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US vs Tambunting

Berkenkotter vs Cu Unjieng
Facts: This appeal was instituted for the purpose of reversing a judgment of the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila, finding the accused, Manuel Tambunting, guilty Facts: that on April 26, 1926, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., owner of the sugar
of stealing a quantity of gas belonging to the Manila Gas Corporation, and sentencing central situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga, obtained from the defendants, Cu Unjieng e
him to undergo imprisonment for two months and one day, of arresto mayor, with the Hijos, a loan secured by a first mortgage constituted on two parcels and land "with all
accessories prescribed by law; to indemnify the said corporation in the sum of P2, with its buildings, improvements, sugar-cane mill, steel railway, telephone line, apparatus,
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. The evidence utensils and whatever forms part or is necessary complement of said sugar-cane mill,
submitted in behalf of the prosecution shows that in January of the year 1918, the steel railway, telephone line, now existing or that may in the future exist is said lots."
accused and his wife became occupants of the upper floor of the house situated at On October 5, 1926, shortly after said mortgage had been constituted, the Mabalacat
No. 443, Calle Evangelista, in the city of Manila. In this house the Manila Gas Sugar Co., Inc., decided to increase the capacity of its sugar central by buying
Corporation had previously installed apparatus for the delivery of gas on both the additional machinery and equipment. The estimated cost of said additional machinery
upper and lower floors, consisting of the necessary piping and a gas meter, which last and equipment was approximately P100,000. In order to carry out this plan, B.A.
mentioned apparatus was installed below. When the occupants at whose request this Green, president of said corporation, proposed to the plaintiff, B.H. Berkenkotter, to
installation had been made vacated the premises, the gas company disconnected the advance the necessary amount for the purchase of said machinery and equipment,
gas pipe and removed the meter, thus cutting off the supply of gas from said promising to reimburse him as soon as he could obtain an additional loan from the
premises. Upon June 2, 1919, one of the inspectors of the gas company visited the mortgagees, the herein defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos. Having agreed to said
house in question and found that gas was being used, without the knowledge and proposition made in a letter dated October 5, 1926 (Exhibit E), B.H. Berkenkotter, on
consent of the gas company, for cooking in the quarters occupied by the defendant October 9th of the same year, delivered the sum of P1,710 to B.A. Green, president of
and his wife: to effect which a short piece of iron pipe had been inserted in the gap the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., the total amount supplied by him to said B.A. Green
where the gas meter had formerly been placed, and piece of rubber tubing had been having been P25,750. Furthermore, B.H. Berkenkotter had a credit of P22,000 against
used to connect the gas pipe of rubber tubing had been used to connect the gas pipe said corporation for unpaid salary. With the loan of P25,750 and said credit of
in kitchen with the gas stove, or plate, used for cooking. At the time this discovery was P22,000, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., purchased the additional machinery and
made, the accused, Manuel Tambunting, was not at home, but he presently arrived equipment now in litigation. On June 10, 1927, B.A. Green, president of the Mabalacat
and admitted to the agent to the gas company that he had made the connection with Sugar Co., Inc., applied to Cu Unjieng e Hijos for an additional loan of P75,000
the rubber tubing between the gas pipe and the stove, though he denied making the offering as security the additional machinery and equipment acquired by said B.A.
connection below. He also admitted that he knew he was using gas without the Green and installed in the sugar central after the execution of the original mortgage
knowledge of the company and that he had been so using it for probably two or three deed, on April 27, 1927, together with whatever additional equipment acquired with
months. said loan. B.A. Green failed to obtain said loan. The appellant contends that the
installation of the machinery and equipment claimed by him in the sugar central of the
Issue: WON gas can be considered in larceny? Mabalacat Sugar Company, Inc., was not permanent in character inasmuch as B.A.
Green, in proposing to him to advance the money for the purchase thereof, made it
Held: Yes. Gas can be considered in larceny, for the very reason that it is considered appear in the letter, Exhibit E, that in case B.A. Green should fail to obtain an
as property being able to be capable of appropriation. Thus having monetary value. additional loan from the defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos, said machinery and
There was evidence before the court showing that the general average of the monthly equipment would become security therefor, said B.A. Green binding himself not to
bills paid by consumers throughout the city for the use of gas in a kitchen equipped mortgage nor encumber them to anybody until said plaintiff be fully reimbursed for the
like that used by the accused is from P18 to 20, while the average minimum is about corporation's indebtedness to him. Upon acquiring the machinery and equipment in
P8 per month. We think that the facts above stated are competent evidence; and the question with money obtained as loan from the plaintiff-appellant by B.A. Green, as
conclusion is inevitable that the accused is at least liable to the extent of the minimum president of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., the latter became owner of said machinery
charge of P2 per month. The market value of the property at the time and place of the and equipment, otherwise B.A. Green, as such president, could not have offered them
theft is of court the proper value to be proven (17 R.C.L., p. 66); and when it is found to the plaintiff as security for the payment of his credit.
that the least amount that a consumer can take costs P2 per months, this affords proof
that the amount which the accused took was certainly worth that much. Absolute Issue: WON the installation of machinery constitutes a real property or a personal
certainty as to the full amount taken is of course impossible, because no meter wad property?
used; but absolute certainty upon this point is not necessary, when it is certain that the
minimum that could have been taken was worth a determinable amount.
Held: Real Property. For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so Arroyo vs. Yu de Sane [1930], 54 Phil., 511.) The only difference between a chattel
hold: (1) That the installation of a machinery and equipment in a mortgaged sugar mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that it is not now
central, in lieu of another of less capacity, for the purpose of carrying out the industrial necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted n the registry of the register
functions of the latter and increasing production, constitutes a permanent of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be
improvement on said sugar central and subjects said machinery and equipment to the entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. (Rubiso and
mortgage constituted thereon (article 1877, Civil Code); (2) that the fact that the Gelito vs. Rivera [1917], 37 Phil., 72; Arroyo vs. Yu de Sane, supra.) Otherwise a
purchaser of the new machinery and equipment has bound himself to the person mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and
supplying him the purchase money to hold them as security for the payment of the validity. (58 C.J., 92.) The Chattell Mortgage Law in its section 5, in describing what
latter's credit, and to refrain from mortgaging or otherwise encumbering them does not shall be deemed sufficient to constitute a good chattel mortgage, includes the
alter the permanent character of the incorporation of said machinery and equipment requirement of an affidavit of good faith appended to the mortgage and recorded
with the central; and (3) that the sale of the machinery and equipment in question by therewith. The absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and
the purchaser who was supplied the purchase money, as a loan, to the person who subsequent encumbrancers. (Giberson vs. A. N. Jureidini Bros. [1922], 44 Phil., 216;
supplied the money, after the incorporation thereof with the mortgaged sugar central, Benedicto de Tarrosa vs. F. M. Yap Tico & Co. and Provincial Sheriff of Occidental
does not vest the creditor with ownership of said machinery and equipment but simply Negros [1923], 46 Phil., 753.) As a consequence a chattel mortgage of a vessel
with the right of redemption wherein the affidavit of good faith required by the Chattel Mortgage Law is lacking, is
unenforceable against third persons.
Philippine Refining Co Inc vs Jarque Facts: Coming now to the merits, it appears that
on varying dates the Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed Mindanao Bus Company vs City Assessor
three mortgages on the motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza. These documents were Facts: Petitioner and respondents, thru their respective counsels agreed to the
recorded in the record of transfers and incumbrances of vessels for the port of Cebu following stipulation of facts: 1. That petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in
and each was therein denominated a "chattel mortgage". Neither of the first two transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized lines in the
mortgages had appended an affidavit of good faith. The third mortgage contained Island of Mindanao, collecting rates approved by the Public Service Commission; 3.
such an affidavit, but this mortgage was not registered in the customs house until May That the machineries sought to be assessed by the respondent as real properties are
17, 1932, or within the period of thirty days prior to the commencement of insolvency the following: (a) Hobart Electric Welder Machine, appearing in the attached
proceedings against Francisco Jarque; also, while the last mentioned mortgage was photograph, marked Annex "A"; (b) Storm Boring Machine, appearing in the attached
subscribed by Francisco Jarque and M. N. Brink, there was nothing to disclose in what photograph, marked Annex "B"; (c) Lathe machine with motor, appearing in the
capacity the said M. N. Brink signed. A fourth mortgage was executed by Francisco attached photograph, marked Annex "C"; (d) Black and Decker Grinder, appearing in
Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the chattel the attached photograph, marked Annex "D"; (e) PEMCO Hydraulic Press, appearing
mortgage registry of the register of deeds on May 12, 1932, or again within the thirty- in the attached photograph, marked Annex "E"; (f) Battery charger (Tungar charge
day period before the institution of insolvency proceedings. These proceedings were machine) appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "F"; and (g) D-Engine
begun on June 2, 1932, when a petition was filed with the Court of First Instance of Waukesha-M-Fuel, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "G". 4. That
Cebu in which it was prayed that Francisco Jarque be declared an insolvent debtor, these machineries are sitting on cement or wooden platforms as may be seen in the
which soon thereafter was granted, with the result that an assignment of all the attached photographs which form part of this agreed stipulation of facts; That these
properties of the insolvent was executed in favor of Jose Corominas. On these facts, machineries have never been or were never used as industrial equipments to produce
Judge Jose M. Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, but on finished products for sale, nor to repair machineries, parts and the like offered to the
the contrary sustained the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages. In general public indiscriminately for business or commercial purposes for which
so doing we believe that the trial judge acted advisedly. Issue: WON vessel should be petitioner has never engaged in, to date. The Court of Tax Appeals having sustained
considered as personal property? Held: Yes. Vessels are considered personal the respondent city assessor's ruling, and having denied a motion for reconsideration,
property under the civil law. (Code of Commerce, article 585.) Similarly under the petitioner brought the case to this Court Issue: WON that said tools, equipments or
common law, vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a machineries are immovable taxable real properties? Held: No. So that movable
peculiar kind of personal property. (Reynolds vs. Nielson [1903], 96 Am. Rep., 1000; equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be "essential and
Atlantic Maritime Co vs. City of Gloucester [1917], 117 N. E., 924.) Since the term principal elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would
"personal property" includes vessels, they are subject to mortgage agreeably to the be "unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established."
provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. (Act No. 1508, section 2.) Indeed, it has We may here distinguish, therefore, those movable which become immobilized by
heretofore been accepted without discussion that a mortgage on a vessel is in nature destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry for those
a chattel mortgage. (McMicking vs. Banco Espaol-Filipino [1909], 13 Phil., 429; which may not be so considered immobilized because they are merely incidental, not
essential and principal. Similarly, the tools and equipments in question in this instant machines which were placed and mounted on foundations of cement. In the contract
case are, by their nature, not essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner's of lease between the sawmill company and the owner of the land there appeared the
business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely following provision: That on the expiration of the period agreed upon, all the
incidentals acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improvements and buildings introduced and erected by the party of the second part
improve its service. Even without such tools and equipments, its business may be shall pass to the exclusive ownership of the party of the first part without any
carried on, as petitioner has carried on, without such equipments, before the war. The obligation on its part to pay any amount for said improvements and buildings; also, in
transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop if its the event the party of the second part should leave or abandon the land leased before
rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another. the time herein stipulated, the improvements and buildings shall likewise pass to the
ownership of the party of the first part as though the time agreed upon had expired:
Sergs Product vs PCI Provided, however, That the machineries and accessories are not included in the
Facts: On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI Leasing improvements which will pass to the party of the first part on the expiration or
for short) filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for [a] sum of money (Annex E), with an abandonment of the land leased. In another action, wherein the Davao Light & Power
application for a writ of replevin docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-33500. On March 6, Co., Inc., was the plaintiff and the Davao, Saw, Mill Co., Inc., was the defendant, a
1998, upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, respondent judge issued a writ of judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in that action against the defendant in
replevin (Annex B) directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and that action; a writ of execution issued thereon, and the properties now in question
equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. No third party claim was filed for such
expenses. On March 24, 1998, in implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to properties at the time of the sales thereof as is borne out by the record made by the
petitioners factory, seized one machinery with [the] word that he [would] return for the plaintiff herein. Indeed the bidder, which was the plaintiff in that action, and the
other machineries. On March 25, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for special protective defendant herein having consummated the sale, proceeded to take possession of the
order (Annex C), invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers machinery and other properties described in the corresponding certificates of sale
and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer executed in its favor by the sheriff of Davao. As connecting up with the facts, it should
enforcement of the writ of replevin. This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing (Annex further be explained that the Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., has on a number of occasions
F), on the ground that the properties [were] still personal and therefore still subject to treated the machinery as personal property by executing chattel mortgages in favor of
seizure and a writ of replevin. the appellate court held that the subject machines were third persons. One of such persons is the appellee by assignment from the original
personal property Issue: WON the subject machineries are personal property? Held: mortgages. Issue: WON the machineries are to be considered as real property? Held:
Yes by stipulation. In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ No. Exception to Art. 415. United States Supreme Court, it was held that machinery
of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by
land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal elements of their chocolate- the owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary,
making industry.Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because they are the owner
essential and principal elements in the industry.[16]In that sense, petitioners are
correct in arguing that the said machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to Prudential Bank vs Panis
Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code. Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of Facts: on November 19, 1971, plaintiffs-spouses Fernando A. Magcale and Teodula
the petitioners that the said machines are not proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure. Baluyut Magcale secured a loan in the sum of P70,000.00 from the defendant
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be Prudential Bank. To secure payment of this loan, plaintiffs executed in favor of
considered as personal.[18] After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently defendant on the aforesaid date a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the following
estopped from claiming otherwise.Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract described properties: l. A 2-STOREY, SEMI-CONCRETE, residential building with
is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. warehouse spaces containing a total floor area of 263 sq. meters, more or less,
generally constructed of mixed hard wood and concrete materials, under a roofing of
Davao Sawmill vs Castillo cor. g. i. sheets; declared and assessed in the name of FERNANDO MAGCALE under
Facts: The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the Tax Declaration No. 21109, issued by the Assessor of Olongapo City with an
Government of the Philippine Islands. It has operated a sawmill in the sitio of Maa, assessed value of P35,290.00. This building is the only improvement of the lot. 2. THE
barrio of Tigatu, municipality of Davao, Province of Davao. However, the land upon PROPERTY hereby conveyed by way of MORTGAGE includes the right of occupancy
which the business was conducted belonged to another person. On the land the on the lot where the above property is erected On April 24, 1973, the Secretary of
sawmill company erected a building which housed the machinery used by it. Some of Agriculture issued Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 4776 over the parcel of land,
the implements thus used were clearly personal property, the conflict concerning possessory rights over which were mortgaged to defendant Prudential Bank, in favor
of plaintiffs. On the basis of the aforesaid Patent, and upon its transcription in the We hold that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station
Registration Book of the Province of Zambales, Original Certificate of Title No. P-2554 building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which
was issued in the name of Plaintiff Fernando Magcale, by the Ex-Oficio Register of fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas
Deeds of Zambales, on May 15, 1972. For failure of plaintiffs to pay their obligation to station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the
defendant Bank after it became due, and upon application of said defendant, the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within
deeds of Real Estate Mortgage (Exhibits "A" and "B") were extrajudicially foreclosed. the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code. Caltex invokes
Consequent to the foreclosure was the sale of the properties therein mortgaged to the rule that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when
defendant as the highest bidder in a public auction sale conducted by the defendant placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant but not when so placed by a
City Sheriff on April 12, 1978 (Exhibit "E"). The auction sale aforesaid was held tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such
despite written request from plaintiffs through counsel dated March 29, 1978, for the person acted as the agent of the owner (Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo, 61 Phil 709).
defendant City Sheriff to desist from going with the scheduled public auction sale Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some purposes
(Exhibit "D")." (Decision, Civil Case No. 2443-0, Rollo, pp. 29-31). Respondent Court, they might be considered personalty (84 C.J.S. 181-2, Notes 40 and 41). "It is a
in a Decision dated November 3, 1978 declared the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage as familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of taxation
null and void. Issue: WON the deed of Real Estate Mortgage is valid? Held: In the which on general principle might be considered personal property" (Standard Oil Co.
enumeration of properties under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, this of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, 633).
