POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST- under Comm.

Sarmiento

PART I: The 1987 Constitution

1. ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED

BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
M. DRILON, respondents, [G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.]||

FACTS:

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives, a verified impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven (7) other Associate Justices of the Court for violation of
the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and, committing high crimes. The House Committee on
Justice subsequently dismissed said complaint on October 22, 2003 for insufficiency of substance.

The next day, or on October 23, 2003, Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., First District,
Tarlac and Felix William B. Fuentebella, Third District, Camarines Sur, filed another verified
impeachment complaint with the Office of the Secretary General of the House against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., alleging underpayment of the COLA of the members and personnel
of the judiciary from the JDF and unlawful disbursement of said fund for various infrastructure
projects and acquisition of service vehicles and other equipment.

Subsequently, several petitions were filed with this Court by members of the bar, members
of the House of Representatives and private individuals, asserting their rights, among others, as
taxpayers, to stop the illegal spending of public funds for the impeachment proceedings against
the Chief Justice.

Petitioners claim:

That the filing of second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice was barred
under Article XI, Sec. 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution which states that "no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year. That calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF
infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the
constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

Respondents claim:

Asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House
of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under
the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate
impeachment cases.

Senate of the Philippines filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the
petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of
the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty
to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of
Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain
exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
 1. Locus standi of petitioners;
2. Ripeness (prematurity; mootness);
3. Political question/justiciability;
4. Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
5. Constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
6. Judicial restraint
RULING:

1. YES
The present suits involve matters of first impression and of immense
importance to the public considering that, as previously stated, this is the first
time a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is being subjected to an
impeachment proceeding which, according to petitioners, is prohibited by
the Constitution. Obviously, if such proceeding is not prevented and nullified,
public funds amounting to millions of pesos will be disbursed for an illegal act.
Undoubtedly, this is a grave national concern involving paramount public
interest. The petitions are properly instituted to avert such a situation.

2. YES
The petitions were justiciable or ripe for adjudication because there was an
actual controversy involving rights that are legally demandable. A case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture. The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity
of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in
accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th
Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts
having been carried out. The Court ruled that upon the mere enactment of the
questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to
have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.

3. YES
The resolution of the issues involves the construction of the word "initiate."
This, in turn, involves an interpretation of Section 3(5), Article XI of
the Constitution, in relation to Sections 3(1) and 3(2). The issue as to the
construction of Rule V of the 2001 House Rules of Procedure affects a person
other than the Members of the House of Representatives, namely, Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. These questions are of necessity within the jurisdiction of
the Court to resolve.

4. NO
This Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of
the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives. Respondents' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the
American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support
 the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment
cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial
review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process.
Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon
the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions
incident to impeachment proceedings. Said American jurisprudence and
authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for
these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited
persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned.

5. YES
An impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a complexus of acts
consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of
the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those
deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of
impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and
its referral to the Committee on Justice. It is thus clear that the framers intended
"initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief,
Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the
phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the
provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all
that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the
complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of
impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was
already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution. The "impeachment proceeding"
is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because
that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding"
initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The
action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation
or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is
the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow. Having
concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on
Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period.

6. NO
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before
this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to
which the controversy may be referred."Otherwise, this Court would be shirking
from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being
clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the
 instant petitions. Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under
our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the
challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. On the occasion
when this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it
had acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an
unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.

2. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION (CHREA) Represented

by its President, MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, respondent. [G.R. No. 155336. July 21, 2006.]
FACTS:

On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as
the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All
Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of this special provisions,
the Commission on Human Rights promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September
1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla
positions, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional
Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary
Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners. The CHR forwarded said staffing
modification and upgrading scheme to the Department of Budget and Management
[DBM] with a request for its approval, but the DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the
request.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the phrase "THE APPROVED ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF THE

COMMISSION SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY RELEASED. Is
equivalent to fiscal autonomy?

2. Whether or not respondent CHR must conform to the Salary Standardization

Law?
RULING:

1. NO

After reviewing the deliberations of the ConCom on Article XIII, Section

17(4), of the 1987 Constitution, in its entirety, not just bits and pieces thereof, this
Court is convinced that the ConCom had intended to grant to the respondent
the privilege of having its approved annual appropriations automatically and
regularly released, but nothing more. While it may be conceded that the
automatic and regular release of approved annual appropriations is an aspect
of fiscal autonomy, it is just one of many others. As envisioned in the
Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the
Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
 allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their
needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect
fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by
law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and
disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the
course of the discharge of their functions. The first sentence of Article IX, Part A,
Section 5, of the 1987 Constitution, expressly granting fiscal autonomy to
constitutional commissions, does not have the same meaning as the second
sentence, directing the automatic and regular release of their approved
annual appropriations.

2. YES
Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal autonomy, this Court
shares the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy
notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to
the Salary Standardization Law. Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group
does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create
positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their
respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such
authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the
Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA
6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law. If the
judiciary, a co-equal branch of government, which was expressly granted
by the Constitution with fiscal autonomy, is required to conform to the Salary
Standardization Law and is subject to the scrutiny of the DBM, sagaciously, the
respondent cannot be deemed to enjoy a better position than the Judiciary.
The respondent must, likewise, toe the line.

3. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.

[G.R. No. 83896. February 22, 1991.]
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 on July 25, 1987 which
provides that:
"SECTION 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his
position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided,
that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards,
councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
"SECTION 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or
other appointive official of the Executive Department holds more positions than
what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position
 in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any
official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
"SECTION 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-
owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the
boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or
assistant secretary."
Petitioners Claim:
That this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs
counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides as follows:
"Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.

That it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the
Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution.
Respondents Claim:

That Cabinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries

may hold other public office, including membership in the boards of government
corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the
Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the
primary functions of their respective positions.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not EO No. 284 is constitutional and not runs counter to Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution?
2. Whether the prohibition on the Members of the Cabinet also applies to other
government employees covered by the Civil Service Commission?
RULING:

1. NO
Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more
than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations,
Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
 employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. As keenly observed by Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the deliberations in these cases, one of the
strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution during the campaign for its
ratification was the assurance given by its proponents that the scandalous
practice of Cabinet members holding multiple positions in the government and
collecting unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom would be
discontinued.

2. NO
The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore
all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment. These
sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official
family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or
employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in
general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987
Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and
to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. The prohibition against holding
dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of
the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by
the primary functions of said officials' office.

4. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents. [G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]

FACTS:
 Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30%
to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the
eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel. Only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and
the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS matched the
bid price tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter petitioner seant a manager's check
issued by Philtrust Bank for P33,000,000.00 as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group,
Messrs. Renong Berhad . . . . which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

Respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51%
of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad,
petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. The Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the
Malaysian firm.

Petitioners Claim:

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that
the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud
legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To
all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues
that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the
national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly
covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution,
applies.

Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of
the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share.

Respondents Claim:

Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s). . . . Thus,
there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be done."

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the
term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, sheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in
the rst and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. Third, Certainly, 51% of the
equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony.

Fourth, the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad
could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise
of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the provisions of the constitution is self- executing

2. Whether or not the shares of Manila Hotel is part of the national national economy and
patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.

3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement section
10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution

4. Whether or not the Filipino First policy should be applied

RULING:

1. YES.

In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of
the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject. Subsequent legislation
however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing
in another.

Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which
is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And
when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may
be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right,
such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance and from which all legislations
must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy.

2. YES.

When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources
of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and
failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity
of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the
hotel and the land on which the hotel edi ce stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents' claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold
is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands.

3. YES.

In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "
public function", (2) when the government is so-signi cantly involved with the private actor as to
make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or
authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt
therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the
State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of
power legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to
the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable
that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the
State.

4. YES

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed
to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the
award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional at is omnipresent to be imply disregarded.
To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law. The Filipino First Policy is a
product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as
a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced.

***GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON

PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE
and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD,
and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase
the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter
to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary
clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

5. ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL. , respondents. [G.R. No. L-1123.
March 5, 1947.]

FACTS:

Three (3) of the plaintiff senators and eight (8) of the plaintiff representatives had been
proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators
and representatives in the elections. The 3 senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after
the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged
irregularities in their election. The 8 representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit
in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason,
although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been
introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon
definitely by the House when the present petition was filed.

As a consequence these 3 senators and 8 representatives did not take part in the passage
of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the
necessary 3/4 vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these
members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary 3/4 vote in either branch of Congress.

Petitioners filed for the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the
Constitution as it allegedly contrary to the Constitution. However, respondents argues that the SC
cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill.
ISSUE: Whether the court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution
proposing an amendment of the Constitution.

RULING:

No. It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political
questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with
such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision.
This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well
known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters
fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and
precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on
this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the
government.

If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification

has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to
achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I
of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and
ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that
character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by
the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the
Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to
safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then
into that of a ratification.

As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House
and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court
on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated,
the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of
Act No. 190 as amended. The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution
(enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over
those of the journals.

**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the
proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

6. KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C.

CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE,
CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN,
QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAADA, and REP. JOKER P. ARROYO,
petitioners, vs. TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Of ce of the
President; RENATO CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Executive Secretary and Chairman of
the Presidential Review Committee on the Lotto, Of ce of the President; PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE; and PHILIPPINE GAMING CORPORATION, respondent. [G.R. No. 113375.
May 5, 1994.]

FACTS:

This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain
the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with
the on- line lottery system, also known as "lotto."

Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg.
42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and
other similar activities," the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of
increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993,
after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya
Group Berhad, "a multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in
Malaysia,"became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO." As an initial step, Berjaya
Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March
1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC), which "was intended to be the medium through which the technical and management
services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.

The bid of PGMC was later on approved which resulted to the petitioners objection.

Petitioners Claim:

That the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC
because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery
system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No.
1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic." Even granting
arguendo that a lease of facilities is not within the contemplation of "collaboration" or
"association," an analysis, however, of the Contract of Lease clearly shows that there is a
"collaboration, association, or joint venture between respondents PCSO and PGMC in the holding
of the On-Line Lottery System," and that there are terms and conditions of the Contract "showing
that respondent PGMC is the actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO."

