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BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

AS PRESENTED BY

JAYANTA BHATTA.
111.0. Definitio n o f Pramka according t o Buddhists philosophy
According t o t h e Budd.hists t h e d e f i n i t i o n of pramana

- e

is: a cognitio n which i s n o t contradicte d and which leads t o


t h e obtainment of t h e o b j e c t , i s a v a l i d cognition. 1 Its

c a p a c i t y t o lea d t o o r i g i n a l obtainment c o n s i s t s i n this t h a t


it p o i n t s o u t t ot h e objec t a s t h e aim of purposive action
i n t h e form ~f obtaining and giving up a? object which
causes ha23iness 2 i . e . when w? proceed t o a c t
o r so-row,
with reference t o o b j e c t p o i n t ~ dou t b y th e c ~ z n i t i o n ,it,
is 3
obtained .
The known a t t a i n s t h e objec t bu t t h e p e o ~ l ethink t h a t

th e means o f proof causes him t o a t t a i n it because it shows


t h e o b j e c t t o him. For instance , t h e peogle say t h a t he

robs, a man o f h i s property through h i s s o l d i e r s a c t u a l l y do


th e a c t o f h i s instance . Here a means of knowledge v i r t u a l l y
Point s out t o the p o a s t b l e attainment of the ob3ects an d thus
becomes responsible f o r it . So it i s a means of 4
knowledge.
The two p r a m h s i.e, perception and inference accepted by
. .-
the Buddhists ,have the capacit y t o lea d t o the attainment
4AL-e
Of the obJect and hence they a r e v a l i d e 5 I n both cases
i a i-rect. Even t h e perception I s about unique
indiei~mlthiag which i s momentary and therefore, cannot be
a t t a i n e d , b u tt h e s e r i e s of t h e t h i n g i s obtained, and there -
f o r e , i n f a c t t h e P e r c e p t i o n Can give r i s e t o a determination
about t h e s e r i e s i n i t s capacity t o lead t o a t t a i n l e n t . 6
I n t h e case of i n f e r e n c e , t5ough i t s object i s always

a c r e a t u r e of imagination being bzsed upon t h e solid rock of

t h e unbroken succession of r e a l o b j e c t s , s m5n a t t a i n s a


r e a l o b j e c t under t h e guidance o< a:- i n f e r e n t i a l knowledge. 7

L e t us c i t e an e x z q l e t o c l a r i f y t h i s . A mnn sees t h e
l u s t e r o f t h e jewel a t a d i s t a n c e and mistakes it for t h s
jewel. If he procee?s t o a c t wit", ~ f e r e n c et o the su7,~os?d
jewel, h e g e t s t h e r e a l jewel. Likewise, 2 Isn yroceedin;:
t o g z t h o l d of imaginary o b j e c t under t h e dir:jction of

i n f e r e n c e a t t a i n s a r e a l o b j e c t . Thougl-I the object of


determinate knowledge i s u n r e a l , y e tt h e source of imngi-
n a t i o n being r e a l , t h e r e a l o b j e c t a t t a i n e d through it.
Jayanta concludes t h e d e f i n i t i o n of
.
Pramha according

t o Buddhists as: a v a l i d means knowledge leads t o t h e attain-


ment.02 the obdect which it i s determined t o be,8 and so
-
.* 9
i l l u s o r y c o g n i t i o n s are d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m v a l i d c o g n i t i o n !
Themfore a judgement such as t h e conch-shell is yellow, etc .
i s n o t t m e though a man vho proceeds t o a t t a i n the object

Nferred t o by the above i l l u e a r y jud~ement c e t s conch-shell


s i n c e h e does n o t a t t : i i n ti.& ,;_I,: .:t r i , ; . i . ; I 'b~:~tj?:~?
ju.';;einent. The Zudge nen t; rr!vco "i s: y e l l o w cv.nr,.! -shell
but a white conch-shell 10
is attsinrb.
Therefore a v a l i d means of Bulowle:dg~ i s that whlch i s

not c o n t r a d i c t e d and wkiich leads to the atitait~~n#:ntof t h e


o b j e c t revealed by t h e 11
apprehension,

According t o the BuEdhist t h e number of means o f


v a l i d knowledge a r e two. l 2 They s t a t e that t h e r e a r e only
%wo types of knowlable objects, nlrnely, perceptible or
p a r t i c u l a r and imperceptiable o r universal. l 3 These types
of o b j e c t s mutually exclude each o t h e r , s o , they maintain
that a t h i d t y p e of o b j e c t i s not possible . '4 Each being
the negation of t h e o t h e r they exhaust the whole u n i v e r s a l
and exclude the middle.

To t h e question how does one .know t h e non-exist,ence


of the t h i r d t y p e , l 5 They answer: That i s because of the
4

m e r i t of t h e perception . I b Perce,,tion which is din - >cted


t o w a r d s a blue o b j e c t grasps it r?s : i blue o ~ j e c ta n d ~vhicI\

is not oirr.cted by it i:: ;inc)n-b?u.> nt);jr?c-I;. 17


Thes i s no such object, a s is n e i t h z r . n l , ~ ~ nor non-
'blue. P e r c e p t i o n d e t e r r n i n . 3 ~i t s own o b j e c t , excludes i t s
o;m o b j e c t , e x c l u a e s i t s n zgztive alci FIJ -,.t:;+h? rib:a nct3
of lij
t h i rci k i n d .
If wz do n o t a c c e p t t h i s view, th? n r 2 c t i c : i i utility

o f knorvledge w i l l be notctin,;, b:-cause :.re a r e n o t 23le t o


nave an o b j e c t as a b t a i n ~ b l ei n l e s s tlrn know rhst it i s other
than ?voidable.
Ir, i s f u r t h e r st?teC! by t h e
31~d," .L-L+ ---
-'2 ..a th?t,
?A?

r ~ e r c e p t i o ne s t a b l i s h e s i t s ovm o b j e c t 2 - d i r e c t l y n c r c ? i v e d ,
e x c l u d e s t h e o b i s c t which does n o t b ? c o ~ em,mife::t i n that
i j e r c e p t i o n , and proves it t o be i n d i : - e c t l y c o ~ n i s n ~ l and-e
3.150 sug;;l:,estst h e i m ? o s s i b i l i t y o f a t h i r d c z t ? a o r y o f ob3ect .
A s i n g l e means of knowledge t h u s functions in three 19
ways.
T h e r e f o r e a c c o r d i n g t h e Buddhists all three functions

of i are essential priorities for the definite


a Pramana
-c

knowledge o f a n o b j e c t , because, they further state that


if t h e n a t u r e of an o b j e c t i s n o t a s c e r t a i n e d i n t h i s manner,
it i s i m p o s s i b l e t o u s e i t h e r t o a c c e p t o r t o r e f u s e a
p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i n view o f i t s 20
practical utility.
Even i n f e r e n c e proves only two c a t e g o r i e s o f t h e
knowable. C f the two 373351:+7 hen 9115 j . ~;?sr~rtc.?.!2t:-;,3
n e g a t i o n of he," ot!~?lsri s ncz~cesszril . r?cognised bccaus? o f

their op3osition. I t i s aZso n q t necec.:ary t o zip ,rehc?nr!


s e ? ~ r : t e l y t h a t soxethin: i s 0?7~:;,.cll t o 9,_ri;ic:~l. t h i nc.
That which i s n o t a??rehended on tb.? s i t u ~ e i o no f t h e ap?rc-

nension o f one i s o - ) p o s e 3 t o t:2e 21 T h i s 1s :~nou+


0bj1;ct.
g r o ~ n l - t: oprove t h z t t h e r e i s n9 t'nir:! c a t e y o r y ,b c ~ : ~ u s e
things assert their axistencc 5y t h . .. o t h : ? r s an3
d!.er?i?~i~of
t h e r e z r e only twc kin(5s of obj:cts . 22

1
i h u ~t n e t~::t;-i>lciciivi:sFgn ~f r i l l sub:?cts is

~ e r c 2 ~ t i b lr~lb.j. ; - ct, v i z . 39 exc iusivi '-1i 3 ' 3 ~ t i ~ : :'IT :33int of

23
the range o f ? e r c e p t i o n .

T h e r e f o r e Budd3ist.s conclud? t h a t , t h e r e a r e two


k i n d of knowable o b j e c t s which a r e w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d by two
k i n d s of t h e means of p r o o f .
Thus argued t h a t t h e s e are
only
two t y p e of knowable
t y p e i s d o u b t l e s st ,h e p o s s i b i l i
ty of
mean, o t h e r t h a n t ha e
third

postulate
a third type
of
24
Xotes and References

2 . a r t h e n s s a l a y a t sZm7yam sadrsyaw
.- -

szma r t h a ? a d a r t h a -.? e n t i p e r i h E r a ohGtGya3


c f . marge c e t sahaj&&IC?na h&au va bhavah kutah

- - - - -- -- -- - -- -- . -- .
sukh?--- briaveyam- dukkhi----- va- -ma bnuvamiti----- -. . ---.
trsy itah
PV-. 44. I . s l . 202.
prsptik prati
- -.-
pra'Ptirbhavat?ti pramanasya
/ .-
pradarsakatvameva vyilpdrah NM, pt. I . p . 35.
cf /

. vaktrvyZparavisayo yo 'rtho budhu p r a k a S t i


-. .- I---.---
f
--- -----
prGrn6nyam tatra sabdasya nathatatvhibandhai.
a-

-
PV. p . 3 , I. Sl* 4 ,
/
so'rthah prspito
4. p r a d a r s a y a t s -h-i. tena
bhavati ra jz~rn~j;~
yathC hartavyai- -p r a t i
dgnameva- -h a r t r t v a i , taduktam p r5pana
.' -------
- . - -
s a k t i h pm mgnyamiti. NM. p t .I. p . 35.
-* .---
5. t.- a c c a p e a k a t v a r n pratyaks5nmanayontbha
yoverpyastiti pram&asaGnya laksana6. I b i d . p. 35,
- .-. -
-0

6 . .t- a t r a pratyaksasya vastusvalaksana visa


-.
.- .- - . - I.

yatva't tasya ca ksanikatvena p ~ ~ p t y a s a & b h a v e p i


--- -
jannanameva przpakatvam. Ibid. p. 35.

vas tuksanaparamparyap rabhavatvz&anipra

.-. 0-

bhZmanibuddhivettatpEpty5-. pr*akatvarh.I b i d . 3. 35<


/
ki&idudayataaka6.

p rayogadarsangd vZt sya -yat


- P V . p . 61, I . s l . 286.
d

8. --
.--
adhyavasitaprZpakatva6 prZrnZnyam, adhya
v a s i t a s y a a v a s t u t v e ' p i Lamula - vastuprzptyg
n i r v a h a t i . NM. p t . I. p. 36.
.- --
/
9 . ~ r t a s a f i k h ~ d i ~ r a..-? l i n asa6khZdimZt'& rap 6 p t a u
0-

