( )

Are X-Rays Outclassed by Powerful New Odic Ray?

By tom April 23, 2014 Bio-energy, Borderlands
(Modern Mechanix, March 1922)
odic raysAre X-Rays Outclassed by Powerful New Odic Ray?
DISCOVERY of odic rays of high penetration produced simply by the electric current drawn
from an ordinary light socket, and yet with the curative and medicinal value of X-rays, is
claimed by Dr. Edgar L. Hollingshead, of Pasadena, Calif.

With simple, inexpensive apparatus he is reported to have passed rays through 11-1/2 inches of
lead and 4-1/2 inches of steel, at such strength as to sear dental X-ray films encased in tinfoil.

Such an achievement appears impossible; yet X-rays seemed equally impossible when Rontgen
first announced their discovery. Doctor Hollingsheads claims are based on tests made in the
presence of eyewitnesses who selected at random the films exposed to the rays, retained the
duplicates, and developed the two simultaneously in the presence of an unprejudiced
committee. After exposure, these films were found to be perceptibly darkened.

Doctor Hollingshead declares that the rays produced try his apparatus are of greater intensity
and penetration than any previously known to science. The rate of vibration of the odic rays
can be controlled by the operator, it is asserted. If these claims are substantiated, the value of
the discovery to the world will be enormous. The medical profession will have an unlimited
supply of curative rays. The X-ray diagnosis can be utilized by every doctor in the country, since
the apparatus can readily be carried from house to house. The doctor has given a partial
explanation of his ray.
He has found, he says, that electricity is not simply a force, but a substance. Amperage, he adds,
is the substance part of electricity and voltage the speed. Like any other substance, electricity is
composed of vibrating molecules, atoms, electrons, and other infinitesimal units, and the form
that the substance takes is due to the rates of atomic speed.

The only differences between one ray of light and another are in wave lengths or vibration,
speed of discharge, and polarity. Assuming that electricity is like water flowing through a pipe,
and that its voltage is the speed with which it travels, he first intensifies its atomic speed, then
he breaks it up, releasing a force or ray of great speed and power.

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Odic force

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Baron Carl von Reichenbach

The Odic force (also called Od [d], Odyle, nd, Odes, Odylic, Odyllic, or Odems) is the name given in the
mid-19th century to a hypothetical vital energy or life force by Baron Carl von Reichenbach. Von
Reichenbach coined the name from that of the Norse god Odin in 1845.[1][2]

Contents [hide]

1 History

2 Scientific reception
3 See also

4 References

5 External links

History[edit]

As von Reichenbach was investigating the manner in which the human nervous system could be affected
by various substances, he conceived the existence of a new force allied to electricity, magnetism, and
heat, a force which he thought was radiated by most substances, and to the influence of which different
persons are variously sensitive.[3] He named this vitalist concept Odic force. Proponents say that Odic
force permeates all plants, animals, and humans.[4]

Believers in Odic force said that it is visible in total darkness as colored auras surrounding living things,
crystals, and magnets, but that viewing it requires hours first spent in total darkness, and only very
sensitive people have the ability to see it.[5] They also said that it resembles the eastern concepts prana
and qi. However, they regarded the Odic force as not associated with breath (like India's prana and the
qi of Eastern martial arts) but rather mainly with biological electromagnetic fields.[6]

Von Reichenbach did not tie Odic force into other vitalist theories. Baron von Reichenbach expounded
the concept of Odic force in detail in a book-length article, Researches on Magnetism, Electricity, Heat
and Light in their Relations to Vital Forces, which appeared in a special issue of a respected scientific
journal, Annalen der Chemie und Physik. He said that (1) the Odic force had a positive and negative flux,
and a light and dark side; (2) individuals could forcefully "emanate" it, particularly from the hands,
mouth, and forehead; and (3) the Odic force had many possible applications.

The Odic force was conjectured to explain the phenomenon of hypnotism. In Britain, impetus was given
to this view of the subject following the translation of Reichenbach's Researches by a professor of
chemistry at the University of Edinburgh. These later researches tried to show many of the Odic
phenomena to be of the same nature as those described previously by Franz Mesmer and even long
before Mesmer by Swedenborg.[7]

The French parapsychologists Hippolyte Baraduc and Albert de Rochas were influenced by the concept
of the Odic force.[8]

Von Reichenbach hoped to develop scientific proof for a universal life force; however, his experiments
relied on perceptions reported by individuals who claimed to be "sensitive", as he himself could not
observe any of the reported phenomena. The "sensitives" had to work in total or near-total darkness to
be able to observe the phenomena. Reichenbach stated that, through experimentation, possibly 1/3 of
the population could view the phenomenon, but far less otherwise.

Scientific reception[edit]

The concept of Odic force was criticized by the scientific community as there was no reliable or
replicable data for its existence. In the 19th century it was described as quackery by critics and is
regarded today as an example of pseudoscience.[9][10][11]

Science writer Martin Gardner in his book Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science (1957) noted that
"scientists were unable to duplicate the baron's experiments."[12]
Robert Todd Carroll in the The Skeptic's Dictionary has written:

The baron had no training in psychology or psychopathology and no training in devising experiments
involving people. He applied many standard scientific techniques and followed standard practices of
data collection and recording, including graphs and charts. But he seems to have had no sense of how to
do a controlled experiment with so-called "sensitives," people who might better be described as
neurotics or delusional. (Jastrow says that for the most part, his subjects were "neurotic young
women.") Given the fact that he deceived himself so thoroughly over such a long period of time, it
seems reasonable to assume that he was (at the very least) unconsciously suggesting behaviors to his
subjects. His enthusiasm for the project undoubtedly biased his subjective observations. That he came
to think that the odic force could explain dozens of disparate phenomena, while being unable to
convince other scientists that he had discovered anything, signifies the pathological nature of his
investigations. Reichenbach's pursuit of the odic force is a classic example of pathological science.[13]

Scientists have abandoned concepts such as the Odic force. In western popular culture the name is used
in a similar way to qi or prana to refer to spiritual energies or the vital force associated with living things.
In Europe, the Odic force has been mentioned in books on dowsing, for example.[14]

See also[edit]

Aether (classical element)

Aether theories

Energy (esotericism)

Kirlian photography

Mana

Orgone

Prana

Qi

Seid

Vitalism

Vril

References[edit]

Jump up ^ Williams, William F. (2000). Encyclopedia of Pseudoscience: From Alien Abductions to Zone
Therapy. Facts on File Inc. p. 299. ISBN 1-57958-207-9

