Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
OKEREKE, CHUKWUNONSO N.
MSc.
Academic Year: 2014 - 2015
MSc
OKEREKE, CHUKWUNONSO N.
Keywords:
i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research paper is made possible by God through the help and support of
everyone including my parents Prof. and Mrs. C.S. Okereke. Especially, I would
like to dedicate my acknowledgement of gratitude to the following significant
advisors and contributors.
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Weizhong Fei for his
support and encouragement. He gave me utmost guidance through the duration
of my research always offering detailed advice on grammar, organization and
theme of the paper.
Second, I would like to thank Dr. Mahmood Shafiee who also provided valuable
advices on how to go about my research, as well as all other lecturers who
taught me over the last one year. I am grateful to even the non-teaching staff
who helped along the way, especially Jessica Puttick and the rest in the SEEA
office.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................... i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................... iii
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................ vii
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................... ix
LIST OF EQUATIONS ........................................................................................ x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................ xi
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1
1.1 Ageing Scenarios ...................................................................................... 3
1.2 Aims and Objectives ................................................................................. 3
1.3 Methodology ............................................................................................. 4
2 REVIEW OF AGEING ..................................................................................... 5
2.1 Analysis of Ageing Process ...................................................................... 5
2.2 Ageing Effects ........................................................................................... 8
2.2.1 Degradation ........................................................................................ 9
2.2.2 Corrosion............................................................................................ 9
2.2.3 Fatigue ............................................................................................. 12
2.2.4 Obsolescence .................................................................................. 15
2.2.5 Organisational Issues ....................................................................... 15
3 REVIEW OF AGEING MANAGEMENT ......................................................... 17
3.1 Asset Life Extension ............................................................................... 17
3.2 Safety Critical Elements .......................................................................... 21
3.2.1 Performance Standards ................................................................... 21
3.2.2 Development of Ageing SCEs Management Structure..................... 21
3.3 Maintenance of Physical Asset ............................................................... 23
3.3.1 Modern Maintenance Techniques .................................................... 23
4 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT (SIM) ...................................... 25
4.1 Overview ................................................................................................. 25
4.2 Elements of SIM...................................................................................... 25
4.2.1 Data Management ............................................................................ 26
4.2.2 Evaluation (Assessment).................................................................. 26
4.3 Strategy .................................................................................................. 30
4.4 Program .................................................................................................. 31
5 RISK BASED INSPECTION .......................................................................... 33
5.1 Overview ................................................................................................. 33
5.2 RBI Model ............................................................................................... 35
6 CASE STUDY ............................................................................................... 37
6.1 Case Study on Hurricane Ivans Damage on Offshore Structures in
the GOM ....................................................................................................... 37
6.2 Results .................................................................................................... 37
6.2.1 Qualitative Assessment .................................................................... 37
v
6.2.2 Quantitative Assessment.................................................................. 40
6.2.3 Recommendations from Case Study ................................................ 41
7 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................ 43
7.1 General discussion ................................................................................. 43
7.2 Problems Associated with Ageing ........................................................... 44
7.3 Limitations to Ageing Management and Asset Life Extension
(Challenges) ................................................................................................. 44
8 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 47
REFERENCES ................................................................................................. 49
APPENDICES .................................................................................................. 53
Appendix A Probability of Failure Assessment ............................................. 53
Appendix B Important Ageing and Life Extension Codes and Standards ..... 60
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1: Age Histogram for UKCS Platforms (Stacey, Sharp, & Birkinshaw,
2008) ........................................................................................................... 1
Figure 1-2: Ageing scenarios.............................................................................. 3
Figure 2-1: Stages of an equipment life. (Wright, 2011) ..................................... 6
Figure 2-2: Ageing management (Hokstad, Habrekke, Johnsen, & Sangesland,
2010) ........................................................................................................... 7
Figure 2-3: Connection between ageing management and life extension (Perez
Ramirez, Bouwer, & Haskins, 2013) ............................................................ 8
Figure 2-4: Histogram showing causes of equipment failure. (Wright, 2011) ..... 9
Figure 2-5: Riser corrosion in splash zone (Clock Spring Company, 2012) ..... 10
Figure 2-6: Common fatigue failures in steel parts (ESDEP course accessed on
26/08/2015) ............................................................................................... 13
Figure 2-7: Alexander Keilland Platform fatigue failure (Exponent Inc, 2010) .. 15
Figure 3-1: Organizational context development considerations ...................... 18
Figure 3-2: Offshore Production Platforms (Moan, 2005) ................................. 19
Figure 3-3: Commonplace North Sea type steel jacket platform (STATOIL,
2013) ......................................................................................................... 20
Figure 3-4: Tubular joints and braces illustration (El-Reedy, 2002) .................. 20
Figure 3-5: Illustration of procedures for SCEs management ........................... 22
Figure 4-1: SIM flowchart (Dinovitzer, Semiga , Tiku, Bonneau, Wang, & Chen,
2009) ......................................................................................................... 25
Figure 4-2: Normal design analysis (left), refined analysis (right) procedures.
(O'Connor, Bucknell, DeFranco, Westlake, & Puskar, 2005) ..................... 28
Figure 4-3: Joint selection for inspection (Piva, Latronico , Sartirana, Gabetta , &
Nero, 2013)................................................................................................ 29
Figure 4-4: Fracture mechanics approach (Marshall & Copanoglu, 2009) ....... 30
Figure 5-1: Reliability based maintenance framework based on ISO 3100 ...... 34
Figure 5-2: The RBI process ............................................................................ 36
Figure 6-1: Hurricane Ivan path showing locations of destroyed platforms
(Energo Engineering Inc., 2005) ................................................................ 42
vii
Figure A-1: Comparing alternate inspection programs with same range but
different frequencies (Rouhan & Schoefs, 2003) ....................................... 58
Figure A-2: Risks related with alternative structural inspection programs for a
platform (Barton & Descamps, 2001) ........................................................ 60
viii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1: Structural components prone to corrosion (Galbraith & Sharp, 2007)
.................................................................................................................. 11
Table 2-2: Structural parts prone to fatigue (Galbraith & Sharp, 2007) ............ 14
Table 5-1: Examples of inspection methods. (Animah, 2012) .......................... 34
Table 6-1: Fixed platforms destroyed by Hurricane Ivan (Energo Engineering
Inc., 2005).................................................................................................. 38
ix
LIST OF EQUATIONS
Equation 1 ........................................................................................................ 54
Equation 2 ........................................................................................................ 55
Equation 3 ........................................................................................................ 58
Equation 4 ........................................................................................................ 59
x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
LE Life extension
DL Design life
FL Fatigue life
NS North sea
PS Performance standards
xi
RSR Reserve strength ratio
TT Through-thickness
UT Ultrasonic testing
FM Fracture mechanics
Inc. Incorporation
xii
1 INTRODUCTION
A whole lot of fixed offshore installations in operation have exceeded their
conventional theoretical 25 years design life. The demand for the continued use
of assets after their design life is exceeded would continue to go higher. There
exists a persistent necessity for them to be utilized in oil and gas production,
therefore they are operated for a symbolic period of time exceeding many years
above the design life. Statistics show that many offshore installations are
beyond their original design life and the trend is increasing with the relative
decrease in platform decommissioning and installations of new offshore
structures. Using the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) as a reference,
the diagram in Figure 1-1 shows the age profile for fixed platforms. (Stacey,
Sharp, & Birkinshaw, 2008)
Figure 1-1: Age Histogram for UKCS Platforms (Stacey, Sharp, & Birkinshaw,
2008)
1
Paying attention to the UKCS, several movable offshore installations have been
employed in the UKCS to be utilized as production platforms resulting in
unending or use at the point of interest (on-station). These installations were not
designed for such method of use. This is because activities like routine
inspection, maintenance and repair are not possible in these cases. But as
these structures are being utilized, they continue to deteriorate and this
deterioration is known as ageing. (Stacey, Sharp, & Birkinshaw, 2008)
Many of these issues can take place as grovelling changes that increase with
time, some occurring with little hints or as an outcome of extensive offshore
structure development.
2
1.1 Ageing Scenarios
The figure below gives clear knowledge of the different scenarios common to
ageing offshore installations
AGEING
SCENARIOS
TIME-RELIANT
PROCESS DAMAGE EXTERNAL
OVER TIME CHANGES
FATIGUE ACCIDENTAL MODIFICATIONS
DAMAGE
CORRSION NEW
ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES
CREEP BURDEN
FAILURE TO
GEOLOGICAL ADAPT TO
CHANGES
3
1.3 Methodology
The research methodology established the major determinants that aid ageing
and ways for managing ageing and extending asset life. Theoretical data were
used to establish ageing management and life extension methods. Literature
review from valid journals, conference proceedings, books, reports, websites
were utilized in analysing current oil and gas industry structures, these
literatures are cited accordingly. One case study is discussed and this case
study helps establish issues and challenges associated with ageing offshore
assets and their managements and life extension.
4
2 REVIEW OF AGEING
2.1 Analysis of Ageing Process
A lot of offshore structures are created according to codes and guidelines or
standards depending on limit states including design life. Ageing which we
already know is as a result of exceeding design life would most often disturb the
fatigue limit state of the offshore installation.
According to ISO 1990, the design life is the estimated length of time in which
an installation or component is to be utilized for its purpose with expected
maintenance but without any extraordinary repairs as a result of ageing. Design
life is associated with fatigue life. The UK Department of Energy and the Health
and Safety Executive guidance cites a minimum of 20 years design life for
offshore installations. In some special cases, up to 60 years of design life have
been designated. Design life can be reassessed or requalified.
