CHAPTER 1

G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY AKLAN NATIONAL COLLEGE

OF FISHERIES (ANCF) AND DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, IN HER CAPACITY AS
ANCF SUPERINTENDENT, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, NAMELY:
SALVACION L. SIN, ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S.
YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN, JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L. SIN, AND
CEFERINA S. VITA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP
No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181, segregating
from the Aklan National College of Fisheries (ANCF) reservation the portion of land being
claimed by respondents.

Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, represented by ANCF and Dr.
Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as Superintendent of ANCF. Respondents claim that
they are the lawful heirs of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner of a parcel of
land situated at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, and more particularly
described as follows:
A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay Tambac, New Washington,
Aklan, containing an approximate area of FIFTY[]EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIX
(58,606) square meters, more or less, as per survey by Geodetic Engineer Reynaldo L.
Lopez. Bounded on the North by Dumlog Creek; on the East by Adriano Melocoton; on the
South by Mabilo Creek; and on the West by Amado Cayetano and declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Maxima L. Sin (deceased) under Tax Declaration No. 10701
(1985) with an assessed value of Php1,320.00.2
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint
against Lucio Arquisola, in his capacity as Superintendent of ANCF (hereinafter ANCF
Superintendent), for recovery of possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership
with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231square meterportion of the
property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt with respect
to their ownership over the parcel of land they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation.

The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents
was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating
24.0551 hectares of land within the area, which included said portion of private
respondents alleged property, as civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF. The
ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the subject parcel of land is timberland
and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.

Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party defendant and
Lucio Arquisola, who retired from the service during the pendency of the case, was
substituted by Ricardo Andres, then the designated OfficerinCharge of ANCF.

The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan, in view of
the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction of firstlevel
courts. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1181 (4390).

Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel
of land from their mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in New Washington,
Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima Sin acquired said bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of
Sale (Exhibit B), and then developed the same by planting coconut trees, banana plants,
mango trees and nipa palms and usufructing the produce of said land until her death in
1945.

In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from Maxima Sin was
occupied by ANCF and converted into a fishpond for educational purpose. Respondent
heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were previously in possession of the disputed land
in the concept of an owner. The disputed area was a swampy land until it was converted
into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove possession, respondents presented several tax
declarations, the earliest of which was in the year 1945.

On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent heirs herein] the
owner and possessor of the land in question in this case and for the defendants to cause
the segregation of the same from the Civil Reservation of the Aklan National College of
Fisheries, granted under Proclamation No. 2074 dated March 31, 1981.

It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs actual
damages for the unearned yearly income from nipa plants uprooted by the defendants
[on] the land in question when the same has been converted by the defendants into a
fishpond, in the amount of Php3,500.00 yearly beginning the year 1988 until plaintiffs are
fully restored to the possession of the land in question.

It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the sum of
Php10,000.00 for attorneys fees and costs of this suit.3
According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner in his report (Exh.
LL) shows that the disputed property is an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Furthermore, the land covered by Civil Reservation under Proclamation No. 2074
was classified as timberland only on December 22, 1960 (Exh. 4D). The MCTC
observed that the phrase Block II Alien or Disp. LC 2415 was printed on the Map of the
Civil Reservation for ANCF established under Proclamation No. 2074 (Exh. 6), indicating
that the disputed land is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals4 where it was pronounced that:
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them
can be acquired. The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved a
parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of
protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law,
issues a proclamation reserving certain lands, and warning all persons to depart
therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such lands by a person who
has settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. And patents for
lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated are void.
(Underscoring from the MCTC, citations omitted.)
Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring all persons to depart
from the reservation, the MCTC concluded that the reservation was subject to private
rights if there are any.

The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by virtue of
their and their predecessors open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
amounts to an imperfect title, which should be respected and protected.

Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, where the
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6130.
On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC judgment with
modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is modified absolving Appellant
Ricardo Andres from the payment of damages and attorneys fees. All other details of the
appealed decision are affirmed in toto.5
The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested rights acquired by private
individuals prior to its issuance on March 31, 1981.

The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be disturbed on appeal
unless the court below has overlooked some facts of substance that may alter the results
of its findings. The RTC, however, absolved the Superintendent of the ANCF from liability
as there was no showing on record that he acted with malice or in bad faith in the
implementation of Proclamation No. 2074.6

Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity
as the new Superintendent of the ANCF, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through
a Petition for Review. The petition was docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 65244.

On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition
for lack of merit. In addition to the findings of the MCTC and the RTC, the Court of
Appeals held:
Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the subject land was
likewise declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960. Considering
that lands adjoining to that of the private respondents, which are also within the
reservation area, have been issued original certificates of title, the same affirms the
conclusion that the area of the subject land was agricultural, and therefore disposable,
before its declaration as a timberland in 1960.

It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through purchase and sale, the
subject property from its previous owners spouses Sotera Melocoton and Victor Garcia on
January 15, 1932, or 28 years before the said landholding was declared a timberland on
December 22, 1960. Tacking, therefore, the possession of the previous owners and that of
Maxima Lachica Sin over the disputed property, it does not tax ones imagination to
conclude that the subject property had been privately possessed for more than 30 years
before it was declared a timberland. This being the case, the said possession has ripened
into an ownership against the State, albeit an imperfect one. Nonetheless, it is our
considered opinion that this should come under the meaning of private rights under
Proclamation No. 2074 which are deemed segregated from the mass of civil reservation
granted to petitioner.7 (Citation omitted.)
Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following grounds:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING

RESPONDENTS CLAIM TO SUPPOSED PRIVATE RIGHTS OVER SUBJECT LAND DESPITE
THE DENR CERTIFICATION THAT IT IS CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS RELEASING THE SUBJECT LAND BEING CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS FROM THE
MASS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND AWARDING DAMAGES TO THEM.8
The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the first paragraph of
Proclamation No. 2074:
Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development, approved by the Minister of
Natural Resources and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby set aside as Civil Reservation for Aklan
National College of Fisheries, subject to private rights, if any there be, parcels of land,
containing an aggregate area of 24.0551 hectares, situated in the Municipality of New
Washington, Province of Aklan, Philippines, designated Parcels I and II on the attached
BFD Map CR203, x x x [.]9
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents retain
private rights to the disputed property, thus preventing the application of the above
proclamation thereon. The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which
respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject property, through their
predecessorsininterest, for 30 years before it was declared as a timberland on
December 22, 1960.

At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property Registration
Decree. Nevertheless, the courts a quo apparently treated respondents complaint for
recovery of possession, quieting of title and declaration of ownership as such an
application and proceeded to determine if respondents complied with the requirements
therefor.

The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
which provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessorsininterest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessorsininterest under a bona fideclaim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.10

With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed property was
alienable and disposable before 1960, citing petitioners failure to show competent
evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as
such on said year.11 Petitioner emphatically objects, alleging that under the Regalian
Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and that lands not appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner. As this Court held in the
fairly recent case of Valiao v. Republic12:
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain
part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified
as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man
and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation
thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.

There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. (Citations
omitted.)
This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources v. Yap,13 which presents a similar issue with respect to another
area of the same province of Aklan. On November 10, 1978, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and
peninsulas of the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). On September 3, 1982, PTA
Circular 382 was issued to implement Proclamation No. 1801. The respondents
claimants in said case filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan,
claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 382 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes.
The respondents claim that through their predecessorsininterest, they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of their lands in
Boracay since June 12, 1945 or earlier since time immemorial.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the above case with
this Court, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying
Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and six hundred twentyeight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural
land (alienable and disposable). Petitionerclaimants and other landowners in Boracay
filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064, alleging that it infringed on their prior vested right over portions
of Boracay which they allege to have possessed since time immemorial. This petition was
consolidated with the petition for review concerning Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular 382.

This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine visvis the right of the claimants to lands
they claim to have possessed since time immemorial, held:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands
which have been officially delimited and classified.

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who
must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of
the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act
declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent
such wellnigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters
of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof.14(Emphases in the original; citations omitted.)
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent
evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as
such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that said land was alienable and disposable
prior to said date. On the contrary, the presumption is that unclassified lands are
inalienable public lands. Such was the conclusion of this Court in Heirs of the Late Spouses
Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,15 wherein we held:
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that
the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to
the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land
remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied, citation deleted.)
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, and the equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree was furthermore painstakingly debated upon by the members of this
Court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic.16 In Malabanan, the members of this Court
were in disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable after June 12,
1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. There was, however, no
disagreement that there must be a declaration to that effect.

In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify
a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since
respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessorsin
interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. Accordingly, respondents
cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074
as to prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject property. We are thus
constrained to reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner
Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the
Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181
(4390), segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries reservation the portion of
land being claimed by respondents is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1181
(4390) of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC.,

REPRESENTED BY RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 90503. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated May 16,
2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case
No. N11465.

The Facts

On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application4 with

the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated
in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077,
Mcadm590D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq m,
respectively.

On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order5 finding the respondents application for
registration sufficient in form and substance and setting it for initial hearing on February
21, 2002. The scheduled initial hearing was later reset to May 30, 2002.6 The Notice of
Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, April 1, 2002 issue, Volume 98, No.
13, pages 163116337 and in the March 21, 2002 issue of Peoples Balita,8 a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was likewise posted in a
conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, as well as in a conspicuous place on the
bulletin board of the City hall of Taguig, Metro Manila.9

On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing, only the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of
general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition
to the respondents application for registration.10

On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition11 to the respondents application for
registration, asserting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are not part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition,12 alleging that the respondent
failed to prove that it and its predecessorsininterest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.

Trial on the merits of the respondents application ensued thereafter.

The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the respondents corporate
secretary; Ronnie Inocencio, an employee of the respondent and the one authorized by it
to file the application for registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the
caretaker of the subject properties since 1957; and Engineer Mariano Flotildes (Engr.
Flotildes), a geodetic engineer hired by the respondent to conduct a topographic survey of
the subject properties.

For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon Magalonga (Engr.
Magalonga) and Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic
engineers employed by the LLDA.

Essentially, the testimonies of the respondents witnesses showed that the respondent and
its predecessorsininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent
purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares
(Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned and
possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops
in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975,
Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the
lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.

The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following
documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and
Mijares in favor of the respondent;13 (2) survey plans of the subject properties;14 (3)
technical descriptions of the subject properties;15 (4) Geodetic Engineers Certificate;16 (5)
tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002;17 and (6) certifications dated
December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno (Calamno), Senior Forest
Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.18

On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondents application for registration
should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of
Republic Act No. 485019 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located
at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part
of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed
that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map
of Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department
of National DefenseBureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot
Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject
properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the
subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.

On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the
actual topographic survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the
respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDAs claim, are above
12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging
from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80
m.

The RTC Ruling

On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,20 which granted the respondents
application for registration of title to the subject properties, viz:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered confirming the title of the

applicant Remman Enterprises Incorporated over a parcels of land [sic] consisting of
29,945 square meters (Lot 3068) and 20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in Brgy. Napindan,
Taguig, Taguig, Metro Manila more particularly described in the Technical Descriptions Ap
04003103 and Swo00001769 respectively and ordering their registration under the
Property Registration Decree in the name of Remman Enterprises Incorporated.

SO ORDERED.21 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The RTC opined that the
elevations of the subject properties are very much higher than the reglementary elevation
of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC pointed out that
LLDAs claim that the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since
the same was merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial
survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was
indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the preparation of
the topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the
same; that the elevations of the subject properties may have already changed since 1966
when the supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was
based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in
measuring the elevations of the subject properties, pointing out that:

Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below 12.5 meters, oppositors
witness merely compared their elevation to the elevation of the particular portion of the
lake dike which he used as his [benchmark] or reference point in determining the
elevation of the subject lots. Also, the elevation of the said portion of the lake dike that
was then under the construction by FF Cruz was allegedly 12.79 meters and after finding
that the elevation of the subject lots are lower than the said [benchmark] or reference
point, said witness suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was below 12.5
meters. x x x.

Moreover, the finding of LLDAs witness was based on hearsay as said witness admitted
that it was DPWH or the FF Cruz who determined the elevation of the portion of the lake
dike which he used as the [benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of
the subject lots and that he has no personal knowledge as to how the DPWH and FF Cruz
determined the elevation of the said [benchmark] or reference point and he only learn[ed]
that its elevation is 12.79 meters from the information he got from FF Cruz.22 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m,
the RTC opined that the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake.
The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to
those areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual
maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those parcels of land that
are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not those
that are already far from it, which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC
pointed out that the subject properties are more than a kilometer away from the shoreline
of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is
at its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that
it and its predecessorsininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.

The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision,23 affirmed the RTC
Decision dated May 16, 2007. The CA found that the respondent was able to establish that
the subject properties are part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain;
that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, as claimed by the petitioner.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant registration of the subject
lands in its name. Appellees witness Engr. Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual
area verification of the subject lots, ably proved that the elevation of the lowest portion of
Lot No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. As to
the other lot, it was found [out] that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3077 is
also 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. Said elevations are
higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as provided for under paragraph
11, Section 41 of R.A. No. 4850, as amended.

In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies merely on the
Topographic Map dated March 2, 1966, prepared by Commodore Pathfinder, which
allegedly shows that the subject parcels of land are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake
water] of Laguna Lake. The said data was gathered through aerial photography over the
area of Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966. However, nobody testified on the due
execution and authenticity of the said document. As regards the testimony of the witness
for LLDA, Engr. Ramon Magalonga, that the subject parcels of land are below the 12.5
meter elevation, the same can be considered inaccurate aside from being hearsay
considering his admission that his findings were based merely on the evaluation
conducted by DPWH and FF Cruz. x x x.24 (Citations omitted) chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present certifications issued
by the DENR, attesting that the subject properties form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA
further ruled that the respondent was able to prove, through the testimonies of its
witnesses, that it and its predecessorsininterest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties prior to June 12, 1945.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC
Decision dated May 16, 2007, which granted the application for registration filed by the
respondent.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the respondents
application for registration since the subject properties do not form part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. The petitioner insists that the elevations of the
subject properties are below the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, pursuant to Section
41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake.

That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m
is a finding of fact by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. It is
a longstanding policy of this Court that the findings of facts of the RTC which were
adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed conclusive and binding. This Court
is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless
there are substantial reasons for doing so.25cralawred

That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not
necessarily mean that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with wellnigh
incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. While deference is due to the lower courts finding
that the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m
and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A.
No. 4850, the Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its
entitlement to registration of title to the subject properties.

Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State,
remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.26

The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152927 , which provides that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.

xxx
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.)
No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073.28 Under Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: first, that the
subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessorsininterest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third,
that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.29

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property
forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent
presented two certifications30issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under Project No.
27B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968.

However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that
the subject properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,31 the Court clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by the
proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for
land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true
copy by the legal custodian of the records. Thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that
the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.32 (Emphasis ours) chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In Republic v. Roche,33 the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N.
Properties, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of
the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of
land classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and
disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through
survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established
by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as
alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and
technical description of the land which bears no information regarding the lands
classification. She did not bother to establish the status of the land by any certification
from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with
all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.34 (Citations omitted
and emphasis ours) chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its
application for registration are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are
indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative
for the respondent to present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy.
Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application for registration in spite of
the failure of the respondent to prove by wellnigh incontrovertible evidence that the
subject properties are alienable and disposable.

Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Courts ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which
was promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that
decisions of this Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the
Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that its
application for registration of title to the subject properties was filed and was granted by
the RTC prior to the Courts promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Accordingly,
that it failed to present a copy of the original classification covering the subject properties
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true
copy, the respondent claims, would not warrant the denial of its application for
registration.

The Court does not agree.

Notwithstanding that the respondents application for registration was filed and granted by
RTC prior to the Courts ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that case may
be applied to the present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of nonretroactivity of laws
pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that the interpretation of a law by
this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally passed, since this
Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the
interpreted law carried into effect.35 Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the
passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre
existing one.36

Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in subsequent cases
notwithstanding that the applications for registration were filed and granted by the lower
courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.

In Republic v. Medida,37 the application for registration of the subject properties therein
was filed on October 22, 2004 and was granted by the trial court on June 21, 2006.
Similarly, in Republic v. Jaralve,38 the application for registration of the subject property
therein was filed on October 22, 1996 and was granted by the trial court on November 15,
2002. In the foregoing cases, notwithstanding that the applications for registration were
filed and granted by the trial courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, this
Court applied the pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties and denied the applications for
registration on the ground, inter alia, that the applicants therein failed to present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal
custodian thereof as a true copy.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessorsininterest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

To prove that it and its predecessorsininterest have been in possession and occupation
of the subject properties since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of
Cerquena. Cerquena testified that the subject properties were originally owned by Jaime
who supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since 1943; that sometime in 1975,
Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in turn, sold the same to
the respondent in 1989.

The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and selfserving assertions of the possession and
occupation of the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessorsininterest;
they do not constitute the wellnigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and
occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed,
other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other
evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it and its
predecessorsininterest of the subject properties.

For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific
acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application.
Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere
conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists
in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually
exercise over his own property.39

Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its predecessorsininterest

cultivated the subject properties, by planting different crops thereon, his testimony is
bereft of any specificity as to the nature of such cultivation as to warrant the conclusion
that they have been indeed in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the
manner required by law. There was no showing as to the number of crops that are planted
in the subject properties or to the volume of the produce harvested from the crops
supposedly planted thereon.

Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessorsin
interest have indeed planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow
that the subject properties have been possessed and occupied by them in the manner
contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject properties may only
have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is not the possession and occupation
required by law.

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute
possession under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious
so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land,
however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years.40

Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented
by the respondent were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its
claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors
ininterest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only in
2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. While tax declarations
are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
ownership.41 That the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in
2002 gives rise to the presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or possession
of the subject properties starting that year. Likewise, no improvement or plantings were
declared or noted in the said tax declarations. This fact belies the claim that the
respondent and its predecessorsininterest, contrary to Cerquenas testimony, have
been in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the manner required by
law.

Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its predecessorsininterest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondents application for registration should be
denied.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition

is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R.
CV No. 90503, which affirmed the Decision dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N11465 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Remman
Enterprises, Inc. in Land Registration Case No. N11465 is DENIED for lack of
merit.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179155 April 2, 2014

NICOMEDES J. LOZADA, Petitioner,

vs.
EULALIA BRACEWELL, EDDIE BRACEWELL, ESTELLITA BRACEWELL,
JAMES BRACEWELL, JOHN BRACEWELL, EDWIN BRACEWELL, ERIC
BRACEWELL, and HEIRS OF GEORGE BRACEWELL,Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated May 23, 2007 and the
Resolution3 dated August 14, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81075,
which affirmed the Decision4 dated July 31, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las
Pifias City, Branch 275 in Civil Case No. LP 98-0025, directing the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) to set aside Decree of Registration No. N-217036 (Decree No. N-217036) and Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-78 in the name of petitioner Nicomedes J. Lozada (petitioner),
and ordering the latter to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 as well as segregate
therefrom Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598.

The Facts

On December 10, 1976, petitioner filed an application for registration and confirmation of title
over a parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-129514, which was granted on February 23, 1989
by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134, acting as a land registration court. 5 Consequently, on
July 10, 1997, the LRA issued Decree No. N-217036 in the name of petitioner, who later
obtained OCT No. 0-78 covering the said parcel of land.6

On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of the aforementioned decree, James
Bracewell, Jr. (Bracewell) filed a petition for review of a decree of registration under Section 32
of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,7 otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree,"
before the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 275 (Las Pias City-RTC), docketed as Civil Case
No. LP 98-0025,8 claiming that a portion of Plan PSU-129514, consisting of 3,097 square
meters identified as Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598 (subject lot) of which he is the absolute owner
and possessor is fraudulently included in Decree No. N-217036.9 He allegedly filed on
September 19, 1963 an application for registration and confirmation of the subject lot, as well
as of Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Plan PSU-180598, situated in Las Pias City, which was granted by
the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58, on May 3, 1989.10 He further averred that petitioner
deliberately concealed the fact that he (Bracewell) is one of the adjoining owners, and left him
totally ignorant of the registration proceedings involving the lots covered by Plan PSU-
129514.11 Instead of impleading him, petitioner listed Bracewells grandmother, Maria Cailles,
as an adjoining owner, although she had already died by that time.12

In his answer13 to the foregoing allegations, petitioner called Bracewell a mere interloper with
respect to the subject lot, which the Bureau of Lands had long declared to be part and parcel
of Plan PSU-129514.14 He argued that his Plan PSU-129514 was approved way back in 1951
whereas Bracewells Plan PSU-180598 was surveyed only in 1960, and stated that the latter
plan, in fact, contained a footnote that a portion known as Lot 5, i.e., the subject lot, is a portion
of the parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-129514.15

The overlapping was confirmed by LRA Director Felino M. Cortez in his 2nd Supplementary
Report dated August 5, 1996, which was submitted to the RTC of Makati City, Branch
134.16 The report, which contains a recommendation that petitioner be ordered to cause the
amendment of Plan PSU-129514 in view of Bracewells claims, reads as follows:

COMES NOW the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and to the Honorable Court respectfully
submits this report:

1. LRA records show that a decision was rendered by the Honorable Court on February
23, 1989, confirming the title of the herein applicant [petitioner] over the parcel of land
covered by plan PSU-129514;

2. Upon updating of plotting on our Municipal Index Sheet, thru its tie line, it was found
to overlap with plan PSU-180598, Lot 5, applied in LRC Record No. N-24916, which
was referred to the Lands Management Services, El Bldg., Quezon City, for verification
and/or correction in our letter dated January 12, 1996 x x x;

3. In reply, the Regional Technical Director, thru the Chief, Surveys Division, in his letter
dated 20 June 1996, x x x, informed this Authority that after [re-verification] and
research of the plan, they found out that Lot 5, PSU-180598 applied in LRC Record No.
N-24916 is a portion of plan PSU-129514, applied in the instant case;

4. Our records further show that the petition for registration of title to real property
pertaining to Lot 5, PSU-180598 filed by the petitioner James Bracewell, Jr. under Land
Reg. Case No. N-4329, LRC Record No. N-24916 has been granted by the Honorable
Court per his decision dated May 3, 1989.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for its
information with the recommendation that the applicant [herein petitioner] in the instant case
be ordered to cause for the amendment of plan PSU-129514, subject of registration, by
segregating therefrom the portion of Lot 5, PSU-180598 also decided in Land Reg. Case No.
N-4328. The approved amended plan and the corresponding certified technical descriptions
shall forthwith be submitted to the Honorable Court for its approval to enable us to comply with
the decision of the Court dated May 3, 1989 in the instant case. 17 (Emphases supplied)

The Las Pias City-RTC Ruling

Finding that petitioner obtained Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78 in bad faith, the Las
Pias City-RTC rendered a Decision18 on July 31, 2003 in favor of Bracewell, who had died
during the pendency of the case and was substituted by Eulalia Bracewell and his heirs
(respondents). Accordingly, it directed the LRA to set aside Decree No. N-217036 and OCT
No. 0-78, and ordered petitioner (a) to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 and to
segregate therefrom the subject lot, and (b) to pay respondents the sum of 100,000.00 as
attorney's fees, as well as the cost of suit.19

The Las Pias City-RTC faulted petitioner for deliberately preventing respondents from
participating and objecting to his application for registration when the documentary evidence
showed that, as early as 1962, Bracewell had been paying taxes for the subject lot; and that he
(Bracewell) was recognized as the owner thereof in the records of the Bureau of Lands way
back in 1965, as well as in the City Assessor's Office.20

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal21 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 81075, arguing mainly that the Las Pias City-RTC had no jurisdiction over a petition for
review of a decree of registration under Section 32 of PD 1529, which should be filed in the
same branch of the court that rendered the decision and ordered the issuance of the
decree.22 He likewise raised (a) the failure of Bracewell to submit to conciliation
proceedings,23as well as (b) the commission of forum shopping, considering that the decision
granting Bracewells application for registration over Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598
was still pending resolution before the Court at the time he filed Civil Case No. LP 98-0025.24
 The CA Ruling

In a Decision25 dated May 23, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the assailed judgment of the
RTC, finding that respondents were able to substantiate their claim of actual fraud in the
procurement of Decree No. N-217036, which is the only ground that may be invoked in a
petition for review of a decree of registration under Section 32 of PD 1529. It held that, since
the petition for review was filed within one (1) year from the issuance of the questioned decree,
and considering that the subject lot is located in Las Pias City, the RTC of said city had
jurisdiction over the case.26 It further declared that: (a) there was no need to submit the case a
quo for conciliation proceedings because the LRA, which is an instrumentality of the
government, had been impleaded; (b) no forum shopping was committed because the petition
for review of the decree of registration before the Las Pias City-RTC and the application for
land registration then pending before the Court involved different parties and issues; and (c)
the award of attorneys fees was well within the sound discretion of the RTC. 27

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration28 having been denied,29 he now comes before the Court
via the instant petition for review, challenging primarily the jurisdiction of the Las Pias City-
RTC which set aside and nullified the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City, Branch
134 that had not yet become final and was still within its exclusive control and discretion
because the one (1) year period within which the decree of registration issued by the LRA
could be reviewed has not yet elapsed.30

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue raised for the Courts resolution is whether or not the Las Pias City-RTC has
jurisdiction over the petition for review of Decree No. N-217036, which was issued as a result
of the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134.

The Courts Ruling

The petition must fail.

Under Act No. 49631 (Act 496), or the "Land Registration Act," as amended,32 which was the
law in force at the time of the commencement by both parties of their respective registration
proceedings jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title was conferred upon the
Courts of First Instance (CFIs, now RTCs) of the respective provinces in which the land sought
to be registered is situated.33

The land registration laws were updated and codified under PD 1529, which took effect on
January 23, 1979,34 and under Section 1735 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land
registration is still vested on the CFI (now, RTC) of the province or city where the land is
situated.36

Worth noting is the explanation proffered by respondents in their comment to the instant
petition that when petitioner filed his land registration case in December 1976, jurisdiction over
applications for registration of property situated in Las Pias City was vested in the RTC of
Makati City in view of the fact that there were no RTC branches yet in the Las Pias City at
that time.37 Bracewells own application over Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598, all
situated in Las Pias City, was thus granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58. 38

Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,39 otherwise known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," was enacted and took effect on August 14, 1981,40 authorizing
the creation of RTCs in different judicial regions, including the RTC of Las Pias City as part of
the National Capital Judicial Region.41 As pointed out by the court a quo in its Decision dated
July 31, 2003, the RTC of Las Pias City was established "in or about 1994." 42Understandably,
in February 1998, Bracewell sought the review of Decree No. N-217036 before the Las Pias
City-RTC, considering that the lot subject of this case is situated in Las Pias City.
Petitioner maintains that the petition for review should have been filed with the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 134, which rendered the assailed decision and ordered the issuance of Decree
No. N-217036, citing the 1964 case of Amando Joson, et al. v. Busuego43 (Joson) among
others. In said case, Spouses Amando Joson and Victoria Balmeo (Sps. Joson) filed a petition
to set aside the decree of registration issued in favor of Teodora Busuego (Busuego) on the
ground that the latter misrepresented herself to be the sole owner of the lot when in truth, the
Sps. Joson were owners of one-half thereof, having purchased the same from Busuegos
mother.44 The court a quo therein dismissed the petition for the reason that since its jurisdiction
as a cadastral court was special and limited, it had no authority to pass upon the issues raised.
Disagreeing, the Court held that, as long as the final decree has not been issued and the
period of one (1) year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after
hearing, may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another. 45

To be clear, the only issue in Joson was which court should take cognizance of the nullification
of the decree, i.e., the cadastral court that had issued the decree, or the competent CFI in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction.46 It should be pointed out, however, that with the passage of
PD 1529, the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited
jurisdiction conferred upon it as a cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now have the power to
hear and determine all questions, even contentious and substantial ones, arising from
applications for original registration of titles to lands and petitions filed after such
registration.47 Accordingly, and considering further that the matter of whether the RTC resolves
an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court
is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction, 48petitioner
cannot now rely on the Joson pronouncement to advance its theory.

Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the review of a decree of registration falls within the
jurisdiction of and, hence, should be filed in the "proper Court of First Instance," viz.:

Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of
1wphi1

registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability
of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the
branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and
after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for
value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of
title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration
in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other
persons responsible for the fraud. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Since the LRAs issuance of a decree of registration only proceeds from the land registration
courts directive, a petition taken under Section 32 of PD 1529 is effectively a review of the
land registration courts ruling. As such, case law instructs that for "as long as a final decree
has not been entered by the [LRA] and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the
date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it."49

While it is indeed undisputed that it was the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 which rendered
the decision directing the LRA to issue Decree No. N-217036, and should, applying the
general rule as above-stated, be the same court before which a petition for the review of
Decree No. N-217036 is filed, the Court must consider the circumstantial milieu in this case
that, in the interest of orderly procedure, warrants the filing of the said petition before the Las
Pias City-RTC.

Particularly, the Court refers to the fact that the application for original registration in this case
was only filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 because, during that time, i.e.,
December 1976, Las Pias City had no RTC. Barring this situation, the aforesaid application
should not have been filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 pursuant to the rules on
venue prevailing at that time. Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court,
which took effect on January 1, 1964, the proper venue for real actions, such as an application
for original registration, lies with the CFI of the province where the property is situated, viz.:

Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance. (a) Real actions. Actions affecting title to, or for
recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof
lies.

As the land subject of this case is undeniably situated in Las Pias City, the application for its
original registration should have been filed before the Las Pias City-RTC were it not for the
fact that the said court had yet to be created at the time the application was filed. Be that as it
may, and considering further that the complication at hand is actually one of venue and not of
jurisdiction (given that RTCs do retain jurisdiction over review of registration decree cases
pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529), the Court, cognizant of the peculiarity of the situation,
holds that the Las Pias City-RTC has the authority over the petition for the review of Decree
No. N-217036 filed in this case. Indeed, the filing of the petition for review before the Las Pias
City-RTC was only but a rectificatory implementation of the rules of procedure then-existing,
which was temporarily set back only because of past exigencies. In light of the circumstances
now prevailing, the Court perceives no compelling reason to deviate from applying the rightful
procedure. After all, venue is only a matter of procedure50 and, hence, should succumb to the
greater interests of the orderly administration of justice.51

Anent the other ancillary issues raised by petitioner on forum shopping, submission to
conciliation proceedings, and award of attorney's fees, suffice it to say that the same have
been adequately discussed by the appellate court and, hence, need no further elucidation.

Finally, on the matter of petitioner's objections against the trial judge's "unusual interest" in the
case, the Court concurs with the CA in saying that such tirades are not helpful to his cause.
Besides, as pointed out in the Decision dated July 31, 2003 of the RTC of Las Pias City,
Branch 275, petitioner already had his chance to disqualify the trial judge from further hearing
the case, but the appellate court dismissed his petition in CA G.R. SP No. 74187 for lack of
merit.52

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and the Resolution
dated August 14, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81075 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for G.R. No. 170757
himself and in behalf of his co-
heirs LODOVICO, Present:
RICARDO, BIENVENIDO,
all Surnamed VALIAO and
NEMESIO M. GRANDEA, VELASCO,
Petitioners, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
- versus- ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MACARIO
ZAFRA, and MANUEL Promulgated:
YUSAY,
Respondents, November 28, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land Registration Case No. 03, granting
petitioners' application for registration of title over a parcel of land located in Ilog, Negros
Occidental.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

On August 11, 1987, petitioners[4] Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all surnamed
Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea filed with the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental an
application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 504,535 square meters, more
or less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.

On June 20, 1988, private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed their Motion
to Dismiss the application on the following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been
declared alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the application for
registration; and (3) the application has no factual or legal basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the following grounds,
among others: that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniment/s of title and/or the tax
declaration/s and tax payments/receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the
application, do/es not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona
fide acquisition of the land applied for or of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto;
that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic,
which is not subject to private appropriation; and that the present action is barred by a
previous final judgment in a cadastral case prosecuted between the same parties and
involving the same parcel of land.

On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter
ensued.

In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired the
subject property in 1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio Millarez (Basilio), who
purchased the land from a certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of Sale[5] dated May
19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish language. Basilio possessed the land in question
from May 19, 1916 until his death in 1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous,
peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's
death, the applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966, when oppositor Zafra
unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of their property, which compelled them to file
complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against Zafra. In support of their claim
of possession over the subject property, petitioners submitted in evidence Tax Declaration
No. 9562[6] dated September 29, 1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio Millarez.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners' application for
registration of the subject property, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders and decrees registration
of Lot No. 2372 subject of the present proceedings and the registration of title thereto, in
favor of the applicants, who are declared the true and lawful owners of said Lot No. 2372,
except applicant Lodovico Valiao, who sold his right to Macario Zafra.

Upon the finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration and
Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the applicants, Heirs of Basilio Millarez,
namely: Pacifico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao and Nemesio Grandea,
subject to the rights of private oppositors, Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay over said lot
whose fishpond permits are declared VALID and will expire on December 31, 2003.
 No costs.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the Republic, through Assistant
Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin, filed an appeal with the CA, which reversed the trial court's
findings in its Decision dated June 23, 2005. The CA ruled that the classification of lands
of the public domain is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the
government and in the absence of such classification, the lands remain as unclassified until
it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Further, there exists a prior
cadastral case involving the same parties herein and the same Lot No. 2372, which ruled
that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. The CA held that such judgment constitutes res
judicata that bars a subsequent action for land registration. It also ruled that the subject
property is part of the inalienable land of the public domain and petitioners failed to prove
that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED.

Accordingly, We REVERSE the Decision dated December 15, 1995 of the Regional Trial
Court, DENY the application for registration of title filed by petitioners-appellees,
DECLARE as moot and academic any and all claims of private oppositors-appellants over
Lot No. 2372, and DECLARE the subject parcel of land to be inalienable and indisposable
land belonging to the public domain.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated November 17, 2005. Hence, the present petition with the following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2372 OF THE ILOG CADASTRE IS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIM OF PRESCRIPTION BY THE APPLICANT WILL
LIE ON LOT NO. 2372.

III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CAD. CASE
NO. 23, ENTITLED LODOVICO VALIAO, ET, AL., VS. MACARIO ZAFRA, ET, AL.,
AC G.R. NO. CV-68873, CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATA AS FAR AS THIS
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS CONCERNED.
 IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE APPLICANTS
THROUGH THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
THEIR CLAIM FOR PRESCRIPTION.[9]

Petitioners claim that Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain. The possession of applicants' predecessors-in interest since 1916 until 1966 had
been open, continuous and uninterrupted; thus, converting the said land into a private land.
The subject lot had already become private in character in view of the length of time the
applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had possessed the subject lot, which entitles
them to the confirmation of their title. Petitioners further claim that prior dismissal in a
cadastral proceeding does not constitute res judicata in a subsequent application for
registration of a parcel of land.

In its Comment, the OSG submits that the issues to be resolved in the present petition, i.e.,
whether Lot No. 2372 is alienable and disposable land of the public domain and whether
petitioners have the right to have the said property registered in their name through
prescription of time are questions of fact, which were already passed upon by the CA and
no longer reviewable by the Court, since findings of fact of the CA, when supported by
sufficient evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties. The OSG further claims that
petitioners failed to prove that the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable portion
of the public domain and that petitioners' application for land registration is already barred
by a prior decision in a cadastral case. Lastly, the OSG asserts that petitioners did not
present sufficient evidence to prove that their possession over the subject lot applied for
had been open, peaceful, exclusive, continuous and adverse.

Anent the propriety of filing a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts and that only questions of
law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts
whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this
Court. This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the
findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court. [10] Due to the
divergence of the findings of the CA and the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the facts
and evidence adduced before the lower courts.

Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree provides:
 SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly-authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

From the foregoing, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from
June 12, 1945 or earlier.[11] These the petitioners must prove by no less than clear, positive
and convincing evidence.[12]

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land.All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.[13] Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not
susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the
concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title.[14] The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that
the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable ordisposable.[15]

There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.[16]
No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been
classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In the absence of
incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as
alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public
domain.[17] Verily, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and
until the land subject thereof is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

With respect to the existence of a prior cadastral case, it appears that on July 11,
1966, the petitioners filed in Cadastral Case No. 23 of the then CFI of Negros Occidental
a petition to reopen the proceedings relative to three lots, one of which is Lot No. 2372. The
lower court, in its Order[18] dated October 20, 1980, held that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the
Republic. It found that after the subject lot was declared public land, it was found to be
inside the communal forest. On appeal, the CA, in its Decision[19] dated August 7, 1984,
found no reversible error and affirmed the decision of the cadastral court. Thereafter, a
petition elevating the case to this Court was dismissed for lack of merit. [20] In the present
case, the CA, in its Decision dated June 23, 2005, ruled that such judgment constitutes res
judicata that will bar a subsequent action for land registration on the same land.

In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court held that a judicial declaration that
a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently
seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies
with the provisions of Section 48[22] of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as
long as said public lands remain alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, not only did
the petitioners fail to prove that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain, they failed to demonstrate that they by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12,
1945 or earlier as mandated by the law.

It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of ownership
to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which
are mere conclusions of law thanfactual evidence of possession.[23] Actual possession
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property.[24]
The testimonies of Nemesio and Pacifico as to their own and their predecessors-in-interest's
possession and ownership over the subject lot fail to convince Us. Petitioners claim that
Basilio was in possession of the land way back in 1916. Yet no tax declaration covering the
subject property, during the period Basilio allegedly occupied the subject
property, i.e., 1916 to 1947, was presented in evidence. Other than the bare allegations
of Nemesio and Pacifico that Basilio allegedly introduced improvements on the subject
property, there is nothing in the records which would substantiate petitioners' claim that
Basilio was in possession of Lot No. 2372 since June 12, 1945 or earlier, the period of
possession required by law. Hence, petitioners' assertion that Basilio possessed the property
in question from 1916 to 1947 is, at best, conjectural and self-serving.

As regards petitioners' possession of the land in question from 1947 to 1966, petitioners
could only support the same with a tax declaration dated September 29, 1976. At best,
petitioners can only prove possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest,
under a bona fideclaim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[25] Petitioners failed
to explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in-interest have possessed the
subject properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in
1976 that they started to declare the same for purposes of taxation.
Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the
right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The disputed property may
have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration, or
of their predecessors-in-interest, but it does not necessarily prove ownership. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership.[26]

Evidently, since the petitioners failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified
as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
their application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529
should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
54811, which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental, Branch 61, in Land Registration Case No. 03, is AFFIRMED. The application
for registration of title filed by the petitioners Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo
Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea, over Lot No. 2372, with a total area
of 504,535 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog,
Negros Occidental,is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
LAUREANO V. HERMOSO, as G.R. No. 166748
represented by his Attorney-in-
Fact FLORIDA L. UMANDAP,
Petitioner,

- versus -
Present:
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF
ANTONIO FRANCIA and PETRA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
FRANCIA, NAMELY: BENJAMIN P. Chairperson,
FRANCIA, CECILIA FRANCIA, AMOS AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
P. FRANCIA, JR., FRANCISCO F. CHICO-NAZARIO,
VILLARICA, DANILO F. VILLARICA, NACHURA, and
RODRIGO F. VILLARICA, MELCHOR PERALTA, JJ.
F. VILLARICA, JESUS F. VILLARICA,
BENILDA F. VILLARICA and Promulgated:
ERNESTO F. VILLARICA,
Respondents. April 24, 2009

x----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision[1] dated October 15, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated January 19,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77546.

The case involves parcels of land located at Malhacan, Meycauyan, Bulacan,

identified as Lot No. 3257 owned by Petra Francia and Lot 3415 owned by Antonio
Francia. The lots comprises an area of 2.5 and 1.5850 hectares, respectively, and forms part
of a larger parcel of land with an area of 32.1324 hectares co-owned by Amos, Jr.,
Benjamin, Cecilia, Petra, Antonio and Rufo, all surnamed Francia.[3]

Since 1978, petitioner and Miguel Banag (Banag) have been occupying and cultivating Lot
Nos. 3257 and 3415 as tenants thereof. They filed a petition for coverage of the said lots
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.[4] On July 4, 1995, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) issued an order granting the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing facts and jurisprudence considered, Order is hereby

issued:
 1. PLACING the subject two (2) parcels of land being tenanted by petitioners
Laureano Hermoso and Miguel Banag situated at Malhacan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan, owned by Amos Francia, et al. under the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27; and

2. DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned to process the issuance of

emancipation patents in favor of said Laureano Hermoso and Miguel Banag
after a parcellary mapping have been undertaken by the Bureau of Lands over
the subject landholdings.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Respondents filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and reinvestigation. On

December 9, 1995, the DAR affirmed with modification the earlier order, and disposed of
the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, ORDER is hereby issued

AFFIRMING the first dispositive portion of the Order, dated July 4, 1995,
issued in the instant case, but MODIFYING the second dispositive portion of
the same now to read, as follows:

1. PLACING the subject two (2) parcels of land being tenanted

by petitioners Laureano Hermoso and Miguel Banag situated at
Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, owned by Amos Francia, et al.
under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D.
27; and

2. DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned to hold in

abeyance the processing of the emancipation patent of Miguel
Banag until the issue of tenancy relationship in DARAB Cases
Nos. 424-Bul92 and 425-Bul92 is finally resolved and disposed.

No further motion of any and/or the same nature shall be entertained.

SO ORDERED.[6]

In a separate development, petitioner and Banag filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) consolidated Cases Nos. 424-BUL-92 and 425-
BUL-92. The cases delved on whether both petitioner and Banag are tenants of respondents
in the subject landholding. On June 3, 1996, the DARAB rendered a Decision[7] upholding
the tenancy relationship of petitioner and Banag with the respondents. Respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. A petition for review
on certiorari was filed before the CA. However, the petition was denied on technical
grounds in a Resolution[8] dated October 9, 1996. A motion for reconsideration was filed,
but the same was likewise denied in a Resolution[9] dated December 27, 1996. The case
was eventually elevated to this Court in G.R. No. 127668. On March 12, 1997, the Court
denied the petition for lack of verification,[10]and subsequently, also denied the motion for
reconsideration in a Resolution[11] dated July 14, 1997.

Earlier, on January 20, 1997, Banag filed before the DAR, an urgent ex-parte motion
for the issuance of an emancipation patent. On March 13, 1997, the DAR granted the
motion.[12] On March 21, 1997, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. They
claimed that the lands involved have been approved for conversion to urban purposes in an
Order[13] dated June 5, 1973 issued by the DAR Secretary. The conversion order stated that
the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 does not cover
the subject parcels of land.[14] On March 10, 1998, the DAR issued an Order[15] affirming
the March 13, 1997 order granting the motion for issuance of emancipation patent in favor
of Banag. On March 30, 1998, respondents filed a notice of appeal and correspondingly
filed their appeal memorandum.[16] On April 21, 2003, the Office of the President through
the Deputy Executive Secretary rendered a Decision[17] denying respondents appeal. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby

DISMISSED and the questioned Order dated 10 March 1998 of the DAR
Secretary AFFIRMED in toto.

Parties are required to INFORM this Office, within five (5) days from notice,
of the dates of their receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.[18]

Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. They maintained that P.D. No. 27 does not cover the subject parcels of land pursuant
to the June 5, 1973 Order of the DAR Secretary reclassifying the lands and declaring the
same as suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes. Furthermore,
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) reclassified the lands as early as
October 14, 1978.

On October 15, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed Decision,[19] the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the

assailed decision of the Office of the President is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new decision is hereby rendered
dismissing the Petition for Coverage under P.D. No. 27 filed by respondents
[now herein petitioner].

SO ORDERED.[20]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 19, 2005, the CA rendered the
assailed Resolution[21] denying the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition.

The sole issue in this petition is whether Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 are covered by P.D. No.
27.
Petitioner avers that the final and executory decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127668
affirming that he is a tenant of the landholding in question entitles him to avail of the right
granted under PD 27. In other words, because of the finality of the decision declaring him
a tenant of the landholding in question, in effect, the subject lots are considered as
agricultural lands and are thus covered by P.D. No. 27. Parenthetically, we take judicial
notice of the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 127668, in which the tenancy relationship
between petitioner and respondents was upheld. That decision is already final and
executory.

Respondents, for their part, claim that the lands were already declared suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844 as early as 1973. Hence, they are no longer
subject to P.D. No. 27.

We resolve to deny the petition.

Section 3, Article XII[22] of the Constitution mandates that alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.

The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary
classification and secondary classification. The primary classification comprises
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands specifically
mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same provision of the
Constitution, however, also states that agricultural lands of the public domain may further
be classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further
classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification.[23]

Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a number of government

agencies to effect the secondary classification of agricultural lands to residential,
commercial or industrial or other urban uses.

Thus, Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1988, which took effect on June 15, 1988, explicitly provides:

Section 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its
award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will
 have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with
due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize
the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided,
That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.

On the other hand, Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991[24] states:

SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands.

(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by

the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose,
authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for
the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases:
(1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of
Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater
economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes,
as determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such
reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the
total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the
ordinance:

(1) For highly urbanized and independent component

cities, fifteen percent (15%);

(2) For component cities and first to the third class

municipalities, ten percent (10%); and

(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five

percent (5%): Provided, further, That agricultural
lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries
pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six
hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise
known as The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
shall not be affected by the said reclassification and
the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall
be governed by Section 65 of said Act.

(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development
Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in
excess of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph.

(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing

laws, continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use
 plans enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the primary
and dominant bases for the future use of land
resources: Provided, That the requirements for food production,
human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into
consideration in the preparation of such plans.

(d) Where the approval by a national agency is required for

reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.
Failure to act on a proper and complete application for
reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the same
shall be deemed as approval thereof.

(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending,

or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.

But even long before these two trail-blazing legislative enactments, there was already R.A.
No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code, which was approved on August 8, 1963,
Section 36 of which reads:

SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.Notwithstanding any

agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, agricultural lessee
shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except
when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is
final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his

immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably
located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site
or other useful non-agricultural
purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall
be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to
five years rental on his landholding in addition to his
rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four,
except when the land owned and leased by the
agricultural lessor, is not more that five hectares, in
which case instead of disturbance compensation the
lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least
one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are
filed against him: Provided, further, That should the
landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years
or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within
one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall
be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant
shall have the right to demand possession of the land
and recover damages for any loss incurred by him
because of said dispossessions;
 (2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply
with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or
any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is
caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;

(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the

landholding for a purpose other than what had been
previously agreed upon;

(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm

practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section
twenty-nine;

(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement

thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has
unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or
negligence of the agricultural lessee;

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental
when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of
the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of
seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous
event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for
dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental
due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or

(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding

in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section
twenty-seven.

The petitioner in the instant case claims that he is entitled to the issuance of an
emancipation patent under P.D. No. 27. The said decree promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, on October 21, 1972, is entitled, DECREEING THE
EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL
TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND
PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS THEREFOR. However, the
law specifically applied to tenant-farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to
rice and corn under a system of share tenancy or lease tenancy, whether classified as landed
estate or not.

For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage of P.D.
No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the land is agricultural. Section 3(c) of R.A.
No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as follows:
 (c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land.

and Section 3(b) specifies agricultural activity as:

(b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means

cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices
performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by
persons whether natural or juridical.

On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land cannot be considered as within
the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This considering that the subject lots were reclassified by the
DAR Secretary as suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes
way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation under P.D. No. 27. The pertinent
portions of the June 5, 1973 Order[25] read:

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 3844, as amended, the said requests
of the petitioners were referred to the National Planning Commission as well
as to the Agrarian Reform Team Leader, Valenzuela, Bulacan for proper
investigation.

The National Planning Commission in compliance therewith after due

investigation and physical survey of the subject areas, favorably
recommended the suitability of the same to residential, commercial, industrial
or other urban purposes.

Similarly, the Agrarian Reform Team in Valenzuela, Bulacan after due

investigation thereof found the parcels of land subject hereof highly suitable
for conversion into urban purposes in view of his findings and verification of
the location, facilities necessary for urban development and also, the low
agricultural income thereof (unirrigated), of the said land. The Team Leader
concerned in his recommendation submitted to this Office made mentioned
(sic) that in his declaration of the suitability of the subject properties for urban
purposes, he believes that the conformity of the tenants consisting of eleven
(11) tenants are no longer needed so long as the petitioners are willing to pay
the disturbance compensation as provided for by law. The petitioners
manifested to the Team Leader concerned their willingness to pay each and
every tenant the disturbance compensation according to law. To show further
their sincerity to comply with the provisions of the law on disturbance
compensation, and to show that their (petitioners) purpose of the instant
request is not to evade the provisions of Decree 27, they stated in their letter-
request that they will not eject any tenants therefrom, nor dispossessed (sic)
them of their landholdings until after they are fully and justly paid the
disturbance compensation according to law.
 The subject parcels of land are not included in the land transfer operation
according to the teams report.

It maybe mentioned in this connection, that from the report of the National
Planning Commission submitted to this Office, it appears that the subject
properties are strategically located in the urban center of the town
of Meycauayan wherein there are already existing developed and occupied
residential subdivisions and even low cost housing projects subsidized by
funds from government financial institution. Likewise, there are also
industrial establishments in its vicinity according to the National Planning
Commissions report.

In view of the foregoing, and considering the parcels of land subject hereof to
be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes as
found and recommended by the National Planning Commission and the
Agrarian Reform Team concerned, and considering further that the said
parcels of land by reason of their location and the existence of developed and
occupied residential subdivisions and industrial establishments in the
immediate vicinity maybe considered as one of the possible areas to be
reserved for urban development as contemplated in the Letter of Instruction
No. 46 of the President, and considering finally, that the right of the
agricultural tenants therein will be fully compensated and there will be no
ejectment of tenants until after full payment thereof, as manifested by the
petitioners, the instant requests of the petitioners should be, as hereby it is,
given due course and the parcels of land subject thereof are hereby declared
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 3844, as amended.

It is understood however, that no agricultural tenants and/or lessees shall be

ejected from or dispossessed of their landholdings by virtue of this Order not
until after they are duly and justly paid the disturbance compensation
according to law, the amount of which maybe determined and fixed by the
proper court in the absence of any mutual agreement thereto by and between
the agricultural lessees and the owner-petitioners.

SO ORDERED.[26]

The main contention of petitioner for the approval of the emancipation patent in his favor
under P.D. No. 27 is the fact that respondents were not able to realize the actual conversion
of the land into residential purposes. To bolster his claim, petitioner relies on Section 36
(1) of R.A. No. 3844, viz.:

SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any

agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural
lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding
 except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment
that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will

personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if
suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful
non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his
landholding in addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-
four, except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor, is not
more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation
the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one agricultural
year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further,
That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years
or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith
and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and
recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossessions.

xxxx[27]

However, the provision of R.A. No. 3844 had already been amended by R.A. No. 6389, as
early as September 10, 1971. Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, now reads:

SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any

agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural
lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding
except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment
that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation

of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee
shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the
average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding
calendar years;

xxxx[28]

Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the landowner to implement the
conversion of the agricultural land to non-agricultural purposes within a certain period was
deleted. With the enactment of the amendatory law, the condition imposed on the
landowner to implement the conversion of the agricultural land to a non-agricultural
purpose within a certain period was deleted.[29] The remedy left available to the tenant is to
claim disturbance compensation.
 In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform[30], the Court held that
lands not devoted to agricultural activity and those that were previously converted to non-
agricultural uses are outside the coverage of the CARL, viz.:

We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL.

Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to
as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
"Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable
agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential
lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as
"agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased
to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod
Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be
developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can
readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an
action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The
enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have
delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands
are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL. [31]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision dated October 15, 2004 and the Resolution dated January 19, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77546 are hereby affirmed. The case is
remanded to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan for the proper
computation of the disturbance compensation of petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES G.R. No. 151312
PEDRO S. PALANCA AND
SOTERRANEA RAFOLS VDA.
DE PALANCA namely: IMELDA
R. PALANCA, MAMERTA R. Present:
PALANCA, OFELIA P. MIGUEL,
ESTEFANIA P. PE, CANDELARIA
P. PUNZALAN, NICOLAS R. PUNO, J., Chairperson,
PALANCA, CONSTANTINO R. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
PALANCA, EDMUNDO PALANCA, CORONA,*
LEOCADIA R. PALANCA and AZCUNA, and
OLIVERIO R. PALANCA, represented GARCIA, JJ.
by their attorney-in-fact, OFELIA P.
MIGUEL,
Petitioners, Promulgated:

- versus -
August 30, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
(represented by the Lands Management
Bureau), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF PALAWAN (Office of the
Executive Judge) and the REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF PALAWAN,
Respondents.
X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the decision[1] dated July 16, 2001, and the resolution[2] dated
December 21, 2001, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62081 entitled
Republic of the Philippines (Represented by the Lands Management Bureau) v. Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Palawan (now Regional Trial Court), Seventh Judicial District,
Branch II presided over by Former District Judge, Jose P. Rodriguez, et al.