Jump up ^ Levitt, Theresa. (2009). The Shadow of Enlightenment: Optical and Political Transparency in
France, 1789-1848. Oxford University Press. p. 113. ISBN 978-0-19-954470-7

Jump up ^ Serge Kahili King, Serge King Earth Energies: A Quest for the Hidden Power of the Planet 1992,
Chapter 3 The Odic Force and Reichenbach, pp. 38-60
Jump up ^ Mary Coddington Seekers of the Healing Energy: Reich, Cayce, the Kahunas, and Other
Masters of the Vital Force 1991, p. 67

Jump up ^ Peter Johannes Thiel The Diagnosis Of Disease By Observation Of The Eye To Enable
Physicians, Healers, Teachers, Parents to Read the Eyes Kessinger Reprint Edition, 2004, p. 52

Jump up ^ Mark Woodhouse Paradigm Wars: Worldviews for a New Age 1996, pp. 191-192

Jump up ^ Charles R. Kelley Life Force... the Creative Process in Man And in Nature 2004, pp. 286-287

Jump up ^ Bruce Clarke, Linda Dalrymple Henderson From Energy to Information: Representation in
Science and Technology, Art and Literature 2002, pp. 140-141

Jump up ^ Steavenson, William Edward. (1884). Electricity & Its Manner of Working in the Treatment of
Disease. London : J. & A. Churchill. p. 8

Jump up ^ Jastrow, Joseph. (1935). Wish and Wisdom: Episodes in the Vagaries of Belief. D. Appleton-
Century Company. pp. 341-349. (Published in 1962 by Dover Books as Error and Eccentricity in Human
Belief).

Jump up ^ Radner, Daisie; Radner, Michael. (1982). Science and Unreason. Wadsworth. pp. 24-29. ISBN
0-534-01153-5

Jump up ^ Gardner, Martin. (2012 edition, originally published in 1957). Fads and Fallacies in the Name
of Science. Dover Publications. p. 345. ISBN 0-486-20394-8

Jump up ^ "Reichenbach's Odic force". The Skeptic's Dictionary. Retrieved 18 April 2016.

Jump up ^ Spiesberger, Karl (1989) [1962]. Der erfolgreiche Pendel-Praktiker: Das Geheimnis des
siderischen Pendels - Ein Querschnitt durch das Gesamtgebiet der Pendel [Reveal the Power of the
Pendulum: Secrets of the Sidereal Pendulum, A Complete Survey of Pendulum Dowsing]. ISBN 0-572-
01419-8.

External links[edit]

Researches on Magnetism, Electricity, Heat and Light in their relations to Vital Forces or here

Public Domain This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm,
Hugh, ed. (1911). "article name needed". Encyclopdia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University
Press.

[show] v t e

Pseudoscience

Categories: Consciousnessmatter dualismHypnosisMagic (paranormal)Magical terms in Germanic

mysticismNew AgeObsolete biological theoriesPseudoscienceVitalism
 Dualism (philosophy of mind)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Main article: Dualism

Ren Descartes's illustration of dualism. Inputs are passed on by the sensory organs to theepiphysis in the
brain and from there to the immaterial spirit.

In philosophy of mind, dualism is the position that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-
physical,[1] or that the mind and body are not identical.[2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about
the relationship between mind and matter, and between subject and object, and is contrasted with
other positions, such as physicalismand enactivism, in the mindbody problem.[1][2]
Aristotle shared Plato's view of multiple souls and further elaborated a hierarchical arrangement,
corresponding to the distinctive functions of plants, animals, and people: a nutritive soul of growth
and metabolism that all three share; a perceptive soul of pain, pleasure, and desire that only people
and other animals share; and the faculty of reason that is unique to people only. In this view, a soul
is the hylomorphic form of a viable organism, wherein each level of the hierarchy
formally supervenes upon thesubstance of the preceding level. Thus, for Aristotle, all three souls
perish when the living organism dies.[3][4] For Plato however, the soul was not dependent on the
physical body; he believed in metempsychosis, the migration of the soul to a new physical body.[5]
Dualism is closely associated with the thought of Ren Descartes (1641), which holds that the mind
is a nonphysicaland therefore, non-spatialsubstance. Descartes clearly identified the mind
with consciousness and self-awareness and distinguished this from the brain as the seat
of intelligence.[6] Hence, he was the first to formulate the mindbody problem in the form in which it
exists today.[7] Dualism is contrasted with various kinds of monism. Substance dualism is contrasted
with all forms of materialism, but property dualism may be considered a form of emergent
materialism or non-reductive physicalism in some sense.

Contents
[hide]

1Types of mindbody dualism

o 1.1Substance or Cartesian dualism
o 1.2Property dualism
 1.2.1Epiphenomenalism
o 1.3Predicate dualism
2Dualist views of mental causation
o 2.1Interactionism
o 2.2Non-reductive physicalism
o 2.3Epiphenomenalism
o 2.4Parallelism
o 2.5Occasionalism
3Historical overview
o 3.1Plato and Aristotle
o 3.2From Neoplatonism to scholasticism
o 3.3Descartes and his disciples
4Arguments for dualism
o 4.1The subjective argument
o 4.2Special sciences argument
o 4.3The zombie argument
o 4.4Argument from personal identity
o 4.5Argument from reason
o 4.6Causal interaction
5Arguments against dualism
o 5.1Causal interaction
o 5.2Argument from physics
5.2.1Replies to the argument from causal interaction and the argument from physics
o 5.3Argument from brain damage
o 5.4Argument from biological development
o 5.5Argument from neuroscience
o 5.6Argument from simplicity
6See also
7References
8Further reading
9External links

Types of mindbody dualism[edit]

Ontological dualism makes dual commitments about the nature of existence as it relates to mind and
matter, and can be divided into three different types:

1. Substance dualism asserts that mind and matter are fundamentally distinct kinds of
foundations.[1]
2. Property dualism suggests that the ontological distinction lies in the differences between
properties of mind and matter (as in emergentism).[1]
3. Predicate dualism claims the irreducibility of mental predicates to physical predicates.[1]
Substance or Cartesian dualism[edit]
Substance dualism is a type of dualism most famously defended by Ren Descartes, which states
that there are two kinds of foundation: mental and body.[6] This philosophy states that the mental can
exist outside of the body, and the body cannot think. Substance dualism is important historically for
having given rise to much thought regarding the famous mindbody problem. Substance dualism is
a philosophical position compatible with most theologies which claim that immortal souls occupy an
independent "realm" of existence distinct from that of the physical world.[1]
Property dualism[edit]
Main article: Property dualism
Property dualism asserts that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of
mind and matter, and that consciousness is ontologically irreducible to neurobiology and physics. It
asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e., in the way that living human
bodies are organized), mental properties emerge. Hence, it is a sub-branch of emergent materialism.
What views properly fall under the property dualism rubric is itself a matter of dispute. There are
different versions of property dualism, some of which claim independent categorisation.[8]
Non-reductive physicalism is a form of property dualism in which it is asserted that all mental states
are causally reducible to physical states. One argument for this has been made in the form
of anomalous monism expressed by Donald Davidson, where it is argued that mental events are
identical to physical events, and there can be strict law-governed causal relationships. Another
argument for this has been expressed by John Searle, who is the advocate of a distinctive form of
physicalism he calls biological naturalism. His view is that although mental states are ontologically
irreducible to physical states, they are causally reducible (see causality). He has acknowledged that
"to many people" his views and those of property dualists look a lot alike. But he thinks the
comparison is misleading.[8]
Epiphenomenalism[edit]
Main article: Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism is a form of Property Dualism, in which it is asserted that one or more mental
states do not have any influence on physical states (both ontologically and causally irreducible). It
asserts that while material causes give rise to sensations, volitions, ideas, etc., such mental
phenomena themselves cause nothing further: they are causal dead-ends. This can be contrasted
to interactionism, on the other hand, in which mental causes can produce material effects, and vice
versa.[9]
Predicate dualism[edit]
Predicate dualism is a view espoused by nonreductive physicalists such as Donald
Davidson and Jerry Fodor, who maintain that while there is only one ontological category of
substances and properties of substances (usually physical), the predicates that we use to describe
mental events cannot be redescribed in terms of (or reduced to) physical predicates of natural
languages.[10][11] If we characterize predicate monism as the view subscribed to by eliminative
materialists, who maintain that such intentional predicates as believe, desire, think, feel, etc., will
eventually be eliminated from both the language of science and from ordinary language because the
entities to which they refer do not exist, then predicate dualism is most easily defined as the
negation of this position. Predicate dualists believe that so-called "folk psychology", with all of
its propositional attitude ascriptions, is an ineliminable part of the enterprise of describing, explaining
and understanding human mental states and behavior.
Davidson, for example, subscribes to Anomalous Monism, according to which there can be no strict
psycho-physical laws which connect mental and physical events under their descriptions
as mental andphysical events. However, all mental events also have physical descriptions. It is in
terms of the latter that such events can be connected in law-like relations with other physical events.
Mental predicates are irreducibly different in character (rational, holistic and necessary) from
physical predicates (contingent, atomic and causal).[10]

Dualist views of mental causation[edit]

Four varieties of dualist causal interaction. The arrows indicate the direction of causations. Mental and physical
states are shown in red and blue, respectively.

This part is about causation between properties and states of the thing under study, not its
substances or predicates. Here a state is the set of all properties of what's being studied. Thus each
state describes only one point in time.
Interactionism[edit]
Main article: Interactionism (philosophy of mind)

Interactionism is the view that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, causally interact with
physical states. This is a position which is very appealing to common-sense intuitions,
notwithstanding the fact that it is very difficult to establish its validity or correctness by way
oflogical argumentation or empirical proof. It seems to appeal to common-sense because we are
surrounded by such everyday occurrences as a child's touching a hot stove (physical event) which
causes him to feel pain (mental event) and then yell and scream (physical event) which causes his
parents to experience a sensation of fear and protectiveness (mental event) and so on.[6]
Non-reductive physicalism[edit]
Main article: Non-reductive physicalism
Non-reductive physicalism is the idea that while mental states are physical they are not reducible to
physical properties, in that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between the properties of
mind and matter. According to non-reductive physicalism all mental states are causally reducible to
physical states where mental properties map to physical properties and vice versa. A prominent form
of non-reductive physicalism called anomalous monism was first proposed by Donald Davidson in
his 1970 paper Mental events, where it is claimed that mental events are identical with physical
events, and that the mental is anomalous, i.e. under their mental descriptions these mental events
are not regulated by strict physical laws.
Epiphenomenalism[edit]
Main article: Epiphenomenalism
According to epiphenomenalism, all mental events are caused by a physical event and have no
physical consequences, and that one or more mental states do not have any influence on physical
states. So, the mental event of deciding to pick up a rock ("M1") is caused by the firing of specific
neurons in the brain ("P1"). When the arm and hand move to pick up the rock ("P2") this is not
caused by the preceding mental event M1, nor by M1 and P1 together, but only by P1. The physical
causes are in principle reducible to fundamental physics, and therefore mental causes are
eliminated using this reductionist explanation. If P1 causes both M1 and P2, there is
no overdetermination in the explanation for P2.[6]
The idea that even if the animal were conscious nothing would be added to the production of
behavior, even in animals of the human type, was first voiced by La Mettrie (1745), and then
by Cabanis (1802), and was further explicated by Hodgson (1870)
and Huxley (1874).[12] Jackson gave a subjective argument for epiphenomenalism, but later refuted it
and embraced physicalism.[13]
Parallelism[edit]
Main article: Parallelism (philosophy)
Psycho-physical parallelism is a very unusual view about the interaction between mental and
physical events which was most prominently, and perhaps only truly, advocated by Gottfried Wilhelm
von Leibniz. Like Malebranche and others before him, Leibniz recognized the weaknesses of
Descartes' account of causal interaction taking place in a physical location in the brain. Malebranche
decided that such a material basis of interaction between material and immaterial was impossible
and therefore formulated his doctrine of occasionalism, stating that the interactions were really
caused by the intervention of God on each individual occasion. Leibniz's idea is that God has
created a pre-established harmony such that it only seems as if physical and mental events cause,
and are caused by, one another. In reality, mental causes only have mental effects and physical
causes only have physical effects. Hence the term parallelism is used to describe this view.[9]
Occasionalism[edit]
Main article: Occasionalism
Occasionalism is a philosophical doctrine about causation which says that created substances
cannot be efficient causes of events. Instead, all events are taken to be caused directly by God
himself. The theory states that the illusion of efficient causation between mundane events arises out
of a constant conjunction that God had instituted, such that every instance where the cause is
present will constitute an "occasion" for the effect to occur as an expression of the aforementioned
power. This "occasioning" relation, however, falls short of efficient causation. In this view, it is not the
case that the first event causes God to cause the second event: rather, God first caused one and
then caused the other, but chose to regulate such behaviour in accordance with general laws of
nature. Some of its most prominent historical exponents have been Louis de la Forge, Arnold
Geulincx, and Nicholas Malebranche.[14]