The most common concept related to ageing is that provided by The UK Health
and Safety Executive (HSE). It states that, ageing is not about how old the
equipment is but about what is known about its condition and how that changes
with respect to time. (Nabavian & Morshed, 2010) In addition, ageing is also
viewed as constant alterations or adjustments that usually have a negative
effect on the structural integrity of offshore installations. There are two contexts
from which ageing can be viewed. (Hokstad, Habrekke, Johnsen, &
Sangesland, 2010) They include:
Ageing that has to do with reliability. This has to do with failures taking
place in a system (loss of function, failure rates etc.).
Physically inclined ageing. This has to do with the slow deterioration
process of equipment features.
The figure below shows the life cycle of equipment which might be a structure
or component. Equipment that has reached mature phase is assumed to work
still within the design restrictions aided by regular checks and maintenance with
a rather slow deterioration process. It is also aided by the fact that installation
and commissioning matters, design flaws and early phase life operating errors
5
have been determined during the beginning work stage. The structure reaches
design limit when it gets to the ageing phase and hence would need more
constant repairs as a result of increased deterioration rate. At the end of life
phase, even more extreme inspection techniques and extensive repairs would
be required to inhibit the fast degradation. (Wright, 2011)
The effects of ageing are not only connected to equipment, this can be seen on
Figure 2-2 below. The Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research
(SINTEF) demonstrates ageing management from three extensive
perspectives. These include; material deterioration, obsolescence and
organizational problems or issues. Figure 2-3 below, shows the connection
between ageing management, design life and life extension of offshore assets.
The dotted lines in figure 4 represent the design life of the structure.
Management of ageing through this period helps improve the safety margin of
6
the structure during the life extension phase. A huge safety margin indicates a
longer life extension period.
AGEING MANAGEMENT
7
Figure 2-3: Connection between ageing management and life extension (Perez
Ramirez, Bouwer, & Haskins, 2013)
8
2.2.1 Degradation
Degradation of material depicts physical aspect of ageing. This aspect of ageing
is not necessarily assessed with respect to time but it helps provide knowledge
of probability of failure as time goes on. (Animah, 2012) The main degradation
methods related to time are fatigue and corrosion. (Piva, Latronico , Sartirana,
Gabetta , & Nero, 2013) Studies have shown that corrosion is responsible for
most failures. This includes general and stress corrosion cracking.
2.2.2 Corrosion
Corrosion comprises an interaction between a material and the environment
such as air, sea, etc. resulting in a decay of the material. Corrosion is time-
related and hence, an important topic to ageing offshore installations.
9
some or rather, most cases, sacrificial anode technique is used to protect the
whole structure from corrosion. The figure below shows the deterioration as a
result of corrosion, a predominant ageing process in the splash zone.
Figure 2-5: Riser corrosion in splash zone (Clock Spring Company, 2012)
10
Table 2-1: Structural components prone to corrosion (Galbraith & Sharp, 2007)
11
2.2.3 Fatigue
It is recognized that cracking can also take place during the design life of
offshore structures, especially if there is still presence of flaws from the
manufacturing process. In recent times, incidents have occurred due to fatigue
failures in the offshore environment. The repercussion of regional fatigue failure
has to be figured out well in the management of ageing of offshore installations.
(Stacey, Sharp, & Birkinshaw, 2008).
12
Figure 2-6: Common fatigue failures in steel parts (ESDEP course accessed on
26/08/2015)
Table 2-2 shows some structural elements that are prone to fatigue. Also, it can
be seen on the table, the different ways to manage the risks associated with the
different elements and factors to be considered when carrying out life extension
measures on the ageing components. Figure 2-7 shows the damage done to
the Alexander Keilland platform, a semi-submersible rig that operated in
Norwegian waters. The platform capsized in March 1980 while working in the
Ekofisk oil field. This collapse was due to a fatigue crack in one of the six
braces that acted as a connection between the platform leg and the rest of the
rig. 123 lives were lost.
However, it is noteworthy to know that being able to predict fatigue life is very
important in ageing management and offshore structures life extension.
13
Table 2-2: Structural parts prone to fatigue (Galbraith & Sharp, 2007)
14
Figure 2-7: Alexander Keilland Platform fatigue failure (Exponent Inc, 2010)
2.2.4 Obsolescence
Obsolescence continues to be an important point of concern in most offshore
installations due to speed of development in technology. Obsolescence most of
the times influences electrical equipment instrumentation and control systems.
(Wright, 2011) It is aided by three principal determinants namely; technological
development speed, suppliers survival and expertise availability. (Habrekke,
Bodsberg, Hokstad, & Ersdal, 2011)
Better organization of duty holders for ageing management and asset life
extension.
15
Manpower should be resourced and satisfactory resources should be put
in place for ageing management and asset life extension.
16
3 REVIEW OF AGEING MANAGEMENT
In order for platforms to continue functioning properly even after they exceed
their design life, ageing which is an inevitable process in such installations
needs to be properly managed with the right management procedures being
utilized. Some steps taken towards ageing management are discussed below.
