CALALANG v. A. D.
WILLIAMS, ET AL unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right
Facts: Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer
of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition
against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; et al.
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved
to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon
de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from
1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic.
That the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure
proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the
Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of
the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal
Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which
the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on
national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated
by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade
and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion and
that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all the people.
Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an
Respondents," reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter which dismissed
to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
Ruling: In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby
denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Ratio: The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not
confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein
conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and
avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by
acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
"whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such
action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest."
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of
which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the
National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience
and welfare.
No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles
of salus populi estsuprema lex.
RUBBERWORLD(PHILS.),INC.vs.THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the decision
of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR Case
No. 6-2158-84 entitled "Nestor Malabanan and Jonathan Transmil,
Complainants, versus Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. and Elpidio Hidalgo,
the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit.
Respondent Malabanan was employed by petitioner Rubberworld (Phils.),
Inc. on September 25,1978 as an ordinary clerk. In May, 1980, he was
promoted to the position of production scheduler with a corresponding
salary increase. He was again transferred to the Inventory Control Section
as stock clerk on September 1, 1983.
On April 6,1984, Elpidio Hidalgo, the Plant I General Manager of petitioner
company, received a copy of the Financial Audit Report from the Internal
Audit Department of the company showing a significant material variance
between the year-end actual inventory and that of the Cards (SC)/EDP
Control Records. As a result thereof, Noel Santiago, Section Head of the
Inventory Control Section, where respondent Malabanan was assigned,
conducted an investigation of the reported discrepancies in the stock cards
upon the request of the Plant General Manager. Santiago then submitted
his report to the general manager recommending the dismissal of
respondent Malabanan.
Consequently, Malabanan's case was endorsed to the Human Resources
Division of petitioner company, which conducted a reinvestigation on the
matter and which affirmed the recommendation of the Inventory Control
Section Head for the termination of employment of respondent Malabanan.
On June 6, 1984, respondent Malabanan was dismissed by petitioner
company.
On June 16, 1984, respondent Malabanan, along with another complainant
named Jonathan Transmit, filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and
illegal dismissal against petitioner company alleging that they (respondent
Malabanan and complainant Transmil) were members of the monthly
salaried employees' union affiliated with TUPAS; that petitioner company
forced them to disaffiliate from the union; and that due to their refusal to
resign from the union, they were ultimately dismissed from employment by
petitioner company.
Petitioner company on the other hand, denied complainants' allegations
and averred that respondent Malabanan's dismissal was due to gross and
habitual neglect of his duty and not due to his union affiliation.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the dismissal of respondent Malabanan is tainted with
unfair labor practice; and
(2) Whether or not a just and valid cause exists for the dismissal of private
respondent Malabanan.
Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. However,
the decision of the public respondent is hereby MODIFIED to the effect that
petitioner company is ordered to reinstate private respondent Nestor
Malabanan to the position of stock clerk or substantially equivalent
position, with the same rank and salary he is enjoying at the time of his
termination, with three years backwages and without loss of seniority rights
and benefits appurtenant thereto.
Ratio: The question of whether an employee was dismissed because of his
union activities is essentially a question of fact as to which the findings of
the administrative agency concerned are conclusive and binding if
supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence has been defined
as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.
The findings of the Labor Arbiter on the non-existence of unfair labor
practice on the part of the company are more in accord and supported by
the evidence submitted by the parties in the instant case. Complainant had
stated that he was a member of the monthly salaried employees union
affiliated with TUPAS. He, however, offered no proof to support his
allegation. In fact, no evidence was presented to prove the existence of
such union. We (note] from the records that, as the usual practice, in cases
like this one, complainant is usually supported by the union of which he is a
member. And ordinarily, the union itself is impleaded as a co- complainant.
Such circumstances, surprisingly, [are] not present in this case. In fact,
complainant categorically alleged that he had solicited the services of the
PAFLU Labor Union in filing this case. It is, indeed, surprising that
complainant had to solicit the help of a labor union (PAFLU) of which he
was not a member instead of soliciting the aid of the labor union (TUPAS) of
which he was allegedly a member. These circumstances alone [destroy] the
credibility of complainant's allegations.
Penultimately, even assuming for the sake of argument that herein
complainant 'posted entries in the stock card without counter checking the
actual movement status of the items at the warehouse, thereby resulting in
an inaccurate posting of data on the stock cards," to our impression does
not constitute as a just cause for dismissal. Records show that he was only
transferred to the Inventory Control Section on September 1, 1983 and was
not so familiar and experienced as a stock clerk, and prior to his transfer,
the record shows no derogatory records in terms of his performance. His
failure to carry out efficiently his duties as a stock clerk is not so gross and
habitual. In other words he was not notoriously negligent to warrant his
severance from the service. Considering that there is nothing on record that
shows that he wilfully defied instructions of his superior with regards to his
duties and that he gained personal benefit of the discrepancy, his dismissal
is unwarranted.
It does not appear that private respondent Malabanan is an incorrigible
offender or that what he did inflicted serious damage to the company so
much so that his continuance in the service would be patently inimical to
the employer's interest. Assuming, in gratia argumenti that the private
respondent had indeed committed the said mistakes in the posting of
accurate data, this was only his first infraction with regard to his duties. It
would thus be cruel and unjust to mete out the drastic penalty of dismissal,
for it is not proportionate to the gravity of the misdeed.
