G.R. No.
213455, August 11, 2015 On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing7 informing him that his arraignment would be held before the
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for certiorari with prayers (a) for the Court En Banc to act on the petition; (b) to expedite the
proceedings and to set the case for oral arguments; and (c) to issue a temporary restraining order to the respondents from
holding a pre-trial and further proceedings in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-02381 filed by petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile
(Enrile) challenging the July 11, 2014 resolutions2 of the Sandiganbayan.
I.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information3 for plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes,
Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan.
The Information reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Courts jurisdiction, above-named accused
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enriles
Office, both public officers, committing the offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one another and
with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the project identification,
NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from
ENRILES Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILES endorsement, directly
or through REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES non-government organizations
which became the recipients and/or target implementors of ENRILES PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds
for her personal gain;
(b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority, relationships,
connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for lack of evidence
on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail),4 and (2) a supplemental opposition to issuance of
warrant of arrest and for dismissal of Information,5 on June 10, 2014, and June 16, 2014, respectively. The
Sandiganbayan heard both motions on June 20, 2014.
On June 24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to both motions.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enriles motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the
plunder case against the accused.6redarclaw
Sandiganbayans Third Division on July 11, 2014.
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars8 before the Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he filed
a motion for deferment of arraignment9 since he was to undergo medical examination at the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH).
On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the Sandiganbayans order and his motion for bill
of particulars was called for hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Enriles counsel, argued the motion orally.
Thereafter, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice (PJ) Amparo Cabotaje-Tang (Cabotaje-Tang), declared a 10-minute
recess to deliberate on the motion.
When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Courts denial of Enriles motion for bill of
particulars essentially on the following grounds:
(1) the details that Enrile desires are substantial reiterations of the arguments he raised in his
supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information; and
(2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.
Atty. Mendoza asked for time to file a motion for reconsideration, stating that he would orally move to reconsider the
Sandiganbayans denial if he would not be given time to seek a reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan then directed Atty.
Mendoza to immediately proceed with his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the reconsideration of the denial of Enriles motion for bill of
particulars. The Sandiganbayan again declared a recess to deliberate on the motion. After five (5) minutes, PJ Cabotaje-
Tang announced the Sandiganbayans denial of the motion for reconsideration. 10redarclaw
The Sandiganbayan reduced its rulings into writing on Enriles written and oral motions. The pertinent portion of this ruling
reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In todays consideration of accused Juan Ponce Enriles Motion for Bill of Particulars, the Court heard the parties on oral
arguments in relation thereto. Thereafter, it declared a ten-minute recess to deliberate thereon. After deliberating on the
said motion as well as the arguments of the parties, the Court resolves to DENY as it hereby DENIES the same motion for
bill of particulars for the following reasons: (1) the details desired in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the said motion are substantially
reiterations of the arguments raised by accused Enrile in his Supplemental Opposition to Issuance of Warrant of Arrest
and for Dismissal of Information dated June 16, 2014 x x x.
The Court already upheld the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging accused Enrile, among other
persons, with the crime of plunder in its Resolution dated July 3, 2014. It finds no cogent reasons to reconsider the said
ruling.
Moreover, the desired details that accused Enrile would like the prosecution to provide are evidentiary in nature, which
need not be alleged in the Information. They are best ventilated during the trial of the case.
Counsel for accused Juan Ponce Enrile orally sought a reconsideration of the denial of his motion for bill of particulars
which was opposed by the prosecution. The Court then declared another ten-minute recess to deliberate on the said
motion for reconsideration. After deliberation thereon, the Court likewise resolved to DENY as it hereby DENIES accused
Juan Ponce Enriles motion for reconsideration there being no new or substantial grounds raised to warrant the grant
thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the scheduled arraignment of accused Juan Ponce Enrile shall now proceed as previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.11
Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enriles arraignment. The Sandiganbayan responded by directing
the doctors present to determine whether he was physically fit to be arraigned. After he was declared fit, the
Sandiganbayan proceeded with Enriles arraignment. Enrile entered a no plea, prompting the Sandiganbayan to enter a
not guilty plea on his behalf.
 II.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed
against him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his specific participation in the crime of plunder had been. He
posits that the Information should have stated the details of the particular acts that allegedly constituted the imputed
series or combination of overt acts that led to the charge of plunder. Enrile essentially reiterates the details desired that
he sought in his motion for bill of particulars, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Allegations of Information
x x x accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a
Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G.
REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enriles
Office, both public officers, committing the
offense in relation to their respective offices,
conspiring with one another and with JANET
LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and
JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass,
accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a
combination or series of overt acts, x x x.
x x x by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES
and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and
others, kickbacks or commissions under the
following circumstances: before, during and/or
after the project identification, NAPOLES gave,
and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a
percentage of the cost of a project to be funded
from ENRILES Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of
ENRILES endorsement, directly or through
REYES, to the appropriate government
agencies, of NAPOLES non-government
organizations which became the recipients
and/or target implementers of ENRILES PDAF
projects, which duly-funded projects turned out
to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF
proceeds for her personal gain;
Details Desired
a. Who among the accused acquired the alleged ill-
gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY
FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php172,834,500.00)? One of them, two of them or all
of them? Kindly specify.
b. The allegation through a combination or series of
overt criminal acts is a conclusion of fact or of law.
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the
combination? What are the particular overt acts
which constitute the series? Who committed those
acts?
a. What was repeatedly received? If sums of money,
the particular amount. If on several occasions and in
different amounts, specify the amount on each
occasion and the corresponding date of receipt.
b. Name the specific person(s) who delivered the
amount of Php172,834,500.00 and the specific
person(s) who received the amount; or if not in lump
sum, the various amounts totaling
Php172,834,500.00. x x x Specify particularly the
person who delivered the amount, Napoles or Lim or
De Asis, and who particularly are the others.
c. To whom was the money given? To Enrile or
Reyes? State the amount given on each occasion,
the date when and the place where the amount was
given.
d. x x x Describe each project allegedly
identified, how, and by whomwas the project identified,
the nature of each project, where it is located and the
cost of each project.
e. For each of the years 2004-2010, under what
law or official document is a portion of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund identified as that of a
member of Congress, in this instance, as ENRILEs, to
be found? In what amount for each year is ENRILEs
Priority Development Assistance Fund? When, and to
whom, did Enrile endorse the projects in favor of
Napoles non-government organizations which
became the recipients and/or target implementers of
ENRILEs PDAF projects? Name Napoles non-
government organizations which became the
recipients and/or target implementers of ENRILEs
PDAF projects. Who paid Napoles, from whom did
Napoles collect the fund for the projects which turned
out to be ghosts or fictitious? Who authorized the
payments for each project?
f. x x x what COA audits or field investigations were
conducted which validated the findings that each of
Enriles PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010 were
ghosts or spurious projects?
x x x by taking undue advantage, on several a. Provide the details of how Enrile took undue
occasions of their official positions, authority, advantage, on several occasions, of his official
relationships, connections, and influence to positions, authority, relationships, connections, and
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and
to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people
people and the Republic of the Philippines. and the Republic of the Philippines. Was this because
he received any money from the government? From
whom and for what reason did he receive any money
or property from the government through which he
unjustly enriched himself? State the details from
whom each amount was received, the place and
the time.
Enrile posits that his desired details are not evidentiary in nature; they are material facts that should be clearly alleged in
the Information so that he may be fully informed of the charges against him and be prepared to meet the issues at the
trial.
Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of particulars are cited in a context different from his opposition to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He maintains that the resolution of the probable cause issue was interlocutory and did
not bar the submission of the same issue in subsequent proceedings especially in the context of a different proceeding.
Enrile thus prays that: (a) the Court en banc act on the present petition; (b) by way of an interim measure, the Court issue
a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Sandiganbayan from holding the pre-trial and subsequent
proceedings against him in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 during the pendency of the present petition; (c) the Court
expedite the proceedings and set the case for oral arguments; and (d) at the conclusion of the proceedings, the Court
annul and set aside the Sandiganbayans July 11, 2014 resolution and his arraignment.
A. The Peoples Comment
12 13
In its Comment, the People of the Philippines counters that the Sandiganbayan did not exercise its discretionary power
in an arbitrary or despotic manner. Even assuming that the Sandiganbayans denial of Enriles motion for bill of particulars
was erroneous, the error did not amount to lack or excess or jurisdiction. It further maintains that the assailed
Sandiganbayan rulings were arrived at based on the procedures prescribed under Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan.
The People also argues that the Information already contained the ultimate facts; matters of evidence do not need to be
averred.
B. Enriles Reply
In his Reply, Enrile essentially claims that the right to move for a bill of particulars is ancillary to and in implementation of
an accuseds rights to due process, to be heard, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. He maintains that the Sandiganbayans denial of his motion for bill of particulars is not a mere denial of a procedural
right under the Rules of Court, but of rights vested in an accused under the Constitution to ensure fairness in the trial of
the offense charged. Enrile also adds that there could only be a fair trial if he could properly plead to the Information and
prepare for trial.
Enrile further argues that the Peoples Comment did not dispute the relevance of the details sought in the motion for bill of
particulars. He likewise claims that the desired details could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by
the prosecution during the preliminary conference. Finally, Enrile maintains that his motion for bill of particulars was
not dilatory.
III.
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the petition under the terms outlined below.
A. The constitutional right of the accused to be informed
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.14 This right has long been established in English law, and is the same right expressly
guaranteed in our 1987 Constitution. This right requires that the offense charged be stated with clarity and with certainty
to inform the accused of the crime he is facing in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense.15redarclaw
In the 1904 case of United States v. Karelsen,16 the Court explained the purpose of informing an accused in writing of the
charges against him from the perspective of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The object of this written accusation was First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him
as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether
they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.) In
order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of
certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names
(plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstances necessary to constitute the crime charged. x x x. 17 [Emphasis supplied.]
The objective, in short, is to describe the act with sufficient certainty to fully appraise the accused of the nature of the
charge against him and to avoid possible surprises that may lead to injustice. Otherwise, the accused would be left
speculating on why he has been charged at all.18redarclaw
In People v. Hon. Mencias, et al.,19 the Court further explained that a persons constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him signifies that an accused should be given the necessary data on why he
is the subject of a criminal proceeding. The Court added that the act or conduct imputed to a person must be described
with sufficient particularity to enable the accused to defend himself properly.
The general grant and recognition of a protected right emanates from Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The purpose of the guaranty
is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty, and property of individuals; to secure the individual from
the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and
distributive justice x x x; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general
law.20redarclaw
Separately from Section 1, Article III is the specific and direct underlying root of the right to information in criminal
proceedings Section 14(1), Article III which provides that No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law. Thus, no doubt exists that the right to be informed of the cause of the accusation in a criminal
case has deep constitutional roots that, rather than being cavalierly disregarded, should be carefully protected.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division),21 the Court, in sustaining the Sandiganbayans grant of
the motion for bill of particulars of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., held that the facile verbosity with which the legal counsel for the
government flaunted the accusation of excesses against the Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by a
bill of particulars, so that respondent can properly prepare an intelligent responsive pleading and so that trial in this case
will proceed as expeditiously as possible.22 The Court additionally stated that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest latitude of discretion in setting aside default orders
justified under the right to due process principle. Plain justice demands and the law requires no less that defendants must
know what the complaint against them is all about.
x x x In the interest of justice, we need to dispel the impression in the individual respondents' minds that they are being
railroaded out of their rights and properties without due process of law. 23
B. Procedural Sufficiency of the Information
An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, signed by the prosecutor and filed with the
court.24 The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, specifically require certain matters to be stated in the Information for
its sufficiency. The requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense since he is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense charged.25redarclaw
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. 26redarclaw
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute penalizing it.
The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances alleged must be stated in
ordinary and concise language; they do not necessarily need to be in the language of the statute, and should be in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is charged and what qualifying and
aggravating circumstances are alleged, so that the court can pronounce judgment. 27 The Rules do not require the
Information to exactly allege the date and place of the commission of the offense, unless the date and the place are
material ingredients or essential elements of the offense, or are necessary for its identification.
B.1. Ultimate facts versus Evidentiary facts
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense; the evidentiary and other details (i.e., the
facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be provided during the trial. 28redarclaw
Ultimate facts is defined as those facts which the expected evidence will support. The term does not refer to the details
of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It refers to the
facts that the evidence will prove at the trial.29redarclaw
Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal, determinative, and constitutive facts on whose existence the cause
of action rests;30 they are also the essential and determining facts on which the court's conclusion rests and without which
the judgment would lack support in essential particulars.31redarclaw
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they are the premises that
lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion.32They are facts supporting the existence of some other alleged and
unproven fact.33redarclaw
34
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained these two concepts in relation to a particular criminal case, as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is analogous or akin to the
difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial
facts which either form the basis of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or
omissions of the defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish
said ultimate facts. x x x.35 [Emphasis supplied.]
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information, matters of evidence as
distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense do not need to be alleged. Whatever facts and
circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be determined based on the definition and the essential elements of the
specific crimes.36redarclaw
C. Arraignment
The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be fully
informed as to why he was charged and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on showing that his guilt
is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him.37 During arraignment, the
accused is granted the opportunity to fully know the precise charge that confronts him and made fully aware of
possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him.38redarclaw
An arraignment thus ensures that an accused be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him in the
Information and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. 39 It is likewise at this stage of the proceedings
when the accused enters his plea,40 or enters a plea of not guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged.41redarclaw
A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that the Information should provide the accused with fair
notice of the accusations made against him, so that he will be able to make an intelligent plea and prepare a
defense.42Moreover, the Information must provide some means of ensuring that the crime for which the accused
is brought to trial is in fact one for which he was charged, rather than some alternative crime seized upon by the
prosecution in light of subsequently discovered evidence.43Likewise, it must indicate just what crime or crimes
an accused is being tried for, in order to avoid subsequent attempts to retry him for the same crime or
crimes.44 In other words, the Information must permit the accused to prepare his defense, ensure that he is prosecuted
only on the basis of facts presented, enable him to plead jeopardy against a later prosecution, and inform the court of the
facts alleged so that it can determine the sufficiency of the charge.
Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the material elements of the crime charged. If the Information
fails to comply with this basic standard, it would be quashed on the ground that it fails to charge an offense. 45Of
course, an Information may be sufficient to withstand a motion to quash, and yet insufficiently inform the
accused of the specific details of the alleged offenses. In such instances, the Rules of Court allow the accused to
move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial.46redarclaw
C.1. Bill of Particulars
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an action, which an accused
may avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial. In civil proceedings, a
bill of particulars has been defined as a complementary procedural document consisting of an amplification or more
particularized outline of a pleading, and is in the nature of a more specific allegation of the facts recited in the
pleading.47 The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in civil cases is to enable a party toprepare his responsive
pleading properly.
In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific conduct not recited in the Information but nonetheless
pertain to or are included in the crime charged. Its purpose is to enable an accused: to know the theory of the
governments case;48 to prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of
another prosecution for the same offense; and to compel the prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering
evidence.49redarclaw
In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is governed by Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly
to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details
desired.
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of the crime
charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that persons of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what the Information means.50redarclaw
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard against surprises during
trial. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor
shall not be required to include in the bill of particulars matters of evidence relating to how the people intend to prove the
elements of the offense charged or how the people intend to prove any item of factual information included in the bill of
particulars.51redarclaw
C.2. Origin of bill of particulars in criminal cases52redarclaw
Even before the promulgation of the 1964 Rules of Court, when the applicable rules for criminal procedure was still
General Order No. 58,53 the Court had already recognized the need for a bill of particulars in criminal cases. This
recognition came despite the lack of any specific provision in General Order No. 58 setting out the rules for a bill of
particulars in criminal cases.
In U.S. v. Schneer,54 the issue presented was whether a bill of particulars was available in a criminal case for estafa after
the accused had already been arraigned. The Court essentially ruled that there was no specific provision of law expressly
authorizing the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases, and held that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We know of no provision either in General Orders, No. 58, or in the laws existing prior thereto which requires the
Government to furnish such a bill of particulars, and we accordingly hold that it was not error on the part of the court below
to refuse to do so.
In U.S. v. Cernias,55 however, the Court formally recognized the existence and applicability of a bill of particulars in
criminal cases. In this case, the prosecution filed an information charging Basilio Cernias with several counts of
brigandage before the Court of First Instance of Leyte. In overruling the accuseds objection, the Court declared that the
prosecutions act of specifying certain acts done by the conspirators in the Information did no more than to furnish the
defendant with a bill of particulars of the facts which it intended to prove at the trial x x x. 56redarclaw
In sum, the Court essentially held that a detailed complaint or information is not objectionable, and that the details it
contains may be properly considered as specifications or bill of particulars. 57redarclaw
In People v. Abad Santos,58 the court first recognized a bill of particulars, as a right that the accused may ask for from the
court. In this case, the prosecution charged respondent Joseph Arcache with the crime of treason before the Peoples
Court. The Information filed against the accused contained, in counts 2 and 3, the phrase and other similar equipment.
The counsel for the accused verbally petitioned the Peoples court to order the prosecution to make more specific [the]
phrase and other similar equipment, which request the Peoples Court granted. The People of the Philippines filed a
petition for certiorari, but the Court dismissed this petition.
In upholding the order of the Peoples Court, the Court ruled that in the absence of specific provisions of law prohibiting
the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases, their submission may be permitted, as they cannot
prejudice any substantial rights of the accused. On the contrary, they will serve to apprise the accused clearly of the
charges filed against them, and thus enable them to prepare intelligently whatever defense or defenses they might
have.59redarclaw
Notably, Abad Santos emphasized the importance of a bill of particulars in criminal cases, stating that x x x inasmuch as
in criminal cases not only the liberty but even the life of the accused may be at stake, it is always wise and proper that the
accused should be fully apprised of the true charges against them, and thus avoid all and any possible surprise, which
might be detrimental to their rights and interests; and ambiguous phrases should not, therefore, be permitted in criminal
complaints or informations; and if any such phrase has been included therein, on motion of the defense, before the
commencement of the trial, the court should order either its elimination as surplusage or the filing of the necessary
specification, which is but an amendment in mere matters of form.60redarclaw
In these cited cases, the Courts did not rely on the Rules of Court to provide for a bill of particulars in criminal cases. A
specific provision granting the accused the right to move for or demand a more definite statement or a bill of particulars
was not incorporated as a formal rule until the 1964 Rules of Court,61under its Section 6, Rule 116. This initial provision
later became Section 10 of Rule 116 under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure62and Section 9 of Rule 116 under the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.63redarclaw
C.3. The Distinctive Role of a Bill of Particulars
When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a
motion for a bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or information to enable the
accused to properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid Information, one that presents all the elements
of the crime charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill of particulars may supply are only
formal amendments to the complaint or Information.
In Virata v. Sandiganbayan,64 the Court expounded on the purpose of a bill of particulars as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
It is the office or function, as well as the object or purpose, of a bill of particulars to amplify or limit a pleading, specify
more minutely and particularly a claim or defense set up and pleaded in general terms, give information, not contained in
the pleading, to the opposite party and the court as to the precise nature, character, scope, and extent of the cause of
action or defense relied on by the pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the case which he has to meet, to the end
that the proof at the trial may be limited to the matters specified, and in order that surprise at, and needless preparation
for, the trial may be avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his answering pleading and preparing
for trial. It has also been stated that it is the function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify,
particularize, and limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general
function or purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case when that cannot be
accomplished without the aid of such a bill.65redarclaw
x x x x [Emphasis ours.]
Notably, the failure of the accused to move for the specification of the details desired deprives him of the right to
object to evidencethat could be introduced and admitted under an Information of more or less general terms but
which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite crime.66redarclaw
Although the application for the bill of particulars is one addressed to the sound discretion of the court 67 it should
nonetheless exercise its discretion within the context of the facts and the nature of the crime charged in each case
and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. As articulated in
the case of People v. Iannone:68
It is beyond cavil that a defendant has a basic and fundamental right to be informed of the charges against him so that he
will be able to prepare a defense. Hence the courts must exercise careful surveillance to ensure that a defendant is not
deprived of this right by an overzealous prosecutor attempting to protect his case or his witnesses. Any effort to leave a
defendant in ignorance of the substance of the accusation until the time of trial must be firmly rebuffed. This is especially
so where the indictment itself provides a paucity of information. In such cases, the court must be vigilant in safeguarding
the defendant's rights to a bill of particulars and to effective discovery. Should the prosecutor decide to use an indictment
which, although technically sufficient, does not adequately allow a defendant to properly prepare for trial, he may well run
afoul of the defendant's right to be informed of the accusations against him.
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting 69 and order the government to
file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill70 to give full
meaning to the accuseds Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing certain overt acts through the Information
and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends to prove at the trial. This is the type of surprise a
bill of particulars is designed to avoid.71The accused is entitled to the observance of all the rules designated to bring
about a fair verdict.
This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime charged carries with it the severe penalty of
capital punishment and entails the commission of several predicate criminal acts involving a great number of
transactions spread over a considerable period of time.
C.4. Motion to Quash vs. Motion for Bill of Particulars
A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information while a motion to quash is a jurisdictional defect on account that the
facts charged in the Information does not constitute an offense.72redarclaw
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his dissent, avers that the allegations in the information are not vague because the
Information needs only allege the ultimate facts constituting the offense for which the accused stands charged, not the
finer details of why and how the illegal acts alleged were committed. In support of his position, Justice Carpio cited the
cases of Miguel v. Sandiganbayan,73Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,74 andPeople v. Romualdez,75 among others, to
support the superfluity of the details requested by Enrile.
Justice Carpios reliance on these cases is misplaced for they involve the issue of quashal of an information on the
ground that the facts charge do not constitute an offense, rather than a request for bill of particulars. That is, these cited
cases involve the critical issue of the validity of an information, and not a request for specificity with request to an offense
charged in an information.
On the other hand, the cases of People v. Sanico,76People v. Banzuela,77Pielago v. People,78People v. Rayon,
Sr.,79People v. Subesa,80People v. Anguac,81 and Los Baos v. Pedro,82 which were likewise cited by Justice Carpio,
involve the issue that an Information only need to allege the ultimate facts, and not the specificity of the allegations
contained in the information as to allow the accused to prepare for trial and make an intelligent plea. 83redarclaw
Notably, in Miguel,84 to which Justice Carpio concurred, this Court mentioned that the proper remedy, if at all, to
a supposed ambiguity in an otherwise valid Information, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the
quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged.85redarclaw
Clearly then, a bill of particulars does not presuppose an invalid information for it merely fills in the details on an
otherwise valid information to enable an accused to make an intelligent plea and prepare for his defense.
I stress, however, that the issue in the present case involves abuse of discretion for denying Enriles request for a bill of
particulars, and not a motion to quash.
If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order.86redarclaw
But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused cannot prepare to
plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper remedy.87redarclaw
Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars are distinct and separate remedies, the latter
presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an offense.88redarclaw
D. The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the Information is filed. As usual in
matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly
erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is shown. 89redarclaw
Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that amounts or is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law such as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 90 For the extraordinary writ
of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of power.
It will be recalled that the Sandiganbayan denied Enriles motion for bill of particulars on two grounds,
namely:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the details sought were evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial; and
(2) his desired details were reiterations of the details he sought in his supplemental opposition to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
We shall separately examine these grounds in determining whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied Enriles motion for a bill of particulars and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Sandiganbayan Ground #1:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The details sought were evidentiary in nature
D.1. The Law of Plunder
A determination of whether the details that Enrile sought were evidentiary requires an examination of the elements of the
offense he is charged with, i.e., plunder under Republic Act No. 7080.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates oracquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person
who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The
court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties
and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [Emphasis supplied.]
Based on this definition, the elements of plunder are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates, or other persons;
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the
following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other
form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of government-owned or -
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(f) by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
P50,000,000.00. [Emphasis supplied.]
D.1.a. The Conspiracy Element and its Requested Details
Taking these elements into account, we hold that Enriles requested details on Who among the accused acquired the
alleged ill-gotten wealth are not proper subjects for a bill of particulars.
The allegation of the Information that the accused and Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, conspiring with one another and with
Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis x x x expressly charges conspiracy.
The law on plunder provides that it is committed by a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with x x x. The
term connivance suggests an agreement or consent to commit an unlawful act or deed with another; to connive is to
cooperate or take part secretly with another.91 It implies both knowledge and assent that may either be active or
passive.92redarclaw
Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in conspiracy with other persons, and the Information filed
clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one another and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald
John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary to specify, as an essential element of the offense, whether
the ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had been acquired by one, by two or by all of the accused. In
the crime of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for
as long as the total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated is at least P50 million.
We point out that conspiracy in the present case is not charged as a crime by itself but only as the mode of committing the
crime. Thus, there is no absolute necessity of reciting its particulars in the Information because conspiracy is not the
gravamen of the offense charged.
It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use
of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude; or (2) by allegations of basic
facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and
with such precision as the nature of the crime charged will admit, to enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts.93redarclaw
Our ruling on this point in People v. Quitlong94 is particularly instructive:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like
the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting
all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the
same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a
statement of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much
certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know
what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts. x x x95
D.1.b. The Requested Details of Enriles PDAF
We similarly rule that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought under the questions
For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official document is a portion of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund identified as that of a member of Congress, in this instance, as ENRILEs, to be found? In what
amount for each year is ENRILEs Priority Development Assistance Fund?
and
x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted which validated the findings that each of Enriles
PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?
These matters will simply establish and support the ultimate fact that Enriles PDAF was used to fund fictitious or
nonexistent projects. Whether a discretionary fund (in the form of PDAF) had indeed been made available to Enrile as a
member of the Philippine Congress and in what amounts are evidentiary matters that do not need to be reflected with
particularity in the Information, and may be passed upon at the full-blown trial on the merits of the case.
D.1.b(i) The yearly PDAF Allocations
Specifically, we believe that the exact amounts of Enriles yearly PDAF allocations, if any, from 2004 to 2010 need not be
pleaded with specific particularity to enable him to properly plead and prepare for his defense. In fact, Enrile may be in a
better position to know these details than the prosecution and thus cannot claim that he would be taken by surprise during
trial by the omission in the Information of his annual PDAF allocations.
Thus, whether the amounts of Enriles PDAF allocations have been specified or not, Enrile has been sufficiently informed
that he stands charged of endorsing Napoles non-government organizations to implement spurious or fictitious projects,
in exchange for a percentage of his PDAF.
D.1.b(ii) The details of the COA Audits

The details of the COA audits or field investigations only support the ultimate fact that the projects implemented by
Napoles NGOs, and funded by Enriles PDAF, were nonexisting or fictitious. Thus, they are evidentiary in nature and do
not need to be spelled out with particularity in the Information.
To require more details on these matters from the prosecution would amount to asking for evidentiary information that the
latter intends to present at the trial; it would be a compulsion on the prosecution to disclose in advance of the trial the
evidence it will use in proving the charges alleged in the indictment.
D.1.c. Other Sources of Kickbacks and Commissions
We also deny Enriles plea for details on who the others were (aside from Napoles, Lim and De Asis) from whom he
allegedly received kickbacks and commissions. These other persons do not stand charged of conspiring with Enrile and
need not therefore be stated with particularly, either as specific individuals or as John Does. The Court cannot second-
guess the prosecutions reason for not divulging the identity of these others who may potentially be witnesses for the
prosecution.
What the Constitution guarantees the accused is simply the right to meet and examine the prosecution witnesses. The
prosecution has the prerogative to call witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information, subject to the
defenses right to cross-examine them.96Making these others known would in fact be equivalent to the prosecutions
premature disclosure of its evidence. We stress, to the point of repetition, that a bill of particulars is not meant to compel
the prosecution to prematurely disclose evidentiary matters supporting its case.
D.2. The Overt Acts constituting the Combination or Series under the Plunder Law
We hold that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought under the following questions
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the combination? What are the particular overt acts which
constitute the series? Who committed those acts? [Emphasis ours.]
D.2.a. Reason for Requirement for Particulars of Overt Acts
Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass wealth involving at least P50 million by means of a
combination or series of overt acts.97 Under these terms, it is not sufficient to simply allege that the amount of ill-gotten
wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million; the manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth whether through a
combination or series of overt acts under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 is an important element that must be
alleged.
When the Plunder Law speaks of combination, it refers to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories listed in
Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids on the public treasury under Section 1, paragraph (d),
subparagraph (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Section 1,
paragraph (d), subparagraph (3)].
On the other hand, to constitute a series there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under
the same category of enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d) [for example, misappropriation, malversation and
raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1)]. 98redarclaw
With respect to paragraph (a) of the Information
[(i.e., by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and
ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILES Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILES endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the appropriate
government agencies, of NAPOLES non-government organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementers of ENRILES PDAF projects, which duly funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain x x x)]
we hold that the prosecution employed a generalized or shotgun approach in alleging the criminal overt acts allegedly
committed by Enrile. This approach rendered the allegations of the paragraph uncertain to the point of ambiguity for
purposes of enabling Enrile to respond and prepare for his defense. These points are explained in greater detail
below.
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase combination or series of overt or criminal acts. Hence, even if the
accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act. This interpretation of the Plunder Law is very clear from the
congressional deliberations.99redarclaw
Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder, the various overt acts that
constitute the combination and series the Information alleged, are material facts that should not only be alleged, but
must be stated with sufficient definiteness so that the accused would know what he is specifically charged of and why he
stands charged, so that he could properly defend himself against the charge.
Thus, the several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy must not
be generally stated; they should be stated with enough particularity for Enrile (and his co-accused) to be able to prepare
the corresponding refuting evidence to meet these alleged overt acts.
It is insufficient, too, to merely allege that a set of acts had been repeatedly done (although this may constitute a series if
averred with sufficient definiteness), and aver that these acts resulted in the accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00, as in this case. The Information should reflect with particularity the
predicate acts that underlie the crime of plunder, based on the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080.
A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present case shows that the prosecution made little or no effort
to particularize the transactions that would constitute the required series or combination of overt acts.
In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the Information its recital of the manner Enrile and his co-accused
allegedly operated, thus describing its general view of the series or combination of overt criminal acts that
constituted the crime of plunder.
Without any specification of the basic transactions where kickbacks or commissions amounting to at least
P172,834,500.00 had been allegedly received, Enriles preparation for trial is obviously hampered. This defect is not cured
by mere reference to the prosecutions attachment, asEnrile already stated in his Reply that the desired details
could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution, which documents are not integral
parts of the Information. Hence, the prosecution does not discharge its burden of informing Enrile what these overt acts
were by simply pointing to these documents.
In providing the particulars of the overt acts that constitute the combination or series of transactions constituting
plunder, it stands to reason that the amounts involved, or at their ball park figures, should be stated; these
transactions are not necessarily uniform in amount, and cannot simply collectively be described as amounting to
P172,834,500.00 without hampering Enriles right to respond after receiving the right information.
To stress, this final sum is not a general ball park figure but a very specific sum based on a number of different
acts and hence must have a breakdown. Providing this breakdown reinforces the required specificity in describing the
different overt acts.
Negatively stated, unless Enrile is given the particulars and is later given the chance to object to unalleged details, he
stands to be surprised at the trial at the same time that the prosecution is given the opportunity to play fast and loose with
its evidence to satisfy the more than P50 Million requirement of law.
D.2.b. Approximate Dates of Commissions or Kickbacks
Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at least, of the receipt of the kickbacks and commissions, so that he
could prepare the necessary pieces of evidence, documentary or otherwise, to disprove the allegations against him. We
point out that the period covered by the indictment extends from 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, of which, we again stress
that different overt acts constituting of the elements of Plunder took place during this period.
Undoubtedly, the length of time involved six years will pose difficulties to Enrile in the preparation of his defense and
will render him susceptible to surprises. Enrile should not be left guessing and speculating which one/s from among the
numerous transactions involving his discretionary PDAF funds from 2004 to 2010, are covered by the indictment.
D.2.c. The Projects Funded and NGOs Involved

Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that Enrile allegedly funded coupled with the name of
Napoles NGO (e.g., Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to sufficiently inform Enrile of the particular transactions referred
to.100redarclaw
Be it remembered that the core of the indictment is:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the funding of nonexisting projects using Enriles PDAF;
(2) Enriles endorsement of Napoles NGOs to the government agencies to implement these projects; and
(3) Enriles receipt of kickbacks or commissions in exchange for his endorsement.
Under the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed by Enrile and his co-accused, the project
identification was what started the totality of acts constituting plunder: only after a project has been identified could Enrile
have endorsed Napoles NGO to the appropriate government agency that, in turn, would implement the supposed project
using Enriles PDAF. Note that without the project identification, no justification existed to release Enriles PDAF to
Napoles allegedly bogus NGO.
In these lights, the identified project and Napoles NGO are material facts that should be clearly and definitely stated part of a conspiracy to attain a common criminal goal.103redarclaw
in the Information to allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense evidence on the specific transaction pointed to. The
omission of these details will necessarily leave Enrile guessing on what transaction/s he will have to defend against, since
he may have funded other projects with his PDAF. Specification will also allow him to object to evidence not referred to or
covered by the Informations ultimate facts.
D.2.d. The Government Agencies Serving as Conduits
The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed Napoles NGOs are also material facts that must be specified, since
they served anecessary role in the crime charged the alleged conduits between Enrile and Napoles NGOs. They
were indispensable participants in the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed.
The particular person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions, need not anymore be named in the
Information, as these are already evidentiary matters. The identification of the particular agency vis--vis Napoles NGO
and the identified project, will already inform Enrile of the transaction referred to.
In Tantuico v. Republic,101 the Republic filed a case for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
before the Sandiganbayan against former President Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez, and
Francisco Tantuico, Jr. Tantuico filed a motion for bill of particulars essentially alleging that the complaint was couched in
general terms and did not have the particulars that would inform him of the alleged factual and legal bases. The
Sandiganbayan denied his motion on the ground that the particulars sought are evidentiary in nature. Tantuico moved to
reconsider this decision, but the Sandiganbayan again denied his motion.
The Court overturned the Sandiganbayans ruling and directed the prosecution to prepare and file a bill of particulars.
Significantly, the Court held that the particulars prayed for, such as: names of persons, names of corporations,
dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular transactions
involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the
conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. The Court explained that those
particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint so that the defendant may be
fairly informed of the claims made against him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
To be sure, the differences between ultimate and evidentiary matters are not easy to distinguish. While Tantuico was a
civil case and did not involve the crime of plunder, the Courts ruling nonetheless serves as a useful guide in the
determination of what matters are indispensable and what matters may be omitted in the Information, in relation with the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In the present case, the particulars on the:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) projects involved;
(2) Napoles participating NGOs; and
(3) the government agency involved in each transaction
will undoubtedly provide Enrile with sufficient data to know the specific transactions involved, and thus enable him to
prepare adequately and intelligently whatever defense or defenses he may have.
We reiterate that the purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify allegations in the Information that are indefinite, vague, or
are conclusions of lawto enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial, not simply to inform him of the
crime of which he stands accused. Verily, an accused cannot intelligently respond to the charge laid if the allegations
are incomplete or are unclear to him.
We are aware that in a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in
furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080, for purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.102redarclaw
The term overall unlawful scheme indicates a general plan of action or method that the principal accused and public
officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve their common criminal goal. In the alternative, if no overall scheme
can be found or where the schemes or methods used by the multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form
Lest Section 4 be misunderstood as allowing the prosecution to allege that a set of acts has been repeatedly done
(thereby showing a pattern of overt criminal acts), as has been done in the present case, we point out that this section
does not dispense with the requirement of stating the essential or material facts of each component or predicate act of
plunder; it merely prescribes a rule of procedure for the prosecution of plunder.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,104 we construed this procedural rule to mean that [w]hat the prosecution needed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt was only the number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series that would constitute a
pattern involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There was no need to prove each and every other act alleged in
the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth.105redarclaw
If, for example, the accused is charged in the Information of malversing public funds on twenty different (20) occasions,
the prosecution does not need to prove all 20 transactions; it suffices if a number of these acts of malversation can be
proven with moral certainty, provided only that the series or combination of transaction would amount to at least
P50,000,000.00. Nonetheless, each of the twenty transactions should be averred with particularity, more so if the
circumstances surrounding each transaction are not the same. This is the only way that the accused can properly
prepare for his defense during trial.
D.3. Paragraph (b) of the Information
As his last requested point, Enrile wants the prosecution to provide the details of the allegation under paragraph (b) of the
Information (i.e., x x x by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official position, authority, relationships,
connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines) in the following manner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Provide the details of how Enrile took undue advantage, on several occasions, of his official positions, authority,
relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. Was this because he received any money from the
government? From whom and for what reason did he receive any money or property from the government through which
he unjustly enriched himself? State the details from whom each amount was received, the place and the time.
Our ruling on Enriles desired details specifically, the particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the combination and
series charged in the Information; a breakdown of the amounts of the kickbacks and commissions allegedly received,
stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at; a brief description of the identified projects where kickbacks
and commissions were received; the approximate dates of receipt of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the
identified projects; the name of Napoles non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged recipients and/or
target implementors of Enriles PDAF projects; and the government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed
Napoles NGOs renders it unnecessary to require the prosecution to submit further particulars on the
allegations contained under paragraph (b) of the Information.
Simply put, the particular overt acts alleged to constitute the combination or series required by the crime of plunder,
coupled with a specification of the other non-evidentiary details stated above, already answer the question of how Enrile
took undue advantage of his position, authority, relationships, connections and influence as Senator to unjustly enrich
himself.
We also point out that the PDAF is a discretionary fund intended solely for public purposes. Since the Information stated
that Enrile, as Philippine Senator, committed the offense in relation to his office, by repeatedly receiving kickbacks or
commissions from Napoles and/or her representatives through projects funded by his (Enriles) PDAF, then it already
alleged how undue advantage had been taken and how the Filipino people and the Republic had been prejudiced. These
points are fairly deducible from the allegations in the Information as supplemented by the required particulars.
E. The Grave Abuse of Discretion
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayans denial of the petitioners motion for a bill of
particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized or specified are all evidentiary without any
explanation supporting this conclusion constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts that must be alleged to enable the petitioner to
properly plead and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted through each detail sought to be
specified, and made the necessary determination of whether each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly
after Enrile stated in his Reply that the desired details could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the
prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the presence of these desired details; neither
can we put on him the burden of unearthing from these voluminous documents what the desired details are. The remedy
of a bill of particulars is precisely made available by the Rules to enable an accused to positively respond and make an
intelligent defense.
Justice Carpios reference to the voluminous 144-page Ombudsmans resolution (which found probable cause to indict the
petitioner and his co-accused not only of the crime of plunder, but also for violations of several counts of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practice Act) to justify his argument that Enrile was already aware of the details he seeks in his motion for a
bill of particulars, all the more strengthens our conclusive position that the Information for plunder filed against Enrile was
ambiguous and glaringly insufficient to enable him to make a proper plea and to prepare for trial. We reiterate, to the point
of being repetitive, that the purpose of the bill of particulars in criminal cases is to supply vague facts or allegations in the
complaint or information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial.
Moreover, a resolution arising from a preliminary investigation does not amount to nor does it serve the purpose of a bill of
particulars.
106
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by restricting the scope of the proof; it limits
the evidence to be presented by the parties to the matters alleged in the Information as supplemented by the bill.
It is for this reason that the failure of an accused to move for a bill of particulars deprives him of the right to object to
evidence which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more or less general terms which
sufficiently charges the defendants with a definite crime.
The record on preliminary investigation, in comparison, serves as the written account of the inquisitorial process when the
fiscal determined the existence of prima facie evidence to indict a person for a particular crime. The record of the
preliminary investigation, as a general rule, does not even form part of the records of the case.107 These features of the
record of investigation are significantly different from the bill of particulars that serves as basis, together with the
Information, in specifying the overt acts constituting the offense that the accused pleaded to during arraignment.
Notably, plunder is a crime composed of several predicate criminal acts. To prove plunder, the prosecution must
weave a web out of the six ways of illegally amassing wealth and show how the various acts reveal a
combination or series of means or schemes that reveal a pattern of criminality. The interrelationship of the separate
acts must be shown and be established as a scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 million.
Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts and numerous transactions and schemes that span a period of time.
Naturally, in its prosecution, the State possesses an effective flexibility of proving a predicate criminal act or
transaction, not originally contemplated in the Information, but is otherwise included in the broad statutory definition, in
light of subsequently discovered evidence. The unwarranted use of the flexibility is what the bill of particulars guards
against.
Justice Carpio further argues that the ponencia transformed the nature of an action from an accusation in writing
charging a person with an offense to an initiatory pleading alleging a cause of action.
We see nothing wrong with such treatment, for a motion for a bill of particulars in criminal cases is designed to achieve
the same purpose as the motion for a bill of particulars in civil cases. In fact, certainty, to a reasonable extent, is an
essential attribute of all pleadings, both civil and criminal, and is more especially needed in the latter where conviction is
followed by penal consequences.108redarclaw
Thus, even if the Information employs the statutory words does not mean that it is unnecessary to allege such facts in
connection with the commission of the offense as will certainly put the accused on full notice of what he is called upon to
defend, and establish such a record as will effectually bar a subsequent prosecution for that identical offense. 109redarclaw
Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital punishment; for this reason, more process is
due, not less. When a persons life interest protected by the life, liberty, and property language recognized in the due
process clause is at stake in the proceeding, all measures must be taken to ensure the protection of those fundamental
rights.
As we emphasized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,110 the administration of justice is not a matter of guesswork. The name
of the game is fair play, not foul play. We cannot allow a legal skirmish where, from the start, one of the protagonists
enters the arena with one arm tied to his back.
Finally, we find no significance in Justice Carpios argument that Atty. Estelito Mendoza did not previously find vague the
Information for plunder filed against President Joseph Estrada in 2001.
Under the amended Information111 against Estrada, et al., each overt act that constituted the series or combination and
corresponding to the predicate acts under Section 1(d) had been averred with sufficient particularity so that there was no
doubt what particular transaction was referred to.
We point out that unlike in the Information against Enrile, the following matters had been averred with sufficient
definiteness, viz: the predicate acts that constitute the crime of plunder; the breakdown of how the alleged amount of
P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, had been arrived at; the participants involved in each transaction; and the specific
sources of the illegal wealth amassed.
At any rate, that Atty. Mendoza did not previously question the indictment of President Estrada via a motion for bill of
particulars does not ipso facto mean that the present Information for plunder filed against Enrile is not vague and
ambiguous.
Sandiganbayan Ground #2:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That Enriles cited grounds are reiterations of the grounds previously raised
Enrile does not deny that the arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and
for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of particulars were identical. He argues, however, that the mere
reiteration of these grounds should not be a ground for the denial of his motion for bill of particulars, since the context in
which those questions were raised was entirely different.
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of particulars involved the right of an accused to
due process, the enumeration of the details desired in Enriles supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest
and for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of particulars are different viewed particularly from the prism of
their respective objectives.
In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information did not state a crime for which he can be convicted; thus, the
Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he already impliedly admits that the Information
sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking in details that would allow him to properly plead and prepare his
defense; he essentially alleged here a defect of form.
Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to state the nature and cause of the
accusation against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the motion for bill of particulars) are required to be
specified in sufficient detail because the allegations in the Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions
and will not allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are made.
That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the Information does not preclude the accused
from requesting for more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is alleged to have committed. The
request for details is precisely the function of a bill of particulars.
6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles NGOs. The particular person/s in each
government agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby denied.

Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause and the crime an accused is charged, the
allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly plead and prepare for trial.

We likewise find no complete congruence between the grounds invoked and the details sought by Enrile in his motion for
bill of particulars, and the grounds invoked in opposing the warrant for his arrest issued, so that the Sandiganbayans
action in one would bar Enrile from essentially invoking the same grounds.

The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for
placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. 112 Simply put, the judge determines
whether the necessity exists to place the accused under immediate custody to avoid frustrating the ends of justice.

On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure grants the accused the remedy of a bill of particulars to
better inform himself of the specifics or particulars concerning facts or matters that had not been averred in the
Information with the necessary clarity for purposes of his defense.

Its purpose is to better acquaint the accused of the specific acts and/or omissions in relation with the crime charged, to
limit the matters and the evidence that the prosecution may otherwise be allowed to use against him under a more or less
general averment, and to meet the charges head on and timely object to evidence whose inadmissibility may otherwise be
deemed waived.

Based on these considerations, the question of whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest against an
accused, is separate and distinct from the issue of whether the allegations in the Information have been worded with
sufficient definiteness to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare his defense. While the grounds cited for each
may seemingly be the same, they are submitted for different purposes and should be appreciated from different
perspectives, so that the insufficiency of these grounds for one does not necessarily translate to insufficiency for the other.
Thus, the resolution of the issue of probable cause should not bar Enrile from seeking a more detailed averment of the
allegations in the Information.

The Sandiganbayan grossly missed these legal points and thus gravely abused its discretion: it used wrong and
completely inapplicable considerations to support its conclusion.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari, and SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayans resolutions dated
July 11, 2014, which denied Enriles motion for bill of particulars and his motion for reconsideration of this denial.

b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from
finality of this Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars containing the facts sought that we herein rule to
be material and necessary. The bill of particulars shall specifically contain the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the combination or series of overt criminal acts charged in the
Information.
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the kickbacks or commissions allegedly received, stating how the amount of
P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.
3. A brief description of the identified projects where kickbacks or commissions were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, of the alleged kickbacks and commissions
from the identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state the year when the kickbacks and
transactions from the identified projects were received.
5. The name of Napoles non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged recipients and/or target
implementors of Enriles PDAF projects.
 On December 24, 2002 at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon AAA,3 a seven (7) year old girl, together with her younger
siblings CCC, DDD and EEE were in their house at Taal 2, Royal Valley, Bangkal, Davao City. Accused-appellant Joel
"Anjoy" Buca (Anjoy for brevity), a neighbor of their family, entered the house and ordered AAA's siblings to go to another
room to sleep. When Anjoy and AAA were all alone, Anjoy placed AAA on his lap, pulled down her panties and forcibly
inserted his penis into her vagina. He began to have sex with AAA. CCC, the younger brother, who was at that time hiding
below a bench, saw what was happening. CCC came out and pulled AAA away from Anjoy. Then, Anjoy warned AAA not
to tell anyone of what he did or else he will kill her parents.

BBB, the mother of AAA[,] came home after buying food. CCC met her at the door and told her, "Mie, Mie, si Ate (referring
to AAA) gani no ky gibastos ni Anjoy". BBB pretended to ignore the information relayed by CCC as Anjoy was still inside
their house. BBB was scared that Anjoy might notice her reaction. About ten minutes after, Anjoy left their house. AAA
then disclosed that Anjoy did the same thing to her many times already.

On the same day, AAA and her mother BBB reported the incident to the police. They also went to a physician to have her
examined. The medical examination revealed thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

PROVISIONAL MEDICAL CERTIFICATE4

ANOGENITAL EXAM

Genitalia (+) Erythema, perihymenal area

(+) Whitish and yellowish discharge

Anus Normal

CONCLUSION

1. Genital findings are suspicious for sexual abuse

On January 7, 2003, BBB executed an Affidavit-Complaint. Three (3) Informations were filed against accused-appellant
Anjoy. The accusatory portions of the three (3) Informations state:cralawlawlibrary

I. In Criminal Case No. 52,260-2003:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

"That sometime in the months prior to December 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned [accused], by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, had carnal knowledge of the child AAA, seven (7) years old, by forcibly inserting his penis into
G.R. No. 209587, September 23, 2015 her vagina.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOEL "ANJOY" BUCA, Accused-Appellant. CONTRARY TO LAW";ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

DECISION II. In Criminal Case No. 52,261-2003

VILLARAMA, JR., J.: "The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code as Amended by R.A. 8353, committed as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On appeal is the June 17, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00888-MIN convicting
accused-appellant Joel "Anjoy" Buca of the crime of rape. That sometime before December 24, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and
We state the antecedents as summarized by the CA2: feloniously, had carnal knowledge of the child AAA, seven (7) years old, by forcibly inserting his penis into her vagina.

CONTRARY TO LAW"; and

III. In Criminal Case No. 52, 262-2003
SO ORDERED.7
"That sometime in the months after December 25, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this chanrobleslaw
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation, did there and then willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, had carnal knowledge of the child AAA, seven (7) years old, by forcibly inserting his penis into
her vagina. Hence, this appeal.

CONTRARY TO LAW." The issues for our consideration are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of rape; and
2. Whether accused-appellant may be convicted of rape despite the failure to allege the exact date of the commission of the
On August 24, 2004, accused-appellant was arraigned and entered his pleas of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. crime in the Information.

As regards Criminal Case No. 52,260-2003, the trial court dismissed it during the trial on May 28, 2007 after Prosecutor We affirm the conviction of accused-appellant.
Dayanghirang manifested that the prosecution will not present evidence because "during his interview with the witness,
she could not recall the dates x x x it was between 2001 and 2002 but she could not recall, so [the prosecution] will not Accused-appellant is guilty of rape.
anymore present"5.
Accused-appellant contends that his guilt was not proved as the credibility of AAA and CCC, whose testimonies were
During his examination, accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusations against him. He insisted that on December utilized to establish the elements of rape, is in serious doubt due to their lack of candor and forthrightness in testifying.
24, 2002 at about 5:45 in the morning, he passed by AAA's house. AAA called him as Uncle Joel and requested that he Accused-appellant further points out that there are inconsistencies in the narrations of the prosecution's witnesses that
look after her younger brother who was crying. When asked where their mother was, AAA answered that she left to buy cast doubt on their statements.
food. When he was about to leave, AAA called him again because her younger sibling was crying and she requested if he
could watch over them. Accused-appellant declined as he was about to go to his work. He further testified that there was We do not agree.
no unusual incident that happened on the day of December 24, 2002. Furthermore, he insisted that he has no knowledge
whatsoever of the other accusations of AAA and BBB against him. Article 266-A, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, defines the crime of rape:cralawlawlibrary
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
In a Judgment6 dated November 11, 2010, the [Regional Trial Court (RTC)] found accused-appellant guilty of the crime
charged in Criminal Case No. 52,261-2003, the dispositive portion of which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to present evidence in Criminal Case No. 52,260-2003, the said Criminal
Case is hereby ordered DISMISSED. a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

As to Criminal Case [N]o. 52,262-2003, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
doubt, the said case is hereby ordered DISMISSED and the ACCUSED is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in
the Information. c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

As to Criminal Case [N]o. 52,261-2003, the Court finds Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
defined and penalized under Article 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said Accused mentioned above be present.chanrobleslaw
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay AAA, the sum of SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P75,000.00)
PESOS, as civil indemnity and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages. In the case at bar, the lower courts found that the element of carnal knowledge was established by the testimony of the
victim, AAA, to wit:cralawlawlibrary
Under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the Accused, who is detained, is hereby entitled to full credit of his preventive PROS. DAYANGHIRANG III:
imprisonment if he agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the rules and regulation[s] imposed upon convicted prisoners. This time we go to Crim. Case No. 52,261-03
If he did not agree, he shall be entitled to 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment. Q: On December 24, 2002, at around one o'clock in the afternoon, where were you at that time, Miss
Witness, if you can recall?
SO ORDERED.chanrobleslaw [AAA]
A: In our house.
Q: Who were with you in your house, at that time?
Accused-appellant appealed. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling and agreed that the testimony of AAA was sufficient to A: My siblings and younger brothers.
establish the crime. The fallo of the appealed CA Decision reads:cralawlawlibrary Q: You are referring to your younger brothers named what?
A: [CCC, DDD and EEE.]
WHEREFORE, the Judgment dated November 11, 2010 of the RTC, Branch 12, Davao City is Q: Aside from you, the three other siblings, who else were there and in your house at that time?
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Joel "Anjoy" Buca is hereby found GUILTY beyond A: No more... Anjoy.
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the benefit of Q: You mean, the accused was also in your house at that time?
parole. A: Yes.
COURT:
Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, Q: Do you know why he was in your house?
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the A: I don't know.
finality of judgment until fully paid. xxxx
Q: According to you, you and your three siblings were there in your house at that time together with the
accused, and your mother left to buy viand. Tell us, what happened?
A: He again cuddled me and put me on his lap and pulled down my panty.
Q: Who at that time again cuddled you? Where were your other siblings?
A: He ordered my other siblings to go inside the room and put them to sleep.
xxxx
Q: Now, according to you, the accused pulled down your panty and cuddled you. What did he do next?
A: He inserted his penis on (sic) my vagina.
Q: What did he do next after he inserted his penis on (sic) your vagina?
A: He was pumping again.
Q: What did you feel?
A: Pain.
Q: What part of your body was painful?
A: My vagina.
Q: That incident of sexual abuse and molestation happened in what part of the house?
A: Near, at the door.
Q: What happened next?
A: One of my brothers saw it and he pulled me.8
chanrobleslaw
We find the testimony of AAA sufficient to establish the element of carnal knowledge. We note that the RTC described the
testimony of AAA as positive, credible, natural and convincing.9 The Court has held time and again that testimonies of
rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender
age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being
subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed
to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true. 10
Further, it is doctrinally settled that factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are
accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. 11 The Court observes restraint in interfering with
the trial court's assessment of the witnesses' credibility, absent any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked
some material facts or gravely abused its discretion, more so, when the CA sustained such assessment, as in this case,
where it affirmed the trial court's findings of fact, the veracity of the testimonies of the witnesses, the determination of
physical evidence and conclusions.12
Furthermore, the narration of AAA is even more convincing as her testimony coincided with that of CCC, who witnessed
the crime.13 We note that the RTC also observed CCC's testimony to be positive, credible, natural and convincing. 14
As to the alleged inconsistency in the testimony of AAA and that of her brother CCC, accused-appellant points out that
AAA testified that her brother pulled her away from accused-appellant while CCC narrated that she was released by
accused-appellant. In People v. Laog,15 the Court clarified that minor inconsistencies are not enough to sustain the
acquittal of an accused, to wit:cralawlawlibrary
xxx Nonetheless, this matter raised by appellant is a minor detail which had nothing to do with the elements of the
crime of rape. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters - not to the central fact of the crime - do
not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses' declarations, as long as these are coherent and
intrinsically believable on the whole. For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a
basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime charged. It cannot
be overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in
her testimony. (Emphasis supplied)chanrobleslaw
The minor inconsistency in this case is how AAA was released by accused-appellant which is not an element of rape.
Such fact not being an element of the crime will not put to doubt the prosecution witnesses' testimony establishing the
crime.
As to the element that the victim is under 12 years of age, the presentation of her birth certificate 16confirming that she was
indeed seven years old at the time the crime was committed on December 24, 2002 sufficiently established the second
element of rape in this case.
In sum, we agree with the RTC and CA that the elements of rape were duly established.
The conviction of accused-appellant
based on the Information stating that the
crime was committed sometime before
December 24, 2002, despite the fact that
the crime was committed on
December 24, 2002, is valid.
Accused-appellant argues that the statement in the Information17 that the rape occurred sometime before December 24,
2002 despite the fact that the prosecution established that the crime was committed on December 24, 2002 violates
Section 11,18 Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, on the requirement of stating the date of
the commission of the offense and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
We do not agree.
The Court has already addressed this issue in People v. Lizada,19 to
wit:cralawlawlibrary
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant. It bears stressing that the precise date of the commission of the
crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. Failure to specify the exact date when the rape was committed
does not render the Information defective. The reason for this is that the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal
knowledge of the private complainant under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, x x x Moreover, in People vs. Salalima,20 this Court held that:cralawlawlibrary
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on
its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The
gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date
when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that allegations that
rapes were committed "before and until October 15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter,"
"sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" and "on or about and
sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. (Emphasis supplied)
chanrobleslaw
Notably, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, states that it is not necessary to
state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of
the offense. Such requirement is not applicable to the crime of rape where the date of the commission of the offense is not
an essential element. Also, said Section 11 expressly permits that a crime may be alleged to have been committed on a
date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. The information charging accused-appellant of rape
sometime before December 24, 2002 when the crime was committed exactly on December 24, 2002 is sufficiently
compliant with said Section 11. In addition, as correctly pointed out by the CA, the Information is valid as under Section 6,
Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an information is deemed sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.21
The Court has also discussed the essence of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him in Andaya v. People,22 to wit:cralawlawlibrary
It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the information. The main purpose of
requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense, ZENAIDA M. LIMBONA, Petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE ALEXANDER S. BALUT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
x x x (Emphasis supplied)chanrobleslaw QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 76, Respondent.

DECISION
It is evident in this case that accused-appellant was able to testify about the incident on December 24, 200223 because the
date alleged was not vague or covering an unreasonable period as to deprive him the opportunity to prepare his defense BERSAMIN, J.:
which is the essence of the right allegedly violated. It is worthy to note that the records are bereft of any objection by the
accused-appellant about the date of the commission of the crime at the time of arraignment, 24 during the formal offer of The issuance by the trial court of the warrant of arrest upon filing of the information and supporting papers implies the
exhibits25 and at the time the prosecution put AAA on the witness stand26 to establish the rape committed on December determination of probable cause for the offense charged. It is then superfluous for the accused to seek the judicial
24, 2002. In People v. Gianan,27 the Court held that an accused-appellant's failure to raise a timely objection that the time determination of probable cause on the pretext that the trial court should still act and proceed independently of the
difference alleged in the information covered a broad period constitutes a waiver of his right to object. We further observe executive determination of probable cause to charge the proper offense.
that accused-appellant did not even disavow knowledge of the incident on that date but, in fact, admitted that he spoke
with AAA at their house on December 24, 200228 and even entered AAA's house.29 The testimony of accused-appellant The Case
leads us to conclude that the allegation was sufficient to inform him of the date the crime charged occurred which enabled
him to prepare his defense. Thus, we find the allegations in the Information and the subsequent conviction of accused-
appellant by the lower courts valid and lawful under the circumstances. Before us are the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 177600 and G.R. No. 178684. G.R. No. 177600 involves the appeal by
petition for review on certiorari of Mayor Anwar Berua Balindong, Lt. Col. Jalandoni Cota, Mayor Amer Oden Balindong,
Proper use of the phrase "without and Ali Balindong (Balindong, et al.) to assail the Decision promulgated on April 24, 2007 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
eligibility for parole" in indivisible CA-G.R. SP No. 97121.1 G.R. No. 178684 relates to the Petition (To Show Cause Why Respondent Should Not Be Held
penalties. in Contempt of Court)2 brought by Zenaida M. Limbona (Limbona), the private complainant in the criminal cases instituted
against Balindong, et al., charging Presiding Judge Alexander S. Balut of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, in
The CA, in the dispositive portion of its Decision, sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty ofreclusion Quezon City with contempt of court for issuing the order dated July 16, 2007 suspending the proceedings in the criminal
perpetua, without the benefit of parole.30 A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC31 is instructive on the matter of using the phrase cases involving Balindong, et al. out of judicial courtesy.3
without eligibility for parole to qualify indivisible penalties, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Antecedents
II.
In these lights, the following guidelines shall be observed in the imposition of penalties and in the use of the phrase
"without eligibility for parole":chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The CA's decision being assailed in CA-G.R. SP No. 97121 rendered the following factual antecedents, to wit:
II.
(1) In cases where the death penalty is not warranted, there is no need to use the phrase"without eligibility for
The long-drawn controversy now raised in the instant petition was instigated by a shooting incident that took place in
parole" to qualify the penalty of reclusion perpetua; it is understood that convicted persons penalized with an
Poblacion, Malabang, Lanao del Sur on May 11, 1998 that resulted in the death of Dante Limbona and Ante
indivisible penalty are not eligible for parole; and
Maguindanao, and the serious wounding of Azis Panda and Kiri Hadji Salik. In the course of the preliminary investigation
the investigating prosecutor found probable cause to charge private respondents Lt. Col. Jalandoni D. Cota, Anwar
(2) When circumstances are present warranting the imposition of the death penalty, but this penalty is not imposed
Berua Balindong, PO1 Kennedy Balindong, Amer Oden Balindong and Ali Sarip Balindong with Double Murder with
because of R.A. 9346, the qualification of "without eligibility for parole" shall be used to qualify reclusion perpetua in order
Multiple Frustrated Murder. The Information was thereupon filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malabang, Lanao del
to emphasize that the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for R.A. No. 9346.
Sur, Branch 12. However, after reinvestigation ordered by the trial court, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
downgraded the charges against private respondents Lt. Col. Jalandoni D. Cota, Anwar Berua Balindong and
In the instant case, since the accused-appellant committed simple rape, a crime penalized byreclusion perpetua only, the
Kennedy Balindong and dropped the charges against Amer Oden Balindong and Ali Balindong. Private complainant
dispositive portion of this decision should plainly state that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
Zenaida Limbona, the widow of the victim Dante Limbona, filed a petition for review questioning the Provincial
perpetua without any qualification.
Prosecutor's28 August 1998 Resolution before the Department of Justice (DOJ). In a 4 August 1999Resolution, then
Secretary Serafin Cuevas modified the assailed resolution and directed the Provincial Prosecutor to file instead "two (2)
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated June 17, 2013 of the
informations for frustrated murder with attempted murder, two (2) informations for frustrated murder and an information for
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00888-MIN is AFFIRMED with a clarification that the accused-appellant is
attempted murder" against private respondents. Subsequently, in a 1 December 1999 Resolution, Secretary Cuevas
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
denied private respondents' Motion for Reconsideration in this wise:
Costs against accused-appellant.
"The matters raised in the instant motion for reconsideration have been taken into consideration in arriving at our
FIRST DIVISION resolution, hence, we find no cogent reason to reconsider the same.

In view, however, of the Supplemental Manifestation filed by Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote on October 19, 1999, the
G.R. No. 177600, October 19, 2015
dispositive portion of our resolution dated August 4, 1999 is hereby modified to read as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
MAYOR ANWAR BERUA BALINDONG, LT. COL. JALANDONI COTA, MAYOR AMER ODEN BALINDONG, AND ALI
BALINDONG, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, STATE PROSECUTOR LEAH ARMAMENTO, OFFICE OF THE
xxx WHEREFORE, your resolution is hereby modified. You are directed to file two (2) informations for murder with
SOLICITOR GENERAL AND ZENAIDA LIMBONA, Respondents.
attempted murder, two (2) informations for frustrated murder and an information for attempted murder against
respondents Datu Anwar Berua Balindong, Lt. Col. Jalandoni Cota, PO1 Kennedy Macaborod Balindong, Datu Amer-
G.R. No. 178684
Oden Sarip Balindong and Datu Ali Sarip Balindong. Report your compliance within ten (10) days from receipt hereof x x
x"
The corresponding Amended Informations were accordingly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Maguindanao,
Cotabato City and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 2503, 2573, 2574, 2575 and 2576. Private respondents, in the
meantime, filed a secondMotion for Reconsideration, which the succeeding DOJ Secretary Artemio G. Tuquero in a 16
March 2000 Resolution denied "with finality and with warning that no further pleadings will be entertained". Undeterred by
the tenor of the denial of their second motion for reconsideration, they filed a Third Motion for Reconsideration that was
eventually granted by the new DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez in a 12 March 2001 Resolution. Private complainants
sought reconsideration thereof but the same was subsequently denied in a 24 July 2001 Resolution, prompting them to
bring the matter before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari docketed as C.A. G.R. SP No. 66858. In a 22 May
2003 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the assailed issuances of DOJ Secretary Perez and reinstated the 4 August
1999, 1 December 1999 and 16 March 2000 DOJ Resolutions, in due time denying private respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration in a 23 September 2003 Resolution.
Later, Criminal Case Nos. 2503 and 2573 were re-raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 219
and re-docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-998992-93 [sic], Q-01-100542-43 and Q-01-100594. Then, pursuant to
the 22 May 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the RTC-Branch 219 issued a resolution finding probable cause to
charge private respondents for Murder with Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. Q-01-998992-93 [sic], Frustrated
Murder in Criminal Case No. Q-01-100542-43, and Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. Q-01-100594. The warrants of
arrest were accordingly issued against private respondents, who, undaunted, went up to the Supreme Court to question
the Decision of the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 159962. Soon
after, the Supreme Court promulgated therein its 16 December 2004 Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 May 2003 which annulled the
DOJ Resolution dated March 12, 2001 and reinstated its Resolutions issued on 04 August 1999, 01 December 1999 and
16 March 2000 is AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 February 2004 by this Court is hereby
LIFTED, and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219, is ORDERED to implement its Resolution dated 03
December 2003 relative to the issuance of warrants of arrest against all the accused. The said court is directed to submit
a report thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."
Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied with finality as the Supreme Court
declared in its 6 June 2005 Resolution that "there is no longer any obstacle to the implementation of the existing warrants
of arrest". Despite the categorical pronouncement, however, private respondents adamantly filed another motion
purportedly for clarification of the 16 December 2004 Decision but which was in fact an attempt to have the High Court
order a re-determination by the trial court of the appropriate crime with which to charge private respondents. In the 14
August 2005 Resolution, the Supreme Court ruled thus:
"The Court Resolves to (a) EXPUNGE from the records of this case petitioners' urgent motion for clarification dated June
25, 2005, xxx; and (b) ADMONISH petitioners and their counsel to pay heed to the directives of this Court and against
misrepresenting the import of its rulings and to desist from any further unauthorized pleadings UNDER PAIN OF
CONTEMPT."
The 16 December 2006 Decision of the Supreme Court became final and executory on July 5, 2005. Subsequently, due to
the inhibition of the presiding judge of the RTC-Branch 219 the criminal cases were raffled to RTC-Branch 100, whose
presiding judge was expressly ordered by the Supreme Court to enforce the warrants of arrest against private
respondents with utmost dispatch in a 12 December 2005 Resolution. After issuing the Order relative to the enforcement
of the warrants of arrest against private respondents, however, the presiding judge of the RTC-Branch 100 inhibited
herself as well from hearing the criminal cases and the same were re-raffled anew to the RTC-Branch 83, presided by
respondent Judge Ralph S. Lee.
Private respondents then filed before RTC-Branch 83 a Motion to Re-Determine the Existence or Non-Existence of
Probable Cause Which May Even Warrant Dismissal - Even of the Appropriate Charges of Homicide, Frustrated and
Attempted Homicides. Private complainants, on the other hand, moved for respondent Judge Lee's inhibition when the
latter failed to act upon a motion for the issuance of Alias Warrants of Arrest. However, prior to voluntarily inhibiting
himself from the subject criminal cases, respondent Judge Lee issued the assailed 12 May 2006 Order granting private
respondents' motion for redetermination of probable cause and consequently ordering the downgrading of the crimes
charged. The cases were then re-raffled to RTC-Branch 77, presided by respondent Judge Vivencio S. Baclig, who then
issued the second assailed 18 October 2006 Order denying a Motion for Reconsideration of the 12 May 2006
Order issued by respondent Judge Lee and setting the arraignment on November 3, 2006. Private complainants filed a
motion for the voluntary inhibition of respondent Judge Baclig, who later denied said motion and re-set the arraignment on
December 11, 2006 in the 22 November 2006 Order.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Aggrieved by the orders issued on May 12, 2006 and October 18, 2006, respectively, by Judge Ralph S. Lee and Judge
Vivencio S. Baclig, the State, through the Office of Solicitor General, commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the
CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 97121), alleging that:
RESPONDENT JUDGES COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED MAY 12, 2006 AND OCTOBER 18, 2006
ORDERS.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On November 20, 2006, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 173290 adjudging Judge Lee and Balindong, et
al. guilty of indirect contempt,6viz.:
In the present case, private respondents are guilty of indirect contempt for filing the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Urgent Motion for Clarification of the dispositive portion of the December 16, 2004 Decision in G.R. No.
159962;
(2) Motion for Determination of Probable Cause and/or Motion to Dismiss the Case and to Quash Warrant of
Arrest (with prayer for suspension of the enforcement of warrant of arrest pending hearing) filed on
September 1, 2005 before Branch 100 of the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Christine Jacob;
(3) Motion for Reconsideration of Judge Jacob's January 4, 2006 Order denying their motion dated September
1, 2005 filed on January 24, 2006;
(4) Motion to Re-Determine the Existence or Non-Existence of Probable Cause Which May Even Warrant
Dismissal - Even of the Appropriate Charges of Homicide, Frustrated and Attempted Homicide filed before
Branch 83 on February 21, 2006.
The December 16, 2004 Decision of the Court in G.R. No. 159962 clearly sustained the filing of two Informations for
Murder with Attempted Murder, two Informations for Frustrated Murder and an Information for Attempted Murder against
private respondents. The Court even directed the implementation of the arrest warrants against them. This,
notwithstanding, private respondents filed a motion for determination of probable cause and/or dismissal of the case
against them. Worse, this was done after being admonished by the Court to pay heed to its directives under pain of
contempt.
With the finality of this Court's Decision, all issues relative to the determination of the proper offenses with which to charge
private respondents had been laid to rest. In continuing to file pleadings and motions purportedly seeking for the
clarification of the proper charges against them, respondents merely rehashed their tired arguments and unavailing
assertions. They did not only succeed in delaying the conduct of the trial of the aforesaid cases but also willfully and
deliberately flouted this Court's directives with their stubborn refusal to abide by our pronouncement and their incessant
nit-picking of issues already resolved with finality.
In granting respondents' motions for reconsideration and re-determination of probable cause, and consequently down-
grading the charges against respondents in his Order dated May 12, 2006, Judge Lee contravened this Court's directive
in G.R. No. 159962 and in the subject Resolutions. He impudently substituted his own judgment for that of this Court. Had
he thoroughly reviewed the records of the case, it would have been impossible for him to misread the import of said
Decisions and Resolutions.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thereafter, Judge Lee inhibited from the criminal cases, which were re-assigned to Branch 91 the RTC, presided by
Judge Lita Tolentino-Genilo, who, on May 24, 2007, issued an order: (a) reinstating the charges against Balindong, et al.
for two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder to
conform with the decision promulgated in G.R. No. 159962; (b) issuing alias warrants of arrest against them; and (c)
inhibiting herself from further hearing the cases.8 Subsequently, the criminal cases were re-raffled to Branch 76, whose
Presiding Judge was respondent Judge Alexander S. Balut.
Aggrieved by the dispositions of Judge Tolentino-Genilo, Balindong, et al. filed their Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Recall Suspend Order of Arrest.9 As the new trial judge, however, Judge Balut opted to defer action to await the Court's
ruling in G.R. No. 177600.10 He further suspended the enforcement of the alias warrants issued for the arrest of
Balindong, et al.11 Hence, Limbona commenced G.R. No. 178684.
On April 24, 2007, the CA promulgated its ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 97121,12 disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The 12 May 2006 Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, as well as, the 18 October 2006 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 77 are REVERSED andSET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA declared the assailed orders of Judge Lee and Judge Baclig to be in clear defiance of the Court's decision in G.R.
No. 159962.14 It pronounced that Judge Lee erred in opining that the Court had only sustained in G.R. No. 159962 the
executive determination of probable cause by the DOJ, and had not touched on what appropriate crimes should have
been charged against Balindong, et al.;15 and that Judge Baclig similarly erred in holding that the Court "did not prohibit
the trial judge from determining the appropriate crime to be filed against the accused [once] the cases were brought to his
sala."16 It pointed out that:
There are no two ways to construe the 16 December 2004 Decision of the Supreme Court relative the appropriate
charges to be filed against private respondents. In upholding the Court of Appeals' ruling that the DOJ should not have
entertained a third motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court did not merely touch upon a procedural infirmity but
ruled further on private respondents' material objections to the propriety of the murder charge against them. x x x
xxxx
To reiterate the rule, determination of qualifying circumstances is a matter of evidence. Thus, as pointed out by petitioner,
by arbitrarily downgrading the original charge from murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder to homicide,
frustrated homicide and attempted homicide, respondent Judge Lee effectively denied the prosecution the opportunity to
prove the attendance of qualifying circumstances in a fullblown trial.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA took note of the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 173290, which said in part:
Finally, whatever other grounds for opposition raised by private respondents in theirComment to the
Petition and Rejoinder to Petitioner's Reply, the resolution of this case has been simplified by the promulgation of the
Supreme Court 20 November 2006 Decision in the petition for indirect contempt filed against private respondents. In
granting private respondents' motion for reconsideration and re-detcrmination of probable cause, and consequently
downgrading the charges, the Supreme Court found respondent Judge Lee guilty of indirect contempt for having clearly
contravened the Court's directive in G.R. No. 159962 and impudently substituting his own judgment for that of the Court. It
further found private respondents' persistent attempts to raise issues long settled by a final and executory judgment a
contumacious defiance of the Court's authority. x x x
xxxx
Accordingly, private respondents have been penalized for their contumacious acts and the issue concerning the proper
crimes with which they should be charged has been laid to rest. 18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Balindong, et al. have appealed the CA's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97121 (G.R. No. 177600).
Issues
In G.R. No. 177600, Balindong, et al. submit the following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT AFTER THE EXHAUSTION OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WHICH REACHED THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BY WAY OF PETITION FOR REVIEW, TO THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ULTIMATELY
TO THIS HONORABLE COURT (IN G.R. NO. 159962), AND AFTER THE PROSECUTION'S STAND SUSTAINING THE
ORIGINAL INFORMATIONS FOR MURDER, FRUSTRATED AND ATTEMPTED HAD BEEN MADE FINAL AND
EXECUTORY, THE RTC - COURT (A COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION) AND/OR YOUR PETITIONERS
ACCUSED, ARE PRECLUDED/ PROHIBITED FROM INVOKING SECTION 14, RULE 110 OR SECTION 19, RULE 119
OF THE 2000 REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ESPECIALLY SINCE IT WAS MADE FOR THE FIRST
TIME AFTER YOUR PETITIONERS' EXECUTIVE REMEDY FROM TFIE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION TO A
PETITION FORE REVIEW (BEFORE THE DOJ), THE APPELLATE COURT AND THIS HONORABLE COURT WAS
EXHAUSTED AND NOTHING MORE.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In G.R. No. 178684, Limbona raises as the sole ground for her petition to cite in contempt of court Judge Balut and
Balindong, et al. that:
Petitioner respectfully submits the foregoing acts of Respondent in willfully disobeying the decision and resolutions issued
by the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. 159962 and G.R. 173290 (sic), which tend to impede upon or obstruct the
administration of justice, constitutes an indirect contempt which ought to be punished. 20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rulings of the Court
G.R. No. 177600
The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 177600 is denied for being bereft of merit.
Despite conceding that the Decision promulgated in G.R. No. 159962 had long become final and
executory,21 Balindong, et al. insist that they were not precluded from still seeking from the RTC as the trial court the
judicial determination of probable cause against them because all that the Court had upheld in G.R. No. 159962 was only
the executive determination of probable cause. They argue that the Court did not thereby prevent their resort to available
judicial remedies, like filing the proper motions for the judicial determination of probable cause in the trial
court,22 anchoring their argument on Section 14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19, Rule 119, both of the Rules of Court
The insistence of Balindong, et al. is legally unwarranted.
To recall, G.R. No. 159962 was an appeal by Balindong, et al. to review the judgment the CA had promulgated on May
22, 2003: (a) granting the petition for certiorari of Limbona; (b) setting aside DOJ Resolution issued on March 12, 2001 by
then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez favorably acting on the third motion for reconsideration of Balindong, et al.
relative to the proper offenses to be charged against them despite the denial with finality of their first and second motions
for reconsideration; and (c) reinstating the DOJ Resolutions dated August 4, 1999, December 1, 1999 and March 16,
2000 issued by the predecessors of Secretary Perez.23 It is noted that in his assailed Resolution of March 12, 2001,
Secretary of Justice Perez had dropped Amer Oden Balindong and Ali S. Balindong from the informations, and had
directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Lanao del Sur "to cause the filing of the amended information for double
homicide with multiple frustrated homicide against Mayor Anwar Berua Balindong, Lt. Col. Jalandoni Cota and PO1
Kennedy Balindong."24
In granting the petition for certiorari of Limbona, the CA declared that Secretary of Justice Perez had committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, firstly, by totally disregarding the clear provision of Section
13 of DOJ Circular No. 70 (governing appeals) prohibiting second or further motions for reconsideration; and, secondly, by
acting on and granting the third motion for reconsideration despite the grounds relied upon by Balindong, et al. being
previously raised in the first and second motions for reconsideration and being already fully passed upon by his
predecessors in office in the guise of serving the interest of justice and as an exception to Section 13 of DOJ Circular No.
70.
The Court disposed in G.R. No. 159962 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 May 2003 which annulled the
DOJ Resolution dated 12 March 2001 and reinstated its Resolutions issued on 04 August 1999, 01 December 1999 and
16 March 2000 is AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 February 2004 by this Court is hereby
LIFTED, and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219, is ORDERED to implement its Resolution dated 03
December 2003 relative to the issuance of warrants of arrest against all the accused. The said Court is directed to submit
a report thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of Justice for its information and appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The language and meaning of the Decision promulgated in G.R. No. 159962, that the proper criminal charges against
Balindong, et al. were two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and one
count of attempted murder, were clear and forthright enough to require elaboration. Accordingly, the Court, by thereby
ordering the RTC "to implement its Resolution dated 03 December 2003 relative to the issuance of warrants of arrest
against all the accused," did not need to dwell specifically on the judicial determination of probable cause independently of
the executive determination. We should remind that the trial judge, by issuing the warrants of arrest, already found the
existence of probable cause against Balindong, et al. Indeed, the act of issuing the warrant of arrest upon filing of the
information and supporting papers implied that the judge has determined the existence of probable cause for the offenses
charged. It is then superfluous for the accused to seek the judicial determination of probable cause on the pretext that the
trial court should still act and proceed independently of the executive determination of probable cause to charge the
proper offense. Rule 112 of the Rules of Court relevantly provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.
He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds
probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation when the complaint or information
was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information. (bold Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Moreover, Balindong, et al. could not reasonably support their position that they could still have the trial court determine
the existence of probable cause in their criminal cases independently of the executive determination of probable cause by
the DOJ by relying on Section 14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19, Rule 119, both of the Rules of Court.
Section 14 of Rule 110 states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused
from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and
with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all
parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with
section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses
to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (14a) (bold Emphasis supplied)
Ostensibly, Section 14, supra, applies only to a situation in which there has been a mistake on the part of public
prosecutor in charging the proper offense.
It becomes logical to ask: Did the public prosecutor make a mistake in charging the proper offenses against Balindong, et
al.?
The answer is no.
There was no mistake in charging the proper offenses. Balindong, et al. fully exhausted the procedure to determine the
proper offenses to be charged against them by going all the way up to the Secretary of Justice. Their quest was ultimately
settled with finality by the Secretary of Justice denying their second motion for reconsideration and declaring that such
offenses were two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted
murder. They thereafter attempted to undo such final determination by filing a third motion for reconsideration in the DOJ,
and they initially succeeded because Secretary Perez directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Lanao del Sur "to
cause the filing of the amended information for double homicide with multiple frustrated homicide against Mayor Anwar
Berua Balindong, Lt. Col. Jalandoni Cota and PO1 Kennedy Balindong," and dropped Amer Oden Balindong and Ali S.
Balindong from the informations. But their success was overturned by the CA, whose nullification of Secretary Perez's
favorable action on their third motion for reconsideration was affirmed in G.R. No. 159962. Thus, this Court even issued
its judicial imprimatur on the probable cause for two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated
murder, and one count of attempted murder. For Balindong, et al. to rely on Section 14, supra, as basis for the RTC to still
reach a determination of probable cause different from those sanctioned in G.R. No. 159962 would be untenable.
G.R. No. 178684
We next deal with the contempt charge of Limbona against Judge Balut who, by his order of July 16, 2007, deferred
action on the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Recall Suspend Order of Arrest of Balindong, et al., and suspended the
enforcement of the alias warrants of arrest.26
Limbona claims that Judge Balut's actions constituted a disobedience to the decisions of the Court in G.R. No. 159962
and G.R. No. 173290 because the suspension of the enforcement of the aliaswarrants of arrest "has a predilection to put
the dignity of the [Court] in disrepute, obstruct the administration of justice, or interfere with the disposition or (sic) the
court's business in the performance of its function in an orderly manner."27 She also points out that the "order to suspend
the enforcement of the said warrants has the same effect of a temporary restraining order," 28 which, in effect, "pre-empted
the [Court's] resolution of the prayer for the issuance of the temporary restraining order/injunction." 29
Let us also look at Judge Balut's order of July 16, 2007, in which he stated as follows:
Without necessarily addressing the merit of the motion, that is, whether or not the alias warrants of arrest issued against
the accused should be recalled or set aside, and to avert any conflicting determinations on the matter at hand, the Court
deems it but prudent to defer any action hereto considering that the accused's petition for review in G.R. No. 177600
assailing the Court of Appeals' judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 97121, which precipitated the issuance of the order of arrest
sought to be reconsidered/recalled by herein accused, is still pending before the Honorable Supreme Court for final
determination.
In the meantime, while awaiting resolution of the said petition for review in G.R. No. 177600, the enforcement of the alias
warrants of arrest, dated May 25, 2007, issued against the accused is hereby suspended. 30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Judge Balut has justified his actions by invoking judicial courtesy and asserting his judicial discretion on the matters in
question, to wit:
As a backgrounder, five (5) consolidated criminal cases were filed charging the accused Mayor Anwar Berua Balindong et
al. with murder with attempted murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder. Thereafter, a legal battle ensued
concerned mainly on what is the appropriate crime with which to charge the accused. After several years of legal
haggling, flip-flopping of charges and the inhibition of five (5) trial judges, these cases finally landed in the undersigned's
sala with a pending incident: the accused's MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR RECALL SUSPEND ORDER
OF ARREST. Conscientious of his duty to dispose of pending incidents with dispatch, the undersigned, fully aware that
any resolution of the said incident would spark controversy, which would necessarily entail another series of legal
maneuverings resulting in the further delay of the disposition of these cases, resolved to withhold action thereon and
deemed it best to observe judicial courtesy and await this Honorable Court's determination of the accused's petition for
review in G.R. No. 177600.
No less than the imperative of judicial courtesy impelled the undersigned Presiding Judge to issue the order dated July
16, 2007. A PETITION FOR REVIEW assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision reversing and setting aside the May 12,
2006 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 83), as well as the October 18, 2006 Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 77) is pending before this Honorable Court. It is to be recalled that in the May 12, 2006
Order, Judge Ralph S. Lee downgraded the offenses charged in the informations from Murder with Attempted Murder,
Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder, to Double Homicide with Attempted Homicide, Multiple Frustrated Homicide
and Attempted Homicide, respectively. In the October 18, 2006 Order, Judge Vivencio S. Baclig denied the prosecution's
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION thereof. In ordering the suspension of the enforcement of the alias warrants of arrest
dated May 25, 2007, the undersigned, not unmindful of the Decision dated December 16, 2004 in G.R. No. 159962, the
two Resolutions dated June 6, 2005 and December 12, 2005, and the Decision dated November 20, 2006 in G.R. No.
173290, merely exercised his judicial discretion. He most respectfully submits that the issuance of the Order downgrading
the offenses is a supervening fact which now divides the procedural antecedents of the case, i.e, "prior to the order dated
May 12, 2006" and "after said order". Prior to the order, this Honorable Court in ordering the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 219) to implement its Resolution dated December 3, 2003 relative to the issuance of warrants of
arrest against all the accused, resolved that there is no longer any obstacle to the implementation of the existing warrants
of arrest, and ordered Judge Marie Christine A. Jacob (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 100) to enforce the warrants of arrest against the petitioners on December 3, 2004 with utmost dispatch. In this
stage, there could certainly be no question or issue as to the enforcement of the warrants of arrest. The Court indeed
spoke with finality. However, "after the Order, " where the undersigned is, another issue evolved, which issue is still
pending final determination by the Honorable Court. The foundation for this Honorable Court's issuances, "before the
order" could not be said to be the same judicial foundation now, "after the order," as to hold the undersigned for contempt
in suspending the enforcement of the warrants of arrest. The legal milieu has changed. x x x31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is clear that Judge Balut did not thereby disobey the decisions of the Court in G.R. No. 159962 and G.R. No. 173290.
To start with, there was no indication in his Order that bad faith had moved him to suspend the implementation of the
warrants of arrest against Balindong, et al., or that he had thereby acted with a willful and deliberate intent to disobey or to
ignore the Court's bidding, or to cause injustice to any of the parties. In the absence of the clear showing of bad faith on
his part, his being prudent could only be an error of judgment, for which he could not be held to account. Secondly, the
history of the criminal cases, from the transfer of venue at the behest of Secretary Tuquero from Cagayan de Oro to
Quezon City; to the successive inhibitions of several RTC Judges; to the succession of petitions for certiorari bearing on
the handling of the criminal cases brought to the higher courts, including this Court,32 must have probably persuaded
Judge Balut to tread the path of prudence and caution. Indeed, he expressed in his Order of July 16, 2007 the desire "to
avert any conflicting determinations" pending the promulgation of the Court's Decision in G.R. No. 177600. And, thirdly,
his actuations were entirely different from those of Judge Lee's, who downgraded the offenses from two counts of murder
with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder to double homicide with
multiple frustrated homicide, and ordered the issuance of the warrants of arrest for such downgraded offenses. Judge Lee
thereby directly contradicted the ruling in G.R. No. 159962.
Contempt of court is defined in jurisprudence in this manner:
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of
justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses
during litigation.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The contempt power of the courts has been discussed in Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.,34 to wit:
Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power lodged
in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the
proceedings therein, and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious
refusal to comply with court orders. Indeed, the power of contempt is power assumed by a court or judge to coerce
cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect or interference with the courts orderly process by exacting summary
punishment. The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and necessity, in as much as
respect for the courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary to the good order of society, is as
necessary as respect for the laws themselves.35ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
36
Verily, the power of the courts to punish for contempt is to be exercised cautiously, sparingly, and judiciously. Self-
restraint in wielding contempt powers should be the rule unless the act complained of is clearly contumacious. An act, to
be contumacious, must manifest willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice. 37
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 177600;DISMISSES the petition for
contempt in G.R. No. 178684; AFFIRMS theDecision promulgated on April 24, 2007 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97121; and ORDERS the petitioners in G.R. No. 177600 to pay the costs of suit.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, in Quezon City is DIRECTED to forthwith resume the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. Q-01-99892, Criminal Case No. Q-01-99893, Criminal Case No. Q-01-100542, Criminal Case No. Q-01-100543 and
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100594; and to report its compliance with this decision within 30 days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015
MARILOU S. LAUDE AND MESEHILDA S. LAUDE, Petitioners, v. HON. ROLINE M. GINEZ-JABALDE, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 74, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF THE CITY OF OLONGAPO; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS; HON. GEN. GREGORIO PIO P. CATAPANG, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES; HON. EMILIE FE DELOS SANTOS, CHIEF CITY PROSECUTOR OF OLONGAPO CITY; AND L/CPL
JOSEPH SCOTT PEMBERTON, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Failure to meet the three-day notice rule for filing motions and to obtain the concurrence of the Public Prosecutor to move
for an interlocutory relief in a criminal prosecution cannot be excused by general exhortations of human rights. This
Petition fails to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge. Furthermore, the accused, while
undergoing trial and before conviction, is already detained in the Philippines in compliance with the obligations contained
in the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Regarding the Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the Philippines (Visiting Forces Agreement).
This is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction filed by
Marilou S. Laude and Mesehilda S. Laude (petitioners).
On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude (Jennifer) was killed at the Celzone Lodge on Ramon Magsaysay Drive in
Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton).2 On October 15, 2014, a
Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer's sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before the Olongapo City Office
of the City Prosecutor.3 On October 22, 2014, Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo, the general headquarters of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines.4
On December 15, 2014, the Public Prosecutor filed an Information for murder against Pemberton before the Regional
Trial Court in Olongapo City.5 The case was docketed as Case No. 865-14, and was raffled to Branch 74.6 A warrant of
arrest against Pemberton was issued on December 16, 2014. 7Pemberton surrendered personally to Judge Roline M.
Ginez-Jabalde8 (Judge Ginez-Jabalde) on December 19, 2014, and he was then arraigned.9

