Republic vs.

CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got
married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both
as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his
money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their
relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio
City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned
them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet
the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos
action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise
grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she
and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr
Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered
as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in
this case:
burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the
state.

Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)

Facts:
The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on
certiorari praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the
judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy
null and void based on Article 36.

On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children.
In 1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign
divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went
back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her
children inwhich she used her husbands last name as hers in the invitation.

March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts
brought danger and dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her psychological
incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage
contract, and the invitation where Fely used her newhusbands last name as evidences.

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and
thatsince 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found
the evidences sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.

Issue:

Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?

Held:

The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of

and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less,
ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity
or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under the said Article.

Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting
aparty even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume.

Leouel Santos vs. CA

GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995

FACTS:

Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986
before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived
with Julias parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was
named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside
from the interference of Julias parents into their family affairs.

Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months
after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of
her contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent
a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia
but all his efforts were of no avail.

Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than
5 years are circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life.

ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated.

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers
to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA

GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997

FACTS:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding,
they proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no sexual intercourse between
them during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to
have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Ginas relatives went with
them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk
during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989
they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese
General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while
that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations
that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the
country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared
void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to
have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is
physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still
overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination
and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a

serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

WHY THE CASE IS UNFORGETTABLE

In his attempt to prove that he was not impotent, Chi Ming Tsoi was clearly successful. The
Supreme Court was convinced that his little friend could surely rise up to the occasion. But he
probably forgot that court proceedings are public in nature. In his enthusiasm to refute his wifes
allegation of impotency, he also announced to the whole world that his little friend is indeed a
little friend.

Henceforth, the length of Chi Ming Tsois phallus was forever inscribed in the annals of legal
scripture. In fact, this would be an interesting question for the bar exams. What is the size of Chi
Ming Tsois penis? Definitely, all bar examinees will be able answer this question perfectly 2
inches or 5 centimeters while soft and it lengthens by 1 inch and 1 centimeter during a soft
erection.

Kenneth Ngo Te vs Rowena Yu Te (G.R. No. 161793)

FACTS: The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in
January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. After
almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychological incapacity. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of
dependent personality disorder, and the respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder.
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its decision declaring the marriage of the parties null
and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trials
court ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent,
for the clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be
attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell
short of the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before the SC the instant
petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the marriage void, not
only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties
psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to
personally examine respondent.

ISSUE: Whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null
and void?

HELD: The petition for review for certiorari was granted. The decision of the CA was reversed and
set aside, and the decision of the trial court was reinstated. Both parties afflicted with grave,
severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage is, thus, declared null
and void. For the fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.

In dissolving the marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is
not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply
with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining that sacred bond. Let it be
noted that in Art. 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from
the very beginning.

NICDAO CARIO VS YEE CARIO

G.R. No. 132529 February 2 2001

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao Cario. He had 2 children with her. In 1992,
SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cario. In 1988, prior to his second
marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days
after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4.
Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of
P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She
wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized
during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between
Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by
the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on
SPO4s funeral.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive
legitimes.

HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid
marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has
been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their
marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each
party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits
earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were
capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due
to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art
147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed
to have been equally contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by
each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.

Vincent Mercado vs Consuelo Tan

337 SCRA 122 (391 Phil. 809)

In April 1976, Dr. Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva. But in June 1991, Mercado
married a second time. He married a certain Consuelo Tan.

In October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy case against Mercado.

In November 1992, Mercado filed an action to have his first marriage with Oliva be declared void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code (psychological incapacity).

In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for bigamy against Mercado.
In May 1993, Mercados marriage with Oliva was declared void ab initio. Mercado now sought
the dismissal of the bigamy case filed against him. He contended that since his first marriage was
declared void ab initio, there was no first marriage to speak of, hence, his second marriage
with Tan was actually his first marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mercado is correct.

HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are as follows:

1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity

All the elements are present when Mercado married Tan. When he married Tan, his first
marriage was still subsisting and was not declared void. In fact, Mercado only filed an action to
declare his first marriage void after Tan filed the bigamy case. By then, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated.

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage
must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time. Absent that declaration a
person who marries a second time shall be guilty of bigamy.

