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DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Antecedents
"
~
Decision 3 G.R. No. 197146
Later on, the MCWD commenced in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu
City (RTC) its action for declaratory relief seeking to declare Section 3(b) of
P.D. No. 198 unconstitutional; or, should the provision be declared valid, it
should be interpreted to mean that the authority to appoint the members of
the MCWD Board of Directors belonged solely to the Cebu City Mayor. 2
Rollo, p. 151.
Id.
Id.
4
Id.
Id. at 152.
a,\
.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 197146
The RTC (Branch 18), to which the case was raffled, required the
parties to submit their memorandum.
Id.at 99-100.
Id.at 96.
Id.at 152.
Id.at 85-95.
10
Id.atl02-128.
11
Id.atl64-188.
?1
Decision 5 G.R. No. 197146
It has not been belied by defendants that the active water service
connections of Cebu City in the Metropolitan Cebu Water District
(MCWD), at 61.28%, have gone below the required 75% required by law
for the city mayor to have the authority to appoint members of the board
of directors of the water district. Lacking such percentage requisite, the
appointing power is now vested with the governor of the Province of
Cebu. While it may be true that the governor had not participated in
organizing MCWD and neither did the Province of Cebu invest in
establishing waterworks in the component local governments, the law,
however, does not impose any condition or restriction in transferring the
power to the governor to appoint members of the board of directors when
the percentage falls below 75%. Thus, there is no doubt that when any of
the water district's participating city or municipality could not obtain 75%
of the active water service connections, the governor shall appoint the
members of the board of directors of the water district, whether it is a
participant or not, in its organization.
12
Id. at 73-80.
<4
Decision 6 G.R. No. 197146
In sum, the Court has not been able to find any constitutional
infirmity in the questioned provision (Sec. 3) of Presidential Decree No.
198. The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, there
must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt. Those who seek to declare the law, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional, must clearly establish the basis therefore. Otherwise, the
arguments fall short.
13
Id. at 78-80.
14
Id. at 189-221.
15
Id. at 81-84.
~
Decision 7 G.R. No. 197146
Issues
Hence, the petitioners have instituted this special civil action for
certiorari, 16 contending that:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT ABDICATED ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY IN REFUSING TO DELVE ON THE
ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY.
II.
THE JUDGMENT IS VOID ON ITS FACE BECAUSE OF CLEAR
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS APPARENT BY A MERE
READING OF THE DECREE.
III.
THE JUDGMENT VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION. 17
1.
Preliminary Matter:
Yu's expiration of term did not
render case moot and academic
16
Id. at 3-72.
17
Id. at 22.
18
Id. at 96.
19
Davidv. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR. No. I7I397, May 3, 3006, 489 SCRA 160, 214-215.
14
Decision 8 G.R. No. 197146
authority for the members of the MCWD Board of Directors should none of
the cities and municipalities have at least 75% of the water consumers will
not be definitively resolved with finality if we dismiss the petition on the
ground of mootness. It is notable that the two cases for declaratory relief
filed for the purpose of determining the proper appointing authority were
dismissed without any definitive declaration or ultimate determination of the
merits of the issue. The issue festers. Hence, the Court needs to decide it
now, not later.
2.
First Issue:
RTC explained its holding of the
assailed provision as valid and constitutional
but it thereby erred nonetheless
The petitioners take the RTC to task for not explaining why it held
Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 to be not violative of the constitutional
provision on local autonomy and HUCs, and why it only opined that the
question of constitutionality of the provision should be left to Congress; that
it did not determine whether the requisites for raising the constitutional issue
had been met; that it did not discuss the reasons for holding that the issue
about Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 was a political question; that no political
question was involved because what was being inquired into was not the
wisdom of the provision but its validity; and that because it did not perform
its constitutional duty of reviewing the provision, its judgment was void. 20
The petitioners are mistaken on the first issue. The records show that
the RTC, which indisputably had the power and the duty to determine and
decide the issue of the constitutionality of Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198,21
fully discharged its duty. In its assailed decision of November 16, 2010, the
RTC ruled as follows:
S?J
Decision 9 G.R. No. 197146
part in organizing the water district or has contributed to its formation, but
that by law, she has been made the appointing authority even if she has no
participation or involvement in the cooperative effort of the members of
the water district. This may not be the most expedient and appropriate
solution, but still, it is not illegal. As to why this is so is a question only
our lawmakers could answer.
xx xx
In sum, the Court has not been able to find any constitutional
infirmity in the questioned provision (Sec. 3) of Presidential Decree No.
198. The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, there
must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt. Those who seek to declare the law, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional, must clearly establish the basis therefore. Otherwise, the
arguments fall short. 22
The difference between the political and the justiciable questions has
been noted in Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, 25 as follows:
22
Supra note 13, at 79-80.
