GUIAO vs. COMELEC
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
137 SCRA 366, 1985
Facts: After the canvass of the returns for assemblyman in Pampanga, petitioner Ben
Guiao, who lost, submitted his written objections to the inclusion of several returns in
the canvass. He asked that a subpoena be issued to the members of the citizens
election committee. The Board of Canvassers denied the request for the subpoena
and dismissed the objections for failure of petitioner to substantiate them and
proclaimed the winners. Petitioner questioned the proclamation of the private
respondent but did not question the proclamation of other winners who belonged to
his political party.
Issue: Whether or not the BOC should issue a subpoena.
Held: Petitioner cannot challenge the proclamation of any one of the candidates. The
proclamation cannot be void as to one and valid with respect to the others. The
written objection of the petitioner were not timely presented. The time to object in
writing in any election return is when it is being examined by the board of canvassers.
The board of canvassers was correct in refusing to subpoena the members of the
citizen election committee. The function of the board of canvassers is purely
ministerial. To have acceded to the request of the petitioner would have made the
board a hearing body to ascertain the issue of duress and other irregularities alleged
by petitioner.
NICOLAS C. CASTROMAYOR vs.
250 SCRA 298
Facts: Petitioner was a candidate for a seat in the eight-member Sangguniang Bayan
of the municipality of Calinog, Iloilo in the elections held on May 8, 1995. On May 10,
1995, the winners were proclaimed on the basis of the results of the canvass which
showed that petitioner received 5,419 votes and took eighth place in the election for
members of the Sangguniang Bayan. However, when Alice M. Garin, Chairman of the
MBC, rechecked the totals in the Statement of Votes the following day, she
discovered that the number of votes cast for Nilda C. Demorito, as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan, was 62 more than that credited to her. The returns from one
precinct had been overlooked in the computation of the totals. As matters stood,
therefore, the total number of votes cast for Demorito was 5,470, or 51 more than the
5,419 votes cast for petitioner. Atty. Rodolfo Sarroza, the Regional Election Director
advised Garin to request authority from the COMELEC to reconvene for the purpose
of correcting the error. A formal letter was later sent to the COMELEC on May 17,
1995. On May 23, 1995, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 95-2414, directing the
Municipal board of Canvassers of said municipality to reconvene to annul the
proclamation of Nicolas C. Castromayor for the number 8 place for councilor; and to
proclaim the winning number eight (8) councilor, and to submit compliance hereof
within five (5)days from receipt of notice. Petitioner protested the proposed action in a
letter dated June 5, 1995 to COMELEC Executive Director Resurreccion A. Borra,
questioning the legality of the actuations of Garin. Hence, this petition to annul
COMELEC Resolution No. 95-2414.
Issue: Whether or not the MBC has the power to reconvene to annul a proclamation
upon prior authorization from the COMELEC.
Held: Yes. It should be pointed out, in this connection, that what is involved here is a
simple problem of arithmetic. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per
precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. In
making the correction in computation, the MBC will be acting in an administrative
capacity, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Hence any question
pertaining to the proceedings of the MBC may be raised directly to the COMELEC en
banc in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions affecting
elections.
Libardos v. Casar behave atall times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary(Rule 2.01, Canon 2).
Doctrine

A judge has jurisdiction to issue a suspension of the canvassing of election returns,

even if done to prevent bloodshed.

Facts: Mayor Perlita Libardos was an official mayoralty candidate of the Laban
ngDemokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Wilfredo Randa, the
candidate of the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC), during the canvassing, filed a
complaint for Preliminary Injunction with the MCTC of Kolambugan-Maigo, Lanao del
Norte, presided over by judge Abdullah Casar. Judge ordered the Board of
Canvassers to suspend the canvassing of the election returns of Precinct No. 10-A
until either the COMELEC, or Iligan RTC could act on the complaint of Randa. The
order caused the delay in the canvassing of the election returns which was resumed
only after the Provincial Election Supervisor of Lanao del Norte sent a message to the
COMELEC requesting that an order be issued ordering the Board of Canvassers to
disregard the restraining order of the judge. The judge admitted having issued
without jurisdiction the questioned order. He justified its issuance as an immediate
remedy and arrangement to preventbloodshed between the contending parties.
Office of Court Administrator admonished the judge.

Issue: Was judge Casar grossly ignorant of the law?

HELD: YES.

