Luego v. Civil Service Commission (G. R. No.

L-69137)

Posted: August 10, 2011 in Case Digests, Political Law

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by
Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described as permanent but the
Civil Service Commission approved it as temporary. On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service Commission
found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly
directed herein private respondent in place of petitioners position. The private respondent was so
appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his
earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service Commissions order and the
private respondents title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of
this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to
determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being
limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service
Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has
no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil
Service Commissions resolution is set aside.

G.R. No. 134990 April 27, 2000

MANUEL M. LEYSON JR., petitioner,

vs.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, TIRSO ANTIPORDA, Chairman, UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and
OSCAR A. TORRALBA, President, CIIF Oil Mills, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 7 February 1996 International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC), a domestic corporation
engaged in the lighterage or shipping business, entered into a one (1)-year contract with Legaspi Oil
Company, Inc. (LEGASPI OIL), Granexport Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEXPORT) and United
Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNITED COCONUT), comprising the Coconut Industry Investment Fund
(CIIF) companies, for the transport of coconut oil in bulk through MT Transasia. The majority
shareholdings of these CIIF companies are owned by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as
administrator of the CIIF. Under the terms of the contract, either party could terminate the agreement
provided a three (3)-month advance notice was given to the other party. However, in August 1996, or
prior to the expiration of the contract, the CIIF companies with their new President, respondent Oscar A.
Torralba, terminated the contract without the requisite advance notice. The CIIF companies engaged the
services of another vessel, MT Marilag, operated by Southwest Maritime Corporation.

On 11 March 1997 petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., Executive Vice President of ITTC, filed with public
respondent Office of the Ombudsman a grievance case against respondent Oscar A. Torralba. The
following is a summary of the irregularities and corrupt practices allegedly committed by respondent
Torralba: (a) breach of contract - unilateral cancellation of valid and existing contract; (b) bad faith -
falsification of documents and reports to stop the operation of MT Transasia; (c) manipulation -
influenced their insurance to disqualify MT Transasia; (d) unreasonable denial of requirement imposed;
(e) double standards and inconsistent in favor of MT Marilag; (f) engaged and entered into a contract with
Southwest Maritime Corp. which is not the owner of MT Marilag, where liabilities were waived and
whose paid-up capital is only P250,000.00; and, (g) overpricing in the freight rate causing losses of
millions of pesos to Cocochem.1

On 2 January 1998 petitioner charged respondent Tirso Antiporda, Chairman of UCPB and CIIF Oil
Mills, and respondent Oscar A. Torralba with violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act also
before the Ombudsman anchored on the aforementioned alleged irregularities and corrupt practices.

On 30 January 1998 public respondent dismissed the complaint based on its finding that

The case is a simple case of breach of contract with damages which should have been filed in the regular
court. This Office has no jurisdiction to determine the legality or validity of the termination of the
contract entered into by CIIF and ITTC. Besides the entities involved are private corporations (over)
which this Office has no jurisdiction.2

On 4 June 1998 reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint was denied. The Ombudsman was
unswayed in his finding that the present controversy involved breach of contract as he also took into
account the circumstance that petitioner had already filed a collection case before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila-Br. 15, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-83354. Moreover, the Ombudsman found that the
filing of the motion for reconsideration on 31 March 1998 was beyond the inextendible period of five (5)
days from notice of the assailed resolution on 19 March 1998. 3

Petitioner now imputes grave abuse of discretion on public respondent in dismissing his complaint. He
submits that inasmuch as Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. PCGG4 and
Republic v.Sandiganbayan5 have declared that the coconut levy funds are public funds then, conformably
with Quimpo v. Tanodbayan,6 corporations formed and organized from those funds or whose controlling
stocks are from those funds should be regarded as government owned and/or controlled corporations. As
in the present case, since the funding or controlling interest of the companies being headed by private
respondents was given or owned by the CIIF as shown in the certification of their Corporate Secretary,7 it
follows that they are government owned and/or controlled corporations. Corollarily, petitioner asserts that
respondents Antiporda and Torralba are public officers subject to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.

Petitioner alleges next that public respondent's conclusion that his complaint refers to a breach of contract
is whimsical, capricious and irresponsible amounting to a total disregard of its main point, i. e., whether
private respondents violated The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act when they entered into a contract
with Southwest Maritime Corporation which was grossly disadvantageous to the government in general
and to the CIIF in particular. Petitioner admits that his motion for reconsideration was filed out of time.
Nonetheless, he advances that public respondent should have relaxed its rules in the paramount interest of
justice; after all, the delay was just a matter of days and he, a layman not aware of technicalities,
personally filed the complaint.

Private respondents counter that the CIIF companies were duly organized and are existing by virtue of the
Corporation Code. Their stockholders are private individuals and entities. In addition, private respondents
contend that they are not public officers as defined under The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but
are private executives appointed by the Boards of Directors of the CIIF companies. They asseverate that
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was filed through the expert assistance of a learned counsel. They
then charge petitioner with forum shopping since he had similarly filed a case for collection of a sum of
money plus damages before the trial court.

The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the Ombudsman approved the recommendation of the
investigating officer to dismiss the complaint because he sincerely believed there was no sufficient basis
for the criminal indictment of private respondents.

We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman. COCOFED v. PCGG referred to in
Republic v. Sandiganbayan reviewed the history of the coconut levy funds. These funds actually have
four (4) general classes: (a) the Coconut Investment Fund created under R. A. No. 6260;8 (b) the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund created under P. D. No. 276;9 (c) the Coconut Industry Development Fund
created under P. D. No. 582; 10 and, (d) the Coconut Industry Stabilization Fund created under P. D. No.
1841. 11

The various laws relating to the coconut industry were codified in 1976. On 21 October of that year, P. D.
No. 96112 was promulgated. On 11 June 1978 it was amended by P. D. No. 1468 13 by inserting a new
provision authorizing the use of the balance of the Coconut Industry Development Fund for the
acquisition of "shares of stocks in corporations organized for the purpose of engaging in the establishment
and operation of industries . . . commercial activities and other allied business undertakings relating to
coconut and other palm oil indust(ries)." 14From this fund thus created, or the CIIF, shares of stock in
what have come to be known as the "CIIF companies" were purchased.

We then stated in COCOFED that the coconut levy funds were raised by the State's police and taxing
powers such that the utilization and proper management thereof were certainly the concern of the
Government. These funds have a public character and are clearly affected with public interest.
Quimpo v. Tanodbayan involved the issue as to whether PETROPHIL was a government owned or
controlled corporation the employees of which fell within the jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan
for purposes of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. We upheld the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan
on the ratiocination that

While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally "created" as a government-owned or controlled
corporation, after it was acquired by PNOC, which is a government-owned or controlled corporation,
PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its private status. It is now funded and
owned by the government as, in fact, it was acquired to perform functions related to government
programs and policies on oil, a vital commodity in the economic life of the nation. It was acquired not
temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform essential government or government-related functions,
as the marketing arm of the PNOC to assist the latter in selling and distributing oil and petroleum
products to assure and maintain an adequate and stable domestic supply.

