G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946 been acquired by him.

been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate
OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in the
municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and
on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.
predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such
benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had
been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors
in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title
which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their
possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of
by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is
disqualified.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In
a suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would
be necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case
where the vendors do not even object to the application filed by the vendee.

The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application costs.
for registration on January 17, 1940.

The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower
court, committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.

The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable
to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).

The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired
the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and
decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory
information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant below to the public domain. An
exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
(Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not
come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors in
interest begun in 1880.

As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to
decree or registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).

As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the Public
Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature or
classifications of the sought to be registered.

It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate
predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they
applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his
immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have
G.R. No. 112567 February 7, 2000
THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AQUILINO L. CARIO, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No.
29218, which affirmed the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial
Court of Laguna, in LRC No. B-467, ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of the
private respondent.
The facts that matter are as follows:
On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cario, filed with the then Branch I, Court
of First Instance of Laguna, a petition1 for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area
of forty-three thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less, forming
part of a bigger tract of land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao,
Laguna.
Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa
Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911, 2 and later administered by him in behalf of his
five brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934. 3
In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cario, became co-owners of Lot No. 6
by virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the land embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the
heirs of Teresa Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial
settlement, sole ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent. 4
Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands (now Bureau of Lands
Management), disclosed:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That the land subject for registration thru judicial confirmation of imperfect title is
situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna as
described on plan Psu-108952 and is identical to Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-0,
Cabuyao Cadastre; and that the same is agricultural in nature and the
improvements found thereon are sugarcane, bamboo clumps, chico and mango
trees and one house of the tenant made of light materials;
2. That the land subject for registration is outside any civil or military reservation,
riverbed, park and watershed reservation and that same land is free from claim and
conflict;
3. That said land is neither inside the relocation site earmarked for Metro Manila
squatters nor any pasture lease; it is not covered by any existing public land
application and no patent or title has been issued therefor;
4. That the herein petitioner has been in continuous, open and exclusive possession
of the land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his deceased mother,
Teresa Lauchangco as mentioned on the Extra-judicial partition dated July 26, 1963
which applicant requested that said instrument will be presented on the hearing of
this case; and that said land is also declared for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 6359 in the name of the petitioner;
xxx xxx x x x5
With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the Director of Lands as the
only oppositor, the proceedings below ended. On February 5, 1990, on the basis of the
evidence on record, the trial court granted private respondent's petition, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Count hereby orders and declares the registration and
confirmation of title to one (1) parcel of land identified as Lot 6, plan Psu-108952,
identical to Cadastral Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre, situated in the
barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna, containing an area of
FORTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FOURTEEN (43,614) Square Meters,
more or less, in favor of applicant AQUILINO L. CARINO, married to Francisca
Alomia, of legal age, Filipino, with residence and postal address at Bian, Laguna.
After this decision shall have become final, let an order for the issuance of decree of
registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.6
From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court of Appeals, which, on
November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed from.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition; theorizing that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HAS NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF HIS FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR
PROOF OF POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME
REQUIRED BY THE LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT
TITLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HAS NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE
LAND IS A PORTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES.7
The Petition is impressed with merit.
The petition for land registration8 at bar is under the Land Registration Act.9 Pursuant to said
Act, he who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present
muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession
especial or special grant, a composicion con al estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de
compra or title through purchase; and "informacion possessoria" or "possessory information
title", which would become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title.10
In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced
a single muniment of title substantiate his claim of ownership. 11 The Court has therefore no
other recourse, but to dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration of subject land
under Act 496.
Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land
Act (CA No. 141), as amended, private respondent's petition would meet the same fate. For
insufficiency of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private
respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the
manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,12 as amended R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No. 3872,
the law prevailing at the time the Petition of private respondent was filed on May 15, 1975,
provides:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claim and the
issuance of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless the
occupant can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the
required period to constitute a grant from the State. 13
Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration
cases is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be
confirmed. In Director of Lands vs. Agustin,14 this Court stressed that:
. . . The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the
Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose
the registration of his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the
satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not
justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there is
no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the
registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts
presented did not show that petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which
he is attempting to have registered.15
There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles over
public agricultural lands may be granted judicial
recognition.16
The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of the public domain. As enunciated
in Republic vs. Lee:17
. . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less
than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to
abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to
private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be
forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic
assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state.
Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its right over the same as
dominus. . . .18
In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the petitioners may savor the
benefit resulting from the issuance of certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the burden
is upon him (petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for
registration, for at least (30) thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the petition for
confirmation of title.19
In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his own possession of
subject parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an
extra-judicial settlement and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the
private respondent has possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years
as of 1975, when he filed his petition for the registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he
proceeded to tack his possession to what he theorized upon as possession of the same land
by his parents. However, other than his unilateral assertion, private respondent has not
introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that his late mother possessed
the land in question even prior to 1911.1wphi1.nt
Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and
circumstances evidencing his alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements,
which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and
cannot suffice.20
From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the earliest tax declaration
covering Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214 issued in 1949 under the names of the
private respondent and his brother, Severino Cario. The same was followed by Tax
Declaration No. 1921 issued in 1969 declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two
Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax Declaration No. 6359 issued in 1974 in the
name of private respondent, declaring an assessment of Twenty-One Thousand Seven
Hundred Seventy (P21,770.00) Pesos.21
It bears stressing that the Exhibit "E" referred to in the decision below as the tax declaration
for subject land under the names of the parents of herein private respondent does not appear
to have any sustainable basis. Said Exhibit "E" shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921 for Lot
No. 6 in the name of private respondent and not in the name of his parents. 22
The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this
Court is not without exceptions. Where, as in this case, pertinent records belie the findings by
the lower courts that subject land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of private
respondent's predecessor-in-interest, such findings have to be disregarded by this Court.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,23 the Court ratiocinated thus:
This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that if considered would affect the result of the
case (People v. Royeras, 130 SCRA 259) and when it appears that the appellate
court based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts (Carolina Industries, Inc. v.
CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
133 SCRA 88; Director of Lands v. Funtillar, et al., G.R. No. 68533, May 3, 1986).
This case therefore is an exception to the general rule that the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to
this Court.'
and
. . . in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering
such a pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below. The
Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not
assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision.24
Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial court. Had it
examined the original records of the case, the said court could have verified that the land
involved was never declared for taxation purposes by the parents of the respondent. Tax
receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are
mere indicia of claim of ownership.25 In Director of Lands vs. Santiago.26
. . . if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been
in possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation
purposes for the first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For
although tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder
had a claim of title over the property.27
As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother had
been in possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and
inadmissible in evidence. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of
owner", by which characteristics private respondent describes his possession and that of his
parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The
burden of proof is on the private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and
convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his parents was of the nature and duration
required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not amount to preponderant evidence
that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor. 28
In a case,29 this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals for
the registration of a parcel of land in the name of the applicant, pursuant to Section 48 (b) of
the Public Land Law; holding as follows:
Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the
alleged twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda
Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing
of the application, was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of
owners. This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the
Court. The bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had
been in possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in private
respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required
in cases of this nature. Private respondent should have presented specific facts that
would have shown the nature of such possession. . . . 30
In Director of Lands vs. Datu,31 the application for confirmation of imperfect title was likewise
denied on the basis of the following disquisition, to wit:
We hold that applicants' nebulous evidence does not support their claim of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 2027-B en concepto de
dueo. Although they claimed that they have possessed the land since 1950, they
declared it for tax purposes only in 1972. It is not clear whether at the time they filed
their application in 1973, the lot was still cogon land or already cultivated land.
They did not present as witness their predecessor, Peaflor, to testify on his alleged
possession of the land. They alleged in their application that they had tenants on the
land. Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that the applicants had
possessed the land as owners.
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of applicants' insubstantial evidence, it cannot justifiably be concluded
that they have an imperfect title that should be confirmed or that they had performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant of a portion of the public
domain.32
Neither can private respondent seek refuge under P.D. No. 1073, 33 amending Section 48(b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 under which law a certificate of title may issue to any occupant
of a public land, who is a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open, continuous exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Failing to prove that his
predecessors-in-interest occupied subject land under the conditions laid down by law, the
private respondent could only establish his possession since 1949, four years later than June
12, 1945, as set by law.
The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot being claimed by the
private respondent ceased to be a public land and has become private property. 34 To
reiterate, under the Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State. 35 Unless alienated in
accordance with law, it retains its basic rights over the same as dominus. 36

Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his
petition for registration under the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present convincing
and positive proof of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en
concepto de dueo for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his petition, 37 the
Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952,
forms part of the public domain not registrable in the name of private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of
Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. 8-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No.
6, covered by and more particularly described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a public
land, under the administrative supervision and power of disposition of the Bureau of Lands
Management. No pronouncement as to costs
G.R. No. 171631 November 15, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and GLICERIO R.
DELA PAZ, represented by JOSE R. DELA PAZ, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, granting respondents application for
registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela
Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of
Pasig City an application for registration of land3 under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD
1529) otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel
of land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot
Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together with their
application for registration, respondents submitted the following documents: (1) Special power
of attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the application; (2)
Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral
Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623
Proj. No. 27-B classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development,
Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic
Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob
dated June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng
Namatay dated March 10, 1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any
land patent or any public land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the Treasurer,
Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, that the tax on the real property for the year 2003 has
been paid.
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural land, by
virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob4 dated June 18, 1987, executed by their parents Zosimo
dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from
their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa
Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay5 dated March 10, 1979. In their application,
respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they have
been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the
concept of owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents further averred that by way of
tacking of possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public,
adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept of an owner
even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than fifty (50) years since the filing of the
application of registration with the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is
classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date, respondents presented
documentary evidence to prove compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application for registration on the following grounds, among others: (1)
that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a period of not
less than thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments of title, and/or the tax declarations and tax
payments receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied for;
and (3) that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the
Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there was no other
oppositor to the application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default 6 against the whole world
except as against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in support
of their application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application for
registration of the subject property. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered, judgment is hereby
rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela
Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal
address at No. 65 Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described
and bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-
590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-
Five (25,825) Square Meters, more or less, situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig,
Metro Manila, under the operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree.
After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon payment of all taxes
and other charges due on the land, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration shall
be accordingly undertaken.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.8 The CA, in its Decision dated
February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled
that respondents were able to show that they have been in continuous, open, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property through themselves and their predecessors-in-
interest. The CA found that respondents acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-
interest, who have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession
in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents
were able to present sufficient evidence to establish that the subject property is part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant petition raising the
following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE
SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS
FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.9
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in
the concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was
unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or constructive possession and
occupation over the subject land in the concept of an owner. Respondents also failed to
establish that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain. The subject property remained to be owned by the State under the Regalian
Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present evidence of
specific acts of ownership showing open, notorious, continuous and adverse possession and
occupation in the concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they presented several tax declarations, dated
1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance issued by the
Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are up to date in their payment of
real property taxes. Respondents maintain that the annotations appearing on the survey plan
of the subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the issues raised by
the petitioner are questions of fact which the Court should not consider in a petition for review
under Rule 45.
The petition is meritorious.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is
limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of
are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.10 It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all
over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of
support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion.11
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that the subject
land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945
or earlier.12 These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing
evidence.13
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the
inalienable public domain.14 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established
that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.15
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable,
respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-00008416 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot
Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the following annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as alienable/disposable by
the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on Jan. 03, 1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento,17 the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer
on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the alienable
and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by
the Bureau of Forestry," is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to
overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,18 the Court held that:
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required
by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties
are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau
of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In
the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands
Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness
of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and
character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the
proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed
alienable and disposable.
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche,19 the Court held that the
applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this connection, the Court has
held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and
disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the
CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof required
by law to prove that the subject land falls within the alienable and disposable zone.
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to establish
that the subject land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. In
the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already
classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public
domain.20
Anent respondents possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading of the
records failed to show that the respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphil
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation over the
subject property consists of the testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the
tenant of the adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents
predecessors-in-interest' possession and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945
or earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19, 1939, 21 testified that since he attained the age of
reason he already knew that the land subject of this case belonged to them. 22 Amado testified
that he was a tenant of the land adjacent to the subject property since 1950, 23 and on about
the same year, he knew that the respondents were occupying the subject land. 24
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no specific details
as to when respondents' predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of the land subject
of this case. While Jose testified that the subject land was previously owned by their parents
Zosimo and Ester, who earlier inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear
evidence was presented to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and that he
had been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period of possession
required by law. It is a rule that general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not
factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice. 25 An applicant in a land
registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but
must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and
possession of the land.26
Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of
their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best, respondents can only prove
possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.27 Respondents failed to explain why, despite their
claim that their predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept
of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest
started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess
land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have
been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their
predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a
claim of ownership.28
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that
respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as
part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation thereof under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
their application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529
should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The application for registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino
R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented
by Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land, with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight
hundred twenty-five (25,825) square meters situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig,
Metro Manila, is DENIED.
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and
EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and
EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels
of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases at bar,
which have been consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not
correctly applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February
11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria,
Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided
into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold
to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto,
respectively, in 1964. 2
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok
Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the
subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her
father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was
possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in
1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his
predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a
barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who
recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax
declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax
declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold
to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the
claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase,
Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of
owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its
geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on
the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the
Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930,
and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims
were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its
annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of
annual taxes thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine
Bill of 1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine
Islands both surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and
open to exploration, occupation and purchase and the land in which they
are found to occupation and purchase by the citizens of the United States,
or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land
sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not
subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their
claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The applicants
appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims
of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining
claims. 12 In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas
over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by
virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of
ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that
neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the
land because it is not alienable and registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and
Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug
mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of
Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16
mining claims of James E. Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed his
declaration of the location of the June Bug mineral and the same was
recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the
Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated,
Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements on the June
Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had
submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II,
Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also
conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts.
In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had
religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison
registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of
Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral
claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral
claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the
Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public
domain and had become private properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim
under consideration was perfected prior to November
15, 1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth
was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at
that time, as construed and applied by this court
in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a
valid location of a mining claim segregated the area
from the public domain. Said the court in that case: The
moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral
deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location
in accordance with law, the power of the United States
Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the
possession and enjoyment of the located claim was
gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they
were exempted from lands that could be granted to any
other person. The reservations of public lands cannot
be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is
made upon public lands afterwards included in a
reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not
affect the validity of the former location. By such
location and perfection, the land located is segregated
from the public domain even as against the
Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337;
Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is
not only to segregate the area from the public domain,
but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of
the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed
by law. Where there is a valid location of a mining
claim, the area becomes segregated from the public
domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis
Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S.
650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a
mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by
the United States of the right of present and exclusive
possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of
all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals
within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the
extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the
locator's right before as well as after the issuance of
the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested
property right by virtue of his location made in
compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the
government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold
Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez,
Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico
Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259,
265-266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for
as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of
ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he
complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for
all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by
patent.
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the
requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public
domain, and not even the government of the Philippines can take away
this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private
properties of the oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof without due
process of law. 13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution
against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for
this was made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically
provided that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy and other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources with the exception of public agricultural lands, shall not
be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted
for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
 water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the
contrary notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to
February 8, 1935 within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826
of the Revised Administrative Code which would be valid and subsisting
location except to the existence of said reserve are hereby declared to be
valid and subsisting locations as of the date of their respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws
then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act
such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15As the land had
become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they
did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the
private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de
la Rosas is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive
possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership.
They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965,
relying on the earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16The trial judge,
who had the opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the
witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the
absence of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient
basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really
been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner
of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was
mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights
of the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the
mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being
undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind, much less protest, the same although she
claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine,
for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface
but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable
height. 19 Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and
agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to
understand, especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while
the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he
may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy
the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without
encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the
sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be
half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be
either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed,
the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral
and completely mineral once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as mining
operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and
become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was
cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as
follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations,
at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the
inauguration of government established under the Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining
does not include the ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the
minerals which may be found on or under the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are
granted are excluded and excepted from all such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded
and excepted from all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the
benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals
that may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner
of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not
give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to
which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land
could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct
interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is
being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract
the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to
mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner
thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken
therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation
under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of
1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands,
subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not
have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor
could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural
and mineral purposes.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and
that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as
to costs.
G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008 x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or
commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for
which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B
AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation. 3
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of
GOVERNMENT, petitioners, petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, (1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE
SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS (2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
DECISION
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
VELASCO, JR., J.:
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late
gained the attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on (6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and
the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of
environmental destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer (7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
simply heals by itself.2 But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need
bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard. (8) Executive Order No. 192;

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their (9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the
first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To
most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to (10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their
cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a (11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.
(12) International Law
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming
with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the
activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official
Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.

The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila
inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management
Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several
Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural
government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from
protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of
different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content
the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below
ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR
the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the
Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of
Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed
contact recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml. 4
from:

Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf
of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay
through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being
conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the
Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up
and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit
for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this,
defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within
six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by
devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the
rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage]
treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their
capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide,
construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install,
operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous
substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-
generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that
contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate
sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other
alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize
the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other
aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the
purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that
obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and
liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and
engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in
removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable
garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and
sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and
disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through
education the importance of preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all
costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG),
Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and
agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a
Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the
consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the
Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do
not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds
appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila
Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the
Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require petitioners
to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws. 7
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the
following ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE
PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL
COURTS DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES
CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS
SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.
 ARGUMENTS
I First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law,
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF
SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN
GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A
MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY
MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the
headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in
general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And second, can
petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. 8 A
ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment."9 It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing
it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and
imposed by law."10 Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters
involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the
other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid
waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of
judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its
mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by
undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that
petitioners duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not
require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in
particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to
clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents
maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of
solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDAs ministerial duty to attend to
such services.
We agree with respondents.
on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different
concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-
making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be
done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social
Justice Society v. Atienza11 in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a
matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to
cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" within
six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant
case, the MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid
waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial,
its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDAs duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec.
3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates
the scope of the MMDAs waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and
implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and
sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and operation
of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other
alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis
added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management
Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills
and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall
maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of
RA 9003,12 enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the
effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid
waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.
The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in
the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting
up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier
stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act
officially according to their judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows
a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform." 14 Any suggestion
that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related
duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws
would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory
obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from
choosing not to perform these duties. Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192, 15 is the primary agency responsible for
the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment
and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the
other hand, designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its
enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality
management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Acts Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction
"over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity,
causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using
available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution."
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report,
an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality
Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and
adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless
otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and
responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months
from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review
or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12)
months following the completion of the status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12
months following the completion of the framework for each designated water
management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality
management area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of
completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework. 16 Within
twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action
Plan.17 Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to
it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR,
with the assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-
government organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a
comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation
Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation
of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases
should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them
under existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234, 18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and
control over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the
cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged
with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be
necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns
comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water
districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these
districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these
districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment,
and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA,
as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities,
inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal
system in the different parts of the country. 19 In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is
mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO
292),20 is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances
respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources.
Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in
coordination with local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of
establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and
aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable
basis.21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG and
DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters. 22 More specifically, its
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall
primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development,
management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is
tasked under EO 29223 to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for,
among others, flood control and water resource development systems in accordance with
national development objectives and approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-
wide services relating to "flood control and sewerage management which include the
formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an
integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and
MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro
Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood
control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage
services shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along
rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other
pertinent laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of
1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary
responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the
territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in
accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control
Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective implementation and
enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge,
or any other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method,
means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the
Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown,
discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft
or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill
of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that
flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary
of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such
navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water
or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be
liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by
storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or
obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of
1990 was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to
"perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86,
RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter
acquires the capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet
attained the capability to assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine
pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement
of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the
Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of
1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law
and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations. 25
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop,
regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and
national development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police
authority within the ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and
functions and attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the
functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such
police authority shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and
vehicles, as well as movement within the port of watercraft. 27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL
73/78,28 the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception
facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in
Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to
prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated
wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG
and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage
disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the
provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of
jurisdiction.29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated
are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open
burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of
biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or
operation of open dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management
facilities without an environmental compliance certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or
demolition may be allowed "when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros,
railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places
such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in
coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other
pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to
rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that
discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the
concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions,
and other encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in
coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is
tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that
affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under
Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned
agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal
of sewage and the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In
areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage
management system shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec.
5.1.131 of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the
regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies
through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation
clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued
their environmental sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD
1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at
all levels.32 Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission
on Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a
nationwide educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation,
and proper use of the environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA
9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of environmental
concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management
principles.33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of
the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government
funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the countrys development objectives. 34
One of the countrys development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean
Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth
in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh,
brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among
others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of
pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental
strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality
management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated
from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health,
and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution
focusing on pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble
objectives of RA 9275 in line with the countrys development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical,
and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the
law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass
the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the
government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to
upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to
contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case
of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake
containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such
pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o, amended the
counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152
continues, however, to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and
26 hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of
the applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and
clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water
bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in
the event emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to
immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other government
agencies concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup operations.
Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to
have caused such pollution under proper administrative determination x x x.
Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality
Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than
real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the
designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern
themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to
cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the
succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental
spills," as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants
discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that
result from accidents such as collisions and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the
government agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations
of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that
the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are
situations that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the
corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they
argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires "cleanup operations" to restore the body of
water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of
either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in
Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as
delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for
accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in
fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec.
62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day
operations of businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly
accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a
delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including
accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to
Sec. 20 of PD 1152.
To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their
narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water
quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying
that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase
"cleanup operations" embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting
definition. As pointed out, the phrases "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills" do not
appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the
government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal,
and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17
requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water
quality "has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage." This
section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to take
such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards." In fine,
the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any
pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is
properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail
to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies
shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters account. Petitioners assertion, that they
have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution
incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup
operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the
Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come
in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly
invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their
cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard,
what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once
valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a
comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is better served
by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution
incidents."35
Granting arguendo that petitioners position thus described vis--vis the implementation of
Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay
is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a
specific and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with
reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water
pollution incidents" which may be caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or
by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec.
16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to "any person who causes pollution in
or pollutes water bodies," which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes
the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually
end up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve
nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond the specific
pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so
undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the
Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila
Bay polluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to
contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it
behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA
9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup
situation.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the
long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation
process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and
contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from
reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic
exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the
ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves
the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices
under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and
duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal
level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus," 36 the Court
may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that
its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the
doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the
length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution. 37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized
structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the
National Capital Region (NCR) (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-
Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and
connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the
accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If
there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay,
these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or
unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all
efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary
said as much.38
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD
1067 or the Water Code,39 which prohibits the building of structures within a given length
along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes
throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban
areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas,
along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be
allowed to stay in this zonelonger than what is necessary for recreation,
navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind.
(Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing
along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But
while they may not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments
undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the
concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial
establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment
facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their sewage waters,
from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such
period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their
operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to
comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study
on the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The
Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming
as it is shocking. Some highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas,
Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and
leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and
seep into the earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for
drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human
waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by
households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs
rehabilitation is an understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and
possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the
Marikina and Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be
established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003).
Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the
MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.No open
dumps shall be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid
waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for
solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no
controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this
Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years
which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which
strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering,
dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of
open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not
have proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage
system that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA
9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious
wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or
solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or
machine of substances to the aquatic environment including "dumping/disposal of waste and
other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of
carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid,
gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made
structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the
extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act
and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence;
hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks,
some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and
mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical
landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila
Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue
waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those
mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds
to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to
take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend
their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand
becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and
instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in
cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners hiding behind
two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are
required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides
that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil
and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and
it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. 41 Even
assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to
clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their
obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and
clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-
G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in
Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent
developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now
read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-
government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and
restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water
Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make
them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for
the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment
and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary
government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is
directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It
is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and
agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in
accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25
of the Local Government Code of 1991,42 the DILG, in exercising the Presidents power of
general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management
programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs
in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all
factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river
systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-
San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-
Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and
waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the
bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks
as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these
LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said
facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water,
and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay,
under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate,
and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal,
and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination
with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation
facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the
provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest
possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and
restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro
Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using
recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in
accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend
violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent
marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures
to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated
wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood
control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and
other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws
along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers,
the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in
Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood
control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga,
Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group,
HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other
applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting
waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as
prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On
matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the
maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the
apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective
penal provisions of RA 9003,47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing
laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1)
year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have
the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from
septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable
time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its
environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, 49 the
DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental
protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and
hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty
toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and
the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations
Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration,
and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development
objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation,
and revival of our marine waters.

(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM,
PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the
principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the
Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this
Decision.
G.R. No. 162243 November 29, 2006
HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Petitioner,
vs.
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 164516 November 29, 2006
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 171875 November 29, 2006
THE HON. ANGELO T. REYES (formerly Hon. Elisea G. Gozun), in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Petitioner,
vs.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES (PICOP), Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On the line are three consolidated Petitions, all arising from the 11 October 2002 Quezon City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision1 granting the Petition for Mandamus filed by Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP). The Court of Appeals affirmed the 11
October 2002 RTC Decision, with modification, in a 19 February 2004 Decision.2
In G.R. No. 162243, then Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez, who was later successively substituted by subsequent DENR
Secretaries Elisea G. Gozun and Angelo T. Reyes, assails the 19 February 2004 Decision
insofar as it granted the Petition for Mandamus. In G.R. No. 164516, PICOP assails the same
Decision insofar as it deleted the imposition of damages against then Secretary Alvarez.
Secretary Reyes filed a third Petition docketed as G.R. No. 171875, assailing the 16
December 2004 Amended Decision3 of the Court of Appeals lifting the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction that enjoined the enforcement of the 11 October 2002 Decision and 10 February
2003 Orders of the RTC.
FACTS
The facts, culled from the records of the three consolidated petitions, are as follows:
On 24 May 1952, PICOPs predecessor, Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. (BBLCI) was granted
Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43. 4 The TLA was amended on 26 April 1953 and 4
March 1959. As amended, TLA No. 43 covers an area of 75,545 hectares in Surigao del Sur,
Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley, and Davao Oriental.
Allegedly sometime in 1969, the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued a presidential
warranty to BBLCI, confirming that TLA No. 43 "definitely establishes the boundary lines of
[BBLCIs] concession area."5
TLA No. 43, as amended, expired on 26 April 1977. It was renewed on 7 October 1977 for
another 25 years to "terminate on April 25, 2002."6
On 23 December 1999, then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles promulgated DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-53 which had for its subject, the "Regulations Governing
the Integrated Forest Management Program (IFMP)."7
In a 28 August 2000 letter to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO), DENR-Region XIII-D4, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, PICOP signified its intention to
convert its TLA No. 43 into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) invoking the
provisions of Section 9, Chapter III of DAO No. 99-53.8
Acting on the said letter, Forester III Trifino M. Peregrino, In-Charge, Office of the CENRO,
wrote a letter dated 1 September 2000 to PICOPs resident manager in Tabon, Bislig, Surigao
del Sur, informing PICOP "that we will consider said letter as an advance notice considering
that it is yet premature to act on your request since we are yet in CY 2000." 9
In a 24 January 2001 letter, Neolito Frondozo, Group Manager, Forest Operations Manager
of PICOP, requested for a favorable indorsement of their letter of intent from the CENRO of
the DENR, Region XIII-D4 in Bislig City. This was followed up by another letter dated 25
January 2001 of Wilfredo D. Fuentes, Vice President and Resident Manager of PICOP, to the
Regional Executive Director (RED), DENR, Caraga Region XIII in Ambago, Butuan City,
likewise, requesting for a favorable indorsement of their letter of intent to the DENR
Secretary.10
The Officer-In-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director Constantino A. Paye, Jr., in a 6
March 2001 Memorandum, forwarded PICOPs letter of intent dated 28 August 2000 to the
DENR Secretary informing the latter that the DENR Caraga Region XIII in Ambago, Butuan
City, had created a team tasked to conduct a performance evaluation on PICOP on the said
TLA pursuant to DAO No. 99-53.11
Subsequently, Elias R. Seraspi, Jr., RED, DENR, Caraga Region XIII in Ambago, Butuan
City, submitted a 31 July 2001 Memorandum to the DENR Secretary on the performance
evaluation of PICOP on its TLA No. 43. Paragraph 11 of the same Memorandum reads:
Hence, it is imperative to chart a good forest policy direction for the management,
development and protection of TLA No. 43 after it expires on April 26, 2002 for the purpose of
sustainable forest management of the area in support of national development. With this
vision, the proper evaluation to consider the request for automatic conversion of TLA No. 43
to IFMA pursuant to Section 9, DENR A.O. No. 99-53, upon its expiration on April 26, 2002 is
hereby recommended.12
Attached to said Memorandum, inter alia, were the 11 July 2001 Report and 27 July 2001
Supplemental Report of the Performance Evaluation Team created to conduct such
performance evaluation indicating violations by PICOP of existing DENR Rules and
Regulations governing TLA No. 43, such as the non-submission of its five-year forest
protection plan and seven-year reforestation plan as required by the DENR rules and
regulations. The said 31 July 2001 Memorandum was forwarded to the Forest Management
Bureau (FMB) for appropriate action and recommendation.13
Sometime in September 2001, the DENR Secretary was furnished a copy of Forest
Management Specialist II (FMS II) Teofila L. Orlanes 24 September 2001 Memorandum
concerning alleged unpaid and overdue forest charges of respondent on TLA No. 43.
Attached thereto was a 19 September 2001 Memorandum of Amelia D. Arayan, Bill Collector
of the DENR R13-14, Bislig City, likewise indicating purported unpaid and overdue forest
charges by PICOP on its TLA No. 43.14
Said Memorandum was referred to FMB Director Romeo T. Acosta, who directed FMB Senior
Forest Management Specialist (SFMS) Ignacio Evangelista to proceed to Region 13 to gather
forestry-related data and validate the report contained in the respective Memoranda of
Orlanes and Arayan.15 SFMS Evangelista found that the 8 May 2001 to 7 July 2001 forest
charges adverted to in the Orlanes and Arayan Memoranda was belatedly filed. He also
found that PICOP had not paid its regular forest charges covering the period of 22 September
2001 to 26 April 2002 in the total amount of 15,056,054.05. 16 Moreso, he discovered that
from 1996 to 30 August 2002, PICOP was late in paying some of its forest charges in 1996,
and was consistently late in paying all its forestry charges from 1997 onwards. 17
The overdue and unpaid forest charges (including penalties, interests and surcharges) of
PICOP total 150,169,485.02. Its silvicultural fees amount to 2,366,901.00 from 1996 up to
30 August 2002. In all, PICOP has an outstanding and overdue total obligation on its forest
charges in the amount of 167,592,440.90 as of 30 August 2002. 18
Thus, FMB Director Acosta submitted a 5 October 2001 Memorandum to the DENR
Secretary concerning PICOPs application for conversion of its TLA No. 43 into an IFMA, viz:
RECOMMENDATION
The conversion of the TLA into IFMA is primarily aimed at sustaining the raw materials for the
continuous operation of the integrated wood processing plant of the company. However, the
very complex issues presented cannot just be ignored and have to be fully addressed to
before further appropriate action is taken on the application for conversion. In the absence of
categorical comments and recommendation of the regional office to resolve the issue, it is
recommended that a transition team composed of the following be created: x x x. 19
In lieu of a transition team, the DENR Secretary constituted a negotiating team by virtue of
Special Order No. 2001-698 dated 23 October 2001 composed of Undersecretary Ramon
J.P. Paje as chairman, with the following as members: Undersecretary Gregorio V. Cabantac
and FMB Assistant Director Neria A. Andin. The team was authorized to negotiate for such
terms and conditions as are advantageous to the Government. 20
The DENR Secretary sent a 25 October 2001 letter to PICOP, through its president,
requesting him to designate its representative/s to discuss with the DENR negotiating team
"the conditions and details of the said IFMA including the production sharing arrangement
between PICOP and the government."21
Since PICOP failed to send a representative, and considering that TLA No. 43 was about to
expire, DENR Undersecretary Paje called for a meeting on 21 March 2002. It was only then,
or almost five months from the receipt of the 25 October 2001 letter from the DENR
Secretary, that PICOP sent its representatives to the DENR. 22
On 9 April 2002, the DENR Negotiating Team issued Resolution No. 1, series of 2002,
creating a Technical Working Committee (TWC) to provide technical assistance to the
negotiating team composed of representatives from both DENR and PICOP. 23 On 10 April
2002, the members of the TWC met and discussed the findings of the Performance
Evaluation Team that PICOP has neither submitted its Five-Year Forest Protection Plan nor
presented its Seven-Year Reforestation Plan, both being required by DENR rules and
regulations. In the same meeting, PICOP agreed to secure and submit a clearance from the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as required by Section 59 of the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).24
On 15 April 2002, another TWC meeting was conducted, wherein the proposed validation of
PICOPs overall performance "as part of the evaluation process for the conversion of the TLA
into an IFMA" was discussed with PICOP representatives being given copies of the
performance evaluation of PICOP on its TLA No. 43. 25 PICOPs representatives were
subsequently requested to prepare a map showing by categories the area planted with trees
in compliance with PICOPs reforestation requirements. 26
In the next TWC meeting on 19 April 2002, PICOPs representatives were asked of their
compliance with their agreement during the 10 April 2002 meeting that they should have
submitted a list of stockholders on 15 April 2002. The PICOP representatives did not submit
such list and instead inquired on the TWCs interpretation of the 25 October 2001 letter of the
DENR Secretary to PICOP, which provides in full, thus:
25 October 2001
MR. TEODORO G. BERNARDINO
President
PICOP Resources Incorporated
2nd Flr, Moredel Building
2280 Pasong Tamo Extension
Makati City
Dear Mr. Bernardino:
Consistent with our attached Memorandum to Her Excellency, the President, dated 17
October 2001 and in response to your Letter of Intent dated 25 February 2001, we wish to
inform you that, pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-53, we have cleared the
conversion of PICOPs Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 to Integrated Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA) effective from the expiration of said TLA on April 26, 2002.
In this regard, you are hereby requested to designate PICOPs representative(s) to discuss
with the DENR Team, created under Special Order No. 2001-638, the conditions and details
of the said IFMA, including the production sharing agreement between PICOP and the
government.
For your information and guidance.
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ
Secretary27
It was the position of the DENR members of the TWC that PICOPs application for the IFMA
conversion should undergo the process as provided in DAO No. 99-53. PICOP representative
Atty. Caingat, however, claimed that "the TLA has been converted" and suggested the
suspension of the meeting as they would submit a written position on the matter the following
day.28
On 22 April 2002, the TWC members of the DENR received a letter from PICOP dated 18
April 2002 insisting that "the conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA has already been
completed" and indicated that they had "no choice except to decline participation in the
ongoing meeting and bring our issues to the proper public and legal forum."29
On 24 April 2002, the TWC submitted a Memorandum dated 22 April 2002 to the
Undersecretary for Operations and Undersecretary for Legal, Lands and International Affairs
of the DENR, enumerating the salient points taken up during the TWC meetings. This
includes the performance evaluation report of the DENR Regional Office covering the period
from 24 June 1999 to 23 June 2000. The report states that PICOP has not submitted its 5-
Year Forest Protection Plan and 7-Year Reforestation Plan; that it has unpaid and overdue
forest charges; and its failure to secure a clearance from the Regional Office of the NCIP
considering the presence of Indigenous Peoples (IPs) in the area and Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Claims issued within the area.
The DENR Secretary instructed the RED, Caraga Region, to coordinate with PICOP and
reiterate the requirements for conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA.
Thereafter, the FMB Director received a letter dated 6 August 2002 from NCIP Chairperson
Atty. Evelyn S. Dunuan informing him that, based on their records, no certification has been
issued to PICOP concerning its application for conversion of its TLA No. 43 into IFMA, "as
there has never been an application or endorsement of such application to our office." 30
On 12 August 2002, a meeting was held at the Office of the President of the Philippines
presided by Undersecretary Jose Tale and Undersecretary Jake Lagonera of the Office of the
Executive Secretary. PICOPs representatives committed to submit the following, to wit:
1. Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation issued on 12 August
2002 that extended PICOPs corporate term for another fifty (50) years;
2. Proof of Payment of forest charges;
3. Proof of Payment of Reforestation Deposit;
4. Response to social issues, particularly clearance from the NCIP; and
5. Map showing reforestation activities on an annual basis.31
PICOP submitted its purported compliance with aforesaid undertaking through a letter dated
21 August 2002 to the DENR Secretary. Upon evaluation of the documents submitted by
PICOP, the TWC noted that:
a) PICOP did not submit the required NCIP clearance;
b) The proof of payments for forest charges covers only the production period from
1 July 2001 to 21 September 2001;
c) The proof of payment of reforestation deposits covers only the period from the
first quarter of CY 1999 to the second quarter of CY 2001;
d) The map of the areas planted through supplemental planting and social forestry
is not sufficient compliance per Performance Evaluation Teams 11 July 2001 report
on PICOPs performance on its TLA No. 43, pursuant to Section 6.6 of DAO 79-87;
and
e) PICOP failed to respond completely to all the social issues raised. 32
Accordingly, the Secretary of DENR claims that further processing of PICOPs application for
the conversion of TLA No. 43 cannot proceed until PICOP complies with the requirements.
Insisting that the conversion of its TLA No. 43 had been completed, PICOP filed a Petition for
Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez before the RTC of Quezon
City, which was raffled to Branch 220, presided by Hon. Jose G. Paneda. The petition was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-47764 (hereinafter referred to as the MANDAMUS CASE).
On 11 October 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision granting PICOPs Petition for Mandamus,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Mandamus is hereby GRANTED.
The Respondent DENR Secretary Hon. Heherson Alvarez is hereby ordered:
1. to sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and/or documents to PICOP and
issue the corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the
IFMA, formerly TLA No. 43, as amended;
 2. to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from
the said area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw material requirements of
petitioners pulp and paper mills in accordance with the warranty and agreement of
July 29, 1969 between the government and PICOPs predecessor-in-interest; and
3. to honor and respect the Government Warranties and contractual obligations to
PICOP strictly in accordance with the warranty and agreement dated July 29, 1999
(sic) between the government and PICOPs predecessor-in-interest (Exhibits "H",
"H-1" to "H-5", particularly the following:
a) the area coverage of TLA No. 43, which forms part and parcel of the
government warranties;
b) PICOP tenure over the said area of TLA No. 43 and exclusive right to
cut, collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood for the period ending on
April 26, 1977; and said period to be renewable for [an]other 25 years
subject to compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements as
well as with existing policy on timber concessions; and
c) The peaceful and adequate enjoyment by PICOP of the area as
described and specified in the aforesaid amended Timber License
Agreement No. 43.
The Respondent Secretary Alvarez is likewise ordered to pay petitioner the sum of 10
million a month beginning May 2002 until the conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, to IFMA
is formally effected and the harvesting from the said area is granted. 33
On 25 October 2002, the DENR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 34
PICOP filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Mandatory
Injunction.35
On 12 November 2002, then DENR Secretary Alvarez filed a Motion to Inhibit Hon. Jose G.
Paneda from further trying the case, attaching to said motion an administrative complaint
against the latter which was filed by the former before the Office of the Court
Administrator.36 The Motion was denied in an Order dated 10 December 2002.
On 19 December 2002, PICOP filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implead Hon. Elisea
Gozun as respondent,37which was granted. Elisea Gozun was, thus, substituted as
respondent in her official capacity as the new DENR Secretary. 38
On 6 November 2002, then NCIP Chairperson Atty. Evelyn S. Dunuan sent a letter to the
DENR (1) informing the DENR Secretary that after validation by the NCIP, it was found out
that the area of 47,420 hectares covered by PICOPs TLA No. 43 conflicts with the ancestral
domains of the Manobos; and (2) reiterating the information that no NCIP certification was
sought by PICOP to certify that the area covered by TLA No. 43, subject of its IFMA
conversion, does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Accordingly, she "strongly urge[d]
the revocation of the one-year permit granted to PICOP until the full provisions of [the] IPRA
are followed and the rights of our Indigenous Peoples over their ancestral land claims are
respected."39
On 25 November 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297,
"EXCLUDING A CERTAIN AREA FROM THE OPERATION OF PROCLAMATION NO. 369
DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1931, AND DECLARING THE SAME AS MINERAL RESERVATION
AND AS ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA." The excluded area consists of 8,100
hectares, more or less, which formed part of PICOPs expired TLA No. 43, subject of its
application for IFMA conversion.40
On 21 January 2003, PICOP filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the aforesaid
presidential proclamation as well as its implementing DENR Administrative Order No. 2002-
35 (DAO No. 2002-35) which was raffled to Branch 78 of the RTC in Quezon City. The
Petition was docketed as Special Civil Action No. Q-03-48648 (hereinafter referred to as the
NULLITY CASE).
In said NULLITY CASE, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining
respondents therein41from implementing the questioned issuances. The DENR Secretary and
her co-respondents in said case filed on 6 February 2003 an Omnibus Motion (1) To Dissolve
the Temporary Restraining Order dated 3 February 2003; and (2) To Dismiss (With
Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction). 42
The trial court issued a Resolution dated 19 February 2003 granting the Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the Petition does not state a cause of action. 43 PICOP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration as well as a Motion to Inhibit. On 24 March 2003, the presiding judge of
Branch 78 inhibited himself from hearing the case. 44 Accordingly, the NULLITY CASE was re-
raffled to Branch 221 of the RTC of Quezon City, which granted PICOPs Motion for
Reconsideration by setting for hearing PICOPs application for preliminary injunction.
Meanwhile, in the MANDAMUS CASE, the RTC denied the DENR Secretarys Motion for
Reconsideration and granted the Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of
Mandatory Injunction via a 10 February 2003 Order. 45 The fallo of the 11 October 2002
Decision was practically copied in the 10 February 2003 Order, although there was no
mention of the damages imposed against then Secretary Alvarez. 46 The DENR Secretary filed
a Notice of Appeal47 from the 11 October 2002 Decision and the 10 February 2003 Order.
On 28 February 2003, the DENR Secretary filed before the Court of Appeals, a Petition for
Certiorari With a Most Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction insofar as the trial court ordered the execution of its 11
October 2002 Decision pending appeal. The petition (hereinafter referred to as the
INJUNCTION CASE) was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75698, which was assigned to the
Special 13th Division thereof.
On 11 March 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a 60-day TRO48 enjoining the enforcement of
the 11 October 2002 Decision and the 10 February 2003 Order of the RTC. On 30 April 2003,
the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 49
On 30 October 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision 50 in the INJUNCTION CASE
granting the Petition and annulling the Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Mandatory Injunction
issued by the trial court. PICOP filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 51
On 19 February 2004, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 52 on
the MANDAMUS CASE, affirming the Decision of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with modification that the order directing
then DENR Secretary Alvarez "to pay petitioner-appellee the sum of P10 million a month
beginning May, 2002 until the conversion to IFMA of TLA No. 43, as amended, is formally
effected and the harvesting from the said area is granted" is hereby deleted. 53
WHETHER [PICOP] HAD ACQUIRED A VESTED RIGHT OVER ITS FOREST
CONCESSION AREA BY VIRTUE OF THE AFORESAID PRESIDENTIAL WARRANTY.
III

PICOP filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration54 of this Decision, which was denied by the
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THIS
Court of Appeals in a 20 July 2004 Resolution. 55 CASE BECAUSE THE SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF PERTAINS TO THE EXCLUSIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE DOMAIN OF [THE DENR SECRETARY].
Meanwhile, in a 22 March 2004 Resolution, 56 the Special Thirteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals held in abeyance the ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration of the INJUNCTION
IV
CASE pending the Seventh Divisions resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration of the 19
February 2004 Decision in the MANDAMUS CASE.
WHETHER [PICOPS] PETITION FOR MANDAMUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (1)
FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION; AND (2) BECAUSE THE SUBJECT MATTER
The DENR Secretary and PICOP filed with this Court separate Petitions for Review on the 19 THEREOF IS NOT CONTROLLABLE BY CERTIORARI.
February 2004 Court of Appeals Decision in the MANDAMUS CASE. These Petitions were
docketed as G.R. No. 162243 and 164516, respectively.
V
On 16 December 2004, the Special Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals rendered an
Amended Decision57 on the INJUNCTION CASE lifting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction it WHETHER [PICOP] HAS FAITHFULLY COMPLIED WITH ALL THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND
had previously issued, to wit: OTHER STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS ENTITLING IT TO AN IFMA CONVERSION.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 22, 2004 holding in abeyance the resolution of VI
the motion for reconsideration of Our October 30, 2003 decision is set aside and the Decision
dated October 30, 2003 reconsidered. WHETHER [PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 605]62 HAS BEEN PARTLY REPEALED BY
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8975].63
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 30 April 2003 is hereby lifted and dissolved and the
Order dated 10 February 2003 allowing execution pending appeal and authorizing the In G.R. No. 164516, PICOP submits the sole issue:
issuance of the writ of mandamus and/or writ of mandatory injunction is hereby affirmed. The
Petition dated February 27, 2003 is herewith dismissed.58
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY DELETED THE AWARD OF DAMAGES
59
TO PETITIONER BY THE TRIAL COURT.64
Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration in a 9 March 2006 Resolution, the DENR
Secretary filed with this Court, a Petition for Review 60 of the INJUNCTION CASE. The Petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 171875. Finally, in G.R. No. 171875, the DENR Secretary submits the following arguments:

On 5 July 2006, this Court resolved61 to consolidate G.R. No. 162243, 164516, and 171875.
ISSUES
In G.R. No. 162243, the DENR Secretary brought forth the following issues for our
consideration:
I
WHETHER THE PRESIDENTIAL WARRANTY IS A CONTRACT WHICH CONSTITUTES A
LEGAL BAR TO THE EXERCISE BY THE STATE OF ITS FULL CONTROL AND
SUPERVISION REGARDING THE EXPLORATION DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION OF
ITS NATURAL RESOURCES.
A. [PICOP] DID NOT ACTUALLY FILE A MOTION FOR EXECUTION PENDING
APPEAL.
B. THERE ARE NO GOOD REASONS FOR THE GRANT OF EXECUTION
PENDING APPEAL.65
THIS COURTS RULING
Whether or not outright dismissal was proper
Since the third, fourth and sixth issues raised by the DENR Secretary, if determined in favor
of the DENR Secretary, would have warranted an outright dismissal of the MANDAMUS
CASE as early as the trial court level, it is proper to resolve these issues first.

II
The DENR Secretary alleges that the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the MANDAMUS
CASE pertains to the exclusive administrative domain of the DENR, and therefore, the RTC
had been in error in taking cognizance thereof. The DENR Secretary adds that, assuming
arguendo that the RTC properly took cognizance of the MANDAMUS CASE, it committed a
reversible error in not dismissing the same (1) for lack of cause of action; and (2) because the
subject matter thereof is not controllable by mandamus.
The Petition filed before the trial court was one for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction with damages. Specifically, it sought
to compel the DENR Secretary to: (1) sign, execute and deliver the IFMA documents to
PICOP; (2) issue the corresponding IFMA number assignment; and (3) approve the
harvesting of timber by PICOP from the area of TLA No. 43. The DENR Secretary contends
that these acts relate to the licensing regulation and management of forest resources, which
task belongs exclusively to the DENR66 as conveyed in its mandate:
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the countrys
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources,
including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well
as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order
to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos.67
The Court of Appeals ruled:
The contention does not hold water. In its petition for mandamus, [PICOP] asserted that
"DENR Secretary Alvarez acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction
in refusing to perform his ministerial duty to sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and
to issue the corresponding IFMA number to it." The cited jurisdiction of the DENR on licencing
regulation and management of our environment and natural resources is not disputed. In fact,
the petition seeks to compel it to properly perform its said functions in relation to [PICOP].
What is at stake is not the scope of the DENR jurisdiction but the manner by which it
exercises or refuses to exercise that jurisdiction.
The courts have the duty and power to strike down any official act or omission tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. The 1987 Constitution is explicit in providing that judicial power
includes not only the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government. 68
The Court of Appeals is correct. Since PICOP alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the DENR Secretary, it behooves the court to determine the same. An outright dismissal of
the case would have prevented such determination.
For the same reason, the MANDAMUS CASE could not have been dismissed outright for lack
of cause of action. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits
the truth of the allegations in the complaint. 69 In ruling upon the DENR Secretarys Motion to
Dismiss, PICOPs allegation that it has a contract with the government should, thus, be
hypothetically admitted. Necessarily, the DENR Secretarys argument that there was no such
contract should be considered in the trial of the case and should be disregarded at this stage
of the proceedings.
The DENR Secretary, however, counters that he/she has not yet exercised his/her exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, i.e., either to approve or disapprove PICOPs
application for IFMA conversion. Hence, it is argued that PICOPs immediate resort to the trial
court was precipitate based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 70
The Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
disregarded when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention,71 which are averred to be extant in this case, citing PICOPs employment of a
sizable number of workers and its payment of millions in taxes to the government. 72 The
Court of Appeals appends:
Moreover, contrary to [the DENR Secretarys] claim, the approval of an application for IFMA
conversion is not purely discretionary on the part of the DENR Secretary since the approval of
an IFMA conversion depends upon compliance with the requirements provided under DAO
No. 99-53.
Of course, as earlier intimated, even assuming, arguendo, that the approval of an IFMA
conversion involves the exercise of discretion by the DENR Secretary, the writ of mandamus
may be issued to compel the proper exercise of that discretion where it is shown that there
was grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. 73
While the Court of Appeals is correct in making such rulings, such accuracy applies only
insofar as the RTC assessment that the MANDAMUS CASE should not have been subjected
to outright dismissal. The issue of whether there was indeed an urgency of judicial
intervention (as to warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus despite the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DENR) is ultimately connected to the truth of PICOPs assertions, which
were hypothetically admitted in the motion to dismiss stage. In other words, it all boils down to
whether the DENR Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in not executing the IFMA
documents and in not approving PICOPs harvesting of timber from the area of TLA No. 43.
The sixth issue raised by the DENR Secretary concerns Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
605 which, according to the Court of Appeals had been partly repealed by Republic Act No.
8975. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 605 provides:
SECTION 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out
of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action
whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits,
patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization,
exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines.
According to the Court of Appeals,
Section 1 of PD 605 has been partly repealed by RA No. 8975, enacted on November 7,
2002. Section 3 of the said law limits the prohibition on the issuance of restraining orders and
injunctions to the following:
"(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site of location of any
national government project;
"(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under
Section 2 hereof;
"(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract
or project;
"(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
"(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such
contract/project."
Noticeably, the subject coverage on concessions, licenses and the like contemplated in
Section 1 of PD 605 is notreproduced in the foregoing enumeration under Section 3 of R.A.
8975. The effect of the non-reenactment is a partial repeal of Section 1 of PD 605. It is a rule
of legal hermenuetics (sic) that an act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to
contain operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was contained in the old act and not
included in the act as revised. As the repealing clause of R.A. 8975 states:
"Sec. 9. Repealing Clause All laws, decrees including Presidential Decree Nos. 605, 1818
and Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly."74
The DENR Secretary claims that since Republic Act No. 8975 simply declares that
Presidential Decree No. 605 or parts thereof "inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly," then, there should be an inconsistency between Presidential Decree
No. 605 and Republic Act No. 8975 before there can be a partial repeal of Presidential
Decree No. 605.
We agree with the DENR Secretary. Republic Act No. 8975 was not intended to set out in full
all laws concerning the prohibition against temporary restraining orders, preliminary
injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions. Republic Act No. 8975 prohibits lower
courts from issuing such orders in connection with the implementation of government
infrastructure projects, while Presidential Decree No. 605 prohibits the issuance of the same,
in any case involving licenses, concessions and the like, in connection with the natural
resources of the Philippines. This can be further seen from the respective titles of these two
laws, which, of course, should express the subjects thereof: 75
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8975
AN ACT TO ENSURE THE EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLETION OF
GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY PROHIBITING LOWER COURTS
FROM ISSUING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
OR PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTIONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 605
BANNING THE ISSUANCE BY COURTS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN CASES
INVOLVING CONCESSIONS, LICENSES, AND OTHER PERMITS ISSUED BY PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS OR BODIES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES.
However, when the licenses, concessions and the like also entail government infrastructure
projects, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8975 should be deemed to apply, 76 and, thus,
Presidential Decree No. 605 had been modified in this sense.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that Presidential Decree No. 605 subsists, the DENR Secretary
must have missed our ruling in Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito,77 wherein we held that the
prohibition in Presidential Decree No. 605 "pertains to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases, because to allow courts to judge these matters could
disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. But on issues definitely
outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts are not prevented by
Presidential Decree No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative
acts."
While there are indeed questions of facts in the present Petitions, the overriding controversy
involved herein is one of law: whether the Presidential Warranty issued by former President
Marcos are contracts within the purview of the Constitutions Non-Impairment Clause.
Accordingly, the prohibition in Presidential Decree No. 605 against the issuance of
preliminary injunction in cases involving permits for the exploitation of natural resources does
not apply in this case.
Moreover, as we held in Republic v. Nolasco,78 statutes such as Presidential Decree No. 605,
Presidential Decree No. 1818 and Republic Act No. 8975 merely proscribe the issuance of
temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction. They cannot, under pain of violating the Constitution, deprive the courts of
authority to take cognizance of the issues raised in the principal action, as long as such action
and the relief sought are within their jurisdiction. We further held in Nolasco:
However, it must be clarified that Republic Act No. 8975 does not ordinarily warrant the
outright dismissal of any complaint or petition before the lower courts seeking permanent
injunctive relief from the implementation of national government infrastructure projects. What
is expressly prohibited by the statute is the issuance of the provisional reliefs of temporary
restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions. It does not
preclude the lower courts from assuming jurisdiction over complaints or petitions that seek as
ultimate relief the nullification or implementation of a national government infrastructure
project. A statute such as Republic Act No. 8975 cannot diminish the constitutionally
mandated judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. x x x.79
As the disposition of these consolidated Petitions will be dispositions of the principal actions,
any applicability of the prohibitions in Presidential Decree No. 605 will be mooted.
Whether or not the presidential warranty was a contract
PICOPs ground for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is the supposed contract entered into
by the government in the form of a Presidential Warranty, dated 29 July 1969 issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos to PICOP. The DENR Secretary refutes this claim, and
alleges that the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Presidential Warranty a
valid and subsisting contract under the Constitutions Non-Impairment Clause.
The Court of Appeals has this brief statement concerning the main issue of the MANDAMUS
CASE:
The questioned warranty is a valid contract. It was freely entered into by the government and
[PICOP]. Mutual considerations were taken into account in the execution of that contract.
[PICOP] invested billions of pesos in its concession areas. In return, the government assured
[PICOP] of its tenurial rights over TLA No. 43, as amended, as well as its exclusive right to
cut, collect and saw timber and pulpwood therein. The DENR must perforce honor and
respect the warranty by maintaining the area alloted (sic) to [PICOP] under TLA No. 43, as
amended.80
We are constrained to disagree. In unequivocal terms, we have consistently held that such
licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the countrys forests cannot be considered
contracts that would bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the demands
of public interest and welfare.81 Such unswerving verdict is synthesized in Oposa v. Factoran,
Jr.,82 where we held:
In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with
utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by petitioners, into every timber license must be read
Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
"x x x Provided, that when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein x x x."
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the constitution.
In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, [125 SCRA 302, 325 (1983)] this Court held:
"x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in
this case.
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to
whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right;
nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights. (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576). x x x"
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary [190 SCRA 673, 684 (1990)]:
"x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may
be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due
process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended.
Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
cannot be invoked.
PICOP, however, argues that these rulings laid down in Tan v. Director of Forestry, 83 Felipe
Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary 84 and Oposa do not find application in
the present case allegedly because the issue here is the unlawful refusal of then DENR
Secretary Alvarez to issue an IFMA to PICOP and not the matter of a timber license being
merely a license or privilege.85
We are not persuaded. PICOP filed the MANDAMUS CASE against then DENR Secretary
Alvarez on the ground that Secretary Alvarezs refusal to issue an IFMA in its favor allegedly
violated its vested right over the area covered by its TLA No. 43 and presidential warranty,
and impaired the obligation of contract under said agreement and warranty. 86
The argument that the Presidential Warranty is a contract on the ground that there were
mutual considerations taken into account consisting in investments on PICOPs part is
preposterous. All licensees put up investments in pursuing their businesses. To construe
these investments as consideration in a contract would be to stealthily render ineffective the
settled jurisprudence that "a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and
the licensee or permittee, and is not a property in the constitutional sense, as to which the
constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts may extend."87 Neither shall we
allow a circumvention of such doctrine by terming such permit as a "warranty."
Whether or not there was compliance with the requirements for the conversion of TLA No. 43
as amended into an IFMA
DAO No. 99-53 enumerates the requirements for the grant of the IFMA conversion:
Sec. 9. Qualifications of Applicants. The applicants for IFMA shall be:
(a) A Filipino citizen of legal age; or
(b) Partnership, cooperative or corporation whether public or private, duly registered
under Philippine laws.
However, in the case of application for conversion of TLA into IFMA, an automatic conversion
after proper evaluation shall be allowed, provided the TLA holder shall have signified such
intention prior to the expiry of the TLA, PROVIDED further, the TLA holder has shown
satisfactory performance and have complied with the terms and conditions of the TLA and
pertinent rules and regulations.
Therefore, the following are the requisites for the automatic conversion of the TLA into an
IFMA, to wit:
1. The TLA holder had signified its intent to convert its TLA into an IFMA prior to the
expiration of its TLA;
2. Proper evaluation was conducted on the application; and
3. The TLA holder has satisfactorily performed and complied with the terms and
conditions of the TLA and the pertinent rules and regulations.
The Court of Appeals held:
From the foregoing provision, it can be gleaned that as long as an applicant-corporation has
signified its intention to convert its TLA into an IFMA prior to the expiration of its TLA, has
shown satisfactory performance as a TLA holder and has complied with the terms and
conditions of the TLA and pertinent rules and regulations, conversion follows as a matter of
course. It becomes automatic.
[PICOP] has complied with the administrative requirements. In its letter dated August 28,
2000 to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) for DENR-
RXIII-D4, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, it signified its intention to convert its TLA into an IFMA. It
has also shown satisfactory performance as a TLA holder as evidenced by the July 31, 2001
Report of Director Elias Seraspi, Jr. The said report states that [PICOP] was able to hold on
its management and protection of its concession areas.
xxxx
Apparently, [the DENR Secretary] refuses to sign the documents on the grounds that [PICOP]
has not secured and submitted a clearance from the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) showing that its TLA areas do not overlap with existing ancestral domains:
and that [PICOP] has outstanding and overdue obligation in forest charges.
The two reasons last cited by the Secretary for refusing to sign and deliver the IFMA
documents are not real nor valid.
Section 59 of RA 8371, which requires prior certification from the NCIP that the areas affected
do not overlap with any ancestral domain before any IFMA can be entered into by the
government, should be read in conjunction with Sections 3 (a) and 56 of the same law.
Section 3 (a) of RA 8371 describes ancestral domains as "areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held
under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through
their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the
present xxx." On the other hand, Section 56 of the same law provides:
"Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. Property rights within the ancestral domains
already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and respected."
It can thus be deduced that Section 59 can only be interpreted to refer to ancestral domains
which have been duly established as such (i.e., the concerned indigenous people must have
been in continuous possession or occupation of the area concerned since time immemorial
up to the present). Too, existing property rights over the areas sought to be declared as part
of an ancestral domain must be recognized and respected.
[PICOP] has already acquired property rights over its concession areas. It has been in
exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession and occupation of TLA No. 43 areas
since 1952 to present. From the time it managed and operated TLA No. 43, it has made huge
investments on its concession areas. These include the planting of millions of trees and the
scientific silvicultural treatment of the forest to make it more productive. Having acquired
property rights over TLA No. 43 areas, [PICOP] need not be required to secure clearance
from the NCIP pursuant to Section 59 of RA 8371.
[The DENR Secretarys] claim that [PICOP] failed to settle its outstanding obligations to the
government in the form of unpaid forest charges do not inspire belief. Under Sec. 3 (3.5) of
DENR Memorandum Circular No. 96-04 dated March 14, before an Integrated Annual
Operations Plan (IAOP) can be issued, it is a condition precedent that the licensee has no
pending forestry accounts. If it were true that [PICOP] had unpaid forest charges, why was it
issued IAOP for calendar year 2001-2002 by Secretary Alvarez himself?88
Upon close scrutiny of the records, this Court observes that these findings of compliance by
PICOP are negated by the very evidence on which they are supposedly moored.
As clearly shown by the 31 July 2001 Memorandum of Regional Executive Director Elias D.
Seraspi, Jr., DENR Caraga Region, RED Seraspi neither made a categorical finding of
PICOPs satisfactory performance on its TLA No. 43 nor favorably recommended approval of
PICOPs application for IFMA conversion. Rather, RED Seraspi recommended the proper
evaluation of PICOPs request for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43 into an IFMA:
Hence, it is imperative to chart a good forest policy direction for the management,
development and protection of TLA No. 43 after it expires on April 26, 2002 for the purpose of
sustainable forest management of the area in support of national development. With this
vision, the proper evaluation to consider the request for automatic conversion of TLA No. 43
to IFMA pursuant to Section 9, DENR A.O. No. 99-53, upon its expiration on April 26, 2002 is
hereby recommended.89
Administrative Requirements
There was actually no way by which RED Seraspi could have come up with a satisfactory
performance finding since the very Performance Evaluation Team tasked to make the
evaluation found PICOP to have violated existing DENR rules and regulations. According to
the 11 July 2002 Memorandum Report of the Performance Evaluation Team, PICOP has not
submitted its Five-Year Forest Protection Plan and its Seven-Year Reforestation Plan.90
Forest charges are, on the other hand, due and payable within 30 days from removal of the
forest products from the cutting area when timber and other forest products are removed for
domestic sales pursuant to Sections 6 and 6.2 of DAO No. 80, series of 1987. Thus:
Section 6. Payment of Forest Charges. x x x In such a case, the forest charges shall be due
and payable as follows:
6.1 When timber and other forest products are intended for export. x x x x
6.2 When timber and other forest products are to be removed for domestic sales. The forest
charges shall be due and payable within thirty (30) days from removal thereof at the cutting
area, or where the forest products are gathered; Provided, that such date of removal shall in
no case be beyond thirty (30) days when the products are cut, gathered and removed.
As testified to by FMB SFMS Ignacio M. Evangelista, PICOP failed to pay its regular forest
charges covering the period from 22 September 2001 to 26 April 2002 in the total amount of
15,056,054.05.91 PICOP was also late in paying most of its forest charges from 1996
onwards for which it is liable for a surcharge of 25% per annum on the tax due and interest of
20% per annum which now amounts to 150,169,485.02. 92 Likewise, it has overdue and
unpaid silvicultural fees in the amount of 2,366,901.00 as of 30 August 2002. 93 In all, PICOP
has unpaid and overdue forest charges in the sum of 167,592,440.90 as of 10 August
2002.94
PICOPs failure to pay its regular forest charges, interests, penalties and surcharges and
silvicultural fees amounting to 167,592,440.90 as of 30 August 2002 is further evidenced by
the collection letters sent to PICOP and the absence of official receipts in the DENR records
in Bislig City evidencing payment of the overdue amounts stated in the said collection
letters.95 As can be gleaned from SFMS Evangelistas tabulation, all the official receipts
evidencing payments of PICOP with their corresponding periods are indicated. However,
there are no similar official receipts for the period covering 22 September 2001 to 26 April
2002, which indicate that no payment has been made for the same period.
With the DENR Secretarys presentation of its positive and categorical evidence showing
PICOPs failure to pay its forest charges amounting to 167,592,440.90 as of 10 August
2002, the burden of evidence has been shifted to PICOP to prove otherwise. PICOP should
have, thus, presented official receipts as proof of their payment of such forest charges, but
failed to do so.
Despite the foregoing evidence, the Court of Appeals declared that if it were true that PICOP
has unpaid forest charges, it should not have been issued an IAOP for the year 2001-2002 by
Secretary Alvarez himself.96 In doing so, the Court of Appeals disregarded the part of the very
evidence presented by PICOP itself, which shows that the IAOP was approved subject to
several conditions, not the least of which was the submission of proof of updated payment of
forest charges from April 2001 to June 2001.97
Neither was this the only evidence presented by PICOP which showed that it has unpaid
forest charges. PICOP presented the certification of CENRO Calunsag which refers only to its
alleged payment of regular forest charges covering the period from 14 September 2001 to 15
May 2002.98 The certification does not mention similar payment of the penalties, surcharges
and interests which it incurred in paying late several forest charges, which fact it did not rebut.
The 27 May 2002 Certification by CENRO Calunsag, on the other hand, specified only the
period covering 14 September 2001 to 15 May 2002 and the amount of 53,603,719.85 paid
by PICOP without indicating the corresponding volume and date of production of the logs.
This is in contrast to the findings of SFMS Evangelista which cover the period from CY 1996
to 30 August 2002 which includes penalties, interests, and surcharges for late payment
pursuant to DAO 80, series of 1987.
Per request of PICOP, a certification dated 21 August 2002 was issued by Bill Collector
Amelia D. Arayan, and attested to by CENRO Calunsag, showing that PICOP paid only
regular forest charges of its log production covering 1 July 2001 to 21 September 2001.
However, there being log productions after 21 September 2001, PICOP failed to pay the
corresponding regular forest charges amounting to 15,056,054.05. 99 The same certification
also shows delayed payment of forest charges, thereby corroborating the testimony of SFMS
Evangelista and substantiating the imposition of penalties and surcharges.
Finally, even if we consider for the sake of argument that the IAOP should not have been
issued if PICOP had existing forestry accounts, the issuance of the IAOP cannot be
considered proof that PICOP has paid the same. Firstly, the best evidence of payment is the
receipt thereof. PICOP has not presented any evidence that such receipts had been lost or
destroyed or cannot be produced in court.100 Secondly, it is a well known and settled rule in
our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government, is usually not estopped by mistake or
error on the part of its officials or agents. 101 If PICOP had been issued an IAOP in violation of
the law allegedly because it may not be issued if PICOP had existing forestry accounts, the
government cannot be estopped from collecting such amounts and providing the necessary
sanctions therefor, including the withholding of the IFMA until such amounts are paid.
Statutory Requirements
To recap, the Court of Appeals had relied on RED Seraspis certification in concluding that
there was satisfactory performance on the part of PICOP as a TLA holder, despite said
certification showing non-compliance with the required Five-Year Forest Protection Plan and
Seven-Year Reforestation Plan. The Court of Appeals also declared that PICOP has paid its
outstanding obligations based on an inference that the IAOP would not have been issued if
PICOP had unpaid forest charges, contrary to the conditions laid down in the IAOP itself, and
in violation of the Best Evidence Rule and the doctrine disallowing the estoppel of the
government from the acts of its officers.
On the statutory requirement of procuring a clearance from the NCIP, the Court of Appeals
held that PICOP need not comply with the same at all. As quoted above, the Court of Appeals
held that Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8371, which requires prior certification from the NCIP
that the areas affected do not overlap with any ancestral domain before any IFMA can be
entered into by government, should be interpreted to refer to ancestral domains which have
been duly established as such by the continuous possession and occupation of the area
concerned by indigenous peoples since time immemorial up to the present. According to the
Court of Appeals, PICOP has acquired property rights over the TLA No. 43 areas, being in
exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession and occupation of TLA No. 43 areas
since 1952 up to the present.
This ruling defies the settled jurisprudence we have mentioned earlier, including that of
Oposa and Tan which held that "[a] license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property
right, nor does it create a vested right; x x x."102
The Court of Appeals resort to statutory construction is, in itself, misplaced. Section 59 of
Republic Act No. 8371 is clear and unambiguous:
SEC. 59. Certification Precondition. All departments and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or
lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior certification from the
NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification
shall only be issued after a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains
Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP
without the free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided,
further, That no department, government agency or government-owned or controlled
corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while
there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the
right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the
requirement of this consultation process.
The court may not construe a statute that is clear and free from doubt. Time and again, it has
been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. 103 PICOPs
intent to put a cloud of ambiguity in Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8371 by invoking Section
3(a) thereof fails miserably. Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 8371 defines ancestral domain
as follows:
a) Ancestral domains Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held
under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through
their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the
present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered
into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure
their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable
or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and
other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs
but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities,
particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
Ancestral domains remain as such even when possession or occupation of the area has been
interrupted by causes provided under the law such as voluntary dealings entered into by the
government and private individuals/corporation. Therefore, the issuance of TLA No. 43 in
1952 did not cause the Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples to lose their
possession or occupation over the area covered by TLA No. 43.
The issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title is merely a formal recognition of the
ICCs/IPs rights of possession and ownership over their ancestral domain identified and
delineated in accordance with the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act,104 and therefore, cannot be
considered a condition precedent for the need for an NCIP certification. In the first place, it is
manifestly absurd to claim that the subject lands must first be proven to be part of ancestral
domains before a certification that they are not part of ancestral domains can be required. In
Cruz v. Secretary of DENR,105 where no single member of the Court penned a majority
opinion (since the petition to declare Republic Act No. 8371 unconstitutional was dismissed
for the reason that the votes were equally divided), Mr. Justice Reynato Puno, who voted to
dismiss the petition, wrote in his separate opinion:
As its subtitle suggests, [Section 59 of R.A. No. 8371] requires as a precondition for the
issuance of any concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification
be issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie with any ancestral
domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the
State as to determine whether to grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It
merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the
agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the certification
applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral
domains. For those that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA
apply.
Another requirement determined by the Court of Appeals to have been complied with by
PICOP, albeit impliedly this time by not mentioning it at all, is the requirement posed by
Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code:
SEC. 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance.
It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation
authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may
cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land,
rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local
government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain
the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the
community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be
undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
SEC. 27. Prior Consultation Required. No project or program shall be implemented by
government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof
are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided,
That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted
unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution.
These provisions are clear: the prior approval of local government units affected by the
proposed conversion of a TLA into an IFMA is necessary before any project or program can
be implemented by the government authorities that may cause "depletion of non-renewable
resources, loss of crop land, rangeland or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant
species."
The common evidence of the DENR Secretary and PICOP, namely the 31 July 2001
Memorandum of RED Seraspi, enumerates the local government units and other groups
which had expressed their opposition to PICOPs application for IFMA conversion:
7. During the conduct of the performance evaluation of TLA No. 43 issues/complaints against
PRI were submitted thru Resolutions and letters. It is important that these are included in this
report for assessment of what are their worth, viz:
xxxx
7.2 Joint Resolution (unnumbered), dated March 19, 2001 of the Barangay Council and
Barangay Tribal Council of Simulao, Boston, Davao Oriental (ANNEX F) opposing the
conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA over the 17,112 hectares allegedly covered with CADC
No. 095.
7.3 Resolution Nos. 10, s-2001 and 05, s-2001 (ANNEXES G & H) of the Bunawan Tribal
Council of Elders (BBMTCE) strongly demanding none renewal of PICOP TLA. They claim to
be the rightful owner of the area it being their alleged ancestral land.
7.4 Resolution No. 4, S-2001 of Sitio Linao, San Jose, Bislig City (ANNEX I) requesting not to
renew TLA 43 over the 900 hectares occupied by them.
7.5 Resolution No. 22, S-2001 (ANNEX J) of the Sanguniang Bayan, Lingig, Surigao del Sur
not to grant the conversion of TLA 43 citing the plight of former employees of PRI who were
forced to enter and farm portion of TLA No. 43, after they were laid off.
7.6 SP Resolution No. 2001-113 and CDC Resolution Nos. 09-2001 of the Sanguniang
Panglungsod of Bislig City (ANNEXES K & L) requesting to exclude the area of TLA No. 43
for watershed purposes.
7.7 Resolution No. 2001-164, dated June 01, 2001 (ANNEX M) Sanguniang Panglungsod of
Bislig City opposing the conversion of TLA 43 to IFMA for the reason that IFMA do not give
revenue benefits to the City.106
As stated in RED Seraspis 31 July 2001 Memorandum, 107 several indigenous groups and
some affected local government units have expressly opposed PICOPs application for IFMA
conversion of its TLA No. 43.
PICOP merely submitted a purported resolution108 of the Province of Surigao del Sur
indorsing the approval of PICOPs application for IFMA conversion. But Surigao del Sur is not
the only province affected by the area covered by the proposed IFMA. As even the Court of
Appeals found, PICOPs TLA No. 43 traverses the length and breadth not only of Surigao del
Sur but also Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental. 109 How then can PICOP
claim that it complied with the Local Government Code requirement of obtaining prior
approval of the Sangunian concerned when only one out of the four affected local
government units has purportedly signified its concurrence to the proposed IFMA conversion?
Finally, the DENR, by withholding the conversion of PICOPs TLA No. 43 into an IFMA, has
made a factual finding that PICOP has not yet complied with the requirements for such a
conversion. Findings of facts of administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect,
if not finality, by the courts because of the special knowledge and expertise over matters
falling under their jurisdiction. 110 Such finality of the DENRs factual finding, supported as it is
by substantial evidence, can only be overcome by grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess in jurisdiction, which is even more pronounced in a Petition for Mandamus.
Whether or not there has already been a conversion of TLA No. 43 into an IFMA
The Court of Appeals declared that there exists no legal impediment to the conversion of
respondents TLA No. 43 into an IFMA as evidenced by petitioners letters dated 26 October
2002 and 26 April 2002:
Moreover, [the DENR Secretarys] own letters to [PICOP] confirm that it has established a
clear right to the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43 to IFMA. Thus, on October 26, 2002,
[the DENR Secretary] stated in his letter to [PICOP] "that pursuant to DAO-99-53, we have
cleared the conversion on PICOPs TLA No. 43 to IFMA effective from the expiration of said
TLA on April 26, 2002." Too, in its April 24, 2002 letter to [PICOP], [the DENR Secretary]
granted PICOPs TDMP "[p]ending the formal approval of [its] IFMA xxx." It could thus be
deduced that there exists no legal impediment to the conversion of PICOPs TLA 43 to IFMA.
Its approval remains a formality.
We disagree. Then DENR Secretary Alvarezs 25 October 2001 letter is reproduced herein
for reference:
Dear Mr. Bernardino:
Consistent with your attached Memorandum to her Excellency, the President, dated 17
October 2001 and in response to your Letter of Intent dated 25 January 2001, we wish to
inform you that, pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-53, we have cleared the
conversion of PICOPs Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 to Integrated Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA) effective from the expiration of said TLA on April 26, 2002.
In this regard, you are hereby requested to designate PICOPs representative(s) to discuss
with the DENR Team, created under Special Order No. 2001-638, the conditions and details
of the said IFMA, including the production sharing arrangement between PICOP and the
government.111
By giving this clearance for the conversion of PICOPs TLA into an IFMA, the DENR
Secretary cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be claimed to have granted the conversion
itself. The letter is clear that the "conversion" could not be final since its conditions and details
still have to be discussed as stated in the second paragraph of said letter; hence, the same
letter could not have reduced to a mere formality the approval of the conversion of PICOPs
TLA No. 43 into an IFMA.
Likewise, then DENR Secretary Alvarezs 26 April 2002 letter approving PICOPs Transition
Development and Management Plan (TDMP) cannot be considered as an approval of
PICOPs application for IFMA conversion. Again, the aforesaid letter is quoted in full:
April 24, 2002
MR. WILFREDO D. FUENTES
Vice President Resident Manager
PICOP Resources, Incorporated
2nd Floor, Moredel Building
2280 Pasong Tamo Extension
Makati City
Dear Mr. Fuentes:
This refers to your request for approval of the submitted Two-year Transition Development
and Management Plan of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PRI) for the areas under TLA No. 43 which
expires on April 26, 2002.
Pending the formal approval of your IFMA and consistent with our letter to the PRI President
dated 25 October 2002, we hereby grant your Transition Development and Management Plan
(TDMP) for a period of one (1) year, effective 26 April 2002.
Within such period we expect PRI to submit/comply with all the necessary requisites for the
final conversion of TLA 43 into IFMA, as provided for under DENR Administrative Order No.
99-53, including the settlement of certain obligations such as taxes, if any, and submission of
plans and programs for evaluation and approval of item number 1 of your proposal contained
in your letter dated February 4, 2002.
All other proposed activities in your TDMP, particularly items 2 7 of your letter dated
February 4, 2002, are hereby approved.
For your information and guidance.
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ
Secretary
Cc: Mr. Teodoro G. Bernardino
President
The Director, FMB
The aforesaid letter speaks for itself. PICOPs application for IFMA conversion is still pending
approval. Indeed, there could have been no approval of PICOPs application for IFMA
conversion because DAO No. 99-53 (which governs application for IFMA conversion)
requires full and complete compliance with the requirements for conversion before it may be
approved. As stated in the letter itself of then DENR Secretary Alvarez, PICOP has yet to
"submit/comply with all the necessary requisites for final conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA."
Even assuming, however, that the IFMA has already been converted, this is all purely
academic because of the above-discussed settled jurisprudence that logging permits are not
contracts within the Non-Impairment Clause and thus, can be amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded when the national interest so requires. If the DENR Secretary, therefore, finds that
the IFMA would be in violation of statutes, rules and regulations, particularly those protecting
the rights of the local governments and the indigenous peoples within the IFMA area, then it
behooves the DENR Secretary to revoke such IFMA. These same statutes, rules and
regulations are the very same requirements mentioned above for the conversion of the TLA
No. 43 into an IFMA.
Whether or not it is proper to determine the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 in these
consolidated petitions
Another reason why the DENR Secretary wishes to further withhold the conversion of
PICOPs TLA No. 43 into an IFMA is the 25 November 2002 Proclamation No. 297 excluding
an area of 8,100 hectares, more or less, from the coverage of TLA No. 43, as amended, and
which declared the same as a mineral reservation and as an environmentally critical area.
The DENR Secretary claims that said Presidential Proclamation is rendered nugatory by the
Court of Appeals disposition that the DENR should honor and respect the area allotted to
PICOP under TLA No. 43.112
PICOP claims that Proclamation No. 297 is a new matter which the DENR Secretary cannot
raise before this Court without offending the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process.113
The DENR Secretary counters that it did not take up the issue of Proclamation No. 297 before
the trial court precisely because said proclamation was issued more than one month after the
trial court rendered its 11 October 2002 Decision. The DENR Secretary claims that PICOP
cannot claim a violation of its right to due process because it raised the issue before the Court
of Appeals in its Memorandum.
While not giving in to the DENR Secretarys argument, PICOP claims that Proclamation No.
297 is violative of the Constitution and an encroachment on the legislative powers of
Congress.114
We agree with PICOP that this constitutional issue cannot be decided upon in this case. This
Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-
established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law
to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it
is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may raise its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until such question will be unavoidable. 115
The constitutional question presented by PICOP is not the very lis mota in these consolidated
cases, as the preceding discussions very well give us adequate grounds to grant the Petition
in G.R. No. 162243, deny the Petition in G.R. No. 164516, and dismiss the Petition in G.R.
No. 171875. Moreover, PICOP has filed a separate petition for the declaration of nullity of
Proclamation No. 297, wherein the issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 is
properly ventilated.
Consequently, all actions and reliefs sought by either PICOP or the DENR Secretary which
has Proclamation No. 297 as its ground or subject should be ventilated either in the pending
petition for the declaration of its nullity, or in another proper suit instituted for that matter.
EPILOGUE AND DISPOSITION
In sum, the DENR Secretary has adequately proven that PICOP has, at this time, failed to
comply with the administrative and statutory requirements for the conversion of TLA No. 43
into an IFMA. The Petition in G.R. No. 162243 should therefore be granted.
On the other hand, as PICOP is not yet entitled to such conversion, then Secretary Alvarez
had been correct in withholding the same and thus cannot be held liable for damages
therefor. Thus, the Petition in G.R. No. 164516 should be dismissed.
Finally, the DENR Secretarys Petition in G.R. No. 171875, assailing the lifting by the Court of
Appeals of the Preliminary Injunction in its favor, is now mooted.

PICOPs noncompliance with the requirements for the conversion of their TLA is so glaring,
that we almost see a reluctance to uphold the law in light of PICOPs sizeable investments in
its business, a fact repeatedly stressed by PICOP in its pleadings. In applying the judicial
policy of nurturing prosperity, consideration should also be given to the long-term effects of
the judicial evaluations involved, particularly to our nations greatest wealth, our vast natural
resources.1wphi1

Our country has been blessed with rich, lush and verdant rain forests in which varied, rare
and unique species of flora and fauna may be found.116 The legislative policy has been to
preserve and nourish these natural resources as they are not only for our benefit but more so
for the countless future generations to which we are likewise responsible. It has also been
legislative policy to let the citizens of this country reap their benefits, foremost the citizens in
close proximity to such resources, through the local governments and the NCIP.

In working for the legislative policy of environmental preservation, the requirements of a five-
year forest protection plan and seven-year reforestation plan had been laid down, together
with the levy of forest charges for the regulation of forestry activities. In pursuing, on the other
hand, the benefit distribution policy, the Local Government Code requires prior Sanggunian
approval to ensure that local communities partake in the fruits of their own backyard, while
R.A. No. 8371 provides for the rights of the indigenous peoples, who have been living in,
managing, and nourishing these forests since time immemorial.

PICOP has been fortunate to have been awarded an enormous concession area and thus, a
huge chunk of the benefits of this countrys natural resources. Attached to this fortune is the
responsibility to comply with the laws and regulations implementing the stated legislative
policies of environmental preservation and benefit distribution. These laws and regulations
should not be ignored, and the courts should not condone such blatant disregard by those
who believe they are above the law because of their sizable investments and significant
number of workers employed. PICOP has only itself to blame for the withholding of the
conversion of its TLA. But while this disposition confers another chance to comply with the
foregoing requirements, the DENR Secretary can rightfully grow weary if the persistence on
noncompliance will continue. The judicial policy of nurturing prosperity would be better served
by granting such concessions to someone who will abide by the law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 162243 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals insofar as it affirmed the RTC Decision granting the Petition for Mandamus filed by
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Petition in G.R. No. 164516 seeking the reversal of the same Decision insofar as
it nullified the award of damages in favor of PICOP is DENIED for lack of merit. The Petition
in G.R. No. 171875, assailing the lifting of the Preliminary Injunction in favor of the Secretary
of Environment and Natural Resources is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness.