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Advanced fragility curves of Interdependent

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Advanced fragility curves of Interdependent Lifelines Using Decision
Making Process
M. N. Alexoudi
Dr. Civil Engineer, MSc, Department of Civil Engineering, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
K. G. Kakderi
Civil Engineer, MSc, Department of Civil Engineering, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
K. D. Pitilakis
Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece

First International Symposium on Life-Cycle Civil Engineering (IALCCE08), Varenna, Lake Como, Italy, June 11-14, 2008,
No.A129

ABSTRACT: Lifeline systems co and post seismic performance are controlled by the vulnerability and intra-
connectedness of their components. The main objective of this research is the estimation of the expected seis-
mic performance of infrastructure components through a probabilistic approach taking into account their in-
teractions with other lifeline systems. The method proposed is based on the use of adequate interdependency
indices between lifeline systems. They are evaluated using the Analytical Hierarchy Process which is enlisted
in the most popular multicriteria decision making procedures. The notions of pair-wise comparisons, in terms
of verbal or arithmetic preferences, of the production of reciprocal square matrix and the accepted consistency
index and of the systemic vulnerability or vulnerability of interdependent elements are introduced. Fragility
curves of the interdependent components are estimated based on vulnerability functions of independent ele-
ments and the reciprocal square matrix. The applicability of the proposed methodology is illustrated using an
explanatory example.

1 INTRODUCTION the evaluation of the interactions between lifeline

Lifelines are vital for the community, the quality of
living, the degree of development and the growth of
a society. Based on most recent data from strong
earthquakes they are proved to be quite vulnerable
during earthquakes. The mid and long-term effects
of lifeline damages could be very important, as they
can result in malfunction of urban activities and can
have serious socioeconomic losses.
In complex city environment lifelines are highly
intra-dependent and inter-dependent systems, show-
ing a great degree of coupling between sub-
components of the same system and with other infra-
structures. A representative case of interactions
among different lifeline systems during the restora-
tion period is reported after the 1995 Kobe earth-
quake by Hada and Meguro (2000). They outlined
the problems in the restoration activities of water
and gas network in Kobe area due to traffic conges-
tion, street blockades, damaged buildings and water
flowed into gas pipelines.
The inherited complexity makes the assessment
of inter-dependent lifeline systems performance a
difficult task and a very challenging issue for ad-
vanced seismic risk management solutions. An effi-
cient seismic vulnerability analysis and the devel-
opment of an optimum mitigation strategy require
systems in three different periods (prior, during and
after the occurrence of a seismic event). The meth-
odology illustrated in this paper is orientated towards
this direction.
A major concern for the quantification of lifeline
elements interactions is the description of the typol-
ogy and the functioning of systems involved, the na-
ture of the reciprocal influence, when the specific
synergy is evolved (normal, co-seismic or restora-
tion/recovery period) and the importance of the link
(slight / strong) between components and systems.
Several types of interdependencies exist described
by different researchers (Kameda 2000, Rinaldi et al.
2001, Peerenboom et al. 2001, Tang et al. 2004, Yao
et al. 2004):
Function interaction/ physical, cyber interaction.
Collocation interaction/ geographic, space, physical
damage propagation.
Substitute interaction/ back-up functions of substi-
tute systems.
Restoration/ recovery interaction.
Cascade interaction/ functional damage propaga-
tion/ system interaction.
General interaction.
Logical interaction/ financial markets.
 Interdependencies in the seismic risk analysis of
lifelines were studied by several researchers (Ho-
shiya & Ohno 1985, Nojima & Kameda 1991, Scaw-
thorn 1992, Eidinger 1993, Shinozuka et al. 1993,
Shinozuka & Tanaka 1996 and Menoni 2001). How-
ever, little research has been made so far for interac-
tions between different critical infrastructures which
may seriously affect the seismic risk management
and mitigation. The research work presented in this
paper accounts for the logical and the general inter-
action between different critical infrastructure ele-
ments, which derives from the compilation of the
operational productivity offered from one lifeline
element to another.
Several approaches can be used for the estimation
of such interactions: economic, fuzzy logic, decision
making or composite approaches (Wong & Isenberg
1995, Giannini and Vanzi 2000, Amin 2001, Little
2002, Brown et al. 2004, Bernhardt & McNeil 2004,
Haimes & Jiang 2001, Santos & Haimes 2004,
Dueas-Osorio et al 2006, Li & He 2002). The
methodology presented herein (Fig. 1) is based on
the use of multicriteria decision making procedure in
order to estimate adequate interdependency indices
between different elements of lifeline systems, that
are used to evaluate systemic fragility curves of in-
terdependent lifelines.
ECONOMIC FUZZY DECISION COMPOSITE
APPROACH LOGIC MAKING APPROACH
ESTIMATION OF LIFELINE SYSTEMS
INTERDEPENDENCY INDICES
ESTIMATION OF LIFELINE SYSTEMS
PROPAGATED INOPERABILITY MATRIX
INDEPENDENT LIFELINE INDEPENDENT LIFELINE
COMPONENTS COMPONENTS
VULNERABILITY CURVES WEIGHT COEFFICIENTS
ESTIMATION OF INTERDEPENDENT LIFELINE
COMPONENTS VULNERABILITY CURVES
Figure 1. Flowchart of the proposed methodology.
2 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN LIFELINE
SYSTEMS
As previously mentioned, lifelines are highly inter-
connected; thus the risk of failure or deviation from
normal operating conditions in one lifeline system
(or part of it) can affect the risk in another. In case of
an earthquake, malfunction of a systems compo-
nents can result in cascading effects within the same
system and other connected systems. The nature of
the identified interactions, as well as the degree of
interconnectedness (type and degree of coupling) is
the determinant of the interdependent systems seis-
mic behavior. Equation 1 describes the seismic risk
(S.R.) of interdependent lifeline systems:
{S.R.interdependent}={S.R.independent}*{Interaction func-
tion}(1)
Lets us consider three lifeline networks (systems
1, 2 and 3). Each node represents the lifeline ele-
ments that compose the system. The veil illustrates
connections between the different elements inside
the systems. If systems 1, 2 or 3 were independent,
the failure of one systems component would influ-
ence the operability of the connected (with veils)
lifeline elements inside the system and the function-
ality of the system as a whole lifeline. In the case of
systems dependency, it could be considered that
systems 1, 2 and 3 are dependent on the functionality
of others through node N (Fig. 2). Node N represents
one lifeline system element that participates in sys-
tem 1 but also influences systems 2 and 3. The func-
tionality of node N is unsatisfactory (event EN) if
system 1 fails between supply node 1 (red node) and
node N (event E1) or system 2 fails somewhere be-
tween its supply node 2 (red node) and node N
(event E2) or systems 3 fails between supply node 3
and node N (event E3).
Figure 2. Functionally interactive networks systems.
The probability of the event EN (interdependent
event) for a three systems interconnectivity can be
written as:
P(EN)= P(E1)+ (1-P(E1))*P(E2)*a12N +
(1-P(E1))*P(E3)*a23N (2)
where: P(E1) denotes the probability of event 1
(event inside system 1- system 1 independency),
P(E2) denotes the probability of event 2 (event inside
system 2- system 2 independency) and P(E3) denotes
the probability of event 3 (event inside system 3-
system 3 independency), a12N denotes a cross impact
factor representing the degree of probabilistic contri-
bution (functional dependence) of system 1 and 2 to
the lifeline element of node N and a23N denotes a
cross impact factor representing the degree of prob-
abilistic contribution of system 2 and 3 to the lifeline
element of node N.
3 ESTIMATION OF COMPOSITE
INTERDEPENDENT FRAGILITY CURVES
The vulnerability of a system of interacting lifeline