But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that the CIIF companies are
government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without resorting to the definition of
"government owned or controlled corporation" contained in par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of
the Administrative Code of 1987, i. e., any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested
with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of
stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The definition
mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation;
second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and,
third, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where
applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital
stock.

In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock
corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of
GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT. 15 Obviously, the below 51%
shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or
controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT
as we go back to the second requisite. Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to
substantiate his contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/or UNITED COCONUT was
vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature unlike
PETROPHIL in Quimpo. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF companies are, as found by public
respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction.

With the foregoing conclusion, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by petitioner.

A brief note on private respondents' charge of forum shopping. Executive Secretary v. Gordon 16 is
instructive that forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
It is readily apparent that the present charge will not prosper because the cause of action herein, i. e.,
violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, is different from the cause of action in the case
pending before the trial court which is collection of a sum of money plus damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution of public respondent Office of the
Ombudsman of 30 January 1998 which dismissed the complaint of petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., as
well as its Order of 4 June 1998 denying his motion for reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 136374 February 9, 2000

FRANCISCA S. BALUYOT, petitioner,

vs.

PAUL E. HOLGANZA and the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) represented by its

Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas ARTURO C. MOJICA, Director VIRGINIA PALANCA-

SANTIAGO, and Graft Investigation Officer I ANNA MARIE P. MILITANTE, respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

FACTS: During a spot audit conducted on March 21, 1977 by a team of auditors from the Philippine

National Red Cross (PNRC) headquarters, a cash shortage of P154,350.13 was discovered in the

funds of its Bohol chapter. The chapter administrator, petitioner Francisca S. Baluyot, was held

accountable for the shortage. Thereafter, on January 8, 1998, private respondent Paul E. Holganza,

in his capacity as a member of the board of directors of the Bohol chapter, filed an affidavit-

complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman charging petitioner of malversation under Article 217

of the Revised Penal Code. However, upon recommendation by respondent Anna Marie P. Militante,

Graft Investigation Officer I, an administrative docket for dishonesty was also opened against

petitioner.

On February 6, 1998, public respondent issued an Order 3 requiring petitioner to file her counter-

affidavit to the charges of malversation and dishonesty within ten days from notice, with a warning

that her failure to comply would be construed as a waiver on her part to refute the charges, and that

the case would be resolved based on the evidence on record. On March 14, 1998, petitioner filed
her counter-affidavit, raising principally the defense that public respondent had no jurisdiction over

the controversy. She argued that the Ombudsman had authority only over government-owned or
controlled corporations, which the PNRC was not. On August 21, 1998, public respondent issued the first
assailed Order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. It further scheduled a clarificatory hearing on the
criminal aspect of the complaint and a preliminary conference on its administrative aspect on September
2, 1998. Petitioner received the order on August 26, 1998 and she filed a motion for reconsiderationthe
next day. On October 28, 1998, public respondent issued the second assailed Order denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this recourse.

We dismiss the petition.

HELD: Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the

controversy since the PNRC is allegedly a private voluntary organization. The following

circumstances, she insists, are indicative of the private character of the organization:

(1) the PNRC does not receive any budgetary support from the government, and that all money

given to it by the latter and its instrumentalities become private funds of the organization;

(2) funds for the payment of personnel's salaries and other emoluments come from yearly fund

campaigns, private contributions and rentals from its properties; and

(3) it is not audited by the Commission on Audit.

Petitioner states that the PNRC falls under the International Federation of Red Cross, a Switzerland-

based organization, and that the power to discipline employees accused of misconduct,

malfeasance, or immorality belongs to the PNRC Secretary General by virtue of Section "G", Article

IX of its by-laws.

She threatens that "to classify the PNRC as a government-owned or controlled

corporation would create a dangerous precedent as it would lose its neutrality, independence and

impartiality . . . .

Practically the same issue was addressed in Camporedondo v. National Labor Relations

Commission, et. al.,

10
where an almost identical set of facts obtained. Petitioner therein was the administrator of the Surigao
del Norte chapter of the PNRC. An audit conducted by a field auditor

revealed a shortage in the chapter funds in the sum of P109,000.00. When required to restitute
the
amount of P135,927.78, petitioner therein instead applied for early retirement, which was denied
by
the Secretary General of the PNRC. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages against PNRC before the National Labor Relations Commission. In turn,
PNRC moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, averring that PNRC
was
a government corporation whose employees are embraced by civil service regulation. The labor
arbiter dismissed the complaint, and the Commission sustained his order. The petitioner assailed
the
dismissal of his complaint via a petition for certiorari, contending that the PNRC is a private
organization and not a government-owned or controlled corporation. In dismissing the petition,
we
ruled thus:
Resolving the issue set out in the opening paragraph of this opinion, we rule that the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government owned and controlled
corporation, with an original charter under Republic Act No. 95, as amended. The
test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private
in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public
function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special
charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are
under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members
of the Government Service Insurance System. The PNRC was not "impliedly
converted to a private corporation" simply because its charter was amended to vest
in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes,
fees and other charges of all kinds on all importations and purchases for its exclusive
use, on donations for its disaster relief work and other services and in its benefits and
fund raising drives, and be allotted one lottery draw a year by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office for the support of its disaster relief operation in addition to its
existing lottery draws for blood program.
Clearly then, public respondent has jurisdiction over the matter, pursuant to Section 13, of
Republic
Act No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", to wit:
Sec. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers
or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in ever case where the evidence warrants in
order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
11
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner
G.R. No. 95445 August 6, 1991

MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIER MERLIN

ANONUEVO, MINDA GALANG and other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated,
petitioners-appellants,

vs.

HON. ISIDRO CARIO in his capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports

Facts: September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular school day. There is no
question that the some 800 teachers who joined the mass action did not conduct their classes on that day;
instead, as alleged in the petition in G.R. No. 95590, 4 they converged at the LiwasangBonifacio in the
morning whence they proceeded to the National Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sport
(DECS) for a whole-day assembly.

Issue: Do public teachers have the right to strike?

Ruling : NO,THE MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION HAS NO RIGHT TO

STRIKE DURING CLASS HOURS.

The dissenting opinions, however, would anchor their defense of the public school teachers on
their right to petition the government for redress of grievances.

SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions demands concerning the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary
restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners
contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the
jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor
dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules
and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the
court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On
one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,

subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s.
1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable
laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all
government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and
other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.
Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from
doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as government employees
and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil
Service Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in
labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a
writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

Bitonio vs. COA

Post under case digests, Political Law at Friday, March 09, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of
Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. As representative of the Secretary of Labor
to the PEZA Board, he was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years
1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per
diems to Mr. Bitonio pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling declaring unconstitutional the holding of other
offices by the cabinet members, their deputies and assistants in addition to their primary office and the
receipt of compensation therefore, and, to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997,
implementing Senate Committee Reports No. 509.