The antecedent facts[3] are as follows:

On July 19, 1973, the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, (petitioners herein),
filed an application to bring the pieces of land they allegedly owned under the
operation of the Land Registration Act. These are: a two hundred thirty-nine
thousand nine hundred eighty (239,980) square meter parcel of land situated
in Barrio Panlaitan, Municipality of Busuanga, Province of Palawan, as shown
on plan Psu-04-000074, and a one hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred
eighty-eight (176,588) square meter land in Barrio of Panlaitan (Island
of Capari), Municipality of New Busuanga, Province of Palawan, as shown on
 plan Psu-04-000073. They acquired said realties by inheritance from the late
Pedro S. Palanca, who had occupied and possessed said land openly and
continuously in the concept of an owner since 1934, or 39 years before the
filing of said application, and planted on said lands about 1,200 coconut trees
on each land, declared the same for taxation purposes and paid the taxes
thereof. The first parcel of land is presently occupied by Lopez, Libarra,
an encargado of herein (petitioners), while the second is occupied by
(petitioner) Candelaria Punzalan. In Civil Case No. 573 entitled Heirs of
PedroPalanca, Plaintiffs, vs. Alfonso Guillamac, Defendant, for Recovery of
Possession of a Parcel of Land the Court of First Instance of Palawan rendered
a decision on March 4, 1970, declaring (petitioners), the heirs of Pedro
S. Palanca, as the rightful possessors of the land
at Talampulan Island, Bario of Panlaitan, Municipality of Busuanga, Province
of Palawan, covered by Psu-04-000074, including the two (2) hectare portion
occupied and claimed by Alfonso Guillamac.

It also appears that the jurisdictional requirements as to notices, as

prescribed by Section 31, Act No. 496, namely publication in the Official
Gazette, were complied with.

During the initial hearing of the case, verbal oppositions to the application were made by
the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan purportedly for and in behalf of the Bureau of Forest
Development, the Bureau of Lands, and the Department of Agrarian Reform, some
inhabitants of the subject properties and a businessman by the name of Alfonso Guillamac.
The Provincial Fiscal stated that the lands subject of the application had no clearance from
the Bureau of Forestry and that portions thereof may still be part of the timberland block
and/or public forest under the administration of the Bureau of Forestry and had not been
certified as being alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Lands. He therefore requested
that the resolution on the application be stayed pending the examination and issuance of the
required clearance by the Bureau of Forest Development.[4] After the lapse of three years
from the date of the initial hearing, however, no valid and formal opposition was filed by
any of the oppositors in the form and manner required by law.[5] Neither did the Provincial
Fiscal present witnesses from the relevant government bureaus and agencies to support his
contention that the subject lands had not yet been cleared for public disposition.

On the other hand, petitioners submitted the plan and technical description of the land, a
survey certificate approved by the Bureau of Lands and also tax declarations showing that
they have consistently paid the realty taxes accruing on the property. Petitioners likewise
presented six witnesses in support of their application, namely Constantino Palanca,
Ofelia Palanca-Miguel, Lopez Libarra, Alejandro Cabajar, Alfonso Lucero
and Augustin Timbancaya.
 Both Constantino Palanca and Ofelia Palanca-Miguel testified that: (1) they were
heirs of one Pedro S. Palanca; (2) they, together with their other siblings, were applicants
for the registration of two parcels of land located in Barrio Panlaitan, Busuanga, Palawan;
(3) their father, Pedro S. Palanca, acquired ownership over the subject properties by
continuous, public and notorious possession; (4) their father built a house on each parcel of
land and planted coconut trees; (5) since their fathers death, they have continued their
possession over the lands in the concept of owners and adverse to all claimants; and (6) the
properties have been declared for taxation purposes and the corresponding taxes religiously
paid for over forty (40) years.[6]
Lopez Libarra and Alejandro Cabajar testified that they knew the late Pedro S. Palanca and
worked for the latter as an overseer and a capataz respectively in the cultivation of the
subject properties. Cabajar, in particular, claimed that he helped clear the lands sometime
in the mid-1920s, planted upon such lands coconut trees which are now bearing fruit, and
continued working with Pedro S. Palanca until the latters death in 1943. He subsequently
went to work for the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca whom he confirms now own and manage
the properties.[7]
For his part, Libarra testified that he had been the overseer of the two coconut plantations
of the late Pedro S. Palanca since 1934. He identified the location of the properties, averring
that one plantation is in Talampulan, Panlaitan Island and the other
in Talampetan, Capari Island. He further testified that at the time he was employed in 1934,
there were already improvements in the form of coconut trees planted in the areas, a number
of which were already bearing fruits. His duties included overseeing and cleaning the
plantations, making copra and replanting the area when necessary. He also claimed he
worked with Pedro S. Palanca until the latters death in 1943 and continues to work for the
latters heirs up to the present.[8]
Also presented were Alfonso Lucero and Augustin Timbancaya, who testified thus:

Alfonso Lucero testified that he is a Forester in the Bureau of Forest

Development, formerly the Bureau of Forestry. He was once assigned as the
Chief of Land Classification Party No. 55 in Palawan. Presently, he is a
member of the Composite Land Classification Team No. 32 in the province
with station at Puerto Princessa City. He has been employed with the Bureau
of Forest Development for about 30 years, starting as a Forest Guard in 1947.
As chief of Land Classification Party No. 55, he covered the territory from
Puerto Princesa City northward up to Busuanga, where the land in question is
located. His duty was to supervise the team that conducted the limitation,
segregation and deviation of agricultural lands within the area. He served in
this capacity for twelve (12) years until December 1975. As such, he issued
certifications after due classification by his office, of alienable and disposable
land for administration by the Bureau of Lands and eventual disposition to
interested parties. He had been in Busuanga, Palawan a number of times and
is familiar with the lands in question, one of which is
in Talampetan, Capari Island and the other in Talampulan, Panlaitan Island.
He is aware that the lands in question are claimed and administered by the heirs
of Pedro S. Palanca. The improvements on the land are at least 40 years old in
his estimation. He recalls having issued a certification of release of this
property for disposition to private parties, but could not remember the exact
date when he did so. He identified Exhibits JJ and KK to be certifications to
the effect that Talampulan in Panlaitan Island and Talampetan, a portion
of Capari Island, both in Busuanga (formerly Coron), Palawan, are fully
cultivated and mainly planted to coconuts before World War II by herein
applicants, the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca. He is fully convinced that the lands
in question have already been released before the war for agricultural purposes
in favor of Pedro S. Palanca, applicants predecessor-in-interest. Releases of
agricultural lands which are done in bulk at present was not in vogue before
the last war, for releases at that time were made on a case-to-case basis. Under
the pre-war system, an application for a piece of land was individually referred
to the then Bureau of Forestry which in turn conducted a classification of the
area as to its availability, whether it be for sale, homestead, etc. On the basis
of the Bureau of Forestry investigation, a certification was then issued as to its
availability for the purpose for which the application was made. The
certification was made on the basis of such application, and was called the
isolated case release or the case-to-case basis. This procedure was followed in
the case of herein applicants and there seemed to be no reason to doubt that the
area was in fact released to herein applicants. Therefore, the area is no longer
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.

Alfonso Lucero also testified that as Chief of Land Classification Party

No. 55, he was the one directly in charge of classification and release of lands
of public domain for agricultural purposes. His office is directly under the
bureau chief in Manila, although for administrative purposes he is carried with
the district forestry office in Puerto Princesa City. The certifications he issue
carry much weight in land classification and releases in the province unless
revoked by the Manila Office.

Augustin O. Timbancaya testified that he is a licensed geodetic

engineer, formerly called a land surveyor. His services were engaged by
applicant Ofelia P. Miguel, the representative of the other applicants, to
conduct and prepare a land plan for two parcels of land subject of the
application. He went personally to the lands in question. He executed Exhibit
U, the Plan of Land covered by PSU-04-000073, containing an area of one
hundred seventy-six thousand, five hundred eighty-eight (176,588) square
meters situated at Talampetan, Capari Island, Busuanga, Palawan, approved
by the Director of Lands on June 25, 1973. He also identified Exhibit V, the
Plan of Land under PSU-04-000074, containing an area of two hundred thirty-
nine thousand, nine hundred eighty (239, 980) square meters located
at Talampulan, Panlaitan Island, Busuanga, Palawan, which was also
approved by the Director of Lands on June 25, 1973. Both lands are in
barrio Panlaitan, Busuanga (formerly Coron), Palawan, and have an aggregate
 total area of four hundred sixteen thousand five hundred sixty-eight (416,568)
square meters. All these surveys were properly monumented. He personally
prepared the technical description for both lots. He also prepared the Geodetic
Engineers Certificates and had the same notarized by Atty. Remigio Raton, the
first on January 24, 1972 and the second on March 14, 1972. He believes that
both parcels of land have been released for agricultural purposes because if it
were otherwise, the survey plans he executed would not have been approved
by the Director of Lands. In other words, the approval of the Land Plans by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands indicates that the lands in question have been
previously released for alienation and disposition. Both parcels of land have
been fully developed and the coconuts planted thereon are about 50 years old.
He has no doubt that these lands were released for agricultural purposes long
ago.[9]

After trial, the CFI of Palawan issued a decision on December 15, 1977 declaring
petitioners as the owners in fee simple of the two parcels of land in question. Thereafter,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4295 was issued in the name of petitioners.
Subsequently, out of OCT No. 4295, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-7095, T-7096,
T-10396, T-10397, T-10398, T-10399, T-10418, and T-10884 were issued.

On December 6, 2000, or after almost twenty-three years, respondent Republic of

the Philippines filed with the CA a petition[10] for annulment of judgment, cancellation of
the decree of registration and title, and reversion. Respondent sought to annul the December
15, 1977 decision of the CFI, arguing that the decision was null and void because the two
lands in question were unclassified public forest land and, as such, were not capable of
private appropriation. In support of this proposition, respondent presented Land
Classification Map No. 839, Project 2-A dated December 9, 1929 showing that the subject
properties were unclassified lands as of that date as well as a certification dated November
24, 2000 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office stating that
the islands of Talampulan and Capar(i) Island located in the municipality of Busuanga,
Palawan are within the unclassified public forest. Respondent likewise drew attention to
Executive Proclamation No. 219 issued on July 2, 1967 which classified
the Province of Palawan as a National Game Refuge and Bird Sanctuary and the small
islands off Palawan as national reserves closed to exploitation and settlement under the
administration of the Parks and Wildlife Office, subject only to existing private rights.[11] In
view of the fact that the properties were never classified as alienable and disposable,
respondent argued that the CFI did not have jurisdiction to make a disposition of the same.
 In addition, respondent asserted that the participants in the proceedings committed
perfidious acts amounting to extrinsic fraud which is one of the grounds for the annulment
of a judgment. Respondent maintained that a culture of collusion existed between and
among the petitioners, the Provincial Fiscal and the ranking officer of the District Forestry
Office, Alfonso Lucero, such that the State was deprived of the opportunity to fairly present
its case to the court.

On July 16, 2001, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the

then Court of First Instance of Palawan, Branch II, dated December 15, 1977, in
Land Registration Case No. N-21, LRC Record No. N-44308 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. Accordingly, Decree No. N-172081 and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. 4295 issued in the name of the
Heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, as well as the subsequent Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-7095, T-7096, T-10396, T-10397, T-10398, T-10399, T-10410 and T-
10884 and all subsequent TCTs issued thereafter are also declared NULL and
VOID. Private respondents Heirs of Pedro S. Palanca are DIRECTED to
surrender said transfer certificates of title to public respondent Register of Deeds
of Palawan; and the latter is also DIRECTED to cause the cancellation thereof.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in a

resolution[13] dated December 21, 2001. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners contend that the CA disregarded settled jurisprudence and applicable land
laws when it ruled that the subject properties covered by their application for registration
were forest lands and that, consequently, the land registration court did not have
jurisdiction to award the same to them. They opine that it is not necessary for them to prove
that the government had expressly given a grant of the subject properties to Pedro
S. Palanca, their predecessor-in-interest, separate of the legislative grant given to them
purportedly under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act). Petitioners furthermore
insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of the Executive before
it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands[14] and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.[15] They likewise argue that
the CA erred in relying upon Executive Proclamation No. 219 and upon Land
Classification Map No. 839, Project 2-A to nullify petitioners mother title. According to
petitioners, the reversal of the CFIs decision violated the principle of resjudicata as well
as the rule on incontrovertibility of land titles under Act No. 496.

Respondent, on the other hand, denies the allegations of the petition in its
comment[16] dated August 6, 2002 and contends that (a) the claim that the subject parcels
of land are public agricultural lands by virtue of a legislative grant is unfounded and
baseless; (b) the land registration court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, was devoid of
jurisdictional competence to order titling of a portion of forest land; (c) the CA is correct
in declaring that there must be a prior release of the subject lands for agricultural purposes;
(d) the rules on res judicata and the incontestability of Torrens titles do not find proper
applications in the exercise of the power of reversion by the State; and (e) estoppel
and laches will not operate against the State. Respondent also reiterates its contention that
collusion existed between the parties in the proceedings below which prevented a fair
submission of the controversy, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that an action for reversion filed by the State to
recover property registered in favor of any party which is part of the public forest or of a
forest reservation never prescribes. Verily, non-disposable public lands registered under
the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time [17] and the defense
of res judicatawould not apply as courts have no jurisdiction to dispose of such lands of
the public domain.[18] That being said, it must likewise be kept in mind that in an action to
annul a judgment, the burden of proving the judgments nullity rests upon the petitioner.
The petitioner has to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the judgment being
challenged is fatally defective.[19]

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court finds that respondent met
the required burden of proof. Consequently, the CA did not err in granting respondents
petition to annul the decision of the land registration court. This petition for review,
therefore, lacks merit.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act upon which petitioners anchor their claim
states:

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxx

(b) Those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-

interest, have been in continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
 The above provision clearly requires the concurrence of two things: (1) that the land
sought to be registered is public agricultural land, and (2) that the applicant seeking
registration must have possessed and occupied the same for at least thirty years prior to the
filing of the application. That the petitioners, through Pedro S. Palanca, have been in
possession of the properties since 1934 is not disputed. What is in doubt is the compliance
with the first requisite.

To reiterate, the validity of the CFI decision was impugned on the basis of the courts
lack of jurisdiction. If the properties were alienable public lands, then the CFI, acting as a
land registration court, had jurisdiction over them and could validly confirm petitioners
imperfect title. Otherwise, if the properties were indeed public forests, then the CA was
correct in declaring that the land registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case and, as a result, its decision decreeing the registration of the
properties in favor of petitioners would be null and void.

The reason for this is the fact that public forests are inalienable public lands. The
possession of public forests on the part of the claimant, however long, cannot convert the
same into private property.[20] Possession in such an event, even if spanning decades or
centuries, could never ripen into ownership.[21] It bears stressing that unless and until the
land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.[22]

In the present case, Land Classification Map No. 839, Project 2-A[23] indicated that
the Talampulan and Capari Islands on which the properties were located were unclassified
public lands as of December 9, 1929. It was by virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 219
issued on July 2, 1967 that these islands were subsequently classified as national reserves.
Based on these, it becomes evident that the subject properties have never been released for
public disposition. Obviously, from the time that petitioners and their predecessor-in-
interest were occupying the properties in 1934 until the time that an application for
registration was filed in 1973, these properties remained as inalienable public lands.

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the
islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result.
In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified
land until released and rendered open to disposition.[24] When the property is still
unclassified, whatever possession applicants may have had, and however long, still cannot
ripen into private ownership.[25] This is because, pursuant to Constitutional precepts, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership in such lands and is charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.[26] Thus, the Court has emphasized the need to show in registration proceedings
that the government, through a positive act, has declassified inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[27]

Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands[28] and Ankron v.

Government[29] is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October
7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or
President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending
upon the preponderance of the evidence.

As petitioners themselves admit, registration of the properties is sought under

Commonwealth Act No. 141. Sections 6 and 7 of the Act provide as follows:

Section 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of

Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.

Section 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of

alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare
what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.

Based on the foregoing, the classification or reclassification of public lands into

alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government. Clearly, the courts no longer have the authority, whether
express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.[30]

To the Courts mind, petitioners have failed to present incontrovertible proof that the
lands they claimed had previously been classified as alienable. The bare allegation of
Alfonso Lucero that a certification had been issued releasing the properties for agricultural
purposes is not sufficient to prove this fact. The best evidence would be the document itself
which, however, was not produced in this case. It was error for the land registration court
to have taken Mr. Luceros testimony at face value, absent any other evidence to
conclusively prove that the land had been released for public disposition.
 Furthermore, it must be pointed out that petitioners contention that the State has the
burden to prove that the land which it avers to be of public domain is really of such nature
applies only in instances where the applicant has been in possession of the property since
time immemorial. When referring to this type of possession, it means possession of which
no person living has seen the beginning and the existence of which such person has learned
from the latters elders.[31] Immemorial possession justifies the presumption that the land
had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before
the Spanish conquest.[32] The possession of petitioners in this case does not fall under the
above-named exception as their possession, by their own admission, only commenced
sometime in 1934.

To reiterate, where there is a showing that lots sought to be registered are part of the
public domain, the applicant for land registration under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 must secure a certification from the government that the lands claimed to have
been possessed by the applicant as owner for more than 30 years are alienable and
disposable.[33]Petitioners failure to do so in this case, when taken with the evidence adduced
by respondent showing that the lands in question indeed remain part of the public domain
and form part of the national reserves, confirms that the CFI never acquired jurisdiction to
order the registration of such lands in favor of petitioners, and certainly justifies their
reversion to the State.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No.
167707
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBIN
G,
LANDS MANAGEMENT
BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO,
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL A
USTRIA-MARTINEZ,
RESOURCES OFFICER
*
KALIBO, CORONA,
AKLAN, REGISTER
DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES,
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA,
REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, TINGA,
DEPARTMENT
TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO,
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR
OF VELASCO, JR.,
PHILIPPINE
TOURISM NACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES,
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
- versus -
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD
TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD,
and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf
and Promulgated:
in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Respondents. O
ctober 8, 2008
x----------------------------
----------------------x
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No.
173775
WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
OF THE LANDOWNERS OF
BORACAY SIMILARLY
OF SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,
Petitioners,
OF - versus -
THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN,
Respondents.

x------------------------------------------
--------x
DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants

of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
 There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory
relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of
Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064[3] issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand
beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist
destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants[4] who live in the bone-shaped
islands three barangays.[5]

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.[7]

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation

No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in
the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance
of PTA Circular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay
since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax
purposes and paid realty taxes on them.[10]

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing

Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was
classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the
right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect
titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as
public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,[11] as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was
governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as
alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following

facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay
Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing
trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted
more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were
occupying for tax purposes.[12]

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal:
whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of
the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for
resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.[13]

The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more
particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved
in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before
[15]
the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants,

with a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that

Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to
the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in
Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed
therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent
 Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself
constitute a title to the land.