Bonifacio vs Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education
and Culture) and ECC (Employees Compensation Commission) GR L-62207,
December 15, 1986
Nature of Action: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the ECC
(August 19, 1982), affirming the denial by the GSIS of petitioners claim for
the benefits under PD No. 626 as amended for the death of his spouse,
Lourdes Bonifacio.
Facts: The late Lourdes Bonifacio was a classroom teacher from August
1965 until she contracted carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the
gastro-intestinal tract and lungs which caused her death. Dr. Yabee-
Almirante certified that the late Lourdes B underwent radical mastectomy
for breast cancer in 1973. In 1976, she submitted herself to an operation
when her ailment was noted to metastasize to her abdomen. In 1978, she
complained of abdominal pain and enlargement, vomiting and failure to
pass stools. Upon operation, it was found out that her gastro-intestinal
tract was enveloped by carcinoma. On 1978, she dies from carcinoma of the
breast metastatic to gastrointestinal tract and lungs.
Thereafter a claim for death benefits under PD 626, as amended was filed
by petitioner with GSIS but was later on denied on the ground that the
decedents principal ailment, carcinoma of the breast with metastases to
gastrointestinal tract and lungs is not an occupational disease for her
particular work as a teacher, nor is the risk of contracting said disease
increased by her working conditions. The ECC, on appeal, affirmed the
decision of the respondent System.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can claim for the benefits under PD No.
626 for the death of his spouse.
Ruling: Petition is dismissed and the decisions of the GSIS and ECC denying
the claim, are affirmed. No costs.
Ratio: A compensable sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an
occupational disease listed by the ECC, or any illness caused by employment
subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is
empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-
related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar
hazards of employment (Article 167(1) Labor Code as amended by PD No.
1368, effective May 1, 1978).
Carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and
lungs is not listed by the Commission as an occupational disease.
The cancer which affected the deceased not being occupational in her
particular employment, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that the
decedents working conditions increased the risk of her contracting the
fatal illness. Petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge.
Under the present Labor Code, the latitudinarian or expansive application
of the Workmens Compensation Law in favour of the employee or worker
no longer prevails as the burden of showing proof of causation has shifted
back to the employee particularly in cases of sickness or injuries which are
not accepted or listed as occupational by the Employees Compensation
Commission. As stated in Sulit vs. ECC, the Labor Code abolished the
presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness
caused by the nature of employment.
Maternity Childrens Hospital v Secretary of Labor (GR No. 78909 June 30,
1989)
Nature of Action: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the
Secretary of Labor dated September 24, 1986 1) affirming with modification
the Order of respondent Regional Director of Labor awarding salary
differentials and ECOLAs (Emergency Cost of Living Allowances) to
employees to petitioner, and the 2) Order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration dated May 13, 1987, on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.
Facts: Petitioner is a semi-government hospital and has 41 employees.
Aside from salary and living allowances, the employees are given food but
he amount spent therefor is deducted from their respective salaries. On
May 23, 1986, 10 employees of the petitioner filed a complaint with the
Office of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment for underpayment
of their salaries and ECOLAs.
On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed 2 of his Labor Standard
and Welfare Officers to inspect the records of the petitioner to ascertain
the truth of the allegations in the complaints. On July 17, 1986, the LSWO
submitted their report confirming that there was underpayment of wages
and ECOLAs. In response, the Regional Director issued an Order directing
the payment of P723,888.58, representing underpayment of wages and
ECOLAs to ALL the petitioners employees.
Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and
Employment who rendered a decision modifying the said Order that the
payment should be computed only from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986.
The case is then remanded to the Regional Director for recomputation. On
October 24, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the Secretary of Labor.
The instant petition QUESTIONS the all-embracing applicability of the
award involving salary differentials and ECOLAs, in that it covers not only
the hospital employees who signed the signatories but also those (a) who
are not signatories to the complaint, and (b) those who were no longer in
the service of the hospital at the time the complaints were filed. Petitioner
likewise maintains that the Order of the respondent Regional Director of
Labor, does not clearly state the facts and law on which the award was
based. Petitioner further questions the authority of the Regional Director to
award salary differentials and ECOLAs to private respondents.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the RD erred in extending the award to all hospital
employees.
Ruling:
1. Under the present rules, an RD exercises both visitorial and enforcement
power over labor standard cases, and is therefore empowered to
adjudicate money claims provided that there still exists an employer-
employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not
contested by the employer concerned.
Even in the absence of EO no. 111, Court believes that RD already had
enforcement powers over money claims, effective under PD No. 850, issued
on Dec 16, 1975, which transferred labor standards cases from the
arbitration system to the enforcement system.
With the promulgation of PD 850, RD were given enforcement powers in
addition to visitorial powers. Labor arbitrers on the other hand lost the
jurisdiction over labor standard cases.
EO 111 authorizes an RD to order compliance by an employer with labor
standards provisions of the Labor Code and other legislation. It is Our
considered opinion however, that the inclusion of the phrase, The
provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding and in
cases where the relationship of employer-employee exists xxx Article
128(b) as amended, above-cited, merely confirms/reiterates the
enforcement or adjudication authority of the RD over uncontested money
claims in cases where an employer-employee relationship still exists.