In his motion for reconsideration to the COA, he contended that the Supreme Court modified its earlier
ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case which limits the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries,
Undersecretaries and their Assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary
or Assistant Secretary and other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered
by the prohibition.

He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four years after the Civil Liberties Union
case became final, authorized the payment of per diems; in expressly authorizing per diems, Congress
should be conclusively presumed to have been aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition as
interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case.

COA rendered the assailed decision denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in
the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.

Held: The assailed decision of the COA is affirmed.

The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receive per diem for his board meetings sitting as representative
of the Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA.

The petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative
of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his
additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board
only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. The Supreme Court cannot allow the petitioner who sat as
representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right than his principal.
Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the Constitution. No
law can render it nugatory because the Constitution is more superior to a statute. The framers of R.A. No.
7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A.
No. 8748 to cure such defect. The option of designating representative to the Board by the different
Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the paragraph as to payment of per diems to the members of
the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the
proscription set by the Constitution.

Renato Cayetano vs Christian Monsod

Posted on November 27, 2012

201 SCRA 210

G.R. No. 100113
September 3, 1991

Facts:
Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Corazon C. Aquino as chairman of the
COMELEC. Cayetano questioned the appointment for Monsod allegedly lacked the necessary
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
It was established that after graduating from the College of Law and hurdling the Bar, respondent
worked in his fathers law office for a short while, then worked as an Operations Officer in the
World Bank Group for about 2 years, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries, negotiating loans, and coordinating legal, economic and project work of the
Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as Chief
Executive Officer of an investment bank and has subsequently worked either as Chief Executive
Officer or Consultant of various companies.

Issue
1. Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming Monsods appointment.

Held
1. YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in courtIn general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held
to constitute law practice.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill. In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is
whether in or out of court.

A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable consideration
engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees
as lawyer for more than 10 years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.

2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by
the president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the
discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess
the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise
its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.

Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo

Pacificador
Due Process impartial and competent court
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the
Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of massive terrorism,
intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under
duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the
2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of
Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate
until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately
convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the
Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was
set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which
the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first
be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should
inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made
by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en
banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved
to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has
repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should
be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice.
They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense
of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be
no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be
equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone
the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated
plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according
to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.

Aruelo v. CA
 G.R. No. 107852 October 20, 1993
Quiason, J.

Facts:

Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the
respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the
petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his
answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is
prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of
said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day
period to file his answer.

Issue:

whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period
prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

Held:

No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings
are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to
proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only
to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings
brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases
cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided
that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto
cases pending before the regular courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain
pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and
procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC [201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5 MAR 1992]

Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from
selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for
office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and
taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the
candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act
No. 66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it
selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a
particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of
1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners
contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of
media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the
newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial
reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.

Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom
of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX
(C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period i.e.,
"during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public
office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an
important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the
Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential question is
whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during
an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media
operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or
regulation of media operations during election periods.

Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation
of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election
periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or
television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political
parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and
expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in
respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments,
opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum,
Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible
media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid
political advertisements of particular candidates.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not
unduly repressive or unreasonable.

FLORES vs. COMELEC Case Digest

FLORES vs. COMELEC

184 SCRA 484

Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest number of
votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus
proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election was
protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less than the
petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong
barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latters total. Flores
appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four votes
cast for Flores only, without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered
invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate
for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second
place.

The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power to
review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest
appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections on questions of fact shall be final and
non-appealable. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the
petitioners appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay election contests are
subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679?
Held: The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant ground, to
wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall Exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of
limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision rendered by the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC.
Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or
metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared
unconstitutional.

Garces v CA

FACTS:

Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She

was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy,

Zamboanga del Norte.

Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion, however, refused to

transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for

Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued

by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming

office as the same is not vacant.

Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed

check to cover for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was addressed Mrs. Lucita Garces

E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment

order. Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc

cancelled his appointment to Liloy.

Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory

injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the COMELEC en
banc resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that

the appointments of Garces be cancelled.

Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot

and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC

under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only

on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer

of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.

RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper

remedy, and (2) that the cases or matters referred under the constitution pertain only to those

involving the conduct of elections.

CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?

HELD:

No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.

Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
members any case or matter brought before it

within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed

submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required

by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this

constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme

Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the

contrary, it was the COMELECs resolution that triggered this Controversy.

The case or matter referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the

COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that decision, rulings, order

of the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are
those that relate to the COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving

elective regional, provincial and city officials.

In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post

which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an

appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court.

To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best

ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction

over all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising

judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

*Petition denied

PAL. vs. C.A.

Philippine Air Lines vs. Court of Appeals

GR 120262, 17 July 1997)

FACTS:

On 23 October 1988, Leovigildo A. Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL plane in
Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to take his connecting flight to Surigao
City. However, due to typhoon Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled. To
accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out cash assistance of P 100.00
and, the next day, P200.00, for their expected stay of 2 days in Cebu. Pantejo requested instead that he
be billeted in a hotel at the PALs expense because he did not have cash with him at that time, but PAL
refused. Thus, Pantejo was forced to seek and accept the generosity of a co-passenger, an engineer
named Andoni Dumlao, and he shared a room with the latter at Sky View Hotel with the promise to pay
his share of the expenses upon reaching Surigao. On 25 October 1988 when the flight for Surigao was
resumed, Pantejo came to know that the hotel expenses of his co-passengers, one Superintendent
Ernesto Gonzales and a certain Mrs. Gloria Rocha, an Auditor of the Philippine National Bank, were
reimbursed by PAL. At this point, Pantejo informed Oscar Jereza, PALs Manager for Departure Services
at Mactan Airport and who was in charge of cancelled flights, that he was going to sue the airline for
discriminating against him. It was only then that Jereza offered to pay Pantejo P300.00 which, due to the
ordeal and anguish he had undergone, the latter declined.
Pantejo filed a suit for damages against PAL with the RTC of Surigao City which, after trial, rendered
judgment, ordering PAL to pay Pantejo P300.00 for actual damages, P150,000.00 as moral damages,
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, P15,000.00 as attorneys fees, and 6% interest from the time of the
filing of the complaint until said amounts shall have been fully paid, plus costs of suit.

On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the court a quo, but with the exclusion of the
award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

The Supreme Court affirmed the challenged judgment of Court of Appeals, subject to the modification
regarding the computation of the 6% legal rate of interest on the monetary awards granted therein to
Pantejo.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner airlines acted in bad faith when it failed and refused to provide hotel
accommodations for respondent Pantejo or to reimburse him for hotel expenses incurred by reason of
the cancellation of its connecting flight to Surigao City due to force majeur.