23
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452, 459.
24
Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, No. L-44640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333, 360.
2s Id.
~
,
upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law
may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en bane and no
treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional
without the concurrence of at least ten Members .... " The Supreme Court
has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but
also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers
organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited
power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to
determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
(Emphasis supplied)
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review
of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the
Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new
provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine
what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power
of doing nothing. x x x (Italics omitted)
3.
Second Issue:
Section 3(b) of P.D. 198 is already superseded
The petitioners argue that the MCWD became a water district by the
pooling of the water utilities belonging to several HU Cs and municipalities;
that the active water connections in the MCWD have been distributed as
follows: Cebu City: 61.28%; Mandaue City: 16%; Lapulapu City: 6.8%;
Tali say City and the Municipalities of Liloan, Consolacion, Compostela, and
Cordova: 16.92%; that Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 198 was unconstitutional on
its face for being unreasonable and arbitrary because the determination of
who would exercise the power to appoint the members of the MCWD Board
of Directors was thereby made to depend on the shifting number of water
users in the water district's component LGUs; that the provision on the
26
Supra note 24.
SJ,
Decision 11 G.R. No. 197146
The petitioners asseverate that the provision or any part of P.D. No.
198 did not state any reason for departing from the rule of the majority; that
the provision failed reasonableness as a standard of substantive due process;
that the appointing authority should be the mayor of the city or municipality
having the majority of the water connections; that if such majority could not
be attained, there must be a power sharing scheme among those having the
largest number of water connections conformably with the rule of the
majority; that the temporary alternative was the Board of Directors
themselves, who, under Section 10 of P.D. No. 198, could appoint upon
failure of the appointing authority to do so; that the assailed provision was
void on its face for violating the constitutional provision on local autonomy
and independence of HUCs under Article X of the 1987 Constitution; that
the provision unduly interfered with the internal affairs of Cebu City, and
diminished the autonomy of the LGUs; that the provision undermined the
independence of HUCs; that both the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel and the Office of the Solicitor General have opined that because
Cebu City was an HUC, the City Mayor of Cebu City should retain the right
to appoint the members of the MCWD Board of Directors; that the chief
executive of the LGU having the majority of water consumers was in the
best position to exercise the discretion of choosing the most competent
persons who could best serve the constituents; that because the largest
number of water consumers were in Cebu City, any intrusion on the City
Mayor's power to appoint would violate its independence and autonomy;
that the Province of Cebu could not exercise powers that affected the
constituents of HUCs; that providing water to constituents was the sole
responsibility of the concerned LGU; that the water utility of the LGU was a
patrimonial property that was not for public use; that as such, the operation,
ownership and management of the public utility should belong to the LGU;
())
>
and that the operation of the water utilities involved the private rights of the
LGUs that could not be amended or altered by a statute. 27
The Court opines that Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 should be partially
struck down for being repugnant to the local autonomy granted by the 1987
Constitution to LGUs, and for being inconsistent with R.A. No. 7160 (1991
Local Government Code) and related laws on local governments.
MALA CANANG
Manila
27
Id. at 41-59.
fl
Decision 13 G.R. No. 197146
TITLE I
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
/;
Decision 14 GR. No. 197146
xx xx
The enactment of P.D. No. 198 on May 25, 1973 was prior to the
enactment on December 22, 1979 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 (An Act
Providing for the Elective or Appointive Positions in Various Local
Governments and for Other Purposes) and antedated as well the effectivity
of the 1991 Local Government Code on January 1, 1992. At the time of the
enactment of P.D. No. 198, Cebu City was still a component city of Cebu
Province. Section 328 of B.P. Blg. 51 reclassified the cities of the Philippines
based on well-defined criteria. Cebu City thus became an HUC, which
immediately meant that its inhabitants were ineligible to vote for the
officials of Cebu Province. In accordance with Section 12 of Article X of the
1987 Constitution, cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law,
and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province, but the
voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such
prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial
officials. Later on, Cebu City, already an HUC, was further effectively
rendered independent from Cebu Province pursuant to Section 29 of the
1991 Local Government Code, viz.:
28
Sec. 3. Cities. - xx xx
Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and component c1t1es in accordance with the
standards established in the Local Government Code as provided for in Article XI, Sec. 4 (I) of the
Constitution, any city now existing with an annual regular income derived from infrastructure and
general funds of not less than forty million pesos (F40,000,000.00) at the time of the approval of this
Act shall be classified as a highly urbanized city. All other cities shall be considered components of
the provinces where they are geographically located.
xx xx
J
Decision 15 G.R. No. 197146
Section 25 29 of the 1991 Local Government Code, a law enacted for the
purpose of strengthening the autonomy of the LGUs in accordance with the
1987 Constitution.
In Navarro v. Ermita, 32 the Court has pointed out that the central
policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic
viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to
their constituents. These considerations must be given importance as they
ensure the success of local autonomy. It is accepted that the LGUs, more
than the National Government itself, know the needs of their constituents,
and cater to such needs based on the particular circumstances of their
localities. Where a particular law or statute affecting the LGU s infringes on
their autonomy, and on their rights and powers to efficiently and effectively
address the needs of their constituents, we should lean in favor of their
autonomy, their rights and their powers.