EO no. 111 was issued on Decemeber 24, 1986 or 3 months after the
promulgation of the Secretary of Labors decision upholding private
respondents salary differentials and ECOLAs on Sept 24, 1986. The
amendment of the visitorial and enforcement powers of the RD (Article
128-b) by said EO No. 111 reflects the intention enunciated in Policy
Instructions Nos. 6 and 37 to empower the RD to resolve uncontested
money claims in cases where an employer-employee relationship still exists.
This intention must be given weight and entitled to great respect.
2. The justification for the award to this group of employees who were not
signatories to the complaint is that the visitorial and enforcement
powers given to the Secretary of Labor is relevant to, and exercisable
over establishments, not over the individual members or employees,
because what is sought to be achieved by its exercise is the observance
of, and/or compliance by, such firm/establishment with the labor
standards regulations. Necessarily, in case of an award resulting from a
violation of labor legislation by such establishment, the entire
members/employees should benefit therefrom. `
ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION vs. The Hon. COURT OF APPEALS,
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari sought by the petitioner under Rule 65
of the 1995 Rules of Civil Procedure. The DOLE, through Undersecretary
Cresenciano B. Trajano issued an Explanatory Bulletin dated March 11,
1993, clarifying inter alia, that employees are entitled to 200% of their basic
wage on April 9, 1993, two regular holidays falling on the same day, being a
Good Friday and ArawngKagitingan, whether unworked. The first 100%
represents the payment of holiday pay on April 9, 1993 as Good Friday and
the second 100% is the payment of holiday pay for the same date as
ArawngKagitingan. The said bulletin was reproduced on January 23, 1998,
when April 9, 1998 was both Maundy Thursday and ArawngKagitingan.
However, petitioner opted to pay its daily paid employees only 100% of
their basic pay on April 9, 1998 despite the bulletin. Respondent Bisigng
Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested. The controversy was
submitted for voluntary arbitration. Subject of interpretation in the case at
bar is Article 94 of the Labor Code which reads:
ART. 94. Right to holiday pay. - (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular
daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service
establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;
(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such
employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate;
and
(c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes: New Years Day, Maundy
Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May, the twelfth of
June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and
thirtieth of December and the day designated by law for holding a general
election,
The Voluntary Arbitrator held in favor of the respondent BATLU, contending
that the article provides for holiday pay for every regular holiday, the
computation of which is determined by a legal formula which is not
changed by the fact that there are two holidays falling on one day and that
that the law, as amended, enumerates ten regular holidays for every year
should not be interpreted as authorizing a reduction to nine the number of
paid regular holiday. The Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the
Voluntary Arbitrator, adding that the law governing the relations between
them, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), clearly recognizes their
intent to consider Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday, on whatever
date they may fall in any calendar year, as paid legal holidays during the
effectivity of the CBA and that "there is no condition, qualification or
exception for any variance from the clear intent that all holidays shall be
compensated.
Issues: Whether daily-paid employees are entitled to be paid for two
regular holidays which fall on the same day.
Ruling: The petition is devoid of merit. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: The appeal from the CA is a petition for review under Rule 45 and
not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, now Rule 45
and Rule 65, respectively, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. For the writ
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, a petitioner must
show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered
"plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from
the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or
agency. In this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and
adequate remedy. Technicality aside, this Court finds no ground to disturb
the assailed decision.
Technicality aside, this Court finds no ground to disturb the assailed
decision. Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the
Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford protection to labor. Its
purpose is not merely "to prevent diminution of the monthly income of the
workers on account of work interruptions but also is also intended to
enable the worker to participate in the national celebrations held during
the days identified as with great historical and cultural significance. Art. 94
of the Labor Code, as amended, affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid
regular holidays. The provision is mandatory, regardless of whether an
employee is paid on a monthly or daily basis. Holiday pay is a statutory
benefit demandable under the law. Since a worker is entitled to the
enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays, the fact that two holidays fall on
the same date should not operate to reduce to nine the ten holiday pay
benefits a worker is entitled to receive. This is under the rules of statutory
construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal,
the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In any event, Art. 4 of
the Labor Code provides that all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. For the working mans
welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. From the
pertinent provisions of the CBA entered into by the parties, petitioner had
obligated itself to pay for the legal holidays as required by law.
Douglas Millares vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Facts: Petitioner Millares was employed as a machinist in 1968 by private
respondent ESSO International through a local manning agency, Trans-
Global, and was later on promoted as Chief Engineer which position he
occupied until he opted to retire in 1989. He was then receiving a monthly
salary of US $1,939.00 On June 13, 1989, petitioner Millares applied for a
leave of absence for the period July 9 to August 7, 1989 which was
approved by the president of the private respondent Trans-Global.
Petitioner wrote Esso International informing him of his intention to avail of
the optional retirement plan. But respondent Esso International denied
him. PetitionerMillares requested for an extension of his leave of absence.
On August 19, 1989, Roy C. Palomar, Crewing Manager, Ship Group A,
Trans-global, wrote petitioner Millares advising him that respondent Esso
International has corrected the deficiency in its manpower requirement
specifically in the Chief Engineer rank by promoting a First Assistant
Engineer to this position as a result of (his) previous leave of absence,
adding that in view of his absence without leave, which is equivalent to
abandonment of his position, he had been dropped from the roster of crew
members September 1, 1989.