HELD:
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation, and this is because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is
mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carriers employees naturally could give ground for an action for damages.

The discriminatory act of PAL against Pantejo ineludibly makes the former liable for moral damages
under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code. As held in Alitalia Airways vs. CA, et al.,
such inattention to and lack of care by the airline for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its
utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the
passenger to the award of moral damages.

Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They
are awarded only to allow the former to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendants culpable action and must,
perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted. However, substantial damages do not translate into
excessive damages. Herein, except for attorneys fees and costs of suit, it will be noted that the Courts
of Appeals affirmed point by point the factual findings of the lower court upon which the award of
damages had been based.

The interest of 6% imposed by the court should be computed from the date of rendition of judgment
and not from the filing of the complaint.
The rule has been laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. that when an
obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of
damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No
interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the
demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established
with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the
time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount
finally adjudged. This is because at the time of the filling of the complaint, the amount of the damages
to which Pantejo may be entitled remains unliquidated and not known, until it is definitely ascertained,
assessed and determined by the court, and only after the presentation of proof thereon.

Luego v. Civil Service Commission (G. R. No. L-69137)

Posted: August 10, 2011 in Case Digests, Political Law

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu
City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described as
permanent but the Civil Service Commission approved it as temporary. On 22 March 1984,
the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner
for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private respondent in place of
petitioners position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new
mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment
as well as to question the Civil Service Commissions order and the private respondents title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the
basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not
empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing
officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commissions resolution is set
aside.
Accountability of Public Officials

IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988 REQUESTING
HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT.

A.M. No. 88-4-5433

DIGEST BY: Reynaldo R. Badulis Jr.
Submitted: November 25, 2016

FACTS OF THE CASE

The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez,
"Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-complaint, dated 14
December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court," together with a telegram of
Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten (10) days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this 1st
Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the important implications of policy raised by said 1st
Indorsement.

Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a letter-
complaint. The letter was said to be from concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous letter).

The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel
Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking him (Gonzales) to do something about it.
The Court furnished to Mr. Raul M. Gonzales a copy of the per curiam Resolution in which, the Court Resolved to
dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the same
Resolution, the Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively
dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the
Court had granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an
omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia, Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is
concerned, the Court treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated 15
April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE
Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term of office.

HELD
A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine
Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot
be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his
incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with any offense which
carries with it the penalty of removal from office.

Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under the Constitution, members
of the SC may be removed only by impeachment. The above provision proscribes removal from office by any other
method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged
criminally while holding his office with an office that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative
of the clear mandate of the Constitution.

The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or
profit under the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be held liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.

The court is not saying that its Members or other constitutional officers are entitled to immunity from liability for
possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What
the court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability
may be determined and enforced. A member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office, via the
constitutional route of impeachment, and then only may he be held liable either criminally or administratively (that
is, disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.

IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS
1987 Philippine Constitution, Article XI, Section 3

Francisco vs. House of Representatives

TOPIC: Political Question

GR 160261

10 November 2003

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules
approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et.
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year."

Issue: Whether or not the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that
as of the time of filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it.

Held: The courts power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is
subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality
of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. The Court found the
existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty
of the judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation
of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional
material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with
the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main
issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions.
Because it not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great
branches of the government.

Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner: The powers of
government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive, and the
Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that
supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice courts
of justice determine the limits of powers of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of
its officers. The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or
any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not
only a judicial power but also a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature a duty which cannot
be abdicated by the mere specter of the political law doctrine.

The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer
to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the second
impeachment complaint. More importantly, any discussion of this would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v . COURT OF APPEALS and DR. M. MACABULOS

Dr. Minda Virtudes (Dr. Virtudes) charged Dr. Mercedita J. Macabulos (Dr. Macabulos) who
was then holding the position of Medical Officer V at the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports National Capital Region (DECS-NCR) or the Chief of the School Health and Nutrition
Unit with dishonesty, grave misconduct, oppression, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and acts unbecoming a public official in violation of the Civil Service
Laws and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Dr.
Virtudes alleged that Dr. Macabulos incurred a cash advance of P45,000 and she was required by
the latter to produce dental and medical receipts for the liquidation of the cash advance. Taking
into account that Dr. Virtudes was not yet assigned at School Health and Nutrition Unit, DECS-
NCR, she did not submit the receipts and invoices. Upon failure to submit the receipts, Dr.
Macabulos allegedly subjected her to several forms of harassment. Dr. Macabulos denied the
accusations and claimed that it was Dr. Antonia Lopez-Dee (Dr. Dee), the Supervising Dentist,
who used the money to purchase medical and dental supplies. In support of her claim, she
attached an unnotarized affidavit of Dr. Dee admitting said purchase using the cash advance of
Dr. Macabulos. Dr. Virtudes asserted that it was Dr. Macabulos who used the cash advance by
improperly spending it and that she tried to liquidate the same by submitting a tampered invoice
in conformity with the amount of the cash advance. Graft Investigation Officer I Ulysis S.
Calumpad rendered a decision absolving Dr. Macabulos from the administrative charge.
However, Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. disapproved the decision. He
found out that Dr. Dee signed an unnotarized affidavit but the contents of the first page were
entirely different from the affidavit submitted by Dr. Macabulos in her counter- affidavit. A new
memorandum by the Ombudsman was released finding Dr. Macabulos guilty imposing upon her
the penalty of dismissal from the government service. Thereafter, Dr. Macabulos filed a motion
for consideration before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the decision of the
Ombudsman ratiocinating that the Ombudsman can no longer investigate the complaint since the
acts complained of were committed one year from the filing of the complaint and that the penalty
imposed by the Ombudsman is not immediately executory.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not CAs interpretation of Section 20(5) of Republic Act No. 6670 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989) as a prescriptive period on the Ombudsman administrative
disciplinary cases is correct
2) Whether or not the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on the private respondent is
immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly
observed in administrative disciplinary cases

HELD:

The Court of Appeals should have granted the motion for intervention filed by the Ombudsman.
In its decision, the appellate court not only reversed the order of the Ombudsman but also delved
into the investigatory power of the Ombudsman. Since the Ombudsman was not impleaded as a
party when the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 6, Rule 43
of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman had no other recourse but to move for intervention and
reconsideration of the decision in order to prevent the undue restriction of its constitutionally
mandated investigatory power. The Court of Appeals held that under Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770,
the Ombudsman is already barred by prescription from investigating the complaint since it was
filed more than one year from the occurrence of the complained act. The Court found this
interpretation by the appellate court unduly restrictive of the duty of the Ombudsman as provided
under the Constitution to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The use of the word may is ordinarily construed
as permissive or directory, indicating that a matter of discretion is involved. Thus, the word
may, when used in a statute, does not generally suggest compulsion. The use of the word
may in Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 indicates that it is within the discretion of the
Ombudsman whether to conduct an investigation when a complaint is filed after one year from
the occurrence of the complained act or omission. The Court of Appeals held that the order of the
Ombudsman imposing the penalty of dismissal is not immediately executory. The Court of
Appeals applied the ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, that all other decisions of the
Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in Section 27 of RA 6770 are
neither final nor immediately executory. In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court
by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the
Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or
failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be ground for disciplinary action
against said officer. Hence, in the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon.
Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, the Court noted that Section 7 of A.O. 17 provides
for execution of the decisions pending appeal, which provision is similar to Section 47 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. More recently, in the 2007 case of
Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, the primary issue was whether the decision of the Ombudsman
suspending petitioner therein from office for six months without pay was immediately executory
even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the pertinent ruling in Lapid v.
Court of Appeals has already been superseded by the case of In the Matter to Declare in
Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, which clearly held that
decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal.