SO ORDERED.[17]

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in
their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82
mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of
disposition.[18] The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.[19] The trial court
cited Sections 87[20] and 53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private
ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were
declared as part of the forest reserve.[22]

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[23] The Republic
then appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby

rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the
decision of the lower court.[24]

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration

that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.[25] Hence, the
present petition under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island into four hundred
(400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight
and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The
Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the
centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the
area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27] Wilfredo

Gelito,[28] and other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.[30] They allege that the
Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have
been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and
building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.[31]

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation

reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber
land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their possession in the concept of owner
for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a
vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public
forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed
portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need
for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as
they principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.[33]

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire
title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.[34]

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS
IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN
BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE
30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS
OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED
 BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?

II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED
RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED
PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY
HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN
TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006,
VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY,
PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8,
CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW
THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR
PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF
PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?[35] (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in

G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles
over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve
their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.

Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902[36] in relation to Act No.
926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; [37] (b)
Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No.
1064[39] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their
rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive
acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify
lands of the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions:
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest
and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law, [41] giving the
government great leeway for classification.[42] Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the
1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks.[43] Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.[44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.[46]

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable
public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public
domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the
state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the
favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such
privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.[49]

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in
the Philippinespassed to the Spanish Crown.[50] The Regalian doctrine was first introduced
in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the
foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain.[51]

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law
of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and
deeds as well as possessory claims.[52]

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the
method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were
set forth in said decree.[54] Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion
posesoria or possessory information title,[55] when duly inscribed in the Registry of
Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of
uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,[56] from the date of its
inscription.[57] However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the
promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert
to the State.[58]

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal
grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment
title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory
information title.[59]

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under
American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the
public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to
wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.[61] The act provided for, among others,
the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease
(leasehold system).[62] It also provided the definition by exclusion of agricultural public
lands.[63] Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of 1902,
the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:[64]

x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act

No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral lands. x x x[65] (Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which
recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as
the Torrens system.[66]

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926,
which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made
provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale
or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons
owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.[67] Under the
Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.[68]
 On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise
known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the
exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries
which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and
occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was
required.[69]

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874
on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing
general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other
than timber and mineral lands,[70] and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.[71]

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or
since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No.
1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,[73] which
now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.[74]

The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.[76] Under the decree, all holders
of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496
within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter,
the recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known
as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to
registration of property.[78] It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well
as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.[79]

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping

with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes.[81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands
only to those lands which have been officially delimited and classified.[82]

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[83] To
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land
subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. [84] There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that
the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.[85] The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.[86]

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,

report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants
were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition
before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call
for proof.[87]

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of
it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land
pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De
Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).[89] These cases were decided under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old
cases that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.[90]

Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did
not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into
agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of
the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural
depended on proof presented in each case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines
had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and
agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.[91] This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses
Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,[92] in which it
stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be

formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to
private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron
v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
 xxxx

Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.

Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine
Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision
vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so
that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon
the preponderance of the evidence.[93]

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then
necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum
in Ankron that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.[94]

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an

argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as
disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act
No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already
classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these
lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally
repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases
brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with
judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an
applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No.
926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As
to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued
to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land
classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was
better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber
land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
 In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-
General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs
to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land
has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare
that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof
of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the
minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for
agriculture, forestry, and mineral lands, and that in each case it is a question
of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the
proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which
it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not
sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears
some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by
reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural
land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the
discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be
differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof
in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for
one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it
is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine
Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must,
therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the
other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular
case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient
for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It
may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The
Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may,
by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such
reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have
intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148),
may decide for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set aside and
reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.
175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)[95] (Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from
the facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands. [96] Act
No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the
Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or
reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts
no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of
lands of the public domain.[97]
 Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title
in 1933,[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court
of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts
then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural
lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application
for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-
interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the propertys land
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds of Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the
Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in
effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The
Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.[103]

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different

issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the
general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a
residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the
issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
agricultural.

Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko relied on

the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De
Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were
decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural,
timber, or mineral.

Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued
possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under
Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may
apply for a title in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of

Appeals.[107] Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The
law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling
 and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine
Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also
provided for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon
public lands, for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots
therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants
in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands
remained in the government; and that the governments title to
public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States. The term public
land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands.

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are
alienable and disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR[109] and the National Mapping and
Resource Information Authority[110] certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of
the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass
of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which
are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island,
are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already
existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705
may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has
been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As
a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a
commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach
resorts on the island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that
the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry,
do not negate its character as public forest.
 Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution[112] classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land
or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.[113] The discussion
in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry[114] is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped
it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. [115] (Emphasis
supplied)

There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land
as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for
legal purposes.[116] At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status
of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has
been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not
been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an
agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by
then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants
assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of
Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which
made BoracayIsland an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to private
lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and disposable[118] does not by itself classify the
entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private
lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
 No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority
from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest
reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its
powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of
Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable
when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by

the Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to
classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified
the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not
done in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure
the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas
tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply
put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological
purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.[119]

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-
four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde
Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in
Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island
in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation
of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide
open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of
the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay
as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No.
141[120]provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper
department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.[121]
 In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably
subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative
of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority
to do so.[122]Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and
rendered open to disposition.[123]

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land
and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-
meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for
right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection
purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much
less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President
through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification,
subject to existing vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of
public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under
PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without
running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988

shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain

devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of
forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress,
taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar
the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained
an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
 In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
Republic,[124] the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.

While it is true that the land classification map does not

categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they
were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land
until released and rendered open to disposition.[125] (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification of

land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can
be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the
Department of Justice[126] on this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in

Section 4(a) is the word reclassification. Where there has been no previous
classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification
for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which
are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses
under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no reclassification of forest
lands to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against

the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law
delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those
lands of the public domain, denominated as public forest under the Revised
Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as
needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised
Forestry Code.[127]

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under
the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under
a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.[128]

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801
did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained
an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered
State property.
 Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the
absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a
government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed
and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the
law itself.[129] Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no
matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.[130]

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as
agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief
that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the
first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not
sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced
on June 12, 1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing
the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give
them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not

automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply
for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to
decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and
jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of
title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and
considerable investment in the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development
of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The
Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island their
home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply
the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito
ang dapat umiral.
 All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible
to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as
amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and
other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of
their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not
necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another,
they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire
title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present
land laws. There is one such bill[133] now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether
that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to
open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some
sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as
absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision
to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and
ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion
and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that
become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to
control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v.
Munoz:[134]

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to
public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have
written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing
need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and
reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment
of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that
absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of
adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry
up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish
disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function,
so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away;
geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak
havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and highways not
to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should
be written down in a lumbermans decalogue.[135]
 WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY

OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and
CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG,
EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M.
DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-
BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D.
LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO
SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD,
DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY
MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU
SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON,
BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S.
REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-
CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS,
GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S.
ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO
CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-
VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN,
VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY
ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR,
MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI,
PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T.
SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY
MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB,
MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A.
LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES,
FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY,
LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON,
VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG
MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M.
ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY
DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY
 SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P.
GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG,
SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S.
TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID,
represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M.
LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA,
JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID,
ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY
BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND,
PULA BATO BLAAN TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION,
INTER-PEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-
WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION
FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit

for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required
respondents to comment. In compliance, respondents
[1]

Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on

Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created
under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13,
1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The
Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over
natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the
petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of
Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano
Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous
peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to
Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality
of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus
Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the
principle of parens patriae and that the State has the
responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who
are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this
reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan
Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the
Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a
motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition
for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and
organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the
parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in
which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier
pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground
that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of
ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines
ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that
ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of
water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous
peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous
peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or
exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the
areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25
years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the
responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation.[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners. [3]

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA

defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making
customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. [4]

These provisions are:

(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation
and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the
NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP
that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon
notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and
Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of
the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and
practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with
respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt
or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in
favor of the indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices
shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples;
and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples.[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II,
Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the
NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral
but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
Presidents power of control over executive departments under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. [6]

Petitioners pray for the following:

(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63,
65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;
 (2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson
and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from
implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to
cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of
1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of
Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing
public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of
R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply with
his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization
and conservation of Philippine natural resources.[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the
Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed
an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA
which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read
in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a
justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the
petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66
of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific
cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the
IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the
view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices
Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary
majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated
upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the
same.Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the
separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 155394. February 17, 2005]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs. GREGORIO AGUNOY, SR., Et al., SPOUSES
EDUARDO and ARCELITA MARQUEZ and RURAL
BANK OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:

Interplaying in this case are two (2) counter-balancing

doctrines in the law of land titles: one, the doctrine of fraus et
jus nunquam cohabitant, which basically means that no one
may enjoy the fruits of fraud,[1] and the other, the doctrine that a
fraudulent title may be the root of valid title in the name of an
innocent buyer for value and in good faith.[2]
Invoking the first, petitioner Republic of the Philippines in this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeks to nullify and set aside the decision dated
September 26, 2002[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 55732, which reversed an earlier decision of the Regional
Trial Court at Cabanatuan City, Branch 25, in its Civil Case No.
831-AF, an action for cancellation of free patent, original
certificate of title and derivative transfer certificates of title,
thereat filed by the petitioner against, among others, the herein
respondents.
The facts are well laid out in the decision under review:
On May 26, 1958, Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. filed his application for Free
Patent No. 5-1414 covering two parcels of land identified as Lot Nos.
1341 and 1342, Cad 269, Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, containing
an aggregate area of 18.6486 hectares with the Bureau of Lands. On
January 18, 1967, he was issued Free Patent No. 314450 by the
Director of Lands.
On February 6, 1967, the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija registered
Free Patent No. 314450 and issued the corresponding Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4522 in the name of Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr.
On March 10, 1967, the heirs of Eusebio Perez, represented by
Francisca Perez, caused the annotation on the said OCT of an adverse
claim in their favor over a portion of 15.1593 hectares of the
property.
On July 30, 1975, the said heirs of Eusebio Perez filed a formal
protest docketed as B.L. Claim No. 760 (n) with the Bureau of Lands
alleging that Lot 1341 of the Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No-P4522 is identical to Lots
1 and 2 of Plan Psu-47200 which had been adjudicated as private
property of said protestant pursuant to a decision promulgated on
October 24, 1960 by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in
Land Registration Case No. 430, LRC Records No. 14876.
On May 3, 1976, the chief of the Legal Division, Bureau of Lands,
conducted a formal investigation and ocular inspection of the
premises and it was ascertained that Free Patent No. 314450 and its
corresponding OCT No. P-4522 were improperly and fraudulently
issued (Records, p.78)
On July 31, 1979, upon the death of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr., the heirs, namely Gregorio Sr., Tomas, Lilian, Angelito and
Gregorio, Jr., executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale in
favor of Joaquin Sangabol for and in consideration of the sum of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
The Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 was cancelled by the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 166270 was issued in favor of the aforenamed heirs. Said
TCT No. 166270 was again cancelled by reason of the concurrent
sale to Joaquin Sangabol in whose favor TCT No. NT- 166271 was
issued.
On August 1, 1979, Joaquin Sangabol sold an undivided portion of
three (3) hectares of the property described as Lot 1341 in TCT No.
NT-166271 to Fortunato Para for and in consideration of the sum of
Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (3,500.00)
The following day, he sold the property described as Lot 1342 in
TCT No. NT-166271 to Virginia P. Jimenez for and in consideration
of the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) in
whose favor TCT No. N-166287 was issued.
On May 12, 1980, the adverse claim of Francisca Perez, et al.
annotated at the back of the OCT was cancelled by the Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit G).
On January 16, 1981, Joaquin Sangabol subdivided the property
described as Lot 1341 in TCT No. NT-166271 into three lots
designated as Lot Nos. 1341-A, 1341-B, and 1341-C of plan Psd-
299875 duly approved by the Land Registration Commission.
TCT No. NT-166271 was cancelled and TCT No. NT-168972
covering Lot No. 1341-A was issued to spouses Fortunato Para and
Araceli Sena. TCT Nos. NT-168973 and NT-168974 covering Lot
Nos. 1341-B and 1341-C were issued in favor of Joaquin Sangabol.
On June 15, 1982, Virginia P. Jimenez sold the property covered by
TCT No. NT-166287 in favor of spouses Blandino and Josefina A.
Salva Cruz for Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P11,500.00)
where TCT No. 174634 was issued in favor of said spouses. On June
17, 1982, Josefina A. Salva Cruz effected the subdivision of the
property into thirteen (13) lots designated as Lot Nos. 1342-A t0
1342-M as per subdivision plan Psd-03-004756 thereby canceling
TCT No. NT-174634 and TCT Nos. NT- 174635 to 174647 were
issued in lieu thereof.
On November 2, 1982, Fortunato Para, through his attorney-in-fact
Gloria Bergonia, mortgaged the property covered by TCT No. NT-
168972 in favor of the Perpetual Finance and Investment, Inc. in the
amount of One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P125,000.00). The mortgage was foreclosed and the property was
sold at public auction. Thereafter, the corresponding certificate of
sale was executed in favor of Perpetual Finance and Credit, Inc.
On March 3, 1983, the properties covered by TCT Nos. NT-174643
and NT- 174644 were mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Gapan for
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00). On February 25, 1985, the
mortgage was likewise foreclosed and the properties were sold at
public auction in favor of the said bank.
On December 16, 1986, Joaquin Sangabol sold the property covered
by TCT No. NT-168974 to Eduardo R. Dee for and in consideration
of the sum of One Hundred Twenty [Thousand] Pesos (P120,000.00).
Subsequently, TCT No. NT-168974 was cancelled and TCT No.
196579 was issued in the name of Eduardo R. Dee.
On January 5, 1988, the heirs of Ruperto Perez (oldest son of
Eusebio), now represented by Sabina P. Hernandez, filed a
supplemental protest alleging that:
a) Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342, Cad 269 of the Sta. Rosa Cadatre
have been exclusively occupied and cultivated by them and
their immediate predecessors-in-interest who have
introduced permanent improvements thereon consisting of
irrigated ricelands, mango trees, bamboo groves and other
crops;
b) Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. never occupied and cultivated said
parcels of land in the manner and for the period required by
law;
c) Said parcels of land are identical to Lots 1, 3 and a portion
of 87,674 square meters of Lot 4 of the amended plan-
47200 Amd. as shown by the relocation survey conducted
by Geodetic Engineer Deogracias L. Javier on July 29,
1977;
d) The patent and title issued to Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. were
obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. (Records pp.
9-10)
The Bureau of Lands conducted anew an investigation and ocular
inspection of Lot 1342, Cad. 269 of Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija,
and came out with the following findings, to wit:
 a) Lot 1342, Cad. 269 of Sta Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija is
located at Barangay Imbunia (formerly Marawa),
Municipality of Jaen, Nueva Ecija;
b) Said lot was originally registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City on May 23, 1914
under OCT No. 125 issued in the name of Valeriano
Espiritu, pursuant to Decree No. 15733 issued on May 20,
1914 in Land Registration Case No. 9552;
c) On May 13, 1952, said property was conveyed in favor of
Isaias Carlos under TCT No. 11554 and the latter conveyed
the same in favor of the spouses Santiago Mateo and
Leogarda Juliano;
d) TCT No. 11554 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
17471 was issued in the name of Santiago Mateo. (Records,
pp. 13;78)
On May 10, 1988, the Chief of the Legal Division recommended to
the Director of Lands that court action be instituted for the
cancellation of Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 in the name Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr., as well as other subsequent transfer certificates of title
issued therefrom based on the foregoing findings (Underscoring
supplied).
It was against the foregoing backdrop of events when, on May
24, 1990, in the Regional Trial Court at Gapan, Nueva Ecija
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, thru the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed the complaint[4] in this case against
several defendants, among whom are the herein respondents
Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., his children, the spouses Eduardo Dee
and Arcelita Marquez-Dee and the Rural Bank of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija. In its complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 831-AF,
petitioner Republic alleged, inter alia, as follows:
30. Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding Original Certificate
of Title No. P-4522 were procured by defendant Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr., through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation since the property in
question (Lots 1341 and 1342) at the time the patent and the title
were issued was already adjudicated as private property of the heirs
of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, respectively. Consequently,
the then Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management Bureau, no longer
had any jurisdiction and control over the same. xxx xxx.
31. The fraudulent acts and misrepresentation of defendant Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr. had misled the then Bureau of Lands in issuing said
patent. Since the property in question was no longer a disposable
public land, Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding Original
Certificate of Title No. P-4522 issued to defendant Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr. are null and void and should be cancelled. Moreover, Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr. has not occupied and cultivated the land in the manner
and for the length of time required by law (C.A. 141 as amended; see
also RA 782) (Emphasis supplied),
and accordingly prayed for a judgment -
1. Declaring Free Patent No. 314450 and the corresponding Original
Certificate of Title No. P-4522 in the name of Gregorio Agunoy, as
well as all other subsequent transfer certificates of title emanating
therefrom, i.e., Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT-168972, NT-
168973, NT-196579, NT-174635 to NT-174647 (inclusive),
including all liens and encumbrances annotated thereon, null and
void;
2. Ordering defendants to surrender their owners duplicate copies of
all subsequent transfer certificates of title emanating from Original
Certificate of Title No. P-4522 to the Register of Deeds of Nueva
Ecija;
3. Directing the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the
aforesaid certificates of title;
4. Ordering defendants and all those claiming under them to desist
from exercising or representing acts of ownership and/or possession
in the premises (Underscoring supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
 Eventually, in a decision dated September 9, 1996,[5] the trial
court rendered judgment for the Republic, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
1. Declaring as null and void Free Patent No. 314450 and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 in
the name of Gregorio Agunoy, as well as all other
subsequent transfer certificates of titles emanating
therefrom (TCT Nos. NT-166270, NT-166271, NT-
168972, NT-168973, NT-168974, NT-166287 and NT-
174634 to NT-174647, inclusive, of the Registry of Deeds
of Nueva Ecija) including all liens and encumbrances
annotated thereon;
2. Ordering defendants to surrender their owner's duplicate
copies of all the said subsequent transfer certificates of
titles emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. P-
4522 to the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, and ordering
the Register of Deeds to cancel the aforesaid certificates of
titles;
3. Ordering reversion of the pieces of land embraced in Free
Patent No. 314450 and OCT No. P-4522 of the Registry of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija, to the mass of public domain except
the pieces of land which were already the subject of land
registration proceedings;
4. Ordering that henceforth the defendants and all those
claiming under them to desist from disturbing the
ownership of the government over the said pieces of land,
and
5. To pay costs of suits.
For lack of evidence, the third-party complaint filed by the Rural
Bank of Gapan, Inc. against defendants-Spouses Blandino Salva Cruz
and Josefina Salva Cruz is hereby dismissed without pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED (Underscoring supplied).
Therefrom, the spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita Marquez-
Dee and the Rural Bank of Gapan, Nueva Ecija went to the
Court of Appeals, whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 55732.
As earlier stated herein, the appellate court, in a decision
dated September 26, 2002,[6] reversed and set aside the
appealed decision of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED and
the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A
new judgment is hereby rendered to read as follows:
1. Defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. is declared to have validly and
properly acquired Free Patent No. 314450 and the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 over Lot Nos. 1341 and
1342, Cad 269, Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija; and
2. The title over the portion of Lot No. 1342, now covered by TCT
No. 196579 in the name of defendants-appellants Spouses Dee is
likewise declared valid for having acquired in good faith and for
value.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this recourse by the petitioner, submitting for our
resolution the following issues[7]:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