On the other hand, petitioner Lagda was employed by private respondent
Esso International as wiper/oiler in June 1969 and was later on promoted as
Chief Engineer in 1980, a position he continued to occupy until his last COE
expired on April 10, 1989. He was then receiving a monthly salary of
US$1,939.00. Like Millares, Lagda petitioner Lagda applied for a leave of
absence from June 19, 1989 up to the whole month of August 1989, which
was also approved. On June 26, 1989, petitioner Lagda wrote a letter to G.S.
Stanley, Operations Manager of respondent Esso International, through
respondent Trans-Globals President Michael J. Estaniel, informing him of his
intention to avail of the optional early retirement plan in view of his twenty
(20) years continuous service in the complaint. And the same was denied.
The same as the Millares, when lagda requested for an extension, he was
advised that in view of his unavailability for contractual sea service, he had
been dropped from the roster of crew members effective on the same day
as Millares
Both petitioners filed a complaint-affidavit for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of employee benefits against private respondents Esso
International and Trans-Global, before the POEA. On July 17, 1991, the
POEA rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
Petitioners elevated their case which obtain a favorable action, thus this
petition.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE REGULAR EMPLOYEES.
Ruling: The COURT Resolved to Partially GRANT Private Respondents
Second Motion for Reconsideration and Intervenor FAMES Motion for
Reconsideration in Intervention. The Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated June 1, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED with
MODIFICATION. The Private Respondents, Trans-Global Maritime Agency,
Inc. and Esso International Shipping Co.,Ltd. are hereby jointly and severally
ORDERED to pay petitioners One Hundred Percent (100%) of their total
credited contributions as provided under the Consecutive Enlistment
Incentive Plan(CEIP).
Ratio: it is undisputed that petitioners were employees of private
respondents until their services were terminated on September 1,
1989.They served in their capacity as Chief Engineers, performing
activities which were necessary and desirable in the business
of private respondents Esso International, a shipping company; and Trans-
Global, its local manning agency which supplies the manpower and crew
requirements of Esso Internationals vessels. It is, likewise, clear that
petitioners had been in the employ of private respondents for 20 years. The
records reveal that petitioners were repeatedly re-hired by private
respondents even after the expiration of their respective eight-
month contracts. Such repeated re-hiring which continued
for 20 years, cannot but be appreciated as sufficient evidence of the
necessity and indispensability of petitioners service to the private
respondents business or trade. Verily, as petitioners are by express
provision of Article 280 of the Labor Code, considered regular employees.
SC: Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. - The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment
is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph. Provided, that, any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which
he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity
exists. The primary standard to determine a regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The
test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by
considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the
scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if the
employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the
performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the
repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence
of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business.
Hence, the employment is also considered regular, but only with respect to
such activity and while such activity exists.
(GR No. 107307 August 11, 1997) Philippine National Construction
Corporation vs. The Honorable National Labor Relations Commission
Facts: The petitioner contended that the real contract of employment was
the one executed after the original contract was amended and which was
accepted by private respondents.
Issue: WON the amended contract of employment shall bind the
contracting parties.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the questioned Resolution of
the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED. Consequently, this petition is DISMISSED.
With costs. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: Paragraph (1) of Article 34 of the Labor Code prohibits the
substitution or alteration of employment contracts approved and verified
by the Department of Labor from the time (of) the actual signing thereof by
the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without
the approval of the Department of Labor
Our Civil Code states: In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the
laborers. The mandate of the law for a liberal interpretation of labor
contracts in favor of the working man was applied in the case of Ditan vs.
POEA Administrator where We made the following pronouncement: A strict
interpretation of the cold facts before us might support the position taken
by the respondents. However, we are dealing here not with an ordinary
transaction but with a labor contract which deserves special treatment and
a liberal interpretation in favor of the worker . . . the Constitution mandates
the protection of labor and the sympathetic concern of the State for the
working class conformably to the social justice policy. Under the policy of
social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests
of the working class on the humane justification that those with less
privileges in life should have more privileges in law.
(G.R. No. 127195 August 25, 1999) MARSAMAN MANNING AGENCY, INC.
and DIAMANTIDES MARITIME, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and WILFREDO T. CAJERAS
Facts: The SC affirmed the decision of the public respondent finding that
the dismissal of the private respondent by the petitioner was premature
and illegal. However, the petitioner assailed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter granting the private respondent the amount of salaries due to the
latter and holding the rule that an illegally dismissed worker whose
employment is for a fixed period is entitled to payment of his salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment. Petitioner
contended the applicability of RA 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 took effect, Sec. 10 of which
provides:
Sec. 10. In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid
or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion
of the employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term whichever is less
Issue: WON RA 8042 is applicable to the case.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision and Resolution of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission are AFFIRMED.
Petitioners MARSAMAN MANNING AGENCY, INC., and DIAMANTIDES
MARITIME, INC., are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay private
respondent WILFREDO T. CAJERAS his salaries for the unexpired portion of
his employment contract or USD$5,100.00, reimburse the latter's
placement fee with twelve percent (12%) interest per annum conformably
with Sec. 10 of RA 8042, as well as attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of
the total monetary award. Costs against petitioners.