Historical overview[edit]
Plato and Aristotle[edit]
In the dialogue Phaedo, Plato formulated his famous Theory of Forms as distinct and immaterial
substances of which the objects and other phenomena that we perceive in the world are nothing
more than mere shadows.[5]
Plato makes it clear, in the Phaedo, that the Forms are the universalia ante res, i.e. they are ideal
universals, by which we are able to understand the world. In his allegory of the cave Plato likens the
achievement of philosophical understanding to emerging into the sun from a dark cave, where only
vague shadows of what lies beyond that prison are cast dimly upon the wall. Plato's forms are non-
physical and non-mental. They exist nowhere in time or space, but neither do they exist in the mind,
nor in the pleroma of matter; rather, matter is said to "participate" in form ( methexis). It
remained unclear however, even to Aristotle, exactly what Plato intended by that.
Aristotle argued at length against many aspects of Plato's forms, creating his own doctrine
of hylomorphism wherein form and matter coexist. Ultimately however, Aristotle's aim was to perfect
a theory of forms, rather than to reject it. Although Aristotle strongly rejected the independent
existence Plato attributed to forms, his metaphysics do agree with Plato's a priori considerations
quite often. For example, Aristotle argues that changeless, eternal substantial form is necessarily
immaterial. Because matter provides a stable substratum for a change in form, matter always has
the potential to change. Thus, if given an eternity in which to do so, it will, necessarily, exercise that
potential.
Part of Aristotle's psychology, the study of the soul, is his account of the ability of humans to reason
and the ability of animals to perceive. In both cases, perfect copies of forms are acquired, either by
direct impression of environmental forms, in the case of perception, or else by virtue of
contemplation, understanding and recollection. He believed the mind can literally assume any form
being contemplated or experienced, and it was unique in its ability to become a blank slate, having
no essential form. As thoughts of earth are not heavy, any more than thoughts of fire are causally
efficient, they provide an immaterial complement for the formless mind.[3]
From Neoplatonism to scholasticism[edit]
In the philosophical school of Neoplatonism, most active in Late Antiquity, claimed that the physical
and the spiritual are both emanations of the One. Neoplatonism exerted a considerable influence
onChristianity, as did the philosophy of Aristotle via scholasticism.[15]
In the scholastic tradition of Saint Thomas Aquinas, a number of whose doctrines have been
incorporated into Roman Catholic dogma, the soul is the substantial form of a human
being.[16] Aquinas held theQuaestiones disputate de anima, or "Disputed questions on the soul", at
the Roman studium provinciale of the Dominican Order at Santa Sabina, the forerunner of
the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelicum during the academic year 1265-
66.[17] By 1268 Aquinas had written at least the first book of the Sententia Libri De anima, Aquinas'
commentary on Aristotle's De anima, the translation of which from the Greek was completed by
Aquinas' Dominican associate at Viterbo William of Moerbeke in 1267.[18] Like Aristotle, Aquinas held
that the human being was a unified composite substance of two substantial principles: form and
matter. The soul is the substantial form and so the first actuality of a material organic body with the
potentiality for life.[19] While Aquinas defended the unity of human nature as a composite substance
constituted by these two inextricable principles of form and matter, he also argued for the
incorruptibility of the intellectual soul,[20] in contrast to the corruptibility of the vegetative and sensitive
animation of plants and animals.[21] His argument for the subsistence and incorruptibility of the
intellectual soul takes its point of departure from the metaphysical principle that operation follows
upon being (agiture sequitur esse), i.e., the activity of a thing reveals the mode of being and
existence it depends upon. Since the intellectual soul exercises its own per se intellectual operations
without employing material faculties, i.e. intellectual operations are immaterial, the intellect itself and
the intellectual soul, must likewise be immaterial and so incorruptible. Even though the intellectual
soul of man is able to subsist upon the death of the human being, Aquinas does not hold that the
human person is able to remain integrated at death. The separated intellectual soul is neither a man
nor a human person. The intellectual soulby itself is not a human person (i.e., an
individual supposit of a rational nature).[22] Hence, Aquinas held that "soul of St. Peter pray for us"
would be more appropriate than "St. Peter pray for us", because all things connected with his
person, including memories, ended with his corporeal life.[23]
The Catholic doctrine of the resurrection of the body states that at the second coming, the souls of
the departed will be reunited with their bodies as a whole person (substance) and witness to
the apocalypse. The thorough consistency between dogma and contemporary science was
maintained here[24] in part from a serious attendance to the principle that there can be only one truth.
Consistency with science, logic, philosophy, and faith remained a high priority for centuries, and a
university doctorate in theology generally included the entire science curriculum as a prerequisite.
This doctrine is not universally accepted by Christians today. Many believe that one's immortal soul
goes directly to Heaven upon death of the body.[25]
Descartes and his disciples[edit]
In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes embarked upon a quest in which he called all his
previous beliefs into doubt, in order to find out of what he could be certain.[7] In so doing, he
discovered that he could doubt whether he had a body (it could be that he was dreaming of it or that
it was an illusion created by an evil demon), but he could not doubt whether he had a mind. This
gave Descartes his first inkling that the mind and body were different things. The mind, according to
Descartes, was a "thinking thing" (lat. res cogitans), and an immaterial substance. This "thing" was
the essence of himself, that which doubts, believes, hopes, and thinks. The body (res extensa) "the
thing that exists" regulates normal bodily functions (such as heart and liver). According to Descartes,
animals only had a body, a res extensa, and not a soul (which distinguishes humans from animals).
The distinction between mind and body is argued in Meditation VI as follows: I have a clear and
distinct idea of myself as a thinking, non-extended thing, and a clear and distinct idea of body as an
extended and non-thinking thing. Whatever I can conceive clearly and distinctly, God can so create.
So, Descartes argues, the mind, a thinking thing, can exist apart from its extended body. And
therefore, the mind is a substance distinct from the body, a substance whose essence is thought.[7]
The central claim of what is often called Cartesian dualism, in honor of Descartes, is that the
immaterial mind and the material body, while being ontologically distinct substances, causally
interact. This is an idea that continues to feature prominently in many non-European philosophies.
Mental events cause physical events, and vice versa. But this leads to a substantial problem for
Cartesian dualism: How can an immaterial mind cause anything in a material body, and vice versa?
This has often been called the "problem of interactionism."
Descartes himself struggled to come up with a feasible answer to this problem. In his letter
to Elisabeth of Bohemia, Princess Palatine, he suggested that spirits interacted with the body
through the pineal gland, a small gland in the centre of the brain, between the
two hemispheres.[7] The term "Cartesian dualism" is also often associated with this more specific
notion of causal interaction through the pineal gland. However, this explanation was not
satisfactory: how can an immaterial mind interact with the physical pineal gland? Because
Descartes' was such a difficult theory to defend, some of his disciples, such asArnold
Geulincx and Nicholas Malebranche, proposed a different explanation: That all mindbody
interactions required the direct intervention of God. According to these philosophers, the appropriate
states of mind and body were only the occasions for such intervention, not real causes.
These occasionalists maintained the strong thesis that all causation was directly dependent on God,
instead of holding that all causation was natural except for that between mind and body.[14]