On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender
Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage. 10 "The [M]otion was [scheduled] for
hearing on December 22, 2014, at 2 p.m."11According to petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on
Pemberton's counsel through registered mail.12 In any case, they claim to have also "furnished a copy of the [M]otion
personally ... at the hearing of the [M]otion."13
On December 23, 2014, Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied petitioners' Urgent Motion for lack of merit, the dispositive portion of
which reads:14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Wherefore, the . . . UrgentMotion [sic] to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to
the Olongapo City Jail [is] denied for utter lack of merit.15 (Emphasis in the original)
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Petitioners received a copy of the Order on January 5, 2015.16 On January 9, 2015, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.17 On February 18, 2015, Judge Ginez-Jabalde issued an Order denying petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.
In a Resolution19 dated April 21, 2015, respondents were required to file their Comment on the Petition. On June 5, 2015,
public respondents, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their (First) Motion for Extension of Time to
File Comment20 for 60 days. On the same day, Pemberton posted his Motion for Additional Time to File Comment 21 for 10
days. Pemberton filed his Comment by counsel on June 16, 2015,22 while public respondents, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed their Comment on September 23, 2015.23
Petitioners argue that "[Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to an excess or absence of
jurisdiction when she dismissed the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody
o[f] Accused to the Olongapo City Jail [based] on mere technicalities[.]" 24 In particular, they argue that the three-day rule
on motions under Rule 15, Section 425 of the 1997 Rules of Court is not absolute, and should be liberally interpreted when
a case is attended by exigent circumstances.26
Petitioners advance that the rationale behind the three-day notice rule is satisfied when there is an opportunity to be
heard, which was present in this case since Pemberton's counsel and the Public Prosecutor were present in the hearing
of the two Motions filed by petitioners.27 Petitioners allege that the court noted their attendance, and were able to make
comments during the December 22, 2014 Motion hearing.28 They assert that the rights of Pemberton were not
compromised in any way.29
Petitioners also aver that the three-day notice rule should be liberally applied due to the timing of the arrest and
arraignment.30 "The Urgent Motion was set for hearing on December 22, 2014[.]"31 This date preceded a series of legal
holidays beginning on December 24, 2014, where all the courts and government offices suspended their
work.32 Petitioners point out that a "murder trial is under a distinctly special circumstance in that Paragraph 6, Article V of
the Visiting Forces Agreement. . . provides for [a] one-year trial period[,] after which the United States shall be relieved of
any obligations under said paragraph[.]"33 Petitioners had to file and set the Motion hearing at the earliest possible date. 34
Petitioners further argue that Judge Ginez-Jabalde should not have dismissed the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail "considering that the Urgent Motion
raised issues that are of transcendental importance and of primordial public interest." 35 Petitioners aver that under
international human rights law, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, they have the right to access to
justice,36 which is "distinct from the power of the Public Prosecutors to prosecute [the] criminal case."37
Furthermore, petitioners advance that Philippine authorities ought to "have primary jurisdiction over [Respondent
Pemberton's person while [he] is being tried [in] a Philippine Court[,]"38 in accordance with Article V, paragraph (3)(b) of
the Visiting Forces Agreement,39 which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses committed by
United States personnel. . .
(Emphasis and underscoring in the original)40
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Petitioners argue that the custody of Pemberton must be ordered transferred to the Olongapo City Jail, considering that
the crime involved is murder, which is non-bailable.41 They aver that it is unconstitutional to refuse to put him "in the
custody of Philippine jail authorities[,]" as such refusal "undermines the Constitutional Powers of [the Court] to hear a
jurisdictional matter brought before it"42 and to promulgate rules for the practice of law.43 Petitioners argue that even
though the Visiting Forces Agreement gives the United States the "sole discretion" to decide whether to surrender custody
of an accused American military personnel to the Philippine authorities, "the rule is that . . . the Court [still] has control
over any proceeding involving a jurisdictional matter brought before it, even if it may well involve the country's relations
with another foreign power."44
As for the nonconformity of the Public Prosecutor, petitioners argue that the Public Prosecutor's refusal to sign the Urgent
Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail
rendered the requirement for conformity superfluous.45Petitioners allege that the Public Prosecutor's act is contrary to
Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima's (Secretary De Lima) position on the matter. 46 They quote Secretary
De Lima as having said the following statement in a news article dated December 17, 2014:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Philippines will now insist on the custody (of Pemberton) now that the (case) is filed in court and especially since the
warrant of arrest has been issued," De Lima told reporters in an ambush interview.47cralawlawlibrary
Petitioners also quoted Secretary De Lima as having stated in another news article dated December 18, 2014 the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Justice Secretary Leila De Lima stressed that Pemberton should be under the custody of Philippine authorities, following
the filing of charges.
"There is also a provision in the Visiting Forces Agreement that, in cases of extraordinary circumstances, the Philippine
government can insist on the custody and for me, there are enough such circumstances, such as cruelty and treachery,
that justified the filing of the murder and not homicide," De Lima said.48cralawlawlibrary
The contrary manifestations made by Secretary De Lima, according to petitioners, meant that "[t]he conformity of the
Public Prosecutor . . . is a mere superfluity"49 and was meant "to deny [petitioners' 'quest for justice[.]'"50
Due to the nature of the case, petitioners pray in this Petition that procedural requirements be set aside.51
In his Comment dated June 16, 2015, Pemberton argues that Judge Ginez-Jabalde did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused
to the Olongapo City Jail since petitioners violated the three-day notice rule and failed to secure the conformity of the
Public Prosecutor assigned to the case.52 He claims that he "was not given an opportunity to be heard"53 on petitioners'
Motion.
In his counterstatement of facts, Pemberton avers that he voluntarily surrendered to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74,
on December 19, 2014.54 On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of the Accused to the Olongapo City Jail, and setting the Motion hearing for December
22, 2015, but did not obtain the Public Prosecutor's conformity. 55 Marilou S. Laude also failed to personally serve a copy
of the Urgent Motion on Pemberton at least three days prior to the hearing thereof.56
Pemberton further avers that on December 22, 2014, Judge Ginez-Jabalde heard the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of the Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Suspend the
Proceedings.57 Counsel for Pemberton was in court to attend the hearing for the Motion to Suspend the Proceedings, but
did not have knowledge of the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of the
Accused to the Olongapo City Jail filed by Marilou S. Laude.58 Counsel for Pemberton received a copy of the Urgent
Motion only "a few minutes"59 before it was to be heard.60
On December 23, 2014, Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied Marilou S. Laude's Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to Surrender Custody of the Accused to the Olongapo City Jail for being devoid of merit.61 Marilou S.
Laude filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 9, 2015,62without conformity of the Public Prosecutor.63 On January
20, 2015, Pemberton filed his Ad CautelamOpposition [To Private Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration], arguing that
Judge Ginez-Jabalde correctly denied Marilou S. Laude's Urgent Motion due to the latter's "failure to comply with settled
procedure regarding hearing of motions[.]"64 Pemberton further argues that the custody over him "rightfully remain[ed] with
the [United States] authorities. . . ." He cites Section 6 of the Visiting Forces Agreement, which provides that the "custody
of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United
States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense, until completion of all judicial
proceedings."65
Pemberton further argues in his Comment that the presence of his counsel during the Urgent Motion to Compel the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of the Accused to the Olongapo City Jail hearing did "not equate to
an opportunity to be heard as to satisfy the purpose of the three-day notice rule."66 Citing Preysler, Jr. v. Manila
Southcoast Development Corporation,67 Cabrera v. Ng,68 and Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food
Authority,69 Pemberton avers that an opposing party is given opportunity to be heard when he is "afforded sufficient time
to study the motion and to meaningfully oppose and controvert the same." 70 Even though his counsel was able to orally
comment on the Urgent Motion,71 Pemberton was deprived of any meaningful opportunity to study and oppose it,72 having
been furnished a copy a few minutes before the hearing.73 Marilou S. Laude also failed to provide "justifiable reason for . .
. failure to comply with the three-day notice that would warrant a liberal construction of the rules."74
Pemberton likewise argues that Marilou S. Laude, being only the private complainant, lacks the legal personality to file the
Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail
and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration "without the conformity of the Public Prosecutor." 75 Quoting Rule 110,
Section 576 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Pemberton states that the Public Prosecutor's lack of consent
"rendered the Urgent Motion a mere scrap of paper."77 He adds that the defect is "not a mere technicality[.]"78
Pemberton also argues that Marilou S. Laude cannot rely on the alleged statements of Secretary De Lima for the following
reasons:79 First, Secretary De Lima did not direct the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor to give its approval to
the Urgent Motion and Motion for Reconsideration;80second, Secretary De Lima did not state that the Public Prosecutor
should insist on turning over the custody of Pemberton to the Philippine authorities.81 Neither was there any such order
from Secretary De Lima.82 Petitioners' claims are, therefore, without legal basis. 83
According to Pemberton, petitioners' use of the '"right to access to justice' under international law did not excuse
[petitioner Marilou [S. Laude] from securing the authority and conformity of the Public Prosecutor[.]" 84 He argues that both
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power "refer to national or domestic legislation in affording [victims] access to
justice."85 The Rules of Court and jurisprudence have established procedures for criminal proceedings, and these require
Marilou S. Laude "to obtain authority and consent from the Public Prosecutor" 86 before filing a Motion in the ongoing
criminal proceeding.87
As for the issue of custody under the Visiting Forces Agreement, Pemberton argues that there is a difference between
"jurisdiction" and "custody."88 He avers that jurisdiction is "the power and authority of a court to try, hear[,] and decide a
case."89 Pemberton does not dispute that "Philippine authorities have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over
offenses committed by [a] United States personnel[,] [which is] why the case is being tried [in] a Philippine
court."90 However, custody "pertains to [the] actual physical control over the person of the accused[,]" 91 and under the
Visiting Forces Agreement, Pemberton argues that custody shall reside with the United States Military authorities, since
the Visiting Forces Agreement expressly provides that "[t]he custody of any United States personnel . . . shall immediately
reside with [the] United States military authorities . . . from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings."92
Public respondents advance that Judge Ginez-Jabalde did not commit grave abuse of discretion when she denied the
Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City
Jail.93 Public respondents, through their Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that "[petitioners are
not real parties in interest[.]"94 They claim that "the real party in interest is the People [of the Philippines], represented by
the public prosecutor in the lower court and by the Office of the Solicitor General ... in the Court of Appeals and in the
Supreme Court."95 While public respondents recognize that petitioners may intervene as private offended parties, "the
active conduct of. . . trial [in a criminal case] is properly the duty of the public prosecutor."96 The nonconformity of the
Public Prosecutor in petitioners' Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of
Accused to the Olongapo City Jail is fatal in light of its nature pertaining to the place of Pemberton's confinement.97 The
issue of confinement of an accused pertains to the criminal aspect of the case and "involves the right to prosecute[,] which
[is lodged] exclusively to the People[.]"98
Referring to Rule 110, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, public respondents aver that the requirement for motions to be
"filed in the name of and under the authority of the public prosecutor"99 is not a mere technical requirement, but is part of
"the essential, inherent, and exclusive power of the State to prosecute criminals[.]"100 Public respondents counter
petitioners' claim that the Public Prosecutor's approval is superfluous given the alleged position of Secretary De Lima in
the newspaper articles. Citing Feria v. Court of Appeals, public respondents argue that newspaper articles are "hearsay
evidence, twice removed"101 and are "inadmissible" for having no probative value, "whether objected to or not." 102
As for the three-day notice rule under the Rules of Court, public respondents argue that petitioners' failure to comply
cannot be excused in light of the rule's purpose, that is, for the Motion's adverse party not to be surprised, granting one
sufficient time to study the Motion and be able to meet the arguments contained in it. 103
Public respondents argue that while the Visiting Forces Agreement "grants primary jurisdiction to Philippine
authorities"104 in this case, Pemberton's handover specifically to the Olongapo City Jail is unnecessary.105 The Visiting
Forces Agreement does not specify the place of an accused American personnel's confinement. The issue of custody is
thus "best left to the discretion of the trial court."106According to public respondents, for so long as the present
arrangement neither renders it difficult for Pemberton to appear in court when he is required nor impairs Judge Ginez-
Jabalde's authority to try the case, the trial court may validly decide for Pemberton to remain where he currently is. 107
Lastly, public respondents maintain that petitioners are not entitled to a mandatory injunction since they have no "clear
and unmistakable right to the transfer of [respondent Pemberton] from Camp Aguinaldo to the Olongapo City Jail." 108 They
underscore that "petitioners are private offended parties[,] not the real party in interest in [this] criminal case[.]"109
We dismiss the Petition.
I
The failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is unjustified.
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be given notice of
hearing on the motion at least three days prior.
Failure to comply with this notice requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party's
right to procedural due process.110 In Jehan Shipping Corporation:111chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As an integral component of procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the
benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the
adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court.
Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be
heard.112 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)cralawlawlibrary
While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an
exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause
prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights. 113 The adverse party must be given time to study the
motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant. 114 In this case, the
general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners' Motion, thereby depriving
him of his right to procedural due process.
Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail only during the hearing. 115 They attempt to
elude the consequences of this belated notice by arguing that they also served a copy of the Motion by registered mail on
Pemberton's counsel.116 They also attempt to underscore the urgency of the Motion by making a reference to the
Christmas season and the "series of legal holidays"117 where courts would be closed.118 To compound their obfuscation,
petitioners claim that the hearing held on December 22, 2014, attended by Pemberton's counsel sufficiently satisfied the
rationale of the three-day notice rule.