elements depends on the vulnerability of the individ-
ual components, the way in which the components
are connected and the degree of their interdepen-
dency. The fragility of the system can differ signifi-
cantly from the fragilities of its components. The
concept of systemic vulnerability or vulnerability of
interdependent elements is introduced to evaluate
the system fragility in addition to the individual
component fragilities. Fragility curves are described
in terms of the probability of exceeding, in an inde-
pendent lifeline component, a specific limit state as a
function of ground motion intensity. Each systems
element is examined as an individual component
with no interaction between subcomponents of the
same system or/and other external infrastructures.
Thus, fragility curves of the interdependent compo-
nents are estimated based on vulnerability functions
of independent elements and the cross impact ma-
trix. Fragility curves are usually described by (cumu-
lative) lognormal distribution functions defined by a
median value and a standard deviation (e.g. NIBS,
2004). The conditional probability of being or ex-
ceeding, a particular damage state dsi, given the peak
ground acceleration (PGA) is defined by the rela-
tionship:
1 PGA
P (dsdsi/PGA)= ln
(3)
dsi PGA, dsi
where: PGA, ds i is the median value of peak ground
acceleration at which the component reaches the
threshold of the damage state dsi, dsi, is the standard
deviation of the natural logarithm of the peak ground
acceleration for damage state, dsi and is the stan-
dard normal cumulative distribution function.
For each PGA level a, and for each damage state,
the final discrete probability of each infrastructure
element j is estimated from the following function:
dPa*j = dPa1j*a1j+dPa2j ++dPmj*amj = dpa*ij
1, for i=1,,m (4)
where: dPa is the discrete probability at PGA level a,
i is the respective damage state and j is the examined
infrastructures component.
4 CROSS IMPACT ANALYSIS
Cross impact analysis is a systemic method to evalu-
ate probabilities of occurrences of various events in
an interactive relationship. This method inevitably
involves complex interactions among events and
high uncertainty. It involves the following steps: (1)
construct a structural model of interrelationship of
all systems under consideration, (2) quantify expert
opinions for the importance of each lifeline system
or element compared to another (3) convert the opin-
ions into the form of a cross impact matrix com-
posed of elements representing degree of corre-
sponding impact and (4) modify probability of an
event occurrence using the cross impact matrix. In
this study the principle of a cross impact analysis is
employed for evaluation of system interactions,
whereas the impacted probability is formulated on
the rigorous basis of probability theory, decision
making procedure and a systematic approach of
seismic risk analysis.
5 ANALYTICAL HIERARCHY PROCESS (AHP)
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) method is
used to estimate the degree of probabilistic contribu-
tion of system 1 and 2 to the lifeline element of node
N as mentioned in paragraph 2. AHP is listed in the
most popular multicriteria decision making proce-
dures as it employs simplicity, accuracy, it has theo-
retical robustness, it can handle both intangible and
tangible criteria and most important it has the capa-
bility to directly measure the inconsistency of the re-
spondents judgments (Saaty 1980, Vargas 1990).
The AHP combines subjective and objective alterna-
tives into a single measure in a hierarchical or net-
work framework. The assessment is based on a ratio
scale and pair-wise comparisons for the estimation
of lifelines interactions either verbally or numeri-
cally.
The AHP method requires the following major
steps:
1) Structuring the hierarchy.
2) Collecting input data by pair-wise comparisons.
3) Using the eigenvalue method to yield priorities.
4) Calculating Consistency Ratio (CR) of individ-
ual expert to check the reliability of the experts.
5) Estimating Consistency Index (CI) for the group
of experts.
The larger the CR the less consistent the expert is. In
case of inconsistency, the procedure continues until
consistency is accomplished.
5.1 Structuring the hierarchy
A top down approach is employed placing on the
principal level macro-level criteria. Then attributes
of each principal level criterion are developed on the
secondary level. Every secondary level criterion
contributes to the quality of the decision on the next
level. The process of breaking down the levels con- 5.4 Consistency Ratio (CR) of individual expert
tinues until a bottom level criterion is reached.
A Consistency Index (CI) is used to measure the de-
gree of inconsistency in the square matrix A. The CI
5.2 Pair-wise comparisons is defined as CI= (max - n) / (n-1), where n is the
number of elements and max is the largest right ei-
Once the hierarchical structure has been established, genvalue estimated from each individual expert.
the relative importance (weights) of all decision ele- Saaty (1980) compared the estimated CI with the
ments is explicitly captured and revealed through ra- same index derived from a randomly generated
tio scale approach. Pair-wise comparison of these square matrix, called the Random Consistency Index
elements within the same hierarchical level, with re- (RCI) shown in Table 2. The ratio of CI to RCI for
spect to the parent elements in the next higher level, the same order matrix is called the Consistency Ra-
is established. Table 1 shows conversion used to tio (CR). The judgmental consistency of each expert
translate verbal preferences into numbers judgments. is determined. Generally, a CR of 0.10 or less is con-
The numerical scales range from 1 to 9 according to sidered acceptable; otherwise matrix A will be re-
the preferences of experts. vised to improve the judgmental consistency.
Table 1. Conversion table used in the Analytical Hierarchy Table 2. The Random Consistency Index (RCI)- Saaty, 1994
Process to translate verbal preferences into numbers (Saaty, n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1988). RCI 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35
Verbal judgment Numerical judgment
Equally preferred 1
Equally to moderately 2
Moderately preferred 3 5.5 Group Consistency Index
Moderately to strongly 4
Strongly preferred 5 The Geometric Mean Method (GMM) (Saaty 1989),
Strongly to very strongly 6 as shown is Equation 7 is being employed to aggre-
Very strongly preferred 7 gate different judgments from several experts. It
Very strongly to extremely 8
Extremely preferred 9 should be noted that only consistent expert judg-
ments are included in this step.
The input data can be achieved from individual 1/ H
aijgp = (aij1 x aij2 xxaijh x x aijH)1/H = aijk
H

