SECOND DIVISION property under litigation by prescription.
perty under litigation by prescription. We cannot agree with such
[G.R. No. L-46364. April 6, 1990.]
SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO MATIAS, Petitioners , v. VICENTE
FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ and TEODORA
GRADO, Respondents .
Antonio E. Bengzon III, for Petitioners .
Agustin U. Cruz for Private Respondents .
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; CIVIL CODE OF 1889; GOVERNS RIGHTS
TO INHERITANCE PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF CIVIL CODE (R.A.
No. 386). It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent
(Art. 777, Civil Code). Moreover, Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as
follows: "Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a will,
before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of
1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court . . ." (Rollo, p. 17).
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that
parcel of land then covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 50933, died on
July 9, 1936 (Exhibit "F") way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the successional rights pertaining to his estate must be
determined in accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFIED CHILDREN; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT
BAR. Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein this
Court categorically held that: "To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of
1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez died and which
should be the governing law in so far as the right to inherit from his estate
was concerned), a child must be either a child legitimate, legitimated, or
adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child for illegitimate not natural
are disqualified to inherit." (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807, 935). Even assuming
that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the common-law-relationship
between her mother (Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she could not
even be considered an acknowledged natural child because Carlos Jimenez
was then legally married to Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified to
marry Maria Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab was an
illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to any successional rights in so far
as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO RIGHT TO TRANSFER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
IN THE ABSENCE OF VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE BY DECEDENT.
Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any voluntary conveyance to her by
Carlos Jimenez or Sulpicia Jimenez of the litigated portion of the land could
not even legally transfer the parcel of land to Edilberto Cagampan who
accordingly, could not also legally transfer the same to herein private
respondents.
4. ID.; ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION, NOT APPLICABLE TO LAND
REGISTERED UNDER TORRENS SYSTEM. The respondent court
relying on the Arcuino case, concluded that respondents had acquired the
of the appellee to file an action to recover possession based on its Torrens
conclusion, because there is one very marked and important difference
between the case at bar and that of the Arcuino case, and that is, that since
1933 petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez was a title holder, the property then being
registered in her and her uncle Carlos Jimenez name. In the Arcuino case,
this Supreme Court held." (I)t is true that lands registered under the Torrens
System may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the
registered owners." (Rollo, p. 38) Even in the said case the principle of
imprescriptibility of Torrens Titles was respected. Melecia Cayabyabs
possession or of her predecessors-in-interest would be unavailing against the
petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez who was the holder pro-indiviso with Carlos
Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate of Title covering a tract of land which
includes the portion now in question, from February 28, 1933, when the
Original Certificate of Title No. 50 933 (Exhibit 8) was issued. "No possession
by any person of any portion of the land covered by said original certificate of
titles, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the land covered by the
certificate of title." (Benin v. Tuason, L-26127, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531)
Sulpicias title over her one-half undivided property remained good and
continued to be good when she segregated it into a new title (T.C.T No.
82275, Exhibit "A") in 1969. Sulpicias ownership over her one-half of the
land and which is the land in dispute was always covered by a Torrens title,
and therefore, no amount of possession thereof by the respondents, could
ever defeat her proprietary rights thereon. It is apparent, that the right of
plaintiff (now petitioner) to institute this action to recover possession of the
portion of the land in question based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia Jimenez,
T.C.T. No. 82275 (Exhibit "A") is imprescriptible and not barred under the
doctrine of laches. (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Macalindong, L-15398, December
29, 1962, Francisco v. Cruz, Et Al., 43 O.G. 5105) Rollo, p. 39).
5. ID.; LACHES; APPLICATION THEREOF; CONTROLLED BY EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATION. The respondent Court of Appeals declared the
petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez guilty of laches and citing the ruling in the case of
Heirs of Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan (65 SCRA 605), held that, since
petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez executed her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication only in
1969, she lost the right to recover possession of the parcel of land subject of
the litigation. In this instance, again We rule for the petitioner. There is no
absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each
case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The
question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and since
laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud
and injustice. It would be rank injustice and patently inequitous to deprive the
lawful heirs of their rightful inheritance. Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled
to the relief prayed for, declaring her to be the sole and absolute owner of the
land in question with right to its possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle
Carlos Jimenez died in 1936, his pro-indiviso share in the properties then
owned in co-ownership with his niece Sulpicia descended by intestacy to
Sulpicia Jimenez alone because Carlos died without any issue or other heirs.
6. ID.; ID.; ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION BASED ON TORRENS
TITLE; NOT BARRED. The professed objective of Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act or the law which established the Torrens
System of Land Registration in the Philippines is that the stability of the
landholding system in the Philippines depends on the confidence of the
people in the titles covering the properties. And to this end, this Court has
invariably upheld the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title and in, among others,
J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Macalindong (6 SCRA 938), held that "the right
Title is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches."
DECISION
PARAS, J. :
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the following Decision 1 and
Resolution 2 of the Honorable Court of Appeals: (1) Decision, dated March 1,
1977 in C.A.-G.R. No. 49178-R entitled "Sulpicia Jimenez, Et Al., v. Vicente
Fernandez, Et. Al." affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District in Civil Case No. 14802-I
between the same parties and (2) Resolution dated June 3, 1977 denying
plaintiffs-appellants motion for reconsideration.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case is as
follows:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of Four Hundred
Thirty Six (436) square meters of that parcel of residential land situated in
Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay), Municipality of Labrador, Pangasinan actually
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 (Exhibit A) issued in the
name of Sulpicia Jimenez.
The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square meters, formerly
belonged to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez has two (2) sons named
Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez who predeceased his
father has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez. After the death of
Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the
name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal
shares pro-indiviso. As a result of the registration case Original Certificate of
Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued on February 28, 1933, in the names of
Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal shares pro-indiviso.
Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia
Cayabyab, also known as Melecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern
portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters.
On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square-meter-portion of
the property to Edilberto Cagampan and defendant Teodora Grado executed
a contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the former
transferred said 436 square-meter-portion to the latter, who has been in
occupation since.
On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez executed an affidavit
adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property appertaining to Carlos
Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased uncle.
Consequently Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 was issued on October
1, 1969 in petitioners name alone over the entire 2,932 square meter-
property.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, instituted the
present action for the recovery of the eastern portion of the property
consisting of 436 square meters occupied by defendant Teodora Grado and
her son.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and
holding the defendant, Teodora Grado, the absolute owner of the land in
question; ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant the amount of
P500.00 as damages, as attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 20)
Petitioner appealed the above judgment to the respondent Court of Appeals
and on March 1, 1977, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision
affirming the same in toto. Said decision was rendered by a special division
of five (5) justices, with the Hon. Lourdes San Diego, dissenting.
Petitioners within the reglementary period granted by the Honorable Court of
Appeals, filed therewith a motion for reconsideration. But said motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated
June 3, 1977.
In their appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals from the aforequoted
decision of the trial court, herein petitioner raised the following assignments
of error to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I assuming for the sake of argument that Melecia Cayabyab was the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA
CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IS NOT THE
DAUGHTER OF CARLOS JIMENEZ.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA
CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, HAS NO RIGHT TO
SELL THE LAND IN QUESTION TO EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT EDILBERTO
CAGAMPAN DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF SALE (EXH. "1") EXECUTED
BY MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALIAS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IN HIS FAVOR.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT TEODORA
GRADO DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION
BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF EXCHANGE (EXH. "7") EXECUTED BY
HER AND EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
V force when Carlos Jimenez died and which should be the governing law in so
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF
APPELLANT SULPICIA JIMENEZ OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION CAN
NOT BE DEFEATED BY THE ADVERSE OPEN AND NOTORIOUS
POSSESSION OF APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPELLEE
TEODORA GRADO IS THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE CASE OF LOURDES ARCUINO, ET AL., V. RUFINA APARIS AND
CASIANO PURAY, G.R. NO. L-23424, PROMULGATED JANUARY 31, 1968,
WHICH CASE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND
ORDERING THE APPELLANTS TO PAY THE APPELLEES THE SUM OF
P500.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES PLUS THE COSTS.
From the foregoing, this petition for review was filed.
We find merit in the petition.
From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring that Melecia
Jimenez Cayabyab also known as Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of
Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the property in question.
Respondents failed to present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia
Cayabyab was really the daughter of Carlos Jimenez. Nonetheless,
illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia
Cayabyab had no right to succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could
not have validly acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that
portion of the property subject of this petition.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil
Code). Moreover, Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a will, before
the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by
other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court . . ." (Rollo, p. 17)
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that
parcel of land then covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 50933, died on
July 9, 1936 (Exhibit "F") way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the successional rights pertaining to his estate must be
determined in accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.
Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein this Court
categorically held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in
far as the right to inherit from his estate was concerned), a child must be
either a child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged
natural child for illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit." (Civil
Code of 1889, Art. 807, 935)
Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the common-law-
relationship between her mother (Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she
could not even be considered an acknowledged natural child because Carlos
Jimenez was then legally married to Susana Abalos and therefore not
qualified to marry Maria Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab was
an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to any successional rights in so
far as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual law library
Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any voluntary conveyance to her by
Carlos Jimenez or Sulpicia Jimenez of the litigated portion of the land could
not even legally transfer the parcel of land to Edilberto Cagampan who
accordingly, could not also legally transfer the same to herein private
respondents.
Analyzing the case before Us in this manner, We can immediately discern
another error in the decision of the respondent court, which is that the said
court sustained and made applicable to the case at bar the ruling in the case
of Arcuino, Et Al., v. Aparis and Puray, No. L-23424, January 31, 1968, 22
SCRA 407, wherein We held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . it is true that the lands registered under the Torrens System may not be
acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the registered owners.
They merely claim to have acquired by succession, their alleged title or
interest in lot No. 335. At any rate plaintiffs herein are guilty of laches."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The respondent court relying on the Arcuino case, concluded that
respondents had acquired the property under litigation by prescription. We
cannot agree with such conclusion, because there is one very marked and
important difference between the case at bar and that of the Arcuino case,
and that is, that since 1933 petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez was a title holder, the
property then being registered in her and her uncle Carlos Jimenez name. In
the Arcuino case, this Supreme Court held." (I)t is true that lands registered
under the Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs
herein are not the registered owners." (Rollo, p. 38) Even in the said case the
principle of imprescriptibility of Torrens Titles was respected.
Melecia Cayabyabs possession or of her predecessors-in-interest would be
unavailing against the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez who was the holder pro-
indiviso with Carlos Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate of Title covering a tract
of land which includes the portion now in question, from February 28, 1933,
when the Original Certificate of Title No. 50 933 (Exhibit 8) was
issued.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"No possession by any person of any portion of the land covered by said
original certificate of titles, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the
land covered by the certificate of title." (Benin v. Tuason, L-26127, June 28,
1974, 57 SCRA 531)
Sulpicias title over her one-half undivided property remained good and
continued to be good when she segregated it into a new title (T.C.T No.
82275, Exhibit "A") in 1969. Sulpicias ownership over her one-half of the
land and which is the land in dispute was always covered by a Torrens title,
and therefore, no amount of possession thereof by the respondents, could
ever defeat her proprietary rights thereon. It is apparent, that the right of
plaintiff (now petitioner) to institute this action to recover possession of the
portion of the land in question based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia Jimenez,
T.C.T. No. 82275 (Exhibit "A") is imprescriptible and not barred under the
doctrine of laches. (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Macalindong, L-15398, December
29, 1962, Francisco v. Cruz, Et Al., 43 O.G. 5105) Rollo, p. 39)