.-
Ibid . p. 36.
-
sstygrnapi naprKrnanyG.
----.
lo . yathii avagatasygpre teravagato
hi pitah
. pspyat Y
-
/ . 36.
sarikhah e ca sveta iti Ibid. p.
a--.
--- --- --
..
cf. 1 . -na pratyaksaproks6bhyiim meyasya nyasyasa6bhavah
..
t asmzt p rameyadvi tvena p rarnanadvi tvami s y a t e
PV. p. 77. 11. S Z , 6 3 .
-
2. dvividho -hi visayah pramznasya ?JBT. p . 70
----,A. --- . -
-. / L *.&-* - .-.-
13. v i s a y a s c a pratyaksa paroksabhedena svalaksana
p t . I . p . 43.
samanya -bhede va- dvividha z.-NPI
c f . NBT. pp. 70-71.
-
/
p t . I . p. 43
trtiyara'-yanupravesa'bhGv~tN?1..
-.
15. trtiyavisayZsatvapariccheda eva kutastya iti
.- . . -- - -
c e t ? I b i d . p . 43.
+-

c f . abhave r t h a b a l a j j a t e r a r t h a l saktyanapeksane .-
.-
vyavadhGnZdibhaf p i jayatendriya j5 matih . PV. p .78 I1
-. .. .-
-.--

. .
-..
16. pratyaksamahimna e v e t i b n h a h . NM. p t . I. p. 43
- -. -.- -
/ /
abhgve v--. i n i v r t t i s c e t pratyaksasyaiva niscayah .
.-- -. . .- . -
78, 11. sl . 67.
--PV. p .
paricchinattiti tavadavivgda --eva.NM. pt, I. p . 4
3
cf, -NBT. pp. 87-89.
,
/
18. t a d a p a k a r o t i bhiiti
trtiyamapi S s i m ada eva
- -. . - ---."-- --
t--atno c e t t a t h g-l
.

cennilameva syiirina prakar&tarantu


p t . I . p . 44.
pyanilam syana prakggntarasr h i t a t . -I.
cf. I.-Px. p . 68.11. sl. 16
/ .
2. tryekasa&khyZnir a s o VZ prameyadvayadarsangt

-
I b i d . p . 75. sl . 64 .
19. t a t p a r i c c h i n a t t --i , anyadvyavacchinatti,

.
pramEnavyZp5rah . Xi. p t . I. p . 4 4 .
-----
/
20. a n y a t h. a. v i sayasyaiva
svam-pEpariniscayKt
kvopEdZna9arityagau kuryurartha kriyzrthinah. Ibid. p.44,
- -. ..--- . "

2 1 . viruddhayorekatarapariccheda samaye
-
d- v----itI y a n i r~sanamava;~amb h a t i v i ruddhZtvZdeva
/
. - - -- ..- .- - -- - -- - -
-
sitosnavat. Ibid. p. 44.
- -
22 . t r u t i y a v i s a y o l p i --
tadviruddha eva tadbuddha - -- ---

vapratibhasa?lanatvat- .I b i d .
p 44 . .
t a t r a p- r a t y a k s e
.- - .-
.- .- tu
v-is.a-y e --pratyaksam p r a v a r t t a -te , parokse.-.--

.
sgm&y&are
'numanamiti Ibid. p 45, .
24. pramgnadvaya s i d d h e c a visayadvaya vedane.
-
-- * -. - .
-.
vadakasyanumdhena trtiYai~ G n a m-*i s y a t i h . I b i d . -"-
p . 44.
111.1 B u d e n i s t ' s d e f i n i t i o n of p e r c e p t i o n
There a r e two t r a d i t i o n s of' d e f i n i n g p e r e e - ~ t i o n , 9ne

which does n o t i n c l u d e the word non i l l u s o r y


i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n , and a n o t h e r one which incorpor2tes it.
The f i r s t t r a d i t i o n i s s t a t e d by D i h a g a , t . ? e ? i o n e e r
Buddhist l o g i c i a r l o f 5 t . c e n t u r y A.D. According t o him the

d e f i n i t i o n o f p e r c e p t i o n i s t h a t c o g n i t i o n which i s f r e e
from mental I imqgination ( ~ a l p g n a s ) .
constructions. i e. .
By Kalpana the association of the five categories such as
niimarn (name), jzti ( c l a s s ) , guna ( q u a l i t y ) , kriyZ (action)
- - .- -
and dravya job j e c t ) w i t h 2 i s understood . A knowledge
a thins,
w i t h o u t any r e f e r e n c e t o name, u n i v e r s a l , q u a l i t y , etc., is
n o t h i n g b u t t h e knowledge of .sv a l a k s a n a and t h a t i s termed
.-.-
a s n i r v i k a l p a k a-. iiere J a y a n t a
.
3 h a t t.a mentions ~ h a r m a k ~ r t i ' s
d e f i n i t i o n of p e r c e p t i o n and g i v e s an e x p o s i t i o n o f t h e
r e a s o n s f o r r e g a r d i n g d e t e r m i n a t e c o g n i t i o n a s anon - valid

cognition. According t o ~ h a r m a k z r t it h e d e f i n i t i o n of
p e r c e p t i o n i s t h a t , " t h e c o g n i t i o n which i s f r e efrom
c o n c e p t u a l c o n s t r u c t i o n and i i . l ~ s i o n . ~It i s a d i r e c t o r

immediate c o g n i t i o n because i t s o b j e c t is p r e s e n--t b e f o r e


Us d i r e c t l y and t h a t must be t a k e n as non - constructive and
non - erroneons . The meaning of t h e term k a l p a n s must be

explained here.
r>ha+rmakirti d e f i n e s kalpqna a s the "that c7gnition
t h e c.-mtr,ct o f which i s corni~etentt: be associated witil a
v e r b a l d e ~ i ~ n a t i o n And.~ verbal d e s i g n a t i o n i s t h e deno-

t a t i o n by words o f something. It i s f u r t h e r s t + % e dt h + ~at

p e r c e 2 t u a l c o g n i t i o n vinich i s f r e e fron conce??tual con-


s t r u c t i o n ( k a l p a n a j and which i s n o t i l l u s o r y i s a l o n e
a u t h o r i t a t i v e and v s l i d . Sur,'? a kinowl?dge a r i s e s avlniz?n t h e
eye f i r s t time comes i r l c o n t a c t w i t h c e r t a i n o b j e c t and is
f r e e from d e t e r m i n a t i o n . The unique indivit?ual free fros
t n i s a s s o c i a t i o n i s t h e o b j e c t o f such as v a l i d 7 e r c e p t i o n .
6

Jere in this context,


- of D n a m o t t a r a c i t e s t h a t ,
I;BT
some t i m e s i t s:3 happens t h a t even i f the o b j e c t s of percep-
tion are not accompaniedby word element, t h e y ,?T? a l s o

c a p a b l e of b e i n g accom2anied by t h a t . To c i t e an example

a baby a l t h o u g h does n o t know t h e meaning o f a word and


h i s i h e r p e r c e p t i o n i s n o t associatt?", w i t h any name, we
cannot s a y t h a t h e i s f r e e from mental construction.
S i m i l a r l y a new b o r n baby does n o t s t o p c r y i n g and does n o t
suck h i s o r h e r m o t h e r ' s b r e a s t until and u n l e s s h e o r
she r e c o g n i z e s t h e b r e a s t t h a t he ( o r ) s h e has experienced
before.
Thus " t h e a c t of r e c o s n i t i o n and nqming i n v o l v e t h e

u n i f i c a t i o n of t'ne o b j e c t s of p r e s e n t experience w i t h t h e
03j e c t o f t h e o a s t experience. So, t h a t t ~ e - ;are n o t
d i r e c t l y produced by ob j s c t s coning i n t o cont3ct w i t h t h e
p r o J e r s e n s e organs, f o r p a s t o b j e c t s can never be presented
t o t h e sense.' Hence a p e r c e , t u z l c o g n i t i o n must be f r e e

from a l l a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h names and e l a b ~ r a t i o n s . This


indeterminate perception i s v a l i d means of knowled3e; because,
i t makes known an o b j e c t a sit i s , and it i s distinguis" . led
from a c o g n i t i o n e x p r e s s e d i n v e r b a l statements; because, the
l a t t e r i s n o t a u t h o r i t a t i v ean2 v a l i d , and which i s c a l l e d as
.-
tile Determinate c o g n i t i o n
.
i e . S a v i k a l p ~ k apratyaksam:
I t may be observed that ~ : ? ? r m a k i r t ie l a b o r a t e s t h e

d e f i n i t i o n of D i h Z g a ' s ? e r c e ? t i o n by addin,.: t h e wonj abhrznta


to the definition, which is n o t a f f e c t e d by m y illusion
o r e r r o n e o u s c o g n i t i o n2roducsd o u t o f t h ecolour blindness,
r a p i d moment t r a v e l l i n g on board a ship, sickness or other
b o t h t h e words kalpanZpodharn and abhrzntarn
.'
c a u s e s So,
t a k e n t o g e t h e r c o n s t i t u t e t h e d e f i n i t i o n of p e r c e p t i o n .
Now i n t h i s c o n t e x t it i s j e n u i n e t n know t h e o b j e c t of

perception i e. . the svalaksana, the mere p a r t i c u l a r .


*-.-
It may be s t a t e d h e r e t h a t a word e x p r e s s i o n + a s always

a r e f e r e n c e t o the common, and it f u n c t i o n s i n dependence on


t h e knowledge of r e l a t i o n s . Word c a n n o t have any r e f e r e n c e
t o t h e unique p a r t i c u l a r which i s excluded from a l l the
~ a r t i c a l a r sb e l o n g i n g t o t h e same c l a s s a s ;.Is9 from
avsrythingcissimilar. ~ n a r r n o t t n r a lt~o o ?.fines ir, his

.- .-a s a n e n t i t y whiccl i s uncomnon t h e t n i n g i n


TiBT s v a l a k s a n ap-

itself. I n o t h e r words, it i s ~ e l : - d e f i n e d and t h e r e i s no


common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f it, and it i s unique individual.
F u r t h e r , ~ h a r m a k i r t ia l s o s t a t e s i n h i s iB, a b m t

.- .- -
svalaksana that it is the first percs3tual cognition, the
o b j e c t o f which i s somethin:: uncolninon. . a d f u r t h e r he

e x p l a i n s t h a t t ~ oeb j e c t grodxces a d i f f e r e n ? rnentzl i r n q ~ e


a c e o r z i n g t o t l e placement of t h e objxt. i . e . f a r -n;l n ? a r .

