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G.R. No.

3593 March 23, 1907 of whom have been duly admitted to


practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff, vs. C.W. NEY and JUAN
GARCIA BOSQUE, defendants. It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for
the suspension or removal of the defendant Ney from his office as
Attorney-General Araneta for plaintiff. attorney. The defendant Bosque, not being an officer of the court,
C.W. Ney for defendants. could not be proceeded against in that way, and probably for that
reason the Attorney-General instituted this form of
proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
TRACEY, J.:
Should either of these defendants be thus punished for
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for contempt?chanrobles virtual law library
contempt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as
In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia follows:
Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice law in the
Philippine Islands, upon the ground that after the change of
sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as such 1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
was not qualified for admission to the bar ( In re Bosque, 1 Phil. judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or
Rep., 88), and an order was entered judge;chanrobles virtual law library
accordingly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his
In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney, a official duties or in his official transactions.
practicing attorney, to carry on business together, sending out a
circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they had established an Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is restricted
office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands to punishment for acts so defined. ( Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S.,
and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation and 505.)chanrobles virtual law library
office work relating to Spanish law. The paper was headed "Law
Office - Ney & Bosque. Juan G. Bosque, jurisconsulto espaol - As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or command
C.W. Ney, abogado americano."chanrobles virtual law library of this court has been disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney.
The only order that the defendant Bosque can have disobeyed is the
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared in one denying him the right to practice law. This order, however, was
the courts, and with one exception, occuring through an inadvertance, directly binding upon him, notwithstanding proceedings taken for its
papers from the office were signed not with the firm name alone nor review, and any hope on his part of ultimately reversing it furnished
with any designation of the firm as attorneys, but with the words no excuse for its violation. Even had he been entitled under the
"Ney & Bosque - C.W. Ney, abogado."chanrobles virtual law library statute to practice law without any license from the court and without
an application to it, yet its order made on his own petition. A mandate
On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The irregular signature
15, 1906, this court refused to consider petitions so singed with the to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his authorization and
names of the defendants and the practice being repeated, on the 2nd constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the
day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent to the Attorney- firm circular in setting forth the establishment of an office for the
General to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands, amounted to an
instituted this proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles assertion of his right and purpose, not effectively qualified by the
virtual law library addition that he would devote himself to consultation and office work
relating to Spanish law. Spanish law plays an important part in the
equipment of a lawyer in the Archipelago, standing on a different
The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their footing from the law of other foreign countries, in regard to which a
acts as being within the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles skilled person might as a calling, advise without practicing law. The
virtual law library fact stated on the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not
amount to a disclaimer of his professional character in the Islands.
Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every Independent of statutory provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of
pleading must be subscribed by the party or his attorney, does not his status disqualified from practicing law. One of the most eminent
permit, and by implication prohibits, a subscription of the names of American advocates was an alien barrister admitted to the bar after a
any other persons, whether agents or otherwise; therefore a signature contest in the court of New York State. ( In re Thomas Addis
containing the name of one neither a party nor an attorney was not a Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.) Consequently the conduct of the
compliance with this section, nor was it aided by the too obvious defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a
subterfuge of the addition of the individual name of a licensed proceeding to which he was a
attorney. The illegality in this instance was aggravated by the fact party.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
that one of the agents so named was a person residing in these Islands
to whom this court had expressly denied admission to the bar. The Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is
papers in question were irregular and were properly rejected. We obviously not answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of the
refuse to recognize as a practice any signature of names appended to court. On the other hand, under this subdivision, the defendant Ney,
pleadings or other papers in an action other than those specified in the as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct amounted to
statute. A signature by agents amounts to a signing by non-qualified misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of
attorneys, the office of attorney being originally one of agency. ( In Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney
re Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not, however, mean to participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was
discountenance the use of a suitable firm designation by partners, all chiefly and personally responsible. It is impossible to say that the
signature itself was a violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless the In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman
man who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that his provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the
persistent and rash disregard of the rulings of the court has not counsels signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaints
commended him to our indulgence, while the offensive character of validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate
certain papers recently filed by him forbids us from presuming on the cases for Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed
hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
members of the bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August
2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer,
The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated
the sum of 200 pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of this 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty.
court within ten days, with the costs de oficio. So Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracias
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions.
Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the
cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against
him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint
A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013 for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the
RUSTIA, Complainants, Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public
vs. document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. dispositive portion states:
JARDER, Respondents.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for
DECISION insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by
Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and
CARPIO, J.: other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.