Ratio: We agree with petitioners that Sec. 10, RA 8042, applies in the case
of private respondent and to all overseas contract workers dismissed on or
after its effectivity on 15 July 1995 in the same way that Sec. 34, RA 6715, is
made applicable to locally employed workers dismissed on or after 21
March 1989. However, we cannot subscribe to the view that private
respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only. A plain reading of
Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally
dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3) months salary
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play
only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one
(1) year or more. This is evident from the words for every year of the
unexpired term which follows the words salaries x x x for three months. To
follow petitioners thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3)
months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely
disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect
to some. This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics
that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or word
thereof be given effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the
meaning of the words employed in the statue and to have used them
advisedly.
(GR No. 161757 January 25, 2006) SUNACE INTERNATIONAL
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION et al.
FACTS: Respondent Divina Montehermozo was deployed to Taiwan as a
domestic helper by Sunace International Management Services (Sunace)
under a 12-month contract. Such employment was made with the
assistance of Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the
contract, Montehermozo continued her employment with her Taiwanese
employer for another 2 years. When Montehermozo returned to the
Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace, Wang, and her Taiwanese
employer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). She
alleges that she was underpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan.
She further alleges that the 2-year extension of her employment contract
was with the consent and knowledge of Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand,
denied all the allegations. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The National Labor
Relations Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiters
decision. Hence, the filing of this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozos
employment was made with the knowledge and consent of Sunace
HELD: Petition granted. The challenged resolution of CA are hereby
reversed and set aside.
RATIO D: There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship when
after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign
principal directly negotiated with the employee and entered into a new and
separate employment contract. Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding,
the alleged continuous communication was with the Taiwanese broker
Wang, not with the foreign employer. The finding of the Court of Appeals
solely on the basis of the telefax message written by Wang to Sunace, that
Sunace continually communicated with the foreign "principal" (sic) and
therefore was aware of and had consented to the execution of the
extension of the contract is misplaced. The message does not provide
evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after the
expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the
Taiwanese broker communicated regarding Montehermozos allegedly
withheld savings does not necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the
extension of the contract. As can be seen from that letter communication, it
was just an information given to Sunace that Montehermozo had taken
already her savings from her foreign employer and that no deduction was
made on her salary. It contains nothing about the extension or Sunaces
consent thereto.
Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is
safe to assume that it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed,
by Summons issued on February 15, 2000, to appear on February 28, 2000
for a mandatory conference following Montehermozos filing of the
complaint on February 14, 2000. Respecting the decision of Court of
Appeals following as agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess
ignorance of such an extension as obviously, the act of its principal
extending [Montehermozos] employment contract necessarily bound it, it
too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of imputed
knowledge.
The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent,
Sunace, to the principal, employer, not the other way around. The
knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed
to its agent Sunace. There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of
and consented to be bound under the 2-year employment contract
extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner"
cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Montehermozos claims arising
from the 2-year employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides,
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs,
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract
are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of
law. Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied
revocation of its agency relationship with its foreign principal when, after
the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal
directly negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new and
separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil
Code states that the agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the
business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons.
MASING AND SONS DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. ROGELIO, (G.R. No. 161787),
April 27, 2011
Petitioners assail the October 24, 2003 decision, whereby the CA reversed
the decision dated January 28, 2000 of the NLRC that affirmed the decision
of the LA.
FACTS OF THE CASE: On May 19, 1997, respondent Gregorio P. Rogelio
(Rogelio) brought against Chan a complaint for retirement pay pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7641, in relation to Article 287 of the Labor Code. On
March 17, 1997, Rogelio was paid his last salary. Lim, then the Ibajay Branch
Manager, informed Rogelio that he was deemed retired as of that date, in
March 1997, he commenced his claim for such pay and benefits. In their
defense, MSDC and Chan denied having engaged in copra buying in Ibajay,
insisting that they did not ever register in such business in any government
agency. They asserted that Lim had not been their agent or employee,
because he had been an independent copra buyer. They averred, however,
that Rogelio was their former employee, hired on January 3, 1977 and
retired on June 30, 1989; and that Rogelio was thereafter employed by Lim
starting from July 1, 1989 until the filing of the complaint.
On April 5, 1999, the LA dismissed the complaint against Chan and MSDC..
Rogelio appealed, but the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA on January
28, 2000, observing that there could be no double retirement in the private
sector; that with the double retirement, Rogelio would be thereby enriching
himself at the expense of the Government; and that having retired in 1991,
Rogelio could not avail himself of the benefits under Republic Act No. 7641.
Rogelio commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA, charging
the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in denying to him the benefits
under Republic Act No. 7641, and in rejecting his money claims on the
ground of prescription. On October 24, 2003, the CA promulgated its
decisionholding that Rogelio had substantially established that he had been
an employee of Chan and MSDC, and that the benefits under Republic Act
No. 7641. Chan and MSDCs motion for reconsideration was denied by the
CA. Hence this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not the CA erred: in concluding that Rogelio had
remained their employee from July 6, 1989 up to March 17, 1997; and (c) in
awarding retirement benefits and attorneys fees to Rogelio?
RULING: The petition for review is barren of merit.
RATIO DECIDENDI: We agree with the CAs factual finding, the records
substantially established that Chan and MSDC had employed Rogelio until
1997.