I f an DSj e c t i s n e a r , i t : ~ r o d u c e s 2 c l e a r c q g n i t i o n and i f
i t i s f a r i t p r o d u c e s a f a i n t l y v i s i b l e c o - ; n i t i o n , b u t above
311 t h e s e n s e g r o u p s t h e I?
easiest particular.
T h e r e f o r e u n i q u e i n d i v i d u a l i s n o t giver? t o a word

which has a l w a y s a r e f e r e n c e t o t h e conmon because of its


v e r y n a t u r e , t o e n t e r i n t o any r e l a t i o n w i t h any o t h e r t n i n g
i.e. a n o t i o n o r an e x p r e s s i v e word. There i s no o t h e r
r e a l i t y but t h e u n i q u e i n d i v i d u a l , ' ) which i s grasped by

indelerminate perception.
T h e r e f o r e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e B u d d h i s t s , it may be

o b s e r v e d on the b a s i s of t h e above d i s c u s s i o nt h a t
-- .- .- has n o o t h e r commoli c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s than." ' i t s
svalaksana
u n i q u e n e s s , i . e . when it is perceived i n t h e f i r s t moment
of p u r e p e r c e p t i o n no part of it rnmrlins u n c 3 ~ t a i s e d14.
dence t h e knowledge of Svalaksana is yre percep-zion, The
nirvik.ilpaka, t h e ul t i r n ~ t er e a l i t y wni -,hthe Sa~ddhists

c o n s i d e r s it a s t h ? s o u l o f t h e i r t h e o r r .
~ h a r m a k i r t ifurther m a i n t a i n s t h a t a ? . ? r t i c u l w , once

s e e n i n one ? l a c e , c a n n o t be t h e same a s perceivred in


another place. The r e a s o n i s t h a t t h e r e i s no u n i v e r s a l
o v e r and above the particular which i s fo>ma c o x p l z t e l y

d i f f e r e n t from t h e p u r e p a r t i c u l a r . 15
S i m i l a r l y , when we s a y we p e r c e i v a msn w i t h stick

( d a n d i ) we look upon t h e m.in as q u a l i f i e d by tile s t i c k ,


-. .-
t a k i n g t h e s t a f f t o be h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n , we t a k e i n t o
a c c o u n t t h e i r r e l a t i o n and a l s o do n o t f a i l t o observe
their state i n t h e g e n e r a l scheme of t h i n g s . Then only
we have t h e d e t e r m i n a t e c o g n i t i o n such a s "a man with 16
stick"
I n d e t e r m i n a t e p e r c e p t i o n which a r i s e s when t h e eye first

f a l l s on t h e o b j e c t i s n o t a b l e t o c a r r y on such a l e n g t h y
p r o c e s s b e i n g as it i s an i n s t a n t a n e o u s r e v e l a t i o n of the
o b j e c t . l7 Hence a l l knowledge a r i s i n g o u t 6f t h e s e n s e
experience, are only the pure p e r c e p t i o n . A continuous

endeavour f o r employing a word t o e x p r e s s a i n d i v i d u a l


becomes f u t i l e s e.-n s e a i n d i v i d u a l i s e n t i r e l y f r e e from the
range o f any r e l a t i o n between a word and a i n d i v i d u a l . X
74
word i s connected w i t h t h a t o b J e c t which h a s i t s proper -
r e f e r e n t of a u n i v e r s a l construction . '' Thus, so f a r a s
t h i s argument i s concerned, no moaning r e l a t i o n can be
e s t a b l i s h e d between a word and an i n d i v i d u a l .
Therefore it may be observed t h a t according t o the

Buddhists t h e d e f i n i t i o n of a 2ure p e r c e p t i o n i s t h a t w h ~ na
man b e r e f t of all s o r t of imaginative - constructions frox
h i s mind, and a g a i n c o n c e n t r a t i n g h i s mind on p a r t i c u l a r
object perceives the colour witli his e y e s, a? t h ? t time
t h e p e r c e p t i o n of h i s i s apure p e r c e p t i o n i.e.
.-
kalpanKpodha~nabhrZntani ? ratyaksam .19
P e r c e p t i o n and Kalpzna:
6
-

The Buddhists n a r r a t e s five v a r i e t i e s o f imaginative


judgements. They are:
imaginative judgement which i s
.
1 ~ S t i k a l p a n 6 ;A
having a universal as its context.
2 . gunakalpana; A imaginative judgement which i s
L.

having a n a t t r i b u t e a s i t s content .
3. or kriya7calpang; A i m a g i n a t i v e judgement
-
karma
which i s having a word as i t s c o n t e n t .
.. ..-,

4 . ngmakalpang; A imaginative judgement which is


having a word a s i t s c o n t e n t .

5. dravyakalpana;-- A imaginative judgement which is


having a substance a s its content .
According t h e Buddhists these five kind ; of imaginative
judgement sometimes super-impose i d e n t i t y between two diff-
e r e n t o b j e c t s and a t o t h e r times super-impose d i f f e r e n c e
between two i d e n t i c a l things . O' For example, t h e r e is no

difference between an individual and a univc:rsal, but a


judgement a b s t r a c t s a uni v p r s a l from an indivivual anti
superimposes an imaginary difference between t h e two, for
example between (gau) cow an< (gotvam) covmess. Nobody
-- .- --
experiences a d i f f e r e n c e , but s t i l l i t i s imagined, and
L
it i s c a l l e d j a t i k a l p a n a .
There i s no difference? between a sllbstancc and its

a t t r i b u t e s , and they can nt5ver be experienced independent


of each o t h e r , s t i l l they have d i f Serence ancl it is called
- An a c t i o n cannot be d i f f e r e n c i a t e d from
guna kalpana. 22
t h e substance, b u t when we say 'devadatta g o e s f , we a r e
seeing n e i t h e r more n o r l e s s than Devadatta and it i s c a l l e d
ngmakalpana-. 24 The judgement connected with a substance i s
imaginative s i n c e i n cases such a s this i s a club man
(dandiayam) t h i s and club' a r e two d i f f e r e n t substances
-*.
b u t s i n c e they a r e mentioned a s i f they have t h e same
substance and it i s c a l l e d drvyakalpanz. 25 Here, it can
be s a i d t h a t t h e s e fmeginative judgements are neither truth
nor u n t r u t h , and accordin3 t o t h e Buddhists kalpang i s not

d i f f e r e n t from the e r r o r .
Notes and References

I.pratyaksari .- kalpanzpodam, PS. p. 8 2 .


-
cf. z.p 90. sl . 123.

-
..-.- 141.
pratyaksalaksanam . NI\I. pt. I. p.
- p. 141
.--
.

pratyaksasya. Ibid.
- .- -

.
c f . 1 t a t r a pratyaksari kalpanZpodha6abhrZntafi. NBT. p 32 .
5. .&bdasa~sargayog~~rthaprat~ti--k l a kalpana- . -NM. pt .I. p. 141

p. 100 sl. 176.


cf. I. PV. -
2 . JgT*. p. 42

jn"~na& .E.p t . I . p . 142.


c f . E. p. 101, sl . 177. -
-
7. E T p . 89 .
8. S i n h a , J.N. I n d i a n psychology c o g n i t i o n . p . 105

9. t a y g r a h i t d /
bhramananaupay~nasa6ksobh5dyana?ita
timirasu
10. -Svam- asa"dh3iranam l a k s a n d t a t v a i svalaksanam. I b i d . p . 6 9 .

- ,- . - .-
- 1 - 11 -

11.
12.
HB. quoted in DP. p . 75.
...- - - -.---
e k z t r a d r s t o bhedo h i kvacinn&-iyat ra d r s y a t e na
tagms.3. bhignamastyany:t_ ~%jrq& behyabhedatah
1). Sabdgrtasya, v 5 s t a v a s y ~ b h Z v ~ tsvalaksanasya9
- 4- -
/
savyapeksaprart t i n s

sabdena v i s a y ~ k a r t u m a s a k y a t v ~ t ,
.-..- - ..
t a d r y a t i r i k t a s y a vastunah anupalambhst. Nvl. p t I , . p . 141.
-
I 4. yekasyarthasvabhZvasya pratyaksasya s a t a h svayam
. - -,
kon'yo.- na d r s t o bhggah syzd ya pramanaih ? a r i k s y a t e iti.
---...-----a
.-.- - -.-- * -
I b i d . p t . I. p. 143.
c f . -PV. p . go. s l . 126
/

15. tasmgd- v i s e s a v i s a y g sarvaivendriyaja rnztih


-- - .-. --- - -- - - -.
/ /
na v i s e s u sabdzna'i .p r a v r t 6 v a s t i saibhavah
.-- - . -- --%

I b i d . p . 9 0 , sl . 127.
16. kiEca-- d a n d i t y z d i vikalpavijE&ai neridriyZp5tavelGyZmeva
j a y a t e k i n t u bahuprakriyzpaksd yada'ha
-- .-
/ /
visesanarn visesyai ca sambanda6 laukikim s t h i t i m
" ,
-.-,--
NM. p t . I. p . 142.

-
17. L a c e y a t % p r a k r i y G prathamanayanopanipgta j5tamavikalpakam

j&namudbodh~ ksamami ty&a


- -.
sa&ketasmaranopiiyram drsta samkalpanatmakd ,
- *-
- ..- ...-
cf.
-Pv. p . 100. sl. 174.
0 /
18. s d k e t a s y i p r .-*-
avrttitah
- -...-.. -

-.
ananvayiit vises&a& visayo yasca

5 -- -.

sa eva taih .-sl. 128


/

sabdgnam s a i y oj y a t e

--
na y a t h a v a s t u j a y a n t e kadscidapi k a l p a n a . NM.pt. I. p .143.
- - -- .-
..- /

c f . samhrtya-- s a r v a t a s c i n t Z m , s t i r n i t e n a t a r a t i a n a .
kvacicca bhadepyabhedakalpanzt kalpana ucyante .

- p . 143.
IW. pt . 1 .
/

21. j a t i r j z t i a a t o b h e d o

-na . k a s c i t para3arthatah
/
.
idanasya g o r g o t v a m i t i --nahi kascidbhedai
/
bhedakalpanaiva. I b i d . p . 143.
p a s y a t i tenabnede
t a t r a p y a b h i n a y o r- -bhedah kalpyzte guna tadvatoh, Ibid. p.143.

-. -. - .
A -. - --
23. bhedaropanarupaiva gunavatkarmakalpana
tatsvafip&.riktZ hina
kriysnama kacana. I b i d . p . 144.
24. " - -- .-
vibhinayostvabhedena p r a v r t t a nZimakalpana
caitroyamityabhedena ni&ayo nZmanSminoh. I b i d . p . 144.
.
--evam
dandyamityZdimantavyZ drvyakalpana

25. '

. .-. '-

144-
sZrniin&dhikaranyena bhedinorgrhanattayoh . I b i d . p.
111.2 .
The-t h e o r y of AnumZna According t o t h e Buddhists

The Buddhist h o l d t h a t the r e c o l l e c t i o n of Niyama i s one


of t h e c o n d i t i o n s real rela-
of i n f e r e n c e
.'Niyarns means t h e
t i o n o f i n v a r i a b l e cancomitance h o l d i n g between t h e middle
term and t h e mesor term, an i n d i s o l u b l e cp,nnexion between
objectsor ideas. And a l s o it i s designed a s the constant
co - presence o f t h e two,
Buddhists f u r t h e r s t a t e t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n of i n v a r i a b l e

concomitance (ltiyama) i s based upon t h e laws of identity and

Z
causality.
/ /
For example, a a tree. i .e. an individual

,simsapa i -
/ /
Delonging to a species oftree, so a the
simsapa c o n s t i t u t e s
probans for the probandumt h a t it i s a t r e e . This probans
i s based upon i d e n t i t y . This i s a t r e e , because this is a
/
t h e i n d i s s o l u b l e connexi on between t h e s e two
s i i s a ~ ~ .Thus
i d e a s i s based upon t h e law of i d e n t i t y , which i s v y g p t i .
They f u r t h e r s t a t e t h a t , what i s a n e f f e c t i s a b s o l u t e l y