17
Preparation or
context
establishment
Organizational
policy Competent work Regulations
Oil production and processing equipment are situated on the platform. Platforms
are made up of the topside and the structure. The basic mechanism on a
platform whether fixed or floating is the structure. The predominant type of
platform being used especially in the North Sea is the steel jacket platform. The
jacket construction consists of tubular joints and braces which joints are highly
expensive and cause difficulty during design, fabrication and maintenance of
offshore structures due to the fact that they are very important to stability
maintenance and are very prone to fatigue. (El-Reedy, 2002) Figure 3-2 below
is an illustration of different types of offshore production platforms including
ship, semi-submersible, jack-up rig, spar etc.
18
Figure 3-2: Offshore Production Platforms (Moan, 2005)
The figure below (figure 3-3) shows a typical steel jacket platform. They are
predominantly used in the North sea and require life extension procedures as
they are required to continue operation beyond their design life and are
susceptible to ageing.
The steel jackets are made of tubular joints and braces which are very
susceptible to failurThese failures occur as a result of stress when ageing is not
properly managed. Figure 3-4 is an illustration of a tubular joint and brace.
19
Figure 3-3: Commonplace North Sea type steel jacket platform (STATOIL, 2013)
20
3.2 Safety Critical Elements
The UK Health and Safety Executive defines SCEs as those components
whose failure would result in a fatal or catastrophic failure. They are
components of a structure which have the function to impede the repercussion
of a catastrophic failure or major accident event(Stacey, Birkinshaw, & Sharp,
2001) such as ship collision, fire outbreak, explosions, loss of stability,
helicopter crash, major mechanical failures, release of toxic substances etc.
(Ritchie, 2011) Safety critical elements are referred to as barriers in the
Norwegian regulations. Virtually, the whole jacket is itemized as a safety critical
element by most operators. The temporary refuge and helideck are examples of
topsides safety critical elements. (Stacey, Birkinshaw, & Sharp, 2001)
Functionality
Equipment availability
Reliability
21
provides maintenance guidelines and ways to mitigate environmental loads to
aid proper management of ageing SCEs.
The SCE management structure is divided into six stages as shown by the
figure below:
CONTEXT PREPARATION
AGEING SCEs
IDENTIFICATION
IDENTIFY FACTORS
AFFECTING ASSET LIFE
DECIDE MAINTENANCE
POLICY
TAKE NOTES OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LOAD
IMPACTS ON SCEs
Figure 3-5: Illustration of procedures for SCEs management
22
3.3 Maintenance of Physical Asset
Maintenance can be explained as all practical and organizational activities
carried out in order to return a structure to its original good functional condition.
Maintenance can be very expensive, whether financially or safety-wise. A
number of accidents have been as results of maintenance activities and
maintenance procedures have accounted for cause of 27% of injuries sustained
in the offshore oil and gas industry. (HSE, 2001) Maintenance cost makes for
60% of the total cost of operating offshore oil and gas installations. It is
therefore very important for the intricacies of maintenance to be understood.
(Ostebo, Olav, & Heggland, 1992)
The progress from corrective to preventive maintenance was very critical. This
involved the application of reliability engineering and was very necessary in
order to cut costs on maintenance procedures and to gain high conformities.
(Boznos & Greenough, 1998)
23
system component must be in very ideal working condition due to the fact that a
minor failure can lead to a breakdown. This has led to development of
maintenance strategies. Reliability engineering and risk analysis are used to
improve asset integrity and decrease cost of maintenance. (BSI, 1993)
In the Risk based method, energy used in inspection is focused mainly on very
crucial systems. This method has been around for quite some years in the
offshore oil and gas sector. Both maintenance and inspection procedures are so
much similar but employ risk based ranking of activities made use of for
maintenance and inspection.
24
4 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT (SIM)
4.1 Overview
The goal of a structural integrity management structure is to observe and
ensure a platforms fitness-for-purpose. (Piva, Latronico , Sartirana, Gabetta , &
Nero, 2013) SIM is a continuous process (Stacey, Sharp, & Birkinshaw, 2008)
that is carried out sequentially and through the life cycle of a platform.
(Westlake, Puskar, O'Connor, & Bucknell, 2006) It provides a relationship
between evaluation procedure and inspection method during design,
fabrication, operation/checks, re-evaluation and decommissioning stages.
(Galbraith, Sharp, & Terry, Managing Life Extension in Ageing Offshore
Installations, 2005) Different operators take up distinctive approaches and it can
be executed or achieved from any stage. This can be seen in figure 4-1 below.
25
4.2.1 Data Management
This is a very crucial element of the life extension process. This is due to the
fact that the amount and quality of data available is the basis for the extent of
certainty of results. (Biasotto & Rouhan, 2011) The data required falls into:
(Westlake, Puskar, O'Connor, & Bucknell, 2006)
Characteristic data that can show structures age, water depth design
data etc.
Design level analysis uses linear means to represent every component of the
platform identical to the method employed in the construction of new platforms.
