6/14/2017 G.R. No.

147097

THIRDDIVISION

CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO G.R.No.147097
A.MORALES,TEODOROL.DAVID Present:
andANGELITOA.PELAYO, YNARESSANTIAGO,J.,
Petitioner, Chairperson,


CARPIO,*
versus CORONA,**
NACHURA,and
PERALTA,JJ.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as Promulgated:
OMBUDSMAN, and
SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD June5,2009
DIVISION,
Respondents.

xx


DECISION


PERALTA,J.:


ThisresolvesthepetitionforcertiorariunderRule65oftheRulesofCourt,prayingthatthe
[1]
Ombudsman's disapproval of the Office of the Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution dated
September18,2000,recommendingdismissalofthecriminalcasesfiledagainsthereinpetitioners,
bereversedandsetaside.
Theantecedentfactsareasfollows.
OnJuly22,1998,theFactFindingandIntelligenceBureauoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanfileda
ComplaintAffidavitdocketedasOMB0981500,charginghereinpetitionerswithIllegalUseof
PublicFundsasdefinedandpenalizedunderArticle220oftheRevisedPenalCodeandviolation
ofSection3,paragraphs(a)and(e)ofRepublicAct(R.A.)No.3019,asamended.

The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then Congressman Carmello F.
LazatinofhisCountrywideDevelopmentFund(CDF)forthecalendaryear1996,i.e.,hewasboth
proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his CDF he signed vouchers and
supportingpaperspertinenttothedisbursementasDisbursingOfficerandhereceived,asclaimant,
eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner Lazatin, with the help of
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petitioners Marino A. Morales,Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to
converthisCDFintocash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Evaluation and Preliminary
[2]
InvestigationBureau(EPIB)issuedaResolution datedMay29,2000recommendingthefiling
against herein petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of Malversation of Public Funds and
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman
hence,twentyeight(28)InformationsdocketedasCriminalCaseNos.26087to26114werefiled
againsthereinpetitionersbeforetheSandiganbayan.
Petitioner Lazatin and his copetitioners then filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to reevaluate the cases against
petitioners.

[3]
Subsequently,theOSPsubmittedtotheOmbudsmanitsResolution datedSeptember18,2000.It
recommendedthedismissalofthecasesagainstpetitionersforlackorinsufficiencyofevidence.

The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP
[4]
Resolution. In a Memorandum dated October 24, 2000, the OLA recommended that the OSP
Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the cases against
petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby
disapproving the OSP Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and ordering the aggressive
prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for
continuationofcriminalproceedings.

Thus,petitionersfiledtheinstantpetition.
Petitionersallegethat:

I.
THEOMBUDSMANACTEDWITHGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONORACTEDWITHOUT
ORINEXCESSOFHISJURISDICTION.

II.
THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS,
[5]
SPECULATIONS,SURMISESANDCONJECTURES.
Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the Ombudsman had no authority to
overturntheOSP'sResolutiondismissingthecasesagainstpetitionersbecause,underSection13,

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Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch,
investigateandrecommendthefilingofpropercasesagainsterringofficials,butitwasnotgranted
thepowertoprosecute.TheypointoutthatundertheConstitution,thepowertoprosecutebelongs
to the OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan), which was intended by the framers to be a separate and
distinct entity from the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the
Constitution,theOSPbeingaseparateanddistinctentity,theOmbudsmanshouldhavenopower
andauthorityovertheOSP.Thus,petitionersmaintainthatR.A.No.6770(TheOmbudsmanActof
1989), which made the OSP an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be
struckdownforbeingunconstitutional.

Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any liability because the checks were
issuedtopetitionerLazatinallegedlyasreimbursementfortheadvanceshemadefromhispersonal
funds for expenses incurred to ensure the immediate implementation of projects that are badly
neededbythePinatubovictims.

TheCourtfindsthepetitionunmeritorious.

Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled
thattheprovisionsofR.A.No.6770grantingtheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanprosecutorialpowers
andplacingtheOSPundersaidofficehavenoconstitutionalinfirmity.The issue of whether said
provisionsofR.A.No.6770violatedtheConstitutionhadbeenfullydissectedasfarbackas1995
[6]
inAcopv.OfficeoftheOmbudsman.

Therein,theCourtheldthatgivingprosecutorialpowerstotheOmbudsmanisinaccordancewith
theConstitutionasparagraph8,Section13,ArticleXIprovidesthattheOmbudsmanshallexercise
such other functions or duties as may be provided by law. Elucidating on this matter, the Court
stated:

x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman was indeed
present,theCommission[referringtotheConstitutionalCommissionof1986]didnothesitateto
recommend that the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such other powers, functions,
and duties to the Ombudsman. x x x As finally approved by the Commission after several
amendments, this is now embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI (Accountability of
PublicOfficers)oftheConstitution,whichprovides:

Sec.13.TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallhavethefollowingpowers,functions,
andduties:

xxxx

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Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other functions or duties as
maybeprovidedbylaw.

Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other powers, functions, and duties to the
Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during interpellation by
CommissionerRodrigo:
xxxx

MR.RODRIGO:
Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated functions of the
Ombudsmanis:toexercisesuchpowersorperformsuchfunctionsordutiesasmay
beprovidedbylaw.So,thelegislaturemayvesthimwithpowerstakenawayfrom
theTanodbayan,mayitnot?

MR.COLAYCO:
Yes.

MR.MONSOD:
Yes.

xxxx


MR.RODRIGO:
MadamPresident.Section5reads:TheTanodbayanshallcontinuetofunctionand
exerciseitspowersasprovidedbylaw.


MR.COLAYCO:
Thatiscorrect,becauseitisunderP.D.No.1630.

MR.RODRIGO:
So,ifitisprovidedbylaw,itcanbetakenawaybylaw,Isuppose.


MR.COLAYCO:
Thatiscorrect.

MR.RODRIGO:
Andprecisely,Section12(6)saysthatamongthefunctionsthatcanbeperformed
by the Ombudsman are such functions or duties as may be provided by law. The
sponsorsadmittedthatthelegislaturelateronmightremovesomepowersfromthe
TanodbayanandtransferthesetotheOmbudsman.


MR.COLAYCO:
MadamPresident,thatiscorrect.

xxxx

MR.RODRIGO:
Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a constitutional body
whichhasneitherpunitivenorprosecutorypowersbutonlypersuasivepowers,we
mightberaisingthehopesofourpeopletoomuchandthendisappointthem.

MR.MONSOD:
IagreewiththeCommissioner.
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MR.RODRIGO:
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be
implementedbythelegislature,whynotleavethistothelegislature?

xxxx

MR.MONSOD:(reactingtostatementsofCommissionerBlasOple):

xxxx
Withrespecttotheargumentthatheisatoothlessanimal,wewouldliketo
say that we are promoting the concept in its form at the present, but we are also
sayingthathecanexercisesuchpowersandfunctionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw
inaccordancewiththedirectionofthethinkingofCommissionerRodrigo.Wedo
notthinkthatatthistimeweshouldprescribethis,butweleaveituptoCongress
at some future time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the
Ombudsmanneedinorderthathebemoreeffective.Thisisnotforeclosed.
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch it is not an
[7]
irreversibledisability.
TheconstitutionalityofSection3ofR.A.No.6770,whichsubsumedtheOSPundertheOfficeof
theOmbudsman,waslikewiseupheldbytheCourtinAcop.Itwasexplained,thus:
xxxthepetitionersconcludethattheinclusionoftheOfficeoftheSpecialProsecutorasamong
theofficesundertheOfficeoftheOmbudsmaninSection3ofR.A.No.6770(AnActProviding
for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman and for Other
Purposes)isunconstitutionalandvoid.

Thecontentionisnotimpressedwithmerit.xxx

xxxx
x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be
henceforthknownastheOfficeoftheSpecialProsecutor,shallcontinuetofunctionandexercise
itspowersasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthoseconferredontheOfficeofthe
Ombudsman created under this Constitution. The underscored phrase evidently refers to the
Tanodbayan'spowersunderP.D.No.1630orsubsequentamendatorylegislation.It follows then
that Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D. No.
1630orgrantitotherpowers,exceptthosepowersconferredbytheConstitutionontheOfficeof
theOmbudsman.


Pursuingthepresentlineofreasoning,whenoneconsidersthatbyexpressmandateofparagraph
8,Section13,ArticleXIoftheConstitution,theOmbudsmanmayexercisesuchotherpowersor
performfunctionsordutiesasmaybeprovidedbylaw,itisindubitablethenthatCongresshasthe
power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman.In the
samevein,CongressmayremovesomeofthepowersgrantedtotheTanodbayanbyP.D.No.1630
and transfer them to the Ombudsman or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other
powersandfunctionsanddutiesasCongressmaydeemfitandwise.ThisCongressdidthrough
[8]
thepassageofR.A.No.6770.
[9]
TheforegoingrulingoftheCourthasbeenreiteratedinCamanagv.Guerrero. Morerecently,in
[10]
OfficeoftheOmbudsmanv.Valera, theCourt,basingitsratiodecidendionitsrulinginAcop
andCamanag,declaredthattheOSPismerelyacomponentoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanand
mayonlyactunderthesupervisionandcontrol,anduponauthorityoftheOmbudsmanandruled
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thatunderR.A.No.6770,thepowertopreventivelysuspendislodgedonlywiththeOmbudsman
[11]
andDeputyOmbudsman. TheCourt'srulinginAcopthattheauthorityoftheOmbudsmanto
prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the
[12]
foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to
prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not
beendelegatedtotheOSP.Itis,therefore,beyondcavilthatundertheConstitution,Congresswas
not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the
OSPundertheOfficeoftheOmbudsman.
PetitionersnowassertthattheCourt'srulingontheconstitutionalityoftheprovisionsofR.A.No.
6770shouldberevisitedandtheprincipleofstaredecisissetaside.Again,thiscontentiondeserves
scantconsideration.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
thingswhichareestablished)isembodiedinArticle8oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippines which
provides,thus:

ART.8.JudicialdecisionsapplyingorinterpretingthelawsortheConstitutionshallforma
partofthelegalsystemofthePhilippines.

[13]
ItwasfurtherexplainedinFerminv.People asfollows:

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a
countrytofollowtheruleestablishedinadecisionoftheSupremeCourtthereof.Thatdecision
becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The
doctrineofstaredecisisisbasedontheprinciplethatonceaquestionoflawhasbeenexaminedand
[14]
decided,itshouldbedeemedsettledandclosedtofurtherargument.

In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel
[15]
Corporation, the Court expounded on the importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating that:

The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
practicethatwhenacourthaslaiddownaprincipleoflawasapplicabletoacertainstate
offacts,itwilladheretothatprincipleandapplyittoallfuturecasesinwhichthefactsare
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled.Staredecisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a
conclusionreachedinonecaseshouldbeappliedtothosethatfollowifthefactsare
substantiallythesame,eventhoughthepartiesmaybedifferent.Itproceedsfromthefirst
principleofjusticethat,absentanypowerfulcountervailingconsiderations,likecases
oughttobedecidedalike.Thus,wherethesamequestionsrelatingtothesameeventhave
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been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to
[16]
relitigatethesameissue.

The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that
[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the
becomingvirtueofpredictabilitywhichisexpectedfromthisCourtwouldbeimmeasurablyaffected
[17]
andthepublic'sconfidenceinthestabilityofthesolemnpronouncementsdiminished. Verily,only
uponshowingthatcircumstancesattendantinaparticularcaseoverridethegreatbenefitsderivedby
ourjudicialsystemfromthedoctrineofstaredecisis,canthecourtsbejustifiedinsettingasidethe
same.
Inthiscase,petitionershavenotshownanystrong,compellingreasontoconvincetheCourtthatthe
doctrineofstaredecisisshouldnotbeappliedtothiscase.Theyhavenotsuccessfullydemonstrated
how or why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has been validly
conferredbylawwiththepowerofcontrolandsupervisionovertheOSP,todisapproveoroverturn
anyresolutionissuedbythelatter.

ThesecondissueadvancedbypetitionersisthattheOmbudsman'sdisapprovaloftheOSPResolution
recommendingdismissalofthecasesisbasedonmisapprehensionoffacts,speculations,surmisesand
conjectures. The question is really whether the Ombudsman correctly ruled that there was enough
evidence to support a finding of probable cause. That issue, however, pertains to a mere error of
judgment.Itmustbestressedthatcertiorariisaremedymeanttocorrectonlyerrorsofjurisdiction,
noterrorsofjudgment.ThishasbeenemphasizedinFirstCorporationv.FormerSixthDivisionofthe
[18]
CourtofAppeals, towit:


It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the
extraordinaryremedyofcertiorari,whichisextraordinembeyondtheambitofappeal.Incertiorari
proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the
parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the
correctnessoftheevaluationofevidence.Anyerrorcommittedintheevaluationofevidenceis
merelyanerrorofjudgmentthatcannotberemediedbycertiorari.Anerrorofjudgmentisone
whichthecourtmaycommitintheexerciseofitsjurisdiction.Anerrorofjurisdictionisonewherethe
actcomplainedofwasissuedbythecourtwithoutorinexcessofjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseof
discretion,whichistantamounttolackorinexcessofjurisdictionandwhicherroriscorrectibleonly
bytheextraordinarywritofcertiorari.Certiorariwillnotbeissuedtocureerrorsofthetrialcourt
initsappreciationoftheevidenceoftheparties,oritsconclusionsanchoredonthesaidfindings
anditsconclusionsoflaw.ItisnotforthisCourttoreexamineconflictingevidence,reevaluate
[19]
thecredibilityofthewitnessesorsubstitutethefindingsoffactofthecourtaquo.


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Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a finding of probable cause would
necessitateanexaminationandreevaluationoftheevidenceuponwhichtheOmbudsmanbasedits
disapproval of the OSP Resolution. Hence, the Petition for Certiorari should not be given due
course.

LikewisenoteworthyistheholdingoftheCourtinPresidentialAdHocFactFindingCommittee
[20]
on Behest Loans v. Desierto, imparting the value of the Ombudsman's independence, stating
thus:

UnderSections12and13,ArticleXIofthe1987ConstitutionandRA6770(TheOmbudsmanAct
of1989),theOmbudsmanhasthepowertoinvestigateandprosecuteanyactoromissionofapublic
officeroremployeewhensuchactoromissionappearstobeillegal,unjust,improperorinefficient.
IthasbeentheconsistentrulingoftheCourtnottointerferewiththeOmbudsman'sexerciseof
his investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are supported by substantial
evidence.Envisionedasthechampionofthepeopleandpreserveroftheintegrityofpublicservice,
he has wide latitude in exercising his powers and is free from intervention from the three
branchesofgovernment.ThisistoensurethathisOfficeisinsulatedfromanyoutsidepressure
[21]
andimproperinfluence.

Indeed,fortheCourttooverturntheOmbudsman'sfindingofprobablecause,itisimperativefor
petitioners to clearly prove that said public official acted with grave abuse of discretion. In
[22]
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, the Court elaborated on what
constitutessuchabuse,towit:

Graveabuseofdiscretionimpliesacapriciousandwhimsicalexerciseofjudgmenttantamountto
lackofjurisdiction.TheOmbudsman'sexerciseofpowermusthavebeendoneinanarbitraryor
despoticmannerwhichmustbesopatentandgrossastoamounttoanevasionofapositivedutyor
[23]
avirtualrefusaltoperformthedutyenjoinedortoactatallincontemplationoflaw.xxx

In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman acted in a manner described
above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and properly
exercised its power of control and supervision over the OSP when it disapproved the Resolution
datedSeptember18,2000.

ItshouldalsobenotedthatthepetitiondoesnotquestionanyorderoractionoftheSandiganbayan
ThirdDivisionhence,itshouldnothavebeenincludedasarespondentinthispetition.

INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOING,thepetitionisDISMISSEDforlackofmerit.Nocosts.

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SOORDERED.

DIOSDADOM.PERALTA
AssociateJustice


WECONCUR:



CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson



ANTONIOT.CARPIORENATOC.CORONA
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice



ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA
AssociateJustice



ATTESTATION


I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
wasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.



CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
ThirdDivision,Chairperson


CERTIFICATION


PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitutionandtheDivisionChairpersonsAttestation,I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

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REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

*Designatedtositasanadditionalmember,perSpecialOrderNo.646datedMay15,2009.
**Designatedtositasanadditionalmember,perSpecialOrderNo.631datedApril29,2009.
[1]
Rollo,pp.4857.
[2]
Id.at5870.
[3]
Supranote1.
[4]
Rollo,pp.114117.
[5]
Id.at13.
[6]
G.R.No.120422,September27,1995,248SCRA566.
[7]
Id.at575579.
[8]
Id.at580582.
[9]
G.R.No.164250,September30,2005,268SCRA473.
[10]
G.R.No.121017,February17,1997,471SCRA715.
[11]
Id.at743
[12]
G.R.No.166062,September26,2006,503SCRA252.
[13]
G.R.No.157643,March28,2008,550SCRA132.
[14]
Id.at145,citingCastillov.Sandiganbayan,427Phil.785,793(2002).(Emphasissupplied).
[15]
G.R.No.159422,March28,2008,550SCRA180.
[16]
Id.at197198.(Emphasissupplied).
[17]
PepsiColaProducts,Phil.,Inc.v.Pagdanganan,G.R.No.167866,October12,2006,504SCRA549,564.
[18]
G.R.No.171989,July4,2007,526SCRA564.
[19]
Id.at578.(Emphasissupplied).
[20]
G.R.No.138142,September19,2007,533SCRA571.
[21]
Id.at581582.(Emphasissupplied).
[22]
G.R.No.139296,November23,2007,538SCRA207.
[23]
Id.at216.

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