- . " .A

dependent upon i t s c a u s e f o r i t s v e r y e x i s t e n c e , and i s n e v e r


i n d e p e n d e n t o f its4 But when an e f f e c t cognized it l e a d s t o
the inferential knowledge of i t s c a u s e . I n o t h e r words the
c a u s e i s i n f e r r e d from i t s e f f e c t -for example, h e r e i s f i r e
because h e r e is smoke. The i n d i s s o l u b l e connexion s u b s i s t i n g
between 'smoke' and 'fi r e ' i s based upon t h e law of c a u s a l i t y . 6
T h e r e f o r e t h e Buddhists hold t h a t merely a s t a t e m e n t of

t h e i n v a r i a b l e a s s o c i a t i o n of the probans andprobandum


founded on t h e fact that certain entities a r ealways found
t o c o - ? r e s e n t o r co - absent does n o t s u f f i c e as a s u r e b a s i s
of i n f e r e n c e .
The Buddhist Theory o f TrirGpa

The Buddhists m a i n t a i n t h r e e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s ,

t h a t it i s p r e s e n t i n t h e . - -. -

sapaksa, absent i n t h e vipaksa


and a l s o p r e s e n t i n t h e s u b j e c t . If t h e p r ~ b a n si s t h u s
c h a r a c t e r i z e d , t h e n i t s p o s s i b i l i t y ofbeing a s s o c i a t - ? d with
a probandum, which i s c o n t r a d i c t e d by a piece of v a l i d know-
l e d g e , i s r u l e d o u t ; s i n c e , i n v a r i a b l econcomitance and
contradiction are For example, i n t h e propo-
position, fire i s n o th o t because it i s an e f f e c t , it i s wrong
t o suppose t h a t t h e reason fulfills the three conditions, and
y e t it i s sublated . ' I n f a c t , t h e t h r e e conditions are not
fulfilled here. The reason Is.n o t a t a l l a property of the
s u b j e c t , because t h a t thing alone can be t h es u b j e c t whose
P o ~ s i b i l i t i e sa r e n o ta p r i o r i d e n i a l 10
b y perception .
That b e i n g n o t t h e c a s e namely, f i r e i s n o t h o t , i s n o t
- t o be 11
qualified a subject. It i s vipaksa,
. - .-
-13
Secondly, t h e p o s i t i v e concomitance of t h e reason i s n o t
?roved beyond doubt. While we g r a s p the p o s i t i v e concomitance
e v e r y t h i n g i s i n c l u d e d i n W e v y a p t i statement, l 2 a s whatever
is an effect is not hot, but the loophole in the vyzpti is

already laid bare at the time of i t s v e r y ascertainment,


because w e observe t h a t though f i r e i s a n e f f e c t , it i s hot . 13
If t h e positive concomitance i s g r a s p e d witho>.~ti n c l u d i n g
t h e f i r e , i . e . t h e i n t e r n a l i n v a r i a b l e a s s o c i a t i o n of t h e
problems and t h e probandum is not 14
cognized and a s c e r t a i n e d .
To e x p e c t t h e proof o f t h e probandum frorn a reason whicn has
b i d f a r e w e l l t o u s ~robandumi s 15
fruitless.
The Buddhists further points out that the nsgativs

concomitance i s cognized subsequent t o p o s i t i v e concomitance,


i f l a t e r i s d e n i a l the former i s obviously r e j e c t e d . l 6 The

f i r e i s p e r c a i v e dt o be p o s s e s s i n g a property
quite opposite
of t h e one d e s i r e d t o be proved, t h a t is called . -
vipaksa,
when t h e r e a s o n t l k r t a k a t v a t t n o t being absent, I negative
concomitance i s disproved. So t h a t t h e t r i p l e c o n d i t i o n s n o t
b e i n g f u l f i l l e d , it becomes a f a l l a c i o u s reason and it h a s no
n e c e s s i t y t o l a y down t h e 18
fourth c o n d i t i o n of non - sublation .
The f a c t of non - sublation c a n n o t be a s c e r t a i n e d merely

On the s t r e n g t h of non-apprehension, because that does not


e n s u r e a b s o l u t e a b s e n c e o-f a bzdha, and s o a s t h e r e a s o n
i s n o t f u l l y a s c e r t a i n e d t o be f r e e from contradiction
it cannot be a v a l i d 19
reason.
It may be observedt h a t according to t e Buddhists

t h e r e i s no d i r e c t d e f i n i t i o n o f anumzna, because they


themselves have s t a t ~ dt h a t they can e a s i l y define t h e
d e f i n i t i o n of anumana, through its classification, t h a ti s
why t h e y s t a t e f i r s t t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of anwngns. i . e .
svZrth&umZna I t i s interestin: to
and pasarthZnumZna .20
note t h e comment of Dharmamottara on the types of inference .
Dnarmottara s t a t e s t h a t the two types of inference a r e

a b s o l u t e l y d i f f e r e n t from each o t h e r and that i s why Dharna-


k i r t i p o i n t s o u t t h e s e types before attempting t h e i r defini-
tion. He f u r t h e r opines t h a t it i s not possible t o give a
s i n g l e d e f i n i t i o n f o r both t h e types . Because inference f o r
both t h e types . Because inference f o r oneself i s an i n t e r n a l
process of c o g n i t i o n and inference f o r others c o n s i s t s of
p r o p o s i t i o n s f o r t h e purpose of 21
communications.
Let u s see t h a d e f i n i t i o n of sviirthanumiina, According

t o ~ h a x m a k i r t i . The cognition which i s produced i n d i r e c t l y


through a mark, c o n s i s t i n g of a three - fold aspects and referr-
ing , t o an i n f e r r e d o b j e c t , is c a l l e d 22
sv6rthGnumEna.
Dharmottara t o o d e f i n e s inference i n a s l m i l 3 r way, but
t h e r e i s a s l i g h t d i f f e r e n c e i n language. According t o him

t h e d e f i n i t i o n of svarthZnumZna i s cognition produced by a


mark having t h r e e a s p e c t s and concerning an i n f e r r e d object . 23
The d i f f e r e n c e between t h e inference and i t s r e s u l t i s j u s t
t h e i n f e r e n c e and i t s r e s u l t i s j u s t t h e same a s i n t h e case

24
of perception .
The t h r e e a s p e c t s o f t h e aark a r e as follows:

1 . I t must abide i n the i n f e r r e d object cognised by

25
inference.
2. It must abide i n homologous instances . 26
3. I t must n o t abide i n heterologus 27
instances .

The homologous i n s t a n c e i s t h a t i n which both t h e


probans and t h e probandum abide. 28 The heterologousinstance
i s t h a t i n which t h e probance and t h e probandum never reside . 29
Dhamottara states thatinference is cognitiono f an

absent t h i n g , which cannot be grasped, b u t only imagined.

I n t h e c a s e of perception, c o g n i t i o n grasps the

P a r t i c u l a r and c o n s t r u c t s t h e symbol. I n inference it grasps


t h e symbol and c o n s t r u c t s 30
the particular.
The d e f i n i t i o n of t h e pan-rthZnumZna i s that, the
c o g n i t i o n , which i s deduced f o r t h e b e n e f i t of a n o t h e r
person from premises presented 31
t o him.
Thus we may draw t h e conclusion, t h a t according t h e

Buddhist, the three fold characteristic


f e l t u r e s of -hetu
leads to the inference. They d i v l d e anurnzna i n t ~two
v a r i e t i e s f i r s t and d r f i n e it l a t e r on, and on t h e b a s i s
of t h e t h e o r y of i d e n t i t y and c a u s a l i t y .
Notes and References

1. niyamasmrti iti . NY1. p t . I. g . 168.


,.- - -
t e n a i v a jziita sambande d v a y o r m y a t a r o k t i t a h
a r t h z p a t t y a d v i t i y e ' p i smrti samupajayate . PV. 111. p.136,
- - .- -
s l . 28.
2. v y z p t i ravinZbhZvo n i tyasa%acarysmi t y a r t h a h tacca
-.*-
t Z d Z t m y a t a d u t p a t t i c ? a i . -M\I. p t . I .
p. 169.
PV. 172. 111. sl . 2

-
/
2 . vastutastZdZtmyZt t a d u t 2 a t t e s c a . Idi3T-. p . 1 j S , G I G . 21 1
3. v r k s a t m i k a i v a h i s/ i r n s a , ~ Zt e n a v r k s a t v a s anumzpayati,
- .-.
- --

s o ' y a i svabhEvaheturucyate-. vrkso'yam ;imsag5tviiditi .


-.-. -
-
N d . p t . I. p . 169 .
.
cf. 1 vrksotyamiti sa6ketah kriyste tatpratipadyate
- .-.
v- y a v a h z r e ' p i t e n a l y d adosa it c e t - taruh.PV. p.229
-* - * -
I11 sl. 117.
2.-=T. p. 125. NYB. 2 . 15 .

cf kZryakG6nabhEvah -. l o k e pratyaksEnup~l&bhanibandhanah
0 -
4

-2

-NM. pt . 1 . p . 169.
--.-.-.-. - -- - -
126. NYB. 2.17.
khryh
cf + yathg vahni
a t r a dhtiinii iti . NBT . p .
karyahetau t-a d u t p a t t i h - )G4. p t . I . p . 169.
6. . pratibandhah-
.- /
-
cf.
-- -.

h--et o s t r i s v a p i rupesu niscayastena varnitah


-PV. p . 179. 111. sl. 15.

cf : tadapratibaddhasya tadavyabnicara niyarnSbhiiva't- . ..-

NBT. p . 131. NYB, 2.10


----
8. nanu t r i l a k s.a-n.a k e hetau avinahavah parisamzpyate ,
- 7- --

b5dhZvini%havayorvirodhat- . -NM. p t . I. p. 165.


c f : E.p . 233. 111. sl . 216.

9 yaccedai agniyanusnatvasadhane k r t a k a t v d trilaksanarnapi


.
- --
.. --. .-.-
bhidhznai, a t r a trilaksunyZnupapatteh . NIL p t .I. p. 165.
-- .-. -

10. paksadhma -eva .tavzdayai -na bhavati ... pratya-


k s s d y n i r a r t a h h i paksa ucyate. I b i d . p. 165.
- .-- -
1 1 . ngpi a y a i anvayI heturanvaya grhanasamaya eva t a d
-- --
viplav5vadhZranGt. Ibid . p. 165.
'8-

12. anvayo h i grhyamcmah sar6ksepena yad y a t


- -.--- -
--

- 0 -- .

krtakai tattadanusnd ityeva6 grhyate . I b i d . p. 165.


-. - 8 -
-. .-
/
13. t-atascatadgrhanasamaya evayamusnolpi krtaka
..-.-

it1 hrdayapathamavatarati t a n ~ a p g d i t i I b i d . p.
-
.
. 165

14. --yadit u analamuts rjya khat6dau anvayaghah -EL---- -.

ngntarygptigrhIt5
syiit ~Sdhyasadhanadhamayop . - Ibid . p . 165.
7 5. tata;caiva6vidh5ddhetoh . sv~sZdhyaniyamoj j h i t z t
sZdhy&hilgsa i tyevarh sandha~unayadohrdah
- .- C . - -.*
- I b i d . p I 65
.

