoyar Pasa (1969) Isvar Gupter kabita sangraha. Dhaka:
Maola Brothers.
Haq, Muhammad Enamul (1975) A History of Sufi-ism in Bengal. Dhaka: Asiatic Society of
Bangladesh.
Heimann, B. (1964) Facets of Indian Thought. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Hess, Linda (1986) (1983) The Bjak of Kabir. Tr. Linda Hess and Shukdev Singh. Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass.
Isherwood, S. (1990) Diversity Within Islam: An Instance from Eastern India, Anthro-
pology Today 6(6): 810.
. .
Jha, Saktinath (1995) Phakir Lalan Sa i: des, kal eban silpa. Kolkata: Sanbad Prakasak.
Khare, R.S. (1984) The Untouchable as Himself: Ideology, Identity and Pragmatism Among the
Lucknow Chamars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lamb, Sarah (2000) White Saris and Sweet Mangos: Aging, Gender and Body in North India.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Marriott, McKim (1976) Hindu Transactions: Diversity Without Dualism, in B. Kapferer
(ed.) Transaction and Meaning: Directions in the Anthropology of Exchange and Symbolic
Behaviour (pp. 10942). Philadelphia, PA: I.S.H.I.
Mines, M. (1988) Conceptualizing the Person: Hierarchical Society and Individual
Autonomy in India, American Anthropologist 90: 56879.
Mines, M. (1994) Public Faces, Private Voices: Community and Individuality in South India.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Mines, M. (1999) Heterodox Lives: Agonistic Individuality and Agency in South Indian
History, in R. Guha and J.P. Parry (eds) Institutions and Inequalities: Essays in Honour of
Andre Beteille (pp. 20933). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morris, B. (1994) The Hindu Conception of the Self , in Anthropology of the Self: The
Individual in Cultural Perspectives (pp. 7095). London and Boulder, CO: Pluto Press.
Openshaw, Jeanne (1997a) The Radicalism of Tagore and the Bauls of Bengal, South Asia
Research 17(1): 2036.
200 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)
Openshaw, Jeanne (1997b) The Web of Deceit: Challenges to Hindu and Muslim
Orthodoxies by Bauls of Bengal, Religion 27: 297309.
Openshaw, Jeanne (1998) Killing the Guru: Anti-hierarchical Tendencies of Bauls of
Bengal, Contributions to Indian Sociology 32(1): 119.
Openshaw, Jeanne (2002) Seeking Bauls of Bengal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Radhakrishnan, S. and C.A. Moore (eds) (1957) A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sarkar, Sumit (1984) The Conditions and Nature of Subaltern Militancy: Bengal From
Swadeshi to Non-Co-operation, c.190522, in Ranajit Guha (ed.) Subaltern Studies III,
(pp. 271320). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Searle-Chatterjee, M. and Ursula Sharma (1994) Contextualising Caste: Post-Dumontian
Approaches. Oxford: Blackwell.
Spiro, M.E. (1993) Is the Western Conception of the Self Peculiar within the Context of
World Cultures?. Ethos 21: 107153.
Strathern, Marilyn (1988) The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with
Society in Melanesia. Berkeley, PA and London: University of California Press.
Strathern, Marilyn (ed.) (1994) Shifting Contexts: Transformations in Anthropological
Knowledge. London and New York: Routledge.
Thapar, Romila (1978) Renunciation: The Making of a Counter-culture?, in R. Thapar
Ancient Indian Social History: Some Interpretations (pp. 63104). New Delhi: Orient
Longman.
Thapar, Romila (1979) Dissent and Protest in the Early Indian Tradition, Studies in
History 1(2): 17795.
Thapar, Romila (1982) The Householder and the Renouncer in the Brahmanical and
Buddhist Traditions, in T.N. Madan (ed.) Way of Life, King, Householder, Renouncer:
Essays in Honour of Louis Dumont (pp. 27398). New Delhi: Vikas.