PATRIMONY

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known
as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR).
The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in
the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by
the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.

LEE HONG KOK vs. DAVID

Nature: This is an appeal by certiorari for the reversal of the decision of the CA in affirming the decision
of the lower court in dismissing the complaint to have the Torrens Title of Aniano David be declared null
and void.

Facts:

Aniano David acquired lawful title to a parcel of land pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. An
order of award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958,
covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga
Cadastre. On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands, the Undersecretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources issued Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which an OCT was
issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to Aniano David. Since the filing of the sales application of
Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance
of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs- appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim to
Lot 2892.

The opposition was fatal because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate
certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the
operation of RA 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein. Under Section 38 of RA 496, any
question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within 1 year
from the date of the issuance of the patent otherwise the certificate of title becomes indefeasible after the
lapse of 1 year. The plaintiff-appellants further contended that the Lot is a private property for it was
formed thru the process of accretion.

Issue: WON the patent certificate obtained by Aniano David is void?

Held: NO The Lot in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained its public character for having been formed by
reclamation and not accretion.

Therefore the only remedy available to the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of
fraud. However, Aniano David has not committed any fraud in applying for the purchase of the Lot
because everything was done in the open. The notices regarding the auction sale of the land were
published, the actual sale and award thereof to Aniano David were not clandestine but open and public
official acts of an officer of the Government. The application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's
application who had occupied the land since 1938. Imperium refers to the government authority possessed
by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty while dominium refers to the
states capacity to own or acquire property. The use of dominium is appropriate with reference to lands
held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use
of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. The
manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, which was adopted by the present Constitution, was
embodied in the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown, the ownership however
is vested in the state rather than the head thereof.

As to the unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain, the sole power of legislation is
vested in Congress. There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by
the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must
be held to be public domain (Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands). For it is well-settled "that no
public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government. Therefore it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other
mode of acquisition recognized by law otherwise the property is and remains part of the public domain.

The proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public
Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial
proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final. A holder of a land
acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. Not
only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is
granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years (Cabacug v. Lao).
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. The
legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. Private parties like the
plaintiffs cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga
Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998

FACTS:

On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered
cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means,
of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper
and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in
consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of
foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate
Corporation for the said project.

Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and
the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a
foreshore land.

Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA
1899 gives a broader meaning on the term foreshore land than that in the definition provided by the
dictionary.

RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA
with modifications.

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the submerged area.

II. Whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.

HELD:

The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that
the term foreshore land includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide.

A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-
water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high
tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary)

The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its
meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged
areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the
exclusion of submerged areas from the term foreshore lands.

It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No.
158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA
1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.
La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v DENR (Natural Resources)
LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. v DENR

G.R. No. 127882

January 27, 2004

FACTS:

The present petition for mandamus and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7942, otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and
Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered
into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the Philippines and WMC (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a
corporation organized under Philippine laws.

ISSUES:

Did the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction: (1) x x x in signing and promulgating
DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being
unconstitutional in that it allows fully foreign owned corporations to explore, develop, utilize and exploit
mineral resources in a manner contrary to Section 2, paragraph 4, Article XII of the Constitution; (2) x x x
in recommending approval of and implementing the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
between the President of the Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining Corporation Philippines
Inc. because the same is illegal and unconstitutional.

[Rulings for the substantive issues are not included in this digest since already reversed by another case]

HELD:

As to procedural issues: * Requisites of judicial review - YES, OKAY.

When an issue of constitutionality is raised, this Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are present:

(1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case; - The challenge against the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40 likewise fulfills the requisites of justiciability. Although these laws were not
in force when the subject FTAA was entered into, the question as to their validity is ripe for adjudication.

(2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; - petitioners have
standing to raise the constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as they allege a personal and substantial
injury

(3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and - WMCP points out that the
petition was filed only almost two years after the execution of the FTAA, hence, not raised at the earliest
opportunity.mThe third requisite should not be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality
must be raised immediately after the execution of the state action complained of. That the question of
constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised
later. A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse into
constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same.

(4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case

*Propriety of prohibition and mandamus - YES, OKAY.

The petition for prohibition at bar is thus an appropriate remedy. While the execution of the contract
itself may be fait accompli, its implementation is not. Public respondents, in behalf of the Government,
have obligations to fulfill under said contract. Petitioners seek to prevent them from fulfilling such
obligations on the theory that the contract is unconstitutional and, therefore, void.

*Hierarchy of courts - YES, OKAY.

The repercussions of the issues in this case on the Philippine mining industry, if not the national
economy, as well as the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and compelling circumstances to justify
resort to this Court in the first instance.

In all events, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. When the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, this Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure.

RATIO: (1) The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.

Consonant with the State's "full supervision and control" over natural resources, Section 2 offers the
State two "options."182 One, the State may directly undertake these activities itself; or two, it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
entities at least 60% of whose capital is owned by such citizens.

A third option is found in the third paragraph of the same section:

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.

While the second and third options are limited only to Filipino citizens or, in the case of the former, to
corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos, a fourth allows
the participation of foreign-owned corporations. The fourth and fifth paragraphs of Section 2 provide:

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution.

Although Section 2 sanctions the participation of foreign-owned corporations in the exploration,

development, and utilization of natural resources, it imposes certain limitations or conditions to
agreements with such corporations.

First, the parties to FTAAs. Only the President, in behalf of the State, may enter into these agreements,
and only with corporations. By contrast, under the 1973 Constitution, a Filipino citizen, corporation or
association may enter into a service contract with a "foreign person or entity."

Second, the size of the activities: only large-scale exploration, development, and utilization is allowed.
The term "large-scale usually refers to very capital-intensive activities."183

Third, the natural resources subject of the activities is restricted to minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils, the intent being to limit service contracts to those areas where Filipino capital may not be
sufficient.184

Fourth, consistency with the provisions of statute. The agreements must be in accordance with the
terms and conditions provided by law.