111. s l . .
cf: fl, p. 281. 212
16. anvaya piirvakatvscca vyatirekagrhanasya t a n n i r a
4-

karane t a d a p a k a r a n d avagantavyai . NN. .


p t I. p . 16 5.

- .- /
.- -
pmtyaksato n i s c a y a t vastuvrttens s a eva v i ~ a k s a
.- .- - L._
iti na t a t o vyatirakah krtakatvasyeti . I b i d . p. 165,
- A -
-. -
18. tasmat trilaksanyZpKyZdeva hetvabhaso 'yamiti
------ --
na f i p s n t a r a i abadhi tavisayatva5 apeksate . I\II'4. p t . 1. P. 166.

s.322.
- .------ .--- .-

c f . t r i K ? o . heturuktah . . . gadZrthatv5-t. NBT. p . 339,


/
-
19. --nahi adarsanamzt rena bsdhgvi rahani scayah sarvatnana
.-
h i n a s t i t v a i vidyuh kathak syoginah? NM. pt. I. p.166.
--. -
20.1. anurncam 96, NYB. 11.1.
dvidhg- NBT. p . -
2. prakarabhedo -hi vyaktibhedah, vyaktibhede
ca k a t h i t e p r a t i ~ y a k t i n i ~ a t laksanami
- - C .

sakyate vaktum, ngnyatha. I b i d . p . 97.


3. see NBVT i n NBP. p . 54.
- -
tayoratyanta
-
n u h a 6 tu jz&6tmakai,
bhedhgt n a i k d laksanamasti . NBT p . 97.
-- .

22, 1. -tatra sv6rthe trirupzt llriggt yadanume yajg~nai


tat
anumgnam NBT . . --
- , -
2. t r i s p a .td lixiggt yad utpann& anumeyalam
-

- .-
b and jnham t a t - sv~rtha"numana6 iti NBT -. . p . 99
23. I b i d . -NBT. p . 99, Buddhist l o g i c , vol . 11, p . 49.
-. .-
.
24. I pramZnaphalavyavastha a t r z p i pratyaksavat .
,:BT, p , loo., NYB. 24.
-
2. p r a m s a s y a y a t p h a l a i tasya yZ vyavasthg sZ
--- .- ..-
atra a n u m z e ' p i pratyaksa i v a veditavya . N3T. p.100.
-

25. anumeyo 'tr a .- ---. --


- -

ji j E ~ s i t a v i s e s odharmah. !mT.1 1 1 ., ?NB. 2.6


Spaksa . NBT. p . 1 2 2 . , NYB. 2 . 7 .

-*-
27. na sapakso asapaksah . NBT. p. 114., NYB. 2.8.
- ---- -- - --
28. sadhyadha samany ena samSna)l
spaksh on m T . p. 58.
30. -. -- ceti. - p.llb.,
anupaiabdhih svabhavah k a r y a i NBT. -MBY. 2.11
31 . I . yena param p r a t i p a d a y a t i p . 98.
2 . ye
-
-tat parartham, PJBT.
czparasya p r a t i p a t t i h t a t p a r z r t h a i
-- . -
a v a g a n t a v y h-. -NBVT. see on
-NBP. D. 54.
111. 3 Budahists View of Upamzna
I n NySya magjari o f Jayanta
. no discussion
Bhatta,
o r o b j e c t i o n about t h e nature and forms of comparison i s
recorded from t h e p o i n t of view of the Buddhists. As, they

accepted -- i . e . perception and inference .


only two pramanas,
But, t h e Buddhists hold-sense-perception t o belong t o

a s p e c i f i c a b s t r a c t e n t i t y (svadharma) alone, devoid of a l l


c m c r e t e s p e c i f i c a t i o n so, they can very well deny resemblance

t o be an o b j e c t of sense perce>tion. The percer~tionof


similarity forms an important p a r t i n upamzna and it i s held
t o be t h e case of perception . ~ h a r m a k i r t ir e f e r s t o
pratyaksa and anumzna onl y as t h e sources of knowledge. I
- 0-

1. y a s t a s t i gavzyiikhranh p r a t i -kIdrgasZviti..
---.-
-. . .-
so ' p i pratyaksato d r s t e gavaye vinivartane .

pratyaksggamasiddhe r t h e tasrnZr\m&%tarena .- -kim.?


cf . upama'na'di. - - same ca na'numalaksaniinvi 0-1 tam.

---
PAB. p .2.
t a t a h pramZntarastitve kathddve eva t e iti .
-0 -0
We have a l r e a d y p o i n t e d out t h a t Buddhists a c c e p t two
means o f v a l i d knowledge based on two d i s t i n c t type of
r e a l i t i e s . Thus, the other -.- can be included i n these
pramgnas
t w o , more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n i n f e r e n c e , a s thsy argue . Thus,
they do n o t a c c e p t any distinction between verbal knowledge

and i n f e r e n t i a l 1
knowledge.
They that, both judgement and v e r b a l

knowledge have no immediate o b j e c t t o r e v e a l ; because, both


of them depend upon some r e l a t i o n t o e n l i g h t e n and o b j e c t ,
s l n c e t h e y i n d i c a t e o n l y t h e conmon f e a t u r e of an 2
object.
They f u r t h e r s t a t e t h a t , both o f t q e ~f a i l t o b r i n g

about tneir intended result, if the relation i s not discovered,


because, it i s very d i C ' f i c u l t t o d i s c o v a r t h e i r r e l a t i o n ,
s i n c e t h e p a r t i c u l a r s a r e uncountable .3 On t h e b a s i s o f
t h e f o l l o w i n g example t h e y e s t a b l i s h t h e i r p o i n t s .
If a word i s employed t o convey t h e knowledge of an

o b j e c t , b e c a u s e i n t h e i n f e r e n c e of f i r e smoke p l a y s p a r t of
t h e s u b j e c t of i n f e r e n c e , s o it becomes the subject of
i n f e r e n c e s i n c e t h e s u b j e c t denoted by it, belongs t o it .
In t h e first c a s e smokeness i s t h e r e a s o n , i n t h e second
case t h e u n i v e r s a l belonging t o t h e word, w i l l discharge
t h e f u n c t i o n of a 4
reason .
The v e r b a l knowledge i s i d e n t i c a l with t h e i n f e r e n t i a l

judgement, because t h e conditicx-is and o b j e c t s of both a r e


i d e n t i c a l , hence, we should not d i f f e r e n t i a t e one f rorn
another i n view of minor d i f f e r e n c e s . A s we infer fire,
perceiving smoke, s o we make out t h e aeaning o f a wgrd,

hearing it .6
The Buddhists further state that t h e p o s i t i v e and the

n e g a t i v e concomitance between a probans and a probandum i s


t h e same a s between word and o b j e c t , i . e . i n t h e cas? of
i n f e r e n c e srnokeness i s t h e rrason 2nd i n t h e cas2 of verbal
testimony, u n i v e r s a l belonging t o t h e word performs this

7
role.
The - Buddhists hold t h a t , t h e s e impressions, l e f t by t h e

p r e v i o u s experience of alphabeix, a r e t h e a s s e s s o r y condition


of v e r b a l knowledge. Moreover, t h e t r u t h of t h e verbal

knowledge i s a s c e r t a i n e d while we l e a r n t h a t the sentence,


-7

t h e s o u r c e of t h ev e r b a l knowledge, has been u t t e r e d by a


r e l i a b l e person . Again we a r e a l s o t o read t h e intension of
t h e 8ped~d . rof t h e sentence i n o r d e r t o make o u t i t s o r i g i n a l
meaning, t h e s e a r e t h e d i s t i n c t i v e processes which i n v a r i a b l y
precede a p i e c e of v e r b a l knowledge unlike an i n f e r e n t i a l
judgement, and t h e Buddhists s a i d t h a t by these peculiar
conditions they cannot hold t h a t t h e verb21 t e s t i n o n y is a

d i s t i n c t type of proof of ~ n a w l e d ~ eF. u~r t h e r they rnalntain

t h a t , i n case of a n i n f e r e n c e ?&en a very f a m i l i a r o b j e c t i s


t o be e s t a b l i s h e d , no reference t o an example i s required
because no major premise i s presented t? consciousness, in
case, o f v e r b a l knowledge when a very f a a i l i a r o n j 2 c t i s
c o m ~ u n i c a t e dby word, no reference t o an example is

9
necessary .
Therefore t h e Buddhists coqclude and s t a t e t h a t , t h e

verbal knowledge i s i n f e r e n t i s l , s i n c e it is k n ~ mt o be
v a l i d i f it i s i n agreem2nt witn t h e undoubtable and
unquestionably t r u e of a r e l i a b l e person.'' (Zpta) .
Notes and Reference
/ /
I. nanum%ct vibhinatam.
Sabdasya khalu pasy&o
a t a h tallaksana?rsepgt na ygcyam laksanzri t a r a i
- .--7s.-
- -- .-. - -
- p t . I. p. 220.
NM.
/
-.-
-.- - -. -
c f . I . sabdah na pramgnam saugata7n ahuh . NK. p . 866.
2. t a t r a anumEnamevedai bauddhavais e s i kaih /
sri t a i .
SV. p , S1. 15.
-
2 . paroksavisayatvam h i tulyam tairat dvoyorapi
-. - -- .- -
s~manyavisayatvaf;casa6bandhrlpeksanZt dvayon. N..I.pt .I .T. 2 2 0 ,
#
cf.I
. sabdah anumzna6 a r t h a s y-..a anupalabdheh
-.

anumeyat7:gt. -NS. 1 .2.50 a l s o see NB. p . 123.


2. t a t r a r t h a y o g a h p r a g d r. s. tah.. padartha'ntarasSig ?dah
#
-. /

sabd5narnsabdasa6bandhZt asminnpi -tathia --sah.


l a t o 'numgnamevaitat -aba y e ' r t h e
p r a v a r t a t e Pa . p 9. . .
cf . I . 1,2.52. see a l s o N3. p . 122.
.- -
saibandhgcca-... Nj.
2. anadiresa saibandhah iti sa tu aparamparg
* .- . *.- -- - p r a s i d h y a ti .
prat? i h
4 . p r a k a l p a y i s y a t e pakso d h h o dahanavgniva

6- -

t a t r a d h G a t v a szrniinyd tadvadat Kpi vaksyate -.-.


- p t . I* p. 220.
NM.
5. evam v i sayastimagris~my5tekatvani ;cave na
--. -
vilaksanat*iitram k i z ~ i d a n ~ a t v a k ~ r a n a rInb.i d . p. 220.
- C. .-
6. y a t h a p r a t y a k s a t o dhtimam d r s t v a a s n i h anumiyate.
- - - 0 -

-...- -.
t a t h a i v s iabdad Qarnya f . adartho9pi avagariyate. I b i d . p . 220 .
/ /
.-
t-a t h a h i sabdah -sabdat v ~ pdrvasabdavadevat 1?1,
samiparthena
sanbanddho dh%o dhGma tayaya th5 . PAB . p . 10 .
.- -
anvayavyatirekau -ca bhavatah a t r z p i lirigavat
. -.- / / - -
yo y a t r a d r s y a t e sabdah s a t a s y a r t h a s y a vacakah
-.