Almelor v. RTC-Las Pinas, G.R. No. 179620, Aug. 26, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were
married on January 29, 1989 and had three children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical
practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. After eleven (11) years of
marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pias City to annul their marriage on the
ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
Leonida that in the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father but this
was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian,
unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuels unreasonable way of imposing discipline on
their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple. Leonida complained that this
was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. She also alleged
that her husband has concealed from her his homosexuality. She caught him in an indiscreet
telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found several
pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. And she saw Manuel kissed another man
on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she confronted Manuel, he denied
everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then,
Manuel stopped giving support to their children. Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical
psychologist, was presented to prove Leonidas claim. She testified that she conducted
evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time
interview with Manuel and face-to-face. She concluded that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated and such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage
and appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonidas hostility
against him was their professional rivalry. The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the
ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. CA denied the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to
fraud by reason of Manuels concealment of his homosexuality.

HELD: Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not

homosexuality per se. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations
that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage.
The lower court considered the public perception of Manuels sexual preference without the
corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it
against his sexuality. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in
the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality
from Leonida and that Leonidas consent had been vitiated by such.

Jimenez vs. Canizares

L-12790, August 31, 1960

FACTS:

Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios
Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the
penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and
continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the
marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any
answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to physical examination and to file a medical
certificate within 10 days. She was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack
of interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband.

HELD:

The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to
defend herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact
that women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly submit
to a physical examination unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical examination
in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not
compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should not
be presumed. The case was remanded to trial court.

Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio

GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian
family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and
Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March
3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with Editha
Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to
prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid
and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However,
there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner
though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was
inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to
receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

ONE ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner vs LUCITA ONG, respondent
DATE: October 2006 PONENTE:J. Austria-Martinez
FACTS:
William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13, 1975. Union wasblessed with 3 children.
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legalseparation under Art 55 (1) of FC on grounds
of physical violence, threats,intimidation and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner. RTC granted
prayer for legal separation. CA upheld RTCs decision when herein petitioner filed a Motion
forReconsideration (MR). The climax of the couples drama was on December 14, 1995b when
the respondent asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their son, back from Bacolod which turned
into a violent quarrel with the petitioner hitting therespondent on the head, left cheek, eye,
stomach, arms, and ultimately pointing a gun at respondents head asking her to leave the
conjugal house.

ISSUES: Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTCs decision granting legal separation to
Lucita when she herself has given ground for legal separation when abandoned her family.

HELD: No.
RATIO: It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted when both parties have
given ground for legal separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, the abandonment referred to in the
Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. Also, it was
established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct which does not constitute the
abandonment contemplated in the said provision.
DISPOSITION: Petition denied for lack of merit.

Bugayong vs. Ginez

GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956

FACTS:

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August
1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with the
sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to duty. The couple came to an
agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July
1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had
gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local
college.

Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiffs sister-in-law) and
some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of
alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a
certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the
advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal department.

In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of
the defendants godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where
they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their
own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information he received but instead
of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a confirmation of the acts of
infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a
ground for dismissal of the action.
HELD:

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A
single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to
constitute condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they
live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.

Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by
the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage.

De Ocampo vs. Florenciano

107 Phil 35

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children
who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his
wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out,
he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year.
Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas.
In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived
separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with
Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which
defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action.
Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment
disallowed by the Family Code.

HELD:

Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence
of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed
by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession
done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of
the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be
granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the
plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendants confession. The
petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.

Matubis v. Praxedes G.R. No. L-11766

FACTS: Plaintiff and defendant were legally married in 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. For failure to
agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple agreed to live separately from
each other which status remained unchanged until the present. In 1948, plaintiff and defendant
entered into an agreement$ stating the following:
a) that both of us relin+uish our right over the other as legal husband and wife;
b) that both without any interference by any of us$ nor either of us can prosecute the other for
adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from our separation.
In -January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth to a
child who was recorded as the child of said defendant. It was shown also that defendant and
Asuncion deported themselves as husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the
community. Alleging abandonment and concubinage, plaintiff Socorro Matubis filed with the CFI
of Camarines Sur a complaint for legal separation and changed of surname against her husband
defendant Zoilo Praxedes.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the action had not yet prescribed.
2. Assuming it had not yet prescribed, WON the agreement amounts to consent precluding the
action for legal separation.

Held:
1. No, it aready prescribed.
Article 102 of the new Civil Code provides:
An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on
which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date when
cause occurred.
2. Yes, there was are already an express consent.
The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil
Code), specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having
condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy
(People vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413).