29
Sec. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units.-
(a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general
supervision over local government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized
cities, and independent component cities; through the province with respect to component cities and
municipalities; and through the city and municipality with respect to barangays.
xx xx
30
The pertinent provisions of Article X on this are:
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues
and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local governments.
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Sec. 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner
provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
31
Rollo, pp. 272-304.
32
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011, 648 SCRA 400, 436.
5'
Decision 16 G.R. No. 197146
Water and its efficient supply are among the primary concerns of
every LGU. Issues that tend to reduce or diminish the authority of the
boards of directors to manage the water districts are imbued with public
interest. Bearing this in mind, and recalling that the MCWD had been
established from the erstwhile Osmefia Waterworks Systems (OWS) without
any investment or contribution of funds and material from the Province of
Cebu towards the creation and maintenance of OWS and the MCWD, 33 and
considering that it had always been the City Mayor of the City of Cebu who
appointed the members of the MCWD Board of Directors regardless of the
percentage of the water subscribers, our pronouncement herein rests on firm
ground.
4.
Third Issue:
Section 3(b) of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional
for violating the Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause
The petitioners assert that Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198, being unfair,
violated substantive due process; that Governor Garcia could not determine
the water needs of each of the LGUs within the MCWD; that the provision
allowed inequality of treatment of the cities and municipalities in relation to
the province, and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution; that the provision unduly deprived Cebu City of the power to
determine the membership in the MCWD Board of Directors despite Cebu
City having the majority of the water service connections; that the Province
of Cebu was given unreasonable and unwarranted benefit despite Cebu City
being independent from the Province of Cebu; that Section 3(b) of P.D. No.
198 did not distinguish whether the province contributed any resource to the
water district or not; that under the provision, if two or more provinces
contributed to the water district, they were not subject to the 75%
requirement to avail of the power of appointment, indicating that the power
to appoint devolved only in the provinces; that this violated the guarantee of
equality of treatment in favor of the participating LGUs; that the provision
created a privileged class (the provinces) without any justification in reason;
and that "the classification is not germane to the purpose of the law and is
not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences." 34
Substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the
procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and
just." 35 It demands the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the
rights of the person to life, liberty or property. In short, to be determined is
33
Rollo, pp. I 09-110.
34
Id. at 59-64.
35
Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association, GR. No. 111953, December 12, 1997, 283 SCRA 31, 39-
40.
.i
Decision 17 GR. No. 197146
whether the law has a valid governmental objective, like the interest of the
public as against that of a particular class. 36
We opine that although Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 provided for
substantial distinction and was germane to the purpose of P.D. No. 198 when
it was enacted in 1973, the intervening reclassification of the City of Cebu
into an HUC and the subsequent enactment of the 1991 Local Government
Code rendered the continued application of Section 3(b) in disregard of the
reclassification unreasonable and unfair. Clearly, the assailed provision no
longer provided for substantial distinction because, firstly, it ignored that the
MCWD was built without the participation of the provincial government;
secondly, it failed to consider that the MCWD existed to serve the
community that represents the needs of the majority of the active water
service connections; and, thirdly, the main objective of the decree was to
improve the water service while keeping up with the needs of the growing
population.
The Whereas Clauses of P.D. No. 198 essentially state the raison
d'etre of its enactment, to wit:
WHEREAS, existing domestic water utilities are not meeting the needs
of the communities they serve; water quality is unsatisfactory; pressure
is inadequate; and reliability of service is poor; in fact, many persons
receive no piped water service whatsoever;
Q
Decision 18 GR. No. 197146
38
Rollo,pp.97-101.
39
See De las Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Corporation, G.R. No. 153852, October 24, 2012,
684 SCRA 410, 422-423.
9
Decision 19 GR. No. 197146
subsequent statutory enactments, and for being also in violation of the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
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~~
ANTONIO T. CARPIO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Ass6ciate Justice
JOSEC NDOZA
IENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ESTEL4~S-BERNABE
Associate Justice
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. M~.V.F.L FRANCIS W. JARDELEZA . .....
Associate Justice Associate Justice :f Dt"" J o/1 ~W
1 J . 6r1 ;i..
(On Leave)
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the court.
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