Findings of the OCA adopted. In its report, OCA stated that the Order was issued
withoutjurisdiction, the acts complained of should be met with a corresponding
sanction. Formalinvestigation of the charge against the judge for issuing the order
without jurisdiction is nolonger necessary in view of his admission. The

defense interposed by the judge isunavailing. As a judicial officer, he is

expected to know and keep abreast with thelatest law and jurisprudence. His
feeling of sympathy and fairness cannot serve as alicense for him to
deliberately transgress or dispense with the existing lawsinvolving the
controversy.

To hold him administratively liable for ignorance of the law,there must be reliable
evidence to show the judicial acts complained of were ill-motivatedand corrupt. The
documents on file in the case do not show that questioned order wasill-motivated
or corrupt. He acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing his Orderknowing
full well that he does not have jurisdiction to act on the petition. While his
reasons for issuing the assailed order are perhaps commendable anddemonstrative
of his concern for peace and order during the election period in the givencommunity,
he lost sight of his bounden duty, as a Judge, to be the embodiment
ofcompetence, integrity, and independence (Rule 1.01, Canon 1). A Judge should
Samad v COMELEC private respondent claimed to have assumed the office of the mayor of Kabuntalan
whereas the purpose of such proceeding is to unseat an official on the ground of
FACTS: Samad and Pagayao were both proclaimed as mayor elect by two different disloyalty and fraud.
canvassing boards. One board, which declared samad as mayor, was headed by
Pagayao and the other was headed by Saga. Samad sought the nullification of the
proclamation made in favor of Abdula and the calling of a special election in three
precincts. On the other hand, Abdula prayed that the proclamation of Samad be
nullified and that he be enjoined from assuming as mayor of Kabuntalan. Comelec
then summoned both election registrars saga and pagayao to appear before the
comelec; ordered an ivestigation to be conducted and required elec supervisor
Cabacungan to comment on the petition. Petitioner samad filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Cotabato City an action against the private respondent for quo warranto and
prohibition with preliminary injunction wc was granted. After finding that both cert off
canvass and proclamation prepared by Saga and Pagayao, COMELEC directed the
Office of the Executive Director to constitute a Special Board of Canvassers for the
purpose of verifying which of the two sets of statements of votes upon which the two
different proclamation documents were based was genuine, without prejudice to the
resolution of the prayer for special elections in Kabuntalan. In need of a temporary
OIC-mayor, Abdula was appointed by pres fidel ramos. Such designation was
questioned by Samad.

Issues:

W/N jurisdiction over the present controversy remained with the COMELEC or was
vested in the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City upon the filing of the petition for
quo warranto

HELD: YES. Jurisdiction remained with COMELEC. Both petitions in the COMELEC
and in the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato were directed at the illegality of the
composition of the Saga board and of the proclamation of the private respondent.
This matter is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Further, COMELEC Resolution
No. 2489 stated that all pending petitions for disqualification, failure of elections or
analogous cases, not being pre-proclamation controversies, shall remain active
cases, the proceedings to continue beyond June 30, 1992, until the issues therein are
finally resolved by the Commission. Samads petition for the nullification of
proclamation of abdula was not only for the annulment of Abdula's proclamation but
also for the holding of special elections in three precincts since it was reported that 2
precints were not included in the counting. In addition to that, the board of canvassers
headed by Saga, which proclaimed abdula as mayor, was illegally constituted
because it was not approved by election supervisor Atty. Cabacungan, which
prompted COMELEC to also create a special board of canvassers to continue the
canvassing of votes in said province. Even assuming the petition was a purely pre-
proclamation case, it could nevertheless continue beyond June 30, 1992 because it
was declared by COMELEC that the issue raised is meritorious. Moreover the quo
warranto proceedings was not a proper remedy because both the petitioner and the
ONG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ISAGANI B. RIZON,
respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner William P. Ong and respondent Isagani B. Rizon were candidates for the
position of mayor of the municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte during the May 11,
1998 local elections. On May 13, 1998, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed
William P. Ong as the winner with a margin of fifty-one (51) votes. respondent filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Lanao del Norte an election protest [4] contesting
petitioners votes in five (5) clustered precincts.[5] Only the ballot boxes for two (2)
precincts, namely: Precincts 8A and 28A/28A1 were opened since respondent waived
the revision of the ballots in the other precincts.On March 25, 1999, the trial court
rendered a decision annulling forty-five (45) votes for petitioner while invalidating two
(2) votes for respondent. Petitioners lead was reduced to eight (8) votes over that of
respondent
In time, respondent appealed the trial courts decision to the Comelec.[7] On February
1, 2000, the Comelec, Second Division[8], promulgated a resolution declaring that the
trial court committed serious reversible errors in its appreciation of the contested
ballots and invalidated sixty-three (63) votes for petitioner and eight (8) votes for
respondent. Comelec en banc[11] promulgated a resolution affirming the Second
Divisions resolution but reduced by one (1) vote the lead of respondent over
petitioner. The final result showed that: WILLIAM P. ONG - 4,411 votesISAGANI B.
RIZON - 4,414 votes[12]
Hence, this petition.[13] Petitioner contends that the Comelec en banc resolution, aside
from being patently illegal, was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
HELD:
We find that Comelec grievously erred ousting itself of jurisdiction for grave abuse of
discretion in invalidating the ballots, including the votes for Ong.
The law is clear:
Unless it should clearly appear that they have been deliberately put by the voter to
serve as identification marks, comma, dots, lines, or hyphens between the first name
and surname of a candidate, or in other parts of the ballot, traces of the letter T, J,
and other similar ones, the first letters or syllables of names which the voter does not
continue, the use of two or more kinds of writing and unintentional or accidental
flourishes, strokes or strains, shall not invalidate the ballot. [14]
The rule is in favor of the validity of the ballot, not otherwise. The term unless imports
an exception rather than the general rule. This was enunciated in Tajanlangit vs.
Cazenas,[15]where we ruled that:
x x x. The use of two kinds of writing appearing in this ballot is a good example of
the exception provided for in paragraph 18, section 149 of the Revised Election Code,
which provides that unless it should clearly appear that it has been deliberately put by
the voter to serve as identification mark, the use of two or more kinds of writing shall
be considered innocent and shall not invalidate the ballot. (Underlining ours)
The printed name NIKKI does not show any intention on the part of the voters to
identify or distinguish themselves. Therefore, the ballots are not considered
marked. The name NIKKI only showed that it was the voters intention to emphasize
and stress their adulation for a senator with the name NIKKI, rather than to identify
themselves. The votes are stray for the senatorial candidates but will not invalidate
the entire ballot.
In the same manner, the appearance of print and script writings in a single ballot does
not necessarily imply that two persons wrote the ballot. The strokes of print and script
handwriting would naturally differ but would not automatically mean that two persons
prepared the same. A visual examination of the ballots belies the claim that these
ballots were prepared by two persons. In the absence of any deliberate intention to
put an identification mark, the ballots must not be rejected. We held that:
Ballot Exhibit N.This ballot was rejected by the Court of Appeals as marked because
the names of the candidates from the second space for members of the provincial
board down to the 7th place for councilors were written in capital letters while those of
other candidates were written in small letters, the court concluding that the use of two
forms of writing can only mean an intent to identify the voter. We disagree with this
conclusion. Under Section 149, paragraph 18, of the Revised Election Code, the use
of two or more kinds of writing cannot have the effect of invalidating the ballot unless
it clearly appears that they had been deliberately put by the voter to serve as
identification mark. Here such intent does not appear. The case in point in Hilao vs.
Bernardo, G. R. No. L-7704, December 14, 1954, wherein it was held that the use of
ordinary and printed forms of writing in a ballot is but a mere variation which does not
invalidate the ballot. This ballot should, therefore, be counted for Ferrer
In lieu thereof, Court hereby PROCLAIMS petitioner William P. Ong as the duly
elected mayor of the municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte in the May 11, 1998
elections, with a margin of twelve (12) votes.
PATORAY vs. COMELEC
249 SCRA 440, 1995

Facts: Petitioner Patoray and private respondent Disomimba were the mayoralty
candidates of Tamporan, Lanao del Sur during the May 8, 1995 elections. During the
canvassing of the votes by the MBC, private respondent objected to the inclusion of
election returns from 4 precincts for being substituted, fraudulent and obviously
manufacture but the same was denied by the MBC. On appeal, the COMELEC
Second Division ordered the exclusion from the count of election returns from 2
precincts owing to discrepancy between the taras and the written figures and the
incomplete data as to provincial and congressional candidates. The COMELEC en
banc denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and ordered the constitution of a
new MBC to implement the second Divisions resolution.

Petitioner Patoray filed a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the
COMELEC.

Issue: Whether the exclusion of the 2 election returns was the proper remedy to
answer the discrepancy between the taras and the written figures and the
incompleteness of the data as to provincial and congressional candidates?

Held: The Supreme Court held that the discrepancy between the taras and the
written figure and the incomplete data as to the provincial and congressional
candidates found in the excluded election returns constituted materials defects in the
election return. While the COMELEC was correct in excluding the 2 election returns,
in addition it should have also ordered a recount of the votes cast in the 2 precincts.
Its failure to do this resulted in the disenfranchisement of the voters in these
precincts. The recounting of the votes is consistent with the summary nature of
proceedings involving pre-proclamation controversies.
Bai Sandra Sema vs Commission on Elections
FACTS: The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the
province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted
against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative
districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other
municipalities.A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and
vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays.
Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan
(Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the
1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.For the purposes of
the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of
Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo
should be retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district
should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a
decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or
part of any).Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative
district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that
Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should
be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and
D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon
creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative
representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect
Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power
to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises
with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial
boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k,
and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the
HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be
250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population
requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot
validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district.
But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is
vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities
and provinces.

COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of
S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its
representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can

create validly LGUs.

HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is

governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,

merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality
or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local
government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second,
such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there
must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889 (April 18, 1995)
FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a petition
for certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his
petition for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive
from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a
criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of
personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial
District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said
court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on
account of his alleged flight from that country.
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person who has been
convicted by final judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not
private respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice as such term must be interpreted
and applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is understandable since
the COMELEC outrightly dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead
of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee.
The Court, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the
COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.

Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs May 8,
1992 resolution was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of
a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent.

Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for
cancellation of respondents CoC on account of the candidates disqualification under
Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC.

Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992.

Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private
respondent before the COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy
(and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading
a warrant for his arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice contemplated by
Section 40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for,
and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.

HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in criminal
cases here and abroad are disqualified from running for any elective local position.

It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its
enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181). However, when there clearly is no
obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so
written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law
but must remain congruent to it.
Sampayan vs. Daza The petitioners appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel
respondent Dazas certificate of candidacy before the election or a quo warranto case
213 SCRA 807 with the House of Electoral Tribunal within ten days after Dazas proclamation.

o HRET has exclusive jurisdiction over election contests and qualifications of

members of Congress

o Remedies against a disqualified House of Representative candidate: (1)

cancellation of certificate of candidacy filed with COMELEC before election;
(2) quo warranto case filed with HRET after proclamation

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a petition seeking to disqualify Daza, then incumbent congressman of

their congressional district in Makati, from continuing to exercise the functions of his
office on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent
resident of the United States. They also alleged that Mr. Daza has not by any act or
declaration renounced his status as permanent resident thereby violating the
Omnibus Election Code (Section 68) and the 1987 Constitution (section 18, Article
III).

Respondent Congressman filed his Comment denying the fact that he is a permanent
resident of the United States as evidenced by a letter order of the US Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A, he had long waived his status when he
returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of

the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code

RULING:

The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case, first, the case is moot and
academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6,
1992, that they seek to unseat the respondent from his position as Congressman for
the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30,
1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral
Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election
returns and qualification of its members.
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC (1996)
G.R. No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee
questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential
Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine
citizen.However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled
based on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship, and had
proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as the newly elect
Governor of Sorsogon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldos repatriation was valid.
HELD:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative
nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the
filing of his application to run for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine
Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing
the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if
the application is approved. It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that
the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the
decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of
the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore
qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
Pahilan vs. Tabalba, COMELEC and Judge Tabano Jr. (G.R. No. 110170.
February 21, 1994)
FACTS:
Petitioner Pahilan and private respondent Tabalba were candidates for Mayor during
the local elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Tabalba as the
duly elected Mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest which he sent by registered
mail, addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court , attaching thereto
P200.00 in cash as payment for docket fees. In a letter dated May 28, 1992, the OIC-
Clerk of Court informed Pahilan that the correct fees that where supposed to be paid
amounted to P620.00, and that, accordingly, the petition would not be entered in the
court docket and summons would not be issued pending payment of the balance of
P420.00. On June 16, 1992, petitioner paid the required balance in the total amount
P470.00 after learning.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief.
HELD:
YES. Order of the Commission on Elections and the Order of the RTC in Election
Case No. 3(92) are hereby reversed and set aside.
RATIO:
The rules which apply to ordinary civil actions may not necessarily serve the purpose
of election cases, especially if we consider the fact that election laws are to be
accorded utmost liberality in their interpretation and application, bearing in mind
always that the will of the people must be upheld. Ordinary civil actions would
generally involve private interests while all elections cases are, at all times, invested
with public interest which cannot be defeated by mere procedural or technical
infirmities.
[I]n the present case, the docket fee was paid (P200.00) except that the amount given
was not correct. Considering the fact that there was an honest effort on the part of
herein petitioner to pay the full amount of docket fees, we are not inclined to insist on
a stringent application of the rules.
E. Garcia, et. Al vs HRET
GR. No. 13479212 August 1999
Facts: Harry Angpin was elected as the representative for the 3 rd district of Manila.
However, there hasbeen a petition for quo warranto filed before the HRET against
Congress man Harry Angping. Petitionersquestioned the eligibility of Congressman
Angping to hold office in the House of Representativesclaiming that the latter was not
a natural born citizen of the Philippines, which is a constitutional requirement. Upon
the petitioners filing of their petition, they have paid the required 5,000php
filingfee.However, HRET issued a resolution dismissing the petition for failure to pay
5,000 php asdeposit. The petitioners then filed the cash deposit and filed for a motion
for reconsideration with areceipt attached. However, it was denied.
Issue:Whether or not the HRET has committed a grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for quowarranto of petitioners even after the payment of
deposit fee
Ruling: No, the HRET did not commit grave abuse in dismissing the petition. The
HRET has a judgment call andhas the authority to implement its rules. As long as the
exercise of such discretion is based on a well-founded factual and legal basis, as in
this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal. Inview of the delicate
nature of the charge against Congressman Angpin, the observance of the
HRETRules of Procedure must be taken seriously if they are to obtain their objective.
The petitioners are dutybound to know and are expected to properly comply with the
procedural requirements laid down by thetribunal without being formally orered to do
so. Imperative justice requires the proper observance oftechnicalities precisely
designed to ensure its proper and swift dispensation
Melendres v COMELEC
Facts:
Melendres (who lost the Brgy. Chairman position to Concepcion in the May 1997
elections) filed an election protest at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig contesting
results of the elections. After preliminary hearing, it was found that no filing of docket
fee was paid by Melendres (which was required in Sec.6, Rule 37 of COMELEC
Rules of Procedure) so Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on grounds of failure
to comply with it. Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss and said that the case
should be continued on the ground that the filing of docket fee is merely an admin.
procedural matter and not jurisdictional. Concepcion elevated the case for COMELEC
to decide on and ruling was that the Trial Court should cease and desist form further
acting on the Election case.
Main issue:
W/N COMELEC acted with a grave abuse of discretion in its ruling
Sub-issue:
W/N payment of filing fee in an election protest is a jurisdictional reqt
Held:
Sub-issue: No. The payment of filing fee is an admin. procedural matter, proceeding
as it does from an admin. body. Sec 6, Rule 37 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure is
explicit and does not speak of conferment of jurisdiction upon the Trial Court or
acquisition by the Court of jurisdiction upon payment of filing fee. Contemporaneous
construction is resorted for certainty and predictability in laws esp. those involving
specific terms having tech. agencies.
Main Issue: No. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its ruling. The
interpretation of an admin. govt agency is accorded with great respect and ordinarily
controls the construction of the courts. When it renders an opinion or issues a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Courts give weight to govt
agency or officials charged with the implementation of law, their competence,
expertness, experience and informed judgment.
BANAGA, JR. vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 134696
July 31, 2000
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the en banc resolution of public
respondent Commission on Elections promulgated on June 29, 1998, in a COMELEC
special action case, SPA No. 98-383.
Facts:
Petitioner Banaga, Jr. and respondent Bernabe, Jr. were both candidates for vice-
mayor of the City of Paraaque in the May 1998 election. In said election, the city
board of canvassers proclaimed respondent Bernabe, Jr., as the winner for having
garnered 71,977 votes over petitioner Banaga, Jr.s 68,970 votes.
Dissatisfied with the result, petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 1998, a
Petition to Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections, alleging
that said election was replete with election offenses, such as vote buying and flying
voters. He also alleged that numerous Election Returns pertaining to the position of
Vice-Mayor in the City of Paraaque appear to be altered, falsified or fabricated.
In fact, there were people arrested who admitted the said election offenses.
Therefore, the incidents were sufficient to declare a failure of elections because it
cannot be considered as the true will of the people.
Petitioner Banaga, Jr. is praying that he should be adjudged as the duly elected Vice-
Mayor in the City of Paraaque, during the May 1998 local elections.
Respondent COMELEC dismissed petitioners suit and held that the election offenses
relied upon by petitioner do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section
6 of the Omnibus Election Code. The election tribunal concluded that based on the
allegations of the petition, it is clear that an election took place and that it did not
result in a failure to elect and therefore, cannot be viewed as an election protest.
Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging that the respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for dismissing his
petition motu propio without any basis whatsoever and without giving him the benefit
of a hearing.
Issue:
WON petition to declare a failure of elections and/or for annulment of election is
considered as an election protest.
WON respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners petition, in the light of petitioners foregoing contentions.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed RESOLUTION of
public respondent is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi:
1) No. Mr. Banaga, Jr.s petition docketed as SPA-98-383 before the COMELEC was
a special action under the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. An election protest is
an ordinary governed by Rule 20 on ordinary actions, while a petition to declare
failure of elections is covered by Rule 26 under special actions. Petitioner also did not
comply with the requirements for filing an election protest such as failing to pay filing
fee and cash deposits for an election protest.
2) No. Respondent COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the petition to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections for being
groundless. The petition to declare a failure of election and/or to annul election results
must show on its face that the conditions necessary to declare a failure to elect are
present. Respondent COMELEC only based its decision on the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code with regard to declaring a failure of election. There are three
instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law
for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns
or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
The instances being not present in the petition of Mr. Banaga, Jr. The respondent
COMELEC have no other recourse but to dismiss the petition.
Soller v. COMELECG.R. NO. 139853
FACTS
Petitioner and private respondent (Saulong) were both candidates formayor of the
municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11,1998 elections. The
petitioner was proclaimed as mayor by themunicipal board of canvassers. Private
respondent filed a petition withthe COMELEC to annul the proclamation. Later,
private respondentfiled an election protest against petitioner with the RTC. The
COMELECdismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private respondent, whilethe
RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved forreconsideration but
said motion was denied.Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition for
certioraricontending that respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing privaterespondents election
protest. The COMELEC en banc dismissedpetitioners suit. Petitioner now questions
this decision of the COMELECen banc.
ISSUE:Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to decide on the case.HELD
HELD: The SC has ruled in previous cases that the COMELEC, sitting en banc,does
not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election casesincluding pre-
proclamation controversies in the first instance. Thispower pertains to the divisions of
the Commission. Any decision by theCommission en banc as regards election cases
decided by it in the firstinstance is null and void. In the SCs view, the authority to
resolvepetition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, likethe
questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of theCOMELEC and not on
the COMELEC en banc.
Macias v. Comelec (G.R. No. 188078)
FACTS: Petitioners are 4 members of the House of Representatives from Negros
Oriental, Misamis Oriental and Bulacan & the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental.
They are requesting that the respondent officials be prevented to implement RA 3040,
an act that apportions representative districts in the country. They alleged that their
respective provinces were discriminated because they were given less
representation. Furthermore, they allege that RA 3040 is unconstitutional and void
because:
1. It was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the members
of the HOR at least 3 calendar days prior to passage
2. It was approved more than 3 years after the return of the last census of the
population
3. It apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several
provinces.
Respondents Comelec and Vicente Gella (National Treasurer) contend that they
1. were merely complying with their duties under the statute which they presume and
allege to be constitutional
2. petitioners have no personality to bring such action
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to bring such action.
2. Whether or not the act conformed to the printed form and 3 day requirement.
3. Whether or not the act of apportionment is within the 3 year requirement.
4. Whether or not the apportionment of members of the HOR is valid.
HELD: The petitioners as voters and as congressmen and governor of the aggrieved
provinces have the personality to sue. The passage of the act did not conform to the
printed-form and the 3 day requirement, and that there is no certificate of urgency
from the President was received by the HO. The requirement that the apportionment
must be done within 3 year following the last census is complied with. The
apportionment of members of the HOR is not valid because it is not based on the
number of inhabitants a province has. Some provinces were given more
representation despite the inferior in number of inhabitants. The Court held that RA
3040 infringed the provisions of the Constitution and is therefore void.