/
paksadnarmatvampi a s t i sabda eva y a t o ' r t h a v z n . NFI. pt.I.p.220,
-.
' -- .. -

/
prami.n$fitara,n
i t y z d i n a v i s e s a n a na - - bhavet . I b i d . p . 220 .
-.
"- ---C--

--
/
. -Ibid. p.221.
lirige t a t h i v a sabde ' p i ngnzrthabhxama k a r i n i .
/ /
10. a t a eva h i manyante sabdasyspi vipascitah
---
5ptavadEvisaivZda-. sZmKnyEdanurnanat%n. I b i d . p. 221 .
cf . ZptavZdZvisa~v~das~mZnyZdanuGnat~,
Pv. p . 283. 111. sl. 217.
.y
111. 5 The Buddhist Theory o f Apoha
Jayanta - Bhatta.. h a s d i s c u s s e d the Buddhist theory of
-

apoha j u s t t o e x p l a i n t h e u n i v e r s a l a s an o b j e c t of a 3 r e h ~ n -
s i o n . The Buddhists do n o t a c c e p t t h e r e a l i t y o f t 3 e Universal .
According t o them u n i v e r s a l i s a f i c t i o n . A general name such
as ffcowllaccording t o t h e Bud4hists does not stand f o r any
2osi t i v e e n t i t y commonly i n t e r i n g i n d i v e r s e
partic~lar s .
~ c c o r d i n gt o t h e Buddhists t h e r e a r e t h r e e vie7-:sof

s t a g e s of developinent r e g a r d i n : t h e theory o f Apohz. (1) Pro-


$ asated b y iIiAn?ga h o l d s apoha as t o t 3 1 negation o f a l l
o t h e r s and a c c e o t s t h e e x i s t e n c e of sometning ?osi+iv? only
/
by i m p l i c a t i o n ( 2 ) advxates
Pro:~oundedby S g n t a r a k s i t a ,
t i l a t words mean something p o s i t i v e and nsgation of o t h e r s
i s rendered only by i m p l i c a t i o n and ( 3 ) expounded by Flatna-
k l r t i m a i n t a i n s t h a t words aean something unique. 3e f u r t h e r
holds t h a t n e g a t i o n and a f f i r m a t i o n a r e simultaneous.
-
Anyhow, a g e n e r a l n o t i o n o f t h e Suddhist concept of

- without g o i n g i n t o t h e d e t a i l of t h e s e views of nega-


Apoha,
t i o n 0 2 a l l o t h e r s e x c e p t a 'cowf o r id - gther words it
refers t o 'non-non-cowf.
'Dirintlgii as Rrof . R.C. Pandeya h o l d s , t h u s advocated

-
aPoha as t o t a l n e g a t i o n o f t h e o t h e r and accepted the existence
.L--__.
o f sometnhng p o s i t i v 9 o n l y by i a p l i c a t i o n . And a l s o t h e
Bud&iists a a i n t e i n t h a t s i m i l a r i t y bztween absolutely
d i f f e r e n t things can be e s t a b l i s h e d only by t h e i r counter
c o r r e l a t e s . They say t h a t t h e essence o f words c o n s i s t s i n
the negation of their counter c ~ r r e l a t e si f t 4 i s p r i n c i p l e
is not accepted, it w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o reconnize t h e
d i f f e r e n c e between t h e thing r z f e r r e d and i t s counter
correlate.
According t o 6 ~ n t a r a k s i t aagoha i s three types . They

are presented by t h e following table.


Negation o f a f f i r m a t i o n (

t
T o t a l negation

P arudasa) (Prasajya --pratisedha)

Negati6n of t h e idal
Universal Negation of t h e Physical
(buddhygtmaka ) Universal
( arthztmaka )
Therefore, it can be concluded according t o Buddhists
Apoha i s accepted through the t h r e e views of stages of
development.
Jayanta s t a t e s t h a t t h e 3 u d d h i s t t h e o r y of 'Apoha' is
n o t some e x t e r n a l p o s i t i v e t h i n g . ' J u t it i s i n t e r n a l and
of t h e f o m of 2 I n t h a t c a s e , it may be doubted .
cognition.
t h a t , t h e r e i s no n e c e s s i t y of l o g i c a l l y an4s k i l l f u l l y
developing t h e t h e o r y of kpoha. So, i?;i s S e t t e r t o regard
that aunit of consciousness is cognised even 3
from words.
J u t t n a t i s n o t c o r r e c t . Because t h e 2 0 o h a ' is n e i t h e r
i n t e r a a l , n o r e x t e r n a l , b u t i t i s d i f f e r 9 n t from both consci -
ousness and t h e 4
object.
Yere, t h e o b j e c t i o n a g a i n s tt h e 3uddhi~ti s that, ~ r h i c h

i s n o t e x t e r n a l or. i n t e r r x i l doss r ~ o tr e a l l y exi . - :t and t h e n


r;
how can it form t h e meanin:; of The answer
2 word?' 3uddhists
is that, they neverbeliev thet words!nean sornetbing r e a l .
S i n c e t h e ' A ~ o h a ' i s n e i t h e r e x t e r n a l , nor i c t e r n a l , b it i s
L

c a l l e d ' u n r e a l ' and imaginary f o r t h esame, and it i s some-


t h i n g t h a t i s superimposed and a f f e c t s t h e d e t e r m i n a t e
notion . 'l The c o n c e p t u a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s , being a s i f e x t e r n z i l l y
8
perceptible tinge the cognitions.
The t h e s i s t h a t d e t e r m i n a t e c o g n i t i o n s a r e a b o u t 'apohav

i s based more on l o g i c . t h a n on e x p e r i e n c e ? The d e t e r m i n a t e


c o g n i t i o n s do n o t g r a s p t h e r e a l . What t h e yg r a s p v i z . t h e
u n i v e r s a l i s n o t r e a l , l o t h e n f o r e , t h r o u g h e l i m i n a t i o n , we
g e t t h a t t h e y c o g n i s e t h e apoh8
.
i e. negation
of not.&hat.
The imaginary form f o r t h e very f a c t t h a t it is
superimposed, i s n o t e x t e r n a l and being d i f f e r e n t from
knowledge i s not i n t e r n a l . It i s n o t h i n g and from t h e fonn
of r e s u l t a n t judgement it i s c a l l e d 'apoha' . The opponent
mistaking t h e 'apoha' t o be - m e m a 1 and of t h e n a t u r e of
non - existence, s u f f e r e d hardship without reason by his
cri t i c i s i n a g a i n s t t h e nature of
apoha
11
.
The o b j e c t of determinate cognition possesses three

characteristics viz, t h a t it can be a s s o c i a t e d with existence

o r non-existence through c e r t a i n o t h e r n o t i o n s , it h a s definite


f o r n and it appears s i m i l a r to t h e e x t e r n a l . None of t h e
t h e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s belong t o t h e 12
external thing.
The d e f i n i t e form of t h e o b j e c t o f d e t e r n i n a t i o n i s

known a s ' t h i s i s a c o w only and n o t a h o r s e t and it cannot


be p o s s i b l e u n l e s s o t h = r t h i n g s a r e excluded s o that deter-
a i n a t e c o g n i t i o n s cognise exclusion . An o b j e c t whose n a t u r e
o r c h a r a c t e r i s doubted i s not cognised by them.
This t e x c l u s i o n ' i s t h e only point of s i q i l a r i t y between

t h e e x t e r n a l and t h e imagined o b j e c t and s i n c e d e t e r m i n a t e


c o g n i t i o n cannot c o g n i s e t h e a l r e a d y cngnized external, they
a r e s a i d t o be about t h e exclusion . Though t h e n o t i o n s and
v e r b a l e x p r e s s i o n s t a k e upon a g o s i t i v e form,I 3 i n actual
p r a c t i c e , s t i l l l o g i c i a n s prove t h a t t h e y a r e a b o u t Zyohas,
Jayanta observes14 i n c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h i s view of thinkin5 is
pregnant with t h e t h e o r y t h a t t h e n o n - e x i s t e n t becomes
manifest in cognition.
Notes and References
1. bhavatma bahih abhyupagamyate.
-na -tu a sau
- 9
I\T,bi.pt .I1. p. 34.

2. - 1bi . i . p . -
k i n t u knalu ayam g n t a r o jn"hatma. 14.
----
4. nGamZntaro -na bahyah apoha'n, k i n t u jkartha'bhy-lri7m

-. . . --
arlya =a. I b i d . p. 14 .
-
5. nanu -yad v i a y a t e nznta-mabhih paramarthatah
/
.
na t u v i d y a t e e v e t i kathai: s a b d a r t h a ucyate . I b i d . 3. 15
-
-,
- -
nehagatah smah enai~a $ ~ruyujyernahitv a y c . I b i d . p. 15.
. -. .-
7. KkZramFtrai
vikalpoparGjakaa. Ibid . p . 15
3. yuktya tesam aponavisayatvam ucyate na

-. -.- -- -
p r a t i p a t t i t-ah . GJj. r>t.11. p . 16.
10. pamanya 4 vzstava; n a s t i . I b i d . p. 16.
-
.
1 1 s o 'y q Zropi~ tZkZro na s a h i r ZropitatvZdeva nZntah
-A- -.

abodhafipatvat, . . . -klis t o devSnZn- priyah, Ibid., p. 16.


.- -.
12. a p i c a v i k a l p a b h f h i r a r t h o vikalpEntarasannidhZpita
- 4

/ f
b ~ ~ v & h a ' v & s e p ?niyararGpo b a y a s a d r s a s a s c a
.- -.--.- -

, p r a t i y a t e , na cedam nipatrayam -api bh&ye . -


v a s t u n i y u j y a t e . I b i d . p. 16.
13. yadyapi vidhi G p e n a gaurasva iti / tesam p r a v r t t i h t a t h g ~ i
--. .-
-

.
-C-

n x t i v i d o anyZppohavisay&eva t- g. n
vyavasthgpa y a n t i I b i d p .17, .
14. s o ' yam nEintam -na b a y o ' n y a eva k a 1 s c i d 6 r o p i t a &a'm vyfivrtti-
/