Platforms get constructed on an element-basis; aggregate of loads
administered onto the platform system to ascertain the highest internal forces in
every brace component. An acceptable or allowable strength is thereafter
allocated to each component and joint in the system. If all of the distinctive
members meet the requirements, the structure is considered fit for the chosen
standard. (Stacey & Sharp, Safety factor requirements for the offshore industry,
26
2007) Nevertheless, if one component fails to satisfy the requirements, it is
concluded as non-compliance. (Nichols, Goh, & Bahar, 2006) However, this
method results in some control of strength evaluation due to non-consideration
of material changes over time although platform generated is mostly stronger
and can withstand damage more than originally imagined. (Solland, Sigurdsson,
& Ghosal, 2011) Still, when it has to do with non-compliance, more cutting-edge
analyses are required. (O'Connor, Bucknell, DeFranco, Westlake, & Puskar,
2005)
Refined analysis may be carried out for when SCEs dont the design level
specifications. These types of structural evaluations aid in deciding if
strengthening or repairs are needed or if the current situation is fit-for-operation.
They usually include deformation analysis that is non-linear to decide ultimate
limit scale (ULS) of platform which is the highest amount of loading that can be
withstood without breakdown even when there is damage. (Nichols, Goh, &
Bahar, 2006) Most times, ageing affects the ULS, but ULS can also be
influenced by a decline in reserve strength as a result of cracks. (Stacey, Sharp,
& Birkinshaw, 2008)
In light of the fact that in-service inspections can only be used to assess local
platform degradation, (Piva, Latronico , Sartirana, Gabetta , & Nero, 2013)
ultimate strength can be resolved using reserve strength ratio (RSR) as a basis.
The reserve strength ratio is the ratio between the highest amount of loading
bearable by a structure based on analysis and the characteristic loading. The
reserve strength ratio is highly determined by the redundancy factor of the
structure. (Westlake, Puskar, O'Connor, & Bucknell, 2006)
27
Software Component
FE Modelling Frame
validation behaviour
geometry
Analysis
Component
Code checking
failure
criteria
28
ESTIMATIONS OF
FATIGUE RELIABILITY
FOR EACH JOINT
CHOICE OF SUB-SET OF
CRITICAL JOINTS
IDENTIFICATION OF
CRITICAL JOINTS
(target)
RELIABILITY UPDATING
CONSIDERING NO CRACK
CHOICE OF JOINTS FOR
FOUND SCENARIO FOR
INSPECTION
EACH JOINT OF THE SUBSET
INSPECTION
ALL JOINTS
RELIABILITY UPDATING OVER YES
RELIABILITY
TARGET?
NO
PLAN OF NEXT
INSPECTION
29
Figure 4-4: Fracture mechanics approach (Marshall & Copanoglu, 2009)
4.3 Strategy
The outcomes of all the analyses are implemented to come up with a
comprehensive inspection principle. The ISO procedure provides principles for
in-service inspection. (Stacey, Sharp, & Birkinshaw, 2008)
30
replacement of sacrificial anodes. Repair has to do with activities done in order
to recover a structure to appropriate working condition after damage has been
recognized. (Dinovitzer, Semiga, Tiku, Bonneau, Wang, & Chen, 2009)
4.4 Program
The program stage of the SIM plan has to do with the establishment of an ideal
plan to aid data input back into the procedure for future improvements since the
procedure is a constant cycle. (Westlake, Puskar, O'Connor, & Bucknell, 2006)
Determinants of a SIM program include documentations of procedure,
personnel competence and behaviour, survey tools/methods, and method of
distribution. Inspection records also have to be accurate and consistent.
(Sambu Potty, Akram, & Kabir, 2009)
31
5 RISK BASED INSPECTION
5.1 Overview
Inspections can either be general or precise in nature and can differ in level;
precise inspections are usually more expensive and commonly needed more by
ageing structures. Planning of inspection can be a difficult process and
inspection of underwater components is unrealistic taking into mind the cost.
Therefore, planning of inspection is appropriate.
Risk identification
Risk evaluation
Risk analysis
Risk treatment
It is very crucial to pinpoint the types of risks that can be tolerated. For a new
design, there are many methods that can be employed for risk prevention. But
for an already existing structure, the range can be minimized. Common risk
prevention methods include prevention, elimination, control, mitigation and
restoration. The best method in getting rid of hazards is the elimination method
but it is not always possible. The most economical method should be applied for
risks that cannot be gotten rid of completely. (HSE, 2010) The figure below is a
reliability based maintenance framework as stipulated by ISO
33
Figure 5-1: Reliability based maintenance framework based on ISO 3100
34
member
detection
(FMD).
Cathodic
potential
measurement
(CPM).
3 Close visual Highly detailed inspections.
inspection. Usually done to get data required for structural
Magnetic evaluation.
particle Non-destructive techniques are used.
inspection.
Highly qualified personnel required.
Eddy current
Cleaning, training and testing requirement levels
inspection.
depend on type of damage to be inspected and type
Alternating of equipment used.
current field
measurement.
Ultrasonic
testing.
Radiographic
techniques.
The table above shows different inspection methods that can be used to assess
the risks in an installation. The methods vary according to risk and nature of
inspected component.