DECLARING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT THE REAL PARTY-
IN-INTEREST IN THIS CASE AND THAT GREGORIO
AGUNOY, SR. HAD VALIDLY ACQUIRED FREE PATENT NO.
314450 AND ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-4522
OVER LOT NOS. 1341 AND 1342, CAD. 269, STA. ROSA
CADASTRE, NUEVA ECIJA.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OVER THE PORTION OF LOT
NO. 1342, NOW COVERED BY TCT NO. 196579 IN THE
NAMES OF RESPONDENTS SPOUSES EDUARDO DEE AND
ARCELITA MARQUEZ IS VALID FOR HAVING BEEN
ACQUIRED IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.
We DENY.
To begin with, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
petitioner Republic is not the real party-in-interest in this case.
Basic it is in the law of procedure that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest,
meaning the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit,[8] a procedural rule reechoed in a long line of cases decided
by this Court. For sure, not too long ago, in Shipside, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals,[9] citing earlier cases, we wrote:
xxx. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it
may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of
imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the
government is a party in interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, "every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest." To qualify a
person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be
prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right
sought to enforced (Pioneer Insurance v. CA, 175 SCRA 668 [1989]).
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantial interest,
as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.
The very complaint in this case, supra, filed by petitioner
Republic before the trial court unmistakably alleges that at the
time Free Patent No. 31445 and its corresponding Original
Certificate of Title No. P-45222 were issued to Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr., the property in question (Lots 1341 and 1342) xxx was
already adjudicated as private property of the heirs of Eusebio
Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, and that at that time, the property
in question was no longer a disposable public land. In fact,
in paragraph 27(f) of the same complaint, petitioner further
alleged:
f) Furthermore, it was found that prior to the issuance of Free Patent
No. 314450 on January 18, 1967, Lot 1341 of Sta. Rosa Cadastre,
Nueva Ecija, which was one of the two (2) parcels of land applied for
by Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., was already the subject of an application
for registration filed by the heirs of Eusebio Perez in 1958 before the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, docketed as LRC Case No.
430, LRC Record No. 14876, and wherein a Decision was
promulgated on October 24, 1960 adjudicating Lots 1 and 2 of Plan
Psu-47200 as private properties of said heirs-claimants. The aforesaid
Decision was already final and executory at the time the patent was
issued to defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. (Except for the
underscoring on as private properties, the rest are of the petitioner
itself).
With the very admissions by the petitioner itself in its basic
pleading that Lots No. 1341 and 1342 are already private
properties of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu,
and are, therefore, no longer disposable public land over
which the then Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management
Bureau, no longer had any jurisdiction and control, we are
simply at a loss to understand how petitioner Republic can still
profess to be the real party-in-interest in this case, and insists
that the disputed properties are still part of the public domain. If
ever, the real party-in-interest could be none other than the heirs
of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, but certainly not the
petitioner.
Then, too, it is striking to note that even as the complaint is
basically one for reversion of private property to the mass of
public domain, petitioner did not implead either the heirs of
Eusebio Perez or that of Valeriano Espiritu. Without doubt, if our
decision hereon were to be in favor of petitioner, the real
beneficiary thereof is not the State. And because, as no less
admitted by the petitioner, the lands subject of this case are no
longer part of the public domain, the nullification of Agunoys
Free Patent P-314450 and OCT No. P-4522 would not result in
the reversion of the lands subject thereof to the mass of public
land. And the government, not being the real party-in-interest, is
without personality to institute reversion proceedings. So it is
that in an earlier case,[10] we had an occasion to say:
There is no merit in petitioners' contention that only the State may
bring an action for reconveyance of the lots in dispute. To reiterate,
Lot 2344 is a private property in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the Santiago family. The nullification of its
free patent and title would not therefore result in its reversion to the
public domain. Hence, the State, represented by the Solicitor General,
is not the real party in interest.
We could have, at this point, already written finis to this
decision. Nonetheless, for the peace of mind of those
concerned, we have opted to address the second issue raised
in the petition: whether the appellate court erred in declaring as
valid for having been acquired for value and in good faith the title
over the portion of Lot No. 1342, covered by TCT No. 196579 in
the name of the respondent spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita
Marquez-Dee.
After sleeping for an unreasonably long period of time lasting
for decades, the heirs of Eusebio Perez can longer defeat the
better right arising from the Torrens titles in the names of the
present transferees of the properties, unless and until anyone
succeeds in overcoming the presumption of good faith in
securing their respective titles.
For one, even granting as true the petitioners allegation of a
prior cadastral case - LRC Case No. 430, LRC Rec. No. 148 -
involving a portion of the lots subject of Agunoys Free Patent,
wherein a decision was allegedly promulgated on October 24,
1960 in favor of the heirs of Eusebio Perez, which decision,
according to petitioner, was already final and executory, we are
greatly bothered by the fact that none of the heirs of Eusebio
Perez could show having exerted due diligence towards at least
attempting to accomplish the registration of the properties
involved in the said cadastral case, which properties, according
to petitioner and the Perezes, are identical to Lot Nos. 1341 and
1342. Verily, were we to believe the allegations of the heirs of
Eusebio Perez in their own protest with the Bureau of Lands
dated July 30, 1975,[11] there is an express order for registration
in LRC Case No. 430, as follows:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered affirming the order of
general default heretofore entered and ordering the registration of
Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-47200, situated in the Barrio of
Marawa, Municipality of Jaen, Nueva Ecija, containing a total area of
21.9284 hectares in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
From as early as October 24, 1960, when the aforequoted
decision in LRC Case No. 430 was promulgated, to as late as
February 6, 1967, when OCT No. P-4522 of Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr. was issued, or a slumber lasting for more than six (6) years,
the heirs of Eusebio Perez had numerous opportunities to cause
the implementation of the said registration order. Inexplicably,
they let this chance passed by. Vigilantibus, sed non
dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not
those who sleep on their rights.[12] And speaking of rights, one
may not sleep on a right while expecting to preserve it in its
pristine purity.[13]
For another, Jose Mendigoria, Public Lands Inspector and
Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, made the following remarks
in his certification dated February 28, 1966:[14]
10. Remarks: Attached hereto is the certification of the Clerk of
Court and the Register of Deeds, Cabanatuan City for ready
references in connection with the speedy issuance of patent in
favor of the applicant.
It is informed in this connection that the survey claimants of
these Lots, 1341 for Eusebio Perez and 1342 for Valenciano
Espiritu could not be located in the locality. The lots were already
abandoned by them so that in the year 1941, the present
applicant took possession of the land thru his tenants.
Countering the foregoing certification, petitioner Republic
claims that a more recent verification survey conducted
on February 15, 1988 by Geodetic Engineer Melencio
Mangahas, also of the Bureau of Lands, reveals an anomaly in
the issuance of Agunoy, Sr.s Free Patent No. 314450. Again,
we quote from petitioners complaint, particularly paragraph 27
(c) thereof, to wit:
c) The results of the verification survey conducted by Geodetic
Engineer Melencio Mangahas of the Bureau of Lands on February
15, 1988 on the premises confirmed the earlier findings of said Office
that Lot 1341 Cad. 269 of Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, covered
by Free Patent No. 314450 and OCT No. P-4522 in the name of
Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., is identical to Lots 1, 3 and a portion of 87,674
square meters of Lot 4 of the amended Plan Psu-47200 which was
surveyed and approved on January 21, 1966 in the name of Eusebio
Perez. It was verified likewise that Lot 1341 is within Barrio
Marawa, Jaen, Nueva Ecija.
As between the February 28, 1966 certification of Jose
Mendigoria, supra, which led to the issuance of Agunoys OCT
No. P-4522 and numerous derivative titles descending
therefrom, and the February 15, 1988 verification survey of
Geodetic Engineer Melencio Mangahas, cited in the
aforequoted paragraph of petitioners complaint, which led to
nothing, suffice it to quote herein what this Court has said
in PEZA vs. Fernandez:[15]
xxx. Indeed, the inevitable consequences of the Torrens system of
land registration must be upheld in order to give stability to it and
provide finality to land disputes,
and in Heirs of Brusas vs. Court of Appeals:[16]
The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet
title to land and stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a
title is registered the owner may rest secure without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador de su
casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Indeed, titles over
lands under the Torrens system should be given stability for on it
greatly depends the stability of the country's economy. Interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium.
If at all, the discrepancy in the two (2) separate survey reports
of Mendigoria and Mangahas can only be imputable to either the
past or more recent officials of the Bureau of Lands.
Of course, we are well aware of the rule reiterated in Republic
vs. Court of Appeals and Santos,[17] that, generally, the State
cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials
or agents. In that very case, however, citing 31 CJS 675-676,
we went further by saying -
xxx. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an
ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations xxx, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public
authorities as well as against private individuals
In any event, the verification survey conducted by Geodetic
Engineer Melencio Mangahas on February 15, 1988 came
almost twenty-two (22) years after the February 28, 1966
certification of Jose Mendigoria; more than twenty-one (21)
years after the issuance of Agunoy Sr.s Free Patent No. 314450
on January 18, 1967 and its registration as Original Certificate
of Title No. P-4522 on February 6, 1967; and more than eight
(8) years reckoned from July 31, 1979 when, upon the death of
the wife of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., the heirs executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition with Sale in favor of Joaquin Sangabol. In
the meanwhile, for about half a decade thereafter, ownership
over the properties transferred from one buyer to another, with
each and every transferee enjoying the presumption of good
faith. If only on this score alone that the present petition must
fall.
There can be no debate at all on petitioners submission that
no amount of legal technicality may serve as a solid foundation
for the enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. It is thus understandable
why petitioner chants the dogma of fraus et jus nunquam
cohabitant.
Significantly, however, in the cases cited by petitioner
Republic,[18] as well as in those other cases[19] where the
doctrine of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant was applied against
a patent and title procured thru fraud or misrepresentation, we
note that the land covered thereby is either a part of the forest
zone which is definitely non-disposable, as in Animas, or that
said patent and title are still in the name of the person who
committed the fraud or misrepresentation, as in Acot, Animas,
Republic vs. CA and Del Mundo and Director of Lands vs.
Abanilla, et al. and, in either instance, there were yet no innocent
third parties standing in the way.
Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioners own judicial
admission, the lots in dispute are no longer part of the public
domain, and there are numerous third, fourth, fifth and more
parties holding Torrens titles in their favor and enjoying the
presumption of good faith. This brings to mind what we have
reechoed in Pino vs. Court of Appeals[20] and the
cases[21] therein cited:
[E]ven on the supposition that the sale was void, the general rule that
the direct result of a previous illegal contract cannot be valid (on the
theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its source) cannot apply
here for We are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens
System of Registration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a
fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the ROOT of a
valid title if the certificate of title has already been transferred from
the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or the name
indicated by the forger.
It is even worse in this case because here, there is no forger
to speak of. The remark of Land Inspector Jose Mendigoria
about the abandonment by Eusebio Perez and Valenciano
Espiritu cannot, by itself, be fraudulent. And, for all we know, that
remark may even turn out to be the truth. What petitioner
perceives as fraud may be nothing more than the differences of
professional opinions between Land Inspector Jose Mendigoria
and Geodetic Engineer Melencio Mangahas. But regardless of
who between the two is correct, the hard reality is that the
properties in question are no longer floating objects on a spring
that cannot rise higher than its source, as they are now very
much ashore and firmly standing on the high solid ground of the
Torrens system of land registration.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED and this petition DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision1dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration Case No.
N-25-1.

The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:

This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in the amended
application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional
Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter
alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by
purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from
Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-
in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years;
and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or
encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal
or equitable, or in possession thereof.

On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an

opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior
thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the
lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be
availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation.

On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as

against the whole world, with the exception of the Office of the Solicitor General,
and proceeded with the hearing of this registration case.

After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested
her case. The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no
objection to the admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor
manifest (sic) that the Government had no evidence to adduce. 3

In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for
herein respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in
question and decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels

of land situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447
containing an area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446
containing an area of 15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to
herein applicant Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to
Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with all the
improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name
in accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as
amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is
subject to the various easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws,
presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions which should be
annotated/ projected on the title to be issued. And once this decision becomes
final, let the corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued. (Words
in bracket added)

With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court,
petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001.

As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29,
1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission that the CAs
decision "is not in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since
respondent has not established with the required evidence her title in fee simple
or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots which would warrant their
registration under (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141." In particular,
petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length
of respondents occupation of the property subject of her application for
registration and for not considering the fact that she has not established that the
lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable
and disposable property.

Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by

positive act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private
appropriation.5 As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.6 Given this postulate, the principal issue to be addressed turns on the
question of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status
of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act7 and the
Constitution8 classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands and national parks," do not necessarily refer to a large tract
of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and
underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui 9-

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands"
do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The
classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,10 which embodies the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land.11 All lands not appearing to be clearly of
private dominion presumptively belong to the State.12 Accordingly, public lands
not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain.13 Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying
or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to
agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government
and not the court.14 Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible
evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.15

In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already
alienable and disposable. Wrote the appellate court:

The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public
domain cannot be sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine. Said
doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . . . that
open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private property . (Word in bracket and
underscoring added.)

The principal reason for the appellate courts disposition, finding a registerable
title for respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-interests open, continuous
and exclusive occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years.
Prescinding from its above assumption and finding, the appellate court went on
to conclude, citing Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC)16 and Herico vs. DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon the completion of
the requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land
and become private property.

Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however,
winning cards for the respondent, for the simple reason that, in said cases, the
disposable and alienable nature of the land sought to be registered was
established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the difference.

Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper
government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as
alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot
be assumed. It calls for proof.18 Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in
evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which,
needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the
property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to
overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain.19

It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has

been a notorious practice resorted to in land registration cases. 20 For this reason,
the Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of
forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable
and disposable lands need an express and positive act from the government.21

The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession
of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land,
as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.22

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated
May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondents application for
original registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional
Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 107751 June 1, 1995

LETICIA P. LIGON, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CELIA LIPANA-REYES, Presiding Judge,
Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Iglesia ni Kristo and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 82, granting the motion
of respondent of Iglesia ni Kristo to direct petitioner to surrender the owner's
duplicate of the certificates of title in her possession.

On 19 October 1990 respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint 1 for specific performance with damages
against the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP) docketed as Civil Case
No. Q90-6937. Respondent INK alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an
Absolute Deed of Sale dated 20 April 1989 IDP sold to it two (2) parcels of land
located at Tandang Sora, Barrio Culiat, Quezon City, both of which IDP is the
registered owner. The parties stipulated in the deed of sale that the IDP shall
undertake to evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the property within forty-
five (45) days from the execution of the contract.

IDP failed to fulfill this obligation. Hence INK prayed that the trial court order IDP
to comply with its obligation of clearing the subject lots of illegal occupants and to
pay damages to INK.

IDP alleged in its answer that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying
the payment of the purchase price and prayed that the contract of sale be
rescinded and revoked.

On 15 June 1991 INK filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground
that there was actually no genuine issue as to any material fact.

On 12 September 1991 the trial court rendered partial judgment, and on 7

October 1991 an amended partial judgment granting the reliefs prayed for by INK
except the prayer for damages which was to be resolved later.