These circumstances taken together do not cure the Motion's deficiencies. Even granting that Pemberton's counsel was
able to comment on the motion orally during the hearing, which incidentally was set for another incident, 119 it cannot be
said that Pemberton was able to study and prepare for his counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion. Judge
Ginez-Jabalde was correct to deny the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender
Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to
prejudice Pemberton's rights as an accused.
II
Petitioners also argue that the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of
Accused to the Olongapo City Jail is an assertion of their right to access to justice as recognized by international law and
the 1987 Constitution. They justify the separate filing of the Motion as a right granted by Article 2, paragraph (3) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,120 independent of "the power of the Public Prosecutors to prosecute
[a] criminal case."121
Article 2, paragraph (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State,
and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.122ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
There is no need to discuss whether this provision has attained customary status, since under treaty law, the Philippines,
as a State Party,123 is obligated to comply with its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.124 However, petitioners went too far in their interpretation, ignoring completely the nature of the obligation
contemplated by the provision in an attempt to justify their failure to comply with a domestic procedural rule aimed to
protect a human right in a proceeding, albeit that of the adverse party.
On March 29, 2004, the United Nations Human Rights Committee issued General Comment No. 31, 125which pertained to
the nature of the general legal obligations imposed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on State
Parties. On Article 2, paragraph (3), the General Comment states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights[,] States Parties
must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights. Such remedies
should be appropriately adapted so as to take account of the special vulnerability of certain categories of person, including
in particular children. The Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate judicial and
administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law. The Committee notes
that the enjoyment of the rights recognized under the Covenant can be effectively assured by the judiciary in many
different ways, including direct applicability of the Covenant, application of comparable constitutional or other provisions of
law, or the interpretive effect of the Covenant in the application of national law. Administrative mechanisms are particularly
required to give effect to the general obligation to investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively
through independent and impartial bodies. National human rights institutions, endowed with appropriate powers, can
contribute to this end. A failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise to a
separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is an essential element of the right to an effective
remedy.
16. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that States Parties make reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have
been violated. Without reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated, the obligation to provide an
effective remedy, which is central to the efficacy of article 2, paragraph 3, is not discharged. In addition to the explicit
reparation required by articles 9, paragraph 5, and 14, paragraph 6, the Committee considers that the Covenant generally
entails appropriate compensation. The Committee notes that, where appropriate, reparation can involve restitution,
rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and
changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights
violations.126 (Emphasis supplied)
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The obligation contemplated by Article 2, paragraph (3) is for the State Party to establish a system of accessible and
effective remedies through judicial and administrative mechanisms. The present trial of Pemberton, to which petitioner,
Marilou S. Laude, is included as a private complainant, indicates that there is a legal system of redress for violated rights.
That petitioners chose to act on their own, in total disregard of the mechanism for criminal proceedings established by this
court, should not be tolerated under the guise of a claim to justice. This is especially in light of petitioners' decision to
furnish the accused in the case a copy of her Motion only during the hearing. Upholding human rights pertaining to access
to justice cannot be eschewed to rectify an important procedural deficiency that was not difficult to comply with. Human
rights are not a monopoly of petitioners. The accused also enjoys the protection of these rights.
III
The conformity of the Public Prosecutor to the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender
Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail is not a mere "superfluity." 127In Jimenez v. Sorongon,128 this court held that
in criminal cases, the People is the real party in interest, which means allowing a private complainant to pursue a criminal
action on his own is a rare exception:129chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Procedural law basically mandates that "[ajll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases before the CA
and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People. . . .
....
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal
proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and
continues to be the controlling doctrine.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his
own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the
present case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised
by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not
appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the
criminal action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as
represented by the OSG.130(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)cralawlawlibrary
In this case, petitioners have not shown why the Motion may be allowed to fall under the exception. The alleged grave
abuse of discretion of the Public Prosecutor was neither clearly pleaded nor argued. The duty and authority to prosecute
the criminal aspects of this case, including the custody issue, are duly lodged in the Public Prosecutor. Her refusal to give
her conforme to the Motion is an act well within the bounds of her position. That petitioners used as bases newspaper
articles for claiming that the Public Prosecutor acted contrary to the position of Secretary De Lima cannot be given weight.
Public respondents are correct in asserting that the proper remedy would have been for petitioners to have the act
reversed by Secretary De Lima through proper legal venues.
IV
Finally, petitioners argue that the Visiting Forces Agreement should be declared "unconstitutional insofar as it impairs the .
. . power of the Supreme Court[.]"131 They advance this argument in the context of their Motion to place Pemberton under
the custody of Philippine authorities while the case is being tried,132 with their prayer in this Petition phrased
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(b) Declare the VFA unconstitutional insofar as it impairs the constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules for practice before it, including the Rules of Criminal Procedure[.]133cralawlawlibrary
The constitutionality of an official act may be the subject of judicial review, provided the matter is not raised collaterally.
In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:134chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Judicial review of official acts on the ground of unconstitutionality may be sought or availed of through any of the actions
cognizable by courts of justice, not necessarily in a suit for declaratory relief. . . The constitutional issue, however, (a)
must be properly raised and presented in the case, and (b) its resolution is necessary to a determination of the
case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.135 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)cralawlawlibrary
The constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement is not the lis mota of this Petition. Petitioners started their Petition
with a claim that their right to access to justice was violated, but ended it with a prayer for a declaration of the Visiting
Forces Agreement's unconstitutionality. They attempt to create the connection between the two by asserting that the
Visiting Forces Agreement prevents the transfer of Pemberton to Olongapo City Jail, which allegedly is tantamount to the
impairment of this court's authority.
First, this Petition is not the proper venue to rule on the issue of whether the Visiting Forces Agreement transgresses the
judicial authority of this court to promulgate rules pertaining to criminal cases. Second, the issues of criminal jurisdiction
and custody during trial as contained in the Visiting Forces Agreement were discussed in Nicolas v. Secretary Romulo, et
al:136chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its
terms and provisions.
The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the
following rules apply:
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
xxx xxx xxx
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately
reside with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all
judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and
without delay, make such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings
relating to the offense with which the person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall
present its position to the United States Government regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take
into full account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States shall be
relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one year period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also,
the one year period will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States
authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another provision of the Constitution, namely, that providing for the
exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). They argue
that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that
accused, which also violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution (Art. Ill, Sec. 1. [sic]).
Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a
member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused.
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one's territory is immune from local jurisdiction,
except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary
in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the
principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent
agreed upon by the parties.
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is
curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including
rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply except to the extent agreed upon to subjects of
another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed
forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects
of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State,
diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another State's
territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to
detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs
is the following provision of the VFA:
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities
agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the
Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention
after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific
arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of
both parties, but also that the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities."137 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
cralawlawlibrary
In any case, Pemberton is confined, while undergoing trial, in Camp Aguinaldo, which by petitioners' own description is
the "General Head Quarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines[.] "138Their claim that the detention facility is under the
"control, supervisionfj and jurisdiction of American military authorities"139is not substantiated.
Petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction to compel public respondents to turn over the custody
of Pemberton "from American military authorities to the OLONGAPO CITY JAIL"140 is likewise denied for lack of merit.
In Semirara Coal Corporation v. HGL Development Corporation:141chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is likewise established that a writ of mandatory injunction is granted upon a showing that (a) the invasion of the
right is material and substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent
and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.142 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)cralawlawlibrary
Nowhere in their Petition did petitioners discuss the basis for their claim that they are entitled to the sought writ, let alone
mention it in their arguments. This court cannot consider the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction or a temporary
restraining order without any legal and factual basis.
Besides, considering the extent of the scope of this court's power to issue a temporary restraining order, prayers for the
issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction is usually unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of grave abuse of discretion
resulting in lack or excess of jurisdiction. The prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction is
likewise DENIED for lack of merit.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015
 PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO, MARILOU B. VALDEZ,
EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by accused petitioner Paz T. Bernardo (Bernardo) under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) August 31, 2007 decision1 and the March 14, 2008 resolution2 in
CA-G.R. CR 28721, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Paz T. Bernardo." The appellate court affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, Makati City, finding Bernardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five (5) counts
of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22).
The Factual Antecedents
In June 1991, Bernardo obtained a loan from the private complainant Carmencita C. Bumanglag (Bumanglag) in the
amount of P460,000.00 payable on or before its maturity on November 30, 1991. That loan was evidenced by a
promissory note3 Bernardo and her husband had executed, whereby the couple solidarity bound themselves to pay the
loan with corresponding interest at 12% per annum payable upon default. 4 As additional security, Bernardo gave
Bumanglag the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-1034) 151841.
Prior to the loan's maturity, Bernardo took back the title from Bumanglag to use as a collateral in another transaction. In
place of the title, Bernardo issued to Bumanglag the following five (5) Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC)
checks,5 posted on different dates in June 1992, covering the loan's aggregate amount:cralawlawlibrary
Check No. Amount Date
FEBTC No. 391033 Php 100,000.00 June 1, 1992
FEBTC No. 391034 Php 100,000.00 June 8, 1992
FEBTC No. 391035 Php 100,000.00 June 15, 1992
FEBTC No. 391036 Php 100,000.00 June 22, 1992
FEBTC No. 391037 Php 60,000.00 June 29, 1992
In September 1992, Bumanglag deposited these checks to Bernardo's account but they were dishonored; the reason
given was "Account Closed." Bumanglag thus sent Bernardo a notice informing her of the dishonor of the checks. The
demand went unheeded, prompting Bumanglag to initiate a criminal complaint against Bernardo with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati for five (5) counts of violation of B.P. 22.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City found probable cause to indict
Bernardo for the offenses charged. Bernardo entered a not guilty plea on arraignment.
The prosecution rested its case on September 21, 1994. Bernardo took the witness stand only on May 9, 1996, to present
her defense evidence.
In her testimony, Bernardo argued that she could not be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 because the questioned checks
were presented beyond the 90-day period provided under the law. She also denied having received any notice of
dishonor, which she insisted was essential to prove the material element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
In any case, she maintained that the checks were never meant to be presented as she had always paid her loans in cash,
which she claimed to have done in the aggregate amount of P717,000.00. According to Bernardo, although Bumanglag
returned to her the title to the property after payment, Bumanglag never bothered to issue her receipts. Bumanglag did not
return the checks either.
Following Bernardo's cross-examination, the RTC reset the hearing for redirect examination to September 4, 1996. 6 That
hearing, however, was again reset to April 3, 1997, in view of the absence of Bernardo's counsel. When Bernardo and her
counsel again failed to appear during the April 3, 1997 hearing, and in view of the numerous previous postponements the
defense had asked for, the RTC considered her right to present additional evidence waived.
Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied her motion. The RTC, however, gave her ten (10) days within
which to submit her formal offer of evidence, which she failed to do. As a result, the RTC declared that Bernardo had
waived her right to submit her formal offer of evidence.
RTC Ruling
On May 28, 2003, the RTC issued its ruling finding Bernardo guilty of five counts of violation of B.P. 22.7 The RTC held
that Bernardo failed to substantiate her claim of payment. The RTC further ruled that it is not the nonpayment of the
obligation but the issuance of a worthless check that B.P. 22 punishes.
The RTC sentenced Bernardo to one (1) year imprisonment for each count of the offense charged and ordered her to
indemnify Bumanglag the amount of P460,000.00, plus 12% interest and 5% penalty charges, from December 1, 1991,
until full payment.8
CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed Bernardo's conviction but deleted the penalty of imprisonment and in lieu thereof, imposed a
P460,000.00 fine.9 The CA also retained the civil indemnity of P460,000.00 that the lower court imposed, plus 12%
interest from the time of the institution of the criminal charges until full payment. 10
In denying Bernardo's appeal, the CA noted that Bernardo failed to adduce sufficient evidence of payment. The CA further
held that the 90-day period within which to present a check under B.P. 22 is not an element of the crime.
The CA also did not recognize any merit in Bernardo's claim that she had been denied due process, in view of the RTC's
order waiving her right to present additional evidence.11 To the CA, Bernardo had sufficient opportunity to present her
defense but did not avail of these opportunities. Instead, she and her counsel moved for postponement at least nine (9)
times, not to mention their subsequent failure to appear four (4) times despite due notice of the scheduled hearings.
These developments led the RTC to consider Bernardo's right to present additional evidence waived. 12
Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the CA denied her motion;13 hence, the present petition.14
The Petition and Comment
Bernardo insists in her present petition15 that the CA erred in finding that she had been accorded due process; she was
denied the full opportunity to present her defense and was thus deprived of the chance to prove her innocence of the
crime charged.
She likewise avers that the CA erred in affirming her criminal and civil liabilities because the prosecution failed to prove
her knowledge of insufficiency of funds. According to Bernardo, there was no violation of B.P. 22 because the checks
were presented beyond the mandatory 90-day period. Moreover, Bernardo claimed that these subject checks were issued
without consideration as she had already paid the loan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits in its Comment that Bernardo was given the opportunity to present her
defense evidence.16 Citing Wong v. CA,17 the OSG further points out that the 90-day period provided in the law is not an
element of the offense;18 it is simply one of the conditions to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of
funds.19
The OSG also claims that Bumanglag failed to substantiate her claim that she had settled the obligation. 20 In any event,
the OSG asserted B.P. 22 penalizes the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the nonpayment of the
obligation.21
Subsequent Developments
On March 14, 2011, Bernardo's counsel informed the Court of the petitioner's death on February 3, 2011, and provided,
as well, the names of her heirs (her widower, Mapalad Bernardo, and children: Emilie B. Ko, Marilou B. Valdez, Edwin T.
Bernardo, and Gervy B. Santos), and their address (26 Magdiwang St., Real Village 2, Tandang Sora, Quezon City). In
due course, in our March 7, 2012 Resolution,22 we required Bernardo's heirs to appear as substitutes for the deceased
Bernardo in the present petition for purposes of Bernardo's civil liability.
Bernardo's heirs moved to reconsider our March 7, 2012 resolution. They argued that Bernardo's death extinguished her
civil liability. In the alternative, they contended that any civil liability should be settled in a separate civil case.
We denied the heirs' motion in our June 27, 2012 resolution. We explained that Bernardo's civil liability survived her death
as it is based on contract. Moreover, we observed that it would be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming to dismiss the
present case and require the Bumanglags to file a separate civil action.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit. Preliminary Matters
Classes of Civil Liabilities
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to several distinct civil liabilities on the part of the
offender.23 If the conduct constitutes a felony, the accused may be held civilly liable under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code (ex delicto).24 This particular civil liability due the offended party is rooted on facts that constitute a
crime.25 Otherwise stated, civil liability arises from the offense charged.26 It is not required that the accused be
convicted to be entitled to civil liability based on delict. As long as the facts constituting the offense charged are
established by preponderance of evidence, civil liability may be awarded. 27 Moreover, the civil liability based ondelict is
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.28
The same act or omission, however, may also give rise to independent civil liabilities based on other sources of
obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission: (a) law (b) contracts; (c) quasi-contracts, and (d) quasi-delicts. Among these
are the civil liabilities for intentional torts under Articles 3229 and 3430 of the Civil Code and for quasi-delicts under Article
2176 of Civil Code.31 For conduct constituting defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, the Civil Code likewise grants the
offended party the right to institute a civil action independently of the criminal action under Article-33 of the Civil Code.
Thus, it is entirely possible for one to be free from civil ability directly arising from a violation of the penal law and to still be
liable civilly based on contract or by laws other than the criminal law. 32 Such civil actions may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the criminal action,33 subject however, to the caveat that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission. 34
Bernardo's civil liability may be enforced in the present case despite her death.
As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal extinguishes her criminal liability and the corresponding civil
liability based solely on the offense (delict). The death amounts to an acquittal of the accused based on the
constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in her favor, which can be overcome only by a finding of guilt -
something that death prevents the court from making.35 In a sense, death absolves the accused from any earthly
responsibility arising from the offense a divine act that no human court can reverse, qualify, much less
disregard.36 The intervention of death of the accused in any case is an injunction by fate itself so that no criminal liability
and the corresponding civil liability arising from the offense should be imposed on him.37
The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death and an action for recovery therefore may begenerally pursued but
only by filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended.38 This separate civil action may be enforced against the estate of the accused. 39
In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil actions. Instead of instituting two
separate cases, only a single suit is filed and tried.40 This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets, which had been
packed with B.P. 22 because creditors used the courts as collectors. As we observed in Hyatt v. Asia Dynamic Electrix
Corp.:41cralawlawlibrary
Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a
criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof.
The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the
courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of
instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be
stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action.chanrobleslaw
As a necessary consequence of this special rule, the civil liabilities arising from the issuance of a worthless check are
deemed instituted in a case for violation of B.P. 22; the death of Bernardo did not automatically extinguish the action. The
independent civil liability based on contract, which was deemed instituted in the criminal action for B.P. 22, may still be
enforced against her estate in the present case. We thus rule on the present action to determine Bumanglag's civil liability.
Substantive Aspect
Bernardo was not denied due process.
We meticulously went over the entire record, and confirmed that Bernardo had not at all been deprived of her day in court.
She was afforded ample opportunity to present evidence in her defense but she did not give this case the serious
attention it deserved. For good reason - i.e., the repeated absences of Bernardo and her counsel - the trial court
eventually considered her right to present defense evidence waived.
To be sure, the postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation of evidence is a matter that lies with the
discretion of the trial court; but it is a discretion that must be exercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances of
each case and with a view to doing substantial justice.42 In the present case, the records show that the RTC took all the
steps necessary to safeguard Bernardo's rights and to accord her the opportunity to present whatever evidence she had
in her defense.
In particular, the prosecution formally rested its case on September 21, 1994. Bernardo, through counsel, thereupon
moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence prompting the RTC to reset the hearing for initial presentation of defense
evidence to December 15 and 20, 1994.43 Bernardo filed her demurrer to evidence on November 10, 1994,44 after
previously requesting the RTC for a 10-day extension.
The pendency of the demurrer to evidence prompted several resettings until the RTC finally denied it on March 30,
1995.45 The RTC then set the initial presentation of defense evidence on April 11, 18, and 25, 1995,46 but these were
reset to May 9, 18, and 25, 1995,47 at the motion of Bernardo's counsel who expressed his desire to seek relief from the
CA for the denial of the demurrer.
Despite the RTC's accommodation, Bernardo's counsel failed to appear during the May 9, 1995 hearing as he was
busy attending to the canvassing of votes in Quezon City.48 Eventually, the initial presentation of defense evidence
was reset to July 20, 1995, and August 3, 1995.49
Notably, during the July 20, 1995 hearing, Bernardo's counsel again moved for another resetting as he was not prepared
to conduct a direct examination.50 Despite this flimsy ground, the RTC granted the request and allowed Bernardo to
testify on August 3, 1995.
Bernardo and her counsel, however, failed to appear during the August 3, 1995 hearing despite due notice, prompting
the RTC to waive their right to present defense evidence.51 Bernardo moved for reconsideration and the RTC granted her
motion in the interest of substantial justice.52 Thus, the hearing for the presentation of defense evidence was reset to
November 28, 1995.53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear during the November 28, 1995 hearing, despite due
notice, prompting the RTC again to consider that Bernardo had waived her right to present defense
evidence.54chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bernardo again moved for reconsideration on the ground that it was the first time she and her counsel were
absent at the same time.55 Despite this hollow excuse, the RTC granted the motion in the spirit of compassionate
justice and gave Bernardo the final opportunity to present her defense evidence.56 The parties mutually agreed to set
the hearing for initial presentation of defense evidence on April 18, 1996. 57chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bernardo again failed to appear during the scheduled April 18, 1996 hearing.58 Although Bernardo did not offer any
excuse for this absence,59 RTC exercised compassion and permitted Bernardo to testify, as she did in fact testify, on May
9, 1996,60 - one (1) year and eight (8) months after the prosecution had rested its case. At the conclusion of the cross-
examination, the parties mutually agreed to adjourn the hearing for September 4, 1996, for redirect examination. 61
Bernardo's counsel, however, failed to appear during the scheduled September 4, 1996 hearing, prompting the RTC to
consider her failure as a waiver on her part to present additional evidence. 62Bernardo moved for reconsideration; she
claimed that her counsel had to attend another hearing in a different sala. Why Bernardo's counsel accepted another
engagement on the same day, which was in conflict with the RTC's hearing dates, was never properly explained.
Nonetheless, the RTC granted the motion to give her the last chance to complete the presentation of evidence on
April 3, 17, and 22, 1997.63chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Despite the RTC's warning, Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear at the April 3,1997 hearing.64 Instead,
they filed a motion to reset because Bernardo's counsel was to attend a wedding in the United States of America. 65 This
time, the RTC, mindful that there should be a limit to postponements, ordered the case submitted for decision sans the
presentation of evidence from the defense.66
Under these facts, the RTC was clearly driven by Bernardo and her counsel's repeated failure, without justifiable reason,
to appear at the scheduled hearing dates.67 The order considering Bernardo's right to present evidence waived, followed
as a necessary and unavoidable consequence. As we held in People v. Angco:68cralawlawlibrary
His failure to appear with counsel of his choice at the hearing of the case, notwithstanding repeated postponements and
warnings that failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver to present evidence in his defense, and that the case would
be deemed submitted for judgment upon the evidence presented by the prosecution, was sufficient legal justification for
the trial court to proceed and render judgment upon the evidence before it.chanrobleslaw
The records show that the RTC leniently granted repeated continuances to safeguard Bernardo's rights as an accused.
But Bernardo obviously did not recognize the need for expeditious handling of her case and was already trifling with
judicial process.69
Bernardo failed to adduce sufficient
evidence of payment; thus she is civilly
liable.
Bernardo's death pending appeal converted the present action to purely an enforcement of the civil liability incurred. In
particular, the focal issue in the present petition is no longer Bernardo's criminal liability for violation of B.P. 22
but her civil liability, which is principally based on contract and the corresponding damage Bumanglag suffered
due to Bernardo's failure to pay. Under these circumstances, Bernardo's B.P. 22 defense (that the checks were
presented beyond the 90-day period and that she never received a notice of dishonor) were no longer relevant.
Jurisprudence tells us that one who pleads payment carries the burden of proving it. 70 Indeed, once the existence of an
indebtedness is established by evidence, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been
discharged by payment rests with the debtor.71 After the debtor introduces evidence of payment, the burden of going
forward with the evidence - as distinct from the general burden of proof - again shifts to the creditor, who then labors
under a duty to produce evidence to show nonpayment.72
In the present case, the existence of the obligation to pay has sufficiently been established through the promissory
note73 and the checks74 submitted in evidence. Notably, Bernardo even confirmed due execution of these instruments
during her testimony. During the offer of Bernardo's testimony, her counsel stated:cralawlawlibrary
ATTY. MIRAVITE:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
With the court's permission. Your Honor, we are presenting the witness for the following purposes: to x x x show that she
borrowed money from [Bumanglag] x x x and that in 1991 her total obligation reached Php460,000.000; x x x that all
the checks issued by the accused were only as proof of her obligation to the private complainant x x x.75
[emphasis supplied]chanrobleslaw
In the course of Bernardo's testimony, she even confirmed the issuance of the checks and promissory note. In particular,
she stated:cralawlawlibrary
ATTY. MIRAVITE:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: I am showing to you this promissory note marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution and Exhibit 2 for the defense. There
appears a signature over the name Paz T. Bernardo at the middle portion thereof, do you know whose signature is that?
A: It is mine sir.
xxxx
Q: This document, Madame Witness, mentions of your loan obligations of Php 460,000.00. Can you tell us, Madame
Witness, what is covered by this promissory note?
xxxx
A: The promissory note covers the principal loan, plus interest and penalties, sir.
Q: So, are you saying that this promissory note of Php 460,000.00 was your total obligation as of June 1991 and includes
all other charges?
A: Yes, sir.
x xxx
Q: Madam Witness, can you remember when you issued the checks subject of these cases?
A: It was on June 20, 1991, sir.76chanrobleslaw
Bernardo's principal defense rests on the supposition that she had settled the obligation, which settlement led Bumanglag
to return to her the title to the property.77 A meticulous review, of the records, however, firmly dissuades us from believing
Bernardo's bare allegation.
At the outset, the handwritten note78 evidencing that transaction, which was submitted by the prosecution in evidence,
states that:cralawlawlibrary
10/28/91
Received original copy of Title No. T-151841 in the name of Mapalad Bernardo for loan purposes to pay Mrs. Carmencita
Bumanglag
Sgd
Paz T. Bernardo
10/28/91
chanrobleslaw
The document evidencing this transaction strongly suggests that she asked for the title from Bumanglag to obtain another
loan whose proceeds she would use to pay Bumanglag. Notably, the defense even admitted the genuineness of
Bernardo's signature in this document.79 When Bernardo therefore failed to fulfill her promise to pay, Bumanglag had to
request for checks to secure the obligation, which checks were eventually dishonored upon presentment.
Under the circumstances, we find that Bernardo's claim of payment was nothing more than an allegation unsupported by
adequate proof. If indeed there had been payment, she should have redeemed or taken back the checks and the
promissory note, in the ordinary course of business.80Instead, the checks and the promissory note remained in the
possession of Bumanglag, who had to demand the satisfaction of Bernardo's obligation when the checks became due and
were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank. Bumanglag's possession of the promissory note, coupled with the
dishonored checks, strongly buttresses her claim that Bernardo's obligation had not been extinguished.81
We thus find that the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of Bumanglag's position that Bernardo has not yet settled
her obligation.82chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 31, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.' CR No. 28721
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The heirs of Paz T. Bernardo are ordered to pay the amount of P460,000.00, with
interest at 12% per annum from the time of the institution of criminal charges in court.
The total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the balance and interest due, from the
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
The fine in the amount of P460,000.00 is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179814, December 07, 2015
WILFRED N.CHIOK, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RUFINA CHUA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 180021
RUFINA CHUA, Petitioner, v. WILFRED N. CHIOK, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (AS AN UNWILLING
CO-PARTY PETITIONER), Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions1 seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals (CA) July 19, 2007 Decision2and October 3, 2007
Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23309. The CA reversed and set aside the December 3, 1998 Decision4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig-Branch 165, and acquitted petitioner Wilfred Chiok (Chiok) of the crime of estafa in Criminal
Case No. 109927, but ordered him to pay civil liability to Rufina Chua in the total amount of P9,500,000.00, plus interests:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED DECEMBER 3, 1998 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and accused WILFRED N.
CHIOK is ACQUITTED for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but he is ORDERED to
pay complainantRUFINA CHUA the principal amount of [P]9,500,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned
from the tiling of this case, which rate shall increase to 12% per annum from the finality of judgment.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis in original)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Chiok was charged with estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in an
Information that reads:
That sometime in June, 1995 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from Rufina Chua the amount of P9,563,900.00 for him to
buy complainant shares of stocks, under the express obligation on the part of the accused to deliver the documents
thereon or to return the whole amount if the purchase did not materialize, but the accused once in possession of the said
amount, far from complying will his obligation as aforesaid, with intent to defraud the complainant, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert lo his own personal use and benefit the said
amount of P9,563,900.00, and despite repeated demands failed and relused and still fails and refuses to return the said
amount or to account for the same, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant Rufina Chua in the aforementioned
amount of P9,563,900.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Chiok pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued, with both parties presenting their evidence in
support of their respective claims and defenses.
According to the Prosecution, petitioner Rufina Chua (Chua) met Chiok in mid-1989, during which he offered to be her
investment adviser. Convinced by Chiok's representations and the fact that he is Chinese, Chua made an initial
investment of P200,000.00, allegedly to buy Meralco and PLDT shares. She rolled over the original investment and
profits, and this went on until 1994. For each of their transactions, Chua claimed she was not given any document
evidencing every stock transaction and that she only relied on the assurances of Chiok. In mid-1995, she accepted his
proposal to buy shares in bulk in the amount of P9,563,900.00. Chua alleged that she deposited P7,100,000.00 to Chiok's
Far East Bank, Annapolis account on June 9, 1995 and delivered to him P2,463,900.00 in cash later that same date at the
Han Court Restaurant in Annapolis, Greenhills. As proof, she presented a deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 of Chiok's Far
Bast Bank Annapolis account. There was no receipt or memorandum for the cash delivery.7
Chua narrated that she became suspicious when Chiok later on avoided her calls and when he failed to show any
document of the sale. He reassured her by giving her two interbank checks, Check No. 02030693 dated July 11, 1995 for
P7,963,900.00 and Check No. 02030694 dated August 15, 1995 in the amount of P1,600,000.00 (interbank checks). The
interbank checks were given with the request to deposit the first check only after 60-75 days to enable him to generate
funds from the sale of a property in I long Kong. Both interbank checks were ultimately dishonored upon presentment for
payment due to garnishment and insufficiency of funds. Despite Chua's pleas, Chiok did not return her money. Hence,
she referred the matter to her counsel who wrote a demand letter dated October 25, 1995. Chiok sent her a letter-reply
dated November 16, 1995 stating that the money was Chua's investment in their unregistered partnership, and was duly
invested with Yu Que Ngo. In the end, Chua decided to file her complaint-affidavit against him in the Pasig Prosecutor's
Office.8
In his defense, Chiok denied that he enticed Chua to invest in the stock market, or offered her the prospect of buying
shares of stocks in bulk. Chiok maintained that from the time he met her in 1991 and until 1995, he previously only had
dollar transactions with Chua. It was in 1995 when both of them decided to form an unregistered partnership. He admitted
that the P7,963,900.00 she gave him before she left for the United States was her investment in this unregistered
partnership. Chua allegedly instructed him to invest according to his best judgment and asked him to issue a check in her
name for her peace of mind. Chiok denied having received the P2,463,900.00 in cash from her. 9
On cross-examination, however, Chiok admitted receiving "P7.9" million in June 1995 and "P1.6" million earlier. 10 He
testified that exercising his best judgment, he invested P8,000,000.00 with Yu Que Ngo, a businesswoman engaged in
the manufacture of machine bolts and screws under the name and style of Capri Manufacturing Company. 11 Chiok
narrated that Chua only panicked when she learned that he was swindled by one Gonzalo Nuguid, who supplied him with
dollars.12 It was then that she immediately demanded the return of her investment. To reassure Chua, Chiok informed her
that lie had invested the money with Yu Que Ngo and offered to give Yu Que Ngo's checks to replace his previously
issued interbank checks.13 Chua agreed, but instead of returning his checks, she retained them along with the checks of
Yu Que Ngo. Chua rejected Yu Que Ngo's offer to settle her obligation with land and machineries, insisting on recovering
the "whole amount plus interest, litigation expenses plus attorney's fees." 14 After the case was filed, Chiok and Yu Que
Ngo met with Chua, accompanied by their lawyers, in an effort to amicably settle Chua's demand for the return of her
funds. Chua demanded more than P30,000,000.00, but Chiok and Yu Que Ngo requested for a lower amount because
the original claim was only P9,500,000.00. Chua did not grant their request.15
In a Decision16 dated December 3, 1998, the RTC convicted Chiok of the crime of estafa (RTC conviction). Its dispositive
portion reads:
In View Of All The Foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Wilfred N. Chiok guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer imprisonment of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the costs.
The accused is ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P9,563,900.00 with interest at the legal rate to be
computed from the date of demand - October 25, 1995 until fully paid.
For want of evidence, the Court cannot award the alleged actual damages.
SO ORDERED.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The prosecution filed a Motion for Cancellation of Bail18 pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure on February 1, 1999, the same day the judgment was promulgated. 19On February 15, 1999, Chiok filed a
Motion for Reconsideration20 of the RTC conviction.
The RTC, in an omnibus order21 dated May 28, 1999 (omnibus order), denied Chiok's motion for reconsideration, and also
cancelled his bail pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The RTC held that the
circumstances of the accused indicated the probability of flight if released on bail and/or that there is undue risk that
during the pendency of the appeal, he may commit another crime. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the bail of the accused is cancelled. The accused is given five (5) days from receipt of this order within
which to surrender before this Court otherwise, his arrest will be ordered.
SO ORDERED.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On June 18, 1999, Chiok filed a Notice of Appeal23 on the RTC conviction and omnibus order, docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 23309 (the appeal case) and rallied to the CA Fifteenth Division. On June 19, 1999, Chiok also filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Injunction against the omnibus
order,24 which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 53340 (bail case) and raffled to the CA Thirteenth Division.
Meanwhile, the RTC issued an order of arrest25 on June 25, 1999 (order of arrest) pursuant to the omnibus order. The
order of arrest was returned to the trial court by the Makati Police Station on July 25, 1999 on the ground that Chiok could
not be located at his last given address.26
The Bail Case
On July 27, 1999, the CA issued a TRO on the implementation of the omnibus order until further orders. 27 On September
20, 1999, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction28 enjoining the arrest of Chiok. The CA ruled that Chiok should not
be deprived of liberty pending the resolution of his appeal because the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital
offense, and that the probability of flight during the pendency of his appeal is merely conjectural.29 The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) and Chua filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
November 16, 1999.
On November 3, 1999, the OSG representing the People of the Philippines, and Chua, filed separate petitions for
certiorari before us seeking review of the CA Resolutions dated September 20, 1999 and November 16, 1999. 30 We
granted the OSG's and Chua's petitions and reversed the CA's injunction on the arrest of Chiok.31 Our decisions (SC bail
decisions) became final on December 6, 2006 and June 20, 2007, respectively.
The Appeal Case
On September 21, 1999, the CA Thirteenth Division dismissed the appeal of Chiok finding him to have jumped bail when
the order of arrest was returned unserved.32 The CA considered his appeal abandoned, dismissing it pursuant to Section
8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. However, on February 29, 2000, the CA reinstated Chiok's appeal
when it learned of the issuance of the TRO and injunction in the bail case on September 20, 1999 or a day prior to the
appeal's dismissal.33
Proceedings before the CA ensued. Chiok filed his Appellant's Brief34 dated August 28, 2003 while the OSG filed its
Appellee's Brief35 dated December 23, 2003. Chiok submitted his Reply Brief36 dated April 14, 2004 while the OSG and
Chua replied through their Rejoinder Briefs37 dated October 6, 2004.
On July 19, 2007, the CA in a Special Division of Five (Former-Fourth Division) rendered a Decision reversing and setting
aside the Decision dated December 3, 1998 of the trial court, and acquitted Chiok for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt (CA acquittal).
The CA found that the RTC conviction did not contain findings of fact on the prosecution's evidence but merely recited the
evidence of the prosecution as if such evidence was already proof of the ultimate facts constituting estafa. Instead of
relying on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, the trial court relied on the weakness of the defense. It found that
Chua's testimony, which was the sole evidence of the prosecution, was inconsistent and improbable. Specifically, it was
irregular that Chua was not able to produce any single receipt or documentary evidence of all the alleged stock dealings
which spanned for a long period of six years with Chiokthe purpose of which was to prove that he misappropriated the
amount contrary to her instructions of investing it to blue chip stocks. More importantly, the acceptance by Chua of the
checks issued by Yu Que Ngo ratified his application of the funds based on the instructions to invest it. Simply put, the
prosecution was not able to prove the element of misappropriation (i.e., deviation from Chua's instructions). As to the civil
aspect, the CA found Chiok liable to Chua for the amount of P9,500,000.00, 38 the amount he admitted on record.
The OSG did not file a motion for reconsideration on the ground of double jeopardy. Chua, on the other hand, filed a
motion for reconsideration39 on August 8, 2007. Chiok also filed his own motion for reconsideration, 40 on the civil liability
imposed on him.
In a Resolution41 dated October 3, 2007, the CA denied Chua's motion for reconsideration and its supplement on the
ground that acquittal is immediately final and the re-examination of the record of the case would violate the guarantee
against double jeopardy. It also denied the motions tor reconsideration of both parties on the civil aspect of the case.
Hence, these consolidated petitions questioning the CA acquittal by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus, and
the civil aspect of the case by way of appeal by certiorari.
Issues
The consolidated petitions raise the following issues:
I. Whether or not Chua has a legal personality to file and prosecute this petition.
II. Whether or not the case is an exception to the rule on finality of acquittal and the doctrine of double jeopardy.
III. Whether or not Chiok is civilly liable to Chua.
Discussion
I. Chua lacks the legal personality to file this petition.
Chua argues that her petition should be allowed because the circumstances of this case warrant leniency on her lack of
personality to assail the criminal aspect of the CA acquittal. She argues that "the OSG did not take any action to comment
on the position of Chua [and] that this case belongs to the realm of exceptions to the doctrine of double jeopardy." 42
We disagree with Chua.
Chua lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it is only the OSG, on behalf of the
State, which can bring actions in criminal proceedings before this Court and the CA.
In Villareal v. Aliga,43 we upheld the doctrine that it is only the OSG, as representative of the State, which may question
the acquittal of the accused via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, viz:
x x x The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is
solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (I), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court
and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any
officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of the Government.
To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be
appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may
question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this
view has been time and again espoused and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane, it was categorically slated
that if the criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the
case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private complainant to question
such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the case. The same determination was also arrived at by
the Court in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Veridiano II. In the recent case ofBangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, the
Court again upheld this guiding principle.
xxx
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever
legally feasible, only by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.
(Emphasis supplied)
The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the
State and not the private complainant.44 The interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited only
to the civil liability.45 In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution such that when a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom
on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General.46 The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal, but may only do so as to the civil aspect of the case. 47
Although there are instances when we adopt a liberal view and give due course to a petition filed by an offended party, we
direct the OSG to file its comment.48 When through its comment, the OSG takes a position similar to the private
complainant's, we hold that the OSG ratifies and adopts the private complainant's petition as its own. 49 However, when the
OSG in its comment neither prays that the petition be granted nor expressly ratifies and adopts the petition as its own, we
hesitate in disregarding, and uphold instead, the rule on personality or legal standing. 50
In this case, the OSG neither appealed the judgment of acquittal of the CA nor gave its conformity to Chua's special civil
action for certiorari and mandamus. In its Comment51 dated March 27, 2008, the OSG is of the view that Chua's petition
will place Chiok in double jeopardy:
x x x Notably, while petitioner [Chua] imputes grave abuse of discretion on the Court of Appeals in acquitting private
respondent, a perusal of the allegations will reveal errors of judgment in the appreciation of evidence, not error of
jurisdiction. Verily, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion when it pronounced that "we have
also reviewed the evidence of the accused in order to satisfy ourselves about the essential question of misappropriation or
conversion" and hold thereafter that "review now justifies us to pronounce that his version on the matter was probably
credible." Petitioner argues that a simple review of the evidence of respondent accused readily leads to the conclusion
that it is very far from being probably credible.
Clearly, the errors ascribed to the Court of Appeals are errors that go deeply into the appreciation and assessment of the
evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense during the trial. Thus, the present petition smacks in the heart of
the Court of [Appeals] appreciation of evidence x x x.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In view of the contrary position of the OSG, we do not subscribe to Chua's view that the circumstances of this case
warrant the relaxation on the rule. Even if we do relax this procedural rule, we find that the merits of the case still calls for
the dismissal of Chua's petition.
II. The appeal from the judgment of acquittal will place Chiok in double jeopardy.
The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors, guarantees the right of the accused against double
jeopardy.53 Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy to attach. For double
jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had
pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent. 54
In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings require that a judgment of acquittal,
whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its
promulgation.55 This is referred to as the "finality-of-acquittal" rule. The rationale for the rule was explained in People v.
Velasco:56
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the
laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State, x x x."
Thus, Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with sill its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repealed attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose
as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature
of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against
wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is
easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of
repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection lo insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests
upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. This
interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury
empanelled to try him, for society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the
individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its
very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal
finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet
animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the
abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment,
the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair. (Citations omitted, Emphasis supplied)
There were cases, however, where we recognized certain exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy and its resultant
doctrine of finality-of-acquittal.
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,57 we remanded a judgment of acquittal to a trial court due to a finding of mistrial. In
declaring the trial before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno Simeon "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr., which
resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, we found that "the prosecution and the sovereign people were
denied due process of law with a partial court and biased [Tanodbayan] under the constant and pervasive monitoring and
pressure exerted by the authoritarian [p]resident to assure the carrying out of his instructions."58 We considered the
acquittal as void, and held that no double jeopardy attached.
In People v. Uy,59 we held that by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
Chua assails the acquittal of Chiok on two grounds. First, the first jeopardy did not attach because the CA did not have
jurisdiction over the appeal; Chiok having lost his right to appeal when the CA found him to have jumped
bail. Second assuming that the first jeopardy attached, the circumstances of this case is an exception to the rule on
double jeopardy.
A. The CA had jurisdiction to entertain Chiok's appeal.
Chua claims that the SC bail decisions set aside as bereft of any factual or legal basis the CA resolutions in the bail case
which enjoined the cancellation of bail of Chiok and his warrant of arrest by the trial court. The logical and legal
consequence of the nullification of the CA resolutions is to automatically revive the CA's Resolution dated September 21,
1999 dismissing the appeal of Chiok. Accordingly, the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of Chiok and the
proceedings therein are null and void.
We find no merit in Chua's claims.