The final outcome of the RBI is an inspection plan that precisely shows the
number of inspection activities to be performed, inspection times, qualities of
inspections and the method of mitigation having to do with damage detection.
35
STRUCTURE COMPONENT CLASSIFICATION
36
6 CASE STUDY
6.1 Case Study on Hurricane Ivans Damage on Offshore
Structures in the GOM
In the last decade, Ivan has been one of the hurricanes to cause great damage
to offshore installation in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM). It made landfall in the GOM
in September 2004 causing damage to several offshore installations. Other
hurricanes that have caused extensive damage are Lili, Katrina and Rita. These
hurricanes have helped decide the efficacy of present design standards and
regulations of installations and helped develop propositions for alterations, if
any is required.
In this report, the results of Ivan are used to find out how fixed ageing platforms
in the GOM react to hurricanes. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses are
employed. In the qualitative assessment, a review of damages to jackets and
topsides including general trends such as number of platforms damaged and
their ages. The quantitative assessment compares the actual response of
platforms to Ivan to what was predicted by API RP 2A using analytical response
as a reference. That is to say, if a platform got destroyed, it is checked if it was
predicted by API RP 2A and the results are compared to those of Hurricanes
Andrew and Lili.
6.2 Results
Hurricane Ivan resulted in the damage of seven platforms in the GOM. One
platform damage was due to mudslide as a result of the hurricane while the
other six were due to environmental loads such as wind, waves and currents
going beyond the withstanding capacities of the platforms. It is noteworthy to
37
know that extra platforms might have been decommissioned later due to
Hurricane Ivan damages.
Fixed platform data showed that most failed platforms from Ivan were situated
in water depths between 200 to 350 feet with deck heights below the present
API recommendations. The resulting damages included topside damages (as a
result of winds and wave-in-deck), jacket leg buckles and separations, bracing
failures, joint failures and conductor bracing failures.
Table 6-1: Fixed platforms destroyed by Hurricane Ivan (Energo Engineering Inc.,
2005)
38
Energy, oyed
Inc.
4 MP 293 SONAT Southern 232 1972 L2 42 4-P destr
Natural oyed
Gas
Company
5 MP 305 C Noble 244 1969 L2 46 8-P destr
Energy, oyed
Inc.
6 MP 306 E Noble 255 1969 L2 46 8-P destr
Energy, oyed
Inc.
7 VK 294 A Chevron 119 1988 L2 32 B-CAS destr
U.S.A. Inc. oyed
8 MP 296 A GOM 212 1970 L2 46 8-P major
Shelf LLC (A
9 MP 277 A El Paso 223 2000 L2 50.3 4-P major
Production (A
Oil & Gas
Company
10 MP 279 B Dominion 290 1998 major
Exploratio (A
n&
Production
, Inc.
11 MP 138 A Newfield 158 1991 L2 55 4-P major
Exploratio
n
Company
12 MP 311 B GOM 250 1980 L2 39.5 8-P major
Shelf LLC
13 MP 296 B GOM 225 1982 L2 49.2 8-P major
Shelf LLC
14 SP 62 A Apache 340 1967 L2 40 8-P SK major
Corporatio
n
15 SP 62 B Apache 322 1968 L2 44 8-P SK major
Corporatio
n
16 SP 62 C Apache 325 1968 L2 48 8-P SK major
Corporatio
n
17 VK 900 A Chevron 340 1975 L2 46.3 8-P major
U.S.A.,
Inc.
18 MP 281 A Dominion 307 50 4-P major
Exploratio
n&
Production
, Inc.
19 MP 289 B Apache 320 1999 L1 45 8-P major
Corporatio
n
20 MP 290 A Apache 289 1968 L2 42 8-P major
Corporatio
n
21 MP 305 A Noble 180 1968 L2 45 8-P major
Energy,
39
Inc.
22 MP 305 B Noble 241 1969 L2 46 8-P major
Energy,
Inc.
23 MP 306 D Noble 255 1969 L2 46 8-P major
Energy,
Inc.
24 MP 306 F Noble 271 1978 L2 49 4-P SK major
Energy,
Inc.
25 VK 786 A- Chevron 1754 2000 L1 55 C- major
Petroniu U.S.A. Inc. TOWER
s
26 VK 780 A-Spirit Apache 722 1998 L1 49 4-P minor
Corporatio
n
27 VK 823 A-Virgo TOTAL 1130 1999 L1 47 OTHER minor
E&P USA,
INC.
28 MP 261 JP Williams 299 2001 minor
Field
Services -
Gulf Coast
Company
29 MP 298 B- Southern 222 1972 L2 43 4-P minor
VALVE Natural
Gas
Company
30 MP 144 A Chevron 207 1968 L2 52.2 4-P minor
U.S.A.,
Inc.
31 MP 252 A Shell 277 1990 L2 50 4-P SK minor
Offshore
Inc.
32 MP 280 C Dominion 302 1998 minor
Exploratio
n&
Production
, Inc.