interviews of several experts. For each expert, the (7)

h =1
derived pair-wise comparisons of relative impor-
h
tance aij= wi/wj for all decision elements and their where, aij = (wi/wj) is an element of the square ma-
reciprocals aji= 1/aij are inserted into a reciprocal trix A of a decision maker h; (aijgp) is the geometric
square matrix A = {aij} as shown in Equation 5. mean of the paired comparisons conducted by each
expert; and H is the total number of experts. The
w1 / w1 w1 / w2 ... w1 / wn
Group Consistency Index (GCI) is defined as GCI =
A= w2 / w1 w2 / w2 ... w2 / wn (5) (max n)/n, where max is the largest right eigenvalue
... ... ... ... estimated from the group pair-wise comparison ma-

wn / w1 wn / w2 ... wn / wn trix. The group consistency ration (GCR) is calcu-
lated in the identical way as the typical CR value
(GCR= GCI/RCI). The group judgment is consid-
ered consistent if the GCR is less than 0.10. In this
5.3 Eigenvalue method study, it is assumed that the consensus among differ-
ent individuals can be mathematically achieved by
According to the eigenvalue b method (Saaty 1980), applying the GMM approach.
the normalized right eigenvector (W = {w1,
w2,,wn}T) associated with the largest eigenvalue
(max) of the square matrix A provides the weighting 6 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
values for all decision elements.
A * W= max * W (6) A system of four interacting lifeline systems is as-
sumed as illustrated in Figure 3. Table 3 presents the
The analytical solution of Equation 6 then pro- multiple connections between the four lifeline com-
vides the relative weights for each decision ele- ponents in economical terms. The table inputs repre-
ments. sent the cost which is provided by the ith lifeline sys-
tems product (commodity) and consumed by the jth
lifeline system in order to operate. For example, EPS
generate products that cost 15,000 euros. From these
(15,000 euros), 7,500 euros are used by EPS itself, 1 0.20 0.14 0.25 1 0.20 0.25 0.17
2,500, 3,000 and 2,000 euros are supplied to PWW, Aale= 5 1 0.17 0.33 , Akak= 5
1 1 1
NGMR and TC accordingly. Naturally, consumption 7 6 1 2 4 1 1 0.50

between independent systems can be assumed as 4 3 0. 5 1 6 1 2 1
zero. The total supply for each component is calcu-
lated by the summation of intermediate consump- 1 0.13 0.2 0.17 1 0.33 0.14 0.11
tions. Aarg= 8 1 0.50 1 , Aplia= 3 1 0.20 0.11
5 2 1 0.33 7 5 1 0.20