Fifth, Section 2 prescribes certain standards for entering into such agreements. The agreements must be
based on real contributions to economic growth and general welfare of the country.

Sixth, the agreements must contain rudimentary stipulations for the promotion of the development and
use of local scientific and technical resources.
Seventh, the notification requirement. The President shall notify Congress of every financial or technical
assistance agreement entered into within thirty days from its execution.

Finally, the scope of the agreements. While the 1973 Constitution referred to "service contracts for
financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance" the 1987 Constitution provides for
"agreements. . . involving either financial or technical assistance." It bears noting that the phrases
"service contracts" and "management or other forms of assistance" in the earlier constitution have been
omitted.

(2) KINDS OF MINERAL AGREEMENTS (important)

The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary power and responsibility in
the exploration, development and utilization thereof. As such, it may undertake these activities through
four modes:

The State may directly undertake such activities.

(2) The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens or qualified corporations.

(3) Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens.

(4) For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
technical or financial assistance.

Except to charge the Mines and Geosciences Bureau of the DENR with performing researches and
surveys, and a passing mention of government-owned or controlled corporations,188 R.A. No. 7942
does not specify how the State should go about the first mode. The third mode, on the other hand, is
governed by Republic Act No. 7076 (the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991) and other pertinent
laws. R.A. No. 7942 primarily concerns itself with the second and fourth modes.
Mineral production sharing, co-production and joint venture agreements are collectively classified by
R.A. No. 7942 as "mineral agreements."

A. MINERAL PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENTS (MPSA)

The Government participates the least in a mineral production sharing agreement (MPSA). In an MPSA,
the Government grants the contractor the exclusive right to conduct mining operations within a contract
area and shares in the gross output. The MPSA contractor provides the financing, technology,
management and personnel necessary for the agreement's implementation. The total government share
in an MPSA is the excise tax on mineral products under Republic Act No. 7729, amending Section 151(a)
of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.

B. CO-PRODUCTION AGREEMENT (CA)

C. JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT (JVA)

In a co-production agreement (CA), the Government provides inputs to the mining operations other
than the mineral resource, while in a joint venture agreement (JVA), where the Government enjoys the
greatest participation, the Government and the JVA contractor organize a company with both parties
having equity shares. Aside from earnings in equity, the Government in a JVA is also entitled to a share
in the gross output.

The Government may enter into a CA or JVA with one or more contractors. The Government's share in a
CA or JVA is set out in Section 81 of the law:

The share of the Government in co-production and joint venture agreements shall be negotiated by the
Government and the contractor taking into consideration the: (a) capital investment of the project, (b)
the risks involved, (c) contribution of the project to the economy, and (d) other factors that will provide
for a fair and equitable sharing between the Government and the contractor. The Government shall also
be entitled to compensations for its other contributions.
which shall be agreed upon by the parties, and shall consist, among other things, the contractor's
income tax, excise tax, special allowance, withholding tax due from the contractor's foreign stockholders
arising from dividend or interest payments to the said foreign stockholders, in case of a foreign national
and all such other taxes, duties and fees as provided for under existing laws.

All mineral agreements grant the respective contractors the exclusive right to conduct mining
operations and to extract all mineral resources found in the contract area. A "qualified person" may
enter into any of the mineral agreements with the Government. A "qualified person" is any citizen of the
Philippines with capacity to contract, or a corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative
organized or authorized for the purpose of engaging in mining, with technical and financial capability to
undertake mineral resources development and duly registered in accordance with law at least sixty per
centum (60%) of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines x x x.

D. FINANCIAL OR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS

The fourth mode involves "financial or technical assistance agreements." An FTAA is defined as "a
contract involving financial or technical assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources."

Any qualified person with technical and financial capability to undertake large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources in the Philippines may enter into such agreement
directly with the Government through the DENR. For the purpose of granting an FTAA, a legally
organized foreign-owned corporation (any corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative duly
registered in accordance with law in which less than 50% of the capital is owned by Filipino citizens) is
deemed a "qualified person."

Other than the difference in contractors' qualifications, the principal distinction between mineral
agreements and FTAAs is the maximum contract area to which a qualified person may hold or be
granted. "Large-scale" under R.A. No. 7942 is determined by the size of the contract area, as opposed to
the amount invested (US $50,000,000.00), which was the standard under E.O. 279.
Like a CA or a JVA, an FTAA is subject to negotiation. The Government's contributions, in the form of
taxes, in an FTAA is identical to its contributions in the two mineral agreements, save that in an FTAA:
The collection of Government share in financial or technical assistance agreement shall commence after
the financial or technical assistance agreement contractor has fully recovered its pre-operating
expenses, exploration, and development expenditures, inclusive.

OBITER DICTA:

(1) The Regalian doctrine and the American system, therefore, differ in one essential respect. Under the
Regalian theory, mineral rights are not included in a grant of land by the state; under the American
doctrine, mineral rights are included in a grant of land by the government.

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila
Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with
developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under
P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and
PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and
owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was
followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of
Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI
entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially
when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain
(famously known as the mother of all scams).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary
injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from
implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and
AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.

Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the
(Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture
agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease
these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of
the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and
declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and
declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands
qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111
of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed
lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service.
Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void
in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

G.R. NO. L-36731: GODINEZ V. FONG PAK LUEN

Facts:
 The plaintiffs filed a case to recover a parcel of land sold by their father Jose Godinez to
defendant Fong Pak Luen. Said defendant executed a power of attorney in favour of his co-
defendant Kwan Pun Ming, who conveyed and sold the above described parcel of land to co-
defendant Trinidad S. Navata. The latter is aware of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak Luen
is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the law are prohibited and
disqualified to acquire real property; that Fong Pak Luen has not acquired any title or interest in
said parcel of land as purported contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez alone was contrary to
law and considered non-existent. The defendant filed her answer that the complaint does not
state a cause of action since it appears from the allegation that the property is registered in the
name of Jose Godinez so that as his sole property he may dispose of the same; that the cause of
action has been barred by the statute of limitations as the alleged document of sale executed by
Jose Godinez on November 27, 1941, conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a
result of which a title was issued to said defendant; that under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code,
an action based upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the time the right
of action accrues; that the right of action accrued on November 27, 1941 but the complaint was
filed only on September 30, 1966, beyond the 10-year period provided by law. The trial court
issued an order dismissing the complaint. A motion for reconsideration was filed by plaintiffs but
was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates applicable provisions of the
Constitution and the Civil Code.