That paragraph 10 of the Contract of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to establish a

telecommunications network that will connect all the municipalities and cities in the territory.
However, PGMC cannot do that because it has no franchise from Congress to construct, install,
establish, or operate the network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended. Moreover,
PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, be granted a
franchise for that purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Respondents Claim:

It is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, (i.e., the building and maintenance
of a lottery system to be used by PCSO in the operation of its lottery franchise); and (2) as such
independent contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator of the lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is
PCSO sharing its franchise, 'in collaboration, association or joint venture' with PGMC as such
statutory limitation is viewed from the context, intent, and spirit of Republic Act 1169, as amended
by Batas Pambansa 42." It further claims that as an independent contractor for a piece of work, it
is neither engaged in "gambling" nor in "public service" relative to the telecommunications
network, which the petitioners even consider as an "indispensable requirement" of an on-line
lottery system.

That the execution and implementation of the contract does not violate the Constitution and
the laws; that the issue on the "morality" of the lottery franchise granted to the PCSO is political
and not judicial or legal, which should be ventilated in another forum; and that the "petitioners do
not appear to have the legal standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the
reliefs sought."

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the locus standi to file the petition.
2. Whether or not the challenged Contract of Lease violate or contravene the exception in
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from
holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with"
another.

RULING:

1. YES

The instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The ramifications of such
issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the
remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise.
The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to
take advantage of.

2. YES.

The challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section
1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law.
The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably clear. The PCSO cannot share its
franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign,
transfer, or lease such franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the
PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or
designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the
provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the
soul of the instrument.

The very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood that any arrangement
between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical, operations, and
management aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PSCO would, primarily, provide the
franchise. The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein
are provisions which negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have
a joint venture for a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery
system.

7. Tolentino vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 188456. September 10, 2009)

FACTS:
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from
undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional
amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the
Philippines to eighteen years(18 years) "shall be submitted" for ratification by the people
pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the
subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and
effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts
of the respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in obedience to the
aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of the Constitution of
the Philippines.

The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into
being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a
constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments
to the Constitution, namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16,
1967 and June 17, 1969, respectively. The delegates to the said Constitution were all elected under
and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The
pertinent portions of Resolution No. 2 read as follows:
"SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines, to be composed of two elective Delegates from
each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those
required of Members of the House of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
"SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and
considered part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast in an election at which they are submitted to the people for their ratification
pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution."
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the different cities and
provinces fixed originally in Resolution No. 2.
After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural
session on June 1, 1971. Its preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of committees
and other preparatory works over, as its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session
which began on September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of
September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus:
"CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
"A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18.
"BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention:
"Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is
amended to as follows:
"Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines
not otherwise disqualified by law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years
or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to
vote for at least six months preceding the election.'
"Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the
Philippines when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to
coincide with the local elections in November 1971.
"Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for
the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will
be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other
portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.
"Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00
from its savings or from its unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced
plebiscite; provided, however that should there be no savings or unexpended
sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days per
diem.'"

Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no
force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with
the senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by
the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be
exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the
proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately
from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by the act of
the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic
Resolution No. 1. (or simply W/N Organic Resolution No.1 is unconstitutional)
 2. (Intervenors questioned the jurisdiction of the court) Whether or not the Court can
entertain the issue on this case being a political question and that the Convention being
a legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by
petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress and the courts.

HELD:
1. Yes. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for
ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV
of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that
direction are null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:

1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. It

says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention
called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution, "thus
placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention
may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that
"such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted
to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many
"elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments
proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the
provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and
appropriateness of this provision. As already stated, amending the Constitution is
as serious and important an undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed, any
amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it, if only because
the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be
viable as the framework of the government it establishes, on the one hand, and
adequately formidable and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive
articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and
nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. It is inconceivable
how a constitution worthy of any country or people can have any part which is out
of tune with its other parts.
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once
the original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes
harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assume its
harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very
least, they can examine it before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of
the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a
whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the existing
constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation
to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent
judgment as to its acceptability.

This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact
that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is
provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by
the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to
enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote
intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may already be observed that under
Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he
feels are needed under the circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in the ballot nor
is there any possible indication whether they will ever be or not, because Congress has reserved
those for future action, what kind of judgment can he render on the proposal?

But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental
principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we
do not have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value
at all. Who can say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying
types of voters for each level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the
difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing
substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the existing social and
political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite
intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions
which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea?

We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an
amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient
time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as
its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In
the context of the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started considering
the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present
to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. We are
of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a
plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base
their judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of
reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of
the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the
ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed
plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the
Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission"

2. The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the
Constitutional Convention. Much less does the Court want to pass judgment on the
merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote. But like the Convention,
the Court has its own duties to the people under the Constitution which is to decide in
appropriate cases with appropriate parties whether or not the mandates of the
fundamental law are being complied with. In the best light God has given Us, we are of
the conviction that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and
separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the
Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention
implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should
only be one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the
Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the
proposed amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the
Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately from but together
with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention,
insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution
of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null
and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the
Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the
said organic resolution

CASE NO. 8
JAVELLANA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:

President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 73, submitting to the Filipino people for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor, as well as setting the plebiscite for
said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.