6 1 3 1 9 9 5 1

1 0.14 0.14 0.33 1 0.14 0.20 1

7 1 0 .13 0 .13 1
Apit= , Ahatz= 7 1 0.20
7 8 1 0.5 5 5 1 1

3 8 2 1 1 1 1 1

Using the eigenvalue method wi and max were es-

timated for each one of the six experts (Table 4).
Performing the steps of the methodology de-
scribed above the Consistency Index (CI) and Con-
Figure 3. Indicative system of interacting lifeline components. sistency Ratio (CR) of each individual expert were
estimated (Table 5).
Table 3. Multiple connections between the four lifeline compo-
nents in economical terms. Table 4. Calculated weights and max. eigenvalues.
EPS PWW NGMR TC A/A Names wEPS wPWW wNGMR wTC max
EPS 7500 1 ale 0.06 0.14 0.53 0.27 4.27
PWW 2500 500 2 kak 0.06 0.31 0.25 0.38 4.04
NGMR 3000 700 1800 3 arg 0.05 0.29 0.27 0.40 4.36
TC 2000 1300 2200 500 4 plia 0.04 0.08 0.24 0.63 4.31
TOTAL SUPPLY 15000 5000 8000 6000 5 pit 0.07 0.14 0.35 0.44 5.27
EPS: Electric Power System, PWW: Potable Water Well, NGMR: 6 hatz 0.11 0.24 0.43 0.22 4.90
Natural Gas M/R Station, TC: Telecommunication Centre
Table 5. Estimated Consistency Index (CI) and Consistency Ra-
tio (CR).
6.1 Estimation of cross impact factors between A/A Names CI RCI CR Acceptable
1 ale 0.088 0.89 0.10 YES
lifeline components using AHP 2 kak 0.014 0.89 0.02 YES
3 arg 0.120 0.89 0.13 YES
The triggering issue of this research is to translate 4 plia 0.103 0.89 0.11 YES
the relations between the elements of lifelines as 5 pit 0.422 0.89 0.47 NO
given in Table 3 into words or number that present 6 hatz 0.303 0.89 0.34 NO
the importance of each lifeline element compared to
the other. The method used for such purpose is the Afterwards Geometric Mean Method was em-
AHP. Six experts were selected according to their ployed to aggregate different judgments from the
four consistent experts. Employing Equation 7, a
experience to lifelines and earthquake engineering.
new square matrix Agroup was produced.
Firstly, it was decided to structure a very simple
hierachy. Only one level approach was employed 1 0.20 0.18 0.17
that direct links the four lifeline components of four 4.95 1 0.36 0.44
Agroup=
different lifeline systems to each other without indi- 5.60 2.78 1 0.51
rect links and second level elements. Table 3 illus-
trates the direct links between the components. Sec- 6 2.28 1.97 1
ondly, the six experts filled questionnaires using the The weight coefficients assigned to all four infra-
conversion table provided in Table 1 and making structure elements as estimated from Agroup are:
pair-wise comparisons between the components. All
experts used the number mode of the conversion ta- [wi]T = [wEPS wPWW wNGMR wTC]T =
ble and not the verbal. Six reciprocal square matri- [0.50 0.10 0.30 0.42]
ces were produced for each one of the six experts Performing the steps of the methodology de-
(Aale, Akak, Aarg, Aplia, Apit, Ahatz): scribed above the Consistency Index (CI) and the
Consistency Ratio (CR) of the group is 0.050 and
0.056 respectively. The relative importance of each Electric power substation
1,00
element compared to another as derived from the
normalized Agroup matrix is then used in the sys-

[ Probability Ds>ds / PGA ]

temic vulnerability. 0,75

0.06 0.03 0.05 0.08

0.16 0.10 0.21
0,50 minor 0

Anormalgroup= 0.28 minor 1

moderate 0
0.32 0.44 0.29 0.24 0,25
moderate 1
extensive 0
extensive 1
0.34 0.36 0.56 0.47 complete 0
complete 1
0,00
For an example the cross impact between EPS 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20
and PWW is aEPSPWW = 0.28, the cross impact be- PGA (g)

tween EPS and NGMR is aEPSNGMR = 0.32 and be- Figure 4. Fragility curves of electric power substation (EPS)
tween EPS and TC is aEPSTC= 0.34. independent 0/ interdependent 1 component.

