Salazar v.

People (2002)
GR No. 149472
October 15, 2002

FACTS:
In an information dated January 21, 1987, petitioner Jorge Salazar was charged with estafa under
Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the charge.

Skiva Inc. is a New York-based corporation which imports clothes from the Philippines through
its buying agent from the Philippines, Olivier Inc.; Aurora Corp and Uni-Group Inc. are
domestic corporations which supply finished clothes to Skiva.

Mr. Werner Lettmayr is the President of both Aurora and Uni-Group while the petitioner, Jorge
Salazar, is the Vice-President and Treasurer of Uni-Group and a consultant of Aurora.

Skiva, through its buying agent, Olivier, has been purchasing finished clothes from Aurora and
Uni-Group. When an order is procured for the delivery of clothes, Olivier, issues to the local
supplier, Aurora/Uni-Group, a "Purchase Contract" and Olivier issues to Skiva a "Sales Contract".
In these transactions, payment is usually made by way of a letter of credit wherein the supplier is
paid only upon the presentation of the proper shipping documents to the designated bank.

Skiva informed Olivier that it needs ladies jeans to be delivered sometime in January 1986. Olivier,
in turn, through its Officer-in-Charge, Ms. Teresita Tujan, contacted Aurora and Uni-Group to
supply the jeans.

On January 7, 1986, the parties agreed that Skiva will advance to Aurora/Uni-Group the amount
of US$41,300 as Aurora/Uni-Group did not have sufficient funds to secure raw materials to
manufacture the jeans. It was also agreed that the amount advanced by Skiva represents advance
payment of its order of 700 dozens of ladies jeans.

Skiva then issued a check in the said amount payable to Uni-Group. However, due to the length of
time needed for the check to be cleared, the parties made arrangements to remit the funds instead
by way of telegraphic transfer. Thus, the check issued by Skiva was returned by Mr. Lettmayr and
as agreed, the funds were remitted by Skiva from its bank in New York, the Israel Discount Bank,
to the joint account of Mr. and Mrs. Jorge Salazar and Mr. and Mrs. Werner Lettmayr at Citibank
N.A.

Petitioner, who had possession and control of the passbook of the said joint account, withdrew
money. In the meantime, Ms. Tujan contacted Aurora/Uni-Group to follow up on the production
of the jeans. Upon inquiry with Mr. Lettmayr, the latter advised Ms. Tujan that the query be
directed to petitioner as petitioner is in charge of securing the materials. However, Ms. Tujan could
not locate the petitioner.

Consequently, in a letter, demand was made upon Aurora/Uni-Group through its President, Mr.
Lettmayr, to return the money advanced in the amount of US$41,300.00.
For failure of Aurora/Uni-Group to deliver the ladies jeans or to account for the US$41,300.00
despite demand, Skiva, through its local agent represented by Ms. Tujan, filed a criminal complaint
for estafa against Mr. Lettmayr and petitioner. After preliminary investigation, the Public
Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Mr. Lettmayr and an information was filed against
petitioner.

Lower Court Ruling: convicted

The lower court convicted herein the petitioner of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code. The lower court denied petitioners MR.

CA Ruling: affirmed decision of the lower court

On appeal, it affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and denied petitioners MR.

Petitioner argues that consistent with the ruling of the lower court that Aurora is the owner of the
sum remitted as advance payment, petitioner had the obligation to account for the proceeds thereof
to Aurora and not to Skiva. Thus, petitioner maintains that a conviction for estafa will not hold as
no damage to Aurora was alleged in the information nor did the prosecution present any proof of
damage to Aurora.

Petitioner likewise maintains that Skiva has no authority to institute the present action as estafa
was not committed against Skiva but against Aurora/Uni-Group on the basis of the finding that the
transaction between Skiva and Aurora/Uni-Group was one of sale.

Thus, petitioner argues that pursuant to SECTION 3, RULE 110 OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, the complaint should not have been instituted by Skiva as it is not the "offended
party" contemplated by the Rules and petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva the proceeds
of the amount withdrawn from the joint account.

ISSUE: WON Skiva has the authority to institute the crime of estafa YES

HELD:
As held in the case of First Producers Holdings Corporation v. Co, in estafa, the person prejudiced
or the immediate victim of the fraud need not be the owner of the goods misappropriated. Thus,
Article 315 of the RPC provides that "any person who shall defraud another by any means
mentioned [in Article 315]" may be held liable for estafa.

The use by the law of the word "another" instead of the word "owner" means that as an element of
the offense, loss should have fallen upon someone other than the perpetrator of the crime. Thus,
the finding of the trial court that Skiva, the party prejudiced, is not the owner of the sum
misappropriated will not nullify the conviction of the petitioner.

The "complaint" referred to in RULE 110 contemplates one that is filed in court to commence a
criminal action in those cases where a complaint of the offended party is required by law, instead
of an information which is generally filed by a fiscal. It is not necessary that the proper "offended
party" file a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that
unless the offense subject of the complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any
competent person may file a complaint for preliminary investigation.

Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information, both of

which are filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the
offended party and in case of an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a
"complaint" filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person. Thus, in the
case at bar, the complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of the lower court that
petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.