The Case SO ORDERED.4

This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was
Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19
Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo September 2005.
(Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation
of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated
Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment. Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and
Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner. The complainants alleged
The Facts that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo.
Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order
Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants
dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National
requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for
Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-
usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft
complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close
and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia,
friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned
Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory
signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard
Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly
signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same
signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of
person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were
the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros
respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they
Occidental.
were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and
persecute innocent people.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each
other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the
before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he
Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information. They alleged
represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in
that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder
person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo
Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to
sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint,
Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed
on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the
submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The
Bancolos affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after
Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to
the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo. prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents.
However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the
pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner,
of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present.
disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder
before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T.
supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his
also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the
their law office. Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his
responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done
Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission on Bar that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner
Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to
2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, perform this task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule
complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.7
conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again,
respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board
conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their of Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and
disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP. Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution
Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to states:
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were
directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
2006, the IBP received complainants position paper dated 18 and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
October 2006 and respondents position paper dated 23 October Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
2006. entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
The IBPs Report and Recommendation record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent
Atty. Bancolos violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo
violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the
Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to
the same Code. The Investigating AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for case for lack of merit.8
two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished
for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm. Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty.
Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated
opined: Comment/Reply to Complainants Motion for Reconsideration and
Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted
that his signature appearing in the complaint filed against In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of
complainants Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Governors denied both complainants and Atty. Bancolos motions
Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse
findings that his signatures appearing in the various documents the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed
released from his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule
9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent The Courts Ruling
him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that
respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the
personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable
of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of
indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices
sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline and before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a
its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of
lawyers. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law CANON 9
firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". x x x. Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
xxxx member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal- WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T.
Tenorio,9 where we held: larder for lack of merit.

The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper with more severely.
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L.
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them
of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized
practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to SO ORDERED.
aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the


preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving
the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the
legal profession. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a [A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]
pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing
of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-
lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsels signature serves
as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk
support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi
ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the City, respondent.
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the
document.1wphi1 DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty.
Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of circumstances or
of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative
confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City,
Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his
Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed
for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units
Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint
belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa &
Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him
if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to
Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer. (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995,
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising
some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his
tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of " ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you
Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into
signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS between me and your company, as represented by your Sales
a ground for disciplinary action. Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch
office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said
wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated
secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an
of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable. Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic
practice of law for one year is warranted. We also find proper the language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit,
dismissal of the case against Atty. larder. fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa
& Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform 4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members
you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before
said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous,
I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to
controversial contract." cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and
& Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting
containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely
stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from
addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed. the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the
Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the complaint. Conformably with established usage that notices of
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of
Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo
with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]
in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he
the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said: questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation
of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst.
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but
annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice,
into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong
represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial
authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family
be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my **."[4]
consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty,
and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much
between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real less aggressive, even obsequious tones,[5] Alauya requested the former
facts from me." to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment
thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good
faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently
he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi. bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, of P4,333.10 from his salary.
dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5,
which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury,
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that
Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa
deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any
asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were
Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment
"effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to
payments."c the comment as Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate
mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage,
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the
15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest
January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of mistake.[9]
the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free
Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of: Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion
that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to
which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;" "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a
local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and himself a lawyer.
established reputation;"
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did
"is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured."[10] He claims
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and
friend.[11] He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance
that she would show the completed document to him later for
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the
and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject of public for the judiciary."[18]
his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is
situated;[12] He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good
wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of
do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely --
his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate.
pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he
lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he
he ever saw.[13] exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or
undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he
malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify
and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a
her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject
demonstrable. to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government
workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April improper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord
22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his
-- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms
as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA." might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.[14] As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar
he made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting practice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted
in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine
reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that: Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
"attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar
confidence;" of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and
it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and
unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;" Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or
"counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use
abuse of confidence;" and of the title of attorney.

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the
with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately
housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and establishing the accusation.
"concealed the real facts **." WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby
REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more
"mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold severely.
financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15] SO ORDERED.