Potable water well

1,00
6.2 Estimation of Composite Interdependent
Fragility Curves

[ Probability Ds>ds / PGA ]

0,75

Fragility curves for the individual components (with-

0,50 minor 0
out taking into account the interdependency between minor 1

them) are presented with the corresponding parame- moderate 0

moderate 1

ters (mean values and standard deviations of log- 0,25 extensive 0

extensive 1
normal distribution functions) in Table 6 and Table complete 0
complete 1
7. 0,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20
PGA (g)
Table 6. Fragility curves of independent lifeline element. Figure 5. Fragility curves of potable water well (PWW) inde-
EPS PWW pendent 0/ interdependent 1 component.
Damage
Median Standard Median Standard
state
PGA (g) deviation () PGA (g) deviation ()
Minor 0.13 0.65 0.15 0.75 Natural gas M/R station
1,00
Moderate 0.26 0.50 0.36 0.65
Extensive 0.34 0.40 0.72 0.65
[ Probability Ds>ds / PGA ]

Complete 0.74 0.40 1.50 0.80 0,75

Table 7. Fragility curves of independent lifeline component. 0,50 minor 0

minor 1
NGMR PWW
Damage moderate 0
Median Standard Median Standard moderate 1
state 0,25 extensive 0
PGA (g) deviation () PGA (g) deviation () extensive 1
Minor 0.12 0.60 0.13 0.55 complete 0
complete 1
Moderate 0.24 0.60 0.26 0.50 0,00
Extensive 0.77 0.65 0.46 0.62 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20
PGA (g)
Complete 1.50 0.80 1.03 0.62
Figure 6. Fragility curves of Natural Gas M/R Station inde-
pendent 0/ interdependent 1 component.
Figures 4, 5, 6 & 7 illustrate the comparison be-
tween the fragility curves of independent lifeline
Telecommunication centre
component (illustrated with 0 mode) as derived 1,00
from Tables 6 and 7 and the fragility curve of inter-
[ Probability Ds>ds / PGA ]

dependent components as calculated from the proce- 0,75

dure described in this study (illustrated with 1
mode). 0,50 minor 0
minor 1
moderate 0
moderate 1
0,25 extensive 0
extensive 1
complete 0
complete 1
0,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20
PGA (g)

Figure 7. Fragility curves of Telecommunication Center

independent 0/ interdependent 1 component.
 If infrastructure i depends on infrastructure j, and
j has a high risk of failure, then the likelihood of i
being disrupted or failing is correspondingly higher
than if i was independent of j. In the case of the three
interconnected elements (EPS, PWW and NGMR)
of the example, the derived fragility curves are quite
different from those referring to independent ele-
ments. Especially, in the case of NGMR the fragility
curve of the extensive damage state of the independ-
ent component is similar with the fragility curve of
complete damage state of the interdependent com-
ponent. Moreover, for the EPS component, impor-
tant differences exist in the case of minor and mod-
erate damages especially in Peak Ground
Acceleration (PGA) values in the range between
0.20g to 0.30g. For the case of the PWW, important
differences between independent and interdependent
fragility curves exist in the case of moderate and ex-
tensive damages in the range of 0.20g and 0.40-
0.80g respectively. On the other hand, there are
small differences between the fragility curves of the
communication center estimated taking or not into
account the existing interdependencies with other
lifeline elements.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Infrastructure systems are highly intradependent and
interdependent systems. Capturing and quantifying
lifeline interactions are very important aspects
within an advanced seismic risk management study
of a complex city system. Systems response in case
of an earthquake is contingent on their specific fea-
tures, the level of the induced seismic input ground
motion and also the type and degree of the existing
interdependencies. Within this framework, a method
is proposed to simulate interdependent lifelines vul-
nerability. Interdependency indices are estimated
based on an Analytical Hierarchy Process. Further-
more, the notion of propagated inoperability and sys-
temic vulnerability or vulnerability of interdepend-
ent elements is introduced. Fragility curves of the
interdependent components are estimated based on
vulnerability functions of independent elements and
the reciprocal square matrix A. Using an illustra-
tive example, it is demonstrated the efficiency of the
proposed methodology to evaluate the expected
seismic performance of complex interacting lifelines
(electric power sub-stations, potable water wells,
natural gas M/R stations and telecommunication
network) through a probabilistic approach. In gen-
eral the inter-dependency of sub-components of dif-
ferent systems increases the seismic vulnerability. In
certain cases (i.e. potable water wells), this increase
may be very high in case of strong earthquakes (i.e.
PGA=0.4g). Incorporation of systems intra-
dependencies and generalization of the proposed
methodology to address the vulnerability assessment
of multiple interacting infrastructure systems con-
sisting of a number of different subcomponents, are
the issues where future research will focus on.
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