The respondent Court of Appeals declared the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez

guilty of laches and citing the ruling in the case of Heirs of Lacamen v. Heirs
of Laruan (65 SCRA 605), held that, since petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez
executed her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication only in 1969, she lost the right to
recover possession of the parcel of land subject of the litigation.

In this instance, again We rule for the petitioner. There is no absolute rule as
to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches
is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and since laches is an
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It
cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. It
would be rank injustice and patently inequitous to deprive the lawful heirs of
their rightful inheritance.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to the relief prayed for, declaring her to
be the sole and absolute owner of the land in question with right to its
possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle Carlos Jimenez died in 1936, his
pro-indiviso share in the properties then owned in co-ownership with his
niece Sulpicia descended by intestacy to Sulpicia Jimenez alone because
Carlos died without any issue or other heirs.

After all, the professed objective of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act or the law which established the Torrens System of
Land Registration in the Philippines is that the stability of the landholding
system in the Philippines depends on the confidence of the people in the
titles covering the properties. And to this end, this Court has invariably upheld
the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title and in, among others, J.M. Tuason and
Co., Inc. v. Macalindong (6 SCRA 938), held that "the right of the appellee to
file an action to recover possession based on its Torrens Title is
imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches."cralaw virtua1aw
library

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision

and Resolution dated March 1, 1977 and June 3, 1977 in CA G.R. No. L-
49178-R are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are the instituted legatees must respect the testators will to distribute his
void as being in violation of article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance
[G.R. No. 22595. November 1, 1924. ] things, provides the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph with the laws of the Philippines.

"Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo. JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, Petitioner-Appellee , v. ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-
appellant.
Ross, Lawrence & Selph for Appellant .
Camus & Delgado for Appellee .
SYLLABUS
1. FOREIGN LAWS; PRESUMPTION. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as
those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim v. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
2. POSTPONEMENT OF PROCEEDING; DISCRETION. It is discretionary
on the part of the court to postpone or not to postpone a particular
proceeding in a case, and when the person applying for it has already been
given ample opportunity to present the evidence that he wishes to introduce,
the court commits no abuse of discretion in denying it.
3. SUCCESSIONS; CONDITIONAL LEGACY; CONDITION CONTRARY TO
LAW; NULLITY OF. If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that he
respect the testators order that his property be distributed in accordance with
the laws of the Philippines and not in accordance with the laws of his nation,
said condition is illegal, because, according to article 10 of the Civil Code,
said laws govern his testamentary disposition, and, being illegal, shall be
considered unwritten, thus making the institution unconditional.
"Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the
intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of
the property or the country in which it may be situated."cralaw virtua1aw
library
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did
not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter,
and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the
same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim v. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He,
himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to
present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the
court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the
receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the
matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does
not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into
consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce
competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in
this particular.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails
to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these
proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for
article 792 of the Civil Code provides the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide."cralaw
virtua1aw library
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the
testators national law when, according to article 10 of the Civil Code above
quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his
testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law
which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null
and void, being contrary to law.

DECISION
ROMUALDEZ, J. :
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in
question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre
Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however,
approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: (1) The approval of
said scheme of partition; (2) the denial of his participation in the inheritance;
(3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the
partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by Pietro Lanza of the
deceaseds business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the
declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of
the deceaseds business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions
requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellants opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question
puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimos will which are not in
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are
question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied contrary to the testators national laws.
with and executed.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
erroneous. appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the without any pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons
designated as such in the will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Second. I likewise desire to state that although, by law, I am a Turkish
citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not
by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a
considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in
acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be
made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine
Islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul
and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the
person or persons who fail to comply with this request."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000.]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, Petitioner , v. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALICIA F. LLORENTE, Respondents .
DECISION
PARDO, J. :
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1
modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga
City 2 declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
"Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo
N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during
the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United
States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. 3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter
referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic
Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. 4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United
States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur. 5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship
and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the
United States District Court, Southern District of New York. 6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945,
Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and
he visited the Philippines. 7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant
and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
Ceferino Llorente. 8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of
the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that
the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left blank.
9 Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2,
1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family
allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and
all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be
suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding
their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo
would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily
admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The
agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by
Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary
Public Pedro Osabel. 10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the
County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and
actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior
Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual
allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. 11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. 12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. 13
Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided
in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.
14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.
15 Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. 16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will
was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo
with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano.
In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three
children, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my
residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal
shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located,
specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras,
Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong,
Nabua, Camarines Sur;chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno
and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.
Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City
lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of
Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether
real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and
conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and
disposed of by and among themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this
my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to
act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute
should served (sic) without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary
dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any
degree in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner
whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any
real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one
of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament." 17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga,
Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and
testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate. 18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the
testator Lorenzo was still alive. 19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court
admitted the will to probate. 20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo
died. 21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition 22 for
letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended
(1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property
were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his
property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and
1/2 share in the conjugal property. 23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No.
IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. 24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial
court gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-
888.25cralaw:red
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper
"Bicol Star." 26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision,
thus:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree
granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the
Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on
January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of
Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise,
she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will
especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of
paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente,
meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary
compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate
and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and
also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the
deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of
administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3)
months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and
credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and
discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends
thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and
just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court
by her to be performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence
could not be granted.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"SO ORDERED." 27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the
aforequoted decision. 28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for
reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz
Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were
not legally adopted by him. 29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the
trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo,
entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free
portion of the estate. 30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. 31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming
with modification the decision of the trial court in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties
she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED." 32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. 33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, 34 denied the motion for lack of
merit.
Hence, this petition. 35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various
arguments raised, 36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the
late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the
case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the
deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long
before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia;
(3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed
by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law
of the country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found." (Emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved. 37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did
not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to
the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of
the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not
sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally
unproven statement that "American law follows the domiciliary theory hence,
Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will. 38
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore
refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident. 39 Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi
doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained
dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a mere
paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two
children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to
one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their
cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will,
already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of
Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 40 we held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 41 that
once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he
obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from
him.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the
respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we
stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must
be reversed. 43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente
from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the
estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial
court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution."
(Emphasis ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and
children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to
frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
"family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity." 44

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are
issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.
Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not
intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedents national
law. 45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues
raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET
ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court
and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California
in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and
determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law
with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch
to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of
Court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999.]
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, Petitioner , v. COURT OF APPEALS,
NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of
VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, Respondents .
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. :
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically
void in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect?
This is the issue that arose from the following antecedents:chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and
Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled.
Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandros
death, Petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died,
filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latters last will and
testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandros will to
probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they
filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted
the motion and issued an order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring
Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of
the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and
declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda
Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo
and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and
distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and
other taxes due to the government." 1
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some
compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although
she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but
the same was dismissed for failure to file appellants brief within the extended
period granted. 2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3,
1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the
Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the
lower court to implement the final and executory Order. Consequently, private
respondents filed several motions including a motion to compel petitioner to
surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the
properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the
TCTs, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for
issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the
motion.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting
aside the final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the
Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the
order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character. The court
added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the
distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February 1,
1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals,
which nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and
February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed
by private respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule
65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner
contends that in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said
to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to hear the
case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding
the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic
invalidity of Alejandros will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the
late Alejandro and to maintain the status quo or lease of the premises
thereon to third parties. 3 Private respondents opposed the motion on the
ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful
wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no
longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In
setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial
court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It
is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or
orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of
courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final
judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. 4
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a
judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of
time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question
determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in
the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution
of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res
judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in
connection therewith being for once and forever closed. 5 Such final order
makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity
and due execution. 6
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated, 7 particularly on three
aspects:chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament;
compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
the testamentary capacity of the testator; 8
and the due execution of the last will and testament. 9
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the
testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he
had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace
or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he
was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly
prohibited by law from making a will. 11
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may
still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not
necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always
intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides
for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or
rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, 13 the unlawful
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so
when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision
that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that
character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed.
Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and
executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before
the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure
to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party
does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a
decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is
satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been declared
that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14
become final otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae
ut finis sit litium the very object of which the courts were constituted was to
put an end to controversies. 15 To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily,
certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the
slothful. 16 The only instance where a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by
reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence, 17 which circumstances do not
concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic
invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order
therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986
wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind
those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the
testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were
parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those
matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping.
It should be remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same
issue had already been resolved adversely by some other court. 18 It is clear
from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should
be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory,
hence it can still be set aside by the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner
argues that "an order merely declaring who are heirs and the shares to which
set of heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of
shares from one person to another particularly when no project of partition
has been filed." 19 The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that
petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three
legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the
will. But it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said
that the estate of the late spouses be distributed according to the laws of
intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of intestate
distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of
the same will.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of
successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. 20 But before there
could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and
safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no
longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact
that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is
presumed to give Nemo praesumitur donare. 21 No intestate distribution
of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its
extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of
intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically
valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the
provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this
case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but
the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply
as correctly held by the trial court.

Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of the alleged share in the

conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his "only
beloved wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory order.
Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the
testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given
effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were disposed of
by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in
the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late
spouses estate.

Petitioners motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot

considering that she was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is
not an heir.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.]
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLES
BANK & TRUST COMPANY, executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and
MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, v. EDWARD A.
BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors-appellant.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno for heirs-appellees E.A. Bellis,
Et. Al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, Et. Al.
J .R. Balonkita for appellees Peoples Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
SYLLABUS
1. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW; LAW APPLICABLE WITH REFERENCE
TO THE INTESTATE AND TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION OF AN ALIEN;
SCOPE OF ARTS. 16 (2) AND 1039, CIVIL CODE. Article 16, par. 2, and
Article 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
2. ID.; LEGITIMATES; FOREIGN NATIONALS. It is evident that whatever
public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimates,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For its has chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
rights, to the decedents national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOREIGNERS WILL; CASE AT BAR. Appellants point out
that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and
the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine
law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedents
intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for
as this Court ruled in the Miciano v. Brimo (50 Phil., 867) case, a provision in
a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and
void for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that
Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law
should govern. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.P., J. :
This is a direct appeal to us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of
the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the
project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.
The facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had
five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased
him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by
his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which
he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration
are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, and Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the
foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis,
Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died, a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares
of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts
totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total
of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower
court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter
three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its "Executors Final Account, Report of Administration
and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the
legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting
to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120.000.00. In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the
"Twelfth" clause of the testators Last Will and Testament divided the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testators
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of
service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27,
1964 by the executor. 1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executors final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code,
it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower
court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise
the issue of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-
16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary
system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflict of law rule adopting the situs theory (lex
rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the
conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. 3
Appellants position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As
stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather,
they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
(d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
"Art 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
"However", intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent."cralaw virtua1aw library
Appellants would however counter that Article 17, paragraph three, of the
Civil Code, stating that

"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws, or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country."cralaw virtua1aw library

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code aforequoted. This
is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art.
11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing
without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the
second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be
applied in testate and intestate successions. As further indication of this
legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be

involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedents national
Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one
to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from
this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming
that such was the decedents intention in executing a separate Philippine will,
it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall
be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law,
is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with
costs against appellant. So ordered.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 6801. March 14, 1912. ]
JULIANA BAGTAS, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. ISIDORO PAGUIO ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants .
Salas & Kalaw, for Appellants .
Jose Santiago, for Appellee .
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; FORMALITIES OF EXECUTION. Where notes are made by a
testator of the disposition he desires to make of his property, from which an
attorney prepares a formal will which is read to the testator, who assents to it
section by section, after which the whole will is read in a loud voice and is
then signed by the testator and four witnesses in the presence of each other,
Held: That the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure are fully complied
with.
2. ID.; PRESUMPTION OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. When a testator
has never been adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, there is
a presumption of mental soundness which must be overcome by competent
proof.
3. ID.; ID.; SOUND MIND AND MEMORY. To constitute a sound mind and
disposing memory it is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, and unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator be
in full possession of all his reasoning faculties. Failure of memory is not
sufficient unless it be total or extends to his immediate family or property.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; INFIRMITIES. For some fourteen or fifteen years prior to
his death, the testator suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body. A
few years prior to his death, his hearing became impaired and he lost the
power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles, his head fell to
one side and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right hand,
however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he
was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.
Held: Not sufficient evidence to overthrow the legal presumption of a sound
mind and disposing memory.
DECISION
TRENT, J. :
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Bataan, admitting to probate a document which was offered as the last will
and testament of Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro. The will purports to have been
executed in the pueblo of Pilar, Province of Bataan, on the 19th day of April,
1908. The testator died on the 28th of September, 1909, a year and five
months following the date of the execution of the will. The will was
propounded by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent, and the
opponents are a son and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the
latter being the children of a deceased daughter.
The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the same was
not executed according to the formalities and requirements of the law
touching wills, and further that the testator was not in the full enjoyment and
use of his mental faculties and was without the mental capacity necessary to
execute a valid will.
The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen or
fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left
side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became
impaired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of
certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He
retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well.
Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife
and to other members of his family.
At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four
testamentary witnesses, Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, Francisco Paguio,
and Pedro Paguio, an attorney, Seor Marco, and one Florentino Ramos.
Anacleto Paguio and the attorney have since died, and consequently their
testimony was not available upon the trial of the case in the lower court. The
other three testamentary witnesses and the witness Florentino Ramos
testified as to the manner in which the will was executed. According to the
uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will was executed in the
following manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items
relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn
delivered to Seilor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The
witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which the notes were written
were delivered to the attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to
the testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator
assented each time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the
will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud
voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Seor Marco
gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed
it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn
signed it in the presence of the testator and of each other.
These are the facts of record with reference to the execution of the will and
we are in perfect accord with the judgment of the lower court that the
formalities of the Code of Civil Procedure have been fully complied with.
This brings us now to a consideration of appellants second assignment of
error, viz, the testators alleged mental incapacity at the time of the execution
of the will. Upon this point considerable evidence was adduced at the trial.
One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the
will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill,
he indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the
attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether decedent had
the full use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for some
years, and that he (the witness) was not a physician. The other subscribing
witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for the
opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of the
testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and
advanced age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. This
witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his own
signature as a subscribing witness.
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was
present when the will was executed and his testimony was cumulative in
corroboration of the manner in which the will was executed and as to the fact
that the testator signed the will. This witness also stated that he had
frequently transacted matters of business for the decedent and had written
letters and made inventories of his property at his request, and that
immediately before and after the execution of the will he had performed
offices of this character. He stated that the decedent was able to
communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly
indicates the presence of mental capacity on the part of the testator. Among
other witnesses for the opponents were two physicians, Doctor Basa and
Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he had attended the testator some
four or five years prior to his death and that the latter had suffered from a
cerebral congestion from which the paralysis resulted. The following question
was propounded to Doctor Basa:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. Referring to the mental condition in which you found him the last time you
attended him, do you think he was in his right mind? A. I can not say
exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted some mental disorder,
because when I spoke to him he did not answer me."cralaw virtua1aw library
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is
that the testator had suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some
mental disorder. He does not say that the testator was not in his right mind at
the time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it as his opinion that he
was without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not
state in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he
had noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he
visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, had never seen the testator, but his
answer was in reply to a hypothetical question as to what would be the
mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and who had suffered
from a malady such as the testator was supposed to have had according to
the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He
replied and discussed at some length the symptoms and consequences of
the disease from which the testator had suffered; he read in support of his
statements from a work by a German physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In
answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to
certify to the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a
disease.
We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way
strengthens the contention of the appellants. Their testimony only confirms
the fact that the testator had been for a number of years prior to his death
afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of which his physical and mental
strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what was
the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in
question. There can be no doubt that the testators infirmities were of a very
serious character, and it is quite evident that his mind was not as active as it
had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we can not conclude from
this that he was wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his
property by will.
The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under
such circumstances, but the weight of authority is in support of the principle
that it is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly
established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to
set aside a testamentary document of this character. In the case of Bugnao v.
Ubag (14 Phil. Rep., 163l, the question of testamentary capacity was
discussed by this court. The numerous citations there given from the
decisions of the United States courts are especially applicable to the case at
bar and have our approval. In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in
favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the
contestants of the will to prove the lack of testamentary capacity. (In the
matter of the will of Cabigting, 14 Phil. Rep., 463; in the matter of the will of
Butalid, 10 Phil. Rep., 27; Hernaez v. Hernaez, 1 Phil. Rep., 689.)
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well
established, and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged
insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it
is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal
presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There
are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts
have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age
and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does
not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his
pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such
were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could
meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal,
are universal in the statement that the question of mental capacity is one of
degree, and that there are many gradations from the highest degree of
mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are
denominated as insanity and idiocy.
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as
any other right which a person may exercise and this right should not be
nullified unless mental incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive
manner. In discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it is stated in
volume 28, page 70, of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that
to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that
"Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is
not essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a
variety of mental weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable
in law of executing a valid will." (See the numerous cases there cited in
support of this statement.)
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity,
section 365, and quoted with approval in Campbell v. Campbell (130 Ill.,
466), as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind
shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or
otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession of his
reasoning faculties."cralaw virtua1aw library
In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The question is not so much, what was the degree of memory possessed by
the testator, as, had he a disposing memory? Was he able to remember the
property he was about to bequeath, the manner of distributing it, and the
objects of his bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently
sound to enable him to know and understand the business in which he was
engaged at the time when he executed his will." (See authorities there cited.)
In Wilson v. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon the
trial of the case: The testator died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early
years he was an intelligent and well informed man. About seven years prior
to his death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that time his mind and
memory were much enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in
consequence of the shrinking of his brain he was affected with senile cataract
causing total blindness. He became filthy and obscene in his habits, although
formerly he was observant of the proprieties of life. The court, in commenting
upon the case, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will
affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure
of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total, or
extend to his immediate family or property. . . .
x x x
"Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the
will, and his physical and mental weakness and defective memory were in
striking contrast with their strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind;
not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful of
recent events, especially of names, and repeated questions in conversation;
and sometimes, when aroused from sleep or slumber, would seem
bewildered. It is not singular that some of those who had known him when he
was remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are of the opinion that his reason
was so far gone that he was incapable of making a will, although they never
heard him utter an irrational expression."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw
the same contrast as was pictured by the court in the case just quoted. The
striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last
years of his life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days
the statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and the
statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he
unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion.
At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct was
irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the
nature of the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence shows
that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period of several hours
and that the testator was present during all this time, taking an active part in
all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable
and its dispositions are those of a rational person.
For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the
same is hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 174489 : April 07, 2012]
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L.
MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO,
VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., AND RAFAEL TITCO, PETITIONERS, VS.
LORENZO LAXA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J .:
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly
establish that the decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at the time
of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full
effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner
provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.[1]cralaw
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] of the June 15, 2006
Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which
reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in Special Proceedings No. G-1186.
The assailed CA Decision granted the petition for probate of the notarial will
of Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with
merit, the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30 September 2003, is
hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered GRANTING the petition for the
probate of the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution[6] which denied
the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.
Petitioners call us to reverse the CAs assailed Decision and instead affirm
the Decision of the RTC which disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia.
Factual Antecedents
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and
testament entitled Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia
Regala[7] (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will,
executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin),
was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and
testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said
document on page 3[8] and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4
thereof.[9]
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin),
Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three
attested to the Wills due execution by affixing their signatures below its
attestation clause[10] and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,[11] in
the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who
acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F.
Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:
xxxx
Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the
present by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby
BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my properties enumerated in parcels 1
to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA and
their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the
spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos,
presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and their
children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still not of
legal age and living with their parents who would decide to bequeath since
they are the children of the spouses;
xxxx
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the
properties mentioned in this last will and testament, I am also bequeathing
and giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa
and their two children and I also command them to offer masses yearly for
the repose of my soul and that of D[]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala
and their spouses and with respect to the fishpond situated at San Antonio, I
likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[]a Nicomeda Regala in
accordance with her testament as stated in my testament. x x x[12]
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo
is Paciencias nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely,
Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.[13]
Paciencia lived with Lorenzos family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she
who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the
execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United
States of America (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family
until her death on January 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000,
Lorenzo filed a petition[14] with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate
of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his
favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-1186.
There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC
issued an Order on June 13, 2000[15] allowing Lorenzo to present evidence
on June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she was one of the
instrumental witnesses in the execution of the last will and testament of
Paciencia on September 13, 1981.[16] The Will was executed in her fathers
(Judge Limpin) home office, in her presence and of two other witnesses,
Francisco and Faustino.[17] Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her
signatures on all its four pages.[18] She likewise positively identified the
signature of her father appearing thereon.[19] Questioned by the prosecutor
regarding Judge Limpins present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that
her father had a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery.[20] The
judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her name. Because of
this, Dra. Limpin stated that her father can no longer testify in court.[21]
The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio)
filed an opposition[22] to Lorenzos petition. Antonio averred that the
properties subject of Paciencias Will belong to Nicomeda Regala
Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to
bequeath them to Lorenzo.[23]
Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners
Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B.
Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan
filed a Supplemental Opposition[24] contending that Paciencias Will was null
and void because ownership of the properties had not been transferred
and/or titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article 1049,
paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.[25] Petitioners also opposed the issuance of
Letters of Administration in Lorenzos favor arguing that Lorenzo was
disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the
USA.[26] Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in
favor of Antonio.[27]
Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended
Opposition[28] asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencias Will on the
following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance
with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to
make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the
Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will
had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by
Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of
Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine,
it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend
the document to be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition
and Recommendation[29] reiterating their opposition to the appointment of
Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and requesting for the
appointment of Antonio in his stead.
On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[30] denying the requests of
both Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed administrator since the former is a
citizen and resident of the USA while the latters claim as a co-owner of the
properties subject of the Will has not yet been established.
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued.
Dra. Limpin was recalled for cross-examination by the petitioners. She
testified as to the age of her father at the time the latter notarized the Will of
Paciencia; the living arrangements of Paciencia at the time of the execution
of the Will; and the lack of photographs when the event took place. [31]
Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took
the witness stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified on his fathers
condition. According to him his father can no longer talk and express himself
due to brain damage. A medical certificate was presented to the court to
support this allegation. [32]
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA
in April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his aunt,
Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and lived with him and his
family until her death in January 1996; the relationship between him and
Paciencia was like that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of
him since birth and took him in as an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster
without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time of Paciencias
death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind,
was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and
was only given to him after Paciencias death through Faustino; and he was
already residing in the USA when the Will was executed.[33] Lorenzo
positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three different documents
and in the Will itself and stated that he was familiar with Paciencias signature
because he accompanied her in her transactions.[34] Further, Lorenzo belied
and denied having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery
upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the Philippines when the
same was executed.[35] On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that
Paciencia informed him about the Will shortly after her arrival in the USA but
that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death.[36]
As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died
on May 21, 2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first
cousins.[37] She claimed to have helped in the household chores in the house
of Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein from morning until evening
and that during the period of her service in the said household, Lorenzos
wife and his children were staying in the same house.[38] She served in the
said household from 1980 until Paciencias departure for the USA on
September 19, 1981.[39]
On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring
something for Paciencia to sign at the latters house.[40] Rosie admitted,
though, that she did not see what that something was as same was placed
inside an envelope.[41] However, she remembered Paciencia instructing
Faustino to first look for money before she signs them.[42] A few days after or
on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of Antonios mother
and brought with her the said envelope.[43] Upon going home, however, the
envelope was no longer with Paciencia.[44] Rosie further testified that
Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or forgetful because she would
sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments
later.[45] On cross examination, it was established that Rosie was neither a
doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan
was based on her personal assessment,[46] and that it was Antonio who
requested her to testify in court.[47]
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision[56] denying the
petition thus:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000;
and (b) disallows the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia
Regala.
SO ORDERED. [57]
The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and
concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer
possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary
capacity.[58]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the
Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTCs
conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will.
It ratiocinated that the state of being magulyan does not make a person
mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will.[59]
Moreover, the oppositors in the probate proceedings were not able to
overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no
concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation that
Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.[60]
[61]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA
in its Resolution[62]dated August 31, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review
on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the following errors:
I.
by law is apparent from the face of the Will.
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a
Will in probate proceedings.[64] This is expressly provided for in Rule 75,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Rule 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. No will shall
pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the
proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law.[65] These formalities are enshrined in Articles
805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the
end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall
be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof,
or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction,
in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed
and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.

In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt.[48] He
identified the Will and testified that he had seen the said document before
because Paciencia brought the same to his mothers house and showed it to
him along with another document on September 16, 1981.[49] Antonio alleged
that when the documents were shown to him, the same were still unsigned.
[50]
According to him, Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a
lease of one of her rice lands,[51] and it was he who explained that the
documents were actually a special power of attorney to lease and sell her
fishpond and other properties upon her departure for the USA, and a Will
which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her death.
[52]
Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words: Why
will I never [return], why will I sell all my properties? Who is Lorenzo? Is he
the only [son] of God? I have other relatives [who should] benefit from my
properties. Why should I die already?[53] Thereafter, Antonio advised
Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not want to, to which the
latter purportedly replied, I know nothing about those, throw them away or it
is up to you. The more I will not sign them.[54] After which, Paciencia left the
documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.[55]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIAS WILL DESPITE
RESPONDENTS UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE
76 OF THE RULES OF COURT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING
CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF
SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED[63]
The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial
Will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate.
Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall
be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a
copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance
with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix,
Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present
and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the
critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed
the Will in the presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and
subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In
fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will
may be authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed
the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound
mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on
the shoulders of the petitioners.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was magulyan
or forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary
capacity. They likewise claimed in their Motion for Reconsideration[66] filed
with the CA that Paciencia was not only magulyan but was actually suffering
from paranoia.[67]
We are not convinced.
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a Will.[68] Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to
know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his
bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencias
forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that
would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution
of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra.
Limpins testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter
went to Judge Limpins house and voluntarily executed the Will. The
testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testators mental
condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent.[69]
More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of
the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the
oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of
making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will;
but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly
known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must
prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane
one month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to
prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of
petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was
presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CAs finding
that petitioners failed to discharge such burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character
of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the
document she executed. She specially requested that the customs of her
faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired
the properties from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to
LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child
was born after the execution of the will and was not included therein as
devisee.[70]
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear
or threats, undue and improper influence and
pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as
basis to deny the probate of a will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator
or testatrix to execute the document that will distribute his/her earthly
possessions upon his/her death. Petitioners claim that Paciencia was forced
to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the
execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; and that
assuming Paciencias signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud
or trickery. These are grounded on the alleged conversation between
Paciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981 wherein the former
purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.
We are not persuaded.
We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and
treated Lorenzo as her own son and that love even extended to Lorenzos
wife and children. This kind of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not
unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and raise their
nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a
prevalent and accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many family
discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a testator
and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.
In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencias
relationship with Lorenzo and his family is different from her relationship with
petitioners. The very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived
with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was already married and
already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This
unquestioned relationship between Paciencia and the devisees tends to
support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners
allegations of duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and improper
influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in
nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on
record. It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if
not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the
Court to uphold said allegations.[71] Furthermore, a purported will is not [to
be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of
testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has
been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would have to
depend largely on the attitude of those interested in [the estate of the
deceased].[72]
Court should be convinced by the evidence
presented before it that the Will was duly
executed.
Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencias Will on the ground that
Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not complied with. It
provides:
RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will
contested. If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the
notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if
present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined,
and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily
shown to the court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in the
Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their
deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due
execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are
otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the
court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the
evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner
required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three
(3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that
the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the
absence of any competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary,
expert testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)
They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have
been presented in court since all but one witness, Francisco, are still living.
We cannot agree with petitioners.
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify
before the court was satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings.
As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden
and could no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. To prove
this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her
part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in
1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin could no
longer talk and could not even remember his daughters name so that Dra.
Limpin stated that given such condition, her father could no longer testify. It
is well to note that at that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners neither
interposed any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged
the same on cross examination. We thus hold that for all intents and
purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and
failure of the said subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in
court. Because of this the probate of Paciencias Will may be allowed on the
basis of Dra. Limpins testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of
the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule
that [a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting
witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be
necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor
of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence
before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must
testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by
law.[73]
Moreover, it bears stressing that [i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of
the parties as regards the authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in
question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the court
and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it that is controlling. [74] The very
existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix]
has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and
it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full
effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby.[75]This,
coupled with Lorenzos established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence
and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of
evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies,
constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its
allowance for probate.cralaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006
and the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.