Court ruled that, "it is obvious that the inclusion of "building" separate and distinct from
the land, in said provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an Benguet Corporation vs Central Board of Assessment
immovable property." (Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr., et al., L-10817-18, Feb. 28, 1958; Facts: The realty tax assessment involved in this case amounts to P11,319,304.00. It
Associated Inc. and Surety Co., Inc. vs. Iya, et al., L-10837-38, May 30,1958). Thus, has been imposed on the petitioner's tailings dam and the land thereunder over its
while it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of protest. The controversy arose in 1985 when the Provincial Assessor of Zambales
stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be assessed the said properties as taxable improvements. The assessment was
mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the Province of Zambales. On
still a real estate mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable August 24, 1988, the appeal was dismissed mainly on the ground of the petitioner's
property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land (Leung Yee vs. Strong "failure to pay the realty taxes that fell due during the pendency of the appeal." The
Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644). In the same manner, this Court has also established that petitioner seasonably elevated the matter to the Central Board of Assessment
possessory rights over said properties before title is vested on the grantee, may be Appeals, 1one of the herein respondents. In its decision dated March 22, 1990, the
validly transferred or conveyed as in a deed of mortgage (Vda. de Bautista vs. Board reversed the dismissal of the appeal but, on the merits, agreed that "the tailings
Marcos, 3 SCRA 438 [1961]). dam and the lands submerged thereunder (were) subject to realty tax." This petition
for certiorari now seeks to reverse the above ruling.
Caltex vs Central Board of Assessment
Facts: This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment installed by Issue: WON tailing dams are subject to realty tax?
Caltex (Philippines) Inc. in its gas stations located on leased land. The machines and
equipment consists of underground tanks, elevated tank, elevated water tanks, water Held: The petitioner does not dispute that the tailings dam may be considered realty
tanks, gasoline pumps, computing pumps, water pumps, car washer, car hoists, truck within the meaning of Article 415. The Real Property Tax Code does not carry a
hoists, air compressors and tireflators. The said machines and equipment are loaned definition of "real property" and simply says that the realty tax is imposed on "real
by Caltex to gas station operators under an appropriate lease agreement or receipt. It property, such as lands, buildings, machinery and other improvements affixed or
is stipulated in the lease contract that the operators, upon demand, shall return to attached to real property." In the absence of such a definition, we apply Article 415 of
Caltex the machines and equipment in good condition as when received, ordinary the Civil Code From the definitions and the cases cited above, it would appear that
wear and tear excepted. The lessor of the land, where the gas station is located, does whether a structure constitutes an improvement so as to partake of the status of realty
not become the owner of the machines and equipment installed therein. Caltex retains would depend upon the degree of permanence intended in its construction and use.
the ownership thereof during the term of the lease. The city assessor of Pasay City The expression "permanent" as applied to an improvement does not imply that the
characterized the said items of gas station equipment and machinery as taxable improvement must be used perpetually but only until the purpose to which the
realty. The realty tax on said equipment amounts to P4,541.10 annually (p. 52, Rollo). principal realty is devoted has been accomplished. It is sufficient that the improvement
The city board of tax appeals ruled that they are personalty. The assessor appealed to is intended to remain as long as the land to which it is annexed is still used for the said
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Issue: WON the pieces of gas station purpose. The Court is convinced that the subject dam falls within the definition of an
equipment and machinery already enumerated are subject to realty tax? Held: Yes. "improvement" because it is permanent in character and it enhances both the value
and utility of petitioner's mine. Moreover, the immovable nature of the dam defines its participation ..."Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house
character as real property under Article 415 of the Civil Code and thus makes it as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel
taxable under Section 38 of the Real Property Tax Code. mortgage defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the house as
chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be
Tumalad vs Vicencio allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. Moreover, the subject
Facts: It appears on the records that on 1 September 1955 defendants-appellants house stood on a rented lot to which defendants-appellants merely had a temporary
executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs-appellees over their house of strong right as lessee, and although this can not in itself alone determine the status of the
materials located at No. 550 Int. 3, Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, over Lot Nos. property, it does so when combined with other factors to sustain the interpretation that
6-B and 7-B, Block No. 2554, which were being rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc. the parties, particularly the mortgagors, intended to treat the house as personalty.
The mortgage was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Manila on 2 September Finally unlike in the Iya cases, Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatre, Inc. and
1955. The herein mortgage was executed to guarantee a loan of P4,800.00 received Leung Yee vs. F. L. Strong Machinery and Williamson, wherein third persons assailed
from plaintiffs-appellees, payable within one year at 12% per annum. The mode of the validity of the chattel mortgage, it is the defendants-appellants themselves, as
payment was P150.00 monthly, starting September, 1955, up to July 1956, and the debtors-mortgagors, who are attacking the validity of the chattel mortgage in this case.
lump sum of P3,150 was payable on or before August, 1956. It was also agreed that The doctrine of estoppel therefore applies to the herein defendants-appellants, having
default in the payment of any of the amortizations, would cause the remaining unpaid treated the subject house as personalty
balance to become immediately due and Payable When defendants-appellants
defaulted in paying, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed, and on 27 March Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation vs Wearever Textile Mills Facts: It appears
1956, the house was sold at public auction pursuant to the said contract. As highest that in order to obtain financial accommodations from herein petitioner Makati Leasing
bidder, plaintiffs-appellees were issued the corresponding certificate of and Finance Corporation, the private respondent Wearever Textile Mills, Inc.,
sale. Thereafter, on 18 April 1956, plaintiffs-appellant commenced Civil Case No. discounted and assigned several receivables with the former under a Receivable
43073 in the municipal court of Manila, praying, among other things, that the house be Purchase Agreement. To secure the collection of the receivables assigned, private
vacated and its possession surrendered to them, and for defendants-appellants to pay respondent executed a Chattel Mortgage over certain raw materials inventory as well
rent of P200.00 monthly from 27 March 1956 up to the time the possession is as a machinery described as an Artos Aero Dryer Stentering Range. Upon private
surrendered.On 21 September 1956, the municipal court rendered Defendants- respondent's default, petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the
appellants, in their answers in both the municipal court and court a quo impugned the properties mortgage to it. However, the Deputy Sheriff assigned to implement the
legality of the chattel mortgage, foreclosure failed to gain entry into private respondent's premises and was not able to
effect the seizure of the aforedescribed machinery. Petitioner thereafter filed a
Issue: WON the subject matter of the mortgage is a house of strong materials, and, complaint for judicial foreclosure with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI,
being an immovable, it can only be the subject of a real estate mortgage and not a docketed as Civil Case No. 36040, the case before the lower court. Acting on
chattel mortgage? petitioner's application for replevin, the lower court issued a writ of seizure, the
enforcement of which was however subsequently restrained upon private respondent's
Held: No. Certain deviations, however, have been allowed for various reasons. In the filing of a motion for reconsideration. After several incidents, the lower court finally
case of Manarang and Manarang vs. Ofilada, this Court stated that "it is undeniable issued on February 11, 1981, an order lifting the restraining order for the enforcement
that the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which of the writ of seizure and an order to break open the premises of private respondent to
by nature would be real property", citing Standard Oil Company of New York vs. enforce said writ. The lower court reaffirmed its stand upon private respondent's filing
Jaramillo. In the latter case, the mortgagor conveyed and transferred to the mortgagee of a further motion for reconsideration. On July 13, 1981, the sheriff enforcing the
by way of mortgage "the following described personal property."The "personal seizure order, repaired to the premises of private respondent and removed the main
property" consisted of leasehold rights and a building. Again, in the case of Luna vs. drive motor of the subject machinery. The Court of Appeals, in certiorari and
Encarnacion, the subject of the contract designated as Chattel Mortgage was a house prohibition proceedings subsequently filed by herein private respondent, set aside the
of mixed materials, and this Court hold therein that it was a valid Chattel mortgage Orders of the lower court and ordered the return of the drive motor seized by the
because it was so expressly designated and specifically that the property given as sheriff pursuant to said Orders, after ruling that the machinery in suit cannot be the
security "is a house of mixed materials, which by its very nature is considered subject of replevin, much less of a chattel mortgage, because it is a real property
personal property." In the contract now before Us, the house on rented land is not only pursuant to Article 415 of the new Civil Code, the same being attached to the ground
expressly designated as Chattel Mortgage; it specifically provides that "the mortgagor by means of bolts and the only way to remove it from respondent's plant would be to
... voluntarily CEDES, SELLS and TRANSFERS by way of Chattel Mortgage the drill out or destroy the concrete floor, the reason why all that the sheriff could do to
property together with its leasehold rights over the lot on which it is constructed and enforce the writ was to take the main drive motor of said machinery. The appellate
court rejected petitioner's argument that private respondent is estopped from claiming course, judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who, on October 8, 1951,
that the machine is real property by constituting a chattel mortgage thereon. A motion bought the house at public auction held in compliance with the writ of execution issued
for reconsideration of this decision of the Court of Appeals having been denied, in said case. The corresponding definite deed of sale was issued to him on October
petitioner has brought the case to this Court for review by writ of certiorari. 22, 1952, upon expiration of the period of redemption. When Evangelista sought to
take possession of the house, Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the ground that he
Issue: WON the machinery in suit is real or personal property? had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. respondent herein
and that the latter is now the true owner of said property. Hence, on June 13, 1953,
Held: Tumalad case, may be considered as personal property for purposes of Evangelista instituted the present action against respondent and Ricardo Rivera, for
executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree the purpose of establishing his (Evangelista) title over said house, securing
and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason possession thereof, apart from recovering damages. After due trial, the Court of First
why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by Instance of Manila rendered judgment for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and
destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because respondent to deliver the house in question to petitioner herein and to pay him, jointly
one who has so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel and severally, forty pesos (P40.00) a month from October, 1952, until said delivery,
mortgage. It must be pointed out that the characterization of the subject machinery as plus costs. On appeal taken by respondent, this decision was reversed by the Court of
chattel by the private respondent is indicative of intention and impresses upon the Appeals, which absolved said respondent from the complaint, upon the ground that,
property the character determined by the parties. As stated in Standard Oil Co. of New although the writ of attachment in favor of Evangelista had been filed with the Register
York v. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, it is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by of Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in favor of respondent, Evangelista did not acquire
agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property, as thereby a preferential lien, the attachment having been levied as if the house in
long as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby. Private respondent question were immovable property, although in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, it
contends that estoppel cannot apply against it because it had never represented nor is "ostensibly a personal property." Evangelista now seeks a review, by certiorari, of
agreed that the machinery in suit be considered as personal property but was merely this decision of the Court of Appeals. In this connection, it is not disputed that although
required and dictated on by herein petitioner to sign a printed form of chattel mortgage the sale to the respondent preceded that made to Evangelists, the latter would have a
which was in a blank form at the time of signing. This contention lacks better right if the writ of attachment, issued in his favor before the sale to the
persuasiveness. As aptly pointed out by petitioner and not denied by the respondent, respondent, had been properly executed or enforced.
the status of the subject machinery as movable or immovable was never placed in
issue before the lower court and the Court of Appeals except in a supplemental Issue: whether a house, constructed the lessee of the land on which it is built, should
memorandum in support of the petition filed in the appellate court. Moreover, even be dealt with, for purpose, of attachment, as immovable property, or as personal
granting that the charge is true, such fact alone does not render a contract void ab property?
initio, but can only be a ground for rendering said contract voidable, or annullable
pursuant to Article 1390 of the new Civil Code, by a proper action in court. There is Held: It is, our considered opinion that said house is not personal property, much less
nothing on record to show that the mortgage has been annulled. Neither is it disclosed a debt, credit or other personal property not capable of manual delivery, but
that steps were taken to nullify the same. On the other hand, as pointed out by immovable property. As explicitly held, in Laddera vs. Hodges (48 Off. Gaz., 5374), "a
petitioner and again not refuted by respondent, the latter has indubitably benefited true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property,
from said contract. Equity dictates that one should not benefit at the expense of whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by usufructuary or lessee. This is the
another. Private respondent could not now therefore, be allowed to impugn the doctrine of our Supreme Court in Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Company, 37 Phil.,
efficacy of the chattel mortgage after it has benefited therefrom, the Tumalad case 644. And it is amply supported by the rulings of the French Court. . . ." It is true that
bears more nearly perfect parity with the instant case to be the more controlling the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal
jurisprudential authority. property for purposes of said contract (Luna vs. Encarnacion, Off. Gaz., 2664;
Standard Oil Co. of New York vs.Jaramillo, 44 Phil., 630; De Jesus vs. Juan Dee Co.,
Santos Evangelista vs Alto Surety and Insurance Company Inc., 72 Phil., 464). However, this view is good only insofar as the contracting
parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel. Neither this
Facts: Briefly, the facts are: On June 4, 1949, petitioner herein, Santos Evangelista, principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers to said contract. Much less is it in
instituted Civil Case for a sum of money. On the same date, he obtained a writ of point where there has been no contract whatsoever, with respect to the status of the
attachment, which levied upon a house, built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila house involved, as in the case at bar.
and leased to him, by filing copy of said writ and the corresponding notice of
attachment with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila, on June 8, 1949. In due
Tsai vs CA personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment
Facts: Respondent Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (Evertex) obtained two loans from petitioner of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at bar. In
Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom). As security for the first loan, Evertex the instant case, the parties herein: (1) executed a contract styled as "Real Estate
executed a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage," instead of just "Real Estate Mortgage" if indeed their
and the chattels located therein as enumerated in a schedule attached to the intention is to treat all properties included therein as immovable, and (2) attached to
mortgage contract. The second loan was secured by a chattel mortgage over personal the said contract a separate "LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT." These facts,
properties enumerated in a list attached thereto. Due to business reverses, Evertex taken together, evince the conclusion that the parties' intention is to treat these units of
filed insolvency proceeding, where it was declared insolvent by the then Court of First machinery as chattels. A fortiori, the contested after-acquired properties, which are of
Instance. All its assets were taken into the custody of the insolvency court, including the same description as the units enumerated under the title "LIST OF MACHINERIES
the collateral, real and personal, securing the two mortgages. Upon Evertex's failure to & EQUIPMENT," must also be treated as chattels.
meet its obligation to PBCom, the latter commenced extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings. PBCom was the highest bidder on the two public auctions held. PBCom Burgos vs Chief of Staff
consolidated its ownership over the lot and all the properties in it. It leased the entire
factory premises to petitioner Ruby L. Tsai, and subsequently sold it to her, including Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
the contested machineries. Evertex filed a complaint for annulment of sale, preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search
reconveyance, and damages with the Regional Trial Court against PBCom, alleging warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao,
that the extrajudicial foreclosure of subject mortgage was in violation of the Insolvency Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under
Law. Evertex claimed that PBCom, without any legal or factual basis, appropriated the which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units
contested properties, which were not included in the real and chattel mortgage and C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
neither were those properties included in the notice of sheriff's sale. The RTC agreed "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and
with Evertex and ruled that the lease and sale of said personal properties were office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other
irregular and illegal. Dissatisfied, both PBCom and Tsai appealed to articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as
the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the judgment appealed from and denied well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be
the motion for reconsideration. PBCom and Tsai filed their separate petitions for in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We
review with the Supreme Court. Forum" newspaper, were seized. Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles,
Issue: DID THE COURT OF APPEALS VALIDLY DECREE THE MACHINERIES and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security
LISTED UNDER PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE COMPLAINT BELOW AS PERSONAL Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their
PROPERTY OUTSIDE OF THE 1975 DEED OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE AND representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be
EXCLUDED THEM FROM THE REAL PROPERTY EXTRAJUDICIALLY enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner
FORECLOSED BY PBCOM DESPITE THE PROVISION IN THE 1975 DEED THAT Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case.
ALL AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTIES DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE
MORTGAGE SHALL FORM PART THEREOF, AND DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED Issue: WoN the said equipments are personal property?
FACT THAT SAID MACHINERIES ARE BIG AND HEAVY, BOLTED OR CEMENTED
ON THE REAL PROPERTY MORTGAGED BY EVER TEXTILE MILLS TO PBCOM, Held: Under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptacles.
AND WERE ASSESSED FOR REAL ESTATE TAX PURPOSES? (WoN the instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
properties are to be considered as personal property?) works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable
Held: Yes. While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a property . In Davao Sawmill Co. vs. Castillo (61 Phil. 709) where this legal provision
perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes
gives us a contrary indication. In the case at bar, both the trial and the appellate courts immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so
reached the same finding that the true intention of PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary
is to treat machinery and equipment as chattels. Too, assuming arguendo that the right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar,
properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties from petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel. As far machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in
back as Navarro v. Pineda, 9 SCRA 631 (1963), an immovable may be considered a
fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a demanded by him constituted a preferred lien over the properties of the obligors; that
search warrant. the surety company was guilty of negligence when it failed to present an opposition to
the application for registration of the property; and that if any annotation of the rights
Lopez vs Orosa and interest of said surety would ever be made, same must be subject to the lien in his
Facts: Enrique Lopez is a resident of Balayan, Batangas, doing business under the favor.
trade name of Lopez-Castelo Sawmill. Sometime in May, 1946, Vicente Orosa, Jr.,
also a resident of the same province, dropped at Lopez' house and invited him to Issue: WoN the said property is to be considered personal property?
make an investment in the theatre business. It was intimated that Orosa, his family
and close friends were organizing a corporation to be known as Plaza Theatre, Inc., Held: No. the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the
that would engage in such venture. Pursuant to said verbal enumeration of what may constitute real properties could mean only one thing that a
agreement, Lopez delivered the lumber which was used for the construction of the building is by itself an immovable property, a doctrine already pronounced by this
Plaza Theatre on May 17, 1946, up to December 4 of the same year. But of the total Court in the case of Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644. Moreover,
cost of the materials amounting to P62,255.85, Lopez was paid only P20,848.50, thus and in view of the absence of any specific provision of law to the contrary, a building is
leaving a balance of P41,771.35. We may state at this juncture that the Plaza Theatre an immovable property, irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on
was erected on a piece of land with an area of 679.17 square meters formerly owned which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. A close examination of the provision
by Vicente Orosa, Jr., and was acquired by the corporation on September 25, 1946, of the Civil Code invoked by appellant reveals that the law gives preference to
for P6,000. As Lopez was pressing Orosa for payment of the remaining unpaid unregistered refectionary credits only with respect to the real estate upon which the
obligation, the latter and Belarmino Rustia, the president of the corporation, promised refection or work was made. This being so, the inevitable conclusion must be that the
to obtain a bank loan by mortgaging the properties of the Plaza Theatre, Inc., out of lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or
which said amount of P41,771.35 would be satisfied, to which assurance Lopez had to repair of which the obligation was incurred. Evidently, therefore, the lien in favor of
accede. Unknown to him, however, as early as November, 1946, the corporation appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the building
already got a loan for P30,000 from the Philippine National Bank with the Luzon attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the obligors.
Surety Company as surety, and the corporation in turn executed a mortgage on the
land and building in favor of said company as counter-security. Persistent demand Yap vs Tanada
from Lopez for the payment of the amount due him caused Vicente Orosa, Jr. to Facts: The case began in the City Court of Cebu with the filing by Goulds Pumps
execute on March 17, 1947, an alleged "deed of assignment" of his 420 shares of International (Phil.), Inc. of a complaint against Yap and his wife seeking recovery of
stock of the Plaza Theater, Inc., at P100 per share or with a total value of P42,000 in P1,459.30 representing the balance of the price and installation cost of a water pump
favor of the creditor, and as the obligation still remained unsettled, Lopez filed on in the latter's premises. Yap appealed to the Court of First Instance. Goulds
November 12, 1947, a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Civil presented evidence ex parte and judgment by default was rendered the following day
Case No. 4501 which later became R-57) against Vicente Orosa Jr. and Plaza by Judge Taada requiring Yap to pay to Goulds (1) Pl,459.30 representing the unpaid
Theatre, Inc., praying that defendants be sentenced to pay him jointly and severally balance of the pump purchased by him; (2) interest. On September 16, 1969 Yap filed
the sum of P41,771.35 with legal interest from the filing of the action; that in case a motion for reconsideration. On October 15, 1969 Judge Taada issued an Order
defendants fail to pay the same, that the building and the land covered by OCT No. O- granting Goulds' Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution dated October 14, 1969,
391 owned by the corporation be sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof be declaring the reasons therein alleged to be meritorious. Yap forthwith filed an "Urgent
applied to said indebtedness; or that the 420 shares of the capital stock of the Plaza Motion for Reconsideration of Order" dated October 17, 1969, 13 contending that
Theatre, Inc., assigned by Vicente Orosa, Jr., to said plaintiff be sold at public auction the judgment had not yet become final, since contrary to Goulds' view, his motion for
for the same purpose; and for such other remedies as may be warranted by the reconsideration was not pro forma for lack of an affidavit of merit, this not being