-.- - -.-
cchgyoggd apohasabdsrtha u c y a t a asatkhyCtivcdagarbhZ -
a n I b i d . p . 17
111. 6 . Non-apprehension Eudghists view
The Buddhists were much awzre about their position

maintained by t h e Naiya'yikas tkat3bhZva is distinct


p a d z r t h a . A t t h e same time t h e y a r e a l s c 7 . c q u ~ i n t e dw i t h
:he t h e o r y o f t h e b h a t t a s t h a t abhgva i s d i s t i n c t Tesn o f
..
knowledge f o r t h e c o g n i t i o n of n e g a t i v e e n t i t i e s . A s a g a i n s t
both t h e s e s u p p o s i t i o n s , S u d d h i s t s h o l d t h a t non e x i s t e n c e
is n e v e r cognised i n d e p e n d e n t l y a s a d i s t i n c t e n t i t y o f t h e
form o f non - existence of ? Sut t h e y s a y t h a t , we a l w z y s
jar.
have a n o t i o n o f non - existence i n t h e c o n t e x t of p a r t i c u l a r
time, p l a c e and ap o s i z i v e c o u n t e r e n t i t y , a s f o r i n s t z n c e ,
something, i . e . a cloth, a pot, etc. is n 2
~ r,owt h e r e .
However, non - existence c a n n o t e n t e r i n t o any r e l a t i o n

e i t h e r with t i m e , p l a c e o r t h e
.'
c o u n t e r - e n t i t y The r e l a t i o n
of c o n j u n c t i o n o ri n t i m a t e union c a n n o t hold good i n t h e e e
c a s e s s i n c e non - existence i s n e i t h e r a s ub s t a n c ei n t h e
f i r s t case, n o r a q u a l i t y e t c . as r e q u i r e d by 4
samavgya.
To t h e q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n o f ' q u a l i f y i n g t o

q u a l i f i e d t may c o n n e c t them w i t h one a n o t h e r , t h e r e f o r e there

is no need of assuming o t h e r r e l a t i o n s , the Buddhists


s t a t e t h a t t h i s relation p r e s u p p o s e s a n o t h e r r e l a t i o n o f
e i t h e r c o n j u n c t i o n o r i n t i m a t e u n i o n (samavzya) b e c a u s e , a
q u a l i f i c a t i o n is e i t h e r conJunctd o r i n t i m a t e l y u n i t e d w i t h
6 For examnle, t h e s t a f f with Devad-.,ti,9, o r
the qxalified.
t h e c o l o u ~b l u e with l o t u s . It i s n o t r e a l r e l a t i o n involv -
i n g t h e t y i n g s b u t only t h e one, rnentqlly construed . Its

f i c t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s proved ~y t h e f a c t t h 5 t t h e samet h i n g
is l o o k e d upon e i t h e r a s t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n o r a s t h e q u a l i f i e d . 7

The 3uddhists f u r t h e r say t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n of non-

existent*> with its c o u n t k r - e c t i t y i s s t i l l mars inconceiv -


a b l e , because t h e t w o belon: to t v ; d i f f a r e n t times .8 For
exaxple, when t h e r e i s a j a r , i t s non-e.fi:ist@ncei s 3bs:nt
and w2en t . ;~non-existence o f j a r ? r e v a i l s , t h e r e i s no 9
jar.
The r e l a t i o n o f o p p o s i t i ~ ncannot s e r v e an escape

from t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n . I t would o b t a i n between them i f t h e


a l r e a d y p r e s e n t non-existence of j a r were t o come and d e s t r o y
t h e jar, i n t h e manner of s t a f f . 3 u t i n a s much a s t h e
d e s t r o y e r and the destroyed a r e n o t simultaneously present
t h e r e i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of such a r e l a t i o n . 1 Destruction
i s t h e same as non-existence. T h e r e f o r e , t h e Buddhists
b r i n g i n t h e d o c t r i n e of c a u s e l e s s d e s t r u c t i o n and the
consequent s u p e r f l W y . o f t h e s u p p o s i t i o n o f causes of
destruction." They p o i n to u t t h a t nnon - existencelt o f a
t h i n g cannot be a nproduct" o f t h e agency of t h e c a u s e s of
destruction. Non-existence i s n o t a p o s i t i v e e n t i t y and
t h e r e f o r e , as such could be produced by c a u s e s . The supposed
causes of d e s t r u c t i o n a r e , i n f a c t , responsible f?r t h e
o r i g i n of a new d i s s i m i l a r series . '12 The s t a f f does n o t

dectrgy a j a r , b u t pr2duces a d i f f e r e n t s e r i e sof pot-

sherd~.'~ d e s t r u c t i o n i s d i s t i n c t e n t i t y a ? a r t fraa
If
t h e thing a jar i n v i r t u e o f which it can e n t e r i n t o a
r e l a t i o n w i t h the l a t t e r , it besones d i f f e r e n t f r o 3 t h e jzr
and then it cannot and does not q o d i t y the bein5 o f jar

s o t h a t t h e jar would be cognisee a s b e f o r t . I f it is


i d e n t i c a l with t h e j z r , t h e j a r w i l l bb7 th product of the
ageKcy of t h e causes o?d?struction. If the non - existence

o f j a r i s s a i d t~ be t h e same as the potshnl-ds, wnen thn

potsherds are+ broken, t h e non-existence of ,-j?rbeing. d e s t r o y e d <


The 14
j a r should be r e c o n s t i t u t e d .
The 3uddhists f u r t h e r maintain that t h enon - existence

of jar has e i t h e r t h e n a t u r e of coming i n t ? e x i s t e n c e , o r t h e


n a t u r e of n o tcoming i n t o e x i s t e n c e . l 5 I n t h e f i r s t c a s e ,
i t would be ap o s i t i v e e n t i t y l i k e a jar,'6 i n t h e second
case it becomes e t e r n a l . j7 F u r t h e r it is said that, the
e t e r n a l non-existence i s connected w i t h one t h i n g only o r
far as t h e first a l t e r n a t i v e is
with a l l of them. So '*
concerned, we do n o t come across a d e c i s i v e c a u s e a s t o
why it should be connected with one p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g only?19
As for t h e second a l t e r n a t i v e it i s connected with a l l
t h i n g s and the non-existence being e t e r n a l a l l t h i n g s as i t s
c o u n t e r - e n t i t i e s would be no m9rf ths-:re and t h e r e would be
20
l e f t no p o s i t i v e o b j e c t e t e r n a l o r n o n - e t e r n a l as e x i s t e n t .
:he 3 u d d h i s t s f u r t h e r 3 o i n t s out t h q t , i f t'ne h y o o t h e s i s

of n e g a t i o n is d i s c a r d e d then t h e line of d i s t i n c t i o n which


a 3 s o l u t e l y s e p a r a t e s one p o s i t i v e o b j e c t f r ? n anoY.her w i l l
oreak down anclt one :nonot nous i d e - i t i t y w i l l snc;ulf a l l thrl-7
d i s t i n c t t y p e s o f o b j e c t s . Thus, t h s h u n a r cqnvention of
5 i s t i r : c t i ~ nbased upon the classificati?n OFsbje ctsof t he
u n i v ? r s e , w i l l d i s a p 7 e a r from t h e s u r f a c e of 21
eartn.
If w? assume the h y p o t h e s i s t h ~ nt e g s t i ~ ni s o b j e c t i v e l y

real, t h e n t h e ? o s i t i v e objects m a i n t a i n their rnut~2l


distinction bymeans of t h e i r o b j e c t i v e a i f f e r e n c e . 22 2 u t

it do n o t s u b s c r i b e t o t h i s view and do n o t try t o a m i d t h e


d a n g e r o f t h e merging o f o b j e c t s i n t o one a n o t h e rt h a n a
g r e a t e r p e r i l w i l l s u r e l y a w a i t u s . 2 3 If t h e d i f f e r e n t f ~ m s
-of non e x i s t e n c e become d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by themselves from
one a n o t h e r as from p o s i t i v e o b j e c t s t h a t t . e y a r e h e l d
i n c a p a b l e of d i f f e r e n c i a t i n g t h e m s e l v e s from o t h e r o b j e c t s
n a t u r a l l y and hence depending on t h e n e g a t i o n o f mutual
a

24
identity for that sake.
The b u d d h i s t s also held t h a t n o n - e x i s t e n c e as such i s

uniform and i t s supposed d i s t i n c t i o n s are caused by the so


nany 2:jsitiv~: o b j e c t s a n d a r e d e n i e d . 2 5 The t i i n c s are
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from one a n o t n e r i n v i r t u e of t h e 1 r own
b e i n g and t h e r e i s no f e a r o f a c ~ n f u s i o , 'of~. t n e v a r i q u s
o b j e c t s n e c e s s i t a t i n g t h e p o s t u l a t i ~ nof 26
n~n-existence.
F i n a l l y t h e B u d d h i s t s s t a t e t n a t , it w i l l be u n w i ~ et r

assume t h e h y p o t h e s i s o f a ne - a t i v e s e a l , s i n c e the qapre -


h e n s i o n on ' c o l o s s a l c h a o s ' a r i s i n s from i t h2uri-L~us. 27 And

t ? e y e x p l a i n t h e i r view a b m t t h e meaning of the n e g a t i v e


? a r t i c l e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t n word.;, ( n-az)th(zLL a c c o r d i n g t 9
them it i s n o t t h a t t h e s t a t e of t h i n g s c o n f o m s t o v - ? r b a l
s t a t e m e n t s , words s i z n i f y o n l y c 3 n c e ? t u a l 28
constructions.
Tney further mention t h a t , we a c c e p t th? eleven kind

o f non-apprehension ( ~ n u p a ~ a h d b ion) the basis of 3 verbal


e x p r e s s i o n conveying non - existence and n o t t h e c a u s e o f the
c o g n i t i o n of non - existence in the manner a jar is the cause
a c c o r d i n g t o - the Suddhists
its cognition. *' T h e r e f o r e
n o n - e x i s t e n c e i s n e v e r c o g n i s e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y as a d i s t i n c t
e n t i t y of the form of non - existence of jar.
Notes and References

1 . abhgvo nzmz p r a t I y a m ~ n one svantratayh ghatZbhZvasvar@avat,


- ----
anubhcyate. -!@Ipt..I . p. 86.
c f . anupalabdhih svabhavah, karyah c e t i . B?.11. dl.
--- --
'

-.
/ /

--.

c f . 1. -desadibhedZt d r s y a h t e
------ - .

bhinzdravyesu saktayah t a t r i k a -
-. .- -.
/ - L.

crs -kya nsnyatra yuktah taeabhava niscayah PC. J. 183.

atmapratyaksanivrteh abh~va&cay&hZvZt. iilBVT. p 6 7 . .


/
- ,.
3 , --nahi desena kZlena -.pratiyogina
-. -
saha asya
/
-
-. --
/

k a s c i t saiband_iah. I b i d . p. 86.
cf. 1. pradesa
t-,a t r a anupalabcihi. -y-a t h z na
/ -. -..-.-

-
v isekvacit- ghatah upalabdhilaksana
.- -

praptasya anupalabdhe riti . NBP. 11. 1 2


2. / -. -
desa i t y u k t e sarvasya paksatve
-.
g h a t a n z v a siddhereva na sygt saca
- -- -
yogyofpi na bhavati . ,NBVT. p. 60
-0
-
4 p t .I. p . 86.
Sainyogasarnav~yGderanupapatteh. NM.
.
/
5. nanu visesanavisesyabh~va .-eva sambandhah
- --.- t

kim s d b a n d h z t a r a peksays? Ibid. p , 86.


/

bhavati. Ibid . p. 86.


- -..-. L .

sdyuktari, samavetak vG v i s e s a n d
7. &nrS pevadatto, nxlarh u t p a l a i i ti,
4-.-
/ -., / --. -.--
.-
/

visesanamapj. visesyi bhavati visesyamapi


- p . 86.
-.
na ~ a s t u a n a ~ a nI b. i d .
.- -
8. psatiyogina saha natara"111abhavasya
.
sambandhah asam&nakalatvZt. IbFd, p . 86.
9. yada h i ghato na tadZ tadahiivah
..- --.
- .A- -

- -., ---.--. p. 86.


yada tadabh<?vah nat a d a ghata i ti . I b i d ,
1 C . v i rodhzkhy? s&lbandho b h a v i s y a t l t i c e t , ko
-, ----- -
virodharthah? yadi h i praksidkko ghatabhava Satya ghatai
-. --. -
v i rundhyat bhavedapi tadvi robtlo ghatamudgarayoriva , -na. -tu
-- -. abhyupagane -
evam a s t i , tayoh :asam5nakSlatvat, vii ghat3
tadabhavayo? a* vadhyaghatahiyoh
siihacaryahi inub3Gy-it e .
I b i d . p . 86.
---
-.
11 . akiEcitkarasya v i rodhitve a t i p r a s a k t i h
abhgv5ntarakarane anavasta. I b i d . p. 86.
12, .
nhhgva he tavah bhavi td a r h a n t i ,
.

mudgarZdayd1 ghatasya
eve //

--svata
vinSsahetvanapeksatvZt

bhzvasya bhariguratvena
C r-.

Ibid. p. 86.

-
eva qmugaradika'rakavya"pa'mh. I b i d . p . 86.

14. -- -L-
.
cet .. yadasau na phrvavadupaf abhyate,
-
sa hi ghatgtvastvantad
c e t p r a t y u k t d e t a t . I b i d . p. 86
-
t a d v i r o d h it v g t iti . --- ..-.be

-bhavet. ghatiidivat.
16. Ibid, p. 87
bhavanadharmatve bh5votsau

17. --. abhgvo'sti -- . I b i d . p. 87.


abhavanadharmg t u yadi sa nityah
samapad6rtha saibandhi
va"? Ibid . p . 87.
-43

-
7 9 . -eka bhavasaibandhi t v e na tasya niymakSr2nam
-. --
.I-
/

utpasyzrnah. I b i d . p . 87,
20. sarvabhzva saibandhitve t-u sarvapad&rthapratikG1asya
.- .- --.- - /
-
abhavasya n i t y a t v a t n i t y a h sannityo va k a s c i t abhZv7
n z n z s t--i. i d . p . 87.
I b

21. nanu abhava, anabhyupagame bhgvksm i t a r e t a r a s a h k a r a-t ak!?


il~vyavahZraviplavahp s p n o t i . I b i d . a. 87.
22. .abha'v? abhyupagarne t u bhavsnai ,it a r e t a s Z ~ h Z--v 5 t . -
..asarhirnasvabhavatvgt . I b i d . p. 87 .
I b i d . p . 87.
-sutar%n .viplavah .

24. -bhgvo bhzvgdivsny- asrnct L4 a b ~ ~ v ~ a-npik dhrvamt


.'* -
.-a

- ..-I

asarik?rnah abhyupetavyahsa k a t h a i va bhavisyati .


. -.
anyonyamapi bhavanE&.. -yadi asarikirnata svatah bhzvaih
/

k i 6 aparZddh& va p a r a t a s c e t kuto nu sa . Ibid. p. 87.


-. -. ---
25. a b h a ~ a s v a b h ~ v a t ~ i y. i gsarvgn - c p r t y a v i sesat ..-..

ratisedhya nibandhana eva tadbhedah. Ibid . p . 88.

9.-- . -- L--.. ,-*


26. bhii~adhingiabhgviiniiri a s h k a r y a * vak t u i
I b i d . p. 88.
.
u c i t d , --natu viparyayoyuktah.
-,.
1

-na - .

abh?ita abhyupa gamo yuktah I b i d . p. 88.


28. -na /
rupeyate
-vai sabdGusZrena.- vas t u s t h i
sarvatra khyatakzrtayah
*- --

bauddha khalu vaya6 loke

. p . 88
0

v i kalpamgtra sabdhgrtha .
parikalpana p a n d i t h . Ibid
-* -
29. -SZ_ tu asadvyavahiirasya he tuh na-- abhzvasaividah. Ibid .p-
89
111. 7 Buddhist view on Jati:
A c c o d i n g t o t h e Buddhists t h e r e i s no o n t o l o g i c a l

e x i s t e n c e of u n i v e r s a l s and t?iey ? r e mere c ~ n s t - r u c t i o n sof


mina o r imaginary . They maintain t h a t u n i v z r s a l s a r e subjec -
t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n s capable of being connected with names. They

are not real entities, subsisting as the realists think. The


universeis a flux of momentary particulars. Nothing is
i c i e n t i c a l and no two a r e sirnilar . i'he so calle::! i c 4 e n t i t y and
s i n i l a r i t y a r e based on o u rimagination .
~ h a m a k i r t ir e p u d i a t e s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e u n i v e r s a l a s

an e x t e r n a l t h i n g . The Suddhist denies externalityof the


u n i v e r s a l and not its reality, as a particular 1
i2ea.
The i m p o r t a n t s p o i n t s a g a i n s t the acceptance of o b j e c t i v e

r e a l i t y o f u n i v ? r s a l s by t h e r e a l i s t , a r e summed up by R.R.
Dravia a s follows:
1. The u l t i m a t e l y r e a l i s t h e f l e e t i n g momentary parti-

c u l a r (Svalaksana which is a b s o l u t e l y d i s c r e t e and disparate . )


-
L,

2. The u n i v e r s a l is n o t an e n t i t y belonging t o t h e same


o r d e r o f e x i s t e n c e as t h e p a r t i c u l a r . It i s a c a t e g o r y of
thought
and n o t a thin!;, . The r e a l i s t commits
--
t h e m i s t a k e of

confusing two di $ f e r e n t o r d e r s o f existent:.: thc ~smp&~i@!il

and the u l t i m a t e .
i - y ~ l yresZ ~ ~ n i v e r s a l s .
1
,. Identic21
7 co ~ ntions dr, n o t
x p l a i n a b l e on t.ie b a s i s o f p a r t i c u l a r exf s t e n t s
Lneyarn
anlj t h e n a t u r a l l y c o n s t r ~ c t i v emind.
4. The a s s u a p t i o n o f r e a l u n i - ~ o r s s l spervazin~d i f f e r e n t

p a r t i c u l a r s i s f r a u g h t with insolubel d i f f i c u i t i e s . These


di f i c u l t i e s can be avoided onl-y i f u n i v e r s a l = a r e regarded
2 - tllought - cx - ~st r a c t s .

5. i : ~i d e n t i t y o r s i s n i l a r i t y i s g i v s n . The u n i v - ? r s a l i s

not a perceived f a c t .
6. A l l n o t i o n s or^ i d e n t i t y a r e n.clgative, t l ~ . ? ~a; r i s e 3y

n 2 s e l e c t i n g t h e m u t u a l d i f f e r e n L : e o f o a r t i c u l a r s and by
2
d i f f e r 2 n t i a t i n ~tiiern fron t h e i r o p p o s i t e s
~Gotesand Rt?f e r e n s e s

sam5natZna tu subhyaXSratven3. See ?VTJ 3c T';. ?. 65.


-- - - -- -
11. sl. 9,10.
cf. -X4. p t . 11. p . 2

2 . v i d e 2.3.
D r a v i d ; The ? r o b l e ? o f univ :rsals in I n d i m
2hilosophy. p. 86.
cf. :;.I pt. 11. p. 2.
111. 6 3 u d i h i s t v i e w on ;arnava'ya
-4mongst t h e opponents o f the r e l a t i o n o f the Fnh?r?r~ce

3udC'his"L come first. - comao ~2 1 t7,:e?ty f i v e


: ~ h n m a k i r t ias
., ,exovic v 2 r s e s w i t h h i s own co::imentary i n o r e e r t . 3 r c f u c ? s l L
I
kin55 o f r e l a t i o n s .
-ic:or:inj - a r e l a - z i ~i s~ a c ~ n c ? l ~ t u a l

to Dhamakirti,
f i c s i o n f s * ~ r i c : : : t e byd our mint5 havin:4 no 95joctiv6: raality a t
2
all.
Thi dno-.dedge of r e l a t i o n i s u n r e a l , becaul ? it c s z n o t

be a s c s r t a i n 3 d ei-Lher by n e r c s p t i o n o r 5\: inft?re:lc-3. An,-! t h e r e

i s no t::i+ means o f 3
?roof.
The !JaiyZyikas dsfenc.: ofa r e l a t i o n i s e n t i r e l y

4 t h e r ? ca n be onl y t w o ways of inter-


baseless, because ,
5
preting a rslation.
1 . Dependence (~aratantrya)

.-
2. I n t e r p e n i t r a t i o n ( n i P a s / l e s a ) .
But b o t h t h e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s f a i l t o e s t a b l i s h it . If we
a c c e p t dependence, we w i l l have s e v e r a l d i f f i c u l t i e s .6 If
1
we a c c e p t a g a i n s t t h e fundamental
rfipaslesa , it w i l l go
.-
p r i n c i p l s o f o u r r e l a t i o n s , t h a t n r e l a t i o n needs two d i s c r e
entities.7
F i n a l l y ~ n n r m a ~ i r ct oi n c l u r ~ e s ,t h a t t h e r - can b e no
r z p a s l e s a saSosn<-.habetween t w ? distinct e n t i t i es . 6
/

~ h a r m a k i r t if u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t whether t h e rslation

i s i d e n t i c a l with :he r c l a t ; ? o r d i f f e r e n t f r o x t h s n . If it
is identical with the relati, then t h e r e w i l l bs s i t h e r t ' ~ e
r e l a t i m o r t h e r e l a t ~ i . ~ If t h e r 2 l a t i o n i s a ( - : i s t i n c t
e n t i t y d i f f z r 2 n t from t b . ~ .r e l a t a , now t h e r . - l a t i ? n i s t o be
10
related at all.
.:ran-in; t n i s sug7ositFon tha:, a re!.?ti?n is a distinct

e A t i t y along with t h e r e l a t . ? , i~owt h e two rel::t,2 b rzlatsd

' If
by on? r s l a t i o n . a n o t h e r r e l a t i o n i : nostul-3ted to

relate i t s relation, it would involv.? t h e f a l l l t of 12


anavastha.
F i n a l l y i ) h a m a k i r t i c a t e g o r i c a l l y r u l e d o u t th::t, the

n o t i o n o f r z l a t i o n a s an independent entity is a false 13


one.
1 . F o r a. d e t a i l e d :',iscussion on this, vide!, \I.,;. Jh3,
?hi?;so,:ny o f P k l a t i o n , vide, a l s o h i s a r t i c l e "T~harms-
-,. D a l a i , O?.cit., np,. 94-102.

,irde, d.K.

u k t a lrakarebi-iyah pramSn5ntara;ya - .??renSnabh.vu.2a . miit,

4 . te~mztsarvasya- bhavasya s a i b l n d h o ngsti t?tvst3h


-

.-._ -
laksano va PUI, p. 104.
- -
6. .-
._-- -. .-
prsthamspakse kim a s a u nispannayoh sambandhinoh syat,
anispannayor va? na t a v a t anispannayoh, svanipasyaivZstta -
.-. -- - . . .-
'-'-' --
504,Sw, pa812
--- --.

v--atsas a s visiinavat nispannayos/ca PKM, SMP, P O


7. -..-, -.- - -,
- p. 505+ .-,
dvistatvzt tr[lsya sambandhasya T?KM,
8, rupasleso h i saibandho d v i t v e s a c a k a t h a i bhavet
- .- - I --- --
-. -
tasmgt prakrtibhinnangm saibandho
a---

nasti tatvatah