On 22 January 1992 INK filed a motion in the same case praying that petitioner
Leticia Ligon, who was in possession of the certificates of title over the properties
as mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender the certificates to the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its
name. INK alleged that the document could not be registered because of the
refusal and/or failure of petitioner to deliver the certificates of title despite
repeated requests.

On 31 January 1992 petitioner Ligon filed an opposition to the motion on the

ground that the IDP was not served copy of the motion, and the ownership of the
INK over the property was still in issue since rescission was sought by the IDP as
a counterclaim. She prayed that the motion be denied, but should it be granted,
the Register of Deeds be directed after registration to deliver the owner's
duplicate copies of the new certificates of title to her.

On 15 February 1992 petitioner filed a Supplemental Opposition questioning the

jurisdiction of the trial court because the motion involved the registrability of the
document of sale, and she was not made a party to the main case.

On 2 March 1992 the trial court granted the motion of INK and ordered petitioner
to surrender to INK the owner's copy of RT-26521 (170567) and RT-26520
(176616) in open court for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in the
latter's name and the annotation of the mortgage executed in favor of petitioner
on the new transfer certificates of title to be issued to INK.2

On 6 April 1992, on motion of petitioner Ligon, the trial court reconsidered its
order by directing her to deliver the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City. 3

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking the
annulment of the two (2) orders. However, on 28 October 1992 the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the orders of the trial court.

Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the trial court erred: (a) in ruling that it
had jurisdiction over petitioner; (b) in upholding the orders of the trial court even
as they violated the rule prohibiting splitting of a single cause of action and
forum-shopping; (c) in holding that INK is the owner of the property and entitled
to registration of its ownership; and, (d) in holding that INK has a superior right to
the possession of the owner's copies of the certificates of title.

Upon prior leave, the IDP intervened alleging that prior to the issuance by the
trial court of the order of 2 March 1992, its legal Board of Trustees filed a motion
for intervention informing said court that the sale of the properties was not
executed by it but was made possible by a fake Board of Trustees, hence, the
sale is void. The trial court denied the motion since jurisdiction over the incident
properly belonged to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Conformably therewith, IDP brought the matter before the SEC which later
declared that the sale of the properties was void. Thus, IDP banks on this
favorable decision in similarly seeking the nullification of the questioned orders of
the trial court.

Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by

the Register of Deeds unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented
together with such instrument, except in some cases or upon order of the court
for cause shown. In case the person in possession of the duplicate certificates
refuses or fails to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a
voluntary document may be registered and a new certificate issued, Sec. 107,
Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states:

Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. Where it is

necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any
involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered owner
against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be
registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender
the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a
petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of
Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or
any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same
and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such
surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not
amenable to the process of the court, or if for any reason the
outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the
court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of
a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new, certificate and all
duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of
the outstanding duplicate.

Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1529 otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, the former law, Act No. 496 otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, and all jurisprudence interpreting the former law had
established that summary reliefs such as an action to compel the surrender of
owner's duplicate certificate of title to the Register of Deeds could only be filed
with and granted by the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court if
there was unanimity among the parties or there was no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest, otherwise, if the case became
contentious and controversial it should be threshed out in an ordinary action or in
the case where the incident properly belonged.4

Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided that "Courts of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications
for original registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interest
therein and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to
hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions." The
above provision has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction
vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by
the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding
multiplicity of suits the change has simplified registration proceedings by
conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on
applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon
such applications or petitions.5

The principal action filed by INK in Civil Case No. Q-90-6937 before the trial court
was for specific performance with damages based on a document of sale. Such
action was well within the exclusive jurisdictions of the Regional Trial
Court.6 When IDP, the defendant in the trial court, did not question the
genuineness and validity of said deed of sale and its obligations thereunder, the
summary judgment issued by the court granting the reliefs sought by INK was
also an exercise of its general jurisdiction.

Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the same court
to compel the holder of the duplicate certificates of title to surrender the same to
the Register of Deeds for the registration of the deed of sale subject of the
principal action, the motion was a necessary incident to the main case. When the
sale of the property was upheld by the court in its judgment and the defendant
was directed to comply with its terms and conditions, the right of INK to have the
same registered with the Register of Deeds could not be disregarded. To assert
and enjoy its right, INK should be allowed to seek the aid of the court to direct the
surrender of the certificates of title. Since Regional Trial Courts are courts of
general jurisdiction, they may therefore take cognizance of this case pursuant to
such jurisdiction. 7 Even while Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition which
can be filed by one who wants to compel another to surrender the certificates of
title to the Register of Deeds, this does not preclude a party to a pending case to
include as incident therein the relief stated under Sec. 107, especially if the
subject certificates of title to be surrendered are intimately connected with the
subject matter of the principal action.8 This principle is based on expediency and
in accordance with the policy against multiplicity of suits.

The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage lien of petitioner
appears in the certificates of title Nos. 26520 and 26521. Hence, the order of the
trial court directing the surrender of the certificates to the Register of Deeds in
order that the deed of sale in favor of INK can be registered, cannot in any way
prejudice her rights and interests as a mortgagee of the lots. Any lien annotated
on the previous certificates of title which subsists should be incorporated in or
carried over to the new transfer certificates of title. This is true even in the case of
a real estate mortgage because pursuant to Art. 2126 of the Civil Code it directly
and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the
possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted. It is inseparable from the property mortgaged as it is a right in rem
a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a
change in ownership; in short, the personality of the owner is disregarded. Thus,
all subsequent purchasers must respect the mortgage whether the transfer to
them be with or without the consent of the mortgagee, for such mortgage until
discharged follows the property.9 It is clear therefore that the surrender by
petitioner of the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds as ordered by the trial
court will not create any substantial injustice to her. To grant the petition and
compel INK to file a new action in order to obtain the same reliefs it asked in the
motion before the trial court is to encourage litigations where no substantial rights
are prejudiced. This end should be avoided. Courts should not be so strict about
procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice.
The rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigations because of the
higher objective they seek, which is, to protect the parties' substantive rights. 10
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 October
1992 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 103727. December 18, 1996]

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN, represented
by its HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO,petitioner-
appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), AURELIO OCAMPO,
DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN, TERESA C. DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees.

[G.R. No. 106496. December 18, 1996]

ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON, VICENTE PANTALEON,

ELEUTERIO PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN PEDRO,
RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS, and LEONA SAN PEDRO, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of controversy in
these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and
have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and the Government itself, a
total land area of approximately 173,000 hectares or 214,047 quiniones,[1] on the basis of a
Spanish title, entitled Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 dated April 25, 1894. The claim,
according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija,
Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan
City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from
Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the
north and Tayabas Bay in the south.[2]
Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and land
swindles and rackets proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in various trial courts, in the
appellate court and in the Supreme Court,[3] in connection therewith.
We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Muoz, 23
SCRA 1183 [1968]; Antonio, et al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357 [1968]; Carabot, et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al., 186 SCRA 88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) v. Court of Appeals,
et al., 212 SCRA 360 [1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 318
[1986]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; and Director of Lands v.
Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336 [1994][4]terminated the controversy as to ownership of lands covered
by Spanish Land Titles, for it is the rule that, once this Court, as the highest Tribunal of the land,
has spoken, there the matter must rest:
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence,
after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review
set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter
is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement
with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be
expected; but, it is not their will, but the Courts, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public
policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the courts
dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality.[5] [Cited cases omitted]
 It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we render
judgment herein writing finis to these controversies by laying to rest the issue of validity of the
basis of the estates claim of ownership over this vast expanse of real property.
The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out cases:

G.R. NO. 103727

G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint[6] for recovery of possession and/or
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon City in its decision[7] dated July 7, 1989,
the dispositive portion[8] of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint against the defendants Aurelio
Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of the herein
defendants, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as and for attorneys fees, and to pay the
costs of suit.

The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance with
damages and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio
San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator of the Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban against Jose G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera,
Teresa C. dela Cruz, Gaudencio R. Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D.
Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria
Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment & Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty Corporation
and Jose F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in Branch 104,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that
the aforenamed defendants were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles
to portions of the subject estate, particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982,
951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all
emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. 614[9] and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
255544 and 264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the aforesaid
defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain portions of the
subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation; (3) that
Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled by and through a final and
executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in relation to letter recommendations by the Bureau of
Lands, Bureau of Forest Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation
to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April 23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10,
1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity and genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No.
4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the subject estate had been resolved in favor of the
petitioner estate in a decision dated April 25, 1978 by the defunct Court of First Instance, Branch
1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-B.[10]
Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely, Aurelio
Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung and
Victoria Chung Tiu.[11]
On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Mareco,
Inc. for improper service of summons and against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack
of cause of action considering that the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment and Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria
Chung Tiu.[12]
Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela
Cruz.
On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based on the
following grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of the
parcels of land covered by Torrens titles which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title,
Titulo Propriedad No. 4136, covering the subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban specifically stated in its dispositive portion that all lands which have already
been legally and validly titled under the Torrens system by private persons shall be excluded
from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.[13]
The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied,[14] and so, the petitioner estate
interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On January 20, 1992, the appeal was
dismissed[15] for being unmeritorious and the lower courts decision was affirmed with costs
against the petitioner estate. The appellate court ratiocinated:
(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof was presented in the
proceeding below;
(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not registered under the Torrens
System hence, it cannot be used as evidence of land ownership;
(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor expressly excluded from the Titulo
titled lands of private individuals;
(4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz as
correctly ruled by the lower court;
(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles of Ocampo, Buhain and
Dela Cruz originated was already cancelled, hence, the lower court did not err in not declaring
the same as null and void.[16]
Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate, on March 16,
1992, filed the present petition[17] docketed as G. R. No. 103727.

G.R. NO. 106496

G.R No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a petition[18] for letters of administration
over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban which eventually resulted to an
Order[19] dated November 17, 1978 declaring inter alia, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void
and of no legal force and effect.

The dispositive portion[20] of the said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:

1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside.

2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no legal force and effect and
that therefore no rights could be derived therefrom.

3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any other transactions involving
the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are declared invalidated, void and of
no force and effect.

4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.

5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban are enjoined from representing or exercising any acts of possession
or ownership or from disposing in any manner portions of all the lands covered by Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136 and to immediately vacate the same.
 6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators submit in Court within twenty
days their final accounting and inventory of all real and personal properties of the estate
which had come into their possession or knowledge under oath.

7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to continue with the

presentation of their evidence in order to rest their case.

The consideration and approval of the administrators final accounting and

inventory of the presentation of movants-intervenors evidence as well as the
consideration of all other incidents are hereby set on December 22, 1978 at 8:30 a. m.
The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban was filed on December 29, 1971 with the defunct Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The petition docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by Engracio San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito who sought
to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator, respectively.
On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established, evidence for the
petitioners was received by the lower court without any opposition. [21]
On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order appointing
Engracio San Pedro as Administrator of the subject estate.[22]
On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of Engracio San Pedro
upon posting of a bond in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).[23]
On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to furnish copies of
the letters of administration and other pertinent orders approving certain dispositions of the
properties of the estate to the following entities:
(a) The Commanding General
Philippine Constabulary
Camp Crame, Quezon City
(b) The Solicitor General
Manila
(c) The Government Corporate Counsel
A. Mabini St., Manila
(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan
(e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan
(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and
Caloocan
(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan
and Rizal
(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City
(i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City
(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various
municipalities in which properties of the estate are
located; and
(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon
City and Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.[24]
The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any confusion brought
about by various persons who had been misrepresenting themselves as having been legally
authorized to act for the subject estate and to sell its properties by virtue thereof.
 On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the Petition was filed by
the Republic of the Philippines alleging, inter alia:
4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16, 1976, Spanish titles like the
TITULO is absolutely inadmissible and ineffective as proof of ownership in court
proceedings, except where the holder thereof applies for land registration under Act 496,
which is not true in the proceedings at bar;
5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NO. 4136
as invalid;
6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and/or his supposed heirs
have lost whatever rights of ownership they might have had to the so-called Estate on the
ground of inaction, laches and/or prescription;
7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be administered for purposes of
inventory, settlement or distribution in accordance with law, and all the inventories so far
submitted, insofar as they embraced lands within the TITULO, are deemed ineffective
and cannot be legally considered; and
8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the land subject matter of the
petition considering that, except such portions thereof had been (sic) already the subject
of valid adjudication or disposition in accordance with law, the same belong in State
ownership.[25]
On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings. [26]
On February 16, 1977, the Republics Opposition to the Petition for Letters of Administration
was dismissed by means of the following Order issued by Judge Benigno Puno:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues raised, the Court hereby
DISMISSES the Opposition dated August 30, 1976, filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General; likewise, for lack of merit, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated February 15,
1977, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is DENIED.
The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the co-administrator Justino Z. Benito are ordered
to furnish the office of the Solicitor General all copies of inventories already filed in Court
within ten (10) days from notice hereof.[27]
On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the Republic. [28]
On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao,
rendered a 52-page decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of
the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, issued on April 29, 1984, in the name of the deceased Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, covering a total area of approximately 214,047 quiniones or
173,000 hectares, situated in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, Quezon City and
Caloocan City;

(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa Pantaleon, Vicente
Pantaleon, Eleuterio Pantaleon, Trinidad San Pedro, Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and
Teresa Nicolas, as the true and lawful heirs of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
and entitled to inherit the intestate estate left by the said deceased, consisting of the above-
mentioned tract of private land covered and described by said above-mentioned Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, excluding therefrom: (a) all lands
which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System, by private
persons, or the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its instrumentalities or agencies; (b) all
lands declared by the government as reservations for public use and purposes; (c) all lands
belonging to the public domain; and, (d) all portions thereof which had been sold, quitclaimed
 and/or previously excluded by the Administrator and duly approved by a final order of the
Court, except those which may hereafter be set aside, after due consideration on a case to case
basis, of various motions to set aside the said Court order which approved the said sales,
quitclaims, and/or exclusions;

(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co-administrator, is hereby revoked to take
effect immediately, to obviate any confusion in the administration of the Estate, and to fix the
responsibilities of administration to the co-heir Administrator, Engracio San Pedro, whose
appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The said co-administrator Justino Z. Benito is hereby
ordered to render his final accounting of his co-administration of the Estate, within thirty (30)
days from receipt of copy hereof;

(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby ordered to amass, collate,
consolidate and take possession of all the net estate of the deceased Don Marino San Pedro y
Esteban, as well as all other sets and credits lawfully belonging to the estate and/or to take
appropriate legal action to recover the same in the proper Courts of Justice, government offices
or any appropriate forum; and to pay all taxes or charges due from the estate to the
Government, and all indebtedness of the estate, and thereafter, to submit a project of partition
of the estate among the lawful heirs as herein recognized and declared.

It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos that,
to avoid the concentration of too much land to a few persons and in line with the projected
urban land reform program of the government, corollary to the agricultural land reform
program of the New Society, the above intestate estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban should be expropriated or purchased by negotiated sale by the government to be used
in its human settlements and low cost housing projects.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.[29]

On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above decision:[30]
On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and Petition for
the Inhibition of the then newly appointed Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On July 12,1978,
after the Republic filed its Reply to the Petition for Inhibition, Judge Fernandez denied the said
petition.[31]
After hearings were conducted on the Republics Motion for Reconsideration, Judge
Fernandez issued the aforestated Order[32] dated November 17, 1978 which, in essence, set
aside Judge Bagasaos decision dated April 25, 1978 by declaring Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
as null and void and of no legal force and effect, thus, excluding all lands covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to the Court of
Appeals and alleged that the lower court did not act with impartiality when it granted the
Republics motion for reconsideration which was merely pro forma, thereby overturning a prior
declaration by the same court of the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro. [33]
On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioners-heirs.[34] In
affirming the assailed Order dated November 17, 1978, the appellate court focused its
discussion solely on the issue of whether or not the lower court erred in declaring Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 null and void. The appellate court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed to
controvert the Republics claim that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is invalid on the following
bases; (a) non-production of the original of the subject title; (b) inadmissibility of the photostat
copies of the said title; and (c) non-registration of the subject Spanish title under Act No. 496
(Land Registration Act) as required by Presidential Decree No. 892 (Discontinuance of the
Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land
Registration Proceedings).
The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision by
invoking certain cases wherein the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been allegedly
recognized.The Court of Appeals refused to be swayed and denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.[35]
Hence, the herein petition,[36] docketed as G. R. No. 106496, was filed on September 18,
1992.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, this Court
resolved to consolidate both cases on September 15, 1994.[37]
While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate motions for
intervention which we denied on different occasions for lack of merit.
In G.R. No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are as follows:
I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-88-447, RTC, Branch 104 was
denied due process of law due to gross negligence of lawyer, which respondent court
grossly failed to take cognizance of.
II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction in not remanding the case for trial and in affirming the lower courts null and
void judgment.[38]
In G.R. No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of errors, to wit:
First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order which resolved a question of
title or ownership over which the lower court as an intestate court has no jurisdiction and over
the vigorous and repeated objections of the petitioners.[39]
Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order of Judge Fernandez setting
aside the order and decision of Judge Puno and Bagasao; Judge Fernandez thereby acted as an
appellate court reviewing, revising, amending or setting aside the order and decision of Judges
of equal rank.[40]
Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold the order of Judge Fernandez
who without jurisdiction, set aside the order of Judge Puno and the decision of Judge Bagasao,
both of which were already final.[41]
Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that Judge Fernandez was
appointed by President Marcos to reverse Judge Bagasao, regardless of the evidence, thereby
unmindful that petitioners were denied the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal.[42]
Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the evidence presented before
Judges Echiverri, Puno and Bagasao and merely adopted the order of Judge Fernandez who
never received a single piece of evidence, notwithstanding the 1906 Guido title over Hacienda
Angono in Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary owner stated therein being Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban, and the November 1991 en banc decision of the Supreme Court upholding
the Guido title.[43]
Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative value of the
petitioners Spanish title in these cases is the propriety of the lower courts resolution of the
question of ownership of the subject San Pedro estate in the special proceedings case. Thus,
before we address ourselves to the issue of whether or not petitioners Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 is null and void and of no legal force and effect, it is best that we first determine whether
or not the lower court, acting as a probate court, in the petition for letters of administration,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling the issue of
ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.
Petitioners-heirs, in G.R. No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower court, then
CFI, Bulacan, Branch IV, had no jurisdiction as an intestate court,[44] to resolve the question of
title or ownership raised by the public respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office
of the Solicitor General in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban.[45]
The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens patriae,
argues that petitioners contention is misplaced considering that when the Republic questioned
the existence of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the lower court became duty-bound
to rule on the genuineness and validity of Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which purportedly covers
the said estate, otherwise, the lower court in the intestate proceedings would be mistakenly
dealing with properties that are proven to be part of the States patrimony or improperly included
as belonging to the estate of the deceased.[46]
A probate courts jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what
shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to the
issue of the validity of wills. We held in the case of Maingat v. Castillo,[47] that the main function
of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or
through the process of administration. Thus, its function necessarily includes the examination of
the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on whether or not the inventory
of the estate properly included them for purposes of distribution of the net assets of the estate
of the deceased to the lawful heirs.
In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals,[48] we stated, thus:
x x x questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of the deceased
maybe passed upon in the Probate Court, with the consent of all the parties, without prejudice
to third persons x x x
Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether
certain properties ought to be included or excluded from the inventory and accounting of the
estate subject of a petition for letters of administration, as in the intestate proceedings of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate court. In this
light, we echo our pronouncement in the case of Garcia v. Garcia[49]that:
x x x The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through
the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said
properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted
by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law
requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty, the court
has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should
be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased person duly call the courts attention to the fact that certain properties,
rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the courts duty to hear the
observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if
the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination
is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties.[50] [Underscoring
Supplied]
In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not commit any
reversible error when it issued the Order dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge
Bagasaos decision dated April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and
void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title from the inventory of the estate
of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards the assailed
Order of November 17, 1978 is the impropriety of Judge Fernandez act of granting the motion
for reconsideration filed by the public respondent Republic since, Judge Fernandez did not
personally hear the intestate case. Petitioners thus dubbed him as a reviewing judge. By setting
aside the Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his predecessors in CFI, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan,
namely, Judge Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, respectively, Judge Fernandez,
acting as a reviewing judge, proceeded without authority and/or jurisdiction.[51]
 There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the decision arrived at
is fair and just, a newly appointed judge who did not try the case can decide the same as long
as the record and the evidence are all available to him and that the same were taken into
consideration and thoroughly studied. The reviewing judge argument of the petitioners-heirs has
no leg to stand on considering that the fact that the judge who penned the decision did not hear
a certain case in its entirety is not a compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusion
inasmuch as the full record was available to him for his perusal.[52] In the case at bar, it is evident
that the 41-page Order dated November 17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez bespeaks of a
knowledgeable and analytical discussion of the rationale for reconsidering and setting aside
Judge Bagasaos Decision dated April 25, 1978.
Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of Judge Fernandez
disposition of the case, i.e., the issuance by the lower court of the assailed Order of November
17, 1978, we now focus on the core issue of whether or not the lower court in G.R. No. 106496
committed reversible error in excluding from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on the ground
that the said title is null and void and of no legal force and effect. Juxtaposed with this is the
issue of whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, erred
in not recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove ownership by the late
Mariano San Pedro of the lands covered thereby.
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16,
1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders
of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the
Land Registration Act[53] within six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or
until August 16, 1976.[54] Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a re-classification of
their lands.[55] Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land
ownership.[56]
Section 1 of the said Decree provides:
SECTION 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and
all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be
considered as unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No.
496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity
of this decree.Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage
Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Act. 3344.
The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies for its
passage, to wit:
WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of large tracts of
public and private lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers appear to have been perpetrated
by unscrupulous persons claiming ownership under Spanish titles or grants of dubious origin;
WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in conflicting claims and
litigations between legitimate title holders, bona fide occupants or applicants of public lands,
on the one hand, and the holders of, or person claiming rights under the said Spanish titles or
grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and instability in property ownership and
threatening the peace and order conditions in the areas affected;
WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show that recording in the system
of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is practically nil and that this system has
become obsolete;
 WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of
the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership
unless accompanied by proof of actual possession;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the system of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish titles as evidence in registration proceedings
under the Torrens system;
In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al.,[57] we took cognizance of
this Decree and thus held that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and
admission of Spanish titles taking into account the numerous fake titles that have been
discovered after their supposed reconstitution subsequent to World War II.
In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad
4136 was brought under the operation of P.D. 892 despite their allegation that they did so on
August 13, 1976.[58] Time and again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and the
party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.[59] Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should
be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered.
In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part of Judge Bagasao
who rendered the reconsidered Decision dated April 25, 1978 to have declared the existence,
genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban despite the effectivity of P.D. No. 892. Judge Fernandez, in setting
aside Judge Bagasao's decision, emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under P.D.
892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in the special proceedings
case. He made the following observations as regards the Titulo, to wit:
"The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of recognizing the
nebulous titulo as an evidence of ownership underscored the fact that during the pendency of
this case, smart speculators and wise alecks had inveigled innocent parties into buying portions
of the so-called estate with considerations running into millions of pesos.
Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned donations to charitable and
religious organizations, including veterans' organizations as smoke screen to the gargantuan
fraud they have committed and to hood wink further other gullible and unsuspecting
victims.[60]
In the same light, it does not escape this Courts onomatopoeic observation that the then
heir-judicial administrator Engracio San Pedro who filed the complaint for recovery of possession
and/or reconveyance with damages in G.R. No. 103727 on August 15, 1988 invoked Judge
Bagasaos Decision of April 25, 1978 in support of the Titulos validity notwithstanding the fact
that, by then, the said Decision had already been set aside by Judge Fernandez Order of
November 17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts holding in G.R. No. 103727
insofar as it concludes that since the Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the private
respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the
Torrens system is the lack of the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply with
the provisions of P.D. 892. We do not discount the possibility that the Spanish title in question is
not genuine, especially since its genuineness and due execution have not been proven. In both
cases, the petitioners-heirs were not able to present the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
nor a genuine copy thereof. In the special proceedings case, the petitioners-heirs failed to
produce the Titulo despite a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. Q-RP) to produce it as requested by
the Republic from the then administrators of the subject intestate estate, Engracio San Pedro
and Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As an alternative to prove their claim of the
subject intestate estate, the petitioners referred to a document known as hypoteca (the Spanish
term is `hipoteca) allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the said hypoteca was neither
properly identified nor presented as evidence. Likewise, in the action for recovery of possession
and/or reconveyance with damages, the petitioners-heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of their
evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo was presented. (Exhs. C-9 to C-
19).
The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of Court is
stated in unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule read:
SEC. 2. - Original writing must be produced; exceptions. - There can be no evidence of a
writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;

(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;"

xxxxxxxxx
Sections 4 and 5 of the same Rule further read:
SEC. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. --- When the original writing
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss
or destruction or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses.
SEC. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse partys custody. --- If the writing be in
the custody of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such
notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the writing, the contents
thereof may be proved as in the case of its loss. But the notice to produce it is not necessary
where the writing is itself a notice, or where it has been wrongfully obtained or withheld by the
adverse party.
Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such
as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear showing
that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy
submitted, in lieu thereof, must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being
an inadmissible piece of evidence.[61]
Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent proof the
existence and due execution of the Titulo. Their explanation as to why the original copy of the
Titulo could not be produced was not satisfactory. The alleged contents thereof which should
have resolved the issue as to the exact extent of the subject intestate estate of the late Mariano
San Pedro were not distinctly proved. In the case of Ong Hing Po v. Court of Appeals,[62] we
pointed out that:
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or
destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must
establish the former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of
the court.[63]
In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, Judge
Bagasao, in his decision, relied on: (1) the testimony of the NBI expert, Mr. Segundo
Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report dated January 28, 1963 denominated as Questioned
Documents Report No. 230-163; (2) a photostat copy of the original of the Titulo duly certified
by the then Clerk of Court of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila; and (3)
the hipoteca registered in the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on December 4, 1894.
Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge Bagasaos April 1978
decision correctly clarified that the NBI report aforementioned was limited to the genuineness of
the two signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado appearing on the last page
of the Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When asked by the counsel of the petitioners-heirs to admit the
existence and due execution of the Titulo, the handling Solicitor testified:
 xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. BRINGAS:
With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call the distinguished counsel for the
government whether he admits that there is actually a titulo propriedad 4136.
COURT:
Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are precisely impugning the Titulo and I think the question of counsel is already
answered by witness. The parties have not yet established the due existence of the
titulo.
ATTY. BRINGAS:
We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be candid about the question. The witness
is a witness for the government, so with the testimony of this witness for the government
to the effect that there is actually in existence Titulo Propiedad 4136; we are asking the
question candidly to the government counsel whether he is prepared to state that there
is really in existence such Titulo Propiedad 4136.
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are now stating before this Court that there was such a document examined by the NBI
insofar as the signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Manuel Lopez Delgado are concerned
and they are found to be authentic.[64]
The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence to our
pronouncement that the Titulo is of dubious validity:
x x x the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated September 2, 1977
(Exhibit `O-RP) concluded that the document contained material alterations as follows:

a) On line 15 of p. 1, Title and on line 5 of p. 2, Title, the word Pinagcamaligan was written
after Pulo;

b) On line 16, p. 1, Title, un was converted to mil;

c) On Line 18, p. 1, Title, mil was written at the end of tres in tres mil;

d) On line 19 of p. 1, Title, a semblance of mil was written after setentay tres;

e) On line 6, p. 2, Title, un was formed to a semblance of uni; and

f) On line 8, p. 2, Title, un was formed to mil.

The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of the Titulo. According to
Mr. Tabayoyong of the NBI, there are still pieces of black ashes around the rings of the
portions which are indications of burnings. The burnings were made on the very portions
where there were previous erasures, alterations and intercalations. Understandably, the
burnings were done to erase traces of the criminal act.[65]
In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.[66] Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera, in reinstating the trial courts judgment therein, sustained the finding that:
x x x The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish title in the name of
Mariano San Pedro shows obvious alterations and intercalations in an attempt to vastly
increase the area and change the location of the land described in the original title x x x.
 Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we sustain the lower
courts analysis, as affirmed by the appellate court, viz:
To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was never presented in
Court. Upon request of the Government, a subpoena duces tecum (Exhibit Q-RP) was issued to
the two administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as well as to other interested
parties to produce the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. But no one produced the
Titulo. What the parties did was to pass the buck to one another.
Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original could not be produced, the
Court cannot take cognizance of any secondary evidence.
It was explained that the Titulo after changing hands, finally fell into the hands of a certain
Moon Park of Korea but who later disappeared and that his present whereabouts could not be
known.
Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious efforts on the part of the
claimants-heirs were exerted to retrieve this document of vital importance despite the Court
order to produce it in order to determine its authenticity.
It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Parks whereabouts are unknown or that there
are not enough funds to locate him. The only logical conclusion would be that the original
would be adverse if produced.[67]
As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the subject
intestate estate, the petitioners-heirs have not established the conditions required by law for their
admissibility as secondary evidence to prove that there exists a document designated as Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the same acquires no probative value.[68]
At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon.
Emmanuel M. Muoz, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, et al.[69] is
enlightening.In said case, private respondent, Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro Development
Corporation, Inc. (PIADECO), claimed to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located
in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in
Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. To prove its ownership Piadeco relied on Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894. Scholarly opining that the Titulo is of doubtful
validity,[70] Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for the Court, stated that:
But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed facts. First.
The Title embraces land `located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon
City. Second. The title was signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed
only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries desperately for a
plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership of land
must be proved not only through the genuineness of title but also with a clear identity of the
land claimed. (Oligan v.Mejia, 17 Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1,
8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil
51, 54-56; Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a case involving a Spanish
title acquired by purchase that the land must be concretely measured per hectare or per quinon,
not in mass (cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that the
Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands strongly
suggests that the land applied for must be measured per hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadecos Rejoinder to
Opposition dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified that area covered by
its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its Opposition of May
13, 1964 in the same case, it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p.
48). Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadecos land. Piadecos
ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings.
 Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner appearing on the
title, acquired his rights over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal
Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-24796, p. 184) the basic decree that authorized
adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications for adjustment -- showing the location,
boundaries and area of land applied for -- were to be filed with the Direccion General de
Administracion Civil, which then ordered the classification and survey of the land with the
assistance of the interested party or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for adjustment at
one year from the date of publication of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10,
1880, extended for another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano
sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have, then, seriously to be
considered here are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which
limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arid lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100
hectares of irrigable lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154; Bayot v. Director of
Lands, 98 Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889 limited the area
that may be acquired by purchase to 2,500 hectares, with allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op.
cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that Piadecos Titulo is held
out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13, 1894),
published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894 (Ibid., p. 26; Ventura, op. cit., p.
28). That decree required a second petition for adjustment within six months from publication,
for those who had not yet secured their titles at the time of the publication of the law
(Ibid.). Said law also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of lands established by
Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31, 1888,
which boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established by
Decree on Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents which
they may hold in their possession (Ramirez v. Director of Land, supra, at p. 124).
Doubt on Piadecos title here supervenes when we come to consider that title was either dated
April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of the Maura Law.
Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly acquired its rights
under the Titulo. The original owner appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban. From Piadecos explanation -- not its evidence (Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188) we
cull the following: On December 3, 1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the land under pacto de
retro, redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio Conrado. This transaction
was said to have been registered or inscribed on December 4, 1894. Don Mariano Ignacio died,
his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir, adjudicated the land to herself. At about
the same time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of registration was issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission on June 27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don
Ignacio, became a shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the land to Piadecos treasurer
and an incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a certain amount of Piadeco
shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a
certain Fabian Castillo, appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the
land. Castillo also executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over the same land, and then
sold the same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was paid partially by Piadeco, pending the
registration of the land under Act 496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to Fabian Castillo
made to depend on the registration of the land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of
the validity of Titulo de Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein pointed out, cast great
clouds of doubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadecos title.
Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[71] we
categorically enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had
become bereft of any probative value as evidence of land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as
contained in our Resolution dated February 6, 1985 in a related case entitled Benito and
WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as G.R. No. 69343. On March 29, 1985, an entry of final judgment
was made respecting G.R. No. 69343.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by this Court
relating to the issue of the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from adjudicating
otherwise.In the Muoz case, we had cast doubt on the Titulos validity. In the WIDORA case, the
Titulos nullification was definitive. In both cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban were on opposite ends before this bench. In the case en banc of Calalang v.
Register of Deeds of Quezon City,[72] the Court explained the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment, viz:
x x x conclusiveness of judgment - states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former
suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in
privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such
parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either
the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper
authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a
particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that
the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former
judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if
that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of
Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required by merely identity
of issues.
The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be laid to rest. The
Titulo cannot be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of ownership. In
the petition for letters of administration the inventory submitted before the probate court
consisted solely of lands covered by the Titulo. Hence, there can be no net estate to speak of
after the Titulos exclusion from the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San
Pedro.
In G.R. No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private respondents
Buhain, Ocampo and Dela Cruz, namely TCT No. 372592 (Exh. 2, Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh.
2- De Ocampo) and TCT No. 269707 (Exh. 2 - Dela Cruz).[73] Under the Torrens system of
registration, the titles of private respondents became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year
from its final decree.[74] More importantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982, 269707, having been issued
under the Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive presumption of validity. [75] As a last hurrah to
champion their claim to the vast estate covered by the subject Spanish title, the petitioners-heirs
imputed fraud and bad faith which they failed to prove on the part of the private respondents as
regards their Torrens titles and accused their own counsel of gross negligence for having failed
to call the proper witnesses from the Bureau of Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-heirs
claim that OCT No. 614 from which private respondents were derived is null and void. It is an
elementary legal principle that the negligence of counsel binds the client. [76] The records show
that the petitioners-heirs were not at all prejudiced by the non-presentation of evidence to prove
that OCT No. 614 is a nullity considering that their ownership itself of the lands being claimed
was not duly proved. In the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela Cruz, et al.,[77] we held:
It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his client. This
negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such
mistake binds the client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the
mistakes of his counsel. (Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980] Only when the
application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto be
called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice against the
petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an unsupported claim
that the petitioner had been prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an explanation
to that effect.
Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the petitioners-heirs were
denied due process on account of the negligence of their counsel, the writ of certiorari is
unavailing.
It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
are not without recourse. Presidential Decree No. 892, quoted hereinabove, grants all holders
of Spanish Titles the right to apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of the
Decree. Thereafter, however, any Spanish Title, if utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be
used as evidence of ownership in any land registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may
be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344.
In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General to be more
vigilant in handling land registration cases and intestate proceedings involving portions of the
subject estate. It is not too late in the day for the Office of the Solicitor General to contest the
Torrens titles of those who have acquired ownership of such portions of land that rightfully belong
to the State.
In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor of Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban on August 13, 1968 sought by one Catalino San Pedro, alleged heir, legal
holder and owner of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is a matter not ripe for adjudication in these
cases. Firstly, Catalino San Pedro is not a party in any of the two cases before us for review,
hence, this Court in a Resolution dated May 10, 1993,[78] denied Catalinos motion for leave to
reopen and/or new trial. And, secondly, the aforementioned bonds were not included in the
inventory of the subject estate submitted by then administrators, Engracio San Pedro and
Justino Benito before the probate court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496
are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, in G.R. No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 20,
1992 is hereby AFFIRMED.
In G.R. No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows :
(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and, therefore, no rights could be
derived therefrom;
(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;
(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 312-B,
should be, as it is, hereby closed and terminated.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to exercise any act of possession or
ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole or any portion of the estate
covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered to immediately
vacate the same, if they or any of them are in possession thereof.
This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.