Ruling:

No Prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. However,
we see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale
executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se, or merely
prohibited. It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is
unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based on
imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against
whom the constitutional prescription was never intended to apply. As earlier mentioned, Fong
Pak Luen, the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Navata, a Filipino citizen
qualified to acquire real property. Navata, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified
to own the subject property

RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ

111 SCRA 82

FACTS:
 Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a
French. In the project partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1st part to the widow, and
2nd part to the grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2nd part,
1/3 was given to the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews
opposed on the ground that usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional
prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.

ISSUE:

WON the ground for the opposition is correct.

HELD:

No, it is not correct.

The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private
lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
naught and meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a
real right, it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land
in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,

Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARCELLE D. VDA.DE RAMIREZ, ET AL.,
oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors-appellants.

Jul25

FACTS:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his
widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the
estate.

On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of
the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow en plenodominio in
satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or free portion shall go to Jorge and Roberto
Ramirez en nudapropriedad. Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with
the widows usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, died
in Spain on December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:

Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez

-widow

-French who lives in Paris

-received (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion

Roberto and Jorge Ramirez

-two grandnephews
-lives in Malate

-received the (free portion)

Wanda de Wrobleski

-companion

-Austrian who lives in Spain

-received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion

-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez

-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix

-Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because

a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widows usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo
Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wandas usufruct is INVALID because first heirs
(Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator

b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not related to the second heirs
or substitutes within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC
c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5

d. proposed partition of the testators interest in the Santa Cruz Building between widow and
appellants violates testators express will to give this property to them

-LC: approved partition

ISSUE

WON the partition is valid insofar as

a. widows legitime

b. substitutions

c. usufruct of Wanda

HELD

a. YES, appellants do not question because Marcelle is the widow[1]and over which he could
impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever[2]

-the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testators widow of a usufruct over
1/3 of the free portion of the testators estate cannot be made where it will run counter to the
testators express will. The Court erred for Marcelle who is entitled to of the estate enpleno
dominio as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled
to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run
counter to the testators intention for as stated above his disposition even impaired her legitime
and tended to favor Wanda.

b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the only case where a
vulgar substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases also include refusal or
incapacity to accept inheritance therefore it is VALID.

BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace
Ramirez are not related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it validates a fideicommissary
substitution provided that such substitution does not go beyond one degreefrom the heir
originally instituted. Another is that there is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the
usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact the apellee agrees that the testator contradicts the
establishment of the fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties be subject to
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement ofthe usufructuaries and naked owners.

c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID

-Art XIII[3]Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except toindividuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold land of the public domain in the Philippines.[4]

The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not only succession by
operation of law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the opinion that this provision
does not apply to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and
meaningless. Any alien would circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine
landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land BUT an alienmay be bestowed
USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines. Therefore, the usufruct in
favor of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld because it does not vest title to the land in the
usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed
by the Constitution.
Decision: Marcelle (as legitime), Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in naked
ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez

National Development Corporation vs Philippine Veterans Bank

192 SCRA 257 [GR No. 84132-33 December 10, 1990]

Facts: The particular enactment in question is Presidential Decree No. 1717, which ordered the
rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to be administered mainly by the National
Development Company. The law outlined the procedure for filling claims against the Agrix
Companies and created a claims committee to process these claims. Especially relevant to this
case, and noted at the outset, is section 4(1) thereof providing that all mortgages and other liens
presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished.
Earlier, the Agrix Marketing Inc. had executed in favor of private respondent Philippine
Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over three parcels of land situated in
Los Baos, Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage, Agrix went bankrupt. It was the
expressed purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix companies that the aforementioned
decree was issued by President Marcos. A claim for the payment of its loan credit was filed by
PNB against herein petitioner, however the latter alleged and invoked that the same was
extinguished by PD 1717.

Issue: Whether or not Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix is still entitled for payment
without prejudice to PD 1717.

Held: Yes. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the
protection of Bill of rights so do interests on loans, as well s penalties and charges, which are
also vested rights once they accrue. Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one
person and given to another without just compensation and any known public purpose. This is
plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the constitution.

The court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract between Agrix and the
private respondent without justification. While it is true that the police power is superior to the
impairment clause, the principle will apply only where the contract is so related to the public
welfare that it will be considered congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the
interest of greater number.

Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not being in
conformity with the traditional requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The
extinction of the mortgage and other liens and of the interest and other charges pertaining to the
legitimate creditors of Agrix constitutes taking without due process of law, and this is
compounded by the reduction of the secured creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in
violation of the equal protection clause. Moreover, the new corporation being neither owned nor
controlled by the government, should have been created only by general and not special law.
And in so far as the decree also interferes with purely private agreements without any
demonstrated connection with the public interest, there is likewise an impairment of the
obligation of the contract.

Albano vs. Reyes (175 SCRA 264)

Facts:

The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) board directed the PPA management to prepare for the public
bidding of the development, management and operation of the Manila International Container
Terminal (MICT) at the Port of Manila. A Bidding Committee was formed by the DOTC for the
public bidding. After evaluation of several bids, the Bidding Committee recommended the award of
the contract to respondent International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI). Accordingly,
Rainerio Reyes, then DOTC secretary, declared the ICTSI consortium as the winning bidder.

On May 18, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved the same with directives that PPA shall
still have the responsibility for planning, detailed engineering, construction, expansion, rehabilitation
and capital dredging of the port, as well as the determination of how the revenues of the port system
shall be allocated for future works; and the contractor shall not collect taxes and duties except that in
the case of wharfage or tonnage dues.

Petitioner Albano, as taxpayer and Congressman, assailed the legality of the award and claimed that
since the MICT is a public utility, it needs a legislative franchise before it can legally operate as a
public utility.

ISSUE: Whether a franchise is needed for the operation of the MICT?

Held: No. While the PPA has been tasked under E.O. No. 30 with the management and operation of
the MICT and to undertake the provision of cargo handling and port related services thereat, the law
provides that such shall be in accordance with P.D. 857 and other applicable laws and regulations.
P.D. 857 expressly empowers the PPA to provide services within Port Districts whether on its own,
by contract, or otherwise.
Even if the MICT is considered a public utility, its operation would not necessarily need a franchise
from the legislature because the law has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant
licenses for or to authorize the operation of public utilities. Reading E.O. 30 and P.D. 857 together, it
is clear that the lawmaker has empowered the PPA to undertake by itself the operation and
management of the MICP or to authorize its operation and management by another by contract or
other means, at its option.

Doctrine: The law granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for the
operation of public utilities. Theory that MICT is a wharf or a dock, as contemplated under the
Public Service Act, would not necessarily call for a franchise from the Legislative Branch.

Republic v PLDT
Facts:
PLDT and RCA Communications Inc (which is not a party to this case but has contractual relations with e
parties) entered into an agreement where telephone messages, coming from the US and received by
RCA's domestic station could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT and vice versa.

The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) by renting the
trunk lines of PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. One of the many rules prohibits
the use of the service for his private use.

Republic of the Philippines entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service
where the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by the RCA's station to and
from local residents.

PLDT complained that the Bureau was violating the conditions for using the trunk lines not only for the
use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public. PLDT gave a notice
that if violations were not stopped, PLDT would sever the connections -which PLDT did.

Republic sued PLDT commanding PLDT to execute a contract, through the Bureau, for the use of the
facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions
as the court finds it reasonable.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic can command PLDT to execute the contract.

Held:
No. The Bureau was created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing the government offices to meet
the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of a free Gov't of the Phil.

When the Bureau subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should have known that their use by
the subscriber was more or less public and all embracing in nature.

The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had
extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, implies assent by the defendant to such
extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and the public has patronized
both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the
defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical
connection of the trunk lines.

To uphold PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public.

PEOPLE vs. LAGMANG.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893

FACTS:Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violationof section 60
of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. Itis alleged that these two appellants,
being Filipinos and having reached the ageof twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to
register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, even though they had been
required to do so. The two appellants were duly notified to appear before the Acceptance Board in order
to register for military service but still did not register up to the date of the filing of the
information.Appellants argue that they did not register because de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and
a brother eight years old to support, and Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings,
and does not wish to kill or be killed. The Court of First Instance sentenced them both to one month and
one day of imprisonment, with the costs.

ISSUE:WON the National Defense Law (Sec 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1) was constitutionalby virtue
of Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which states that:SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime
duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal military or civil service.HELD:YES. Decision of CFI affirmed. The National Defense Law, in so
far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is,
on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot
be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens
would be to make thisduty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer
to enlist therein.In US cases, it was stated that the right of the Government to require compulsory military
service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State; and, that aperson may be compelled by force

to take his place in the ranks of the army of hiscountry, and risk the chance of being shot down in its
defense.What justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whetheractual or whether in
preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. Thecircumstances of the appellants do not excuse
them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because they can obtain the
proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth
Act No. 1).

AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONS

Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC

G.R No. 127325
March 19, 1997

FACTS:

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative,
filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC
set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the
arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors
to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996,
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action
for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by
Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in
the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE:

WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative.

WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the
Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.

WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is
valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?

WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition
would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.

WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC.

HELD:

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people
are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and
Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of
the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far
more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss
the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

Lambino vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2
and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3
million individuals.

The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-
7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and

HELD:

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a
peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment should be ready and shown to the people before they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that before they sign there is already a draft shown to them. The framers
also envisioned that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must
prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.

The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition
is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.
No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition,
the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition only
if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in

gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper
that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a
copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a peoples initiative to
amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the system
of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which
effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to
implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

GONZALES vs COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967FACTS:

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions No. 1, 2 and 3

i.e. to increase the seats of the Lower House from 120 to 180; to convoke a
ConstitutionalConvention of 1971; and to amend the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so they
can becomedelegates themselves to the Convention.Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which,
upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967,became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that
the amendments to the Constitution proposed in theaforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be
submitted, for approval by the people, at thegeneral elections which shall be held on November 14,
1967.Two cases were filed against this act of Congress: One an is original action for prohibition,
withpreliminary injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a
voter.He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens,
taxpayers,and voters similarly situated. Another one is by PHILCONSA, in L-28224, a corporation
dulyorganized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-
partisanorganization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to
defend itsConstitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever source.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not a Resolution of Congress

acting as a constituent assembly

violates theConstitution?May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a

General Election?

HELD:

The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress

acting as a constituent assembly

violatesthe Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.In
the cases at bar, notwithstanding that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of
three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
votingseparately, said resolutions are null and void because Members of Congress, which approved
theproposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments,
are,at best,

de facto
Congressmen (based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, noapportionment has been
made been made by Congress within three (3) years since 1960.Thereafter, the Congress of the
Philippines and/or the election of its Members became illegal; thatCongress and its Members,
likewise, became a

de facto

Congress and/or

de facto

congressmen);However, As a consequence, the title of a

de facto

officer cannot be assailed collaterally.

Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or

insufficiency,from a constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the people on
November 14,1967, depends

in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute
the minority

upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are suchas to fairly apprise the people of the
gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is

under R. B. H. No. 1

the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and

under R. B. H. No. 3

the authority given to the membersof Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional
Convention and, if elected thereto, todischarge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their
seats in Congress. We


whoconstitute the minority

believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act is, accordingly,
constitutional.One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of certain
proposedconstitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular
elections.Petitioners argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the
proposal tothe people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the election.

HELD:

Pursuant to Art 15 of the 35 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision to

indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The
circumstancethat the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratification inspecial elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances thenobtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in generalelections.

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702

FACTS:

The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress
approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention
to propose amendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held on November 10, 1970,
the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970,
the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION
AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE
VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate
of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on
November 8, 1971 .

Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force
and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the
senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the
Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised
by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed
amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and
all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention violative to the
Constitution.

HELD:

NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in
a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional
amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis
for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the
other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present
context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not thousands, of
proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few
of them cannot comply with this requirement.

JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. L-36142, March 31 1973, 50 SCRA 33

FACTS:

On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite
cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing
any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution.
This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as
a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana
also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new
constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without
authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution;
without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election,
hence null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any
order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or
political question, and therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has
been ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without
valid ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in
force.

HELD:
First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or
not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the
1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the
constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time
of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.

The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the
provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the
US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.

Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the
qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of
suffrage.

The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizens
assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizens Assemblies were fundamentally irregular,
in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which
the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those
of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizens Assemblies must be considered null
and void.

Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935
Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots not orally or by
raising hands by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for,
since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System,
with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the
Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit
judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.

The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of
COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place
without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the
Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein
mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the
returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation
of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in
the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the
people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizens Assemblies is null and void,
insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.

Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935
Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the
Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged
results of the citizens assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January 17,
1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the
Department of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the
citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizens assemblies did not adopt the
proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been
no such citizens assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other
parts of the Philippines.

Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the
Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot recognize its own acts. Recognition normally
connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition
by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members
have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of
Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by the people with the
orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed
Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards
Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees
and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued
subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation
No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these
conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.

As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember
that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the
Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to
by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by
said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results
of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution
denies the executive department of the Government.

In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein
should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed
Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution,
either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof;
that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is
still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed
Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with
Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code
in force at the time of such plebiscite.

Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of
the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon
on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with
judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2
members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not
enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

Pablito Sanidad vs Commission on Elections

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for
the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law,
the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.
Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the
previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the
same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas
clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly
evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,
providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as
they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as
it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-
Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is
political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the
amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature,
is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of
transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly
in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the
regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal
course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute
itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of
amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the
people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure
for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises
a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the
issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this
Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided
by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has
the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution
itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated
and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine
whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution
and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that
time also sits as the legislature.