We believe that the respondents strongest evidence in regard to the
alleged separation of petitioner from service effective July 1, 1989 would be
the affidavit of Wayne Lim, owning to being the employer of petitioner
since July 1, 1989 and the SSS report that he executed listing petitioner as
one of his employees since said date. But in light of the incontrovertible
physical reality that petitioner and his co-workers did go to work day in and
day out for such a long period of time, doing the same thing and in the
same place, without apparent discontinuity, except on paper, these
documents cannot be taken at their face value. We note that Wayne Lim
apparently inherited, at least on paper, ten (10) employees of respondent
Crispin Amigo Chan, including petitioner, all on the same day, i.e. on July 1,
1989. We note, too, that while there exists an initial report of employees to
the SSS by Wayne Lim, no other document apart from his affidavit and
business registration was offered by respondents to bolster their
contention, irrespective of the fact that Wayne Lim was not a party
respondent.
We could conclude that respondents sold their business in Ibajay and assets
to Wayne Lim on July 1, 1989; however, as pointed out above, respondent
Crispin Amigo Chan himself said that he was a copra dealer from Ibajay in
August and October of 1991. Whether or not he was registered as a copra
buyer is immaterial, given that he declared himself a copra dealer and had
apparently engaged in the activity of buying copra, as shown precisely by
the employment of petitioner and Palomata. If Wayne Lim, from being the
respondents manager in Ibajay became an independent businessman and
took over the respondents business in Ibajay along with all their employees,
why did not the respondents simply state that fact for the record? More
importantly, why did the petitioner and Palomata continue believing that
Wayne Lim was only the respondents manager? Given the long
employment of petitioner with the respondents, was it possible for him and
his witness to make such mistake? We do not think so. In case of doubt, the
doubt is resolved in favor of labor, in favor of the safety and decent living
for the laborer as mandated by Article 1702 of the Civil Code. The reality of
the petitioners toil speaks louder than words.
Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7641,
provides: In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for
retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon
reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65)
years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has
served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall
be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being
considered as one whole year.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2)
month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the
13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of
service incentive leaves.
We concur with the CAs holding. The third paragraph of the aforequoted
provision of the Labor Code entitled Rogelio to retirement benefits as a
necessary consequence of the finding that Rogelio was an employee of
MSDC and Chan. Indeed, there should be little, if any, doubt that the
benefits under Republic Act No. 7641, which was enacted as a labor
protection measure and as a curative statute to respond, in part at least, to
the financial well-being of workers during their twilight years soon
following their life of labor, can be extended not only from the date of its
enactment but retroactively to the time the employment contracts started.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LOMA GOCE , (G.R. No. 113161) August
29, 1995
On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a
syndicate and in large scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the
Labor Code was filed against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and herein
accused-appellant Nelly Agustin.
FACTS OF THE CASE: The said accused, conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another, representing themselves to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment
abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and
promise employment/job placement abroad, to (1) Rolando Dalida y
Piernas, (2) Ernesto Alvarez y Lubangco, (3) Rogelio Salado y Savillo, (4)
Ramona Salado y Alvarez, (5) Dionisio Masaya y de Guzman, (6) Dave Rivera
y de Leon, (7) Lorenzo Alvarez y Velayo, and (8) Nelson Trinidad y Santos,
without first having secured the required license or authority from the
Department of Labor. On November 19, 1993, the trial court rendered
judgment finding herein appellant guilty as a principal in the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, and sentencing her to serve the penalty of life
imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of P100,000.00.. Hence this appeal.
ISSUES: Whether or not appellant Agustin merely introduced complainants
to the Goce couple or her actions went beyond that?
RULLING: The appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto
RATIO DECIDENDI: The testimonial evidence hereon show that she indeed
further committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. As correctly held
by the trial court, being an employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical
for appellant to introduce the applicants to said spouses, they being the
owners of the agency. As such, appellant was actually making referrals to
the agency of which she was a part. She was therefore engaging in
recruitment activity.
There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the
ability to send a worker abroad." 29 It is undisputed that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to
send people abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to give
her the money she demanded in order to be so employed. 30
It cannot be denied that Agustin received from complainants various sums
for purpose of their applications. Her act of collecting from each of the
complainants payment for their respective passports, training fees,
placement fees, medical tests and other sundry expenses unquestionably
constitutes an act of recruitment within the meaning of the law. In fact,
appellant demanded and received from complainants amounts beyond the
allowable limit of P5,000.00 under government regulations. It is true that
the mere act of a cashier in receiving money far exceeding the amount
allowed by law was not considered per se as "recruitment and placement"
in contemplation of law, but that was because the recipient had no other
participation in the transactions and did not conspire with her co-accused in
defrauding the victims. 31 That is not the case here.
(GR No. L-43835) Bondoc vs. Peoples Bank and Trust Company
Facts: Bondoc was chosen by the banks board of directors as the first
manager of the banks department of economic research and statistics. He
was also elected as the department manager and assistant vice-president
by the board. Bondoc reported in writing to the bank director certain
anomalies committed by the officers of the bank and such officers were
suspended by the monetary board. Months after, the board of directors of
the bank, in the course of its deliberation on the banks projected merger
with the BPI, resolved to abolish the department of economic research and
statistics. And pursuant to PD No. 21 (creating NLRC), the bank applied with
the Secretary of Labor for clearance to terminate Bondocs services and the
latter opposed alleging he was dismissed without just cause and abolition
of his position was a reprisal for his exposure of anomalies.