At the outset, the CA validly acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal. Chiok filed his Notice of Appeal on June 18, 1999 at
the time when the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure was still in effect. Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure explicitly provides that the right to appeal is not automatically forfeited when an accused fails to appear during
the promulgation of judgment.60 Upon perfection of Chiok's Notice of Appeal and the subsequent denial of the
prosecution's Motion to Deny Due Course to the Notice of Appeal by the RTC in its Order61 dated July 15, 1999, the CA
completely acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal.
After acquiring jurisdiction over the appeal, the CA took cognizance of the unserved order of arrest. Exercising jurisdiction
over Chiok's appeal, the CA in its Resolution dated September 21, 1999 dismissed his appeal in accordance with Section
8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment, or failure to prosecute. - The appellate court may, upon motion of the
appellee or on its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the
time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. (Emphasis and
italics supplied)
The aforecited section gives the CA the authority to dismiss an appeal for abandonment if the accused escapes from
prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. This authority to
dismiss an appeal is, nevertheless, discretionary.62 When an accused jumps bail during the pendency of his appeal, the
appellate court may exercise its discretion whether to proceed with the appeal or dismiss it outright. 63 In several cases, we
still proceeded to acquit an accused who remained at large during the pendency of the appeal. 64
In this case, the CA exercised this discretion when it found that Chiok jumped bail because the order of arrest was not
served. Subsequently, when Chiok moved for its reconsideration, the CA again exercised its discretion, this time to
entertain the appeal. Notably, neither the prosecution nor Chua attributed any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
appellate court when it reinstated the appeal via a Resolution dated February 29, 2000. This resolution, which effectively
replaces the original resolution dismissing the appeal, has already attained finality.
Thus, contrary to the claim of Chua, the SC bail decisions which set aside the CA resolutions enjoining Chiok's arrest did
not automatically revive the CA resolution dismissing the appeal; the dismissal being a discretionary act on the part of the
appellate court. Consequently, we reject the claim of Chua that the first jeopardy did not attach because the whole
proceedings before the CA, and the CA acquittal, are null and void.
B. Exceptions to the rate on finality-of-acquittal and double jeopardy doctrine do not apply.
Chua next asserts that certain exceptions to the rule on double jeopardy are present in this case. Particularly, she submits
that: (1) the appellate court's proceeding is a sham or mock proceeding; (2) the People through the OSG, was deprived of
the opportunity to be heard and its "day in court"; and (3) the result is a null and void judgment of acquittal. Chua cites the
case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan65 to bolster her assertions.
Chua claims that the "trial in both the bouncing checks cases and this estafa case, is a sham insofar as they have resulted
in acquittals."66 Chua anchors her claim on the report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban that there were
unauthorized tamperings in the evidence in the bouncing checks cases 67 (BP 22 case) she filed against Chiok, and that a
TSN in the same BP 22 case, where Chiok allegedly made an implied admission of guilt, has been secretly removed from
the record.
We do not see any exception to the rule on double jeopardy in this case.
The factual milieu in Galman v. Sandiganbayan68 is starkly different from this case. In Galman, we concluded that there
was a mock or sham trial because of the overwhelming evidence of collusion and undue pressures made by former
President Marcos on the prosecution and the Justices who tried and decided the case, which prevented the prosecution
from fully ventilating its position and offering all evidence. We recognized the intensity and gravity of the pressure exerted
by the highest official in the land that resulted to a miscarriage of justice.
In this case, Chua presents a report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban showing irregularities in the BP 22 case
against Chiok, including the loss of a TSN containing an alleged offer of settlement by Chiok equivalent to his implied
admission of guilt. We, however, do not see the same evils presented in Galman when the alleged anomalies pointed out
by Chua were in a different case and when the main basis of the acquittal is not on the credibility of the physical evidence
but of the testimony of Chua herself. Moreover, it is apparent from the CA acquittal that the appellate court considered
Chiok's offer of settlement in arriving at the decision, having included it in its statement of facts. In essence, Chua is
asking us to nullify the CA acquittal because in her opinion, if the appellate court considered these pieces of evidence, it
would have convicted Chiok. These are purported errors of judgment or those involving misappreciation of evidence which
cannot be raised and be reviewed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
We are also not convinced that the State was deprived of due process in presenting its case. The OSG, in fact, actively
participated in prosecuting the case before the CA. It was able to file an Appellee's Brief 69 dated December 23, 2003, as
well as its Rejoinder Brief70 dated October 6, 2004. As Chua even admits in her petition, the OSG was able to present its
case before the appellate court as when "[t]he OSG's position in this case on the merits is clear in the submissions it has
filed, as most eloquently expressed in the Rejoinder Brief..."71 Certainly, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed
where both parties had the opportunity to present their case and even required them to submit memoranda from which its
decision is based, as in this case.72
Although we do not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the
petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the appellate court blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.73 Chua failed to do so.
III. Chiok is civilly liable to Chua in the amount of P9,563,900.00.
Chiok claims thai the Joint Decision74 dated November 27, 2000 in the BP 22 case docketed as Criminal Case No. 44739
of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) San Juan, Manila - Branch 58, which absolved Chiok from civil liability, is res
judicata on this case. On the other hand, Chua. claims that the CA erred when it ordered Chiok to pay only the amount of
P9,500,000.00 when it was shown by evidence that the amount should be P9,563,900.00.
We rule that Chiok is liable For the amount of P9,563,900.00.
In Castillo v. Salvador75 and several cases before it, we ruled that if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the
accused is not automatically exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In this
regard, preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto.76
While the CA acquitted Chiok on the ground that the prosecution's evidence on his alleged misappropriation of Chua's
money did not meet the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, we hold that the monetary transaction between Chua
and Chiok was proven by preponderance of evidence.
Chua presented in evidence a bank deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 to Chiok's Far East Bank, Annapolis account in the
amount of P7,100,000.00. She also testified that she delivered to him in cash the amount of P2,463,900.00. Chiok's
admission that he issued the interbank checks in the total amount of P9,563,900.00 to Chua, albeit claiming that it was
"for safekeeping purposes only" and to assure her that she will be paid back her investment, corroborates Chua's
evidence. In any event, as found by the appellate court, Chiok admitted that he received from Chua the amount of "P7.9"
million in June 1995 and for "P1.6" million at an earlier time. It is on this basis that the CA found Chiok civilly liable in the
amount of P9,500,000.00 only.
However, we find that during the direct and cross-examination of Chiok on September 15, 1997 and October 13, 1997, the
reference to "P9.5" million is the amount in issue, which is the whole of P9,563,900.00:
TSN September 15, 1907 (direct examination of Wilfred Chiok)
ATTY ESPIRITU[:] Mr. Witness. The amount here you are being charged in the information is P9,563,900.00 covered by I
lie two (2) checks Exhibits "C" and "D" of the prosecution. x x x77
TSN Octobcr 13, 1997 (cross examination of Wilfred Chiok)
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] Do you know how much Mrs. Chua is claiming from you [which is the] subject matter of this case
of estafa?
WITNKSK[:] Yes, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] How much?
WITNESS[:] More or less 9.5.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] In peso or in dollar?
WITNESS[:] In Peso.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] 9.5 Million what?
WITNESS[:] Million Peso, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] You admit that you received 9.5 Million from Mrs. Chua?
WITNESS[:] I admitted that, ma'am.78 (Italics supplied)
Accordingly, the amount admitted should be P9,563,900.00.
There is also no merit in Chiok's claim that his absolution from civil liability in the BP 22 case involving the same
transaction bars civil liability in this estafa case under the doctrine of res judicatain the concept of "conclusiveness of
judgment."
The doctrine of res judicata under the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" is found in paragraph (c) of Section 47,
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under this doctrine, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters
determined in the former suit.79 Stated differently, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different cause of
action.80 This principle of res judicata bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the
same parties on a different claim or cause of action.81
In Rodriguez v. Ponferrada,82 we explained that a civil action in a BP 22 case is not a bar to a civil action in estafa case. In
rejecting the theory of petitioner therein that the civil action arising from the criminal case for violation of BP 22 precludes
the institution of the corresponding civil action in the criminal case for estafa pending before the RTC, we ruled that Rule
111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the institution of a civil action in the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP
22, without need of election by the offended party. There is no forum shopping because both remedies are simultaneously
available to the offended party. We explained that while every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil
liability for the offended party who has sustained only a single injury, this single civil liability can be the subject of both civil
actions in the estafa case and the BP 22 case. However, there may only be one recovery of the single civil liability.
We affirmed this in Rimando v. Aldaba,83 where we were confronted with the similar issue of whether an accused's civil
liability in the estafa case must be upheld despite acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in BP 22 cases. We held that
both estafa and BP 22 cases can proceed to their final adjudication-both as to their criminal and civil aspectssubject
only to the prohibition on double recovery.
Since the Rules itself allows for both remedies to be simultaneously availed of by the offended party, the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application here.
Moreover, the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment presupposes that facts and issues
were actually and directly resolved in a previous case.84 However, the records show that in the BP 22 case, the facts and
issues proving the transaction were not actually and directly resolved in the decision, viz:
The court is not persuaded.
First, what the law requires is a notice of dishonor of the check to be given to the accused after its dishonor. There is no
showing dial this requirement was complied by the prosecution. Second, the drawer must be given at least 5 banking days
from such notice of dishonor within which to pay the holder thereof the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for
payment in full by the drawee of such check. Indeed, there was no notice of dishonor established to have been furnished
the accused and therefore there is more reason that the accused was not given the requisite 5-banking day to make good
aforesaid cheeks. The 5-day notice serves to mitigate the harshness of the law in its application by giving the drawer an
opportunity to make good the bum check. And, it cannot be said that accused was ever given that opportunity simply
because the prosecution failed to prove that accused was notified of the dishonor of the checks in suit.
xxx
Even assuming without admitting but only for the sake of argument that accused was notified of the dishonor of the
checks in suit by the demand letter adverted to above, still the prosecution cause must fail because there are more
reasons not to believe than to believe the theory of the prosecution as compared with that of the defense as will be
explained hereunder.
xxx
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the court hereby absolves the accused from criminal as well as
civil liability and orders these cases DISMISSED for lack of evidence to support the charges levelled against him.
Costs de officio.
No other pronouncements.
SO ORDERED.85ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The basis or Chiok's acquittal therein is the prosecution's failure to show that a notice of dishonor was first given to Chiok.
The discussion that the prosecution's version is incredible was merely secondary, and was not necessary, for accused's
acquittal. There were no findings of fact on the transaction which gives rise to the civil liability.
In light of these, we reject Chiok's claim that res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment bars Chua from
recovering any civil claims.
Following this Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,86 the foregoing amount of P9,563,900.00 shall earn interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from October 25, 1995, the date of Chua's extrajudicial demand, until the
date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from such finality of judgment until its satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 179814 and the special civil action for certiorari and
mandamus in G.R. No. 180021 are DENIED. The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 180021 is GRANTED. The
Assailed Decision dated July 19, 2007 and the Resolution dated October 3, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Wilfred Chiok is ordered to pay Rufina Chua the principal amount of
P9,563,900.00, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from October 25, 1995 until the date of
finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of judgment until its satisfaction.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 186597 June 17, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
VICTORIA R. ARAMBULO and MIGUELARAMBULO, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to annul the Decision1 and Resolution2 dated 5 February 2008 and 27
February 2009, respectively of the Court of Appeals, Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 86353 which effectively
suspended the criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-62784, an estafa case against respondents before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City.
Records show that respondent Victoria R. Arambulo (Victoria), Emerenciana R. Gungab, Reynaldo Reyes (Reynaldo),
Domingo Reyes (Domingo), Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes (Oscar) are the heirs of Spouses Pedro C. Reyes and
Anastacia Reyes. Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped) was incorporated as part of the estate planning or as conduit to hold the
properties of the estate of Pedro Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs.
Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice-President and General Manager of Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped), filed a complaint for estafa
against Victoria and her husband Miguel Arambulo, Jr. (Miguel) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City.
He alleged that Victoria failed to remit the rentals collected from the time the ownership of the commercial apartments was
transferred to Anaped.
On 24 April 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alvin A. Almora recommended the filing of an Information against
respondents. On 1 June 2001, respondents were charged with estafa committed as follow:
That on [or] about the period from December, 1994 to June, 1997, in the City of Caloocan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, and with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, after having received rentals from IMF International Corporation, in the total
amount of THREE HUNDRED NINETEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT (P319,888.00)PESOS, under
the express obligation of turning over or remitting the same to ANAPED ESTATE INCORPORATED, once in possession
of the said amount and far from complying with their obligation aforesaid and despite notice [to] that effect, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply, and convert the said amount to
their own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of ANAPED ESTATE, INC., in the sum above-
aforementioned.3
On 14 April 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in view of
the pendency of two intra-corporate cases pending before the RTC of Quezon City and Makati City. SEC Case No. 05-97-
5659 is a petition filed by Victorias brother Oscar for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment
of sale, injunction, receivership and damages.4 SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a petition filed by Victoria and her brothers
Reynaldo and Domingo questioning the authority of their elder sibling Rodrigo Reyes and Emerenciana R. Gungab, as
well as the Anaped Board of Directors and officers, including private complainant Buban to act for and in behalf of the
corporation.5
In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents asserted that the resolution of the SEC cases in their favor
particularly the issues of whether of the group of Rodrigo and Buban are the lawful representatives of the corporation and
whether they are duly authorized to make a demand for remittance would necessarily result in their acquittal in the
criminal case.
On 28 August 2003, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, granted the motion for suspension of
the proceedings. The trial court reasoned that the issue in the SEC cases, i.e., who between the groups has the right to
act for and in behalf of the corporation, has a direct link to the issue of the culpability of the accused for estafa, thus:
For indeed, if the aforesaid issues are resolved in the [respondents] favor, they cannot be held liable for misappropriation
for they possess the authority to collect rentals and hold the same on behalf of the firm. They would then be justified in not
remitting the collections to the group of Jose Buban who would be then deemed as mere usurpers of authority. 6
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the trial court issued an Order dated 19 February 2004 setting
aside its 28 August 2003 Order and setting the case for pre-trial. The trial court noted that respondents failed to file an
opposition to the motion for reconsideration. Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be allowed to file
their Comment/Opposition to the motion for reconsideration and that the pre-trial be held in abeyance. Respondents
claimed that the Order of the trial court to file comment/opposition was served on respondents themselves and not on
their counsel.
On 23 June 2004, the trial court denied respondents Omnibus Motion. The trial court stressed that even if the order was
served upon respondents and not upon their counsel, records show that a copy of the motion for reconsideration was
served by registered mail upon counsel. Thus, the trial court stated that respondents counsel was well aware of the
existence of the motion for reconsideration, thus he could have taken the initiative to file his comment thereto without
waiting for any directive from the court.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals asserting that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it denied them the opportunity to file their comment; when it ruled that respondents
counsel should have filed the comment as he was furnished a copy of the motion for reconsideration; and when it granted
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On 5 February 2008, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, the assailed
Orders of the respondent Judge dated February 19, 2004 and July 23, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and she is
hereby enjoined from hearing the Criminal Case No. C-62784 until the termination of the SEC Case No. 03-99-6259. The
August 28, 2003 Order of the respondent Judge is hereby REINSTATED. 7
Preliminarily, on the procedural question, the Court of Appeals pointed out that respondents were given the opportunity to
present their side in their motion to suspend proceedings. The appellate court treated respondents arguments in said
motion as their Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner. That is correct.
The appellate court ruled that in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259:
[T]he issue is the legality of the election of ANAPED Board of Directors, as well as the authority of its officers, which
include private complainant Jose Buban, to act for and in behalf of the corporation. Clearly, it involves facts that are
intimately related to those upon which the criminal case is based. The resolution of the issues raised in this intra-corporate
dispute will ultimately determine the guilt or innocence of [respondents] in the crime of estafa initiated by Jose Buban. It
must be remembered that one of the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under paragraph 1 (b) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is a demand made by the offended party to the offender. A valid demand must
therefore be made by an offended party to the offender.8
The appellate court added that since respondents are challenging the authority of Buban, then the validity of Bubans
demand to turn over or remit the rentals is put in question. The appellate court concluded that if the supposed authority of
Buban is found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated 27 February 2009. The elements of demand and misappropriation bear relevance to the validity or invalidity of the authority of Anaped
directors and officers. In Omictin v. Court of Appeals,12 we held that since the alleged offended party is the corporation,
the validity of the demand for the delivery rests upon the authority of the person making such a demand on the companys
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the lone ground of whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
behalf. If the supposed authority of the person making the demand is found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever
that there exists a prejudicial question which calls for the suspension of the criminal proceedings before the trial court.
made, hence the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper. The Court added that mere failure to return the thing received for
administration or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or return the same or deliver the value thereof to
Petitioner argues that any decision of the trial court in the SEC cases with respect to the question of who are the lawful the owner could only give rise to a civil action and does not constitute the crime of estafa. 13
officers or directors of Anaped is not determinative of the liability of respondents to remit the rental collections in favor of
Anaped. Petitioner proffers that a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its individual stockholders.
It is true that the accused may be convicted of the felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code if
Petitioner emphasizes that at the time the demand for remittance of the rental collections was made against respondents,
the prosecution proves misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or property subject of the
Buban was an officer of Anaped and until such time that his authority is validly revoked, all his previous acts are valid and
Information. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or
binding. Moreover, petitioner avers that the duty of respondents to remit the collection still subsists even during the
conversion.14 The phrase, "to misappropriate to ones own use" has been said to include "not only conversion to ones
pendency of the SEC cases as the money remitted goes directly to the corporation and not to the person who demanded
personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right." 15 In this case, the
the remittance. Finally, petitioner opines that question pertaining to the authority of Buban to demand remittance may only
resolution of the issue of misappropriation by respondents depends upon the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259. If it is
be considered as a defense in the estafa case and not as a ground to suspend the proceedings.
ruled in the SEC case that the present Anaped directors and officers were not validly elected, then respondent Victoria
may have every right to refuse remittance of rental to Buban. Hence, the essential element of misappropriation in estafa
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved may be absent in this case.
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
In this connection, we find important the fact, noted by the CA, that:
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.9 It appears from the record of the case that Victoria Arambulo for the last twenty (20) years had been tasked with the
management and collection of rentals of the real properties the Reyes siblings inherited from their parents, Ana and Pedro
Reyes.16
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribes the elements that must concur in order for a civil
case to be considered a prejudicial question, to wit:
As earlier mentioned, SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a petition filed by Victoria and her brothers Domingo and Reynaldo
questioning the very authority of their elder siblings Rodrigo and Emerenciana, as well as the Anaped Board of Directors
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
and Officers, including Buban to act for and in behalf of the corporation. We find this issue consonant with the provisions
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
of the Corporation Code which provides in Section 23 that:
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Sec. 23. The Board of Directors or Trustees. - Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the corporate powers of all
Aptly put, the following requisites must be present for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to
corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business conducted and all property of such corporations
cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case: (1) the civil case involves facts
controlled and held by the board of directors or trustees to be elected from among the holders of stocks, or where there is
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues
no stock, from among the members of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year and until their successors are
raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try
elected and qualified.
said question must be lodged in another tribunal.10

In Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Africa,17 we said that:

As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 does not present a prejudicial question to the
criminal case for estafa. It is an action for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of sale,
injunction, receivership and damages. Even if said case will be decided against respondents, they will not be adjudged The underlying policy of the Corporation Code is that the business and affairs of the corporation must be governed by a
free from criminal liability. It also does not automatically follow that an accounting of corporate funds and properties and board of directors whose members have stood for election, and who have actually been elected by the stockholders, on
annulment of fictitious sale of corporate assets would result in the conviction of respondents in the estafa case. an annual basis. Only in that way can the directors continued accountability to shareholders, and the legitimacy of their
decisions that bind the corporations stockholders, be assured. The shareholder vote is critical to the theory that
legitimizes the exercise of power by the directors or officers over properties that they do not own.
With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, however, we affirm the Court of Appeals finding that a prejudicial question
exists.1wphi1 The Complaint in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 prays for the nullification of the election of Anaped directors
and officers, including Buban. Essentially, the issue is the authority of the aforesaid officers to act for and behalf of the From the foregoing, it is clear that, should respondents herein prevail in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, then Buban, who
corporation. does not own either by himself or in behalf of Anaped which is the owner, the property heretofore managed by Victoria,
cannot demand remittance of the rentals on the property and Victoria does not have the obligation to turn over the rentals
to Buban.
On the other hand, the issue in the criminal case pertains to whether respondents committed estafa. Under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) that the money, goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other Verily, the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 will determine the innocence or guilt of respondents in the criminal case for
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of estafa.
such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is demand by the offended party to the offender. 11
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 5 February 2008 and On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0313, filed by
27 February 2009 enjoining the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121 from hearing Criminal Case No. C- the NBI and Atty. Baligod, which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder as defined in RA No. 7080
62784 until the termination of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, are AFFIRMED. be conducted against Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit inOMB-C-C-13-0313 on 9 January 2014.

SO ORDERED. On 3 December 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0397, filed by
the FIO of the Ombudsman, which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder, as defined in RA No.
7080, and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, be conducted against Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-0397 on 16 January 2014.
Associate Justic

Eighteen of Sen. Estradas co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013
Republic of the Philippines
and 14 March 2014.5
SUPREME COURT
Manila
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings (Request) in OMB-C-C-13-0313. In his Request, Sen.
EN BANC
Estrada asked for copies of the following documents:

G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015

(a) Affidavit of [co-respondent] Ruby Tuason (Tuason);

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner,

(b) Affidavit of [co-respondent] Dennis L. Cunanan (Cunanan);
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Office of the Ombudsman, NATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION and ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD, Respondents. (c) Counter-Affidavit of [co-respondent] Gondelina G. Amata (Amata);

DECISION (d) Counter-Affidavit of [co-respondent] Mario L. Relampagos (Relampagos);

CARPIO, J.: (e) Consolidated Reply of complainant NBI, if one had been filed; and

It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses (f) Affidavits/Counter-Affidavits/Pleadings/Filings filed by all the other respondents and/or additional witnesses for the
which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent Complainants.6
shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and,
where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an
Sen. Estradas request was made "[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent to examine the evidence submitted by the
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or crossexamine.
complainant which he may not have been furnished (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to have access to
the evidence on record (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman)." 7
- Paderanga v. Drilon1
On 27 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order in OMB-C-C-13-0313. The pertinent portions of the
This case is a Petition for Certiorari2 with prayer for (1) the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or Writ of assailed Order read:
Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondents Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), Field Investigation Office (FIO) of
the Ombudsman, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and Atty. Levito D. Baligod (Atty. Baligod) (collectively,
This Office finds however finds [sic] that the foregoing provisions [pertaining to Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of
respondents), from conducting further proceedings in OMB-CC-13-03013 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 until the present Petition
Court and Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman] do not entitle respondent [Sen.
has been resolved with finality; and (2) this Courts declaration that petitioner Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada (Sen.
Estrada]to be furnished all the filings of the respondents.
Estrada)was denied due process of law, and that the Order of the Ombudsman dated 27 March 2014 and the proceedings
in OMB-C-C-13-03013 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 subsequent to and affected by the issuance of the challenged 27 March
2014 Order are void. Rule 112 (3) (a) & (c) of the Rules of Court provides [sic]:

OMB-C-C-13-0313,3 entitled National Bureau of Investigation and Atty. Levito D. Baligod v. Jose "Jinggoy" P. Ejercito (a) The complaintshall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant
Estrada, et al.,refers to the complaint for Plunder as defined under Republic Act (RA) No. 7080, while OMB-C-C-13- and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause
0397,4 entitled Field Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman v. Jose "Jinggoy" P. Ejercito-Estrada, et al., refers to
the complaint for Plunder as defined underRA No. 7080 and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). xxx xxx xxx

The Facts (c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the
respondent shall submit his counter affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his
defense. The counter affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section,
with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant.
Further to quote the rule in furnishing copies of affidavits to parties under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman [Section 4 of Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 issued on April 10, 1990]:
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating officer shall require the
complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.
proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397. Finally, Sen. Estrada asked for a judgment declaring that (a)
he has been denied due process of law, and as a consequence thereof, (b) the Order dated 27 March 2014, as well as
the proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 subsequent to and affected bythe issuance of the 27 March
2014 Order, are void.12
On the same date, 7 May 2014, the Ombudsman issued in OMBC-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 a Joint Order
furnishing Sen. Estrada with the counter-affidavits of Tuason, Cunanan, Amata, Relampagos, Francisco Figura, Gregoria
Buenaventura, and Alexis Sevidal, and directing him to comment thereon within a non-extendible period of five days
fromreceipt of the order.

b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the
On 12 May 2014, Sen. Estrada filed before the Ombudsman a motion to suspend proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and
affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondents to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
OMB-C-C-13-0397 because the denial of his Request to be furnished copies of counter-affidavits of his co-respondents
his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant may
deprived him of his right to procedural due process, and he has filed the present Petition before thisCourt. The
file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.
Ombudsman denied Sen. Estradas motion to suspend in an Order dated 15 May 2014. Sen. Estrada filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated 15 May 2014 but his motion was denied in an Order dated 3 June 2014.
It can be gleaned from these aforecited provisions that this Office is required to furnish [Sen. Estrada] a copy of the
Complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents; and this Office complied with this requirement when it furnished
As of 2 June 2014,the date of filing of the Ombudsmans Comment to the present Petition, Sen. Estrada had not filed a
[Sen. Estrada] with the foregoing documents attached to the Orders to File Counter-Affidavit dated 19 November 2013
comment on the counter-affidavits furnished to him. On 4 June 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order in OMB-C-C-
and 25 November 2013.
13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 denying, among other motions filed by the other respondents, Sen. Estradas motion for
reconsideration dated 7 April 2014. The pertinent portion of the 4 June 2014 Joint Order stated:
It is to be noted that there is noprovision under this Offices Rules of Procedure which entitles respondent to be furnished
all the filings by the other parties, e.g. the respondents. Ruby Tuason, Dennis Cunanan, Gondelina G. Amata and Mario L.
While it is true that Senator Estradas request for copies of Tuason, Cunanan, Amata, Relampagos, Figura, Buenaventura
Relampagos themselves are all respondents in these cases. Under the Rules of Court as well as the Rules of Procedure
and Sevidals affidavits was denied by Order dated 27 March 2014 and before the promulgation of the assailed Joint
of the Office of the Ombudsman, the respondents are only required to furnish their counter-affidavits and controverting
Resolution, this Office thereafter reevaluated the request and granted it byOrder dated 7 May 2014 granting his request.
evidence to the complainant, and not to the other respondents.
Copies of the requested counter-affidavits were appended to the copy of the Order dated 7 May 2014 transmitted to
Senator Estrada through counsel.
To reiterate, the rights of respondent [Sen.] Estrada in the conduct of the preliminary investigation depend on the rights
granted to him by law and these cannot be based on whatever rights he believes [that] he is entitled to or those that may
This Office, in fact, held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration in this proceeding in light of its
be derived from the phrase "due process of law." Thus, this Office cannot grant his motion to be furnished with copies of
grant to Senator Estrada a period of five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Order to formally respond to the above-
all the filings by the other parties. Nevertheless, he should be furnished a copy of the Reply of complainant NBI as he is
named co-respondents claims.
entitled thereto under the rules; however, as of this date, no Reply has been filed by complainant NBI.

In view of the foregoing, this Office fails to see how Senator Estrada was deprived of his right to procedural due
WHEREFORE, respondent [Sen.] Estradas Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
process.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filingsis DENIED. He is nevertheless entitled to be furnished a copy
of the Reply if complainant opts to file such pleading.8 (Emphases in the original)
On 2 June 2014, the Ombudsman, the FIO, and the NBI (collectively, public respondents), through the Officeof the
Solicitor General, filed their Comment to the present Petition. The public respondents argued that:
On 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 a Joint Resolution9which found
probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his co-respondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the Joint Resolution dated 28 March I. PETITIONER [SEN. ESTRADA] WAS NOTDENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
2014) dated 7 April 2014. Sen. Estrada prayed for the issuance of a new resolution dismissing the charges against him.
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsmans 27 March 2014 Order denying his Request, Sen. Estrada
II. THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS PROCEDURALLY INFIRM.
filed the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set aside the 27 March 2014 Order.