circumstances. Plaintiff also caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on said required under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court upon which his motion
properties with the Register of Deeds. The surety company, in the meantime, upon was grounded. 2) "the sale was made without the notice required by Sec. 18, Rule 39,
discovery that the land was already registered under the Torrens System and that of the New Rules of Court," i.e., notice by publication in case of execution sale of real
there was a notice of lis pendens thereon, filed on August 17, 1948, or within the 1- property, the pump and its accessories being immovable because attached to the
year period after the issuance of the certificate of title, a petition for review of the ground with character of permanency (Art. 415, Civil Code). In the meantime the
decree of the land registration court dated October 18, 1947, which was made the Sheriff levied on the water pump in question, and by notice dated November 4, 1969,
basis of OCT No. 0-319, in order to annotate the lights and interests of the surety scheduled the execution sale thereof on November 14, 1969. But in view of the
company over said properties (Land Registration Case No. 17 GLRO Rec. No. 296). pendency of Yap's motion for reconsideration of October 29, 1969, suspension of the
Opposition thereto was offered by Enrique Lopez, asserting that the amount sale was directed by Judge Taada in an order dated November 6, 1969. Judge
Taada thereafter promulgated another Order dated September 21, 1970 granting a to their former position and condition (letter, Apendix 4). On March 24, 1953, the
motion of Goulds for completion of execution of the judgment of August 29, 1969. Provincial Sheriff filed an urgent motion in court, manifesting that Roco had been
Once more, Yap sought reconsideration. He submitted a "Motion for Reconsideration asked to furnish the Sheriff's office with expenses, laborers, technical men and
of Two Orders" On December 3, 1970, Yap filed a "Notice of Appeal" equipments, to carry into effect the court's order, to return the seized properties in the
same way said Roco found them on the day of seizure, but said Roco absolutely
Issue: WoN the property has been converted into a real property? refused to do so, and asking the court that the Plaintiff therein be ordered to provide
the required aid or relieve the said Sheriff of the duty of complying with the said order
Held: No. Yap's next argument that the water pump had become immovable property of March 20, 1953 (Appendix 5). On March 30, 1953, the trial court ordered the
by its being installed in his residence is also untenable. The Civil Code considers as Provincial Sheriff and the Plaintiff to reinstate the machineries and equipments
immovable property, among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed removed by them in their original condition in which they were found before their
manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the removal at the expense of the Plaintiff (Appendix 7). on May 4, 1953, the trial court
material or deterioration of the object." The pump does not fit this description. It could ordered the Plaintiff therein to furnish the Provincial Sheriff within 5 days with the
be, and was in fact separated from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering necessary funds, technical men, laborers, equipments and materials to effect the
deterioration. Obviously the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more repeatedly mentioned re-installation (Appendix 13)." (Petitioner's brief, Appendix A,
complicated than the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners. pp. I-IV.)

Machineries and Engineering Supplies Inc. vs CA Issue: When does machineries considered to be immovable? (are the machineries in
Facts: On March 13, 1953, the herein petitioner filed a complaint for replevin for the the case immovable)
recovery of the machineries and equipments sold and delivered to said defendants at
their factory in barrio Bigti, Norzagaray, Bulacan. respondent judge issued an order, Held: Yes. The machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the
commanding the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan to seize and take immediate possession land, particularly to the concrete foundation of a building, in a fixed manner, in such a
of the properties specified in the order (Appendix I, Answer). On March 19, 1953, two way that the former could not be separated from the latter without breaking the
deputy sheriffs of Bulacan, the said Ramon S. Roco, and a crew of technical men and material or deterioration of the object. Hence, in order to remove said outfit, it became
laborers proceeded to Bigti, for the purpose of carrying the court's order into effect. necessary not only to unbolt the same, but to also cut some of its wooden supports.
Leonardo Contreras, Manager of the respondent Company, and Pedro Torres, in Said machinery and equipment were "intended by the owner of the tenement for an
charge thereof, met the deputy sheriffs, and Contreras handed to them a letter industry" carried on said immovable and tended "directly to meet the needs of said
addressed to Atty. Leopoldo C. Palad, ex-officio Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, signed industry." For these reasons, they were already immovable pursuant to paragraph 3
by Atty. Adolfo Garcia of the defendants therein, protesting against the seizure of the and 5 of Article 415 of Civil Code of the Philippines.
properties in question, on the ground that they are not personal properties.
Contending that the Sheriff's duty is merely ministerial, the deputy sheriffs, Roco, the
letter's crew of technicians and laborers, Contreras and Torres went to the factory.
Roco's attention was called to the fact that the equipments could not possibly be
dismantled without causing damages or injuries to the wooden frames attached to
them. As Roco insisted in dismantling the equipments on his own responsibility,
alleging that the bond was posted for such eventuality, the deputy sheriffs directed
that some of the supports thereof be cut (Appendix 2). On March 20, 1953, the
defendant Company filed an urgent motion, with a counter-bond in the amount of
P15,769, for the return of the properties seized by the deputy sheriffs. On the same
day, the trial court issued an order, directing the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan to return
the machineries and equipments to the place where they were installed at the time of
the seizure (Appendix 3). On March 21, 1953, the deputy sheriffs returned the
properties seized, by depositing them along the road, near the quarry, of the
defendant Company, at Bigti, without the benefit of inventory and without re-installing
them in their former position and replacing the destroyed posts, which rendered their
use impracticable. On March 23, 1953, the defendants' counsel asked the Provincial
Sheriff if the machineries and equipments, dumped on the road would he re-installed

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