G.R. NO.
142509 March 24, 2006 minimum, to Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10) Days, as maximum;
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ, Respondents.
Facts
On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. Jose J. Pieraz
(Atty. Pieraz), retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The
letter was open, not contained in an envelope.
In the letter Atty. Pieraz was called stupid and his language as [E]nglish
carabao by the letter sender, Buatis Jr., and even put Yours in Satan name and
his signature on the closing part.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., Atty. Pieraz filed
a complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its
contents came to the knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as
well and they all chided him telling him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."
The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial.
According to him, it was at the behest of the president of the organization
"Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan" or NASATAMA, and of a
member, Teresita Quingco, that he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a
comment to the letter of private-complainant in the second week of August 1995.
Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had signed
that letter-comment or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither could he
remember if he had made and sent another letter, this time dated August 24,
1995, to Atty. Pieraz.
RTC found him guilty of the crime of LIBEL defined in Art. 353 and
penalized under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day, as
to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P20,000.00, by way of
compensatory damages; the amount of P10,000.00, as and for moral damages,
and another amount of P10,000.00, for exemplary damages; to suffer all
accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTCs decision to the CA which, in
a Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its entirety the decision of the trial
court.
Issue: The principal issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner is guilty of
the crime of libel.
Ruling: Yes. He is guilty of the crime of libel
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a)
it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and
(d) the victim must be identifiable.8
The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution.
There is publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the
defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person
against whom it has been written.9 Petitioners subject letter-reply itself states
that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated
the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of
has communicated it to a third person.10 Furthermore, the letter, when found in
the mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
 The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply
was addressed to respondent himself.
It is order then to resolve the issues raised by petitioner as to whether the
imputation is defamatory and malicious.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to
be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading
them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to
be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes,12 to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the
court had the following to say on this point: "In determining whether the specified
matter is libelous per se, two rules of construction are conspicuously applicable:
(1) That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a
meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the
public would naturally understand what was uttered. (2) The published matter
alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole."
Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the letter
dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using
words such as "lousy", "inutile", "carabao English", "stupidity", and "satan", the
letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation
of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No
evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of
petitioner have caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have
told him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."14
prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for
the law already presumes that petitioners imputation is malicious (malice in
law).15 A reading of petitioners subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently
castigated respondent for writing such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There
was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioners good intention and
justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference of
malice.
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means of writings
or similar means with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or
a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action
which may be brought by the offended party.
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single
penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a
penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.
SC Ruling: the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed
upon the petitioner shall be a fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The award of compensatory
damages is DELETED.

Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under

the general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
Facts
Due to a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged
before the MeTC of Pasig, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal
Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and
damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing
him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Petitioner also sought
from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366,
including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a
prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded
with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and
ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until
after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the
RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to maintain
the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
RTC: In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803,
narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain
S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing.
Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
(1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the
MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366
(2) if in the negative, whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Ruling:
(1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366
did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803
(2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from
prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense
bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or
violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of
Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon
motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of
Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to
review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due
Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis
under procedural rules and jurisprudence.
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes
more evident when one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant
who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence merely
renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation
should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant
retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and
could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-
appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a
fugitive without standing.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-
conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed that
petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question
whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense."
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. (See Article 365)
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-
groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of
"imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme
for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for
trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of
"reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8).
Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind
the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible," unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act.
These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them
apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are
distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework
of our penal laws, is nothing new.
 Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-
offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this
Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article
365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same
accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first
prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the
same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior
conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for
the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges,
the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative.
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC
succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize
conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on
complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a
procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2)
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature
crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving
multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most
serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a
felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the
resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime
resulting in one or more consequences.
By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of
the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of
constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention
that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, SC hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from
a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In
imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in
the same first level court.
The ruling secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a
stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-
crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft
Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so
that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of
all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This
will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a
lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
SC GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner is Dismissed.