In December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification
or rejection of the Proposed Constitution and temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation
No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.The Court deemed
it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date
nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially.

Josue Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet
secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana alleged that the President ordered
the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, and that the latter are
acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution. He
construed that the President is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; to approve the
proposed Constitution; proclaim the ratification; and that the election held to ratify the proposed
Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD:

The basic issues and the votes of the SC justices were:

(1) Whether the validity of Proclamation 1102 is a political or a justiciable question - Six justices said
it is justiciable, three said it is political, and one justice qualified his vote.
(2) Whether the new Constitution was validly ratified (with substantial if not strict compliance)
conformably with the 1935 Constitution - Six justices said no, three said there was substantial
compliance, and one qualified his vote.
(3) Whether the people had acquiesced in the new Constitution (with or without valid ratification)
- Four justices said the people had already accepted the new Constitution, two said that there
can be no free expression by the people qualified to vote of their acceptance or repudiation of
the proposed Constitution under martial law, one said he is not prepared to state that a new
Constitution once accepted by the people must be accorded recognition independently of valid
ratification, and three expressed their lack of knowledge or competence to rule on the question
because under a regime of martial law with the free expression of opinions restricted, they have
no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the
Constitution.
(4) Whether the petitioners are entitled to relief - Six justices voted to dismiss the petitions, while
four were for giving due course to the petitions.
(5) Whether the new Constitution is already in force - Four said yes by virtue of the peoples
acceptance of the same, four said they could not with judicial certainty whether or not the
people had accepted the Constitution, and two declared that the new Constitution is not in force,
with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in
force.
The SC decision concluded: Accordingly, by virtue of the majority of six votes x x x. with four
dissenting votes x x x all of the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of
the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force
and effect.

CASE NO. 9
SALIDAD VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L- 44640 October 12, 1976

FACTS:

President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October
16, 1976 for Citizens Assemblies (barangays )to resolve the issues on martial law, the interim
assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence , the length
of the period for the existence by the President of his present powers. The Preside issued PD 1031,
amending the previous PD 991, b declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the nationa l referendum-plebiscite of
October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued
opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such
body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim
legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of
October 16.

Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare
without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in
nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.

HELD:

YES. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15,
Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the
power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National
Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been
followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the
proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite
on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent
words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and
effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the
new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty,
executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at
least ten Members. . . ..

The Supreme Court said that if the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative
powers of the interim (National) Assembly (which was never convened), there is no reason why
he cannot validly discharge the functions of the Assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution, which is but adjunct, though peculiar, to its gross legislative power x x x (W)ith the
interim National Assembly not convened and only the President'and the Supreme Court in
operation, the urge of absolute necessity renders it imperative upon the President to act as agent
for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution.

10. Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986

FACTS: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for
special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and
Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the
President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create
the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis
of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular
elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing)
the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is
proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his
proclamation. The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited
constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it
over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have
not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled
election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is
clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the
holding of the elections

HELD: Yes. The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an
injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as
there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional. The events that
have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned
the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned
constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which
can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election,
since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of
letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new
mandate or to elect a new president.

11. Lawyers League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano, petitioner vs. President
Corazon Aquino, et al, defendant

Facts: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3
was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that
the new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines. Petitioners alleged that the Aquino
government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Discussions: In order that the citizens actions may be allowed a party must show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury
is likely to be redressed by a favourable action. The community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the provisional It was the people that made the judgement and accepted the
new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its legitimacy.

Ruling: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The
holding that petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have a
cause of action. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs
to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. And the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact
and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government.

12. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
DOCTRINE: RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution isconcerned.

FACTS: Private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent COMELEC a "Petition
to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter,
Delfin Petition). The Delfin Petition alleged, among others, that the provisions soughtto be
amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of
the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution" embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the
aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND
SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION? After complying with the order
of the COMELEC, the petition was set for hearing. After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC
directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda"
within five days. The petitioners herein (Santiago, Padilla, Ongpin) filed a special civil action for
prohibition for the ff. reasons: (1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed; (2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on
the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided
for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III; (3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after
publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional
amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication; (4)
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 adopted to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution
and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules
and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress
is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law; (5) The people's initiative is limited
to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits
constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative; (6) Finally,
Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any
other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.

ISSUE: WON RA 6735 is sufficient insofar as initiative on amendments to the

Constitution is concerned.

RULING: No. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides for the exercise of the right of the
people to propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative.The Congress shall provide
for the implementation of the exercise of this right. This provision is not self-executory. The Court
agrees that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. However, it is not in full compliance with the power and duty of
Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right. First, contrary to the
assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads: Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The
power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by
any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied). The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein
was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which
exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and
resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier,
initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded
the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions." Second, unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide
for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires,
among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the
petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. Third, while the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act
is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is
far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. It is "national initiative," if what is
proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It
is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution
which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass. Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles
there should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the Constitution. As to initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twentythree sections, merely (a)
mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and
includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite"
as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or
rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters
who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved
proposition. There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the
paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 5

13. SALONGA vs. PANO

G.R. # L-59524

FACTS: On Sept 6, 1980, a bomb exploded inside the room of Victor Lovely Jr., who was a
Philippine-born American citizen. He and his brother were seriously injured. After said explosion, he
was brought to the AFP Medical Center. Lovely and his two brothers, Baltazar and Romeo were
charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property. His room was
found with several pictures of petitioner Jovito Salonga and his wife with Lovely at the birthday
party of former Congressman Raul Daza.

On Sept 12, 1980, another bomb exploded in Rustans Makati killing an American and
injuring several others. According to Romeo, he drove Victor to Salongas residence on two
occasions implying the latters participation in the said bombings.

After several days, Lovely was transferred to the office of Col. Madella. Several bombing
also occurred and Arrest, Search, and Seizure Orders (ASSO) were issued against those who were
implicated by Lovely in the bombings, one of which was petitioner.

On Oct. 21, 1980, the military arrived at the hospital room of Salonga where he was
confined for asthma and he was arrested without being informed of the charge/s against him. His
lawyers were not even allowed to visit him until the Court issued an order for them to be able to
do so. On Nov. 2, Salonga was transferred to Fort Bonifacio, he claims that he was not informed
of the reason for his transfer and detainment, nor was he investigated or questioned.

On No. 27, he was released from military custody and placed under house arrest. On Dec
10, the Judge Advocate General sent Salonga a Notice of Preliminary Investigaton stating that
the case had been set on the 12th. He still received no copy of the charges against him. On Feb
24, 1981, respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. 1700 or the
Anti-Subversion Act. The preliminary investigation was set for March 17. Salonga was allowed to
leave the country for comprehensive medical examinations after serious injuries during the Plaza
Miranda Bombing.

On March 26, petitioners counsel was furnished a copy of the amended complaint signed
by Gen. Olivas charging the petitioner and 39 others of the violation of the Anti-Subversion Act.

On Oct. 15, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. It was denied on Dec 2, and on Jan. 4
1982, respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the
Revised Anti-Subversion Act against 40 people.

ISSUES: 1.) W/N petitioners certiorari pleading for his motion to dismiss should be given due
course since the MD is a mere interlocutory order

2.) W/N there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case against petitioner

HELD:

1.) The Supreme Court held that generally, interlocutory orders may not be the questioned by
certiorari since the issue of dismissal will once again be decided by the court and that movant
has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, in this case,
the SC held into account certain exceptions: recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus to question the denial of a motion to quash is considered
proper in the interest of "more enlightened and substantial justice", as was so declared in "Yap v.
Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1969."

Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is
respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from
unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a
person is carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons when on the very face of the record
no evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists.

In the light of the failure to show prima facie that the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring
to commit the crime, the initial disregard of petitioner's constitutional rights together with the
massive and damaging publicity made against him, justifies the favorable consideration of this
petition by this Court.

2.) The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted,
is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the
presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction. The records reveal that in finding a case
against the petitioner, the respondent judge relied only on the testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego
and Victor Lovely. Col. Diegos testimony was only based on hearsay as well.

Lovely had two different versions of Salongas participation in the handling of the bomb materials
to him along with Atty. Tanada. The first version in court included him being in Salongas house
and being dropped of by both Tanada and Salonga at the Broadway Centrum with Salonga
personally handing him the alleged bag of materials. The second, given in a radio interview, only
involved Tanada handing Lovely the bag and leaving him at the Centrum without the personal
involvement of Salonga. The two testimonies clearly contradicted Salongas involvement.

The jump from the "contact point" theory to the conclusion of involvement in subversive activities
in the United States is not only inexplicable but without foundation.

The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner Salonga to
actual acts of violence or terrorism. There is no proof of his direct participation in any overt acts of
subversion. However, he is tagged as a leader of subversive organizations for two reasons-

(1) Because his house was used as a "contactpoint"; and

(2) Because "he mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely
should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately."

The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the guilt by visit or guilt by association" theory
is too tenuous a basis to conclude that Senator Salonga was a leader or mastermind of the
bombing incidents. To indict a person simply because some plotters, masquerading as visitors,
have somehow met in his house or office would be to establish a dangerous precedent.

Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of
criminal indictments. It will only constitute prima facie evidence of membership in a subversive
organization if such discussion amounts to conferring with other members in furtherance of a plan
to overthrow the government by illegal means, however, there was no proof of such plan in this
case.

14. TAAADA vs ANGARA

G.R. # 118295

FACTS: On April 15, 1994, respondent Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry, representing the Philippine Government, signed in Marrakesh, Morroco the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act). This was
ratified by the Philippine Senate on December 14 via Resolution No. 97 whereby the Senate
concurs in the ratification by President Fidel Ramos of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.

To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the
Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2)
and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof.

On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO
Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations
and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.

The WTO gives access to the Philippines the foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. It
provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting
and more investment in the country. These are the probable benefits as reflected in the
agreement and a free market espoused by the WTO.

Petitioners, however, viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impairs
Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the
Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention. They argue that the
WTO agreement violates Sec. 19m Article II, providing for the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Art XII, providing for the Filipino First
policy

ISSUE: W/N Resolution No. 97 approving the WTO is unconstitutional

HELD: No. By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state
policies. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the
exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in
the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Moratothe principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the
disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional
principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority
to wade into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making.

While the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor, and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the
bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend
to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the
unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit
them either.
The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.

___________________________________________________________________________________________

15. SALNAKAS vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. # 159085

FACTS: On July 27, 2003, around 300 officers and enlisted men of the AFP seized control of the
Oakwood Building in Makati and publicly complained about the corruption in the AFP and
declared their withdrawal of support for the government. They demanded the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defense, and the PNP Chief. President GMA proclaimed a state of
rebellion and called out the armed forces to suppress the same under Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4. On August 1, 2003, PGMA issued Proclamation No. 435 declaring the
cessation of rebellion despite the Oakwood mutiny ending on the very same day.

However, the instant petitioners were filed contending that Sec. 18 of Art VII of the Constitution
does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no
factual basis for such declaration since the mutiny had already abated and eventually died out.
Furthermore, they contend that the same section does not authorize the declaration of a state
of rebellion, since it is used to circumvent the report requirement of the President to Congress
within 48 hours of the declaration of martial law.

ISSUE: W/N Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional

HELD: YES. Section 18, Art VII does not expressly prohibit declaring a state of rebellion. The
President in addition to the Commander-in-Chief powers is conferred Executive powers as the
Chief Executive. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity of such. None of the petitioners have, by way of
proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the
circumvention of the report is of no merit since there is no illustration that the President has
attempted or has exercised martial law powers. The issue of usurpation of legislative power is
also of no merit since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed
forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers.

These are purely executive powers, vested on thePresident by Sections 1 and 18 of Article VII.

16.) DAVID VS. ARROYO

G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006

FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, on the same
day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military
officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political
opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or
assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

Seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed against
the respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.

Arguments of the petitioners:

(1) It encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress;

(2) It is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and

(3) It violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.

(4) Challenged the CIDGs act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship"
or "prior restraint." They also claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon,
hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the
issuance of PP 1017.

(5) They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of legislative powers";
"violation of freedom of expression" and "a declaration of martial law." They alleged that President
Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable
factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so."

ISSUE:

1.) WON the issue is already moot and academic as defense of the respondents.
2.) WON the orders issued are unconstitutional based on FACIAL CHALLENGE

HELD:

1.) NO. The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;31second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; 32 third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public;33and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.34

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over
the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving
as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press.
Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts,
doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the
present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by
constitutional guarantees.35 And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition.
Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.

In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganibans Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.36 However, they
failed to take into account the Chief Justices very statement that an otherwise "moot" case may
still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be
prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within this
exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.

2.) NO. Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its "overbreadth." They
claim that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the citizens.

A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment
cases.103

A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,104the US Supreme Court held that "we have not
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment"
(freedom of speech).

Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
"harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,105 it was held:

It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on
its face and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at
the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of
practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected
behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that
conduct even if expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect
legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct.

Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied
to protected conduct."106 Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used

"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;"107 The reason for this is obvious.
Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a
person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it
may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the
Court.108 A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of
the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case
basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can
only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face,"
not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly
authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the
normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad
statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad
laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent
effect on the speech of those third parties.

In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine
PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners,
but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the
Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris,109 it was
held that:

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of
these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that
is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided.

And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed
law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.

Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is
unwarranted.

Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law
is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application."110 It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For
one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like
overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its
possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all
its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand
the meaning and application of PP 1017.
17.) SENATE VS. SEC. ERMITA
G.R. NO. 169777 April 20, 2006

FACTS: In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter
alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and
offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with
the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public
hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to
investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the
North Rail Project.

***On September 28, 2005 the president issued an E.O which prohibits its cabinet members and
other officials covered by the executive privilege without its prior consent from attending any
hearing to be conducted by the congress in aid of legislation. The said E.O takes effect
immediately without being published in official gazette or newspaper.

Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a
copy of E.O. 464, and another letter informing him "that officials of the Executive Department
invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the
same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not
secured the required consent from the President." On even date which was also the scheduled
date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter 9 to Senator Biazon,
Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him "that per
instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is
authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written
approval from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP
officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the
investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through,
with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
For defying President Arroyo's order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military
posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.

Several petitioners questioned its constitutionality including some of the members of house of
representatives and the senate. The respondent on the otherhand questioned their legal
standing.

ISSUE:

1.) WON the petitioners have locus standi

2.) WON there was an actual case or controversy since the respondent alleged that there being
no showing that President Arroyo has actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance
of the invited officials. That it merely informed the Senate President that they have not secured
the consent of the president.

HELD:

1.) YES. That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent
public decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is not
disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access
information that is crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has
a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to
assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to
sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as
legislators.
In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan
Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and
Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence
of any claim that an investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees
was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a
claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of
Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.
The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained
three seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to
participate in the legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list
system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation.
As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions,
passing on the standing of their co-petitioners COURAGE and CODAL is rendered unnecessary.
In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of citizens,
and the incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer
members, invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, asserting
that the right to information, curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective exercise
of other constitutional rights and to the maintenance of the balance of power among the three
branches of the government through the principle of checks and balances.
It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the
constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and
personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives, this Court held that when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement
of personal interest.

2.) YES. The Court finds respondents' assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or
prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of
an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either
a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to
bar officials from appearing before Congress.
As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials
invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for
any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be
sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of
E.O. 464.

18.) BAYAN VS. SEC. ERMITA

G.R. 169881 April 25, 2006

FACTS: Factual Arguments: The petitioners here come in three groups Bayan et al., Jess Del Prado
et al., and Kilusang Mayo Uno et al.,. On different dates, these petitioners alleged that their rights
to peaceful assembly were violated because the policemen dispersed their assembly even prior
its start. In dispersing the said rallies, the policemen invoked Batas Pambansa B.P. 880 which
prohibits a public assembly without permit issued by the Mayor of the City or Municipality where
the assembly is to be held. Some of the petitioners alleged that their members were injured during
the confrontation with the policemen.

Legal Arguments: Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a
violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless
of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue
and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not
content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words
"lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not
espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies
to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based
legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it
puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without
a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere
regulations but are actually prohibitions.

Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two
standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are
inconsistent.

Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum
tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of
publication.

Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly
and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even
assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First,
allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present
danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long
as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly
wane.
As to the CPR policy (Calibrated Preemtive response), they argue that it is preemptive, that the
government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law,
ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum
tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the
exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

***The respondents officials argued that Petitioners have no standing because they have not
presented evidence that they had been "injured, arrested or detained because of the CPR," and
that "those arrested stand to be charged with violating Batas Pambansa [No.] 880 and other
offenses." They further alleged that the law does not violate the constitutional rights of the
petitioners.

ISSUE:
1.) WON the petitioners have the locus standi
2.) WON the law is constitutional

HELD:
1.) YES. Petitioners' standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in
peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by theConstitution, is directly
affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation's
streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required
permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the
Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as
contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.

Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 4.No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances
is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in
the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.

2.) YES. It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but
a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted
to in Osmea v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the
time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-
based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
"peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and
"influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any
subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording
of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection
and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
Roque vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 188456. September 10, 2009)

FACTS:

In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction, petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers and concerned
citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelec's award of the 2010 Elections Automation Project
(automation project) to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and
Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic) and to permanently prohibit the Comelec,
TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing the corresponding contract-award.

From the petition, the Court gathers the following facts:

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 8436 authorizing the adoption
of an automated election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and
onwards. The 1998, 2001, and 2004 national and local polls, however, came and went but purely
manual elections were still the order of the day. On January 23, 2007, the amendatory RA
9369 was passed authorizing anew the Comelec to use an AES. The AES was not utilized in the
May 10, 2000 elections, as funds were not appropriated for that purpose by Congress and due
to time constraints.

Accordingly, in early March 2009, the Comelec released the Request for
Proposal (RFP), also known as Terms of Reference (TOR), for the nationwide automation of the
voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes for the May 10, 2010
Synchronized National and Local Elections. What is referred to also in the RFP and other
contract documents as the 2010 Elections Automation Project (Automation Project) consists
of three elaborate components, as follows:
Component 1: Paper-Based AES. 1-A. Election Management System (EMS); 1-B
Precinct-Count Optic Scan (PCOS) System and 1-C. Consolidation/Canvassing System (CCS);
Component 2: Provision for Electronic Transmission of Election Results using Public
Telecommunications Network; and
Component 3: Overall Project Management
And obviously to address the possibility of systems failure, the RFP required interested
bidders to submit, among other things: a continuity plan and a back-up plan.

Under the two-envelope system designed under the RFP, each participating bidder
shall submit, as part of its bid, an Eligibility Envelope that should inter alia establish the bidder's
eligibility to bid. On the other hand, the second envelope, or the Bid Envelope itself, shall
contain two envelopes that, in turn, shall contain the technical proposal and the financial
proposal, respectively.
Meanwhile, Congress enacted RA 9525 appropriating some PhP11.3 billion as
supplemental budget for the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections.

Of the ten (10) invitation-responding consortia which obtained the bid documents, only seven
(7) submitted sealed applications for eligibility and bids which, per Bid Bulletin No. 24, were to
be opened on a pre-set date, following the convening of the pre-bid conference.
Among the submitted bids was that of the joint venture (JV) of TIM and Smartmatic, the former
incorporated under the Corporation Code of the Philippines. Smartmatic, on the other hand,
was organized under the laws of Barbados. For a stated amount, said JV proposed to undertake
the whole automation project, inclusive of the delivery of 82,200 PCOS machines. After the
conclusion of the eligibility evaluation process, only three consortia were found and thus
declared as eligible.
After declaring TIM-Smartmatic as the best complying bidder, the SBAC then directed
the joint venture to undertake post-qualification screening, and its PCOS prototype machines
the Smarmatic *Auditable Electronic System (SAES) 1800 to undergo end-to-end testing
to determine compliance with the pre-set criteria.

Soon after, TIM wrote Comelec expressing its desire to quit the JV partnership. In time, however,
the parties were able to patch up what TIM earlier described as irreconcilable differences
between partners.

What followed was that TIM and Smartmatic, pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA), caused the incorporation of a joint venture corporation (JVC) that would enter into a
contract with the Comelec. Later on, the Comelec and Smartmatic TIM Corporation, as
provider, executed a contract for the lease of goods and services under the contract for the
contract amount of PhP7,191,484,739.48, payable as the "Goods and Services are delivered
and/or progress is made in accordance [with pre-set] Schedule of Payments". 35 On the same
date, a Notice to Proceed was sent to, and received by, Smartmatic TIM Corporation.

Meanwhile, or on July 9, 2009, petitioners interposed the instant recourse which, for all intents
and purposes, impugns the validity and seeks to nullify the July 10, 2009 Comelec-Smartmatic-
TIM Corporation automation contract adverted to. Among others, petitioners pray that
respondents be permanently enjoined from implementing the automation project on the
submission that the public respondents COMELEC and COMELEC-SBAC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in awarding the 2010 Elections
Automation Project to private respondents TIM and SMARTMATIC for the following reasons:

. . . COMELEC DID NOT CONDUCT ANY PILOT TESTING OF THE . . . PCOS

MACHINES OFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND TIM, IN
VIOLATION OF [RA] 8436 (AS AMENDED BY [RA] 9369)

THE [PCOS] MACHINES [THUS] OFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS . . . DO

NOT SATISFY THE MINIMUM SYSTEM CAPABILITIES SET BY [RA] NO. 8436 (AS
AMENDED BY [RA] 9369).

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS . . . DID NOT SUBMIT THE REQUIRED DOCUMENTS

DURING THE BIDDING PROCESS THAT SHOULD ESTABLISH THE DUE
EXISTENCE, COMPOSITION, AND SCOPE OF THEIR JOINT VENTURE, IN
VIOLATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. COMELEC (G.R. No.
159139, Jan. 13, 2004).
 THERE WAS NO VALID JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT [JVA] BETWEEN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND TIM DURING THE BIDDING, IN VIOLATION
OF THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC . . . WHICH REQUIRES A
JOINT VENTURE TO INCLUDE A COPY OF ITS [JVA] DURING THE BIDDING.
THE ALLEGED JOINT VENTURE COMPOSED OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
SMARTMATIC AND TIM, DOES NOT SATISFY THE SUPREME COURT'S
DEFINITION OF A "JOINT VENTURE" IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC . . . WHICH "REQUIRES A
COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER".

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC-SMARTMATIC-TIM Corporation automation Contract is invalid or
unconstitutional due to the alleged COMELECs grave abused its discretion when it awarded
the 2010 Election Automation Project to SMARTMATIC and TIM.

HELD:
NO.
Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the enabling automation law, RA 8436, as
amended by RA 9369, the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners invoked as
an afterthought, the Court finds the project award to have complied with legal prescriptions,
and the terms and conditions of the corresponding automation contract in question to be
valid. No grave abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of respondent
Comelec. And surely, the winning joint venture should not be faulted for having a foreign
company as partner. DAaHET
The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in
our scheme of government. In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair
elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it
should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an
organization of lesser responsibility. It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough
wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great
objective for which it was created to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections.
This is as it should be for, too often, Comelec has to make decisions under difficult conditions
to address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the process the
voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from interfering with the
Comelec's exercise of its power which, by law and by the nature of its office properly pertain
to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on Comelec's part, as
here, the Court should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone
nullify, the acts of that body. This gem, while not on all fours with, is lifted from, the Court's
holding in an old but oft-cited case:
. . . We may not agree fully with [the Comelec's] choice of means, but unless
these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should
not interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt
with realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory [or speculation]. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
 There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and
experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good
government. In the matter of the administration of the laws relative to the
conduct of elections, . . . we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the
[Comelec] the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly
belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission . . .
requires that the power of this court to review the acts of that body should, as a
general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases. . . .
The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing would go wrong,
that a successful automation election unmarred by fraud, violence, and like irregularities
would be the order of the moment on May 10, 2010. Neither will it guarantee, as it cannot
guarantee, the effectiveness of the voting machines and the integrity of the counting and
consolidation software embedded in them. That task belongs at the first instance to Comelec,
as part of its mandate to ensure clean and peaceful elections. This independent constitutional
commission, it is true, possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable latitude in the
discharge of its functions. The road, however, towards successful 2010 automation elections
would certainly be rough and bumpy. The Comelec is laboring under very tight timelines. It
would accordingly need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest elections, of all men
and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist Comelec personnel address the fears
expressed about the integrity of the system. Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish
automated elections to succeed, credibly.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.