33 SP 60 D SPN 193 1971 L2 49 8-P minor
Resources
, LLC
34 VK 989 A- BP 1290 1994 L1 55.8 4-P SK minor
Pompan Exploratio
o n&
Production
Inc.
40
1.0 which is calculated using all known safety determinants in the API
approach.
The bias factor was calculated for Hurricane Ivan paying attention to six
platforms. Generally, the quantitative assessment for Ivan shows a bias factor
of about 1.0 indicating that API RP 2A is doing a somewhat moderate job in
estimating platform performance.
2. Investigate the possible changes to the 100 year wave height curves in
API RP2A used for new design contained in API RP2A and for assessing new
platforms.
The figure below shows the course of Hurricane Ivan with positions of destroyed
fixed base platforms.
41
Figure 6-1: Hurricane Ivan path showing locations of destroyed platforms
(Energo Engineering Inc., 2005)
42
7 DISCUSSION
7.1 General discussion
The issue of ageing offshore structures is very crucial to the offshore industry
and it seems it would continue to be a very crucial matter with the increasing
number of ageing offshore structures. This importance of ageing is shown more
and more in the subject matter of present laws and recommended practices
which emphasize that ageing of offshore structures be considered specifically.
Over the years, several studies have been carried out to assess the
performance of offshore installations. A good number of these researches have
been employed in establishing present standards and guidance for the use of
offshore structures. Getting to understand materials and structural performance
is a continuous process. Know-how, techniques and assessment procedures
43
are improved upon by making use of information made available as offshore
installations age. Decommissioned structures can be inspected to obtain
important info on structural and materials performance for every type of part,
especially those parts that are usually difficult to inspect.
Lately structures that have reached their life extension stages are being dealt
with similar to structures within original design life. However, the emphasis
placed on life extension in current regulations, codes and standards has aided
life extension and ageing management to be taken more seriously in the
offshore industry. Also, the putting together of an adequate structure for SIM
would aid ageing management and life extension.
44
Failing to cite fitness-for-service of SCEs.
Records Hydrocarbon leaks and safety warnings as a result of ageing.
When safety critical systems model and structure are not up-to-date.
Failing to focus on uncompleted important maintenance activities for
SCEs.
Uninspectable elements undetectable deterioration to SCEs.
Incompetent integrity management organization.
45
8 CONCLUSION
This report has analysed how ageing and degradation can influence different
components of an offshore structure and the installation as a whole. Also, a
review of ageing and degradation mechanisms has been carried out.
From this report, it can be noted that ageing assets management does not only
have to do with equipment but also paying attention to management systems.
When the management system is adequate before concentrating on equipment
life, it may help reduce equipment replacement in the long run due to the fact
that equipment focused ageing management gives short term satisfaction.
Proactive methods are the best methods for ageing management and a good
ageing management system begins even before degradation begins.
Ample effort has been put into ageing management in the offshore oil and gas
industry. Nevertheless, more work is required to be directed towards ageing
management plus asset life extension. Life extension of offshore installations is
achievable when structural integrity is properly managed. Integrity indicators
and risk factors are the foundations for life extension. However, for life
extension to be successful, close attention has to be paid to obsolescence and
technical know-how of workforce. Also, identification and proper management of
SCEs help increase reliability of offshore structures.
During this research I observed that due to high amount of work load, less time
and attention is given to asset life extension. There exist therefore urgency for
greater awareness of ageing with proper life extension plans and practices put
in place.
47
REFERENCES
Animah, I. (2012). Managing ageing safety critical elements for life extension in
oil and gas industry (MSc Thesis, Cranfield University).
Dinovitzer, A. S., Semiga , V., Tiku, S., Bonneau, C., Wang, G., & Chen, N.
(2009). Practical Application of Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics for
Structural Integrity Management. Offshore Technology Conference, Vol.
OTC 19841. Houston, Texas.
49
Galbraith, D. N., Sharp, J. V., & Terry, E. (2005, September 6-9). Managing Life
Extension in Ageing Offshore Installations. Offshore Europe, Vol. SPE
96702. Aberdeen, United Kingdom: Society of Petroleum Engineers.
Galbraith, D. N., Sharp, J. V., & Terry, E. (2009, September 6-9). Manageing life
extension in ageing offshore installations. Offshore Europe, Vol. SPE
96702. Aberdeen, UK: Society of Petroleum Engineers.
Galbraith, D., & Sharp, J. (2007). Recommendations for design life extension
regulations.
Goyet, J., Straub, D., & Faber, M. H. (2002). Risk based inspection planning.
Revue Franaise de Gnie Civil, vol. 6, no. 3, 486-503.
Habrekke, S., Bodsberg, L., Hokstad, P., & Ersdal, G. (2011). Issues of
consideration in life extension and managing ageing facilities.
Hokstad, P., Habrekke, S., Johnsen, R., & Sangesland, S. (2010). Ageing and
life extension for offshore facilities in general and for specific systems.
SINTEF Report for The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway.
HSE. (2010).
Hudson, B. (2008). Platform and field life assessment and extension. Abu Dhabi
internantional petroleum exhibition and conference, Vol. SPE 118157, (p.
1). Abu Dhabi, UAE.
Marsh, Z., & Selfridge, F. (n.d.). Corrosion management of ageing assets from
the operator's perspective, Vol. C2012-001620. NACE International , 1.
50
Nabavian, M., & Morshed, A. (2010). Extending Life of Fixed Offshore
Installations by Integrity Management: A structural Overview. Abu Dhabi
International Petroleum Exhibition and Conference, Vol SPE 138386.
Abu Dhabi: Society of Petroleum Engineers.
Nichols, N. W., Goh, T. K., & Bahar, H. (2006). Managing Structural Integrity for
Aging Platform. SPE Project and Facilities Challenges Conference at
METS, Vol. SPE 142858, 13-16 February 2011 (p. 1). Doha, Qatar:
Society of Petroleum Engineers, Doha, Qatar.
O'Connor, P. E., Bucknell, J. R., DeFranco, S. J., Westlake, H. S., & Puskar, F.
J. (2005). Structural Integrity Management (SIM) of Offshore Facilities.
Offshore Technology Conference, Vol. OTC 17545, 2-5 May, 2005,
Houston, Texas, (p. 1). Houston, Texas.
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IPTC 16432, (p. 1). Beijing, China.
Stacey, A., Sharp, J. V., & Birkinshaw, M. (2008). Life Extension Issues for
Ageing Offshore Installations. Estoril.
Westlake, H. S., Puskar, F. J., O'Connor, P. E., & Bucknell, J. R. (2006). The
Development of a Recommended Practice for Structural Integrity
51
Management (SIM) of Fixed Offshore Platforms. Offshore Technology
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52
APPENDICES
Relative
Probability
1
Level
0
Calibrations are afterwards carried out in two phases. These calibrations are
performed to get absolute component PoF values.
53
The second calibration phase has to do with regularly inspected structures.
Calibration determinants are assessed from data gotten from the average
number of breakdowns that occur for each year and are utilized in calculating
the annual PoF peculiar to each element. In order to make calibration
productive, components can be arranged in accordance with identical
repetitiveness of defects. Examples of such groupings include:
Due to the fact that calibrated probabilities are actually small, they are updated
cumulatively in order to examine the time-dependent property of the failure
mechanisms. The probability of fatigue failure is given below:
( ) ( )
( )
Equation 1
Where
P () = PoF
54
( )
( ) ( )
( )
Equation 2
INSP Ratio = ratio between time to TT cracking and time to reach a defect size
detectable by the inspection methods.
Ratios derived from the fatigue analysis database for typical inspection
methods are presented in table 6 below. The notional or imaginary probability of
detection (PoD) of the inspection methods are deduced using these ratios.
Table A-2 below depicts reliability and estimated costs for MPI and CVI.
Table A-2: Inspection ratios for typical inspection methods (Barton & Descamps,
2001)
TECHNIQUE RATIO
MPI 3 90%
CVI 2 90%
55
Table A-3: Reliability and cost estimates for CVI and MPI (Marshall & Goldberg,
2009)
56
Table A-4: Example of qualitative consequence rating (Animah, 2012)
CONSEQUENCES
Category Low (1) Medium (2) High (3)
Safety: When the likelihood When likelihood for When there is
Functional failure of injuries is low. lost time due to likelihood for serious
When likelihood for injuries is present. injuries.
fire explosion is If failure effect on When SCEs are made
absent. SCEs functionality is non-functional.
limited.
Safety: When non- When ignitable When ignitable
Containment failure flammable medium is medium is under medium is over
present. flash point. flashpoint.
When operational When temperatures When temperatures
temperature and and pressures of and pressures of
pressure are normal. medium is extreme. medium is very
extreme.
Production When minimal Where failure will When there exist an
production loss is slow down immediate and
present. production and affect significant loss of
it by 20%. production and
revenue.
57
Figure A-1: Comparing alternate inspection programs with same range but
different frequencies (Rouhan & Schoefs, 2003)
* ( )
( )+
Equation 3
The total of the risk reductions for a particular inspection program provides a
view of the advantages of performing inspection activities. The added value of
inspection can be deduced as follows: (Barton & Descamps, 2001)
58
Equation 4
It is however imperative to note that the highest added value is gotten from the
most cost effective program. Nevertheless, there are other determinants
considered. In coming up with correct criteria, SHE and financial repercussions,
current and future maximum PoF and risk reduction are taken into
consideration.
The point at which extra spending results in just a little extra reduction in risk is
the ALARP point in the risk management decision procedure. The figure below
shows the process for choosing an inspection program for a platform. This
figure is a result of assessment done on 14 jacket platforms. The importance of
optimized inspection that applies to HSE and financial risk is depicted in this
figure.
59
Figure A-2: Risks related with alternative structural inspection programs for a
platform (Barton & Descamps, 2001)
Table B-1
60
existing structures.
61