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials


and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
public service.[16] Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic
officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977
** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest."[17] More JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner,
than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of vs.
every official and employee of an agency involved in the THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior and DOMINGO FORTEZA, JR., respondents.
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others,
not been adequately protected and his properties are in danger of
being confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law. 5
SANTOS, J:
In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge denied the Petition
In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, petitioner and directed the issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that
seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated July 12, 1977, said Petition is ". . a clear case of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel
denying his Petition for Relief from Judgment and allowing a writ of for defendant-appellant ..." herein petitioner, and, that the grounds
execution to issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of the Court of First relied upon ". . . could have been ventilated in the appeal before the
Instance of Bulacan. Court of Appeals ... " 6

The factual antecedents may be recited as follows: On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos,
acting upon the writ of execution, issued by respondent Judge, levied
on three motor vehicles, of petitioner for the satisfaction of the
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was judgment. 7
involved, on October 1, 1971, in an accident resulting to injuries
sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. As a
consequence thereof, a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza Hence the instant Petition.
against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch
VIII), docketed as Civil Case No. 680-V. An Answer thereto was Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to
filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. Vida Jr., of the law firm of frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be
Vida Enriquez, Mercado & Associates. 1 denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the person who
represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the
Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not
conference on April 6, 1972, despite due notice, petitioner was a member of the Bar 8 did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in
treated as in default and private respondent was allowed to present court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the
his evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter rendered by the trial proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner
court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for was duly represented by bona fide members of the Bar in seeking a
Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence
order of default, the reopening of the case for the presentation of his and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other
evidence and the setting aside of the decision. Said Motion for words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the
Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado, another member proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was
of the law firm. The same was denied by the lower Court and subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated, not only
alleged errors, to wit: on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on
April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same,
without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to
a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying defendant countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already taken
Jose Guballa his day in Court by declaring him in well over six years to resolve,
default, it being contrary to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter;
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with
Preliminary Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida,
b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209 Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao,
and decide the case; Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain, within ten (10) days from
notice this Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign
c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not
particularly award of moral damages is contrary a member of the Bar.
to law; and

d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable


defenses.2 G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994

The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,
associate of the same law firm. The decision appealed from was vs.
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52610R. A NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, through a MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents.
different counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II. However the same
was denied and the decision became final on June 29, 1977 and was
then remanded to the lower Court, presided by respondent Judge for Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
execution. 3
R E SO L U T I O N
A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent
with the lower Court which was granted by respondent Judge. 4

On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, REGALADO, J.:
filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery that
Irineo W. Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not
a member of the Philippine Bar and that consequently, his rights had
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case
civil action for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of respondent could be interpreted as a mere afterthought.
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners
to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation
their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest that private respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing
thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from
the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned
attorney's fees. his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their
jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly,
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents'
the de minimis amounts involved should not impose upon the services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the
valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private
issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution.
such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly
demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing grave abuse of
is also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual discretion on the part of said public respondent.
quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise
hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are
"boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non- supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such
air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck
washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at
deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day. with grave abuse of discretion. 4

In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by
the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown respondents to defray any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by
reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against
Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing
taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in
armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and
He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home the respondents must be refunded therefor.
province to recuperate.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi
driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first
employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. No
basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several employer shall require his worker to make
occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule. deposits from which deductions shall be made for
the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools,
materials, or equipment supplied by the
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of employer, except when the employer is engaged
P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in in such trades, occupations or business where the
Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests practice of making deposits is a recognized one,
of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. or is necessary or desirable as determined by the
Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and
Company." regulations.

Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on
reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied
petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit
as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in
repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents
adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which
their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In
deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, other case, any balance due to private respondents after proper
claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.
refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with Sabsalon is as follows:
the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations
Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal
deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
that it took private respondents two years to file the same and such
unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a 1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00 from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual
payment thereof.
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
SO ORDERED.
1990 605.00 570.00

1991 165.00 2,300.00

P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00

The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was


able to withdraw his deposits through vales or he incurred shortages,
such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of
P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was
mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition. We
accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General
that since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he
should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5

On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to
say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no
dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of
duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven
to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by
the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s)
(private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for
washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who
washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much
more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal
deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)

Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the


P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was
nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units
themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor
General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice
in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.

On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private


respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor
Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691,
states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor
arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent
their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that
Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private
respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the
foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not
entitled to attorney's fees.

Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to


have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his
services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client
relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and
such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a
lawyer. 8

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National


Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the
awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees
and directing said public respondent to order and effect the
computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private
respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon

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