Arguments for dualism[edit]

Another one of Descartes' illustrations. The fire displaces the skin, which pulls a tiny thread, which opens a
pore in the ventricle (F) allowing the "animal spirit" to flow through a hollow tube, which inflates the muscle of
the leg, causing the foot to withdraw.

The subjective argument[edit]

An important fact is that minds perceive intramental states differently from sensory
phenomena,[26] and this cognitive difference results in mental and physical phenomena having
seemingly disparate properties. The subjective argument holds that these properties are
irreconcilable under a physical mind.
Mental events have a certain subjective quality to them, whereas physical seem not to. So, for
example, one may ask what a burned finger feels like, or what the blueness of the sky looks like, or
what nice music sounds like.[27] Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental
events qualia. There is something that it's like to feel pain, to see a familiar shade of blue, and so on.
There are qualia involved in these mental events. And the claim is that qualia cannot be reduced to
anything physical.[1]
Thomas Nagel first characterized the problem of qualia for physicalistic monism in his article, "What
is it like to be a bat?". Nagel argued that even if we knew everything there was to know from a third-
person, scientific perspective about a bat's sonar system, we still wouldn't know what it is like to be a
bat. However, others argue thatqualia are consequent of the same neurological processes that
engender the bat's mind, and will be fully understood as the science develops.[28]
Frank Jackson formulated his well-known knowledge argument based upon similar considerations.
In this thought experiment, known as Mary's room, he asks us to consider a neuroscientist, Mary,
who was born, and has lived all of her life, in a black and white room with a black and white
television and computer monitor where she collects all the scientific data she possibly can on the
nature of colours. Jackson asserts that as soon as Mary leaves the room, she will come to have new
knowledge which she did not possess before: the knowledge of the experience of colours (i.e., what
they are like). Although Mary knows everything there is to know about colours from an objective,
third-person perspective, she has never known, according to Jackson, what it was like to see red,
orange, or green. If Mary really learns something new, it must be knowledge of something non-
physical, since she already knew everything about the physical aspects of colour.[29]
However, Jackson later rejected his argument and embraced physicalism.[30] He notes that Mary
obtains knowledge not of color, but of a new intramental state, seeing color.[13] Also, he notes that
Mary might say "wow," and as a mental state affecting the physical, this clashed with his former view
of epiphenomenalism. David Lewis' response to this argument, now known as the ability argument,
is that what Mary really came to know was simply the ability to recognize and identify color
sensations to which she had previously not been exposed.[31] Daniel Dennett and others also provide
arguments against this notion (see Objections).
Special sciences argument[edit]
Robinson argues that, if predicate dualism is correct, then there are "special sciences" that are
irreducible to physics. These allegedly irreducible subjects, which contain irreducible predicates,
differ from hard sciences in that they are interest-relative. Here, interest-relative fields depend on the
existence of minds that can have interested perspectives.[9] Psychology is one such science; it
completely depends on and presupposes the existence of the mind.
Physics is the general analysis of nature, conducted in order to understand how
the universe behaves. On the other hand, the study of meteorological weather patterns or human
behavior is only of interest to humans themselves. The point is that having a perspective on the
world is a psychological state. Therefore, the special sciences presuppose the existence of minds
which can have these states. If one is to avoid ontological dualism, then the mind that has a
perspective must be part of the physical reality to which it applies its perspective. If this is the case,
then in order to perceive the physical world as psychological, the mind must have a perspective on
the physical. This, in turn, presupposes the existence of mind.[9]
However, cognitive science[32] and psychology[33] do not require the mind to be irreducible, and
operate on the assumption that it has physical basis. In fact, it is common in science to presuppose
a complex system;[34] while fields such as chemistry,[35] biology,[36] or geology[37] could be verbosely
expressed in terms of quantum field theory, it is convenient to use levels of abstraction
like molecules, cells, or themantle. It is often difficult to decompose these levels without heavy
analysis[38] and computation.[39] Sober has also advanced philosophical arguments against the notion
of irreducibility.[40]
The zombie argument[edit]
Main article: Philosophical zombie
The zombie argument is based on a thought experiment proposed by David Chalmers. The basic
idea is that one can imagine, and, therefore, conceive the existence of, an apparently functioning
human being/body without any conscious states being associated with it.
Chalmers' argument is that it seems plausible that such a being could exist because all that is
needed is that all and only the things that the physical sciences describe and observe about a
human being must be true of the zombie. None of the concepts involved in these sciences make
reference to consciousness or other mental phenomena, and any physical entity can be described
scientifically via physics whether it is conscious or not. The mere logical possibility of a p-zombie
demonstrates that consciousness is a natural phenomenon beyond the current unsatisfactory
explanations. Chalmers states that one probably could not build a living p-zombie because living
things seem to require a level of consciousness. However (unconscious?) robots built to simulate
humans may become the first real p-zombies. Hence Chalmers half-joking calls for the need to build
a "consciousness meter" to ascertain if any given entity, human or robot, is conscious or not.[41][42]
Others such as Dennett have argued that the notion of a philosophical zombie is an incoherent,[43] or
unlikely,[44] concept. In particular, nothing proves that an entity (e.g., a computer or robot) which
would perfectly mimic human beings, and especially perfectly mimic expressions of feelings (like joy,
fear, anger, ...), would not indeed experience them, thus having similar states of consciousness to
what a real human would have. It is argued that under physicalism, one must either believe that
anyone including oneself might be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombiefollowing from the
assertion that one's own conviction about being (or not being) a zombie is a product of the physical
world and is therefore no different from anyone else's.
Argument from personal identity[edit]
This argument concerns the differences between the applicability of counterfactual conditionals to
physical objects, on the one hand, and to conscious, personal agents on the other.[45] In the case of
any material object, e.g. a printer, we can formulate a series of counterfactuals in the following
manner:

1. This printer could have been made of straw.

2. This printer could have been made of some other kind of plastics and vacuum-tube
transistors.
3. This printer could have been made of 95% of what it is actually made of and 5% vacuum-
tube transistors, etc..
Somewhere along the way from the printer's being made up exactly of the parts and materials which
actually constitute it to the printer's being made up of some different matter at, say, 20%, the
question of whether this printer is the same printer becomes a matter of arbitrary convention.
Imagine the case of a person, Frederick, who has a counterpart born from the same egg and a
slightly genetically modified sperm. Imagine a series of counterfactual cases corresponding to the
examples applied to the printer. Somewhere along the way, one is no longer sure about the identity
of Frederick. In this latter case, it has been claimed, overlap of constitution cannot be applied to the
identity of mind. As Madell puts it:
"But while my present body can thus have its partial counterpart in some possible world, my
present consciousness cannot. Any present state of consciousness that I can imagine either
is or is not mine. There is no question of degree here."[45]
If the counterpart of Frederick, Frederickus, is 70% constituted of the same physical substance
as Frederick, does this mean that it is also 70% mentally identical with Frederick? Does it make
sense to say that something is mentally 70% Frederick?[46] A possible solution to this dilemma is
that of open individualism.
Argument from reason[edit]
Main article: Argument from reason
Philosophers and scientists such as Victor Reppert, William Hasker, and Alvin Plantinga have
developed an argument for dualism dubbed the "argument from reason". They credit C.S.
Lewis with first bringing the argument to light in his book Miracles; Lewis called the argument
"The Cardinal Difficulty of Naturalism", which was the title of chapter three of Miracles.[47]
The argument postulates that if, as naturalism entails, all of our thoughts are the effect of a
physical cause, then we have no reason for assuming that they are also the consequent of a
reasonable ground. However, knowledge is apprehended by reasoning from ground to
consequent. Therefore, if naturalism were true, there would be no way of knowing it (or anything
else), except by a fluke.[47]
Through this logic, the statement "I have reason to believe naturalism is valid" is inconsistent in
the same manner as "I never tell the truth."[48] That is, to conclude its truth would eliminate the
grounds from which to reach it. To summarize the argument in the book, Lewis quotes J. B. S.
Haldane, who appeals to a similar line of reasoning:[49]
If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no
reason to suppose that my beliefs are true ... and hence I have no reason for supposing my
brain to be composed of atoms.

J. B. S. Haldane, Possible Worlds, page 209

In his essay "Is Theology Poetry?", Lewis himself summarises the argument in a similar fashion
when he writes:
If minds are wholly dependent on brains, and brains on biochemistry, and biochemistry (in the
long run) on the meaningless flux of the atoms, I cannot understand how the thought of those
minds should have any more significance than the sound of the wind in the trees.

C. S. Lewis, The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses, page 139

But Lewis later agreed with Elizabeth Anscombe's response to his Miracles argument.[50] She
showed that an argument could be valid and ground-consequent even if its propositions were
generated viaphysical cause and effect by non-rational factors.[51] Similar to Anscombe, Richard
Carrier and John Beversluis have written extensive objections to the argument from reason on
the untenability of its first postulate.[52]
Causal interaction[edit]
If consciousness (the mind) can exist independently of physical reality (the brain), one must
explain how physical memories are created concerning consciousness. Dualism must therefore
explain how consciousness affects physical reality.
The explanation given by Arnold Geulincx and Nicholas Malebranche is that of occasionalism,
where all mindbody interactions require the direct intervention of God.
At the time C. S. Lewis wrote Miracles,[53] quantum mechanics (and physical indeterminism) was
only in the initial stages of acceptance, but still Lewis stated the logical possibility that, if the
physical world was proved to be indeterministic, this would provide an entry (interaction) point
into the traditionally viewed closed system, where a scientifically described physically
probable/improbable event could be philosophically described as an action of a non-physical
entity on physical reality. He states, however, that none of the arguments in his book will rely on
this. It should also be noted that, while someinterpretations of quantum mechanics
consider wave function collapse to be indeterminate,[54] in others this event is defined and
deterministic.[54]

Arguments against dualism[edit]

Causal interaction[edit]

Cartesian dualism compared to three forms of monism.

One argument against Dualism is with regard to causal interaction. If consciousness (the mind)
can exist independently of physical reality (the brain), one must explain how physical memories
are created concerning consciousness. Dualism must therefore explain how consciousness
affects physical reality. One of the main objections to dualistic interactionism is lack of
explanation of how the material and immaterial are able to interact. Varieties of dualism
according to which an immaterial mind causally affects the material body and vice versa have
come under strenuous attack from different quarters, especially in the 20th century. Critics of
dualism have often asked how something totally immaterial can affect something totally
materialthis is the basicproblem of causal interaction.
First, it is not clear where the interaction would take place. For example, burning one's finger
causes pain. Apparently there is some chain of events, leading from the burning of skin, to the
stimulation of nerve endings, to something happening in the peripheral nerves of one's body that
lead to one's brain, to something happening in a particular part of one's brain, and finally
resulting in the sensation of pain. But pain is not supposed to be spatially locatable. It might be
responded that the pain "takes place in the brain." But evidently, the pain is in the finger. This
may not be a devastating criticism.
However, there is a second problem about the interaction. Namely, the question of how the
interaction takes place, where in dualism "the mind" is assumed to be non-physical and by
definition outside of the realm of science. The mechanism which explains the connection
between the mental and the physical would therefore be a philosophical proposition as
compared to a scientific theory. For example, compare such a mechanism to a physical
mechanism that is well understood. Take a very simple causal relation, such as when a cue ball
strikes an eight ball and causes it to go into the pocket. What happens in this case is that the
cue ball has a certain amount of momentum as its mass moves across the pool table with a
certain velocity, and then that momentum is transferred to the eight ball, which then heads
toward the pocket. Compare this to the situation in the brain, where one wants to say that a
decision causes some neurons to fire and thus causes a body to move across the room. The
intention to "cross the room now" is a mental event and, as such, it does not have physical
properties such as force. If it has no force, then it would seem that it could not possibly cause
any neuron to fire. However, with Dualism, an explanation is required of how something without
any physical properties has physical effects.[55]
Alfred North Whitehead and, later, David Ray Griffin framed a new ontology (process
philosophy) seeking precisely to avoid the pittfals of ontological dualism.[56]
Argument from physics[edit]
The argument from physics is closely related to the argument from causal interaction.
Many physicists and consciousness researchers have argued that any action of a nonphysical
mind on the brain would entail the violation of physical laws, such as the conservation of
energy.[57][58][59][60]
By assuming a deterministic physical universe, the objection can be formulated more precisely.
When a person decides to walk across a room, it is generally understood that the decision to do
so, a mental event, immediately causes a group of neurons in that person's brain to fire, a
physical event, which ultimately results in his walking across the room. The problem is that if
there is something totally nonphysicalcausing a bunch of neurons to fire, then there is
no physical event which causes the firing. This means that some physical energy is required to
be generated against the physical laws of the deterministic universethis is by definition a
miracle and there can be no scientific explanation of (repeatable experiment performed
regarding) where the physical energy for the firing came from.[61] Such interactions would violate
the fundamental laws of physics. In particular, if some external source of energy is responsible
for the interactions, then this would violate the law of the conservation of energy.[62] Dualistic
interactionism has therefore been argued against in that it violates a general heuristic principle
of science: the causal closure of the physical world.
Replies to the argument from causal interaction and the argument from physics[edit]
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy[6] and Catholic Encyclopedia[63] give two possible
replies to these objections. The first reply is that the mind may influence the distribution of
energy, without altering its quantity. The second possibility is to deny that the human body is
causally closed, as the conservation of energy applies only to closed systems. However,
physicalists object at thno evidence exists for the causal non-closure of the human body.[64]
Another reply is akin to parallelismMills holds that behavioral events are
causally overdetermined, and can be explained by either physical or mental causes alone.[65] An
overdetermined event is fully accounted for by multiple causes at once.[66] However, J. J. C.
Smart and Paul Churchland have pointed out that if physical phenomena fully determine
behavioral events, then by Occam's razor an unphysical mind is unnecessary.[67]
Another reply to this objection, given by Robinson, is that there is a possibility that the interaction
may involve dark energy, dark matter or some other currently unknown scientific
process.[9] However, such processes would necessarily be physical, and in this case dualism is
replaced with physicalism, or the interaction point is left for study at a later time when these
physical processes are understood.
Another reply is that the interaction taking place in the human body may not be described by
"billiard ball" classical mechanics. If a nondeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics is
correct then microscopic events are indeterminate, where the degree of determinism increases
with the scale of the system (see Quantum decoherence). Philosophers Karl Popper and John
Eccles and physicist Henry Stapp have theorized that such indeterminacy may apply at the
macroscopic scale.[68] However classical and quantum calculations show that quantum
decoherence effects do not play a role in brain activity.[69]Indeed, macroscopic quantum states
have only ever been observed in superconductors near absolute zero.
Thomas Breuer in 1994 had proven[70] that physical theories valid for the whole universe are
impossible. Any theory will be wrong when applied to a system which contains the observer
himself due to self-reference.[dubious discuss] This proves that the observer's own body does not
follow the same physical laws as the rest of the universe. But other people from the observer's
point of view will obey the usual physical laws, so conducting experiments on them would not
indicate any divergence from the physical predictions.
Robin Collins responds[71] that energy conservation objections misunderstand the role of energy
conservation in physics. Well understood scenarios in general relativity violate energy
conservation and quantum mechanics provides precedent for causal interactions, or correlation
without energy or momentum exchange.
Argument from brain damage[edit]
This argument has been formulated by Paul Churchland, among others. The point is that, in
instances of some sort of brain damage (e.g. caused by automobile accidents, drug abuse,
pathological diseases, etc.), it is always the case that the mental substance and/or properties of
the person are significantly changed or compromised. If the mind were a completely separate
substance from the brain, how could it be possible that every single time the brain is injured, the
mind is also injured? Indeed, it is very frequently the case that one can even predict and explain
the kind of mental or psychological deterioration or change that human beings will undergo when
specific parts of their brains are damaged. So the question for the dualist to try to confront is
how can all of this be explained if the mind is a separate and immaterial substance from, or if its
properties are ontologically independent of, the brain.[72] Property dualism and William Hasker's
"emergent dualism"[73] seek to avoid this problem. They assert that the mind is a property or
substance that emerges from the appropriate arrangement of physical matter, and therefore
could be affected by any rearrangement of matter.
Phineas Gage, who suffered destruction of one or both frontal lobes by a projectile iron rod, is
often cited as an example illustrating that the brain causes mind. Gage certainly exhibited some
mental changes after his accident. This physical event, the destruction of part of his brain,
therefore caused some kind of change in his mind, suggesting a correlation between brain
states and mental states. Similar examples abound; neuroscientist David Eagleman describes
the case of another individual who exhibited escalating pedophilic tendencies at two different
times, and in each case was found to have tumors growing in a particular part of his brain.[74][75]
Case studies aside, modern experiments have demonstrated that the relation between brain and
mind is much more than simple correlation. By damaging, or manipulating, specific areas of the
brain repeatedly under controlled conditions (e.g. in monkeys) and reliably obtaining the same
results in measures of mental state and abilities, neuroscientists have shown that the relation
between damage to the brain and mental deterioration is likely causal. This conclusion is further
supported by data from the effects of neuro-active chemicals (such as those
affecting neurotransmitters) on mental functions,[76] but also from research
on neurostimulation (direct electrical stimulation of the brain, including transcranial magnetic
stimulation).[77]
Argument from biological development[edit]
Another common argument against dualism consists in the idea that since human beings
(both phylogenetically and ontogenetically) begin their existence as entirely physical or material
entities and since nothing outside of the domain of the physical is added later on in the course of
development, then we must necessarily end up being fully developed material beings. There is
nothing non-material or mentalisticinvolved in conception, the formation of the blastula,
the gastrula, and so on.[78] The postulation of a non-physical mind would seem superfluous.[citation
needed]

Argument from neuroscience[edit]

See also: Neurophilosophy, Neuroscience of free will, and Thought identification
In some contexts, the decisions that a person makes can be detected up to 10 seconds in
advance by means of scanning their brain activity.[79] Furthermore, subjective experiences and
 covert attitudes can be detected,[80] as can mental imagery.[81] This is strong empirical
evidence that cognitive processes have a physical basis in the brain.[82][83]
Argument from simplicity[edit]
The argument from simplicity is probably the simplest and also the most common form of
argument against dualism of the mental. The dualist is always faced with the question of why
anyone should find it necessary to believe in the existence of two, ontologically distinct, entities
(mind and brain), when it seems possible and would make for a simpler thesis to test against
scientific evidence, to explain the same events and properties in terms of one. It is a heuristic
principle in science and philosophy not to assume the existence of more entities than is
necessary for clear explanation and prediction (see Occam's razor).
This argument was criticized by Peter Glassen in a debate with J. J. C. Smart in the pages
of Philosophy in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[84][85][86] Glassen argued that, because it is not a
physical entity, Occam's Razor cannot consistently be appealed to by a physicalist or materialist
as a justification of mental states or events, such as the belief that dualism is false. The idea is
that Occam's razor may not be as "unrestricted" as it is normally described (applying to all
qualitative postulates, even abstract ones) but instead concrete (only applies to physical
objects). If one applies Occam's Razor unrestrictedly, then it recommends monism until
pluralism either receives more support or is disproved. If one applies Occam's Razor only
concretely, then it may not be used on abstract concepts (this route, however, has serious
consequences for selecting between hypotheses about the abstract).[87]

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The Odic Disk Machine

Od is a manifestation of the aether as discovered by Baron Karl Von
Reichenbach.
Truly a giant in science, Baron Karl Von Reichbach was everything a
true researcher should be, devoted, compassionate, scientific and
fearless.

This simple motor is a worthy experiment and this is the only

information we have been able to find on it. Those daring enough
please take the plunge and report your findings.

In the book The Inner Earth by Doreal, he mentioned that there are
144 separate and distinct types of magnetic current. The Ancients
called this sub-Pranic or sub-aetheric, which can be used for
superhuman powers and levitation or for control of the mind.
The following is a description of how we make a machine to allow
anyone to work with each of the individual magnetic currents.

In the book Vital Force by Baron Charles von Reichenbach, he

shows the chart of these forces:

Fig. 1: Von Reichenbachs Chart of Forces

Take a metal disk and put the N or S pole of a magnet in the center.
Then place the disk horizontally. Use a compass to line up the dark
blue at 90 degrees and red at 270; then you can map out the rest of
the lines.

If you can see magnetic auras then you will not need a compass.

Fig. 2 shows how to make a very powerful magnetic spectrum device.

The 44-inch diameter disk is made of 10:0:8 soft annealed steel
approximately 3/16 inch thick. Between them are placed 16 to 28
ceramic magnets approximately 2 inches in diameter, with a hole in
the center and magnetized with the poles across the faces. The blue
pole is placed under the top disk and the red pole is placed down on
the bottom disk. The top and bottom 2 to 4 magnets are placed so
their poles repel, but when put on top of the metal disk they will still
attract to the metal disk so as to compress the field out away from the
center to the edges of the disk. A brass or copper tube is forced
through the holes in the magnets to align them and give them support.
A plastic stand or motor is used under the bottom plate.

Fig. 2: Magnetic Spectrum Device

An iron triangle was placed on one of the disks to draw off the color to
work with it. The width of the triangle helps to draw off more or less of
the colors nearby. The triangle is connected to a copper and iron wire
to draw off the energy you want to work with. The cone on the other
end increases the efficiency. An iron rod can be placed at the edge
just between the top and bottom so you can draw color from the
bottom and top plate at the same time.

Fig. 3 : How the colors look coming out from the machine: very
concentrated near the edge and slightly inside (Geographic N: dark
blue ray)

As the distance between the plates is increased the separation of the

colors increases and the stinging sensation increases to a point where
it decreases with further separation.

A jar placed between the disks can be used to charge water or seeds
in water. 2 to 4 hours are needed for good results. If the disk is turned
slowly by motor or hand (every 10 minutes by hand), all the colors will
fill the water. Seeds treated for 1 hour or longer showed up to 5 times
as much root growth as compared to untreated. The disk is turned
every 15 minutes. When you use the red or blue pole of a magnet you
still have the complete rainbow in each color. Now as with color
therapy you have each color at your command and it is already in its
aura form which makes it more effective and potent than the aura
which is attached to color.

On the back of most old TV picture tubes is a gray ferrite collar over
copper wire. Remove them and place 2 or more over the copper
tubing on the top disk. With three of these ferrite collars the odic field
coming from the area between the two iron disks will be extended 10
to 100 times.

Our guess is that the field of energy may be equal to a 16-layer Reich
accumulator, but it is of Od (cf. von Reichenbach) rather than Orgone.

Orgone moves west to east; Od moves south to north. They cross

each other. We think that Orgones physical counterpart is electricity,
and Ods physical counterpart is magnetism.

When a person sits in an orgone accumulator his body generates a

larger aura. When that person puts his hands near the odic disk the
orgone aura collapses and a new aura appears that seems different
from the orgone aura. Carbon seems to be able to break orgone into
its different colors. Reich found red and blue energy under the
microscope, and between red and blue is a rainbow. Now that you
have electricity and magnetism (orgone and odic) the sky is the limit.
Go after it!
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About the Author: AetherForce Editor

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One Comment

1.
sucahyo September 15, 2014 at 4:25 pmLog in to Reply

Od is obviously orgone, or more correctly a deadly orgone is positive

od, the bad energy. The DOR sickness symptom is exactly the same
as the bad effect of positive od.

The main difference is, in orgonomy, there is no good orgone.

Although is orgonite community they call good orgone as positive
orgone.

Because orgonomist thought orgone as monopolar, many end up

using the symptom of DOR sickness to measure their orgone device,
 which is dead wrong. They use the DOR symptom as indicator of a
working orgone accumulator or cloud buster, which is dangerous.

Because of this, orgone accumulator become device with restricted

time of use, and cloud buster can only bring calamity weather.

According to eva reich, thunderstorm never happen at Wilhelm Reich

laboratory, and yet today people use cloud buster to make
thunderstorm.

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4. The Binomial Theorem

by M. Bourne

A binomial is an algebraic expression containing 2 terms. For example, (x + y) is

a binomial.

We sometimes need to expand binomials as follows:

(a + b)0 = 1

(a + b)1 = a + b

(a + b)2 = a2 + 2ab + b2

(a + b)3 = a3 + 3a2b + 3ab2 + b3

(a + b)4 = a4 + 4a3b + 6a2b2 + 4ab3 + b4

(a + b)5 = a5 + 5a4b + 10a3b2 + 10a2b3 + 5ab4 + b5

Clearly, doing this by direct multiplication gets quite tedious and can be rather
difficult for larger powers or more complicated expressions.

Pascal's Triangle

We note that the coefficients (the numbers in front of each term) follow a
pattern. [This was noticed long before Pascal, by the Chinese.]
You can use this pattern to form the coefficients, rather th an multiply
everything out as we did above.