At first, NLRC denied the application and ordered the bank to reinstate
Bondoc with backwages. On appeal, NLRC reversed its decision. Bondoc
appealed to the Sec. Of Labor which reversed the NLRCs decision and
ordered the reinstatement of Bondoc to his former position. The BPI,
successor of the Peoples Bank, appealed to the president of the Philippines
in which the Presidential Executive Assistant set aside the decision of the
Sec. Of Labor and affirmed the decision of the NLRC holding that under the
Termination Pay Law, an employment without a definite period may be
terminated with or without just cause. Thus, this petition for certiorari
before the SC.
Issue: Whether respondent Presidential Executive Assistant committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in confirming the
abolition of the petitioners petition as a department manager in a bank
and the payment to him of separation pay instead of reinstating him in
backwages.
Held: The termination of Bondocs employment was lawful and justified
and that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction was
committed by the Presidential Executive Assistant. Bondoc was not
employed for a fixed period and held his position of department manager
at the pleasure of the banks board of directors and his stay therein
depended on his retention of the trust and confidence of the management
and whether there was any need for his services. The banks board of
directors possessed the power to remove him and to determine whether
the interest of the bank justified the existence of his department. Under the
old Termination Pay Law, it was held that in the absence of a contract of
employment for a specific period, the employer has the right to dismiss his
employees at anytime with or without just cause.
(G.R. No. L-68147 June 30, 1988) RANCE vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
NATURE OF ACTION: Petition to review the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission.
FACTS: A Collective Bargaining Agreement was entered into on April 30,
1981 by and between respondents Polybag Manufacturing Corporation and
Polybag Workers Union which provides among others:
ARTICLE V. UNION SECURITY
Any employee within the bargaining agreement who is a member of the
union at the time of the effectivity of this agreement or becomes a member
of the UNION thereafter, shall during the term thereof or any extention,
continue to be a member in good standing of the UNION as a condition of
continued employment in the COMPANY.
Any employee hired during the effectivity of this agreement shall, within 30
days after becoming regular join the UNION and continue to be a member
in good standing thereof as a condition of continued employment in the
COMPANY.
On the basis of a board resolution of the UNION, the COMPANY shall
dismiss from the service any member of the UNION who loses his
membership in good standing either by resignation therefrom or expulsion
therefrom for any of the following causes:
1. Disloyalty to the UNION;
2. Commission of acts inimical to the interest of the UNION;
3. Failure and refusal to pay UNION dues and other assessments;
4. Conviction for any offense or crime; or
5. Organizing and/or joining another labor organization claiming jurisdiction
similar to that of the UNION.
Provided, however, that in case expulsion proceedings are instituted
against any member of the UNION, pending such proceedings, the
COMPANY, on the basis of a board resolution of the UNION, shall suspend
the member concerned; and provided further, that the UNION, jointly and
severally with the officers and members of the board voting for the
dismissal or suspension, shall hold and render the COMPANY, its executive,
owners, and officers free from any and all claims and liabilities. (Rollo, p.
64).
Petitioners herein were among the members of the respondent union who
were expelled by the latter for disloyalty in that they allegedly joined the
NAFLU a large federation. Because of the expulsion, petitioners were
dismissed by respondent Corporation. Petitioners sued for reinstatement
and backwages stating their dismissal was without due process. Losing both
in the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), they elevated their cause to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the workers were denied of due process of their
constitutional right of security of tenure.
RULING: Premises was considered, the decision of NLRC was reversed and
set aside and the respondent corporation was ordered to: (1) to reinstate
petitioners to their former positions without reduction in rank, seniority
and salary; (b) to pay petitioners three-year backwages, without any
reduction or qualification, jointly and solidarily with respondent Union; and
(c) to pay petitioners exemplary damages of P500.00 each. Where
reinstatement is no longer feasible, respondent corporation and
respondent union are solidarily ordered to pay, considering their length of
service their corresponding separation pay and other benefits to which they
are entitled under the law.
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is the policy of the state to assure the right of workers
to "security of tenure" (Article XIII, Sec. 3 of the New Constitution, Section
9, Article II of the 1973 Constitution). The guarantee is an act of social
justice. When a person has no property, his job may possibly be his only
possession or means of livelihood. Therefore, he should be protected
against any arbitrary deprivation of his job. Article 280 of the Labor Code
has construed security of tenure as meaning that "the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by" the code (Bundoc v. People's Bank and Trust Company, 103
SCRA 599 [1981]). Dismissal is not justified for being arbitrary where the
workers were denied due process (Reyes v. Philippine Duplicators, Inc., 109
SCRA 489 [1981] and a clear denial of due process, or constitutional right
must be safeguarded against at all times, (De Leon v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 100 SCRA 691 [1980]). This is especially true in the
case at bar where there were 125 workers mostly heads or sole
breadwinners of their respective families.
Time and again, this Court has reminded employers that while the power to
dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer, the same is not without
limitations. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the
services of his employees especially so when it is made upon the request of
a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, as in the
instant case. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process
must be observed in dismissing an employee because it affects not only his
position but also his means of livelihood. Employers should, therefore,
respect and protect the rights of their employees, which include the right to
labor (Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 90
SCRA 393 [1979], Resolution).
In the case at bar, the scandalous haste with which respondent corporation
dismissed 125 employees lends credence to the claim that there was
connivance between respondent corporation and respondent Union. It is
evident that private respondents were in bad faith in dismissing petitioners.
They, the private respondents, are guilty of unfair labor practice.
(G.R. No. L-69870 November 29, 1988) NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION
(NASECO) AND ARTURO L. PEREZ vs. THE HONORABLE THIRD DIVISION,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, MANILA AND EUGENIA C. CREDO
(G.R. No. 70295 November 29,1988) EUGENIA C. CREDO vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION
AND ARTURO L. PEREZ
NATURE OF ACTION: Consolidated special civil actions for certiorari
seeking to review the decision * of the Third Division, National Labor
Relations Commission in Case No. 11-4944-83 dated 28 November 1984
and its resolution dated 16 January 1985 denying motions for
reconsideration of said decision.
FACTS: Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the National Service
Corporation (NASECO), a domestic corporation which provides security
guards as well as messengerial, janitorial and other similar manpower
services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was first
employed with NASECO as a lady guard on 18 July 1975. Through the years,
she was promoted to Clerk Typist, then Personnel Clerk until she became
Chief of Property and Records, on 10 March 1980. 1 WON Credo was given opportunity to be heard and to defend herself.
Sometime before 7 November 1983, Credo was administratively charged by
Sisinio S. Lloren, Manager of Finance and Special Project and Evaluation
Department of NASECO, stemming from her non-compliance with Lloren's
memorandum, dated 11 October 1983, regarding certain entry procedures
in the company's Statement of Billings Adjustment. Said charges alleged
that Credo "did not comply with Lloren's instructions to place some
corrections/additional remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment; and
when [Credo] was called by Lloren to his office to explain further the said
instructions, [Credo] showed resentment and behaved in a scandalous
manner by shouting and uttering remarks of disrespect in the presence of
her co-employees." 2
On 7 November 1983, Credo was called to meet Arturo L. Perez, then Acting
General Manager of NASECO, to explain her side before Perez and
NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs in connection with the
administrative charges filed against her. After said meeting, on the same
date, Credo was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 1 5 days, effective 8
November 1983. 3
Before the expiration of said 15-day leave, or on 18 November 1983, Credo
filed a complaint, docketed as Case No. 114944-83, with the Arbitration
Branch, National Capital Region, Ministry of Labor and Employment,
Manila, against NASECO for placing her on forced leave, without due
process. 4
Likewise, while Credo was on forced leave, or on 22 November 1983,
NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated and evaluated a
number of past acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her.
After both parties had submitted their respective position papers, affidavits
and other documentary evidence in support of their claims and defenses,
on 9 May 1984, the labor arbiter rendered a decision: 1) dismissing Credo's
complaint, and 2) directing NASECO to pay Credo separation pay equivalent
to one half month's pay for every year of service. 11
Both parties appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which, on 28 November 1984, rendered a decision: 1) directing
NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position, or substantially
equivalent position, with six (6) months' backwages and without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges appertaining thereto, and 2) dismissing
Credo's claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages. As a
consequence, both parties filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, 12 which the NLRC denied in a resolution of 16 January
1985. Hence, the present recourse by both parties.
ISSUE/S: WON NASECO complied with the guidelines in effecting Credos
dismissal before termination of employment.
RULING: The challenged decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED with
modifications. Petitioners in G.R. No. 69870, who are the private
respondents in G.R. No. 70295, are ordered to: 1) reinstate Eugenia C.
Credo to her former position at the time of her termination, or if such
reinstatement is not possible, to place her in a substantially equivalent
position, with three (3) years backwages, from 1 December 1983, without
qualification or deduction, and without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges appertaining thereto, and 2) pay Eugenia C. Credo P5,000.00 for
moral damages and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees.
RATIO DECIDENDI: These guidelines mandate that the employer furnish an
employee sought to be dismissed two (2) written notices of dismissal
before a termination of employment can be legally effected. These are the
notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for
which his dismissal is sought and the subsequent notice which informs the
employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.
Likewise, a reading of the guidelines in consonance with the express
provisions of law on protection to labor 18 (which encompasses the right to
security of tenure) and the broader dictates of procedural due process
necessarily mandate that notice of the employer's decision to dismiss an
employee, with reasons therefor, can only be issued after the employer has
afforded the employee concerned ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself.
In the case at bar, NASECO did not comply with these guidelines in effecting
Credo's dismissal. Although she was apprised and "given the chance to
explain her side" of the charges filed against her, this chance was given so
perfunctorily, thus rendering illusory Credo's right to security of tenure.
That Credo was not given ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
herself is evident from the fact that the compliance with the injunction to
apprise her of the charges filed against her and to afford her a chance to
prepare for her defense was dispensed in only a day. This is not effective
compliance with the legal requirements aforementioned.
The fact also that the Notice of Termination of Credo's employment (or the
decision to dismiss her) was dated 24 November 1983 and made effective 1
December 1983 shows that NASECO was already bent on terminating her
services when she was informed on 1 December 1983 of the charges
against her, and that any hearing which NASECO thought of affording her
after 24 November 1983 would merely be pro forma or an exercise in
futility.
Besides, Credo's mere non-compliance with Lorens memorandum regarding
the entry procedures in the company's Statement of Billings Adjustment did
not warrant the severe penalty of dismissal of the NLRC.