A. LITIS PENDENTIA EXISTS IN THIS CASE.

THE ARGUMENTS

B. PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW.
Sen. Estrada raised the following grounds in his Petition:

III. PETITIONER IS NOTENTITLED TO A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR TEMPORARY

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IN ISSUING THE CHALLENGED ORDER DATED 27 MARCH 2014, ACTED
RESTRAINING ORDER.14
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED SEN. ESTRADA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.10 Sen. Estrada also claimed that under the circumstances, he has "no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and On 6 June 2014, Atty. Baligod filed his Comment to the present Petition. Atty. Baligod stated that Sen. Estradas resort to
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, except through this Petition." 11 Sen. Estrada applied for the issuance of a a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is improper. Sen. Estrada should have either filed a motion for reconsideration of
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain public respondents from conducting further the 27 March 2014 Order or incorporated the alleged irregularity in his motion for reconsideration of the 28 March 2014
Joint Resolution. There was also no violation of Sen. Estradas right to due process because there is no rule which
mandates that a respondent such as Sen. Estrada be furnished with copies of the submissions of his corespondents.
On 16 June 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Reply to the public respondents Comment. Sen. Estrada insisted that he was
denied due process. Although Sen. Estrada received copies of the counter-affidavits of Cunanan, Amata, Relampagos,
Buenaventura, Figura, Sevidal, as well as one of Tuasons counter-affidavits, heclaimed that he was not given the
following documents:
a) One other Counter-Affidavit of Ruby Tuason dated 21 February 2014;
b) Counter-Affidavit of Sofia D. Cruz dated 31 January 2014;
c) Counter-Affidavit of Evelyn Sugcang dated 11 February 2014;
d) Two (2) Counter-Affidavits of Alan A. Javellana dated 06 February 2014;
e) Counter-Affidavit of VictorRoman Cojamco Cacal dated 11 December 2013 (to the FIO Complaint);
f) Counter-Affidavit of VictorRoman Cojamco Cacal dated 22 January 2014 (to the NBI Complaint);
g) Two (2) counter-affidavits of Ma. Julie A. VillaralvoJohnson both dated 14 March 2014;
h) Counter-affidavit of Rhodora Bulatad Mendoza dated 06 March 2014;
i) Counter-affidavit of Maria Ninez P. Guaizo dated 28 January 2014;
j) Two (2) counter-affidavits of Marivic V. Jover both dated 09 December 2013; and
k) Counter-affidavit of Francisco B. Figura dated 08 January 2014. Sen. Estrada argues that the Petition isnot rendered
moot by the subsequent issuance of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order because there is a recurring violation of his right to due
process. Sen. Estrada also insists that there is no forum shopping as the present Petition arose from an incident in the
main proceeding, and that he has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Finally,
Sen. Estrada reiterates his application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain public respondents from conducting further proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-
0397.
This Courts Ruling
Considering the facts narrated above, the Ombudsmans denial in its 27 March 2014 Order of Sen. Estradas Request did
not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the denial did not violate Sen. Estradas constitutional right to due
process.
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits
of his co-respondents.
We reproduce below Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of
Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for ready reference.
From the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 112: Preliminary Investigation
Section 3. Procedure. The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant
and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of
copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to
before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a
notary public, each of who must certify thathe personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground
to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its
supporting affidavits and documents. The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the
complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be
made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination, copying, or photographing
at the expense of the requesting party.
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the
respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his
defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section,
with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in
lieu of a counter-affidavit.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day
period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party ora witness. The
parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the
investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.
The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other documents or from the
expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.
(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient
ground to hold the respondent for trial. Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. If the
investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He
shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall
recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman orhis deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is disapproved by
the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable
cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct any other assistant
prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the
Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he
shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same rule
shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. From the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, Administrative Order No. 7, Rule II: Procedure in Criminal Cases
Section 1. Grounds. A criminal complaint may be brought for an offense in violation of R.A. 3019,as amended, R.A.
1379, as amended, R.A. 6713, Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 of the Revised Penal Code, and for such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees in relation to office.
Sec. 2. Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
Sec. 3. Preliminary investigation; who may conduct. Preliminary investigation may be conducted by any of the following:
1) Ombudsman Investigators;
2) Special Prosecuting Officers;
3) Deputized Prosecutors;
4) Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigations; or
5) Lawyers in the government service, so designated by the Ombudsman.
Sec. 4. Procedure. The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to
the following provisions:
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating officer shall require the
complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the
affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on thecomplainant. The complainant may
file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.
c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer may consider the comment filed by him, if
any, as his answer to the complaint. In any event, the respondent shall have access to the evidence on record.
d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of particulars be
entertained. If respondent desires any matter in the complainants affidavit to be clarified, the particularization thereof may
be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.
e) If the respondent cannot be served with the order mentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or having been served, does not
comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.
f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences, there are facts material to the case which the
investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the parties shall be
afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine the witness being questioned.
Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses is impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may be conducted in
writing, whereby the questions desired to be asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced into writing and
served on the witness concerned who shall be required to answer the same in writing and under oath.
g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall forward the records of the case
together with his resolution to the designated authorities for their appropriate action thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written authority or approval of the
Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other
cases.
xxxx
Sec. 6. Notice to parties. The parties shall be served with a copy of the resolution as finally approved by the
Ombudsman or by the proper Deputy Ombudsman.
Sec. 7. Motion for reconsideration. a) Only one (1) motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of anapproved order or
resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof with the Office of the
Ombudsman, or the proper deputy ombudsman as the case may be.
xxxx
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the corresponding Information in court
on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion. (Emphasis supplied)
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter affidavits of his co-respondents violates his
constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory
requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section
4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estradas claim. What the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the
complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the
respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it
states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall
issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to
submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit
submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not
the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting
affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of
the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estradas Request.
Although Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that a respondent "shall
have access to the evidence on record," this provision should be construed in relation to Section 4(a) and (b) of the same
Rule, as well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4(a) states that "theinvestigating officer shall require the
complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaint." The "supporting witnesses" are
the witnesses of the complainant, and do not refer to the co-respondents.
Second, Section 4(b) states that "the investigating officer shall issue an order attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and
all other supporting documents, directing the respondent" tosubmit his counter-affidavit. The affidavits referred to in
Section 4(b) are the affidavits mentioned in Section
4(a). Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the respondent are the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting
witnesses. The provision in the immediately succeeding Section 4(c) of the same Rule II that a respondent shall have
"access to the evidence on record" does not stand alone, but should be read in relation to the provisions of Section 4(a
and b) of the same Rule II requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with the "affidavits and other
supporting documents" submitted by "the complainant or supporting witnesses." Thus, a respondents "access to
evidence on record" in Section 4(c), Rule II of the Ombudsmans Rules of Procedure refers to the affidavits and
supporting documents of "the complainant or supporting witnesses" in Section 4(a) of the same Rule II.
Third, Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[t]he respondent shall have the
right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at
his expense." A respondents right to examine refers only to "the evidence submitted by the complainant."
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or under Rule II of the Ombudsmans Rules of
Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever that the affidavits executed by the corespondents should be furnished to a
respondent. Justice Velascos dissent relies on the ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Reyes (Reyes case), 15 an
administrative case, in which a different set of rules of procedure and standards apply. Sen. Estradas Petition, in contrast,
involves the preliminary investigation stage in a criminal case. Rule III on the Procedure in Administrative Cases of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in the Reyes case, while Rule II on the Procedure in Criminal
Cases of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in Sen. Estradas Petition. In both cases, the
Rules of Court apply in a suppletory character or by analogy.16
In the Reyescase, the complainant Acero executed an affidavit against Reyes and Pealoza, who were both employees of
the Land Transportation Office. Pealoza submitted his counter-affidavit, as well as those of his two witnesses. Reyes
adopted his counter-affidavit in another case before the Ombudsman as it involved the same parties and the same
incident. None of the parties appeared during the preliminary conference. Pealoza waived his right to a formal
investigation and was willing to submit the case for resolution based on the evidence on record. Pealoza also submitted
a counter-affidavit of his third witness. The Ombudsman found Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and dismissed him from
the service. On the other hand, Pealoza was found guilty of simple misconduct and penalized with suspension from
office without pay for six months. This Court agreed with the Court of Appeals finding that Reyes right to due process
was indeed violated. This Court remanded the records of the case to the Ombudsman, for two reasons: (1) Reyes should
not have been meted the penalty of dismissal from the service when the evidence was not substantial, and (2) there was
disregard of Reyes right to due process because he was not furnished a copy of the counter-affidavits of Pealoza and of
Pealozas three witnesses. In the Reyes case, failure to furnish a copy of the counter-affidavits happened in the
administrative proceedings on the merits, which resulted in Reyes dismissal from the service. In Sen. Estradas Petition,
the denial of his Request happened during the preliminary investigation where the only issue is the existence of probable
cause for the purpose of determining whether an information should be filed, and does not prevent Sen. Estrada from
requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during the pre-trial or even during the trial.
We should remember to consider the differences in adjudicating cases, particularly an administrative case and a criminal
case:
Any lawyer worth his salt knows that quanta of proof and adjective rules vary depending on whether the cases to which
they are meant to apply are criminal, civil or administrative in character. In criminal actions, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is required for conviction;in civil actions and proceedings, preponderance of evidence, as support for a judgment;
and in administrative cases, substantial evidence, as basis for adjudication. In criminal and civil actions, application of the
Rules of Court is called for, with more or less strictness. In administrative proceedings, however, the technical rules of
pleadingand procedure, and of evidence, are not strictly adhered to; they generally apply only suppletorily; indeed, in
agrarian disputes application of the Rules of Court is actually prohibited. 17
It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause,
and "probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary
investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights,
such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence."18Thus, the rights of a
respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in
preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded belief" as tothe fact of the commission of
a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with
the state prosecutors findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of petitioners involvement in the
commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.
Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioners argument that the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol are inadmissible as to
him since he was not granted the opportunity of cross-examination.
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses
which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent
shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and,
where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if petitioner was not given the
opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol atthe time they were presented to testify during the separate trial of
the case against Galarion and Roxas, he cannot assert any legal right to cross-examine them at the preliminary
investigation precisely because such right was never available to him. The admissibility or inadmissibility of said
testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court during the trial proper and not in the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we
find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules. In addition, considering that under Section 8,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in
the Regional Trial Court, then the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not be admitted by the trial court if not
presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal. And, even if the prosecution does present such testimonies, petitioner
can always object thereto and the trial court can rule on the admissibility thereof; or the petitioner can, during the trial,
petition said court to compel the presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of cross-examination.19 (Emphasis
supplied)
Furthermore, in citing the Reyes case, Justice Velascos dissent overlooked a vital portion of the Court of Appeals
reasoning. This Court quoted from the Court of Appeals decision: "x x x [A]dmissions made by Pealoza in his sworn
statement are binding only on him. Res inter alios act a alteri nocere non debet. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced
by an act, declaration or omission of another." In OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397, the admissions of Sen.
Estradas co-respondents can in no way prejudice Sen. Estrada. Even granting Justice Velascos argument that the 28
March 2014 Joint Resolution in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-039720 mentioned the testimonies of Sen. Estradas
corespondents like Tuason and Cunanan, their testimonies were merely corroborative of the testimonies of complainants
witnesses Benhur Luy, Marina Sula, and Merlina Suas and were not mentioned in isolation from the testimonies of
complainants witnesses.
Moreover, the sufficiency of the evidence put forward by the Ombudsman against Sen. Estrada to establish its finding of
probable cause in the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-CC-13-0397 was judicially
confirmed by the Sandiganbayan, when it examined the evidence, found probable cause, and issued a warrant of arrest
against Sen. Estrada on 23 June 2014.
We likewise take exception to Justice Brions assertion that "the due process standards that at the very least should be
considered in the conduct of a preliminary investigation are those that this Court first articulated in Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations [Ang Tibay]."21 Simply put, the Ang Tibay guidelines for administrative cases do not apply to
preliminary investigations in criminal cases. An application of the Ang Tibay guidelines to preliminary investigations will
have absurd and disastrous consequences.
Ang Tibay enumerated the constitutional requirements of due process, which Ang Tibay described as the "fundamental
and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character." 22 These
requirements are "fundamental and essential" because without these, there isno due process as mandated by the
Constitution. These "fundamental and essential requirements" cannot be taken away by legislation because theyare part
of constitutional due process. These "fundamental and essential requirements" are:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. x x x.
(3) "While the duty to deliberatedoes not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, x x x."
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial."
"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." x x x.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected. x x x.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. x x x.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in sucha manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. 23
The guidelines set forth in Ang Tibay are further clarified in GSIS v. CA 24 (GSIS): "what Ang Tibay failed to explicitly state
was, prescinding from the general principles governing due process, the requirement of an impartial tribunalwhich,
needless to say, dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not sit as judge and jury simultaneously, neither
may he review his decision on appeal."25 The GSIS clarification affirms the non applicability of the Ang Tibay guidelines to
preliminary investigations in criminal cases: The investigating officer, which is the role that the Office of the Ombudsman
plays in the investigation and prosecution of government personnel, will never be the impartial tribunal required in Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The purpose of the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary investigation, after
conducting its own factfinding investigation, is to determine probable cause for filing an information, and not to make a
final adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties under the law, which is the purpose of the guidelines in Ang
Tibay. The investigating officer investigates, determines probable cause, and prosecutes the criminal case after filing the
corresponding information.
The purpose in determining probable cause is to make sure that the courts are not clogged with weak cases that will only
be dismissed, as well as to spare a person from the travails of a needless prosecution. 26 The Ombudsman and the
prosecution service under the control and supervision of the Secretary of the Department of Justice are inherently the
fact-finder, investigator, hearing officer, judge and jury of the respondent in preliminary investigations. Obviously, this
procedure cannot comply with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. However, there is nothing unconstitutional with this
procedure because this is merely an Executive function, a part of the law enforcement process leading to trial in court
where the requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, will apply. This has been the procedure under the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. To now rule that Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, should apply to preliminary
investigations will mean that all past and present preliminary investigations are in gross violation of constitutional due
process.
Moreover, a person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada is in the present case when he filed his Request, is
not yet an accused person, and hence cannot demand the full exercise of the rights of an accused person:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed
and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither
on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less
than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial.
It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause, wealso hold that the
DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The
decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the
investigator alone. If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator need not hold a clarificatory
hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner.
Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his
rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the
DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory
hearing was unnecessary.27
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, writing for the Court, emphatically declared in Lozada v. Hernandez, 28 that the "rights conferred
upon accused persons to participate in preliminary investigations concerning themselves depend upon the provisions of
law by which such rights are specifically secured, rather than upon the phrase due process of law." This reiterates
Justice Jose P. Laurels oft-quoted pronouncement in Hashim v. Boncan29 that "the right to a preliminary investigation is
statutory, not constitutional." In short, the rights of a respondent ina preliminary investigation are merely statutory rights,
not constitutional due process rights. An investigation to determine probable cause for the filing of an information does not
initiate a criminal action so as to trigger into operation Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution.30 It is the filing of a
complaint or information in court that initiates a criminal action. 31
The rights to due process in administrative cases as prescribed in Ang Tibay,as amplified in GSIS, are granted by the
Constitution; hence, these rights cannot be taken away by merelegislation. On the other hand, as repeatedly reiterated by
this Court, the right to a preliminary investigation is merely a statutory right, 32 not part of the "fundamental and essential
requirements" of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay and amplified in GSIS. Thus, a preliminary investigation can be
taken away by legislation. The constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him does not apply in
preliminary investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary investigation be an infringement of his right to confront the
witnesses against him.33 A preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional
right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial. 34
The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidenceneeded in a preliminary
investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the
prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to "substantial evidence," while the establishment of probable cause needs "only
more than bare suspicion, or less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." In the United States, from where we
borrowed the concept of probable cause,35 the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.These are not technical;
they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
"The substance of all the definitions" of probable cause "is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt." McCarthy v. De Armit,
99 Pa. St. 63, 69, quoted with approval in the Carroll opinion. 267 U. S. at 161. And this "means less than evidence which
would justify condemnation" or conviction, as Marshall, C. J., said for the Court more than a century ago in Locke v.
United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348. Since Marshalls time, at any rate, it has come to mean more than bare suspicion:
Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within their [the officers] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that"
an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162.
These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and
from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the communitys protection.
Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room
must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts
leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, non technical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more
would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers
whim or caprice.36
In the Philippines, there are four instances in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure where probable cause is needed to
be established:
(1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the investigating officer, to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should
be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where
the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to the fine;
(2) In Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the judge, to determine whether a warrant of arrest or a commitment order, if the
accused has already been arrested, shall be issued and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice;
(3) In Section 5(b) of Rule 113: By a peace officer or a private person making a warrantless arrest when an offense has
just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the judge, to determine whether a search warrant shall be issued, and only upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
In all these instances, the evidence necessary to establish probable cause is based only on the likelihood, or probability,
of guilt. Justice Brion, in the recent case of Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan37 (Unilever), stated:
The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is merely required is
"probability of guilt." Its determination, too, does not call for the application of rules or standards of proof that a judgment
of conviction requires after trial on the merits. Thus, in concluding that there is probable cause, it suffices that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the very offense charged.
It is also important to stress that the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a partys
accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented. As previously discussed, these matters
are better ventilated during the trial proper of the case. As held in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Gonzales:
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted. x x x. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge. (Bold facing and italicization supplied)
Justice Brions pronouncement in Unilever that "the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or
merits of a partys accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented" correctly recognizes
the doctrine in the United States that the determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on hearsay
evidence, as long as the person making the hearsay statement is credible. In United States v. Ventresca, 38 the United
States Supreme Court held:
While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of "probable cause," this Court has long held that "the term probable
cause . . . means less than evidence which would justify condemnation," Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 11 U.S.
348, and that a finding of "probable cause" may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial.
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 358 U.S. 311. As the Court stated in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173,
"There is a large difference between the two things tobe proved (guilt and probable cause), as well as between the
tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish
them." Thus, hearsay may be the basis for issuance of the warrant "so long as there . . . [is] a substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay." Jones v. United States, supra, at 362 U.S. 272. And, in Aguilar, we recognized that "an affidavit
may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant," so long as the
magistrate is "informed of some of the underlying circumstances" supporting the affiants conclusions and his belief that
any informant involved "whose identity need not be disclosed . . ." was "credible" or his information "reliable." Aguilar v.
Texas, supra, at 378 U.S. 114. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in
administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is "substantial evidence" which
cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence
because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay evidence. To
require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of
evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial evidence
of guilt.
It is, moreover, necessary to distinguish between the constitutionally guaranteed rights of an accused and the right to a
preliminary investigation. To treat them the same will lead toabsurd and disastrous consequences.
All pending criminal cases in all courts throughout the country will have to be remanded to the preliminary investigation
level because none of these will satisfy Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations are conducted by
prosecutors, who are the same officials who will determine probable cause and prosecute the cases in court. The
prosecutor is hardly the impartial tribunal contemplated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. A reinvestigation by an
investigating officer outside of the prosecution service will be necessary if Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, were to be
applied. This will require a new legislation. In the meantime, all pending criminal cases in all courts will have to be
remanded for reinvestigation, to proceed only when a new law is in place. To require Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to
apply to preliminary investigation will necessarily change the concept of preliminary investigation as we know it now.
Applying the constitutional due process in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigation will necessarily
require the application of the rights of an accused in Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This means that the
respondent can demand an actual hearing and the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him, rights which are not
afforded at present toa respondent in a preliminary investigation.
The application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is not limited to those with pending preliminary investigations but even
to those convicted by final judgment and already serving their sentences. The rule is well-settled that a judicial decision
applies retroactively if it has a beneficial effect on a person convicted by final judgment even if he is already serving his
sentence, provided that he is not a habitual criminal.39 This Court retains its control over a case "until the full satisfaction
of the final judgment conformably with established legal processes." 40 Applying Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to
preliminary investigations will result in thousands of prisoners, convicted by final judgment, being set free from prison.
Second. Sen. Estradas present Petition for Certiorari is premature.
Justice Velascos dissent prefers thatSen. Estrada not "be subjected to the rigors of a criminal prosecution incourt"
because there is "a pending question regarding the Ombudsmans grave abuse of its discretion preceding the finding of a
probable cause to indict him." Restated bluntly, Justice Velascos dissent would like this Court to conclude that the mere
filing of the present Petition for Certiorari questioning the Ombudsmans denial of Sen. Estradas Request should have, by
itself, voided all proceedings related to the present case.
Although it is true that, in its 27 March 2014 Order, the Ombudsman denied Sen. Estradas Request, the Ombudsman
subsequently reconsidered its Order. On 7 May 2014, the same date that Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition, the
Ombudsman issued a Joint Order in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 that furnishedSen. Estrada with the
counter-affidavits of Ruby Tuason, Dennis Cunanan, Gondelina Amata, Mario Relampagos, Francisco Figura, Gregoria
Buenaventura, and AlexisSevidal, and directed him to comment within a non-extendible period of five days from receipt of
said Order. Sen. Estrada did not file any comment, as noted in the 4 June 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman.
On 4 June 2014, the Ombudsman issued another Joint Order and denied Sen. Estradas Motion for Reconsideration ofits
28 March 2014 Joint Resolution which found probable cause toindict Sen. Estrada and his corespondents with one count
of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019. In this 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the
Ombudsman stated that "[t]his Office, in fact, held in abeyance the disposition of motions for reconsideration in this
proceeding in light of its grant to Senator Estrada a period of five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Order to formally
respond to the above-named respondents claims."
We underscore Sen. Estradas procedural omission. Sen. Estrada did not file any pleading, much less a motion for
reconsideration, to the 27 March 2014 Order inOMB-C-C-13-0313. Sen. Estrada immediately proceeded to file this
Petition for Certiorari before this Court. Sen. Estradas resort to a petitionfor certiorari before this Court stands in stark
contrast to his filing of his 7 April 2014 Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution finding probable
cause. The present Petition for Certiorari is premature.
A motion for reconsideration allows the public respondent an opportunity to correct its factual and legal errors. Sen.
Estrada, however, failed to present a compelling reason that the present Petition falls under the exceptions 41to the general
rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari. This Court has
reiterated in numerous decisions that a motion for reconsideration is mandatory before the filing of a petition for
certiorari.42
Justice Velascos dissent faults the majority for their refusal to apply the Reyes case to the present Petition. Justice
Velascos dissent insists that "this Court cannot neglect to emphasize that, despite the variance in the quanta of evidence
required, a uniform observance of the singular concept of due process is indispensable in all proceedings."
As we try to follow Justice Velascos insistence, we direct Justice Velasco and those who join him in his dissent to this
Courts ruling in Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman (Ruivivar),43 wherein we stated that "[t]he law can no longer help
one who had been given ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the proffered chance."
The Ruivivar case, like the Reyes44 case, was also an administrative case before the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman
found petitioner Rachel Beatriz Ruivivar administratively liable for discourtesy in the course of her official functions and
imposed on her the penalty of reprimand. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the ground that
she was not furnished copies of the affidavits of the private respondents witnesses. The Ombudsman subsequently
ordered that petitioner be furnished with copies of the counter-affidavits of private respondents witnesses, and that
petitioner should "file, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order, such pleading which she may deem fit under the
circumstances." Petitioner received copies of the affidavits, and simply filed a manifestation where she maintained that her
receipt of the affidavits did not alter the deprivation of her right to due process or cure the irregularity in the Ombudsmans
decision to penalize her.
In Ruivivar, petitioner received the affidavits of the private respondents witnesses afterthe Ombudsman rendered a
decision against her. We disposed of petitioners deprivation of due process claim in this manner:
The CA Decision dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust all the
administrative remedies available to her before the Ombudsman. This ruling is legallycorrect as exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a requisite for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Other than this legal significance, however,
the ruling necessarily carries the direct and immediate implication that the petitioner has been granted the opportunity to
be heard and has refused to avail of this opportunity; hence, she cannot claim denial of due process. In the words of the
CA ruling itself: "Petitioner was given the opportunity by public respondent to rebut the affidavits submitted by private
respondent. . . and had a speedy and adequate administrative remedy but she failed to avail thereof for reasons only
known to her."
For a fuller appreciation of our above conclusion, we clarify that although they are separate and distinct concepts,
exhaustion of administrative remedies and due process embody linked and related principles. The "exhaustion" principle
applies when the ruling court or tribunal is not given the opportunity tore-examine its findings and conclusions because of
an available opportunity that a party seeking recourse against the court or the tribunals ruling omitted to take. Under the
concept of "due process," on the other hand, a violation occurs when a court or tribunal rules against a party without
giving him orher the opportunity to be heard. Thus, the exhaustion principle is based on the perspective of the ruling court
or tribunal, while due process is considered from the point of view of the litigating party against whom a ruling was made.
The commonality they share is in the same"opportunity" that underlies both. In the context of the present case, the
available opportunity to consider and appreciate the petitioners counter-statement offacts was denied the Ombudsman;
hence, the petitioner is barred from seeking recourse at the CA because the ground she would invoke was not considered
at all at the Ombudsman level. At the same time, the petitioner who had the same opportunity to rebut the belatedly-
furnished affidavits of the private respondents witnesses was not denied and cannot now claim denial of due process
because she did not take advantage of the opportunity opened to her at the Ombudsman level.
The records show that the petitioner duly filed a motion for reconsideration on due process grounds (i.e., for the private
respondents failure to furnish her copies of the affidavits of witnesses) and on questions relating to the appreciation of the
evidence on record. The Ombudsman acted on this motion by issuing its Order of January 17, 2003 belatedly furnishing
her with copies of the private respondents witnesses, together with the "directive to file, within ten (10) days from receipt
of this Order, such pleading which she may deem fit under the circumstances."
Given this opportunity to act on the belatedly-furnished affidavits, the petitioner simply chose to file a "Manifestation"
where she took the position that "The order of the Ombudsman dated 17 January 2003 supplying her with the affidavits of
the complainant does not cure the 04 November 2002 order," and on this basis prayed that the Ombudsmans decision
"be reconsidered and the complaint dismissed for lack of merit."
For her part, the private respondent filed a Comment/Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 January 2003
and prayed for the denial of the petitioners motion.
In the February 12, 2003 Order, the Ombudsman denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration after finding no basis 8. It is respectfully submitted that the Ombudsman violated the foregoing rule [Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court]
to alter or modify its ruling. Significantly, the Ombudsman fully discussed in this Order the due process significance of the and principles. A reading of the Joint Resolution will reveal that various pieces of evidence which Senator Estrada was not
petitioners failure to adequately respond to the belatedly-furnished affidavits. The Ombudsman said: furnished with hence, depriving him of the opportunity to controvert the same were heavily considered by the
Ombudsman in finding probable cause to charge him with Plunder and with violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
"Undoubtedly, the respondent herein has been furnished by this Office with copies of the affidavits, which she claims she
has not received. Furthermore, the respondent has been given the opportunity to present her side relative thereto, xxxx
however, she chose not to submit countervailing evidence orargument. The respondent, therefore (sic), cannot claim
denial of due process for purposes of assailing the Decision issued in the present case. On this score, the Supreme Court
11. Notably, under dated 20 March 2014, Senator Estrada filed a "Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-
held in the case of People v. Acot, 232 SCRA 406, that "a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had the
Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings," pursuant to the right of a respondent
opportunity to present his side". This becomes all the more important since, as correctly pointed out by the complainant,
"to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished" (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of
the decision issued in the present case is deemed final and unappealable pursuant to Section 27 of Republic Act 6770,
the Rules of Court), and to "have access to the evidence on record" (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. Despite the clear provisions of the law and the rules, the
Office of the Ombudsman).
respondent herein was given the opportunity not normally accorded, to present her side, but she opted not to do so which
is evidently fatal to her cause." [emphasis supplied].
However, notwithstanding the gravity of the offenses leveled against Senator Estrada and the laws vigilance in protecting
the rights of an accused, the Special Panel of Investigators, in an Order dated 27 March 2014, unceremoniously denied
Under these circumstances, we cannot help but recognize that the petitioners cause is a lost one, not only for her failure
the request on the ground that "there is no provision under this Offices Rules of Procedure which entitles respondent to
to exhaust her available administrative remedy, but also on due process grounds. The law can no longer help one who
be furnished all the filings by the other parties x x x x." (Order dated 27 March 2013, p. 3)
had been given ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the proffered chance. 45

As such, Senator Estrada was not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the
Ruivivar applies with even greater force to the present Petition because here the affidavits of Sen. Estradas co-
bases of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause.50
respondents were furnished to him beforethe Ombudsman rendered her 4 June 2014 Joint Order. In Ruivivar, the
affidavits were furnished after the Ombudsman issued a decision.
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estradas Motion for Reconsideration in its 4 June 2014 Joint Order. Clearly, Sen. Estrada
expressly raised in his Motion for Reconsideration with the Ombudsman the violation of his right to due process, the same
Justice Velascos dissent cites the cases of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan46 (Tatad) and Duterte v. Sandiganbayan47(Duterte) in
issue he is raising in this petition. In the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to his petition
an attempt to prop up its stand. A careful reading of these cases, however, would show that they do not stand on all fours
docketed as G.R. Nos. 212761-62 filed on 23 June 2014, Sen. Estrada disclosed the pendency of the present petition, as
with the present case. In Tatad, this Court ruled that "the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and
well as those before the Sandiganbayan for the determination of the existence of probable cause. In his petition in G.R.
filing the information [by the Tanodbayan] in the present case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the
Nos. 212761-62, Sen. Estrada again mentioned the Ombudsmans 27 March 2014 Joint Order denying his Request.
petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him." 48 The Tanod bayan took almost three
years to terminate the preliminary investigation, despite Presidential Decree No. 911s prescription of a ten-day period for
the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation. We ruled similarly in Duterte, where the petitioners were 17. Sen. Estrada was shocked not only at the Office of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause, which he maintains is
merely asked to comment and were not asked to file counter-affidavits as isthe proper procedure in a preliminary without legal or factual basis, but also thatsuch finding of probable cause was premised on evidence not disclosed tohim,
investigation. Moreover, in Duterte, the Ombudsman took four years to terminate its preliminary investigation. including those subject of his Request to be Furnished with Copiesof Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents,
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings dated 20 March 2014.
As we follow the reasoning in Justice Velascos dissent, it becomes more apparent that Sen. Estradas present Petition for
Certiorari is premature for lack of filing of a motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman. When the Ombudsman In particular, the Office of the Ombudsman used as basis for the Joint Resolution the following documents
gave Sen. Estrada copies of the counter-affidavits and even waited for the lapse of the given period for the filing of his
comment, Sen. Estrada failed to avail of the opportunity to be heard due to his own fault. Thus, Sen. Estradas failure
cannot in any way be construed as violation of due process by the Ombudsman, much less of grave abuse of discretion. i. Alexis G. Sevidals Counter-Affidavits dated 15 January and 24 February 2014;
Sen. Estrada has not filed any comment, and still chooses not to.
ii. Dennis L. Cunanans Counter-Affidavits both dated 20 February 2014;
Third. Sen. Estradas present Petition for Certiorari constitutes forum shopping and should be summarily dismissed.
iii. Francisco B. Figuras Counter-Affidavit dated 08 January 2014;
In his verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the present petition filed on 7 May 2014, Sen. Estrada stated:
iv. Ruby Tuasons Counter-Affidavits both dated 21 February 2014;
3.1 I, however, disclose that I have filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 07 April 2014 in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and
OMB-CC-13-0397, raising as sole issuethe finding of probable cause in the Joint Resolution dated 28 March 2014. v. Gregoria G. Buenaventuras Counter-Affidavit dated 06 March 2014; and

Such Motion for Reconsideration has yet to be resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman.49 (Emphasis supplied)
Sen. Estradas Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution prayed that the Ombudsman reconsider
and issue a new resolution dismissing the charges against him. However, in this Motion for Reconsideration, Sen. Estrada
assailed the Ombudsmans 27 March 2014 Joint Order denying his Request, and that such denial is a violation of his right
to due process.
vi. Philippine Daily Inquirer Online Edition news article entitled "Benhur Luy upstages Napoles in Senate Hearing" by
Norman Bordadora and TJ Borgonio, published on 06 March 2014, none of which were ever furnished Sen. Estrada prior
to the issuance of the challenged Joint Resolution, despite written request.
xxxx
 II
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IN ISSUING THE CHALLENGED JOINT RESOLUTION DATED 28 MARCH 2014
AND CHALLENGED JOINT ORDER DATED 04 JUNE 2014, NOT ONLY ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION,
BUT ALSO VIOLATED SEN. ESTRADAS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TO EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
xxxx
2.17 x x x x
Notably, in its Joint Order dated 07 May 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman even arbitrarily limited the filing of Sen.
Estradas comment to the voluminous documents comprisingthe documents it furnished Sen. Estrada to a "non-
extendible" period offive (5) days, making it virtually impossible for Sen. Estrada to adequately study the charges leveled
against him and intelligently respond to them. The Joint Order also failed to disclose the existence of other counter-
affidavits and failed to furnish Sen. Estrada copies of such counter-affidavits.51
Sen. Estrada has not been candid with this Court. His claim that the finding of probable cause was the "sole issue" he
raised before the Ombudsman in his Motion for Reconsideration dated 7 April 2014 is obviously false.
Moreover, even though Sen. Estrada acknowledged his receipt of the Ombudsmans 4 June 2014 Joint Order which
denied his motion for reconsideration of the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution, Sen. Estrada did not mention that the 4 June
2014 Joint Order stated that the Ombudsman "held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration in this
proceeding in light of its grant to [Sen. Estrada] a period of five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 [Joint] Order to
formally respond to the abovenamed co-respondents claims."
Sen. Estrada claims that his rights were violated but he flouts the rules himself.
The rule against forum shopping is not limited tothe fulfillment of the requisites of litis pendentia.52 To determine whether a
party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia
are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicatain another. 53 Undergirding the principle of
litis pendentia is the theory that a party isnot allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter
and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same matter should not be the
subject of controversy in court more than once in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided, for the sake of
the stability in the rights and status of persons.54
x x x [D]espite the fact that what the petitioners filed wasa petition for certiorari, a recourse that in the usual course and
because of its nature and purpose is not covered by the rule on forum shopping. The exception from the forum shopping
rule, however, is true only where a petition for certiorari is properly or regularly invoked in the usual course; the exception
does not apply when the relief sought, through a petition for certiorari, is still pending with or has as yet to be decided by
the respondent court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial body, e.g., a motion for reconsideration of the
order assailed via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as in the present case. This conclusion is supported and
strengthened by Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the availability of a remedy in the
ordinary course of law precludes the filing of a petition for certiorari; under this rule, the petitions dismissal is the
necessary consequence if recourse to Rule 65 is prematurely taken.
To be sure, the simultaneous remedies the petitioners sought could result in possible conflicting rulings, or at the very
least, to complicated situations, between the RTC and the Court of Appeals. An extreme possible result is for the
appellate court to confirm that the RTC decision is meritorious, yet the RTC may at the same time reconsider its ruling and
recall its order of dismissal. In this eventuality, the result is the affirmation of the decision that the court a quo has
backtracked on. Other permutations depending on the rulings of the two courts and the timing of these rulings are
possible. In every case, our justice system suffers as this kind of sharp practice opens the system to the possibility of
manipulation; to uncertainties when conflict of rulings arise; and at least to vexation for complications other than conflict of
rulings. Thus, it matters not that ultimately the Court of Appeals may completely agree with the RTC; what the rule on
forum shopping addresses are the possibility and the actuality of its harmful effects on our judicial system.55
Sen. Estrada resorted to simultaneous remedies by filing this Petition alleging violation of due process by the
Ombudsman even as his Motion for Reconsideration raising the very same issue remained pending with the Ombudsman.
This is plain and simple forum shopping, warranting outright dismissal of this Petition.
SUMMARY
The Ombudsman, in furnishing Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents, fully
complied with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Section 4, Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, Administrative Order No. 7. Both the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require the investigating officer to furnish the
respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of his supporting witnesses. Neither of these
Rules require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-respondents. The
right of the respondent is only "to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant," as expressly stated in Section
3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has unequivocally ruled in Paderanga that "Section
3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to
submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present
but without the right to examine or cross-examine." Moreover, Section 4 (a, b and c) of Rule II of the Ombudsmans Rule
of Procedure, read together, only require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of
the complainant and his supporting witnesses.1wphi1 There is no law or rule requiring the investigating officer to furnish
the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-respondents.
In the 7 May 2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of
the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the counteraffidavits of some of other
co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman even held in abeyancethe disposition of the motions for
reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to
formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully complied with the existing Rules
on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the Rules required. Thus, the
Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, the
Petition fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.
The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to
preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights. A law can abolish
preliminary investigations without running afoul with the constitutional requirements of dueprocess as prescribed in Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply, and were never
intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights
and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate.
Ang Tibay,as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidencefor a decision against the respondent in the administrative
case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of guiltis required. To apply Ang Tibay,as amplified in
GSIS,to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause. The
respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay,as amplified in GSIS,has the right to an actual hearing and
to cross-examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights.
Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer must be impartial and
cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer atthe same time. In preliminary investigations, the same public
officer may be the investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer may
be under the control and supervisionof the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice. This explains
why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now declare that the guidelines in
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all
past and present preliminary investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for
reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout the country. No preliminary investigation can
proceeduntil a new law designates a public officer, outside of the prosecution service, to determine probable cause. The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between
Moreover, those serving sentences by final judgment would have to be released from prison because their conviction the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City
violated constitutional due process. Sen. Estrada did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the 27 March 2014 Order in where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.3
OMB-C-C-13-0313 denying his Request, which is the subject of the present Petition. He should have filed a Motion for R
econsideration, in the same manner that he filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 15 May 2014 Order denying his
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police Station) to report the incident.4Acting on
motion to suspend proceedings. The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal
this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to
or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of the public
go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance.5 SP02 Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the
respondent.56 The plain, speedy and adequate remedy expressly provided by law is a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the
27 March 2014 Order of the Ombudsman. Sen. Estrada's failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration renders this Petition
alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7
premature.

Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the
Sen. Estrada also raised in this Petition the same issue he raised in his Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 March 2014
petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.8 The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan
Joint Resolution of the Ombudsman finding probable cause. While his Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 March 2014
Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty.
Joint Resolution was pending, Sen. Estrada did not wait for the resolution of the Ombudsman and instead proceeded to
Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. 10
file the present Petition for Certiorari. The Ombudsman issued a Joint Order on 4 June 2014 and specifically addressed
the issue that Sen. Estrada is raising in this Petition. Thus, Sen. Estrada's present Petition for Certiorari is not only
premature, it also constitutes forum shopping. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly committed as
212140-41. follows:

SO ORDERED. That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and
taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO,
Associate Justice
with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime
of Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant
WE CONCUR: was able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.

Republic of the Philippines CONTRARY TO LAW.11

SUPREME COURT
Manila
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation12 on the ground that they
had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no
SECOND DIVISION personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the
police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should
have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.13
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014

On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD
Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.15
MUNOZ,Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They attributed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for preliminary
investigation.16
DECISION

The Assailed CA Decision

BRION, J.:

On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. 17 The CA ruled that the word
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the decision 1dated January
"invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting officer clearly
21, 2008 and the resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.
meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was
pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus, the R TC did
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners)
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section
The Antecedent Facts
3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the
motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17, 2008; 18hence, the
present petition.
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO
THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR
FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued; they went to the
police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually
used the word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived at the crime
scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that
the petitioners were the authors of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation
is void because it was not properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings against the petitioners
should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its resolution. The thought is
very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has
been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this case the legalities
surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench
and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their
origins, development and the current applicable interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902, 19 and the 1935,20 197321 and
198722Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. "23
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The Fourth
Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England
(Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on
June 15, 1215.25 The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to proclaim
certain liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war.27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta
Libertatum later became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 28 It
provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed,
or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his
Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or
Right.30 [Emphasis supplied]
In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision does not prohibit
arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable. 32 With regard to an arrest, it
is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of reasonableness. 33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The Court based these
rulings on the common law of America and England that, according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish
laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in
the Philippines.35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the Charter of Manila, defined
the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under statutes or local
ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as those of the officers established under the common law of
England and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on warrantless arrest were based on common sense
and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then Administrative Code41which directed
municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 3043 of the Provisional Law for the Application
of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence. Presently, the
requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forth with delivered to
the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been denominated as one "in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. 44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) the provision applicable in the present case. This provision
has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully
understand its roots and its appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on warrantless arrests
but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the
Application of the Penal Code which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons whom there is
reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to
arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of confinamiento, if his
antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when
summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the
satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever
summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested, although no formal complaint
has been filed against him, provided the following circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been
committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested participated in the
commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila, which provided that certain officials,
including police officers may, within the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in
suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is
about to commit any crime or breach of the peace.
In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace officer may arrest persons walking in the street at
night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a felony having
been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for an arrest without a
warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of
suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not
liable even if the arrested person turned out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary for the arresting
officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably
sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist
to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition, it was also established under the old court
rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest
would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach. 48
In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the arresting person did not
state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which aroused the arresting
person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on warrantless arrests, the gauge for
a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed
and the person sought to be arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway
on the part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court
(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially incorporated in Section 6,
Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows:50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his
presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964 the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has
Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was committed it.
not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable
cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination of the arresting officer as to the
arrested has committed it.
(1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. According to Feria,
these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay. 51
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be actual commission of an
offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense."
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an
Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of
offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
whether the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the element of probable cause,
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed, and the arresting officer's personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-worded and re-
numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting officer shall proceed on
the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an arrested has committed the crime.
offense;
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not
prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable. According to State v. Quinn, 53 the
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of violating the law is not a violation of due process.
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States 54 that the Fourth Amendment limited the
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant
Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term probable
cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds."55
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules
of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have been
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough investigation and exercise
"committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an
reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment are not
investigation for purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the
less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable
crime.
cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the
arrest and not on the information acquired later.56
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under the Fourth
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of the word Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon
"probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the
the crime. particular circumstances and the particular offense involved. 57

Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession, his fair inferences
therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing probable cause to
arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy
information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a
victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information. 58

From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section S(b ), the following
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which
means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, distinguished from probable
cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for triat.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de
Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the respondent was based on
the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his witnesses. 62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage
of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause63 to issue a warrant
of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested
has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged,64 or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts. 65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer arresting without a
warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable cause," within the
spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance within
their possession. In short, although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar
quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of probable cause on
his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the
public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available information that he
must personally gather within a limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable cause in warrantless arrests
due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that one should not expect too much of an
ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no
opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. 67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows that these were
usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was only on December
11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed identification of two (2)
witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission
of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating
that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of
this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the
arrest was invalid considering that the only information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the
information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards the commission of a
crime.
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed means that there
must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there
was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be
secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he was arrested only a day
after the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and
were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle
only during the custodial investigation.
In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only on the basis of
information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the crime was held invalid because the
crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The information upon which the police acted came from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman; another was
able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's
wife. That information did not constitute "personal knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. In this case, the
arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that the
accused was one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received information from the
victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the information
supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld
the warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the
scene of the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the
shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim
and of facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately responded to the report
of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket.
The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The
Court held that the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to the
arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the
place, they met with the complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims
joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the
reported statements of the complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the
arrest was held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the
arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting
incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a
certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place
of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt.
Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the
incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught
him up as he was about to run towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened the door. They
also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III.
The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, were
enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. Based
on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed"
and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the
particular circumstances of the case. However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law Dictionary, 80"circumstances
are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the
actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the
police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal
evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering
of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the
element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of
immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard
to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame.
This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances
obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest
widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors,
interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited
to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same
provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of
circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest:
1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the
standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The
requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of
compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the question
to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were arrested?
2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime?
and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest,
would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by
the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in its decision. 81From a
review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which
they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however,
that the determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the
warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged crime was
committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated
that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon
City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the petitioners already
inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of
the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of the crime is
corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his
brother Joseph Macapanas,83 although they asserted that they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate84 that was issued by East Avenue
Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about
8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion,
T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm;
Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no
visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma,
periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second issue is largely
academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to
the custody of the person making the arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical
restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary.92

To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged
mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the
alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively
identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners 85and Atty. Generoso86 lived
almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they
did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what
transpired.87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than
one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we
deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the
petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and
evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are
within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not but have the intention of arresting the
petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple
directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application
of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired personal knowledge of the
incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the
victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had
informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police
Station for investigation.94
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid

In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying the petitioners' urgent motion for
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present case saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry
regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987
bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him; however, instead of
Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.96
fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.

The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily went with the
allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of
police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with
its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the
Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what transpired.
case."

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not
officers have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best
Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances;
reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.

The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting
officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim. 90 This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that
the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police immediately responded
and had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.1wphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision, does not require
actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of
the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the
reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case.
Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and
hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal
proceedings against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion, the personal
ARTURO D. BRION
circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless
Associate Justice
arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was
appropriate under the circumstances.
WE CONCUR:
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to
mean as an authoritative command
 That on or about the 19th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody, 0.1017 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
commonly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

When arraigned, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense
stipulated on the existence and due execution of the following pieces of evidence: 1] the request for laboratory
examination; 2]certification issued by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);3] Dangerous Drugs Report; and 4]
transparent plastic sachet containing small transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance.6 Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecutions version of the events as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)in its Comment7 on
the petition is as follows:

Around 2:50 pm of March 19, 2003, acting on the information that Jacinta Marciano, aka "Intang," was selling drugs to
tricycle drivers, SPO1 Elmer Amposta, together with CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr., and CSU Samuel
Monzon, was dispatched to Barangay Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite to conduct an operation.

Republic of the Philippines While at the place, the group waited for a tricycle going to, and coming from, the house of Jacinta. After a few minutes,
SUPREME COURT they spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The group chased the tricycle. After catching up
Manila with it, they requested Rizaldy to alight. It was then that they noticed Rizaldy holding a match box.

SECOND DIVISION SPO1 Amposta asked Rizaldy if he could see the contents of the match box. Rizaldy agreed. While examining it, SPO1
Amposta found a small transparent plastic sachet which contained a white crystalline substance. Suspecting that the
G.R. No. 204589 November 19, 2014 substance was a regulated drug, the group accosted Rizaldy and the tricycle driver. The group brought the two to the
police station.

RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI, Petitioner,

vs. On March 20, 2003, Salud M. Rosales, a forensic chemist from the NBI, submitted a Certification which reads:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
This certifies that on the above date at 9:25 a.m. one PO1 Edgardo Nario of Imus, Mun. PS, PNP, Imus, Cavite submitted
DECISION to this office for laboratory examinations the following specimen/s to wit:

MENDOZA, J.: White crystalline substance contained in a small plastic sachet, marked "RSC," placed in a plastic pack, marked "Mar. 19,
2003." (net wt. = 0.1017 gm)

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to reverse and set aside the July 25, 2012 Decision1 and the
November 20, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 filed by petitioner Rizaldy
Sanchez y Cajili (Sanchez), affirming the April 21, 2005 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20
(RTC), which convicted him for Violation of Section 11, Article l l of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. The dispositive portion
of the RTC decision reads:
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen/s gave POSITIVE RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE.
Said specimen/s were allegedly confiscated from RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI and DARWIN REYES y VILLARENTE.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting accused Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of Official report follows:
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12) to fifteen
(15) years and to pay a fine of Php300,000.00. SO ORDERED.4
This certification was issued uponrequest for purpose of filing the case. 8

Sanchez was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in the Information,5 dated March 20, 2003, filed before the RTC and docketed as Criminal Version of the Defense
Case No. 10745-03. The accusatory portion of the Information indicting Sanchez reads:
In the present petition,9 Sanchez denied the accusation against him and presented a different version of the events that
transpired in the afternoon of March 19, 2003, to substantiate his claim of innocence:
On 24 February 2005, the accused Rizaldy Sanchez took the witness stand. He testified that on the date and time in
question, he, together with a certain Darwin Reyes, were on their way home from Brgy. Alapan, Imus, Cavite, where they
transported a passenger, when their way was blocked by four (4) armed men riding an owner-type jeepney. Without a
word, the four men frisked him and Darwin. He protested and asked what offense did they commit. The arresting officers
told him that they had just bought drugs from Alapan. He reasoned out that he merely transported a passenger there but
the policemen still accosted him and he was brought to the Imus Police Station where hewas further investigated. The
police officer, however, let DarwinReyes go. On cross-examination, the accused admitted that it was the first time that he
saw the police officers at the time he was arrested. He also disclosed that he was previously charged with the same
offense before Branch 90 of this court which was already dismissed, and that the police officers who testified in the said
case are not the same as those involved in this case.10
The Ruling of the RTC
On April 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision11 finding that Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto,in actual
possession of shabu. It stated that the police operatives had reasonable ground to believe that Sanchez was in
possession of the said dangerous drug and such suspicion was confirmed when the match box Sanchez was carrying
was found to contain shabu. The RTC lent credence to the testimony of prosecution witness, SPO1 Elmer Amposta
(SPO1 Amposta) because there was no showing that he had been impelled by any ill motive to falsely testify against
Sanchez. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting accused Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12) to fifteen
(15) years and to pay a fine of Php300,000.00. SO ORDERED.12
Unfazed, Sanchez appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA. He faulted the RTC for giving undue weight
on the testimony of SPO1 Amposta anchored merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the
said arresting officer. He insisted that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify the findings of facts and conclusions reached by the RTC and, thus,
upheld the conviction of the accused for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. According to the CA, there was
probable cause for the police officers to believe that Sanchez was then and there committing a crime considering that he
was seen leaving the residence of a notorious drug dealer where, according to a tip they received, illegal drug activities
were being perpetrated. It concluded that the confiscation by the police operative of the subject narcotic from Sanchez
was pursuant to a valid search. The CA then went on to write that non-compliance by the police officers on the
requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, particularly on the conduct of inventory and
photograph of the seized drug, was not fatal to the prosecutions causesince its integrity and evidentiary value had been
duly preserved. The falloof the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite dated April 21, 2005 and Order dated
October 1, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 10745-03 finding accused appellant Rizaldy C. Sanchez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.13
Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 25, 2012 Decision, but it was denied by the CA in its November 20,
2012 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
Bewailing his conviction, Sanchez filed the present petition for "certiorari"under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and
anchored on the following
GROUNDS:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT ACCUSED WAS
CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO, HENCE,A SEARCH WARRANT WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY; AND
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
SECTION 21, PARAGRAPH 1, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY RENDER THE
SEIZED ITEMS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.14
Sanchez insists on his acquittal. He argues that the warrantless arrest and search on him were invalid due to the absence
of probable cause on the part of the police officers to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest under Section 15, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. He also contends that the failure of the police operatives to comply with Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165 renders the seized item inadmissible in evidence and creates reasonable doubt on his guilt. By way of
Comment15 to the petition, the OSG prays for the affirmance of the challenged July 25, 2012 decision of the CA. The OSG
submits that the warrantless search and seizure of the subject narcotic were justified under the plain view doctrine where
a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.
The Courts Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that this petition suffers from procedural infirmity. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the proper remedy to question the CA judgment,final order or resolution, as in the present case, is a petition for
review on certiorari, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 16 By filing a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, Sanchez therefore clearly availed himself of the wrong remedy.
Be that as it may, the Court, in several cases before, had treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review under Rule
45, in accordance with the liberal spirit and in the interest of substantial justice, particularly (1) if the petition was filed
within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review; (2) errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is sufficient
reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.17 The case at bench satisfies all the above requisites and, hence, there is
ample justification to treat this petition for certiorari as a petition for review. Besides, it is axiomatic that the nature of an
action is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition and the character of the relief sought. 18 Here, stripped
of allegations of "grave abuse of discretion," the petition actually avers errors of judgment rather than of jurisdiction, which
are the appropriate subjects of a petition for review on certiorari.
Going now into the substance of the petition, the Court finds the same to be impressed with merit.
Although it is true that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great
respect and not to be disturbed on appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. It is a time-honored rule that the
assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the
reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in
the course of their testimonies. But an exception exists if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the
case.19 After going over the records of the case at bench, the Court finds some facts of weight and substance that have
been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which cast doubt on the guilt of Sanchez.
In sustaining the conviction of Sanchez, the CA ratiocinated that this was a clear case of an in flagrante delicto arrest
under paragraph (a) Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. In this regard, the CA wrote:
In the case at Bar, the acquisition of the regulated drug by the police officers qualifies as a valid search following a lawful
operation by the police officers. The law enforcers acted on the directive of their superior based on an information that the
owner of the residence where Sanchez came from was a notorious drug dealer. As Sanchez was seen leaving the said
residence, the law enforcers had probable cause to stop Sanchez on the road since there was already a tip that illegal
drug-related activities were perpetrated in the place where he came from and seeing a match box held on one hand, the
police officers action were justified to inspect the same. The search therefore, is a sound basis for the lawful seizure of
the confiscated drug, arrest and conviction of Sanchez.
The case of People vs. Valdez (G.R. No. 127801, March 3, 1999) is instructive. In that case, the police officers, by virtue
of an information that a person having been previously described by the informant, accosted Valdez and upon inspection
of the bag he was carrying, the police officers found the information given to them to be true as it yielded marijuana leaves
hidden in the water jug and lunch box inside Valdezs bag. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial courts ruling
convicting Valdez declared that:
In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest.1wphi1 A crime
was actually being committed by the appellant, thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph (a) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. While it is true
that SPO1 Mariano was not armed with a search warrant when the search was conducted over the personal effects of
appellant, nevertheless, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said police officer to
believe that appellant was then and there committing a crime. The cited case is akin to the circumstances in the instant
appeal as in this case, Sanchez, coming from the house of the identified drug dealer, previously tipped by a concerned
citizen, walked to a parked tricycle and sped towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. The search that gave way to the
seizure of the match box containing shabu was a reasonable course of event that led to the valid warrantless arrest since
there was sufficient probable cause for chasing the tricycle he was in. (Underscoring supplied)
A judicious examination of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA.
At the outset, it is observed that the CA confused the search incidental to a lawful arrest withthe stop-and-frisk principle, a
wellrecognized exception to the warrant requirement. Albeit it did not expressly state so, the CA labored under the
confused view that one and the other were indistinct and identical. That confused view guided the CA to wrongly affirm the
petitioner's conviction. The Court must clear this confusion and correct the error.
It is necessary to remind the RTC and the CA that the Terry20 stop- and-frisk search is entirely different from and should
not be confused with the search incidental to a lawful arrest envisioned under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. The distinctions have been made clear in Malacat v. Court of Appeals 21:
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext
for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made --
the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or
property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as
evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
xxxx
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search
of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment x x x x.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop-and-frisk," it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop-and-frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally
be used against the police officer.22
In the case at bench, neither the in flagrante delictoarrest nor the stop- and-frisk principle was applicableto justify the
warrantless search and seizure made by the police operatives on Sanchez. An assiduous scrutiny of the factual backdrop
of this case shows that the search and seizure on Sanchez was unlawful. A portion of SPO1 Ampostas testimony on
direct examination is revelatory, viz:
Pros. Villarin:
Q: On March 19, 2003 at around 2:50 p.m., can you recall where were you?
A: Yes, Mam.
Q: Where were you? A: We were in Brgy. Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite.
Q: What were you doing at Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite? A: We were conducting an operation against illegal drugs.
Q: Who were with you? A: CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr. and CSU Samuel
Monzon.
Q: Was the operation upon the instruction of your Superior?
A: Our superior gave us the information that there were tricycle drivers buying drugs from "Intang" or Jacinta Marciano.
Q: What did you do after that?
A: We waited for a tricycle who will go to the house of Jacinta Marciano.
Q: After that what did you do?
A: A tricycle with a passenger went to the house of "Intang" and when the passenger boarded the tricycle, we chase[d]
them.
Q: After that, what happened next?
A: When we were able to catch the tricycle, the tricycle driver and the passenger alighted from the tricycle.
Q: What did you do after they alighted from the tricycle?
A: I saw the passenger holding a match box.
Q: What did you do after you saw the passenger holding a match box?
A: I asked him if I can see the contents of the match box.
Q: Did he allow you?
A: Yes, mam. He handed to me voluntarily the match box.
Court:
Q: Who, the driver or the passenger?
A: The passenger, sir.
Pros. Villarin:
Q: After that what did you find out?
A: I opened the match box and I found out that it contained a small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance.23
A search as an incident to a lawfularrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. 24 It bears emphasis that the law requires that
the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a
person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed.25
Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the conduct of the search. Arrest is defined
under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. Under Section 2, of the same rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 26 Even casting aside the
petitioners version and basing the resolution of this case on the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, no arrest was
effected by the police operatives upon the person of Sanchez before conducting the search on him. It appears from the
above quoted testimony of SPO1 Amposta that after they caught up with the tricycle, its driver and the passenger,
Sanchez, alighted from it; that he noticed Sanchez holding a match box; and that he requested Sanchez if he could see
the contents of the match box, to which the petitioner acceded and handed it over to him. The arrest of Sanchez was
made only after the discovery by SPO1 Amposta of the shabu inside the match box. Evidently, what happened in this
case was that a search was first undertaken and then later an arrest was effected based on the evidence produced by the
search.
Even granting arguendo that Sanchez was arrested before the search, still the warrantless search and seizure must be
struck down as illegal because the warrantless arrest was unlawful. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as
follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallly committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
xxx
For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in flagrante delicto arrest) to operate, two elements must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting tocommit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or withinthe view of the arresting officer.27 On
the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) requires for its application that at the time of the
arrest, an offense has in fact just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be apprehended has committed it. These elements would be lacking in the case at bench.
The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in
the minds of the police operatives that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Sanchez
was merely seen by the police operatives leaving the residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding a tricycle that
proceeded towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. Such acts cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if
Sanchez had exhibited unusual or strange acts, or at the veryleast appeared suspicious, the same would not have been
considered overt acts in order for the police officers to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5,
Rule 113.
It has not been established either that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5 have been complied
with in this warrantless arrest. When the police officers chased the tricycle, they had no personal knowledge to believe
that Sanchez bought shabu from the notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the
tricycle. Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.28 The police officers in this case had no inkling whatsoever as to what Sanchez did inside the house
of the known drug dealer. Besides, nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it show that the drug dealer was conducting
her nefarious drug activities inside her house so as to warrant the police officers to draw a reasonable suspicion that
Sanchez must have gotten shabu from her and possessed the illegal drug when he came out of the house. In other
words, there was no overt manifestation on the part of Sanchez that he had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or
was attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of shabu. Verily, probable cause in thiscase was
more imagined than real.
In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" search in the case at bench. Elucidating on what constitutes
"stop-and-frisk" operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v. Chua29 wrote:
A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and
restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officers
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband)
concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this
principle to apply.30
In this jurisdiction, what may be regarded as a genuine reason or a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop-and-frisk
search had been sufficiently illustrated in two cases. In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People, 31 a policeman chanced
upon Manalili in front of the cemetery who appeared to be "high" on drugs as he was observed to have reddish eyes and
to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen and when approached and
asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court
held that the policeman had sufficient reason to accost Manalili to determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his
suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that the area was a haven for drug addicts.
In People v. Solayao,32 the Court also found justifiable reason for the police to stop and frisk the accused after considering
the following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions; the fact that his companions fled
whenthey saw the policemen; and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify
reports that armed persons where roaming the vicinity. Seemingly, the common thread of these examples isthe presence
of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity.
It was not so in the case at bench.
The Court does not find the totality of the circumstances described by SPO1 Amposta as sufficient to incite a reasonable
suspicion that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on Sanchez. Coming out from the house of a drug pusher and
boarding a tricycle, without more, were innocuous movements, and by themselves alone could not give rise in the mind of
an experienced and prudent police officer of any belief that hehad shabu in his possession, or that he was probably
committing a crime in the presence of the officer. There was even no allegation that Sanchez left the house of the drug
dealer in haste or that he acted in any other suspicious manner. There was no showing either that he tried toevade or
outmaneuver his pursuers or that he attempted to flee when the police officers approached him. Truly, his acts and the
surrounding circumstances could not have engendered any reasonable suspicion on the part of the police officers that a
criminal activity had taken place or was afoot.
In the recent case of People v. Cogaed,33 where not a single suspicious circumstance preceded the search on the
accused, the Court ruled that the questioned act of the police officer did not constitute a valid stop-and-frisk operation.
Cogaed was a mere passenger carrying a blue bag and a sack and travelling aboard a jeepney. He did not exhibit any
unusual or suspicious behavior sufficient to justify the law enforcer in believing that he was engaged in a criminal activity.
Worse, the assessment of suspicion was made not by the police officer but by the jeepney driver, who signaled to the
police officer that Cogaed was "suspicious." In view of the illegality of the search and seizure, the 12,337.6 grams of
marijuana confiscated from the accused was held as inadmissible.
The OSG characterizes the seizure of the subject shabu from Sanchez as seizure of evidence in plain view. The Court
disagrees.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.34 The plain view doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in
a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it
is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.35
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the subject shabu does notfall within
the plain view exception. First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed, Sanchez was illegally arrested.
Second, subject shabu was not inadvertently discovered, and third, it was not plainly exposed to sight. Here, the subject
shabu was allegedly inside a match box being thenheld by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or transparent to the
police officers. In fact, SPO1 Amposta had to demand from Sanchez the possession of the match box in order for him to
open it and examine its content. The shabu was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant is in
violation of the law and the Constitution. In the light of the foregoing, there being no lawful warrantless arrest and
warrantless search and seizure, the shabu purportedly seized from Sanchez is inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the accused
must be acquitted and exonerated from the criminal charge of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Furthermore, the Court entertains doubts whether the shabu allegedly seized from Sanchez was the very same item
presented during the trial of this case. The Court notes that there wereseveral lapses in the law enforcers handling of the
seized item which, when taken collectively, render the standards of chain of custody seriously breached.
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction.36 The function of the chain of custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. 37 Thus,
the chain of custody requirement has a two-fold purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items, and (2) the removal of unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence. 38
In this case, the prosecution failed to account for each and every link in the chain of custody of the shabu, from the
moment it was allegedly confiscated up to the time it was presented before the court as proof of the corpus delicti. The
testimony of SPO 1 Amposta was limited to the fact that he placed the marking "RSC" on the seized drug; and that he and
the three other police officers brought Sanchez and the subject shabu to their station and turned them over to their
investigator. The prosecution evidence did not disclose where the marking of the confiscated shabu took place and who
witnessed it. The evidence does not show who was in possession of the seized shabu from the crime scene to the police
station. A reading of the Certification, dated March 20, 2003, issued by Forensic Chemist Salud Rosales shows that a
certain PO I Edgardo Nario submitted the specimen to the NBI for laboratory examination, but this piece of evidence does
not establish the identity of the police investigator to whom SPO 1 Amposta and his group turned over the seized shabu.
The identities of the person who received the specimen at the NBI laboratory and the person who had the custody and
safekeeping of the seized marijuana after it was chemically analyzed pending its presentation in court were also not
disclosed.
Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, a serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized shabu that the
prosecution introduced in evidence. The prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody, resulting in
rendering the seizure and confiscation of the shabu open to doubt and suspicion. Hence, the incriminatory evidence
cannot pass judicial scrutiny. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2012 Decision and the
November 20, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court orders the immediate
release of the petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of
his release, or reason for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower courts
ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his
temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty
of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No.
2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. 4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his
arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for
petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners
forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the
RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. 6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning
dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a
pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner
argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his
prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same
offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of
such crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain
his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light
offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to file a comment to the
petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when
the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the
negative, whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of
personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner
from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are
governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the
applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural
rules and jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by
an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and
was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under
Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124. 10
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as
proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant
who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation
should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to
surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the
accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled
proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the
MeTCs proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the
MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioners arrest),
petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13protects
him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether
Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,
submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in
its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed
in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this
article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in
which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend
on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the
quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-
offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the
definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the
mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of
quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already
sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that
"reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" 17 on three points of analysis: (1) the
object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as
distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the
different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery,
malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and
dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes,
the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then
it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as
the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in
proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there
would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the
penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would
constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to
death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the
individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage,
either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property
through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime
conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly
reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller22that
"[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x," 23 has long been abandoned
when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon
rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of
crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint
of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and
the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on
erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of
jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense
alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising
from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior
case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was
based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is,
whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the
affirmative in People v. Belga26(promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in
1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.),
People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in
1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes,
J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and
People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred
the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for
"serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior acquittal of
"slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: 34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x
x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of
Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a
decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the
subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous
conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second
prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly
overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of
Appeals conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight
and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge
was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan: 38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona
decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court,
speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan,
of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the
accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the
Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its
affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to
property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists
where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow
where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a
human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors
vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of
protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case
than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged
in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical
Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter,
invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the
accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the
issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding:
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x
x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with
the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by
them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other
criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage
to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the
collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the
passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both
defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to
quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured
passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just
been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by
one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after
Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in
the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First
Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the
Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a
bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal
court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile
in a fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was
dismissed in that court for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an
information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless
imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to beP249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion,
and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice
Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted
before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the
Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113,
Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts
alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether
one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. The prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute
the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in
the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not
now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously
cleared by the inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of
delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon
the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same
breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga
case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-
examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or
similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing
which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this
Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669,
April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but
awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal
Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation
light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty
for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind
the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," 47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting
consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple
intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the
prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a
hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime
damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing
prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework apply to
"complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light
offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all
the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article
365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy)
applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to
a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less
grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light
felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned
(and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original
jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365
involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the
resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other
acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized
as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime
collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately.
Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value,
but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be
imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot
be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x. 53(Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework
over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate
offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365,
discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as
separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless
of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of
quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz
line of cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to
keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for
(1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) anoffense which is a necessary means for
committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor Generals argument that double
jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the
charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could
not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered
and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice
of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously
cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one
and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of
the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions
are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365
for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable
sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-
prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing
formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability,
should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against
petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double
jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice