Exposing Hidden Racism in Japan Methodological Moves Toward A Feminist Religio - Political Ethic of Self - Reliance (Jiritsuteki Josei Seiji Rinri) PDF

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EXPOSING HIDDEN RACISM IN JAPAN
METHODOLOGICAL MOVES TOWARD A FEMINIST
RELIGIO-POLITICAL ETHIC OF SELF-RELIANCE
(JIRITSUTEKIJOSEI SEIJI RINRI)
Eun Ja Lee
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Union Theological Seminary, New York City
UMI Number: 3048895
Copyright 2002 by
Lee, Eun Ja
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Acknowledgment
It has been a long process to finish this degree and project. I have received much
help, support, encouragement as well as challenges from so many people to complete this
dissertation. I am deeply indebted to my new advisor Dr. Emily Townes, who has told
me, You can do it; just write! from the early stage of the dissertation project. Her
encouragement and strict timeline enabled me to complete the dissertation. I would like
to express my profound appreciation and thanks to my former advisor, Dr, Beverly
Harrison, who was very supportive from the beginning of the program and trusted my
insight. She enlightened and helped me to integrate feminism, social justice and
Christian faith. I especially appreciate her critique and advice which improved my
thinking and writing. I am also deeply grateful to Dr. Larry Rasmussen for spending time
to carefully read my dissertation and share thoughtful suggestions.
Almost all writers say that a book cannot be completed without many hands. This
is particularly true for me in writing a dissertation using my third language of English.
Without first-language speakers to help, this dissertation would not have been finished. I
express my deep thanks to Jeanne Fujiyoshi for her basic correction of my English.
Understanding my thoughts during early stages of my idea was most difficult. She had to
proofread the same chapters again and again because of the many times I revised the first
draft. Thank you to Ron Fujiyoshi who also edited my English with his wife Jeanne and
has been my lifelong friends, comrade injustice work, and mentor. Without
encountering him during my early stage of life in Japan and his continuing support I
would not been able to come this far today.
Thanks also to my colleague from the doctoral program in Ethics at Union
Theological Seminary, Beryl Ingram and Gary Matthews. I am very glad that Beryl and I
went through together this difficult time of finishing up our dissertations and in the
process became lifelong friends. Thanks to Beryl for her cheerful comfort and
encouragement. I am indebted to Gary Mathews offer to help improve my writing. His
amazing skill in editing my dissertation made it clear for an English-reading audience.
His offer was not only technical; he fired my courage and spirit to finish writing. I am
also appreciative of all staff at Union Theological Seminary; they ware very kind,
friendly and supportive. This atmosphere at Union sustained and enabled me to survive
during the program.
I am grateful to so many longtime friends in Japan, Hawaii, and California.
Particularly I need to express my appreciation to Roy Takumi. During his busiest period
of the state legislature in Hawaii, he helped to get my last revisions in on time. My
Korean friends in Japan, Hyo Duk Lee, Kyung Shik Suh and Hwa Mi Park helped this
dissertation to be current with their updated information and sources from Japan. There
are so many other old friends whom I cannot name here, but they are in my heart and I
know they are awaiting eagerly the completion of my dissertation.
Finally, my deepest thanks goes to my family in Japan, my sister, Yon Ja Lee,
bother in law, Young Se Kim, my two brother, Tal Kwan Lee, Tal Bu Lee, sister in law
Sun Ae Cho and my mother, Eul Soon Lee. Their material and spiritual support
sustained, nurtured and strengthened me to persevere in the program. Thanks also to my
family here, my husband Young Woo Shin and my seven years old daughter Hae Jung.
Their generous patient during stressful times was appreciated, particularly that of my
daughter whose birth came just a month before my PhD. Program began. Her visible
day-to-day growth and development comforted me and gave me extra strength and hope.
For my mother Eul Soon Lee
and my sister Yong Ja Lee
from whom I learned strength and wisdom for survive
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
Chapter One Introduction 1
Chapter Two Korean Residents in Japan: History and Problems 6
Chapter Three Underpinning of Cultural Supremacy:

The Emperor State System 55
Chapter Four The Emperor State Ideology as an Ideology of Racism 95
Chapter Five Methodological Moves Toward

a Feminist-Political Ethic of Self-Reliance 130
Bibliography 171
Abstract 184
Author's Vitae 185
Chapter One
Introduction
It is often said that Japan is a homogeneous society, a nation described by Eric
Hobsbawm as composed of a population that is ethnically almost or entirely
homogeneous.1This study assumes that the notion of homogeneity generally applied to
Japan is a suspect one. In the modem era, the notion of homogeneity has served to
construct a new national identity of Japanese, a definition that excludes anyone of
non-Japanese origin, or those categorized as Other. I am one of the members of the
Other category, a Korean woman born, raised and educated in Japan.
Although Japan is an Asian country, it resembles a Western country in the eyes of
other Asians. Japan was the only country in Asia that received massive amounts of aid
after World War II. It is also the only country in Asia that succeeded in avoiding the full
impact of modem Western economic and cultural imperialism. And, like some European
nations, Japan is the only country that colonized and occupied territories in Asia and the
Pacific. Japans relative freedom from Western imperialism parallels its own invasion of
other Asian countries. One of the major slogans used to build the modem nation-state
that conveys Japans ambition and directions succinctly is Fukoku Kyohei Enrich the
Nation and Strengthen the Army.
The Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) led to the
colonization of Taiwan (1894-1945), and opened a way to colonizing Korea as well.
Victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) brought full-scale colonial control over
1Eric Hobsbawm, Nation and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990), 66.
2
Korea (1910-1945).2 Japans participation in World War I (1914-1918) led to Japans
mandate to acquire Micronesia in the Pacific. In addition, after Japans invasion of
Manchuria in 1931, its imperialistic desire escalated and led to another war against China
in 1937. The Pacific War that broke out in 1941, part of World War II (1939-1945),
included the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Micronesia.3
During this imperialist colonial period, many Koreans moved to Japan. Some
were forcefully brought over as cheap labor or sent to fight on the front lines of the war;
some voluntarily migrated to Japan in order to survive.4 My parents moved to Japan in
the 1920s from Cheju Island, an island of the southwest end of Korea, seeking a way to
survive economically. My sister, brother and I were born and raised in Japan. Our mother
tongue is Japanese. We have both Korean and Japanese names.3 We were all educated in
Japanese schools.6 I do not remember being taught anything positive about Korea during
my education. When I was in my second year of junior high school, my history teacher
said something negative about Korea.
Taiwan was occupied for a longer period than Korea but was controlled in a totally different way.
Geo-politically, Korea was much more strategic to enable the further invasion of Asia. See the comparative
study. Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teilcoku nihon no buka tochi (Tokyo: Iwamani, 1996).
3In the case of Micronesia, Japan excised a mandate over it after receiving it from the Germans as
a result of World War I
4 The term voluntary is inappropriate since the policy of putting forces in Korea was enforced by
the colonial government
5This is an excellent example of Japans colonial legacy. In 1937, Japans colonial authority
enacted Soshikaimei, literally meaning changing your first name and creating a last name. Under this policy
all Koreans had to change both their first name and surname. My father, a Christian, wisely chose Japanese
names for my sister and me that contributed to our well-being in this oppressive climate.
My sisters name is Yoko. It means a child who makes people feel relaxed. My name is Megumi. It means
a child of grace. Today there is no longer legal mandate to use Japanese names but due to social pressure
many Koreans use Japanese names instead of their Korean, i.e., their parentally conbienet name.
<sThere are Korean schools in Japan, which are supported by Korean organizations.
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3
I do not recall his actual words, but I remember my body shaking with anger. I wanted to
react against what the teacher said but I could not. At that age, I did not have courage to
confront this teacher in front of my peers. It is an experience I can still recall vividly.
Until I graduated from high school, I was ashamed of being a Korean because I
totally internalized the dominant values of Japanese society, with its negative
representations of Koreans. I had no self-esteem as a Korean. I feared being ostracized as
a Korean whenever I was in public settings. Using my Japanese name was protection
against being unmasked and a good way to pass as a Japanese. It became a sword with
two edges: it allowed me to go undetected as a Korean but it cut me deeply to deny who 1
was.
Koreans using Japanese names constantly feel ambiguous in their day-to-day lives
in Japan. We know that using our Korean names is a symbolical act that can help us
reclaim our presence as Korean with integrity. But we also know that using our Japanese
name can help us avoid, at least superficially, being cast in negative stereotypes in the
eyes of ordinary Japanese people. It is a convenient way to avoid the annoying matter of
racist attitudes. It is very rare to find Koreans who use their Korean names in business.
This practice reveals how difficult it is to live in Japan with a Korean name.
Having a Japanese name, in other words, is a temptation for us living between an
ideal world and reality. Ideally, we should use our Korean names in all circumstances as
a principled way of keeping the integrity of our Koreanness. In reality, we do not want
to face the possibility of being insulted or discriminated against simply because we
choose to use our Korean name. Living in the U.S., its never occurred to me to use my
Japanese name, but when I return to Japan, I always have to ponder the question of which
4
name I should use. This is true even today after deeply reclaiming my Korean ethnic
identity. Past experiences still challenge and haunt me.
I recall when several policemen surrounded me during my early stages of
recovering my ethnic pride. One night, I was riding a bicycle on the way back home
from work and was stopped by the police ostensibly because my bicycle did not have a
light. There were three or four policemen and one started interrogating me in the middle
of the street. He asked, Is this your own bicycle? Where are you going? Where do you
live? What is your name? When I was asked my name, I immediately thought of using
my Japanese name. By doing so, I knew that I would avoid further harassment.7
However, I was just beginning to be politicized through involvement in community
organizing surrounding the issue of human rights of Korean residents in Japan. So
without the slightest hesitation 1 said my Korean name. It was a challenge
for me to do this because I was no longer in a protected territory such as my home
where people knew that I am a Korean. I wanted to test myself to see how far I could go
to reclaiming my pride as a Korean.
As soon as I said my Korean name to the police officers, they immediately asked,
Do you have your Alien Registration Certificate?81 said I did not have it with me and
7We can see an analogy between the experience of African-American and Korean residents in
Japan. In the case of African-American; because of their color they have to constantly face annoying
suspicion in day-to day life, particularly in the white dominated suburb. In the case of Korean residents,
Korean names or accented spoken Japanese in the case of first generation, play the role of color line.
Cornel West describes his experience at Princeton, when he was stopped by police for no apparent reason.
See his book Race Matter (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993).
8Japans Alien Registration law requires that all long-term foreign residents must register at their
local city hall. The law also requires that the Alien Registration Certificate be carried at all times or be
subject to a fine. The requirement that people be fingerprinted was revised in 1992. Note that 90 percent of
the long-term foreign population are Koreans and more than 80 percent of them are Koreans who are bom
and raised in Japan.
5
that it was in my closet at home. Then their voices became louder and their attitude
became belligerent. I felt powerless and intimidated surrounded by these four policemen
who were harassing me simply because I dared to use my Korean name. In their eyes, as
a Korean, I represented the most dangerous residents among aliens.
After the police left, I began to cry. I felt miserable and violated. I was still
crying when I reached home. When I entered the house crying, mother asked what
happened to me. I could not explain immediately, but slowly I told her what happened.
My mother scolded me about crying over such a small thing. She experienced much
worse in her life and by comparison, what I just went through was trivial. First generation
Korean residents in Japan suffered under severe and very cruel conditions of poverty,
lack of educational opportunities, and outright hostility. Yet they were able to persevere
because this first generation who were boro and raised for some period of their life in
Korea have a sense of ethnic pride/identity which sustains them. Besides, in my
mothers case, her deep and strong faith in God sustained her under such an awful living
situation. In contrast, second and third generation Koreans in Japan who today comprise
more than 80 percent of the Korean population in Japan have not had a strong sense of
ethnic identity largely because of the powerful social force of Japanization. Since
the dominant culture through education and societal conditioning results in feelings of
inferiority among Koreans, assimilation into Japanese society involves internalizing a
negative view and representation of Koreans. In other words, we see ourselves through
the eyes of the Japanese - that is, as inferior.
There is a clear difference between the first generation and the second or third
generation in regard to the strength of ethnic identity/pride. For the first generation,
6
such pride is a source for anger (han) against injustice.9 Yet, for the second or later
generations, nationality or ethnicity has become a source of intimidation, self-denial
and insecurity. This difference is a consequence of the ongoing and pervasive process of
socialization, the influence of education and the impact of the mass media. Living in
Japan as a non-Japanese, particularly as a second or later generation Korean, is a struggle
to combat all the negative representations made against Koreans due to the legacy and
reproduction of what many today call colonial discourse.
This deprecation of Korean life and culture has been reproduced and legitimized by
a dominant ideology that is historically rooted in the religious and cultural myth of the
status of the Japanese emperor. When we look at the history of Japan, we find that the
role of the emperor ideology is to preserve the concept of the Japanese nation. However,
the role of the emperor in the modern era, particularly in terms of political authority, can
be distinguished clearly from previous eras.
The distinguishing role of the emperor in the modern era was developed by
leaders of the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The Meiji Restoration led to the establishment
of the modern nation-state of Japan that was the impetus for changes in all sectors of
Japanese society. It was the Meiji leaders who expended vast amounts of energy to unify
a feudal clan-based nation into a solid, unified bureaucratic state. For this purpose, the
Meiji leaders effectively used the role of the emperor and created new policies such as
developing a constitution in which the emperor was guaranteed absolute authority. As a
part of this policy, Shinto religion was reinterpreted in order to exalt the religious
Han is a Korean expression that connotes resentment, anguish, bitterness, and brokenheartedness
as a result of injustice.
7
authority of the emperor.10 Japanese feminist theologian Satoko Yamaguchi has argued
that the interpretation of Shinto in the modern era as a long-standing indigenous Japanese
religion is a mistake. She has seen correctly, that Shintoism as we have it today is an
invention of the 18th and 19th centuries.11 For Meiji leaders, exalting the religious
authority of the emperor was a strategy to facilitate their political agendas. Later
however, the new creation further legitimized the invasion and colonizing of other Asian
countries.
This exaltation escalated in the years leading up to World War U and reached the
point of asserting that the emperor was a living god. This socializing of the emperor was
so great that by the end of the war, Hirohito Showa, emperor of a new defeated nation,
felt compelled to issue the Ningen Sengen," (Declaration of a Human Being) declaring
I am no longer arahitomikami (a living god); I am a human being over the radio when
Japan was defeated. This statement demonstrates that he believed he was truly a living
god before World War Q. Indoctrination by believing in the deity of the emperor as a
descendant of the national sun goddess had become a major tool to justify that Japan was
a supreme nation and the Japanese were a supreme race in Asia, even in the world.
Today, the religious and political authority of the emperor that was granted by the
prewar Meiji Imperial Constitution is no longer allowed and practiced under the postwar
constitution. However, the emperor remains the symbol of Japanese unity under its
postwar Constitution. The emperor is still used culturally to sustain the notion of
IMurakami Shigeyoshi, a scholar of Religious Studies, claims that using the ancient chronicles of
Kojiki and Nihonshoki, a sea of Shinto, Fukko Shinto, absolutizes the religious authority of the emperor
and worship. See, Kokka Shinto to mins/mu shukyo (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1982), 3.
IISatoko Yamaguchi, The Invention of Tradition: The Case of Shintoism, in In Gods Image,
Journal of Asian Womens Resource Center for Culture and Theology. Vol. 18, N o.4,1999: 40.
8
homogeneity and cultural supremacy of Japan and its people. Under such
circumstances, discrimination against Koreans and other non-Japanese gets more
sophisticated and complicated. Thus, it is necessary to interpret the Korean experience
within a new framework that holds greater promise for encouraging strategies for social
transformation and self-liberation.
The Purpose of This Study
This dissertation aims to achieve two goals. The first is to analyze the nature of
the oppression faced by Korean residents in Japan. I have been seeking to understand
why Japanese society is so chauvinistic toward non-Japanese.12 Conversely, what makes
Japanese people maintain such a closed Japanese identity? My assumption is that the
oppression faced by Korean residents in Japan and Japanese chauvinism are inseparable
elements of a historical and cultural construction of a single dominant ideology--the
cultural hegemony of the emperor. This ideology has made oppressed groups like the
Koreans invisible and has rendered null the critical thinking of the oppressors. The
central thesis of this analysis is to make clear that the emperor ideology is a form of
racism.
The second goal is to begin to contribute to the development of a radical (i.e.,
deep) feminist political ethic in order to move towards greater liberation for both the
oppressed group (non-Japanese) and the oppressor group (Japanese). By situating my
I2The definition of non-Japanese in this text are oppressed groups such as the Ainu, the
indigenous people of Japan; Okinawans who are descendants of Ryukyu Kingdom but became part of
Japan after the Meiji Restoration; outcaste Burakumin who are Japanese but labeled outcaste people as
the result of the construction of social status/class ranking during Tokugawa Era; and colonial descendants;
i.e., Koreans and Taiwanese. More recently, it would include those from the Philippine, Thailand, Korea
and South America who, since the 1980s, are entering Japan in greater numbers.
9
approach in relation to the texts of feminist/ womanist ethicists/theologians, I will show
how the norms of responsibility, solidarity, and empowerment can inform and enable to
shape a concept of moral agency adequate for those who are victims of what I argue is
racism. According to Canadian feminist ethicist Marilyn Legge, moral agency is based
on the value of human persons and their sustainable environments, aiming at the
enhancement of personhood, defined as the capacity for responsible self-direction.13
Here I would add self-direction to be shaped in relation to transformation o f one's
community and society. The emphasis on community as well as society counters the
dominant Japanese emphasis on group-oriented culture. Such an emphasis is not really
a representation of community at all. Rather, the Japanese emphasis on society is
composed without concern for personal/individual self-direction. A community without
the notion of self/personal discourages development of an adequate notion of moral
agency.
Deepening the concept of moral agency in the context of contemporary Japanese
life is necessary and important for several reasons. In Eastern Asian nations including
China, Korea and Japan, Confucian moral values including patterns of human
relationship deeply permeate and pervade each section of society.14 Such Confucian
l3Marilyn J. Legge, The Grace o f Difference (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), 13. See another
definition of moral agency in the work of Bruce Birch and Larry Rasmussen. Bible and Ethics in Christian
Life (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1989).
HIt is generally said that Japan has received the least amount of the influence of Confucian culture
and moral tradition, when compared to Korea or China, because of its amalgamation of Shinto, Buddhism
and Confucianism, but we cannot underestimate the influence of Confucianism when we consider its long
history in Japan.
10
traditions strongly encourage and uphold a hierarchical patriarchal order13 rather than a
mutual or horizontal order within social relationships. In a communal approach, people
are encouraged to make their own moral decisions in light of their specific historical,
political and social locations in mutual relations. When such a Confucian cultural
tradition is combined with the emperor patriarchal ideology, the result discourages
individual responsible self-direction even further. Finding a deeper notion of moral
agency, then, is critical to resist racism. Hence, this study seeks to fan a new frame of
accountability on behalf of Korean residents in Japan.
There are numerous studies about Korean residents in Japan by both Koreans and
Japanese as well as a few works by Western scholars.16 Most are either historical or
sociological, offering objective descriptions of the situation of Korean residents in
Japan. Most deal to some extent with the problems of discrimination called minzoku
sabetsu (ethnic discrimination) faced by Koreans. But these studies tend to see the
fundamental causes of discrimination in relation only to the outmoded legacy of
colonialism or to the temperament of the Japanese people. While these explanations are
partially valid, they also generate negative consequences including a lack of awareness of
what changes are needed. In addition, such explanations tend to characterize the issues as
a minority problem. As such, minzoku sabetsu (ethnic discrimination) never comes to
be regarded as a major issue or problem for the whole of Japanese society. Koreans and
13This is not to say that all Confucian moral traditions are bad. In fact, there is a positive aspect of
the tradition which was mentioned by Dr. Kwok Pui- Ian at the Asian and Asian American Woman in
Theology and Ministry annual conference in 1992, March 15-17.
For English readers, see, Lee Changsoo and George De Vos, Koreans in Japan: Ethnic
Conflict and Accommodation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). Richard Mitchell, The
Korean Minority in Japan (Berkeley: University California Press, 1967). Michael Weiner, The Origin o f
the Korean Community in Japan 1910-1923 (New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1989). Sonia
Ryang, North Koreans in Japan: language. Ideology and Identity (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997).
11
other non-Japanese are always seen as victims or objects of study, but there always
remains a lack of recognition that an institutional response of social change is needed as
well as a critical perspective adequate for analyzing the roots of the oppression.
In order to develop the contrast required here, I will review existing notions of
racism in light of the experiences of Korean residents in Japan. As I have said, the
general consensus within Japanese society is that racism does not exist in Japan, that
racism is a western problem. In Japan the word racism (jinshu sabetsu) is considered a
problem different from ethnic discrimination (minzoku sabetsu). The former term refers
primarily in the context of North American or European black-white relationships. My
thesis is that the oppression faced by Korean residents in Japan is a form of racism will
no doubt be received with disdain from some such quarters. However, if public
discussion in Japan is ever to lead to actions that resolve the deep injustice of exclusion
that non-citizens suffer, the claims of this dissertation must be faced.
In addition, minority problems in Japan, as well as Japanese colonialism, have
never been major concerns of Japanese studies in North America or Europe. In these
settings as well, there are studies about the emperor system and emperor ideology as an
extension of Japanese history and cultural tradition, but none of them relate the emperor
ideology to cultural inclusion or racism. Thus, probing the emperor ideology as racism in
light of the experiences of Koreans in Japan constitutes an important re-reading of
Japanese history.
12
Methodology in Christian Ethics
This dissertation is a contribution to the field of Christian Ethics. Christian ethics
is a contested field, so we cannot offer a universal or a historical definition of what is
Christian ethics. Among most feminist/womanist ethicists, there is a wide consensus that
awareness of and attention to methodology is important. Further, within the genre of
Christian ethics, norms and values formed within the experiences of oppressed
communities are generally given preference. Karen Lebacqz aptly insists that if justice
begins with the correction of injustice, then the most important tools for understanding
will be the stories of injustice as experienced by the oppressed.17 Within these
assumptions, Christian ethics can be seen as a set of moves that lead to systematic
analyses designed to clarify Christian moral decision-making. Moral decisions are often
required and made in the thick of the struggle, rather than in abstract theorizing in some
safe place. They constitute a struggle against the reality of our inequality, subjugation
and injustice. This starting point is the first methodological principle in the search for a
just society.
Honoring this first principle in this study is especially hard because the numbers
of the oppressed group are very small, and because this community is politically
powerless, culturally assimilated, and their physical appearance is almost identical to the
dominant Japanese group. Meanwhile, the consciousness of the Japanese is largely
paralyzed because of their privileged position of power.
17Karen Lebacqz, Getting our Priorities Straight: Theological Education and Socially Responsible
Ministry, in Theological Education for Social Ministry, ed. Dieter Hessel (Mew York: Pilgrim Press,
1988), 66.
13
These Japanese have believed the myth that Japan is a homogeneous society and
that its society is composed of only Japanese.18 They believe that Koreans or other
non-Japanese are invisible objects or mere foreigners who came to Japan for their own
personal reasons. Koreans and other colonial descendants have a much different
perspective, one directly linked to colonialism and, as I am arguing, the continuing
racism which shapes their outsider mentality.
This study will seek a normative ethic in order to shake and awaken the sleeping
consciousness that exists among Koreans in Japan and Japanese. A radical feminist
political ethic will provide resources for effective conscientization tools for the
oppressed and oppressors alike. In his well-known book, Pedagogy o f the Oppressed>
Paulo Freire proposed an ingenious methodology for the conscientization of the
oppressed.19 Yet, in fact, the conscientization itself is an urgent task for the group of
oppressors. Unless the oppressors change their consciousness world views and social
values the cry of the oppressed will be constantly consumed for the self-satisfaction of
intellectuals.20
A key term in this study is political. I am not using this term in a conventional
sense, as in parliaments, party politics, nor even standing within a certain political party.
My presupposition in this study is that all of us are holistic political beings who are
ltWhen I enclose Japanese in quotation marks I want readers to pay attention to the nuances of
those who are ethinc"Japanese and citizens. In the current trend of post-modem critique, academic
discourse in Japan encourages the deconstruction of who is Japanese.
l9Paulo Friere, Pedagogy o f the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1970).
"Postcolonial theorist Gayatri Spivak warns of the consumption of the concept of marginality.
Cited in Robert Young, Colonial Desire: Hibridity in Theory, Culture and Race (London and New York:
Routledge, 1995), 163.
14
essentially religious, spiritual and social. However, the Japanese, as elite members of
global capitalism, often welcome the erasure of politics and seek to become apolitical
beings. Apolitical people are those who are ignorant about their differences from other
people, who are insensitive to the pain, apathetic to the problems of the world, and
willing and able to focus only on protecting their own personal life.
Politicization in this sense has another important dimension when we seek to
establish an authentic solidarity between oppressors and oppressed. Working for
authentic solidarity requires a certain quality of conscientization, one that makes it
possible for both groups to critically analyze contradictions within the inner-self, to
acknowledge ones social location and to see the structural contradictions of Japanese
society. Authentic solidarity can help to overcome a merely paternalistic dimension of
support for the oppressed. Only then might effective moral agency reassert itself in the
realms of oppressed and oppressor alike.
The analysis that is followed here is historical and analytical. In order to clarify
the hypothesis that outsiders in Japan, including Korean residents excluded from
citizenship and who are also victims of racism, the study must proceed as follows.
In chapter two, the past and present experience of Korean community in Japan is
situated and put into context. Chapter three describes how the emperor worship and
cultural supremacy became so powerful in Japanese self-understanding. Chapter four
stresses the importance of why it is critical to call the emperor ideology a form of racism.
By re-reading theories of racism in light of some western scholarship, the connection
between racism and nationalism as cultural construction will be shown. The last chapter
will lay out what future work is needed to construct a feminist political ethic for
15
resistance and reclaims feminist relational thinking about community and accountability
for interconnected, multiplayer oppressions of Korean residents in Japan.
Chapter Two
Korean Residents in Japan1: History and Problems
Although the presence of Korean residents in Japan is a historical consequence of
Japans modern imperialism, neither most Japanese nor most Korean people know the
history of the Korean community in Japan.2 Even less do scholars from other cultures
understand this history. There are no historical descriptions of Korean residents in
Japanese school textbooks or in standard studies of Japanese life.3 Learning about this
history is a crucial and necessary factor for correcting distortions in Japanese social
consciousness as well as enabling Koreans to understand their past and current situations.
Examining this history may also lead western scholars to a more critical view of Japanese
culture. The current lack of historical understanding allows Japanese people to ignore the
existence, suffering and social problems of Korean residents in Japan. Such ignorance is
easily maintained due to the relative invisibility of Koreans, reflected by their small
numbers less than 0.5 percent of the Japanese population, roughly 700,000 out of
120, 000,000.
This term comes from Norma Fields article Beyond Envy, Boredom and Suffering: Toward an
Emancipatory Politics for Resident Koreans and Other Japanese, Positions 3 (1994):640-70. Before this
article, Koreans in Japan was the most popular English translation for the Japanese Zainichi Chosenjin or
Zainichi Kankokujin. English speakers often use Japanese-Korean or Korean-Japanese since in the U.S. it
is common to use Korean-American to describe U.S. citizens of Korean ancestry. However, many Korean
residents in Japan refused to be called either since the term Japanese refers to those who have Japanese
ancestry.
2Chan Jung Kim, Zainichi Korean hyakunen shi (Tokyo: Sangokan, 1997), 12. His remarks
represent a self-reflection of the Korean community. Japanese historian Suzuki Yuko articulates the same
point as seen from a Japanese historical consciousness.
3Sang Jin Hong and Tomoko Nakajima, Nihon no gakko ni kayowaseteiru zainichi Chosenjin
fubo no kyoikukan ni kansuru chosa, in Zainichi Chosenjin shi kenkyu, VoL 5 (Kobe: Evergreen Press,
1979), 28-51. The survey reported the frustration of Korean parents regarding the lack of education about
the historical experience of Korean residents in Japan.
17
There is no significant physical distinction between Koreans and Japanese, so the
ontological problem is invisible. In addition, Koreans themselves have undercut their
ability to claim their ethnic heritage because of societal pressures (particularly among the
recent generation of Korean residents in Japan) to assimilate dominant Japanese cultural
values that do not recognize positive aspects of Korean-ness. In order to counter this
reality, this chapter will sketch the historical origins of the Korean community in Japan,
explicitly focusing on why Koreans came to live in Japan over a generation ago, why
they are subject to continued institutional discrimination, and why Koreans are invisible
in the eyes of the Japanese.
While sketching the historical origins of Korean residents in Japan, I will also
reexamine Japans colonial policies and the legacy these policies leave that still
contribute to the negative social stereotypes of Koreans in Japan and to a negative self-
image of Koreans who were bom and raised in Japan. I will also discuss contemporary
issues that illustrate the institutional racism surrounding Korean residents in Japan.
Before going into these discussions, however, I will briefly sketch the Japanese view of
Korea prior to the emergence of the Korean community in Japan. This will, in turn,
enable us to see how and why Japanese attitudes about Korea and the Korean people
changed. The changes were not only due to colonialism but were also tied to the
formation of the modem emperor system that will be discussed in greater detail in the
next chapter.
18
Japanese View of Korea Before Annexation
The relationship between Japan and Korea dates to the second century and
involves the process of tairiku4, where culture, religion, agricultural techniques, etc. were
exchanged. A much closer relationship started during the Edo period3 of the Tokugawa
shogunate (1616-1886) just before the modern Meiji era. The relationship of the two
nations during this period was uneventful.6 This was Tokugawas deliberate policy,
following the failure of Hideyoshi Toyotomi to invade Korea in 1S98. During the
Tokugawa shogunate, Korea was the only nation that had an official diplomatic
relationship with Japan, a relationship that was mutually beneficial for both countries.
However, this respectful relationship changed suddenly when Japan entered a period of
modernization starting with the Meiji Restoration in 1868.
Scholars agree that Japans modernization and industrialization were triggered by
the sudden arrival of the kurojune or black ships7 from the United States in 18S3. The
United States used threats of war to open the country for trade. For over two hundred
years, the Tokugawa dynasty had maintained a policy of national isolation. When
Commodore Perrys black ship arrived at Uraga, near Tokyo Bay, the Tokugawa feudal
4Literally meaning continent and usually refers to China. This expression is commonly used to
contrast it with Japanese culture and tradition since Japan is an island nation. This expression also
contrasts with Hemto, meaning peninsular and usually referring to Korea.
5A name of an area of modem Tokyo, before the Meiji period. When the Tokugawa family seized
power, they built the Edo Castle in this area as the symbol of their power and ruling authority. This period
of the Tokugawa dynasty has since been called either the Edo or the Tokugawa era. The Edo Castle is now
the present day Imperial Palace. Tokugawa is the last name of the warrior class family who seized power
over the course of a generation during the Edo period.
^Richard Mitchell, The Korean Minority in Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1967), 6.
7They were called black ships because the bodies of the ships were black in color and the term was
used to refer to all foreign ships. Commodore Perry led two black ships.
19
regime, already weak, began to crumble. Exploiting peasants by levying heavy taxes, a
long-standing practice, was now no longer workable. Peasants frustration and anger
against the feudal regime, encouraged by foreign interference, erupted while factionalism
against the shogunate among the ruling classes also accelerated. The major issue that
divided the ruling classes, aggravated by Perrys ship, was whether the country should
open itself up to international trade. While one faction wanted to keep the country closed
to other foreign countries, the other was eager to initiate modernization by opening its
borders.
During this time, an anti-shogunate group developed the ideology of sonnojoiron,
literally meaning to revere the emperor and exclude foreigners. This ideology was based
on the school of Mito8 and was the ideological foundation of the Meiji modern Emperor
state. The group that practiced the ideology of sm ojoiron grew out of a dilemma. On
the one hand, the anti-shogunate group knew that modernization was inevitable for
survival in the face of international imperial hegemony. On the other hand, their feeling
of Joi (or anti-foreigner), discouraged opening the nation. Eventually, due to internal
problems, social chaos, and the new international threat, the Tokugawa regime had to
accept the demands of an unequal treaty with Commodore Perry. The treaty heavily
favored American interests with regard to taxes and other trading conditions for
American companies.
*A school emerged at the end of the Tokugawa era led by a leader of the Mito clan or hem. It used
teachings of National Learning (kokugaku), historicity,
Shinto, and a combination of national
consciousness and others. It emphasized the uniqueness and superiority of Japanese traditions. National
Learning is a philosophical system developed by Motoori Norinaga and others.
20
Having been forced to open the country and accept unequal treatment from
western nations, a strong and unified national consciousness began to emerge in response.
The making of a strong nation would require that a sense of unity be developed, so that
Japan could protect itself from the threat of western invasion. Against western
imperialism, however, unity within Japan alone was simply not enough.
Gradually, a unified sense of opposition against western imperialism began to
spread to other Asian nations. At first, this appeared to be a uniform plan of solidarity
among Asian countries. Yet for Japan, its own national interests were always primary.
In order to preserve its own national security, Japan came to believe that it had to become
the Asian leader, that is, the most militarily advanced and industrialized nation among the
Asian countries.
Operating from this vantage point, Japanese policies and attitudes toward Asia in
general and Korea in particular began to change. This was a radically different path from
the one taken in the Tokugawa era. Korea and other nations such as China were no
longer viewed as friends or teachers who brought advanced tairiku culture and technique.
The Meiji leaders already believed that Japan was a much more developed nation than
China or Korea and felt justified in exerting its power as the newly self-proclaimed leader
of Asia.
Yukichi Fukuzawa,9 an intellectual who lived during end of the Tokugawa regime
and who later became one of the most influential ideologues of the Meiji government,
developed the idea of Toyo no Meishu (The Leader of Asia). This proclaimed that Japan,
9Fuknzawas famous phrase was datsu a nyu au," meaning entering West, getting out from
Asia, projected the thoughts of the Meiji leaden and the future direction of the new modem nation-state.
Fukuzawa founded Keio University in Tokyo.
21
as the leader of Asia, had a duty to other Asian countries to facilitate their modernization.
The idea was justified under the name of Asia unity.10 In his article, My View on Our
Relations with Korea, he wrote:
. . . westerners are now advancing eastward (sic.) like a spreading fire. It would
be as if we had invited the burning of our own ghost by allowing our neighbors
house to be consumed.11
Strategically, Fukuzawa believed that Japan could not resist western imperial power
alone. Even if Japan could avoid domination by western imperialism in the short run, if
neighboring countries such as Korea and China were taken over by a western power, this
would severely compromise the long-term national security of Japan as well. In order to
avoid this scenario, a united Asia under Japans control was considered urgent.
Fukuzawa made tremendous efforts to educate liberal Korean people to facilitate the
modernization of Korea. The modernization of Korea would then help align Korea with
Japan as a stronger block against western imperial powers. He believed Japan was the
first nation to institute a new system of modernization. In turn, it was now Japans task
to help other neighboring countries become modernized. Ultimately, Koreans became
aware that the aim was not to help the Korean people but to protect Japan from the
western powers. Again, Fukuzawa believed that the only country that could be entrusted
with East Asian leadership was Japan. Furthermore, he wrote that Korea was weak and
backward as a civilization and that Japan had to help Korea. This view of Korea as a
backward country became deeply implanted in the ways of thinking of the ruling classes
10Michael Weiner, The Origins o f the Korean Community in Japan 1910-1923 (Atlantic, NJ:
Humanities Press, 1989), 11.
IlIbid., 12.
22
of Japan. It also developed and persisted over time in the thinking of ordinary Japanese
citizens as well.
Historical Overview of the Origins of the Korean Community in Japan
It is said that the desire for invading other Asian countries emerged in the late
Meiji period when Japan began its campaign of anti-western imperialism.12 However,
from the beginning of the Meiji government, Korea was a major target of Japans own
colonial aspirations. In 1874, six years after the establishment of the new Japanese state,
a now famous controversy arose among the members of the new Meiji government. The
debate was called seikan ronso or conquering Korea. Modern Japan faced various
problems, including the pervasive threat of western power, internal factionalism, and
mass popular frustration against the new system. Meiji leaders wanted to dilute these
issues by conquering Korea and thereby shifting the national focus of attention.
The major debate among the Meiji leaders regarding Korea was about the timing
of the invasion, not the idea of invasion itself. Hence, from the very formation of the
modem nation-state of Japan, Korea was targeted for political takeover. The invasion of
Korea was not only to be used to dilute internal problems. Geographically, Korea was
important strategically. Korea was a necessary stepping-stone territory for further
invasions into Asia, particularly China. Eventually, just twenty years after the
Restoration, the Meiji government provoked a military conflict with Korea in the 1887
Kanwah Incident, and forced Korea to open its port for trading under unilateral
l2This included 1889 when Meiji Imperial Constitution was enforced and 1890 when the first
national Diet convened.
23
conditions favoring Japan. In 190S, along with its victory in the Russo-Japanese War,
Japan gained controlling authority over Korea and began preparations that led to formal
annexation of the country in 1910.
At this juncture, the immigration of Koreans to Japan began. The first 709
Koreans, mainly students, came in 1909. Over 2,500,000 Koreans had migrated by the
end of the WWII (1945). Japans imperial wars during the 1930s were a major influence
on the number of Korean immigrants who entered Japan. This is made clear by the
following chart:
Prewar Korean Population in Japan13
Year Number of Immigrants Geopolitical Events Koreans Drafted
1909 790
1915 3,989 During WWI
1916 5,638
1917 14,501
1918 22,262 End of Land Survey Program
1919 28,272 March 1 Independent Movement
1920 30,175
1921 35,876
1922 59,865
1923 80,617
1924 120,238
1925 133,710
1926 148,502
1927 175,911
1928 243,328
1929 276,031
1930 298,091
1931 318,212 Outbreak of Manchuria Invasion
1932 390,543
1933 466,217
1934 537,576
13From Chansoo Lee and George De Vos, eds., Koreans in Japan: Ethnic Conflict and
Accommodation, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), 37.
24
1935 625,678
1936 690,501
1937 735,689 Outbreak of China-Japan War
1938 799,865
1939 961,591 National Mobilization Order 8,700
1940 1,190,444 Outbreak of Pacific War 54,944
1941 1,469,230 43,493
1942 1,625,054 112,007
1943 1,882,456 122,237
1944 1,936,843 280,300
1945 unknown End of Word War II 160,427
Given the sociopolitical realities of each period, we can understand why the
Korean population increased over time. In the period during World War I, there was a
shortage of labor in Japan, particularly within the military and in related industries.
Michael Weiner points to the increased demand for labor in Japan brought on by a
period of rapid economic growth during and immediately after World War I.14 He
further explains:
With the outbreak of World War I, Japanese industry was given a tremendous
boost and the demand for industrial labor accelerated rapidly. Between 1914 and
1919 the number of factories employing ten or more workers increased from
approximately 17,000 to 24,000, while the number of workers employed in these
factories increased from 850,000 to nearly 1.5 million.13
Military industries needed cheap labor that could not be supplied by the Japanese alone,
particularly since males were being conscripted into the military.
While escalating imperial war after the invasion of China in 1937, Japan
established the law of kokumin sodoinreii or order of national mobilization in 1939,
which allowed the forcible recruitment of Korean labor to Japan as well as military aid to
Weiner. 46.
Ibid., 49.
25
the battlefield. Within the next six years, more than one million Korean were brought to
Japan, most of them sent to dangerous working areas such as mines and munitions
factories.16 In sum, Japans imperial wars were the cause of Korean forced
immigration during this period.
Brutal colonial policies in Korea accompanied forced immigration. Sotokufu, the
colonial government at the time, made survival difficult for Koreans who remained in
Korea. For example, the first general of Sotokufu, Masakado Terauchi legislated the
Tochi ChosaJigyo, or Land Investigation Act, from 1910 to 1918, which required
peasants to register their own land.17 But the majority of peasants in Korea were illiterate
and did not know how to register the claim to their land. As a result, 96 percent of the
civilian land, excluding mountains and forests, was confiscated from the Korean peasants
by the colonial authorities. Peasants who lived in impoverished conditions in rural areas
had to leave land they had previously owned in order to search for a way to survive.
Furthermore, toward the end of the Land Investigation Act, the colonial
administration passed the Plan for Increasing Rice in Korea. Japan faced a serious
shortage of rice beginning in 1917, a condition that led to a major rice riot in the
country. In order to supply more rice to Japan, the colonial administration enforced
various measures to increase the production of rice in Korea. Under this plan, a new
system of agriculture was imported and forced upon Korean peasants and it resulted in
I6This law also allowed forced recruitment of so-called comfort women. Over 200,000 women
from Korea, Japan and other occupied territories were forced to serve as sexual slaves for Japanese
soldiers. It is estimated that 80-90 percent were Korean women. It was a policy of state-sponsored terror
and a war crime with few equals in modem warfare.
l7Hiroshi Miyashima, Chosen ni okeru shokuminchi jinushisci no tenkai in Iwanami koza

kondai Nihonto shokuminchi. Vol. 3 (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1992), 6.
26
heavy burdens on them, including extra expenses for growing their crops and maintaining
their land. These devastating colonial policies forced many Koreans to journey
elsewhere for economic survival. Some moved to Manchuria and some moved to Japan.
Many colonial studies point out the direct relationship between colonial policies and the
numbers of immigrant labor.
Hardships for Koreans did not end after they settled in Japan. Working conditions
and the wage differences between Korean and Japanese workers were significant, along
with cultural and language barriers that created even more tension between Korean and
Japanese workers. These tensions caused antagonistic feelings and conflicts to escalate.
One extreme example was related to the Kanto Earthquake, the most destructive
earthquake ever recorded in Japan, which took place on September 1, 1923.18 On the
morning of September 2, the rumor spread that the Koreans were setting fires, throwing
poison into wells, rioting against the Imperial Army, killing Japanese, and raping
women.19 These charges were totally groundless. However, even major newspapers
stated, Koreans and Socialists are planning a rebellious and treacherous plot. We urge
the citizens to cooperate with the military and police to guard against Koreans.20 As
rumors spread, more than three thousand vigilante groups were organized voluntarily and
spontaneously by ordinary Japanese citizens in the chaotic aftermath of the earthquake.
The military, police and Japanese vigilante groups were swept up in the frenzy and
indiscriminately killed innocent Koreans wherever they found them. The Japanese were
"Mitchell, 38.
19Lee Chansoo and De Vos., 22
Ibid., 23.
27
able to distinguish Koreans from Japanese by asking them to pronounce juen gojussen
(ten cents), because first generation Koreans could not pronounce the sound Ju
properly. More than 6,000 Koreans were killed by the Japanese military, police and
vigilantes during this incident.
George De Vos asserts that the reason the violence spread was that the Japanese
government itself believed the rumors and did nothing to quell them.21 However, in his
study of the massacre of Koreans during the Kanto Earthquake, Korean historian Kyong
Shik Park claims that the Japanese government initiated the rumors. Park bases his claim
on four points.
First, the decision and preparation for the declaration of martial law by Internal
Affairs Minister Mizuno and others took place from the evening of September 1
through September 2. The crackdown on Korean rioting telegram was also
drafted during this time. From this, it follows that there may have been a
disinformation campaign in an effort to legitimize these measures. (Martial law
declaration is issued during wartime or in the event of civil strife or rioting.)
Second, the report to Konoe and Kanto Martial Law Headquarters of the First
Division mentions well-intentional propaganda by [suppressed] to maintain order
in the civilian population as one of the factors behind the spreading of rumors. It
can be surmised that the censored words are the police or the Internal Affairs
Ministry. Third, on the afternoon of September 2, police stations at Shibuya,
Nakano, Shinagawa and Hibiya issued a stream of reports about attacks by
Koreans. These reports clearly indicate that the police department was spreading
unfounded rumors. Fourth, from the morning of September 2 through the
afternoon, the military or the police were disseminating posters and printed
material alleging attacks by Koreans. From the above, I am of the belief that
while initially unfounded rumors may have spread spontaneously, there was a
deliberate conspiracy of disinformation by Internal Affairs bureaucrats such as
Mizuno, who were afraid that food looting by Japanese would lead mass riots.22
21Ibid, 22.
a Kyong Shik Paik, Temosei kokka to zainichi Chosenjin (Tokyo: Shakai Hyoronsha, 1986), 60.
28
Parks conclusion is much more persuasive if we consider other sociopolitical
circumstances at the time. When the earthquake occurred, Japan was facing a critical
social crisis brought on by the effects of the worldwide Great Depression and the
agitation of the so-called Taisho Democracy, a movement of socialists and anarchists
who were anti-government and who were inspired by the 1919 March First Movement.23
Many historical studies agree that the March First Movement for Koreas independence
astonished the Japanese government and resulted in the government changing its policies
in dealing with Koreans, a shift from military rule (budan seiji) as the primary strategic
focus to cultural rule (bunka tochi). The ruling group grew very uneasy and anticipated
the possibility that it might be overthrown. The government felt it needed a scapegoat to
prevent the possibility of social chaos. In order to prevent a bad situation from becoming
worse, therefore, it is very plausible that the government itself initiated and spread the
rumors that led to the tragic massacre of Koreans.
Whether the rumors were spread spontaneously or were government-initiated, it is
also notable that vigilante corps participated in the killing of innocent Korean people. No
matter how chaotic the situation, this was a very unusual and extreme reaction. How
could ordinary Japanese kill innocent Koreans? Why did this happen? It is estimated
that 2000 out of the 6000 victims were killed by the vigilantes. Clearly, a deeply held
prejudice by Japanese against Koreans led to this tragedy. Hence, these events should not
be interpreted simply as the side effect of chaos from a natural disaster. Rather, the event
serves as a vivid illustration of how ordinary Japanese were educated to have antagonistic
The March First Movement was a spontaneous movement led by ordinary Koreans advocating
for national independence from Japans colonial rule.
29
feelings and degrading images of Koreans during the colonial period. Negative images
and feelings were implanted into all Japanese equally but studies of the massacre point
out that the vigilante corps were organized mainly from Japanese who came from the
lower rungs of society, persons who were frustrated and discontented by their everyday
lives and who used Koreans as scapegoats, to the Japanese governments delight.
In addition, as just stated, it is likely that the government manipulated this
frustration toward Koreans in order to shift the responsibility for hard times away from
the authorities. In 1918 (as alluded to earlier), due to increasing rice prices and the lack
of food, there occurred a nationwide mass uprising called the Rice Riot (komesodo). That
riot was initiated by the same social groups that were largely responsible for initiating the
earthquake riots. Many Koreans participated in the Rice Riot, which begs the question as
to why the Japanese working class and Koreans joined forces in the earlier uprising, yet
Koreans were targeted in the aftermath of the earthquake in 1923. In his study of
Japanese racism, Kazuhiro Abe explains the possible reasons as follows:
in the 1918 Rice Riot, these Japanese who were mobilized to bring the riots
under control showed ambivalence toward the rioters because of their
occupational similarity to the rioters. In 1923, however, those Japanese mobilized
into the vigilant corps killed many Koreans in spite of the similarity between their
occupational composition and that of their victim. What accounts for this marked
difference? Manipulation on the part of authorities alone cannot account for the
whole story. A most basic question still remains: Why did the Japanese so blindly
take the rumors for granted and commit an historical mass murder? To answer
the question, we first have to clearly identify what was absent in the 1918 Rice
Riot that was present in the Korean massacre of 1923. What made the two cases
distinct from each other was intense ethnic antagonism generated in the split labor
market and racism which gave a racist content to the antagonism.24
24Abe, 88-89.
30
Abes detection of racism in the latter event is, I believe, undoubtedly correct.
The major focus of the 1918 Rice Riot was a clear demand from the masses for food and
a stabilization of the price of rice. The riots in the aftermath of the Kanto earthquake, on
the contrary, represented the legacy of an ongoing colonial brutality that had degraded
Koreans in the eyes of most Japanese people.
Today, most Japanese no longer remember the historical legacy of colonialism.
In the article, Formation of Colonial Wars and Sotokufu, the Government-General of
Korea, Shinobu Ooe asserts that there has been no concept or understanding of colonial
war in the modern history of Japan, though two colonies, Taiwan and Korea, were taken
by military force.23 Most ordinary Japanese understand only what the school textbooks
teach them. These textbooks teach that the Japanese obtained their colonies through
international treaties such as the peace treaty between China and Japan, and the Protect
Treaty between Korea and Japan.26 There is no mention that these treaties were the
result of military coercion, and hence Japans colonial aggression is masked. Hiding
behind international treaties, the Japanese delude themselves and seek to create the
illusion for others that the colonial wars were never part of Japanese history, hence
allowing them to deny moral responsibility for their actions during the colonial period, as
well as Japans postwar treatment of other countries.
In addition to using international treaties as a justification for imperialism, the
Japanese educational system portrays Korea as an undeveloped country that could not
^Shinobu Ooe, Shokuminchi senso to sotokufo in Iwanami koza kindai nihon to shokuminchi,
Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1992), 3.
Ibid, 4.
31
help being colonized. Overwhelmed by the influential power of Japans educational
propaganda through history textbooks and other popular methods,27 the counter influence
of other more progressive interpretations by conscientious Japanese intellectuals has been
very limited. The dominant mindset of ordinary Japanese, as a result of such
indoctrination, is illustrated by the comments of Kamisaka Fuyuko, a well-known writer:
1) I would say that the Japanese annexation of Korean was wrong, but
Japans rule over Korea took place within the context of the times and
this was something that received international acceptance at the time.
2) The comfort women must be seen against this backdrop of the
Japanese annexation of Korea as a product of this period, where Japan
was trying to integrate the Korean Peninsula. The presentation of this as
an aggressor-victim relationship is not necessarily correct. Japanese
women became comfort women along with women from the Korean
Peninsula.
3) The people who have come forward as Korean comfort women were
legally/formally Japanese women. There is room for debate as to
whether Japan should compensate those who became foreigners after
the war.
4) While some are of the opinion that Japan has not come to terms with
its wartime history, Japan has in fact sacrificed 1,958 of its people to war
crime tribunals.
5) The Japanese government has not made any reparations to Japanese
comfort women, and in that sense the formerly Japanese comfort women
(it refers to Korean women)28 receive the same treatment. If the Japanese
government were to make reparations to the formerly Japanese comfort
women through pensions or the like, this could be interpreted as
interference in the internal affairs of a foreign country.
6) Japan and Korea are friendly nations today as a result of a complex
history. It is not useful to simply put forward a dichotomy of good and
evil without carefully looking at events in their frill context and history.
In terms of the basic treaty between the two countries, the current
relations between Japan and Korea are founded on the perspective that
all issues have been resolved.
7) In any case, too much time has passed and it is pointless to attempt a
humanitarian resolution at this stage. The context was different fifty
r For example, one of the most popular cultural elements in Japan is manga or comic culture.
Since the mid-1990s there have been a flood of comics written by right-wing writers who deal with the
issue of the comfort women and other related issues of Japans colonialism by defending Japans war
crimes.
^During the annexation all Koreans were considered Japanese.
32
years ago, and notions of humanness were also different. Living in

peacetime, it is impossible to imagine what standard should be used to
evaluate what took place in wartime.29
Kamisakas remarks represent a typical Japanese understanding of the Japanese
colonial era and Japans historical relationship with Korea. Her arguments seek to justify
Japans colonial brutality behind the mask of international treaties such as the Portsmouth
Treaty and the Shimonoseki Treaty.30 However, as Ooe has pointed out, these treaties
were merely the coerced results of colonial wars. In fact, colonial expansion was the
primary aim of the wars.
Largely because of the hardening racism that was in part due to continuing
colonial domination, Koreans were emotionally grateful when Japan finally lost its
imperialistic wars on August IS, 1945. Japans loss in World War II had brought
potential liberation from colonial oppression. Koreans living in Japan prepared to return
to Korea right after the war was over. However, the Allied Powers arrangement for
repatriation to Korea was limited. While some Koreans had already become settled in
Japan, many others learned that Korea was devastated by the war. Many Koreans
discovered that returning to Korea was simply not possible. In my parents case, they
^ u k o Suzuki Feminisumu and Chosen (Tokyo: Akashi Publisher, 1994), 238-239. These seven
points are summarized by Suzuki, a feminist historian in Japan.
30The Treaty of Portsmouth was negotiated in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. President Theodore
Roosevelt received the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in mediating the treaty. Of course, the significance of
this treaty was that it symbolized the first time an Asian country defeated a Western power. In the earlier
Taft-Katsura agreement, the so-called Gentlemens Agreement signed in July, 1905, Roosevelt agreed to
Japans increasing dominance in Korea in exchange for the U.S. having flee sway in the Philippines. The
treaty essentially ceded Korea to Japan. The Portsmouth Treaty forced Russia to recognize Korea's
independence and the "paramount political, military, and economic interests of Japan in Korea. The
Shimonoseki Treaty signed on April 17,1895 signaled the end of the first Sino-Japanese War. The treaty
33
sent all their belongings to Korea. While waiting for the next ship, they heard a rumor
that the situation in Korea was very unstable, and so they gave up their plan to return to
their motherland. Until the day he died, my father in particular yearned to return to
Korea.
About 600,000 of the approximately two million Koreans living in Japan at the
end of World War II remained and became the foundation of todays Korean community
in Japan. Today, in the fourth generation of that community, the Korean population in
Japan remains stable and only slightly more than after the war. The first generation now
comprises less than five percent of the entire population of Korean residents in Japan.
Younger generations view their Korean motherland and issues of discrimination in Japan
differently from previous generations. In general, they are much more assimilated into
the Japanese society. Unfortunately, except for a few progressive intellectuals and
activists, most Japanese and most Korean residents remain blind to ongoing racist
attitudes and discriminatory practices that continue to this day. We consider a few of
these now.
Ongoing Pressures on Korean Residents in Japan
It has now been more than a half century since Korea was liberated from Japanese
colonial control. During that time, there have been several diplomatic changes that
occurred in the relationship between the two nations, starting with the Normalization
ended Chinas control over Korea granting its independence, and ceded Taiwan to Japan along with the
Pescadores Islands, Port Arthur and the Liaodong peninsula.
34
Treaty in 196S.31 This treaty enabled Korean residents in Japan to visit their cities of
origin, something that had not been possible since 194S. This was particularly joyful
news for the first generation of Korean residents in Japan who still had a strong
attachment to their homelands. Secondly, it gave Korean residents in Japan the official
legal status of permanent residency with the condition that they accept South Korean
nationality.33 To some extent, the changes can be seen as positive reforms. This political
resolution also gave the Japanese government, however, an excuse to escape Japans
responsibility for its actions during the colonial period. Kyong Shik Suh, one of most
popular writers among the second generation of Korean residents in Japan, has been an
advocating voice for the Korean people. He criticized the changes brought by the treaty
as follows:
Giving three hundred million dollars as free aid and two hundred million dollars
in loans as a present for independents, the Japanese government made an
excuse to ignore its responsibility for colonialism. Without admitting the
historical fact of Japans colonial control, even the logic o f compensation for war
victims such as the former comfort women and forced draftees, would not be able
to become established. In fact, today many Japanese say that the compensation
for the victims was already resolved through the normalization treaty.
Although Suhs criticism is aimed at the Japanese government, it applies equally to
Japanese public opinion in general. Whenever issues related to the human rights of or
ethnic prejudice toward Korean people arise in Japanese society, both the Japanese
31The two nations here are Japan and South Korea. Japan has no diplomatic relations with North
Korea. I will not elaborate on this point since it is beyond the scope of this study.
32The status of permanent residency is highly debatable in that it was not given to those who had
a loyalty or identity to North Korea. It also involved the possibility of deportation and restriction of re
entry into Japan.
33Kyong Shik Suh, Bundaa o ikiru (Tokyo: Kage Publisher, 1997), 172.
35
government and the general public respond by saying that Japans responsibilities to
Koreans during the colonial period ended with this treaty. Yet with respect to Korean
residents in Japan, this logic is no justification for their postwar treatment.
The formal political changes brought about by the Normalization Treaty did not
result in significant social, economic and cultural improvements in the treatment of
Korean residents in Japan. Fundamentally, Japans postwar polices toward its former
colonies and its colonial descendents have not changed. In addition, since the mid-
1990s, neo-nationalist voices have emerged (the so-called Japanese Revisionists),
consisting of various professors of prestigious universities and popular writers who are
seeking to mask Japans dark colonial past even further. These groups are supported by
many in the business world.34 One such group is called the Group to Make New History
Textbooks, and it was formed to demand that the Education Ministry eliminate textbook
descriptions of Japanese military comfort women, the Nanking Massacre,33 and
Japans brutal behavior during the colonial period, even though these descriptions are
insufficient from the victims perspective.36
According to Puja Kim, a feminist researcher of Korean residents in Japan, the
rationale for eliminating these references from textbooks are that:
34See the analysis of the Japanese Revisionist movement in Hidenori Ishida, Tetsu Ukai, Yoichi
Komori and Tetsuya Takahashi, Beyond Parasite Nationalism, " inSekai, August 2000,189-208.
3SIn 1937, when Japan invaded China, the Japanese military killed hundreds of thousands of
civilian Chinese in Nanking.
36Puja Kim, Backlash Against the Comfort Women Issue: Moves Against History Textbook
Reference, in Common Grounds-Violence Against Women in War andArmed Conflict Situations, ed.,Indai
Lourdes Sajor (Quezon, Philippines: Asian Center for Womens Human Rights), 1998,200.
36
1) the military did not forcibly recruit the women; 2) the comfort
women were commercial prostitutes, some of whom made a lot of
money from operation; 3) telling schoolchildren about comfort women
will deprive them of their national pride; and 4) it is too early for
junior high school students to learn about the dark aspects of sex.37
There is the further claim that the issues of comfort women and the Nanking
Massacre, although historical facts, were nevertheless greatly exaggerated (even
patently falsified) in earlier textbooks and therefore should not be included at all in
subsequent school textbooks.
Recently, anachronistic articles and books have flooded the mass media,
intellectual magazines, and journals. The social impact of this emergent neo-
nationalism of the Japanese Revisionists has been tremendous, serving to reinforce
and reproduce harmful stereotypical social and cultural prejudices against Koreans. The
weekly tabloid, Shukan Shincho, discussing the recent issue of comfort women during
World War Q, is typical:
After SO years of the war, they had been silent for more than 40 years
but all of sudden they raised voices because the prime minister and
other Cabinet members have started to apologize. Their [military
comfort women] logic is if you apologize then you should compensate.
. . . The problem of the Public School Textbooks is clear in that we
cannot teach bad and negative things that deny our country to junior
high school students. The aim of the comfort womens breaking of
silence is obvious because they want to get the money.38
Although those who were former comfort women have clearly expressed that their
motivation in breaking the silence is not to gain financially but rather to reclaim their
dignity, accusations of greed have freely disseminated through the mass media.
J7Ibid., 200-201
"Fuyuhiko Yamamoto, Shukan shincho (December 19%): 15.
37
The neo-nationalist movement is an example of the pervasive discrimination
and prejudice still felt today by the Japanese against Koreans. On the other hand, the
Japanese government still has not addressed more than two hundred institutional rights
such as suffrage, government student loans, and civil service employment. Many of these
rights and privileges are still not available to Koreans on an equivalent basis to the
Japanese, even though Koreans are still required to pay equivalent taxes and other
obligations.39
While the Japanese government has made no effort to set a policy that will bring
significant change in the support and development of ethnic pride among colonial
Korean descendants, younger generation Koreans are nevertheless more Japanized.
Institutional and social discrimination push Koreans to escape into the illusion of
pretending they are Japanese. This Japanization process contributes to problems more
serious and complex than simply being excluded from institutional welfare benefits.
Japanization has an emasculating effect and takes away the will to protest against
Japanese injustice. Japanese cultural supremacy has culminated in a potent Japanese
racism that is preventing Koreans from reclaiming their own destiny. The following are
some of the issues that need to be addressed in order to reverse that trend.
Legal Status
The complexity of the legal status of todays Korean residents in Japan serves to
reveal Japans institutional racism and irresponsible postwar policies toward colonial
39Sonjea Kim, Sabetsoshakai no shynen kara kyosei shaki no furontea e, Fukuin to sekai (July
1998):16-24.
38
decedents. During the colonial period, Koreans and Taiwanese were given Japanese
nationality. This did not mean, however, that they had equal rights with the Japanese.
Under the koseki seido or family registry system, people of colonized countries were
differentiated by the categories of naichijin (literally inside person or Japanese) and
gaichijin (outside person or colonial subject), with additional privileges afforded the
naichijin. After World War n, the Allied Powers negotiated with the Japanese
government about whether Koreans residents in Japan should henceforth be considered
liberated independent nationals, or continue to be considered Japanese nationals. The
San Francisco Peace Treaty with the United States in 1952 declared that Korean residents
were no longer Japanese nationals. The negotiations, of course, ignored Korean voices
entirely.40 Earlier, beginning in 1947, Koreans were obliged by a new Alien Registration
Order to register as aliens.
These were sudden and destabilizing changes in the legal status of Korean
residents. Later, the Normalization Treaty between Japan and South Korea in 1965
brought about further complex problems. As mentioned earlier, permanent residency was
given only to persons whose nationality was that of the Republic of Korea (South Korea).
As a result, people who were identified with the Democratic Peoples of Republic of
Korea (North Korea) or those who could identify with neither North nor South, were
excluded. As a result of these historical twists and turns, Korean residents within a same
^Before this official international resolution was made, Koreans were already categorized as
non-Japanese and compelled to register as foreigners in 1947 under the Alien Registration Order.
Ironically, this order was the last order under the emperors political authority guaranteed in the former
imperial Constitution. Also, this order is the basis of todays Alien Registration Law that aims to control
all foreigners particularly Koreans.
39
family often have different legal statuses.41 In sum, Japanese post-war policies have
failed to adequately protect Korean legal rights in general and have failed as well to treat
Korean residents consistently and equally, often with frustrating and sometimes tragic
consequences for Korean families.
In addition to these legal complexities, Korean residents confront further
discrimination in the form of the distinctive concept of nationality that exists in Japan.
Nationality in Japan implies more than legal status. While Koreans or members of other
ethnic groups might attain the legal status of permanent residency, only ethnic
Japanese are seen as holders of Japanese nationality. While in the United States, by
contrast, a resident alien who becomes a naturalized citizen is henceforth recognized as
American, Japanese nationality is only conferred upon ethnic Japanese.
Thus, permanent residency does not lead to legal, political and social inclusion in
Japanese society. Moreover, nationality in Japan is determined byju s sanguinis or ones
blood line : that is , by parentage. Hence, even a person born in Japan does not
automatically obtain Japanese nationality. In the case of Korean residents, although more
than 80 percent of them were bom and raised in Japan, their nationality remains either
South Korean or chosen Korean.42 The only exceptions are those who have one parent
holding Japanese nationality. In sum, while most Koreans hold permanent resident
41In 1991, the Ministry of Justice finally issued a new categoiy of permanent residency for both
North and South Koreans under the category of special permanent residence. For further discussion of
Koreans legal status in Japan, see Chikako Kashiwazaid, The Politic of Legal Status: The Equation
Nationality with Ethnonadonal Identity, in Koreans in Japan: Cultural Voices From the Margin, ed.
Sonia Ryang (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 13-31.
*Most who are in this category identify ideologically with North Korea. However, since there is
no diplomatic relationship between North Korea and Japan, people who do not take South Korean
40
status, they are not Japanese citizens and, as a result, cannot claim commensurate legal
and institutional rights such as suffrage, public sector employment, social services and
immigration rights. Under the category of special permanent residence, Koreans and
other colonial descendants live relatively normal lives. However, the continuing
unstable and unjust legal status of Korean residents in Japan results in many
inconveniences and injustices. For instance, when Koreans leave Japan for travel or to
study abroad, they have to get re-entry permission from the Ministry of Justice. The
maximum length of stay away from Japan is four years.43 Anyone exceeding this limit
faces the possibility of having his or her resident status revoked.
It is critical to understand this difference and how it results in creating a situation
that is unequal and unjust. In Japan, even if a Korean person is born and raised in Japan,
speaks only Japanese, has never been to Korea, has gone to Japanese schools and worked
for many years in Japan, that person still does not have the right to become a Japanese
citizen. The Ministry of Justice does have the discretion (and it is total discretion) to
naturalize a Korean resident into Japanese nationality or citizenship, if it is deemed to
be in the national interest of Japan. Even when this occurs, however, newly-minted
Korean citizens feel further compelled to take on a new name that is considered
Japanese.44
nationality (i.e., those who are under the categoiy of chosen) have neither a South Korean nor a North
Korean passport
Until 1992, the maximum length was one year.
One example of this is the sumo wrestler Jesse Kuhaulua from Maui, Hawaii He is a well-
known figure in Japan and after retiring from sumo desired to open his own stable, or sumo training
organization. One requirement for ownership is Japanese nationality. So he took on his wifes name and
naturalized. Since Jesse Kuhaulua is not a Japanese name, he legally changed his name to Daigoro
Watanabe. This, of course, means that when signing any legal document, he cannot sign it with his birth
41
There are those who naturalize in the hope that it will improve the lives of their
children. At least nationality, they hope, will allow the younger generation to avoid
institutional exclusion since most jobs, social services, and welfare are available
primarily with reference to ones nationality. Naturalization and a Japanese name will
help them to assimilate and thereby melt into mainstream Japanese society.
Unfortunately, even this is problematic. In the koseki system or family registry even if
one is naturalized, officials will indicate that the person is a shin-Nihonjin or a new
Japanese, clearly indicating to future employers, for example, that the persons family is
not ethnic Japanese.
The social message is clear. Ideologically, there is either exclusion or
assimilation, and both are harmful to the dignity of Korean residents. Many claim that
the process of socialization or assimilation into a host countrys dominant culture and
value system is inevitable. This may be true but in the case of Japan, assimilation means
the explicit denial of ones ethnic heritage with almost certain negative self-perceptions.
Even today, Korean residents must assimilate into Japanese society at the price of
denying their ethnic identity, or be excluded. Let us take a closer look at this societal
process of assimilation in Japan.
name but must use his newty acquired "Japanese name. This may be a small psychological price for him
to pay simply because he is such a well-known figure as Jesse and as a Hawaiian. Such is not the case with
a Korean who runs small business and must give up her/his Korean namesake in order to naturalize.
42
Assimilation Policy
As already noted, the legacy of assimilation still negatively impacts the lives of
Korean residents today. The term assimilation in Japanese is doka, meaning to become
the same. Sociologically, assimilation demands that minorities consent to abandon the
ethnic, cultural, and linguistic characteristics which distinguish them from the national
majority.43 When assimilation affords people the freely-chosen option of learning a
different language and culture, it becomes an agent of social well-being and richness.
Assimilation can also be viewed positively as long as it aims to facilitate equality among
social members whos cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds are different. In the
case of Japan, however, assimilation policies toward Koreans have a long history of
primarily negative characteristics. A brief look at that histoiy exposes its problematic
legacy in the contemporary context.
Historically, the March First Movement for independence in 1919 marks the
starting point of Japanese assimilation policy toward Koreans.46 As I alluded to before,
this was an integral part of the shift in policy from military rule (budan seiji) to cultural
rule (bunka tochi). When the Japanese colonial authorities faced an unexpected mass
uprising for independence, the authorities were shocked and realized the limitations of
their militaristic suppression of civilians. Brutal military suppression had invoked
widespread anger among the Koreans. The ruling authority began to reconsider its
45Ibid., cited from footnotes, 90.
46This is a national liberation movement and triggered by Korean students in Japan. On February
29,1919, a group of Korean students who were studying in Japan declared their nations independence at
the Korean YMCA in Tokyo. This declaration served as a catalyst and the movement spread throughout
43
previous policy toward the masses of Koreans in general and toward Koreans elites in
particular.47
The shift toward cultural control, called the cultural politics of colonialism, was
an explicit strategy for taming the rising anger of the Koreans. As explained on
September 3,1919 by the new general of colonial administration, Saito Makoto, the new
policys purpose was to give [Koreans] more happiness and satisfaction than is the case
at present by bringing their treatment socially and politically on the same footing as the
Japanese. The Koreans and the Japanese must be treated alike as members of the same
family.48 Henceforth, the colonial government formed various associations such as the
soaikai or Mutual Friendship Society. The purpose of the association was to improve the
relationship between the Japanese and Koreans through the educational and social
assimilation of the latter. By helping Koreans to obtain jobs, the association sought to
limit the dangers of a rising Korean nationalism.49
Meanwhile, Korean people were compelled by the education system to use the
Japanese language and to learn only Japanese history and culture.30 In the process of this
Korea. The movement started with non-violent demonstrations that strove for liberation from colonial
oppression and national independence.
47Komagome, 196.
"Mitchell, 24.
"Ringhofer Manfred, Soaikai-Chosenjin doka dantai no ayumi in Zainichi Chosenjin shi

kenkyu, ed., A Study Group of the Movement History of Koreans in Japan (Kobe: Evergreen Publishers,
1981, December vol.9), 58.
it is said the most effective method to assimilate colonial subjects is forcing them to adopt the
national language, in this case Japanese. For a discussion on the ideological problems of national
language, see Yeounsuk Lee, Kokugo to shito no shiao (Tokyo: Iwanami Publisher, 1996).
44
forced Japanization, the assimilation policy further crystallized into the kominka policy.31
Kominka means to make the people the emperors children. Under this policy, Koreans
were forced to profess absolute loyalty to the emperor.
In a legal study of Korean residents in Japan, Chikako Kashiwazaki describes
Japans assimilation policies. According to her, the meaning of assimilation is multi
dimensional:
two broad categories may be identified in colonial policies:

legal-institutional assimilation and cultural assimilation. The former
involves the extension of the institutions of the mother country to
the colonies. This aspect of assimilation facilitates the equalization of
citizenship rights and duties to some degree, due to its tendency
toward the equal treatment of subjects. Cultural assimilation denotes
approximating the colonized to the colonizer through education and
acculturation in terms of language, religion, lifestyle, and symbols of
the empire. Assimilation in Japanese colonialism had distinct
characteristics in its cultural components. In European colonialism,
cultural assimilation was for the most part a project of civilizing the
colonized people through the dissemination of western culture. In the
case of Japan, cultural assimilation was closely linked to the issue of
national identity... Assimilation policies demanded spiritual
assimilation, centered on loyalty and allegiance in the Japanese
emperor, from the colonized population at large.33
As Kashiwazaki points out, fostering loyalty to the emperor has had a distinct spiritual
dimension. In the process of fostering loyalty to the emperor during the colonial period,
Koreans were forced to practice shrine worship and to worship the emperor as a living
god.
5,Unlike the term doka (assimilation) the word kominka appeared much later, during the period
when Japans imperialism escalated intensely in 1930. Yet it is said that doka and kominka are
ideologically the same in terms of cultural control. See an excellent work on Japans cultural control
during the colonial period: Takeshi Komagome, Shokuminchi teikoku nihon no bunka togo (Tokyo:
Iwanami Publisher, 1996), 11-12.
^Kashiwazaki, 17.
45
There is another important aspect of assimilation, again specifically related to this
notion of cultural control. In the article entitled, Assimilation Policy and Japan as an
Invented Notion, Takeshi Ishida analyzes the historical roots of the assimilation policy
and its relationship with the national identity of the Japanese and the notion of
Japan. According to him, before applying assimilation policies to its colonial subjects
(Koreans and Taiwanese), the Meiji government had already attempted the assimilation
of the Ainu people, the indigenous people of Japan, as well as the Okinawan people,
through a new educational system in 1869, although the term doka, or assimilation, was
not used specifically.53 Ishida sees these earlier events as attempts to establish a center-
periphery value system rather than internal colonies, in contrast to the later outside
colonies of Korea and Taiwan. In this regard, Ishida claims that the purpose of
assimilation is not only the Japanization of colonial subjects, but also an effort to absorb
the Japanese into the Japanese control system as constituted by the emperor as the center
of value, power and authority.54
Ishida further claims that the assimilation policy was demanded to clarify the
value of Japan. As an integral part of the process of establishing the great empire of
Japan as a modem state, the notions of Japan and Japanese were projected into the
past in order to create a historical view of Japan as having a divine or eternal national
history. In short, the Japan of the modem era was an invention with an invented
53Takeshi Ishida, Doka seisaku to tsukurareta kannen to shite no Nihon, Shiso (October and
November 1998): 56.
*Ibid., 49.
46
historical tradition to give it root.33 Ishidas argument is very persuasive and has been
interpreted as a post-modernist deconstruction of the modern-day Japan and its
Japanese people.
These points are important because the problem of assimilation relates to not only
the problem of liberating Japanized Koreans but also to the broader problem of liberating
Japanese society. Demanding loyalty and allegiance to the emperor as the center of all
social value, as I shall argue more M y later, has served and continues to serve not only
to enslave colonial subjects but Japanese subjects as well.
While the norms of Japan and Japanese were created to install the emperor at
the top of Japans cultural hierarchy, its assimilation policy served to contain or exclude
those who were deemed non-Japanese at the other end of that hierarchy. In order to
tolerate colonial subjects as members of the great empire of Japan, the cultural
hierarchy was forced to degrade Korean culture, language and religion.
In this regard, Japans assimilation policy has not changed fundamentally since its
colonial period. During the colonial period, the assimilation policy was aimed at making
Koreans accept the ruling authority of the emperor. Today, assimilation affects young
Koreans, subtly coercing them into accepting the loss of their own Korean heritage.
Second and third generation Korean residents who were bom, raised and educated in
Japan have learned and internalized the dominant Japanese social values, values which
include their own degradation, resulting in young Koreans having myriad difficulties
building their self-esteem and self-confidence.36 At the same time, Japanese citizens are
ibid., 47.
47
equally coerced into accepting their own supposed superiority, initiating a chain reaction
o f delusion that ultimately ensnares them in their own trap.
Economic Situation
In Japan, there is a dubious custom rooted in the koseki, or family registry. When
applying for a job, the applicant must hand in his or her kosekitohon (a copy o f the
applicants family registry) with his or her resume. The purpose of this requirement is to
check ones nationality, meaning an employer can select ethnic Japanese employees
even before conducting interviews. Since many Koreans use their Japanese name in their
day-to-day life, they may write their Japanese name in the resume consciously or
unconsciously in order to have a better chance for a job interview.57 Yet they soon
realize that it is hopeless because of the kosekitohon attachment, which reveals that they
are not Japanese.
This mandated custom is a precondition for applications to most jobs in the
public sector and with big corporations. In short, most large Japanese employers,
including the government, require applicants to hold Japanese nationality. Koreans are
thereby shut out from the selection process from the beginning. Only a handful of people
can go into a professional career, while most Koreans work in the unskilled labor
market in either family-run and owned subcontracted small factories or other service
^See the article about the experience of internalization of young Koreans: EunjaLee, A Questin
on Nationalism and Feminism in the Context o fJapan, In Gods Image, Vol.l8,Nno.4,1999:12-14.
57In 1974, a young Korean, Park Jong Sok applied for a job at Hitachi, a one of largest electronic
companies in Japan, with his Japanese name and he passed the first exam. When he took his second exam,
the company asked him to bring his koseki and found out he was Korean. The company turned down his
48
industries. Family-run and owned factories or companies are often the first affected
during times of inflation or recession, because structurally they are situated at the bottom
of Japans economic system. Structurally, these jobs are on the lowest rungs of the social
ladder, but they are still an improvement economically when compared to the
opportunities of the first generation of Koreans, for whom hunger was a serious issue of
survival. Todays younger generation enjoys some degree of material comfort because of
Japans economic development both domestically and internationally, but not because the
relative economic status o f Koreans within Japan has changed. Thus, in the case o f the
second and third generations, the problem is not whether they can eat, but whether they
can develop an adequate sense of self-worth and/or self-realization through their
occupations.
Since achieving their goals and dreams is not easy due not only to institutional
discrimination but also to social discrimination, young Koreans rarely develop hope for
institutional change or personal success. Whether they are politically conscious or not,
most eventually develop a pessimistic view of their future. In Japanese society,
especially in the schools, Koreans are not encouraged to explore their future possibilities.
Whether they have a college degree or higher in the Japanese education system, they
know that degrees do not provide a secure economic life. Under such circumstances, the
economic issues facing Korean residents today are also tightly related to apathy about
their future and, as a result, severely inhibit their identity formation and their economic
achievement.
application claiming that he lied about his ethnicity. He sued the company and won in 1978. But this case
is veiy rare; most Koreans give up early in the struggle.
49
Socio-cultural dimensions
In part because of the Japanese colonial legacy, social discrimination against
Koreans remains persistent in Japanese society. In the personal essays of the second
generation, Koreans commonly describe their early experiences of discrimination, often
experiences of being teased by classmates who call them Chosenjin.5* Until the 1970s,
Koreans were popularly associated with being smelly, noisy and lazy, and newspapers
often conducted polls indicating that the most hated country among the Japanese was
Korea. But since the mid-1980s, after the controversy of the anti-fingerprint movement
and because of closer political and military relationships between Japan and South Korea,
direct social expressions o f dislike for Koreans began to decrease.39 Yet negative images
of Koreans are constantly reinforced nevertheless.
In this climate, younger Koreans hide their ethnic heritage socially by using
their Japanese names. Nevertheless, Japanese frequently discover who is Japanese and
who is Korean among their classmates. Thus, hiding ones ethnic heritage is usually
futile, as it is eventually revealed at some point in school life. Nevertheless, Koreans
continue hiding their ethnic heritage without realizing how much this harms them
psychologically and spiritually. This tells us two things: first, how compellingly
chauvinistic Japanese society is against Koreans and other non-Japanese; and second,
S8The term means Korean, but in this case is said in a veiy pejorative tone.
S9The anti-fingerprint movement was the largest and longest human rights movement led by
Korean residents in Japan since the postwar period. Fingerprints were required for Koreans and other
foreigners who were going to stay in Japan more than 90 days under the Alien Registration Law. Itwas
finally abolished in 1991.
50
how deeply Koreans have internalized the prevalent negative cultural images of being
Korean.
In an interview on a recent Japanese documentary TV program, a third generation
Korean explained how he felt when he was hiding his Korean name. He said, I always
felt guilty with my Japanese friends because I used a Japanese name in order to hide my
Korean roots. The guilt feeling came not only from hiding but also from lying to my
friends. This example is telling because this man knew that he was both lying and
denying the values o f his Korean-ness.
Negative images of Koreans are reinforced through the media. Kim Chan Jong
has criticized the practice of journalists in Japan who report the names of Koreans who
commit a crime but report the Japanese name of Koreans who are victims of crime.
Through this kind o f subtle manipulation, negative images and stereotypes accumulate
and remain fixed in the minds of the Japanese. Such social and cultural prejudice and
discrimination also lead the Japanese to reinforce their supposed superiority and greater
value.
Political Situation
As already discussed, the problem of nationality plays a major part in the
exclusion of non-Japanese from institutional social life. It also plays a role in excluding
non-Japanese from the political arena as well. Due to the suffrage laws that allow only
those with Japanese nationality to vote, Korean residents do not have franchise rights on
either the national or regional levels. One might suppose that if most institutional rights
are restricted to those with Japanese nationality, all Koreans should apply for
51
naturalization. It is true that naturalization is one way to obtain Japanese nationality,
along with marrying someone who is Japanese. In fact, the numbers of naturalized
Koreans are increasing each year. Obtaining Japanese nationality through naturalization
does not free the Korean resident from negative social pressure, however. The process of
naturalization implicitly motivates applicants to hide their Korean background. Indeed,
most Koreans seek to naturalize precisely in order to hide their ethnic heritage. Yet as I
said, the original koseki (family) record continues to carry ones original nationality,
meaning that ones ethnic roots can be uncovered by the State or by a potential employer
at any time.
One tragic example of what can happen to naturalized Koreans is illustrated by
the case o f Arai Shokei, the first national congressman of Korean origin, who committed
suicide in 1998.60 Arai was a third generation Korean who was naturalized in 1966.
When he was growing up, he hid the fact that he was Korean, as many Koreans do.
When he was in junior high school, he was fingerprinted as required by the Alien
Registration Law. It was such a traumatic experience that he was unable to speak for a
while. After this incident he demanded that his parents naturalize in order to become
Japanese. He continued striving himself to become a true Japanese.
By naturalizing, he hoped to be able to accomplish anything a Japanese national
could. He changed his academic major from physics to politics. After graduation, he
was employed by one of the largest steel companies in Japan. Meanwhile, he took the
exam to become a government official and entered the Ministry of Finance. In 1986, he
See Park Qs article Date, aishite soshite shinda: Arai Shoukei noyuigonjyo in Hotumon Bunka
no.8 (Tokyo: Shinlcansha, 1998), 140-161.
52
ran in his first election for the national Diet. During his election campaign, the
opposition candidate wrote on campaign posters that Arai was originally a Korean. Due
to this racial harassment, he lost his first run for office, but he did not give up and ran
once again. Learning from his first defeat, he decided strategically to declare publicly
that he was a Korean. His tenacious efforts to forge trusting relationships in his district
and his skill as a public speaker enabled him finally to win. After his election, he
devoted himself to his work as a politician.
Sometime later, a malicious rumor implicated Arai in a corporate graft scandal.
He repeatedly pleaded his innocence to his party, his supporters, and the media. No one
listened to his appeals, and he was not even given a chance to defend himself. The
Japanese public just accepted the rumors without proof and condemned him. Eventually,
Arai was driven to suicide. After his death, proof of his innocence emerged.
According to his wife, Arai chose to die rather than live under the stress of the
circumstances. Remarks by his father at his funeral reveal the tragedy and irony of the
life of this Korean who devoted himself to a country that ultimately rejected him. He
said, My son loved Japan so much and tried to be a Japanese more than other Japanese.
The story of Arai Shokei starkly reveals the contradictions o f legal Japanese
naturalization and the social norms o f Japanese nationality. Japanese society continues to
insist that Japanese nationals be of pure Japanese descent. As long as this social
expectation continues, the fundamental political status of Korean residents in Japan will
not change, even when Koreans receive franchise rights through legal naturalization.
In the Korean community in Japan there is ongoing debate about the legitimacy of
suffrage rights at the regional level. The points of disagreement among Korean residents
53
center on (1) whether suffrage will lead to further Japanization; (2) whether suffrage
should be granted on the regional level without forcing one to renounce ones Korean
nationality; and (3) whether Koreans born and raised in Japan are Japanese, and whether
all Koreans should have to be naturalized in order to obtain suffrage rights. These issues
remain unresolved, but the points of disagreement illustrate the problems Korean
residents continue to confront in their struggle for a secure and stable socio/political
identity.
Education
One of the fundamental problems affecting Korean residents in Japan is the
availability of an unbiased, quality education. There are three types of schools available
for Korean residents in Japan: (1) Japanese schools, both public and private; (2) schools
supported by South Korea; and (3) schools supported by North Korea. Since Korean
schools are not accredited by the Ministry of Education in Japan (except for one South
Korean supported school in Osaka), about 90 percent of Korean residents in Japan attend
Japanese schools. Japanese schools invariably fail to teach students about the historical
connection between Japans colonialism and the presence of Korean residents in Japan.61
In addition, most Japanese teachers lack the historical consciousness to remedy this
situation.
61In the article of Japan and Korea in Modem History, Duk Sang Kang analyzed nine Japanese
history textbooks of junior high and high school and pointed out that Japanese history text books are
inadequate about the description of Korea. See Korean Written in Japanese Textbooks, 207.
54
The problems of institutional education are found in other aspects of school
curricula as well. Although the Japanese school system teaches English in junior high
school, for example, there is no Korean language option. Even on the college level only
a few schools offer the Korean language, even though most colleges offer English,
French, and German.
As mentioned at the beginning o f this chapter, no descriptions or explanations of
the historical background of Korean residents in Japan exist in Japanese school
textbooks. There are some that have general descriptions of Korea. However, such
descriptions and accounts of the relationship between Japan and Korea are interpreted
only according to patterns that privilege Japanese culture. Under these circumstances,
young Koreans are surrounded by waves of Japanizationconfusing their ethnic identity
and crippling their self-confidence and self-esteem.
Chapter Three
Underpinning of Cultural Supremacy: The Emperor State System
As we studied the historical origins and development of the Korean community in
Japan in the previous chapter, we learned that they are consequences of Japans various
colonial practices and legacies. We also learned about the ongoing oppressions that have
constrained in various ways the lives o f Korean residents in Japan. Evaluating the history
and the oppressive situation o f Korean residents in Japan conveys unfamiliar images of
Japanese life to those who know only conventional histoiy. Conventional texts usually
depict Japan as an ethnically and culturally homogeneous society. This notion of
homogeneity used to describe Japanese society contributes toward manipulating both the
perception and formation of the self-image as well as the identities of both Japanese and
those who are non-Japanese. This notion of homogeneity actually causes non-Japanese
to face alienation as outsiders of Japanese society with the implication that the outsider is
not equal culturally to the Japanese.
The discourse of this mythology of a homogeneous ethnicity (tanitsu
mimokuseteu) has appeared frequently during the postwar period and been celebrated and
reproduced in Japan.1 It has been mirrored by another myth, one that emphasizes that the
great empire of Japan, including Korea and Taiwan, was composed of multi-ethnic
groups of colonial subjects. This latter, contradictory discourse only contributed to the
postwar myth of homogeneity, and this was further enhanced when Koreans and other
non-Japanese were given Japanese nationality. Yet, the colonial subjects were never
included as true members of Japanese society in the emperor- centered hierarchical order.
Eiji Oguma, Tanitsu minzoku shinwa no kigen (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1995), 341.
36
Despite being given Japanese nationality, they were categorized as gaichijirt' (outsider)
in koseki (family registry) records and in everyday life. In short, prewar multi-ethnic
discourse and postwar single-ethnicity discourse are two sides of the same coin.
That said, why do the Japanese continue to believe in their mono-ethnicity and
ethnic superiority? How do we characterize the relationship between the superiority
complex and chauvinistic social attitudes against non-Japanese? What are the cultural and
ideological factors that have contributed to maintaining this Japanese chauvinism?
Institutional discrimination and personal racist and chauvinistic attitudes against
non-Japanese have been masked and justified by erecting a wall of who or what is
Japanese. The boundary of who is Japanese, in turn, is maintained and justified by
the modem political and social construction o f the emperor ideology.2 Thus, analyzing
the modem emperor ideology from the point of view of Korean residents in Japan is
critically necessary in order to create an effective strategy for liberation for both the
Japanese and Korean residents in Japan. As the Japanese theologian Teruo Kuribayashi
points out, minority issues in Japan will never be solved without pointing out the
problem of the emperor system3
Given this presupposition, this chapter examines the modem emperor system and
also known as shocho tem osei or the symbolic emperor system. My thesis is this: The
emperor ideology is deeply embedded in the Japanese mainstream dominant value
system that underlies and regulates various social norms and relationality. These
2See the work of Naoki Sakai deconstructing of the notion of Japanese. Sakai Naoki, Shisan
sareru Nihongo Nihonjin in Shiso no.845 (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1994).
3Knribayashi Teruo, Keikan no shingaku (Tokyo: Shinkyo Publisher, 1991), 400.
57
various norms are continually being cast into the form of a Japanese culture that has
perpetuated the public discourse of the cultural uniqueness of Japan. The claim of the
uniqueness of Japanese culture has directly and indirectly created a gulf o f trust/distrust,
superior/inferior, and victimized victim, between Japanese and non-Japanese.
In order to overcome the unhealthy character of this pattern we must begin by
examining its ideological roots. I will sketch a brief historical overview o f the
development o f the emperor state system. 1 will examine in particular two major notions
that were invented and developed during the formation and solidification of the modern
emperor state system in the late Meiji period. One is the notion o f State Shinto and the
other is the notion of Family State. Why has the ideological influence of the emperor
system been so deep and widespread in Japanese society as well as in the consciousness
of the Japanese? These two notions provide valuable insights into this question. The
notion of State Shinto strengthened the religious authority of the emperor and opened
an avenue for the claim that Shinto is inherently part of the national culture of Japan. The
notion of the Family State became a national morality that worked very effectively to
encourage conformity to Japans ever stronger national identity.
Together, State Shinto and Family State operated organically and
interdependently to support the legitimacy of the modem emperor state ideology and
these legacies are still used in sustaining the emperor ideology in the modem day context.
They are an integral part of the social consciousness of present day Japanese society.
Studying them will help us see an element of the racist ideology o f cultural supremacy
in the formation of a national identity, the Japanese.
58
The Emperor State System
Ideological/Historical Background of the Emperor State System
We can trace the ideological roots of the emperor state system back in Japanese
history to a period beginning with the third century and continuing to the seventh century
of the Yamato state. The Yamato state is the first unified government in the history of
Japan and today the term Yamato is used as a synonym for Japan. A major characteristic
of the political body of the Yamato state was the unification o f rite and government
(saisei icchi). During that period, the king (the emperor) of Yamato was considered a
child of god, the ruler o f the states and the highest priest-king of Shinto.4 Yet from the
medieval period to the modern period, successive emperors had virtually no political
authority or power, and consequently did not enter into the consciousness o f ordinary
people. When Japan entered the era of modern industrialization, however, the group who
succeeded in overthrowing the Tokugawa shogunate to become leaders of the Meiji
government began to intentionally manipulate the visual presence and public profile of
the emperor.5
In replacing the old feudal system with a new capitalist system political-economy
within a modernized state, the new leaders needed a justification o f moral-political-
obligation (taigimeibun) in order to seize and maintain the necessary political power to
lead the new nation and convince the general populace to accept tremendous social
upheaval. The symbol of the emperor was used in the idea o f the Restoration o f Imperial
4Shigeyoshi Murakami, Tenno no smshi (Tokyo: Iwanami Publisher, 1977), 10.
5See the studies of the political meaning of the emperors pageant, Takashi Fujitani, Splendid
Monarchy" Power and Pageantry in Modem Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1996). Kqji Tagi, Tenno no shozo (Tokyo: Iwanami Publisher, 1988).
59
Rule (oseifukko). Placing the emperor into the political system as the head of new
modem nation was justified by relying on the ancient system of unifying traditional rites
and government (saisei icchi). In incorporating the system of saisei icchi, Meiji leaders
sought to establish a new unified nation, integrating the emperors role as priest-king of
Shinto into a new modem political system, thereby establishing a quasi-religious state.
Since the religious authority of the emperor had been considered a symbolic holy
authority throughout Japanese history, Meiji leaders believed this holy authority would
give further legitimacy to their seizure of power.
Nonetheless, the appropriation of the emperors authority took different forms at
different times.6 For example, the role and function of the emperor in the modem era is
very different from that which existed prior to the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Masato
Miyachi explains:
The modem emperor system is not simply imitating the ancient emperor
system. Also it does not have the same kind of relationship between the
shogunate and the emperor as in the past. The major difference starts with
the direct theoretical backbone of National Learning. With this theoretical
base the Meiji leader reclaimed the theory that Japan is a nation
descending from an unbroken line of emperors.7
As Miyachi points out, the ideology of these Meiji leaders was highly influenced by the
teaching of National Learning (kokugaku). The theory that Japan is a nation descending
from an unbroken line of emperors strengthened and justified the idea of Japans
uniqueness and superioriority. Such theory was created by scholars of National Learning
6Shohachi Hayalcawa, Social History o fJapan: The Emperor's Changing Role (Tokyo: Iwanami
Publisher, 1987), 77.
7Masato Miyachi, Tenosei no seijishiteki kenkyu (Tokyo: Kokina Shobo, 1981), 108-109.
60
and became a central foundation and justification for enforcing the power of Meiji
modem emperor state.
The idea of an unbroken line of emperors was also effectively used to support the
notion of family state and the formation of State Shinto, a notion which I will discuss
later. Here it is essential to give an explanation of what National Learning is in order to
comprehend the theoretical and ideological backbone o f the emperor system. Helen
Hardacres description is comprehensive:
It is impossible to understand State Shintos origin without examining the

school of thought known as National Learning (kokugaku). National
Learning began as a type and method of philological study associated
most prominently with Kada no Azumamaro (1669-1739), Kano Mabuchi
(1697-1769), and Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801). Particularly with
Motoori, National Learning strove to recover an idealized, pure
mentality and worldview ascribed to the ancient Japanese, to return to the
thought and consciousness of the ancients before the country became (as
those writers understood the situation) polluted by the contact with
foreign culture and religion. Buddhism was attacked as the agency most
to blame for Japans loss of its original way of life.8
Hardacre described well the nationalistic element in the School of National Learning.
Since the purpose of the School of National Learning was clearly to rid Japan o f the
foreign cultural influences and to recall Japans nativity in Shintothe essence of the
idea was inevitably encouraged nationalistic thinking. This nationalistic teaching of the
School of National Learning became a powerful movement as well as a theoretical
ideology. The movement came to have tremendous influence on the practical level as
well. An example can be seen in the movement of anti-Tokugawa shogunate and foreign
countries that happened just prior to the Meiji Restoration of 1868.
'Helen Hardacre, Shinto and the State 1868-1988 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989),
16.
61
The movement was fueled under the slogan revere the emperor, expel
foreigners (som ojoi) and the leaders of the movement later became the oligarchs of the
Meiji government. Clans such as such as the Satsuma, Chosu and Tosa were the leading
groups leading the Meiji Restoration against the Toicugawa shogunate. These clans were
particularly influenced by the tenets of National Learning.9 The objective behind som ojoi
was to combat the influence o f foreigners, particularly from China at the time, but later
including those from western countries. At that time, this meant combating the influence
of Confucianism as well as Buddhism. In their place, National Learning sought the
revival and strengthening o f the ancient Shinto religion. This had the effect of reversing
a long tradition of the merging and amalgamation between Shinto and Buddhism as well
as Confucianism. Instead, School of National Learning emphasized returning to an
ancient Japan from which they held that the Japanese tradition of purity originated.
The reinterpretation, rediscovery and revival o f Shinto was for the National Learning
advocates/scholars the best way they saw to control the direction of the country. The
advocates/ scholars of National Learning strove to rediscover and redefine the thought
and tradition of ancient Japan by reviving and idealizing the Kojiki, the Legendary Stories
of Ancient Japan (written in 712), and Nihonshoki, the Chronicle of Japan. All of this
was designed to create pride and a strong Japanese national identity as a superior country.
In the Kojiki, Japan is described as a land of gods and the emperor is the
descendant o f the sun goddess (im aterasu omikami). Reinterpreting the Kojiki in light o f
Besides the influence of the teaching of National Learning, the Meiji leaders were also influenced
by the bakumatsu (end of the shogunate) thinkers such as Sakuma Shozan and Yoshida Shoin. Although
these thinkers were Neo-Confudans, the idea of som ojoi originally stemmed from the teaching of
National Learning (kokugaku).
62
the their own political climate, National Learning (kokugaku,) scholars claimed the
following:
Japan is the land of the gods. Therefore in both our histories and our
government we have given priority to the gods and always placed man
second. In high antiquity our rulers governed this land exclusively by
means of Shinto.10
The special dispensation of our Imperial Land means that ours is the
native land of the Heaven-Shining Goddess who cast her light over all
countries in the four seas. Thus our country is the sources and
fountainhead of all other countries, and in ail matters it excels all the
others.11
We can see the seeds o f future ideological impact in these examples of the
reinterpretation of ancient literatures. By reinterpreting the ancient chronology in order to
reclaim the supremacy of Japan, the teaching of the National Learning effectively
established an ideological justification for the som ojoi movement and the Restoration of
Imperial Rule (aseifukko) aimed at establishing a new unified modern emperor state. As
a result is that the ideological nature of the modern emperor system encouraged
nationalism and was chauvinistic toward foreigners.
Characteristics of Emperor State System
The mere phrase emperor system conveys a complexity of various meanings.
The word emperor system in English is a direct translation of tem osei which comes
t0Shigemichi Taira and Abe Akio eds., Kinsei Shinto-ron, zenki Kokugaku (Tokyo: Iwanami,
1972), 310.
"Norinaga Motoori. Precious Comb-Box in Sources o f Japanese Tradition VoL II, eds. Ryusaku
Tsunoda, Wm Theodore de Bary and Donald Keene (New York and London: Columbia University Press,
1958), 18.
63
from two words in Japanese, tenno, which means the emperor and sei, which means a
system. Tenno is composed of two Chinese characters, ten and no. Ten means heaven
and no means emperor or majesty.13 Before the Meiji period tenno was called tenshi,
a child o f heaven, and in the ancient period was called ookimi, a big king.13 Changing
this title functioned to show that the modern period of the emperor would have wider
authority, one that was radically different from the previous era.14 According to the
Japanese historian Kiyoshi Inoue, the word tenno means reign of heaven stemming
from the Chinese ancient state.13 The etymological meaning, reign of heaven means to
control everything -space, time and people, perhaps more accurately expresses the
essence o f the substance o f its nature.
Unlike the Chinese tradition in which the people judged the emperor by his virtue,
the modern emperor in late 19th and beginning of 20* century Japan was not judged by
his quality of moral virtue. Rather the emperor was simply proclaimed to have the
highest virtue, and this justified his absolute authority to rule. By virtue of his assumed
virtue, he was allowed to reign over everythingspace, time and people. In fact, the
gengo system, that is, the enthronement of a new emperor starts a new period of reign
such that each one is given a new name, such as Meiji, Taisho, Showa and the current
,2Iwao Tadakuma points out that in the world today only Japan still uses the term the emperor
instead of the king. When we consider etymological meaning of the term emperor, the continuation of
term implies hidden purpose. See his book, Tenosei to rekishigaku (Kyoto: Kamogawa Publisher, 1990), 8.
13The word tenno, originating from ancient China, came in to use in the early seventh century in
order to emphasize religious authority. Shigcyoshi Murakami, Tenno no saishi (Tokyo: Iwanami Publisher,
1977), 10.
14Yoshio Yasumam points out that the usage of the term tenno stabilized in the late Meiji period.
Kindai tennozo no keisei (Tokyo: Iwanami Publisher, 1992), 14.
lsKiyoshi Inoue, Nihon no rekishi VoLl (Tokyo: Iwanami Publisher, 1963), 57.
64
Heisei, symbolic of the emperors authority to reign over even an historical moment of
time.16
Systematic studies o f the modem emperor state system and its ideology were
begun after World War n, mainly by Japanese historians.17 Studying or accessing the
emperor system before the war was strictly prohibited, absolutely taboo. One common
view among the various postwar studies is that a political apparatus/system formed the
combination of political power and religious authority attributed to the emperor. But
according to Japanese historian Shigeki Toyama, the concept of tenosei or the emperor
system appeared for the first time in an underground document issued by the Japanese
communist party in 1932.18 Although this document was neither theoretical nor
systematic in analyzing the emperor system, the document has tremendous historical
value when we consider the political climate in which criticizing or critical assessment of
the emperor system led to imprisonment. The document characterized termosei as a tool
for keeping the power and authority of feudal lords, who became modern monopoly
capitalists, in order to control and exploit the workers and peasants.19 And the document
concluded that to be anti-Japanese imperialist is also to be ultimately, anti-termosei.
l6It is with the Meiji era that each enthronement began to be accompanied by a change in the name
of the era. Before Meiji, the name of the era changed whenever there was a natural disaster happened or
joyful event happened. We need to pay attention the relationship between heredity of the emperor and
changing of gengo. Hiroshi Takahashi, Shocho tenno (Tokyo: Iwanami Publisher, 1987), 219-220.
I7Caiol Gluck, Japan's Modem Myths: Ideology in the Late M eiji Period (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1985), 6.
"Shigeki Toyama, Tennosei to tenno in Kindai tennosei no seiritsu, ed. Shigeki Toyama
(Tokyo: Iwanami Publisher, 1987), 3.
l9Ibi<L, 6.
65
Right after World War II, Sanzo Nosaka, a leader of the communist party,
analyzed the emperor system and its ideological aspects, taking as his starting point this
1932 document. He found that 1) Japans feudal autocratic national polity (national
body) was structured with the emperor placed in the center, in order to bolster its absolute
political authority, and 2) As the living god (arahitogami), the emperor also played a
quasi religious role, through which a great deal of ideological indoctrination was
effectively practiced.20 Toyama further claims that this ideological influence became a
new method whereby scholars analyzed the impact of the emperor system on mass
consciousness.21 One example of the analysis of ideological influence came from a
survey of Japanese war prisoners. According to the survey, half of the Japanese soldiers
believed in winning the war, while only one third of them trusted their military leaders.
Almost all of them, however, believed in emperor worship.22 Based on this finding,
Nosaka suggested that the communist party should be sensitive to the mass consciousness
when it criticized the emperor system. As the leader of the communist party, Nosaka had
to be careful about criticizing the emperor and the emperor system because of its
powerful influence over the masses. He was afraid that the Communist Party would lose
mass support if it criticized the emperor too strongly. This is just one example o f how the
emperor system had deeply indoctrinated the Japanese mass consciousnesses by the end
of World War n.
Nosaka was the first person to allude to the ideological problem of the emperor
system. Another did so shortly after. One of the most well-known and progressive
ibid., II.
"Ibid., 10.
66
political philosophers in postwar Japan, Masao Maruyama, wrote an article The Logic
and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism in the monthly magazine Sekai in 1946.23
Maruyamas psychological analysis of ultra-nationalism had an unexpectedly positive
influence on the academic environment at the time.24 In his article, Maruyama did not
use either the term the emperor state system or the emperor state ideology. He did,
however, analyze the mechanism of ultra-nationalism (which is the emperor ideology)
and how it worked psychologically to control mass consciousness. In particular,
Maruyama examined the case of Japanese soldiers in World War II, and analyzed their
mentality as to why and how they could perform such brutal acts during the wars. He
noted:
Since the emperor himself was considered as the absolute value25, the
hierarchical status /distance decides ones value. Under this psychological
mechanism, the soldiers were proud o f who they were because they were
in kogun, the Imperial Army. The sense of belongingness to the Imperial
Army allowed soldiers to have not only a supreme complex coming from
their military status but also from all value system, symbolized in the
emperor.
Maruyama concluded that most of the soldiers were indoctrinated by the emperor
centered state ideology, and that this ideology was intensified after the invasion o f China
in 1937 and outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941.
^ o sh iich i Inumam, Marukusu shugi no tennosei ninshiki no Ayum, in ed. Toyama, 275-277.
23The article first came out in the monthly magazine Sekai in 1946. Citations are from his
collected works. Maruyama Masao, Gendeu seiji no shiso to kodo (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964). 11-28.
J4Toyama, 5.
25Maruyama contrasts this with the medieval monarchy system in Europe, where the authority,
power or value of the king was given by God. But in the case of the emperor system in Japan the emperor
himself is the source of moral value.
26Maruyama, 22.
67
Because this indoctrination aimed to reform soldiers self-identity as children of
the emperor, their brutal activities could be justified and even romanticized in the name
of the emperor. Such blind loyalty to the emperor was thought to secure the self-identity
of the Japanese as a group. This mentality has remained a legacy within the
psyches/mentality of older generation Japanese who participated in the war, and it has
been a major obstacle preventing them from confronting and taking moral responsibility
for their shameful and sinful activities during the wars. Several studies have revealed
soldiers irresponsible remarks about their brutal activities during the wars.27 Blindness or
inability to reflect on their activities is a result of their self-identification with the
absolute value of the emperor. This blindness, moreover, can be seen in ordinary
Japanese citizens as well.
In his examination the soldiers psychological identity, Maruyama further claimed
that the psychological aspect of the emperor system made an unbelievable impact not
only on the academic circle but also on Japanese society in general.2* However, he did
not explain how and why this emperor system/ideology was so successfully implanted
into the minds of the soldiers of the Imperial Army and ordinary Japanese people. This
success was probably in significant part to the role of the emperors religious authority.
Shifting from an analysis of Maruyamas political nationalism, Shozo Fujita
compares the emperors religious authority to the absolute monarchy system in Europe.
According to him, the emperor system can be explained into two ways. 1) At its simplest,
^Theie are many books and articles in Japanese about the issue of comfort women. The English
reader should see Indai Loonies Sajor, ed., Common Grounds: Violence against Women in War and Armed
Conflict Situations (Philippines: Asian Center for Womens Human Rights, 1998). For a collection of
testimony from former comfort women. See Dai Sil Kim-Gibson, Silence Broken Korean: Comfort Women
(Iowa: Mid-Prairie Books, 1999).
2*Maruyama,24.
68
the emperor exists as a monarch/sovereign with absolute sacred authority, and 2) The
emperor system is a political system of modem Japan. Fujita names this combination
political/sacred controlling mechanism as non-human(istic) but human control.29
Fujita further explains that a peculiarity of the Japanese emperor system is that the
emperor himself was made the absolute moral value, a moral value that was, in turn,
legitimized by the religious authority of the emperor himself. In contrast to the medieval
absolute monarch system in Europe, Fujita characterizes the emperor system in Japan this
way:
In the case o f the absolute monarch system in Medieval Europe, it was

formed through the separation o f the kings political power and religious
authority afler the long period of struggle between the pope and the
church. But in the case of the emperor system in Japan, it was totally
opposite of this. The emperor system was formed as a political system of
a national body through using the emperors traditional religious
authority.30
As Fujita points out, the formation of the modern emperor system was tied deeply
to the development o f the religious traditions of Shinto. Fujita further explains that the
emperors religious authority fostered multiple meanings of the emperor system.
Non-human (istic) but human control, based in traditional religious authority,
rested on two historical claims. First, the emperor was originally considered a shaman
and played the role o f priest king of the Shinto cult. Second, the emperor was described
as the descendant of the Japanese sun goddess (amaterasu omikami). Japan, in turn, is
held as the land o f the gods in the mythological documents of Kojiki and Nihon Shoki
written in the eighth century.
Ibid., 7.
^Shozo Fujita, Temosei kokka no shUuu genri, Fujita Shorn zenshu Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo,
1998), 5.
69
Although powerful, these claims hold within them several contradictions. The
fundamental contradiction within these mythologies is that, reputed to be Japans oldest
written historical records, they do not really constitute history at all. Even if they are, it
has been widely acknowledged that they were written for the sake of legitimizing the
orthodoxy o f one particular imperial family when the Southern Dynasty and the Northern
Dynasty were split in the seventh century. These mythologies, in short, were never
politically and ideologically innocent. They were pure propaganda from the beginning.
Nevertheless, because of their status as Japans oldest history in written form, they have
served to powerfully reinforce the belief of the Japanese people in the religious authority
of the emperor and in the notion of Japan as Gods country.
State Shinto as a Tool of Cultural Control
Our brief discussion of the characteristics o f the modem emperor system, as
described in the analysis of Nosaka, Maruyama and Fujita, demonstrates the ideological
impact of the emperor system and how it stems from the creation of the religious
authority of the emperor. Religious authority was maintained, practiced, and reinforced
effectively through the rituals of emperor worship to indoctrinate the general populace in
the State Shinto, which itself is social and historical construction of Meiji government
and the legacy of Shinto State can be seen in todays understanding of national culture.31
3lThe term State Shinto was originally appeared in the SCAP s document known as Shinto Order
that abolished state support of Shinto in December 15,1945. In the document states that Shinto was to be
differentiated from sea (kyoha) Shinto, which has thirteen different Shinto religious groups. The
document defined State Shinto as being considered a national rite not a religion. See Miyata Noboru,
Kokka Shinto, in Studies o f Modem Japanese Culture: Religion and Life VoL 9, ed. Add Tamotsu
(Tokyo: Iwanami Publisher, 1999), 41.
70
Before examining the ideological legacy of State Shinto, let us begin with how
Shinto has been discussed in the field of Shinto studies. Shinto (its literal meaning is the
way of god,) emerged from Taoism in China. It is said the word Shinto was used after
the import o f Buddhism in the sixth century, as a counter word for butsudo, the way of
Buddha.32 Since the arrival of Buddhism and Confucianism, Shinto has been
amalgam ated with them. However, historians explain that Shinto already existed in the
Yayoi era, from the third to second century, B.C.33 Shifting from a hunting/gathering life
to an agricultural life, people began to depend on a transcendent power, particularly the
power of nature, because of its major impact on basic agricultural
life. Shinto developed with agricultural rites, animism and nature worship. People in
ancient Japan saw and felt the spirits of the gods in stone, wind, rain, sun, mountain,
river/water, and grass, etc. Then, they built ayashiro, an archetype of a Shinto
Shrine,34with particular sections dedicated to nature.
As people felt centered through the harmony of nature and gods, Shinto
developed as Shrine Shinto, which is very different from the hierarchical and politically
formed State Shinto that emerged much later under the Meiji government.39 As I
explained, the rise of the Meiji government was accompanied by the idea of Restoration
of Imperial Rule (oseifukko). The Meiji government attempted to make Shinto the
3JThe word first appeared in the Kojiki in 8th century as against Butsudo, the way of Buddha. In
fact Shinto did not have any systematic doctrine or creed until it encountered Buddhism imported in 6th
century.
33Shigeyoshi Murakami, Tenno no saishi (Tokyo: Iwanami Publisher, 1988), 1.
34Koremasu Sakamoto points out that the history of shrine cannot be traced before the 8th century,
but in early 8thcentury, shrines were constructed for rituals and practiced. Kokka to shukyo no aida (Tokyo:
Nihon Kyobunsha, 1989), 250.
From the point of view of village customs, ethnographer Kunio Yanagida criticized the SCAPs
Shinto Order as it ignored traditional Shinto principles. Miyata, 42.
71
national religion in order to stabilize the countrys political system. The leaders of the
Meiji Restoration knew well the effectiveness of using the religious authority of the
emperor for mass control. Koremaru Sakamoto points out that a major planner of the
modern Japanese state, Kowashi Inoue, believed that sanctification of the emperor
constituted an easy and effective mode o f domination.36
Helen Hardacre designates the term State Shinto as the relationship of state
patronage and advocacy existing between the Japanese state and religious practice known
as Shinto.37 This definition is correct insofar as it describe the structural relationship
between Shinto and the state, but is probably insufficient for dealing with the problem of
cultural control through the religious authority of the emperor. On the other hand,
Hardacres later description, which relies on historians views of State Shinto, is probably
more appropriate. She explains:
Historians and historians o f religions have tended use the term in a broader
way, thinking of State Shinto as a systemic phenomenon that encompassed
government support of and sponsorship of Shinto rites, construction of
Shinto shrines in Japan and overseas colonies, education for school
children in Shinto mythology plus their compulsory participation in Shinto
rituals, and persecution o f other religious group on the grounds o f their
exhibiting disrespect for some aspect of authorized mythology. These
historians also see State Shinto as a pervasive coloration of the thought
and beliefs of the people by Shinto ideology38
Hardacres description o f how historians view State Shinto is quite useful for the
purposes of this study, though her use o f the term Shinto Ideology differs from my
usage here. In fret, the emperor system and emperor ideology created State Shinto, not
36Koremam Sakamoto, Kokka Shinto keisei katei no kenkyu (Tokyo: Iwanami Publisher, 1994),
28S.
37Hardacre, 4.
Îbid., 6.
72
the reverse. We need a further analysis beyond just a critique o f the relationship between
the state and Shinto -- of how both theory and practice shape ideology.
State Shinto never became an official national state religion, though Shinto groups
received tremendous privilege from the state, due to powerful opposition of Buddhist
sects and internal problems among Shinto priests, but in the process of this attempt the
Meiji government succeeded in changing the status of Shinto priests and shrines. For
example, the reorganization o f the Shinto priesthood and its shrines favored the ruling
political structure.
One of the major inventions in the formation of State Shinto is that the Meiji
government created the ranking of shrines in hierarchical order, with the Ise Ground
Shrine as the head shrine. Under the Ise shrine, all shrines were then ranked in four
categories - imperial shrines, national shrines, government shrines and local shrines. The
purpose of this ranking was not only to formalize the shrine system but also to control
popular consciousness through a sense of connection or tie to a common descent.39
This structural change and effort succeeded in creating a powerful vehicle for
emperor worship by distinguishing the concepts of religion and rite. In year Meiji 4
(1872), the Meiji government promulgated Shinto as a national rite (kokka no saishi).
According to one Shinto priests analysis, this action was in reaction to perceived threats
from Buddhist groups.40 However, Carol d u ck explains that this treatment was a result
of increasing demands for religious freedom learned from the West. She explains:
19Haidacie, 84.
*Uzuhiko Ashizu, Kokka Shinto to wa nandattanoka (Tokyo: Jinjya Shinpo, 1987), 36.
73
By this separation of rites (saishi) and religion (shukyo) the government

proposed to preserve Shinto in its function as imperial ritual without violating the
constitutional dictates of the separation o f church and state.41
Whether this policy was the result of actions from Buddhist sects or voices of religious
freedom not, as a result of this, Shinto did gain a status that transcended all other
particular religions. This is because all religious groups had to practice emperor worship
because emperor worship was not designated as a religious practice at all, but rather as a
national ritual. This national ritual involved the worship of ancestral gods and the
emperor since the emperor was considered the continuation of the lineage of ancestral
gods.
With this declaration and a clever logic o f national rite/ritual {kokka no soshi), all
religious groups were encouraged to be absorbed into the emperor-centered hierarchical
structure. It is a known historical fact that Japanese Christians practice emperor worship
as well. In this way, emperor worship as national ritual facilitated the indoctrination of
the emperor ideology for the purpose of fostering a strong nationalistic identity.
Although State Shinto did not become the official national religion, State Shinto
had tremendous ideological influences that are still alive in the way the Japanese view
their tradition, culture and religious thoughts and practice. We can find legacies in
todays conservative Shinto studies of State Shinto. For example, newsletters issued by
Shinto headquarters explicitly expressed the goals of supporting the emperor state system
and strengthening the spirit and consciousness of emperor worship.42
41Ghick, 138-139.
Înstitution of Japanese Culture ofKokngalnrin University ed., Kindai yem osei to shukyouteki
keni (Kyoto: Dohosha, 1992), 15.
74
While stating that Shinto and State Shinto are different, these Shinto scholars
refused to reject emperor worship because they strongly believed emperor worship and
Shinto are part of national culture and that patriotism required it.43 Shinto scholars
approaches to assessing State Shinto tended to focus on its relationship with the state
rather than its ideological legacy. Hence, their typical conclusion was that State Shinto
was a thing of the past. My position, however, is that the legacy of State Shinto remains
alive in the many forms of cultural control, particularly in shrine related cultural events.
Today when we assess the issue of State Shinto, we need to have this legacy
clearly in view. The role of the emperor and the practice of State Shinto strengthened the
social perception that Shinto is the native religion and an integral part of the ethnic
cultural of Japan. I am arguing that this perception has masked the ideological embrace
of a destructive, imperialistic, and racist nationalism. Consider the following:
There are two reasons why Shinto is ambiguous in being called a religion.
One is that the formation of Shinto history is almost the same as Japanese
ethnic culture. In other words, Shinto has never been separated from
society. Second, from the point of view of the contemporary definition of
religion, it is too ambiguous; most Japanese have touched, felt and
practiced Shinto but not realized it is a religion.44
I argue that such an assumption has to be carefully reexamined in light o f the legacy of
State Shinto because Shintos history does not justify Shintos status as an ethnic
culture but not a religion. The feeling of ambiguity toward Shinto as either culture or
religion is a result of the modem construction of State Shinto. The claim that Shinto is
almost synonymous with Japanese culture uses the same logic found in the nationalistic
"Ibid. 50.
Sonoda, 2.
75
ideas o f National Learning and the declaration that emperor worship is not a religion but
a national rite/ritual to control all religious groups as well as the general populace during
the modem emperor state system.
Furthermore, the view that Shinto is truly synonymous with Japanese ethnic
culture has to be suspect since the Buddhism and Confucianism were brought to Japan in
the sixth century and Japans culture and beliefs cannot be discussed without their
influence. The long history of the amalgamation of Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism
embedded in Japanese religious and cultural life cannot be ignored. Any general
recognition of Shinto only as a pure native national religion or culture is dangerous. Yet
the general Japanese perception is that Shinto is the only pure native national religion.
Kojin Karatani points out that Buddhism is still considered as a foreign religion in
Japan.43 Karatanis point is correct. Such a perception among the Japanese stems
largely from the legacy of State Shinto on scholars assumptions and teachings.
Toshio Fujitani, in a ground-breaking work on the study o f State Shinto, explains
its role:
According to the Shinto Order, State Shinto is the state-designated

religion and State Shinto suppressed the freedom of belief and faith
through the compulsion of Shinto ritual. By doing so, it led to invasion
war and used for militarism and politics. While not referred to in the
Shinto Order, the problem of die emperor comes up. State Shinto
gready contributed to the deification o f the emperor and emperor
worship46
Fujitanis claim is supported by the U.S. analysis during the American occupation in
1945-19S2 by the Supreme Command of Allied Powers (SCAP) of General Headquarters
4SKojin Kaiatani, Nihon seishin bunsdd saiko Bungakukai (November 1997): 161.
^Toshio Fujitani, Kokka Shinto to tenno mondai (Kyoto: Research Institution for Buraku Problem,
1989), 57.
76
(GHQ). On the other hand, conservative Shinto priest Uzuhiko Ashizu denounced the
definition of State Shinto, claiming that Americans and other opportunist Japanese
intellectuals who presented State Shinto as if it was a conspiracy created by the Meiji
government and fanatic Shinto priests.47
While Ashizu rejects the definition of State Shinto put forth by SCAP as a
misunderstanding, he defines State Shinto himself as a legal system (that includes a
legal ideology) set up between the state and Shinto in the Meiji era which, while it can be
called non-religious, is the general national spirit.48 As a Shinto priest, his apologetic
position reveals a lack of awareness o f the problem of national spirit itself. He claims
that Shinto is a general term for a spirit specific to the Japanese. As I have argued, this
interpretation of State Shinto and Shinto reveals the key problem. Again, the
fundamental problem o f State Shinto, as Fujitani points out, is not its historical
relationship with the state but rather the crucial part it has played in enhancing the
religious authority of the emperor in its contrived role as an integral to the Japanese
national culture.
In sum, the questionable claim that Shinto is a pure ethnic religion and culture
reveals a cultural indoctrination that is associated with State Shinto, the so-called non-
religious national rite. That national rite nevertheless enhanced the religious authority of
the emperor, an authority that is still maintained and reproduced in a symbolic emperor
system (shocho tem osei). In addition, I argue that the modem construction of State
47Ashizu, 8.
"Ibid., 199.
77
Shinto is one of the major resources for maintaining the emperor-centered myth of
ethnic supremacy and cultural supremacy which are the roots of Japanese racism.
Constraint of National Morality under the Notion of Family State
As we have seen in the discussion of State Shinto, a major policy in the early
Meiji period was the construction o f Shinto as the national religion. Another major
policy in the late Meiji period was the construction of a national morality through the
notion of the Family State. The Family State doctrine of was produced and developed by
scholars who were ideologues of the later Meiji governments. These included Tetsujiro
Inoue, Yatsuka Hozumi and Hiroyuki Kato, all very nationalistic and all contributing to
the systematization of a strong national morality and culture, all in the name of fostering
loyalty to the emperor and the state. The essence of the notion of the Family State is to
have an analogical connection between the family and the state. The state is an extension
of the family, and both are used to perpetuate the emperor ideology to foster loyalty and
patriotism for the new state. The formation of State Shinto played the role of fostering
cultural conformity by replacing the notion of religion with a national rite/ritual system,
while Family State ideals fostered moral conformity. These two worked in tandem
similar to the wheels of a car - the modern emperor state system. Together, they
sustained the modern emperor system for a long period of time and succeeded in stirring
feelings o f ultra nationalism during the wars. The modern emperor state system lasted
virtually until the end of World War D, from 1868-1945 three quarters of a century.
As a hegemonic ideology, its influence remains strong in Japanese society even today.
78
Neither State Shinto nor Family State could be used independently as a successful
hegemonic ideology within the modern emperor state system. These ideologies by
themselves were not sufficient to serve the political needs of the emperor. Yet, Carol
Gluck explains:
In the process o f definition and diffusion, kokutai, the unbroken imperial

tradition, was increasingly invoked as the symbolic embodiment of the
nation, and the emperor acquired ever more elaborated roles as the
Confiician fount of moral virtue and the Shinto manifestation of a divine
ancestral line. Ethical, national, and historical values were gradually
intertwined in various renderings, the ideological amalgam of which was a
catechism of citizenship that joined code and country in a newly
generalized civil morality.49
As seen in Glucks remarks, the political body {kokutai) is the central
ideology o f the modern emperor state system and it was sustained only by the
combined notion of State Shinto and Family State that together played the role of
facilitator for the newly generalized civil morality. A pioneering work that
assessed the notion of the Family State was written by Takeshi Ishida. In A Study
o f the History o f M eiji Political Thought (M eiji Seiji Shisoshi Kettkyu), he implies
that the most important aspect o f the emperor state system is its collective spirit
and that it is exemplified in the Family State view.30 From this point o f view, he
analyzes the historical formation o f the Family State ideology and its political
functions. According to him, Family State was formulated in a moral school
textbook in 1908. Through compulsory school education, the idea and identity is
of a nation as an extended family. This extended family, he suggests, protected
the virtue and benevolence o f the emperor. This ideology inevitably permeated
*Gtack, 102
"Takeshi Ishida, M eiji seijis shisoshi kenkyu (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1954 first copy, 1992 revival), 3.
79
the consciousness of the Japanese. This became clear when any crisis concerning
the Family State ideology arose, and when the state faced a challenge to its
controlling power.31
While the indoctrination o f State Shinto worked by mystifying the
political role of the emperor through a religious authority thought to be bestowed
from above, the notion of Family State perpetuated the emperor ideology and
made it a national morality to which all people were obligated. There was
recognition here that no matter how solidly a system was established, it would be
impossible to sustain it without support from the masses, whether their support
was on a conscious or unconscious level.
The term Family State was often used in prewar Japan as a political
symbol but it also had a multi-layered meaning.32 The notion the state as an
extended family successfully influenced people in large part because the emperor
was presented as a father figure. Originally, obedience or loyalty to authority was
manifested in a vertical relational pattern. Using the analogy of family, however,
masked or at least softened its verticality. Sannosuke Matsumoto points out that
the teaching o f the Family State view was designed to foster 1) loyalty and turn
filial piety into a voluntary mass feeling, and 2) the growth o f a strong national
identity.33 This mass feeling was in fact the veiled result o f ideological
JIKazue Muta, Senryaku to shite no kazoku (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1996), 81.
S2Sannosoke Matsumoto, Modernity and Tradition in M eiji Thoughts (Meiji Shiso ni okeiu Dento
to Kindai) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1996), 23.
n Ibid., 33.
80
indoctrination and was thus was very dangerous because people could not
recognize how they were being indoctrinated.
Masaaki Kosaka summarizes the Meiji leaders thoughts in relation to Family
State view:
1. The foundation o f the Japanese state and society was conceived to be

the family. The morality to the family was made by extension, the
morality of the country. The preaching of the harmony and unity of
loyalty and filial piety, loyalty to the ruler, and patriotism, these
became the nucleus of the national morality.
2. Family and state, filial piety and loyalty: these were unified by means
of ancestor worship which was encouraged at this time and by the
revival of the belief in the unity of history and myth. If Japanese
history is traced back it becomes myth and, conversely, Japanese
history originates in myth. This is the Japanese mythocohistorical
view. Thus, then, was broadly the process whereby the sanctification
of the Statethe concept of Japan as a God-Country, and deification
of the Emperorthe concept o f Imperial divinitycame about. In
this fashion, there was born in Japan the myth of the 20th century.
3. This myth was not just one expanded by the folk, rather, it was
presented to the nation by the State as a new state-religion, belief in
which was mandatory.14
Filial piety and loyalty to authority were also major moral virtues inherited from
the Tokugawa era through the teachings of Confucianism. But in China, where the
teaching of Confucianism originated, Confucian tradition valued five relationships -lord,
parents, married couple, brother and sister, and friendsas the most important teaching
in human life, and all relationships except friends are hierarchical relations. Foremost
among them is fidelity to parents and second is loyalty to ones political lord.
Nevertheless this priority had already changed in Japan during the Tokugawa/ Edo
period. When the Meiji leaders invented and developed the notion o f the Family State,
S4Masald Kosaka, Japanese Thought in the M eiji Era, trans. David Abosch (Tokyo: Pan-Pacific
Press, 1958), 375-376.
81
they manipulate the masses loyalty to the emperor as their lord and filial piety to the
emperor as their father.33
In other words, the Meiji leaders also effectively used and manipulated the
Confucian legacy from the Tokugawa period for their own purposes. In the book
Tokugawa Religion, Robert Bellah analyzes this strong sense of loyalty to feudal lords as
the highest value in the pre-modern period, exceeding the loyalty to ones parents. He
writes:
.. .ones particularistic tie to ones collectivity is symbolized as loyalty to

its head. The enormous importance of loyalty in Japan is then, a concrete
expression of the values for which we are postulating primacy. It is
important to note that this loyalty is loyalty to the head of ones
collectivity, whoever that person may be. It is loyalty to status rather than
to a person as such.36
As Bellah points out, loyalty in Japan means loyalty to a particular status, position and
social function, rather than to a person. So it would not have mattered if the object o f
such loyalty was changed from feudal lord to emperor. Furthermore, when this loyalty is
combined with the virtue of filial piety to the emperor, ideological manipulation is
romanticized and legitimized.
Jon Holidays observations o f the Family State convinces us o f its ideological
effectiveness. He articulates:
The state organism theory essentially held that the state was one big
living organism in which transitory individuals were merely component
cells subordinate to the whole, there was no sense of individuals in any
way contracting in to society. The Confucian type familistic ethic
provided the real foundation for the society, and increasingly, from the
55Haruko Okano, Feminisuto shitenkara no Nihon shukyo hihan, inShukyo no nakano joseishi,
eds. Akiko Okuda and Haniko Okano (Tokyo: Seikyusha, 1993), 33.
^Bellah Robert, Tokugawa Religion: The Values o f Pre-Industrial Japan (Glencoe: The Free
Press, 1957), 13.
82
late Meiji period on, Japanese ideologists spoke of the nation as an

extended family. The nation was not like a family, it really was a family.
This national family, supported from below by the socio-ethical patterns
of individual house hold, was then sanctified from above by Shinto
beliefs which imbued it with a quality of sacredness.57
Holidays analysis o f the contents of the Family State as an institution is very articulate
but we need to ask how that institution came to have such a pervasive impact on Japanese
mass psychology and spiritual consciousness. Certainly, this was a process that gained
momentum through the countrys educational system.
Takeshi Ishida analyzed the educational method o f dissemination
of the Family State morality. According to him, the Family State doctrine was
introduced in the first textbook used in the compulsory school curriculum and
reinforced by the Imperial Rescript on Education (kyooiku chokugo). In
elementary schools, as children of the emperor, students were obligated to
recite the Imperial Rescript on Education each day. The Imperial Rescript on
Education is as follows:
Know ye, Our subjects,

Our imperial ancestors have founded Our Empire; always respect on a
basis broad and everlasting, and subjects ever united in loyalty and final
piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof.
This is the glory o f the fundamental cricketer of our Empire, and therein
also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your
parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters, as husbands and wives be
harmonious, as friends true; hear yourselves in modesty and moderation;
extend your benevolence to all; pursue leaning and cultivate arts, and
thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers;
furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always
respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise,
offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and earth. So
17Jon Holliday, A Political History o f Japanese Capitalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975),
41.
83
shall be not only ye Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious
the best traditions of your forefathers. The Way here set forth is indeed
the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike
by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all
places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with
you, Our subjects, that we may all attain to the same virtue.38
Indeed, Ishida and some other scholars set the date of the emergence of the Family State
ideal as 1890, when this Imperial Rescript on Education was declared and first read aloud
in the schools.
This late Meiji production of the notion of Family State was maintained and
further developed when Japan entered into imperial wars in 1937. This development can
be seen in the book kokutai no hongi published by the Ministry of Education in 1938.39 It
reads:
Our country is one big family state and the imperial family is the ancestral and the
center of the state life. The masses must respect the imperial family with the
affection of ancestor..
This kokutai no hongi was widely used in the education system and over time,
contributed significantly to the indoctrination of the emperor ideology into the
consciousness of the general populace. Today, such direct ideological education is no
longer part o f the compulsory education system, as todays indoctrination is much more
subtle. However, present-day political leaders in Japan are still of the generation that
went through this earlier doctrinal education so they are very nationalistic and
traditionalists. Since their individual moral values and social norms were formed by the
jon Livingston, Joe Moore, and Felicia Oldfather, cds., Imperial Japan 1800-1945 (New York:
Pantheon Bodes, 1973), 153-154.
59It should be noted that this was the year Japan invaded China this means intense mind control of
the masses was carried out in order to mobilize Japans desire to participate in the war.
60Ministiy of Education, Kokutai no hongi (Tokyo: Naikakn Publisher, 1937), 46.
84
hegemonic national morality embodied in the notion of Family State, this national
morality will continue to be reproduced by these political leaders as long as the emperor
system exists.
Contemporary Problem of the Emperor Ideology
Shocho Tennosei as a Function of Cultural Conformity
In his diaries written in Japan immediately after the war, the American journalist
Mark Gayn expressed astonishment at the deep reverence for the emperor held by the
people in Japan and predicted the continuation of the influence of the emperor ideology.
He wrote, Thus, history will note that on this day, Shintoism is again on the rise, a
powerful religious and political force as ever linked with the imperial myth.61
As we take a close look at todays situation, we will see that Gayn, who was an
eyewitness to events in postwar Japan, was correct in his prediction.
The new emperor system was explicitly set forth in the first chapter of new
constitution that was created in 1947 in which the continuation of this cultural and
ideological tool/influence can be found. Article 1 of Chapter one describes the emperors
function as The Emperor shall be the Symbol of the State and of the unity o f people,
deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.
In effect, this article perpetuates the Meiji Imperial Constitution in which the
emperors absolute political, military and religious authorities as well as power were
guaranteed. It is true that under the new constitution, the emperor will no longer practice
or be involved in any political and military matters. The ruling class can no longer use
61Mark Gayn, Japan Diary (New York: Charles E Tuttle Company, 1981), 494.
83
the emperor for their political agenda as they did in the prewar period. However, from
the point of view of cultural ideology, the function of this symbol works to keep the
boundary of Japanese and non-Japanese intact. In the Japanese constitution, the state is
specified as Japan (nihonkoku) and the people as Japanese (nihonkokumin) which means
non-Japanese are not included as the people from whom the emperor derives his position.
This study has argued that the notion of Japanese does not mean those who hold
Japanese nationality. Just as American represents white American, Japanese
represents those whose parents and grandparents were Japanese. As I discussed in
chapter two, Koreans who naturalized and obtained a Japanese nationality are not
considered Japanese. Thus, non-Japanese are not considered members of the state.
The symbolic character and function of the postwar emperor system that justifies the
nation-state of Japan refers only to the Japanese. Thus, this new form of the emperor
system is problematic because the true notion of the people is not accurately reflected
in the constitution. Because of the loss of the emperors authority, it is often emphasized
by conservative sectors of society that the modern emperor state system and post war
emperor system are substantially different, especially in regard to its different roles and
functions. With this logic, the problem of cultural conformity has received less attention.
Historically, there was an opportunity to abolish the emperor system that was not
fulfilled. This decision was made in the context of two differing opinions about dealing
with the postwar emperor system. Kiyoko Takeda explains the major reason of the
conflict within the U.S. State Department.
The U.S. State Department at the time has a pro-China group and a pro-
Japan, or Japan experts group, and these groups disagreed sharply over
U.S. policy toward Japan, particularly over how to handle the emperor and
the emperor system after Japans surrender. The so-called pro-China
86
group included James Byrnes, who later succeeded Cordell Hull as the
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who would become Assistant Secretary
of Sate, Carter Vincent, the chairman of the Far East Area Committee,
Stanley Hombeck, director of the State Department Far Eastern Division
and Owen Lattimore, an Asia scholar who specialized in China.62
According to Takeda, the pro-China group intensely opposed retaining the emperor
system and demanded its abolishment. In contrast, the so-called pro-Japan group
strongly supported its preservation due to the Japaneses deep reverent feeling toward the
emperor and they stressed the possibility of mass chaos if it was abolished. As a result of
this heated debate, the emperor system was kept and remained the symbol of Japanese
national unity.
Because Japan was defeated in World War II, radical social moves were made
toward democratized society. Most o f the changes were demanded and facilitated by the
Supreme Command of Allied Power (SCAP) during American occupation from 1945 to
1952. One of the first orders of SCAP was the Shinto Order (shinto shirei) that severed
the relationship between the state and Shinto in order to remove the emperor's political,
religious and military authority. Under SCAPs control, the emperor lost all his formal
authority, which was absolutely guaranteed in the Meiji Imperial Constitution. However,
SCAP compromised about the total abolishment o f the emperor system, and as a result
the emperor and the status of the imperial family have remained a cultural if not political
symbol of Japan. In other words, the modem emperor system, shocho tenosei, is the
product of a political compromise between the Japanese government and the U.S. and it
leaves the powerful traditional Japanese culture intact.
Kiyoko Takeda, Tennokan no sokoku (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993), 21.
87
The SCAPs compromise had a two-fold purposes. First, because the emperor
system had exerted such a tremendous ideological and cultural influence upon the psyche
of the Japanese people during the prewar period, SCAP authorities were afraid that its
total abolition would cause additional political and social disorder, thereby preventing
progress toward democratic social transformation. Second, SCAP was willing to allow
Japan to retain its emperor system in return for Japan becoming an anti-Communist
center in the Far East. As a result of this political and historical treatment, the emperor
system survived in a revised form in postwar Japan.
While this is a far cry from the absolute authority of the prewar emperor, the
legacy of the emperor system as a social, cultural and political mechanism of control has
remained alive and well. Some Japanese intellectuals, such as Tetsuya Takahashi claim
that since shocho tenosei was originally established with the help of SCAP for the
temporary purpose of discharging the emperors war responsibility, it should now be
abolished.63
While this argument is valid, it misses a fundamental problem called shocho
tem osei, pertaining to the social and cultural meaning of having the emperor as the
symbol of unity for the nation. What does this type o f unity mean? Doesnt it signify
the same culture of conformity used to control people in the prewar period, the same
dangerous Japanese national ideology and identity? What is the difference between the
prewar emperor system and the postwar emperor system from the standpoint of cultural
cohesion? Examining the cultural and ideological efficacy of the contemporary emperor
Tetsuya Takahashi, Tennosei, feminisumu, and senso sekinin," in Josei,senso, jinken Vol.4, ed.
The Association for Research on the Impacts of War and Military Bases on Womens Human Rights (Josei
Senso Jinken Gakkai) (Shiga: Koiosha, 2001), 26.
88
system, it does not seem to matter whether the emperor has direct political and military
power or not, so long as he remains the cultural symbol o f a nation of superior
ethnicity.
Unity under the name of the emperor was encouraged during the imperial wars in
order to raise national consciousness and to generate a patriotic fervor that would propel
the Japanese people to be willing to sacrifice their lives for the sacred war. Since unity
was used to create an upsurge of patriotism and nationalism, no one can predict whether
this type of nationalism will be used again to mobilize people to support whatever the
state decides is in its national interest. In fact most Asian countries, with China and
Korea in particular, have been concerned about Japans political movement toward
remilitarization since 1970s. Japans superiority complex still causes great concern
among other Asian nations and the contemporary emperor system is a symbol o f that as
well.
In addition, more conservative factions in Japan still legitimize of presence of
shocho tenosei. Yasuo Oohara writes:
This is just one example, but three yeas ago Shokun Magazine interviewed
various segment of the Japanese population regarding their view on the
emperor. The symbolic emperor was, for some the moral continuity
and pride in the State, or the patriarch o f the Japanese people, or a
spiritual symbol, or a home for the heart of the people.64
Indeed, Ooharas claim represents 63 not only conservative factions, but even broader
cross sections o f Japanese society.
^Yasuo Oohara, Shocho tenno ko (Tokyo: Tentensha, 1989), 57.
laid., 58.
89
Why isnt there more concern about the dangers of shocho termoseP Some of the
major reasons are 1) fear of the emperors loss o f all formal authority and power, 2) since
the new constitution is considered as the symbol of democracy and the shocho tem osei is
established under the new constitution, it is valid, and 3) there is still some degree of
attachment to the emperor even among liberal Japanese intellectuals who might be
expected to criticize shocho tennosei. None of these reasons are acceptable in the face of
the dangers of cultural control and ideological impact resulting from shocho tennosei.
Since the early 1970s, the ruling elites have in fact vigorously reorganized the emperor
system symbolically for the sake of political control. Politicians have made official
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine for former solders of the imperial war, who are often
worshiped as national heroes symbolizing the lineage of national gods. There has been
increased encouragement to sing the national anthem and display the national flag at
public schools. For other people in Asia, such actions remain symbols o f invasion and
exploitation of the hand of Japan.
As long as there remains in place a strong legacy of the prewar emperor system,
it remains possible that it could be used again to mobilize the Japanese national identity
to dangerous levels. Beyond this, it is this persistent emperor ideology that shields and
keeps racism and discrimination against Koreans and other non-Japanese alive and well
in todays society. Takeshi Ishida points to the legacy o f the emperor ideology:
This seemingly total destruction of the emperor as a power structure as

well as an ideological system was, however, accompanied by historical
continuity, in that the fragmented parts of the society formerly integrated
by the emperor system still survived with some of the characteristics of the
prewar period-for example, strong group conformity composed o f closed
we-consciousness.66
Takeshi hhiifa, Japanese Political Culture: Change and Continuity (New Brunswick
Transaction Books, 1983), 25.
90
Ishidas comment describes well the legacy o f the prewar emperor system that remains in
the consciousness of contemporary Japanese to this day.
Granted, today the Japanese national consciousness or identity is no longer as
monolithic as it was before World War n. Yet, the ruling groups still tenaciously
reinforce national myths, national memories, and national culture in order to maintain a
strong sense o f a supremacist Japanese national identity. This cultural reproduction is
only possible as long as shocho termosei, the contemporary emperor system, remains in
place.
Christians or Theological Responses of the Emperor Ideology
It is a widely known fact that Japanese Christianity was totally absorbed by
emperor state system before the war. Yet, there has been relatively little theological
reflection with regard to this legacy of the emperor state system, the practice of emperor
worship, or the systems continuing impact. As we learned in the previous section, the
cultural power of the contemporary emperor system remains strong and dangerous, and
thus an adequate critique of it is an urgent task for Japanese Christians. Some recent
critiques have focused quite narrowly on the freedom of faith under the principle of the
separation of politics and religion, which is guaranteed in chapter 20 of the Japanese
Constitution.67
Due to the State Shinto system before the war, many Japanese Christian leaders
engaged in emperor worship. For example, the year when the Taisho Emperor was
^Tomisaka Christian Center, ed., Tennosei no skingakuteld hihan (Tokyo: Shinkyo Publisher,
1992).
91
enthroned in 1915, one o f most influential theologians and ministers, Masahisa Uemura,
held a service on the anniversary of the emperors enthronement in conjunction with the
worship of thanksgiving, using the Letter to the Romans, chapter 13 from the Christian
scriptures. Uemura held that Gods rule was an absolute presupposition, and therefore
differed qualitatively from the emperors authority. Hence, for him there was no
contradiction between preaching Christian theology and teaching that the enthronement
of the new emperor was given by God. Japanese Christian citizens could also pray for
the emperor and the imperial family.68 Common Christian justifications for emperor
worship included the claim that (1) the act of praying for the emperor did not entail
breaking the principle of the separation of politics and religion and (2) worship of the
emperor was different from the worship of God, since worship of the emperor was not
considered a religious practice but part of the national traditional culture and custom.69
As my discussion of State Shinto made clear, the Meiji governments declaration
of Shinto as a national rite brought about the restructuring of the religious order and gave
an excuse for Japanese Christians to practice emperor worship in the churches. While
most Japanese Christians obeyed under pressure from the state, there were several
conservative denominations such as the Holiness Church and the Seventh Day Adventists
that did not accept this teaching and refused to practice emperor worship.
In addition, resistance against emperor worship by many Korean Christians in
Korea, particularly coming from other conservative denominations, was also intense.
Some were imprisoned and were even tortured and martyred for these reasons. Korean
6ITomisaka Christian Center, ed., Daijosai to kirisutokyo (Tokyo: Shinkyo Publisher, 1987), 178.
69Masahiko Kurata, Temosei to kankou kirisutpskyo (Tokyo: Shinkyo Publisher, 1991), 49.
92
Christians, even though they were also taught to be children of the empire by the colonial
government o f Japan, did not identify themselves as Japanese in this regard. Resistance
to emperor worship by Korean Christians was also influenced by their own growing
sense o f nationalism as well as their interpretation of the Bible and strong belief in
monotheism or the second coming o f Christ.70 As a result, the resistance movement
among Korean churches much stronger than within the Japanese churches.
Reflecting on their prewar experiences 22 years later, Japanese Churches
confessed their past failures to resist the system. In 1967, the United Churches of Christ
in Japan acknowledged their past sins of participation in the wars. Interestingly, this
confession addressed their inability to resist the governments efforts to unite all
denominations in the process of the formation of State Shinto. However, the confession
did not address the error of flattering the modern emperor system.71 This statement had a
tremendous impact on the Christian community in Japan. Many conservatives were
opposed to it then and still do not accept its validity today.
Recently there have been some theological critiques of the emperor system
published by liberal Japanese Christians. These theological reflections have shed new
light on the problems of the emperor system. An anthology, Theological Critique on the
Emperor System, has made a major contribution among the very few studies in this field.
One of the books contributors, Setsuro Oosaki, begins with two important points. First,
he acknowledges that there have been very few potent theological critiques of the
70Ibid., 85.
71Thc United Church of Christ in Japan, composed by 35 different former denominations, was a
result of the governments intervention to control Christian organization in 1941.
93
emperor system by Christians. Second, he acknowledges that most Japanese churches
submitted to the emperor system before the war, despite confessions o f faith that would
have compelled otherwise.72 With these self-critical remarks, he critiques the
contemporary emperor system (shocho iennosei) in this way:
Some may want to interpret the hereditary nature of shocho tem osei as a
symbol o f the continuity of our nation as such. However, continuity of
a nation does not necessarily require continuity of bloodline in the form
of a symbolic personage. Leaving aside the archaic character o f this
requirement, it must be pointed out that this requirement results in more
than a few problems. In terms o f the history of the emperor system, it is
difficult to deny that the hereditary nature of the emperor is based on a
mythology of bloodline that implies a special status or special species of
royalty for the imperial family and the emperor. The symbolism provided
by this type of position can serve as a fundamental basis for establishing
discrimination based on background73.
Thus, Oosaki points out that the emperor system has perpetuated discrimination against
people of different ethnic backgrounds. Koreans have suffered particularly in this regard.
Oosaki goes on to argue that the reinforcement of the view that the emperor and
the imperial family are a special species, along with attempts to deify the emperor
through events like the Great Thanksgiving,74 have supported the emperor ideology,
produced inequality, and prevented freedom, justice and peace.73 Oosakis analysis
provides a wider cultural framework within which to reflect theologically upon the
emperor system. As my research made clear, future theological reflections on the
7ISetsuo Oosaki, Shingaku teki shakai rinrigaku teki tenno sti hihan in Tenosei no shingaku
tekii hihan. ed, Tomisaka Christian Center (Tokyo: Shinkyo Publisher, 1990), 75.
73Ibid., 106.
74The ritual of Great Thanksgiving is and ancient Shinto ritual which provides deification of the
emperor through the ritual performed by the new emperor eating rice from the new years crop with God.
Through this act, it is believed that the emperor is transformed as a god.
94
empero r system will need to pay closer attention to the forms o f cultural control within
Japanese religious life, to extend Osakis discussions.
"Ibid., 114.
Chapter Four
The Emperor Ideology as an Ideology of Racism
In the previous chapter, the historical development of the emperor state system
and its cultural and religious functions was briefly described. It was suggested that the
emperor state system is an ideology of domination that was historically constructed to
strengthen and preserve the national identity of what is defined as Japanese.
This Japanese national identity is sustained by juxtaposing it with the construction
o f the other. As a Japanese scholar points out, one of the characteristic elements o f the
emperor ideology is to make people exclude the other.1 If so, is this exclusion a form of
racism? My assertion is that it is a form of racism. In order to argue this point, a
definition of racism is critical. This chapter explores studies of racism in the West and
employs them into the context of Japan from a comparative perspective.
Prior studies of the emperor state system do not make any claim that the emperor
ideology is a form of racism. It comes largely from misunderstanding that racism stems
from biological differences. Recent Western scholars agree that any definition of racism
sorely based on biological or other inherent or innate characteristics are insufficient and
incomplete to fully understand the social construction of racism However, in Japan, the
notion of scientific racism developed in the West in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries is still a widely held belief.2 According to Emilie Townes, one aspect o f racism
'Sadafumi Kanetsuka, Tenno Nihonjin gaikokujin rodosha Gtndai shiso (1994): 122-125.
*When I say the Japanese should not be understood as a temperament of an ethnic group in order
to avoid stereotyping a particular group. My point here is peoples consciousness, which presuppose the
doctrine of M an that is it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social
96
is that it has structured dominant and subordinate roles and relationships between Blacks
and whites.3 If this is an aspect of racism, then the relational patterns between the
Japanese and non-Japanese has also been set as dominant and subordinate and should
also be defined as racism.
A sociological study entitled Japanese Capitalism and the Korean Minority in
Japan: Class. Race, and Racism is one o f the few earlier studies to apply the notion of the
racism to the situation of Korean residents in Japan.4 The study draws historically on the
feelings of antagonism that existed between Japanese workers and Korean workers
during the colonial period in Japan, and introduces three theoretical approaches to race
relations.3 The study views this racism as ethnic conflict between Japanese workers and
Korean workers during the colonial period. However, because it does not sufficiently
characterize the nature of Japanese racism, it fails to link the ideology of racism and the
emperor ideology.
Abes understanding of racism as antagonistic feelings between Japanese and
Korean is a limited perspective as it does not go beyond an analysis of personal attitude
which is actually the result of racism rather than the problem or definition of racism.
Thus, it is necessary to clearly draw a definition of racism in light of the situation of
existence that determines their consciousness. See Communist Manifesto in Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels Selected Works, Vol. 1 ( Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962).413-414.
Êmilie M. Townes, Washed in the Grace of God, in Violence Against Women and Children: A
Christian Theological Sourcebook, eds., Carol Adams and Marie Fortune (New York: Continnum
Publishing Company, 1995), 62.
4Kazuhiro Abe, Japanese Capitalism and the Korean M inority in Japan: Class, Race and Racism
(Unpublished PhD dissertation University of California Los Angeles, 1989).
sThese are 1) assimilationist approach, 2) pluralist and 3)Manrist models. According to Abe all
three models have limitations to analyze the situation in Japan.
97
Korean residents in Japan. The National Churches of the U.S. A. defines racism in a way
that is helpful to consider the emperor ideology in Japan as a form and ideology of
racism:
Racism is the intentional or unintentional use of power to isolate, separate and

exploit others. This use of power is based on and a belief in superior racial origin,
identity or supposed racial characteristics. Racism confers certain privileges on
and defends the dominant group, which in turn sustains and perpetuates racism.
Both consciously and unconsciously, racism is enforced and maintained by the
legal, cultural, religious, educational, economic, political military institutions of
societies. Racism is more that just a personal attitude. It is the institutionalized
form of that attitudes.6
As indicated by this statement, racism is involved power that is supported and
maintained by a belief in superior racial origin, identity or supposed racial
characteristics. Although the usage of racial origin is problematic since it retains the
assumption of biological scientific racism, the analysis o f the belief that the dominant
groups have is very insightful for this chapters discussion. My assertion is that the
emperor ideology is a form of racism that comes from the popular belief held by the
Japanese of their superiority toward non-Japanese in general, Asian people in particular,
and even more particular to Korean residents in Japan. This superiority complex would
not have been produced, reproduced and maintained without the presence of the emperor
and the emperor system that is the driving force behind institutional racism in Japan.
In highlighting Japanese emperor ideology as a form of racism, I intend (1) to
explore the connection between state nationalism, which crystallized in Japan as the
emperor ideology, and racism, in order to (2) argue that racism is one o f common
problems that emerged historically during the modem construction of nation-state; and
National Council of Churches, P olity Statement on Racial Justice (New York: National Council
of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1984),4-5.
98
(3) to explore a paradigm shift for studying issues of Korean residents in Japan. The
paradigm used in studies of Korean residents in Japan focuses only on the social state of
the Koreans, rather than the structural contradictions in Japanese society.7 Instead of
focusing only on the social situation of Koreans, we need to focus on the systemic roots
of social domination in Japan. Shifting to a new paradigm will help us to avoid the
paternalism so apparent in most of the studies to date by Japanese scholars.8
Furthermore, a paradigm shift provides a way to connect the issue of Korean
residents being oppressed in Japan today with a related problem. Contemporary emperor
ideology (under the name of shocho tem osei -symbolic emperor system; see chapter 3),
existing in the form of a cultural code that explicitly and implicitly supports the cultural
supremacy of the Japanese people, has undermined the political, social and
psychological well-being of the Japanese people as well. As the symbol of Japan and the
Japanese, the emperor ideology can and does operate to dominate and control people in
Japan.
With these factors in mind, the Japanese view on race will be elaborated on first
in order to see how biological scientific racism has been internalized in Japanese society.
Then, the contemporary theories of racism by several western scholars will be examined
in order to support the assertion that the emperor ideology is a form of racism.
7John Solomos and Les Bade pointed out similar criticism that one of the fundamental criticisms
of the sociology race and ethnic relations is that it has too often focused on the victims rather than the
perpetrators of racism, in Theories o f Race and Racism: A Reader, eds. Les Back and John Solomos
(London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 21.
*One empirical examples of this tendency among Japanese scholars occurred when I answered a
survey on my identity as a Korean. A question that upset me was when do you think you are most Korean?
My reaction was that Japanese ask and express their own identity first. See my further argument in a
Journal for Koreans in Japan. Eunja Lee, Identity and Self-Liberation as Korean, in Horumon Bunka 8
(Tokyo: Shinkansha, 1998): 126-135.
99
Furthermore, characteristic elements of nationalism from some selected theories of
nationalism will be illuminated upon so that the link between nationalism and racism is
made clear. Since the emperor ideology is the center of Japanese nationalism, it will be
not just relevant but crucial to expose the racism embedded in this ideology.
Finally, discussions on nihonbunkaron (Japanese culture) and nihonjinron (Japanese
identity) that fashionably emerged in public discourse in the late 1960s and early 1970s
will be discussed. The purpose is to expose the implicit and explicit messages of
cultural supremacy in these discussions and how these discussions have contributed to
the reproduction o f cultural supremacy. This exposure is necessary to make clear the
assertion that the emperor ideology is racism.
Japanese View of Race, Ethnicity and Racism
In current western scholarship, particularly in the field of social theory, the study
of racism or race relations is quite popular, though it has never become a mainstream
subject in the field of social science.9 Awareness o f this subject exists not only in the
academic circles but also in the general public discourse of western society. This does
not mean that western society generally understands the problem of racism, however.
Nor is there a consensual definition of racism.
Yet, in the relatively multi-racial western societies of the United States, Great
Britain, and South Africa, there is an awareness o f racism that is comparatively lacking in
the relatively homogeneous society of Japan. Of course, we have to acknowledge that
Michael Orai and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United Sates: From the 1960s to the
1990s (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), 9. They claim that race has never been a top priority in
social science.
100
definitions, perceptions and understandings of racism vary a great deal, even in those
countries in which racism is a recognized phenomenon.
In Japan, race relations and structural racism are hardly even considered domestic
issues or social problems. This is true whether one considers the academic disciplines,
political discourse, or popular journalism.10 In Japan, racism is considered an issue for
other countries. A prime example of Japans ignorance of racism can be found in the
events surrounding the first official report of the Committee on Human Rights of the
United Nation in 1980.11 Japan stated that there is no racism in Japanese society at all in
this way minorities did not exist in Japan.12 In a second report in 1987, Japan admitted
the presence of minorities, but denied its problem in this way although minorities did
exist, there were no minorities problem.
These reports project well the assumption that most Japanese generally hold about
minority problem is linked to racism. However, Koreans and other non-Japanese are
not minorities but foreigners since they are not the Japanese. The assumption of this
statement is that discrimination and prejudice against the foreigner is neither a minority
problem nor racism. For them, racism means only black-white problems or problems
occurring only in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nation-state. Such assumptions come
largely from their perception and understanding that Japan is composed o f one
1interestingly there are several studies on racism done by Japanese scholars, mostly on racism in
the U. S. not Japan, though there is no application to Japan.
1'Each nation has responsibility to give an annual report on the issue of human rights once the
nation ratifies the Covenant of International Human Rights, which Japan ratified in 1979.
12George Hicks, Japans Hidden Apartheid: The Korean M inority and the Japanese (Vermont:
Ashgate Publishing, 1997), 3.
101
racial/ethnic group, that is Japanese.13 This flows from the acceptance of an outmoded
western scholarship on race matters- particularly, certain 19th-century scientific
studies on race convinced the Japanese that racial divisions are based on biological and
physiological differences.14
Many Japanese believe that the Japanese and Korean peoples are different ethnic
groups within the same yellow. The terms ethnicity or ethnic have been used in a
variety of ways. Often, the notion of ethnicity refers to cultural difference between or
among peoples, and hence there is the danger that culture may be used as one way to
exclude through differentiating among peoples. In fact, the emperor-centered Japanese
culture has been embraced and considered as a supreme culture. Hence, differentiating
between race and ethnicity has engendered a double standard to justify Japanese
blindness about racism against Koreans and other non-Japanese.
Despite the fact that the nineteenth-century doctrines o f scientific racism have
been widely discredited,13 in Japanese scholarship the issue of Japanese racism has
remained absent. The binary differentiation of race vs. ethnicity has made the Japanese
blind to the issue of racism as their own domestic social problem. For example, Michael
Weiner explains the reason for the absence of Japanese racism in both English literature
and Japanese literature in the following way:
Concern with the production and reproduction of racial ideologies and racism in
Europe and North America has also generated an even expanding of literature.
l3The notion of Japanese as an analytical concept is relatively new.
The internalized view of race is substantiated in the Japanese Encyclopedia of the Social Science
word,jinshu (race) is defined by skin color, physical stature, hair tenure, cranial form nose shape and blood
type. See ShakaikKagaku daijiten, VoL 11 (Tokyo: Kagoshima Publisher, 1968).
lsRobert Miles, Recent Marxist Theories of Nationalism and the Issue of Racism, British
Journal o f Sociology, 1987,38 (1): 24-43.
102
The Japanese case, however, has rarely been subject of systematic of comparative
analysis. In both the Japanese- and English language literature, dealing with this
subject commentators have consistently relied upon anachronistic concepts of
race and racism. These formulations rest upon three assumptions, all o f which
have historically shaped common-sense discourses of race, but which have been
largely rejected by social scientists in Europe and North America. Firstly, there is
an uncritical acceptance of the notion that human populations can be classified on
the basis of biologically fixed characteristics into races; secondly, and following
on from the first, is the assumption that human potential can be measured on the
basis of these same characteristics; and finally, that racism is an inevitable
consequence of competition or conflict between races.16
Although Weiners analysis of Japanese scholarship is generally correct, I would
add some insight into the psychological background to the Japanese tendency of
accepting western scholarship uncritically. Historically, the Japanese developed an
inferiority complex toward western scholarship, most likely due to western colonial
activity prior to the twentieth century, and aggravated further by the horrific experience
of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the occupation of Allied Powers right after World War n.
These experiences made the Japanese have a victim mentality which is a severe cultural
obstacle, and has resulted in Japanese acceptance of an anachronistic concept of race
without any critical interpretation. A Japanese historian, Takeshi Komagome, points out,
Japanese people most often identify themselves as objects of racism rather than subjects
of the racism. As a Japanese, he self-critically states:
If racism were defined based on color line, yellow race Japanese would be an
object of it but would never be a subject of racism. In fact, there is a general
tendency for Japanese to consider themselves as victims of racism justified and
based on the usage of the Japanese language to differentiate between the
categories o f biological difference as jinshu race and culture as rnimoku
ethnicity. 17
16Michael Weiner, Discourses of Race, Nation and Empire in Prc-1945 Japan, Ethnic and Racial
Studies, Volume 18, Number 3, (July 1995): 433-456.
nTakeshi Komagome, Japans Colonial Rule and Modernity: Fall Down Violence, Traces, no.
928 (2001): 180.
103
Komagomes analysis is correct on two points; one is his critique of Japanese
victim mentality coming from a false understanding of color-line based racism, and two,
his analysis of the connection between the emperor worship and Japanese racism, as seen
in the marriage relationship between naichiseh. (Japanese nationality) and Taiwanseki
(Taiwan nationality) during the colonial period. He writes further:
The marriage of Japanese and Taiwanese was considered as naienkankei (out of

wedlock relationship) This treatment is based on emperor worship, which
finds significance in bloodlines and it distinguishes between human groups as the
Japanese and Taiwanese.18
The notion of bloodline that Komagome mentions has had a special meaning in
the emperor-centered patriarchal family state system and has been used to justify
Japanese superiority as a pure race. Since the notion of bloodline is connected to the
doctrine of bankei issei (unbroken lineage), which refers to the myth that all Japanese are
connected to the lineage of the emperors who were descendants of the national Sun
goddess of Amaterasu, the notion of bloodline reinforces the concept of pure race.
The notion of pure race, particularly during the colonial period, was stressed for the
sake of mobilizing Japanese patriotism.
Despite the fact that the notion of bloodline is also a modern mythological
construction, it still influences the mentality of contemporary Japanese and remains a
legacy of the modern history of Japan. Other scholars claim further that the notion of
bloodline effectively functions to exclude and denigrate others by appropriating the
Ibid., 180.
104
notion of purity and pollution found in Shinto teaching.19 It is generally true that the
notion of pure bloodline was used as a symbol of the Japanese and played the role of
erecting a boundary between Japanese and non-Japanese, both during the colonial period
and postcolonial periods.
However, we also need to pay attention to the contradiction between the ideology
bloodline and its practice. For instance, a contradiction is found in one of the colonial
policies that encouraged intermarriage between Korean and Japanese during 1930.20 As I
illustrated in Chapter 2 with the problems of the koseki (family register) system, the
contradiction is that on the one hand, the colonial administration encouraged the
intermarriage between colonial subjects and colonized subjects under the rhetoric of
dosodoshi (same ancestor) in order to assimilate colonized subjects as members of empire
of Japan. On the other hand, the government propagated the idea of pure ethnicity
through the notion of bloodline in order to encourage national loyalty and patriotism.
The contradiction persists even today in the ways the notion of bloodline is still
implicitly used as a social norm/virtue to erect a boundary between Japanese and non-
Japanese, sustaining and perpetuating their view of race and ethnic relations and their
relative self-images. Consequently, we should ask why this obvious contradiction has
such strong staying power. Perhaps it is due to the continuing presence of the emperor
and the imperial royal family. The emperor and the royal family have continued to be
symbols of a pure, sacred, inviolate and precious Japanese possession, to be treasured and
believed in.
19Michael Weiner, Race and Migration in Imperial Japan (London and New York: Routledge,
1994), 8.
20Yuko Suzuki, Feminisumu and Chosen (Tokyo: Akashi Publisher, 1994), 3.
105
In any event, we need to go beyond the perspective of the demarcation /boundary
of biological category and cultural category to adequately characterize Japanese racism.
We need to explore how a more adequate understanding of racism might be used as a
concept to solve the problem of racism in Japan. As a presupposition for having a new
perspective on racism in Japan, Zygmunt Baumans claims should be taken seriously;
as a conception of the world, and even more importantly as an effective

instrument of political practice, racism is unthinkable without the advancement of
modem science, modem technology and modern forms of state power. As such,
racism is strictly a modem product. Modernity made racism possible.21 (emphasis
is mine)
Baumans claim articulates the link between the modem nation-state and racism, which
can and ought to be applied to the Japanese context. I have stressed the connection
between racism and modem forms of state power as precisely the view of the emperor-
modern state system. With the presupposition that the racism is a modem product,
racism should be interpreted anew as an ideological and social construction legitimized
by the emperor ideology for the sake and interest of the ruling elites.22 Before we explore
this perspective, we need to clearly distinguish the idea of race, nation/nationalism and
ethnicity to define racism in Japan.
Race, Racism and Ideology
2IZygmunt Bauman, Modernity, Racism, Extermination, in Theories o f Race and Racism, eds.
Les Back and John Solomos (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 212.
Here again I need to clarify my understanding of ideology since it is also a contested word. By
ideology I mean center value, as Takeshi Ishida in the discussion of chapter 2, on hierarchical value
orientation with the emperor at the top of the hierarchy.
106
As a starting point to the view of racism as an ideological and social construction
in the modem historical period, instead of seeing racism as attributed from a biological
base, I will first of all discuss a problem concerning the idea o f race itself, since the
words jinshu (race) and minzoku (ethnic or ethnicity) are differentiated to justify Japanese
racism, as was discussed in the proceeding section. The word race also has been used in
confusing way in the literatures of anthropology, sociology, ethnic studies, cultural
studies and postcolonial theories, etc. In the book Racism and Immigrant Labor, Robert
Miles traces the historical development of the word race. He summarizes:
The origin of the word race in the English language can be traced to 1S08 and
for the most of the sixteenth century it was used only refer to a class or category
of persons or things; there was no implication that these class or categories were
biologically distinct. During the seventeenth century a number of Englishmen
interested in their historical origins developed the view that they were the
descendants of a German race and that the Norman invasion of the eleventh
century had led to the domination of the Saxons by an alien race. This
interpretation of history gave rise to a conception o f race in the sense of lineage.
Only during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries do we find evidence
that the word race came to be associated with inherent physical traits. In the
same period, the word came to be applied beyond the boundaries of Europe and to
the populations of the then ever expanding world.23
Giving this historical root of the word race, Miles attempts to debunk the
contemporary perception of the word race as integrally associated with innate biological
differences. He methodologically distinguishes between the idea o f race and the
concept of racism, and insists that the idea o fraces is created within the context of
political and social regulation and is presupposed even before discussions of racism.24
^Robert Miles, Racism and Migrant Labor (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), 10-11.
24MethodologicaUy his assumption comes from historical situation in which Irish, Italian and Jews
suffered and inferior status but were categorized as white.
107
Miles rejects the biological construction of the idea of race because it prevents
comprehending properly the true essence of racism. Extending this logic, Miles even
criticized Paul Gilroys claim that the word race is used as a political strategy.23 For
Paul Gilroy, the idea o f race has a descriptive value and an analytical concept, referring
to the power that collective identities acquire by means of their roots in tradition.26 For
Miles, the politics o f race is narrowly confined to the struggle against racism, and racial
differentiations are always created in the context of class differentiation.27 His
perspective on race matters or race relations is directly linked to racism as seen in
the political economy of immigrant labor.
While Miles emphasizes the political and social aspects of the idea of race,
Michael Banton expresses another view that race is a concept rooted in a particular
culture and a particular period of history.28Miles agrees with respect to his critique of
scientific racism. On the other hand, Miles criticizes Banton and John Rex with respect
to their usage of the word race as an analytical concept because such usage serves to
"Gilroys argument is that even if we accept hat the idea and word race are problematic, we
should regard the word race as a politically nuanced term. See Paul Gilroy, There Ain't No Black in the
Union Jack: The Cultural Politics o f Race and Nation (London: Hutchinson, 1987).
"Robert Miles, Racism After 'Race Relations' (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 41.
"Back and Solomon, 8. To discuss the connection between racism and class that is Miles major
point that beyond the scope of this study but the reader can see his numerous article on that analysis. See
Robert Miles, Labor Migration, Racism and Capital Accumulation in Western Europe, Capital and Class,
28 (l986):49-86. Migration, Racism and Postmodern Capitalism, Economy and Society, 19(3), (1990):
332-356.
"Michael Banton The Idiom of Race: A Critique of Presentism, Solomon, 62.
108
distort sociological studies on race relations and it encourages the continuation of
common usage in society.29
Miles further argues that the idea of race was appropriated and given a new
meaning by an ever-increasing number of biologists and anthropologists who were
inquiring into the significance of human physiological variation during the late eighteenth
and the nineteenth centuries.30 Banton attributed these works to other origin of racism,
i.e., racism derived from a scientific error.31 If this is a historically valid claim, we
should question why a number of biologists and anthropologists needed to categorize the
human-species under the idea of race and judge a particular group or race as superior
and a particular group or race as inferior. One way to answer this might be to look at
the political and economic climate of the late nineteen-century in Europe when the
demand for an expanding economic market increased.
From the historical view of English expansionism, Hugh MacDougall describes
Englands historical climate in the following way:
On balance, the myth of Anglo-Saxonism served Englands national purpose well.

Belief in their racism supremacy encouraged visionary Englishmen to look
beyond their shores to other continents and proceed to build a great world empire
to support a vibrant domestic society.32
29Although Rex also sees the racism an ideology he uses the terms race and ethnicity as an
analytical concept John Rex, Race and Ethnicity (Suffolk: Open University Press, 1986).
Miles takes a position toward these biologists cndcamcnys as scientific racism as used by John
Comas to refer to Bentons idea of doctrine of racial typology. See Robert Miles, Racism and Migrant
Labor, 59.
3tIbid., 72.
32Hugh A. MacDougall, Racial Myth in English History. Trojans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons
(Montreal: Harvest House, 1982), 129.
109
It is difficult to prove whether scientific research on race was sponsored by the state of
England or was simply the motivation of individual scientists. However, MacDougalls
explanation hints at the connection between the origin of scientific racism and the desire
of imperial national interest, though we cannot conclude from this that the idea o f race
at the time constituted the primary root of racism.33 Nevertheless, a number of literatures
show the link between imperial national interests, which is an essence of colonialism, and
racism.
In Miles discussion of the origin of racism, he also acknowledges that an
important role was played by colonialism in the development of capitalism, recognizing
that the impetus for the development of racism was English colonialism. But he also
critiques this colonial paradigm:
There is no doubt that the history of colonialism, and specifically the reproduction
of a colonial imagery of biological inferiority, is an important determinant of the
contemporary expression of racism in a number of European countries.
Elsewhere, I have argued that colonial history is an important determinant of
contemporary British racism. However, if it is assumed or argued that the
colonial paradigm of racism constitutes a universal explanation for the nature and
origin of racism, there are reasons to be more critical o f its explanatory power.
It reifies skin color as an active determinant of social relations. The visibility of
somatic characteristics is not inherent in the characteristics themselves. But arises
from a process of signification by which meaning is attributed to certain of them.
In other words, visibility is socially constructed in a wider set of structural
constrains, within a set of relations of domination. Many physical characteristics
(both real and imagined) have been and continue to be signified as a mark of
nature and of race. Moreover, cultural characteristics have also been, and
continue to be, signified to the same end.34
33For example, Robert Miles sees the emergency of theories of racism in 1930s when scientific
racism declined its influence after the emergency of National Socialists claims on race in Germany,
Methodologically, in my view, Miles view might be valid historically, but it is problematic.
^Miles, Racism After 'Race Relations , 87.
110
Although Miles argument is made in a different context, it is helpful in order to advance
here the analysis of the historical and social relationship between Japanese and non-
Japanese in general and Japanese and Korean residents in Japan in particular. As I have
argued elsewhere in this study, the continuing oppression of Korean residents in Japan
has been seen as an extension or legacy of Japans own colonialism. I dont deny this
aspect, but we need to explore further the intersections of colonialism and state ideology,
i.e., the ideology of the national identity of Japanese.
In order to improve upon and enhance the colonial paradigm, Miles further argues
that the idea of race shifted to racism when it was connected to the formation of an
English identity. He argues:
The idea o f race employed at this time was not one which referred to inherent
biological inferior/superiority in the manner of nineteen-century scientific racism,
but rather was used in the sense of lineage. However, with the idea of race
present, and connected with a sense of Englishness, the subsequent shift towards
the idea o f race as a biological category ensured that the Englishness came to be
viewed in such terms by the nineteen-century. Thereafter, the English were
defined as a distinct biological race whose superiority originated supposedly in
their German origins, in the inherent courage and desire for freedom of the
Saxons, in the inherent superiority of their language and institution (especially
Parliament) and in a natural ability for science and reason.33
In other words, when the idea of race was used for creating the identity of Englishmen,
it became an ideology of exclusion, a pattern of racism. Using the idea of race for the
formation of national identity, which then evolves into the ideological construction of
racism, Miles points out to the connection of English identity and a superior complex:
What is significant to record here is that this racism had a dual object: the English
race was counterposed by the colonial races in a hierarchy of interdependence
and superiority. Within the discourse of race, the superiority of one was
35Robert Miles. Recent Marxist Theories of Nationalism and the Issue of Racism, British
Journal o f Sociology, 38(1): 24-43.
Ill
refracted by the inferiority of the other. By the middle of the nineteenth century,
the idea of race was central to a world view articulated and reproduced by the
English bourgeoisie and sections of the working class. Serving as a category of
simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. More over, this ideological construction
had a phenomenal adequacy because there was an evident difference in
productive relations and material wealth between England and much of the rest of
the world at this time.36
Miles shows well the development of the meaning of the word race and its
connection with national identity (English), consequently leading to an English
supremacy ideology that is indeed racism. With these presupposed arguments, Miles
defines racism as:
The concept of racism refers to those negative beliefs, held by one group which
identify and set apart another by attributing significance to some biological or
other inherent characteristics) which it is said to possess, and which
deterministically associate that characteristics) with some other (negatively
evaluated) feature(s) or action(s). The possession of these supposed
characteristics may be used to justify the denial of the group equal access to
material and other resources and/or political rights.37
Although Japanese and Koreans are biologically (in terms of skin color) similar,
Koreans are denied many political rights by the labeling of all of their (cultural physical)
characteristics in a negative way. Koreans residents in Japan are seen as noisy, lazy and
impudent, for example. These perceived characteristics stem from culturally coded
negative beliefs toward other people rather than from the actual characteristics
themselves. There is simply no actual biological difference between Japanese people and
Korean people. Hence racism as I have been describing it ( that is, racism understood as
evolving from the ideology formative of ones national identity), provides a much more
Îbid., 24-43
^Milcs, Racism After 'Race Relation, 85.
112
persuasive explanation of the treatment of Korean peoples in Japan. The process of the
formation of national identity is indeed the process of indoctrinating ordinary Japanese to
have a supremacist mentality with regard to themselves, and at the same time a
denigrating attitude toward non-Japanese. One must conclude that the formation of a
national identity for the Japanese is the flip side of the same coin of racism. Sadly, the
process of Japanese national identity formation was achieved only at the perverse
exclusion of other people.
Miles analysis is a productive way to open up the discussion and reinterpretation
of Japanese racism. Such avenues should be emphasized in Japan for the sake of
investigating the structural oppression which has undermined the Japanese themselves,
preventing them from forging healthy relationships with non-Japanese.
To conclude, Michael Weiner summarizes a conventional understanding of
racism, and then introduces the new understanding we have been exploring:
In the past, writers relied upon a concept of racism which itself rested upon two
assumptions; the first, that human populations could be categorized into different
types, or races, on the basis of fixed biological characteristics which were passed
down genetically from one generation to the next; and the second, that human
potential, that is to say an individuals social, cultural, economic and intellectual
capacities, were also historically determined in such a way as to create a hierarchy
of races, although such arguments remain deeply embedded within common
sense discourse, most social scientists in Europe and North America have moved
away from the assumption that races exist as easily identifiable categories.
Instead, there is at least a tacit acceptance that the classification of human
populations on the basis o f race is a social activity or construction, which occurs
within a particular historical context.38
Weiners argument does not aim to judge the trend of past studies on race or
Michael Weiner, Race and Migration in Imperial Japan, 7.
113
racism; it is rather to employ the concept of racism to analyze Japanese modern history
from the perspective the origin of Korean community in Japan. He critiques prior studies
that lack the perspective of racism. He says:
No attempt is made to define either race or racism, nor does the text contain any
explanation of the ideological basis for discrimination against and hostility
towards the Korean population.39
This critique is geared toward both English and Japanese literature, which he further
analyzes for the cause of these trends. He explains:
There is first for all the recurrent and uncritical acceptance of the notion of the
worlds population is indeed composed of different races of which the Japanese
are one. Second, and following on from the first, is the assumption that racism
can therefore be reduced to hostility between races.40
As we have stated, the presupposition of many of the studies of Korean residents in Japan
stems largely from the assumption of an outmoded western notion of race or racism
As a result, most of these prior studies on Koreans in Japan fail to see and adequately
describe Japanese racism in general and its connection with the emperor ideology. Now
we need to go beyond this in order to find the ideological basis for discrimination. For
this we need to further explore the development of Japanese nationalism in light of the
Japanese emperor ideology.
39Ibid., 9.
*Ibid., 8.
114
Nation and Japanese Nationalism
The theory of nationalism is a matter of long-standing dispute and like nation and
nationality has proved difficult to define.41 Just as the difficulty encountered in defining
racism depends on how we comprehend the word or idea race, a major difficulty in
defining nationalism is interpreting the concept nation, which is the core idea of
nationalism and also carries ambiguous and various meanings depending on scholars
perspective 42 Even so, since this study is attempting to demonstrate that the emperor
ideology in Japan is a prop for Japanese nationalism, it is necessary to take a closer look
at the concept.
Clarifying the relationship between Japanese nationalism and Japanese racism is
necessary to substantiate my claim that the emperor ideology is a form of Japanese
racism. One way to do this is to view both nationalism and racism as ideologies of
domination underlying the social order of a hegemonic culture, as seen in Antonio
Gramscis notion of cultural domination. Gramsci defines cultural hegemony as follows:
An order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one
concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private
manifestation, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and
political principles, and all social relations43
Both nationalism and racism in Japan have subtly merged and operated to keep pattern of
cultural hegemony as described by Gramsci in place.
41Benedict Anderson, Imagined Community: Reflection on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism
(London and New York: Verso), 1983, 3.
4*Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1992), 4.
43Antonio Gramsci, Selectionsfrom the Prison Notebooks, eds. and trans., Quinth Hoare and
Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1985). 171.
115
As already implied, it is logically and methodologically necessary to examine the
concept o f nation before examining a concept of nationalism. The concept o f nation
has been used as synonymous with the notion of ethnic or ethnicity (minzoku) in Japan.
The ways these words are used in Japanese literature and perceived among the Japanese
are not simply matters of terminology; they are deeply connected with the ideology of
exclusion. In the book Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan, Kosaku Yoshino
points out the mixed usage of each notion:
The nihonjinron literature quite often contains the phrase the Japanese are tan
itsu minzoku. Tan its means one or uni, but minzoku is a multi-vocal term
which, reflecting the Japanese situation, means not only race but ethnic
community and nation. Racial, ethnic and national categories almost completely
overlap in the Japanese perception of themselves. Tan itsu minzoku is used as a
convenient phrase to indicate the homogeneity of Japanese people without
specifying whether one is referring to their racial or cultural features.44
In other words, in Japan the notion of nation is intermingled with the notions of race and
ethnicity in order to systematically exclude non-Japanese.
In his influential account on theories of nationalism, Benedict Anderson describes
a nation as follows:
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds
of each lives the image of their communion Nationalism is not the
awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not
exist.43
44Kosaku Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan (London and New York:
Routledge, 1992), 25.
45Anderson, 6.
116
A typical modernist perspective, Andersons nationalism creates and sustains this
imagined community called a nation. Nationalism, then is a modem cultural artifact.46
Yet, the imagined nation is so compelling, the emotional feeling of its citizens so strong,
that citizens will even die for their nation. How does an imagined concept become
something worth dying for? Anderson follows this procedure to uncover an answer:
My point of departure is that nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in view
of that words multiple significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are
cultural artifacts of a particular kind. To understand them properly we need to
consider carefully how they have come into historical being, in what ways their
meanings have changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound
emotional legitimacy 47
In the history of modem Japan, the meanings o f nation have changed over time.
With Andersons constructionist view of nation and nationalism, lets examine the
political and social circumstances of Japans pre-modem period, just before the
emergence of Japanese modem nationalism. In pre-modem in Japan people did not have
46Andersons concept of imagined community must be understood in consideration with how it

has come into historical being and in what ways its meaning has changed. Because if the concept of
imagined community is understand or used separately from historical context and meanings, it becomes a
dangerous concept For example, in public discourse during the 1990s in Japan, the term or concept of
imagined community was widely used in the discussion of Japans responsibility for war crimes. While
the discussion needed to reflect on the contents of Japans modem nationalism, many liberal Japanese
intellectuals made critiques of Japans prewar nationalism. However, their critiques held several
dimensions of problems. One was their critical self-reflection on their own social and historical location.
When they point out the problem of nationalism in Japan, they speak from the third position, which
means they are Japanese but they are not participants in the production and reproduction of nationalism in
Japan. In other words, their arguments sound that as if they will not address their responsibility as well as
their accountability as individual Japanese. A second problem is seen particularly in the identity of
feminist writings. Their presuppositions in their critique of nationalism or nation are the product of male
chauvinism and a patriarchy system; thus they simply reduce the problem of nationalism to a gender
dimension. As a result in their purpose of deconstmction of a nation-state or nationalism, they fail to
consider historical significances and functions through too much emphasis on the notion of imagined
community. And the third problem is the absence of their self-observation of their own internalized
cultural aspects in their reflection on Japans modem nationalism. Without looking at their own culturally
nationalized identity, their reflective critiques will not have any validity for non-Japanese, whether it has
gender perspective or racial and class perspective.
Îbid., 4.
117
a homogeneous national identity. Rather, they had a strong sense of belonging to local
clans. This situation can be seen clearly in Daniel Holtoms classic study of Japanese
modem nationalism described in relation to Shintoism. Holtom describes the conditions
of Japans historical situation as follows:
Modem Japan has had to struggle for the unification and co-ordination of her
national life in the face of strongly diversifying, not to say disintegrating,
tendencies. There has been much internal heterogeneity to overcome. The
particularism of a feudal regime that was split into rival clans and pocketed
behind mountain barriers and secluded on separate islands has not even been fully
transcended. Religious diversity has revealed itself in a tendency toward
separatism that seems to reflect what amounts almost to a national genius for sect-
making and for breaking up into small esoteric groups.48
In an upheaval of social transition, from the heterogeneous pre-modem period in
Japan to the establishing of a mythical homogeneous society, creating a flourishing
nationalism was an urgent task designed to integrate various conflicting groups into a
homogeneous national identity in order to build a hierarchical social structure.49 In
looking at Japans political background and its process of building a modem nation state,
we see a perfect example of Andersons concept of nation as imagined community.30
Judging by the identity of contemporary Japanese people, it seems hard to believe that the
^Daniel C. Holtom, Modem Japan and Shinto Nationalism: A Study o f Present-Day Trends in
Japanese Religions (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp, 1963; originally printed in 1943), 67.
49 Kosaku Yoshino explains the diversity in this way, Tokugawa Japan (1600-1867) was a feudal
society organized according to a strict hierarchy of four castes: samurai, peasants, artisans and merchants.
Each group had its own patterns of social organization, norms and values. See Cultural Nationalism in
Contemporary Japan (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 94.
Ô f course, it is not only the case of Japan, but of France and other modem nation-states as well.
118
Japanese could overcome such diverse norms, values and identities, and come to possess
an emperor-centered uniform national identity.31
Creating an imagined community worked to erase boundaries existing among the
Japanese themselves in the modem period, but at the same time it erected boundaries
between Japanese and non-Japanese. Nonetheless, the myth of cultural and ethnic
homogeneity has been so legitimatised that today it is viewed as if it were historical fact.
We need to wonder how and why this could happen in such a short period (less than two
centuries) of time.32 One way to begin is with Anthony Smiths articulate definition of
nation. Smith, in his approach to the concept of nationalism as ideology, defines
nation as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and
historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights
and duties for all members 33
Along with Smiths definition of the concept o f nation, we also need to analyze
who creates these common myths and historical memories. I have argued in this project
that common myths and historical memories were manipulatively created in Japan by the
51Although we know the fact that mainstream media is controlled by a dominant ideology, it is
difficult to understand the phenomena of Japanese people expressing their extraordinary joy upon the long
waited birth of the emperors grandchild. This fanatic event was reported as top news for days after the
emperors daughter in law was hospitalized on November 30 2001. Within two days time 80,000 Japanese
citizens appeared before the Imperial Palace to sign their name as an expression of their gratitude.
52In fact the notion of tan itsu minzoku (one ethnic) emerged during the postwar period, or about
only a half-centures. However, its rhetorical and mythical power has overwhelmed the consciousness of
people in Japan. Although Naoki Sakai, professor at Cornell University, points out that the questioning of
the myth of one ethnicity has slowly occured at last I disagree from the view point of masses. Yet, his
analysis of national culture, national language and nationality is very insightful. See Sakai Naoki, Politics
o f Nationality and Mother Language, in Deconstruction o f Nationality, eds. Toshio Itotani, Brett de Bary
and Naoki Sakai (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo, 1996), 9-48.
53Anthony D Smith, Myths and Memories o f the Nation (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999),11.
119
school of National Learning, Shinto scholars and the ruling class through emperor-
centered ethno symbolism. Centripetal force inevitably overcame diversity. At the
beginning and during the Meiji government, the state made tremendous efforts to produce
common myths, memories, and culture and diffused them through public education and
literature. It is worth mentioning that such national education was applied even to
colonial subjects (Korean and Taiwanese). Yet, they did not receive the same degree of
attention/influence that the Japanese received, because from the beginning of the
establishment of imperial Japan, colonized subjects were excluded from the nation of
Japan on many practical levels though they were given Japanese nationality at the time.
One example of the way a narrowly defined nation played the role of embracing
nationalism while erecting a boundary between Japanese (we) and non-Japanese (they)
can be seen in a newspaper, Nihon. It states:
If a nation wishes to stand among the great powers and preserve its national
independence, it must strive always to foster nationalism . . . If a nation lacks
patriotism how can it hope to exist? Patriotism has its origin in the distinction
between we and they which grows out of nationalism, and nationalism in the
basic element in preserving and developing a unique culture.54
This article appeared when Japan faced the hegemony of Western imperial power while
striving itself for colonial expansionism. Japans nationalism was fueled by naming and
targeting outside enemies. This boundary of we and they is regulated by instilling
those common myths and memories weve been speaking of in order to produce a
conformed national identity. Again, these common myths and memories were reinforced
by public education and other literature. Subsequently, people came to share and accept
^Weiner, 19.
120
them as if they were historical facts, and a new culture was formed that is Japanese
cultural supremacy.
While common myth and historical memories are produced and reproduced in the
process of developing a political ideology of nationalism for the nation, emotional
attachment was also created and mystified through the doctrine of the emperor worship.
Since emperor worship was legitimized through elements of ancestor worship, common
to East Asia customs, emotional attachment was elicited.
Modern Japanese history records the fact that the doctrine of emperor worship
was treated as a national rite (see chapter three) rather than a religion, thus enabling
emperor worship to be considered representative of national culture. Once a dominant
culture, even if ideologically colored, achieves legitimacy from mass support, it becomes
hard to see its negative aspect. The chauvinistic nature of Japanese culture is deeply
influential in the forming of each persons identity. When culture becomes a part of
political ideology, (i.e. a nationalism of domination and exclusion), it becomes difficult
for citizens to reflect objectively on how that culture has been used for legitimizing and
creating a narrowly-defined nation, or imagined community. Thus, contemporary
Japanese still inherit or share these unfortunate common memories and myths
uncritically, maintaining their perception of a uniform national identity and belief in
homogeneity. Japanese continue to think that the nation of Japan is composed and
constituted only for Japanese.
In sum, an imagined community was purposely created exclusively for the
Japanese in order to create a homogeneous Japan. This imagined community has been
sustained by the ruling elites with an ideological base (and the emotion generated by it)
121
of emperor centered cultural supremacy. The exclusion from common myths and
memories might be acceptable for Koreans but it is not for the accompanying exclusion
from equal economic and legal rights. To overcome these, the homogeneous Japanese
construction of nation needs to be re-constructed. As Smith further claims
The fund of ethnic elements, the ethno-historical heritage handed down through
the generations, is always being reinterpreted and revised by various social groups
in response to internal differences and external stimuli. Hence, British, Japanese
or Egyptian national identity is never fixed or static; it is always being
reconstructed in response to new needs, interests and perceptions, though always
within certain limits.55
Smiths insight that ethnic elements or national identity is never static leads us to
conclude that a more inclusive notion of nation is possible. But how can we prevent
the reproduction of the chauvinistic aspects? Our critical ability and power to resist
chauvinistic nationalism must be brought to bear. For this, we need to have a holistic
perspective of how a dominant ideology is linked with emperor ideology, racism and
nationalism and how it has operated in the process of reproducing cultural myths. The
following section will analyze the way traditions, common myths and culture are
reproduced.
"Smith, 17.
122
Re-reading the discussion of nihonbunkaron and nihonjinron56
In the previous section we glanced at the problem of nation and nationalism in the
context of modem Japan and contemporary Japan. We learned that Japanese nationalism
is deeply linked with the creation of emperor-centered common myths and common
memories supported under the name of Japanese tradition as well as Japanese
culture, all having concealed the racist nature of the emperor ideology to sustain a
Japanese chauvinistic national identity. For nationalists or ruling elites, producing this
national identity was a critical strategy in order to retain their interests and power.
Without the process of reproducing and reshaping nationalism and maintaining this
conformity in a Japanese national identity, the dominant ideology could not have
permeated, influenced, and controlled the consciousness of the masses.
How has this national identity been reproduced and inculcated? One way is
through the role of intellectuals. David Goldbergs analysis of power and knowledge in
relation to the state is helpful to reflect on the process employed by intellectuals in the
reproduction of dominant ideology. He claims:
Social science is important to the modem state bothfunctionally and

ideologically. In the former sense, social science furnishes the State and its
functionaries with information, and it is often employed in formulating and
assessing State policies to satisfy social needs. Ideologically, the State often
invokes expedient analyses and the results of social science, whether by
collaboration or appropriation, to legitimate State pursuits and rationalize
established relations of power and domination.37
S6The words nihonbunkaron and nihonjinron are composed of nihon (Japan), bunka (culture), ron
(theory, dehate or discussion), and nihonjin (Japanese). But according to Peter Dale nihonjinron defines
the specificity of Japanese identity. He also defines it as works of cultural nationalism concerned with the
ostensible uniqueness of Japan and which are hostile to both individual experiences and the notion of
internal socio-historical diversity Peter Dale; introduction to The Myth o f Japanese Uniqueness (London
and Sydney: Nissan Institute for Japanese Studies, University of Oxford, 1986).
57David Theo Goldberg, Racial Knowledge in Theories o f Race and Racism, eds. Les Back and
John Solomos, 1S7.
123
We can see this social scientific role being played by Japanese intellectuals in the
discourse of nihonbunkaron (theory of Japanese culture) and nihonjinron ( theory of
Japanese identity). In this section I will examine these discourses, arguing that they
played a vital role o f not only reproducing and disseminating the state ideology but also
but also helping to entrench the belief in the supremacy of Japanese ethnicity, culture and
tradition.
The ideology of Japanese nationalism is transmitted to the mass consciousness
not only through academic discourse, but also through the public discourse of
nihonbunkaron and nihonjinron. Both embrace Japanese culture as immemorial and
eternal, as distinguished from Japanese tradition.38 But oftentimes, culture as well as
tradition are embraced, as if they have been inherited over a long historical period. In
fact, ideological reinforcement of culture can only be possible through the belief in and
the assumption of historical tradition.
However, historian Eric Hobsbawm warns that we often assume all traditions are
immemorial. He says:
Traditions which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and
sometimes invented. Take for example the ceremonial of the British monarchy,
nothing appears more ancient, and linked to an immemorial past, than the
pageantry which surrounds British monarchy in its public ceremonial
manifestation. British journalists describe the great royal ceremonials as all the
pageantry and grandeur of a thousand-year-old nation, a pageantry that has gone
on for hundreds of years all the precision that comes from centuries of precedent.
Yet, these are the products of the late 19th and 20* centuries.59
Peter Dale points out that nihonjinron is not only deployed within an academic a id e in this way.
The nihonjinron constitute the commercialized expression of modem Japanese nationalism. The rubric
resumes under one genre any work of scholarship, occasional essay or newspaper artide which attempts to
define the unique specificity of things Japanese. Dale, 14.
S9Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., Ihe Invention o f Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), 1-14.
124
Hobsbawms significant comment on the invented traditions of the British monarchy
also sheds critical light on the discourse of nihonbukaron and nihonjinron in Japan.
Japanese public discourse on Japanese culture always presupposes that the culture is
immemorial with a long period of tradition emphasizing its uniqueness.60 A serious
problem occurs when this uniqueness is emphasized implicitly and sometimes explicitly
with a quality of superiority. Subsequently, there is a tendency to look down on other
cultures.
This emphasis on superior uniqueness appears, for example, in the writing
styles and ways of expression in various nihonbunkaron as well as nihonjinron. For
example, the expressions o f nihonjin gurai and nihonjin hodo mean none so much as
the Japanese and more than any other people, the Japanese. Respectively.
Interestingly, these expressions are often used in order to compare the Japanese to their
Western counterpart in general, but there is often no reference to a specific people in the
West. This attitude and mentality are related to the view of non-Westem culture and
people. Further more, the comparison often concludes with the judgment of Japanese
superiority.61 Such expressions imply that Japan or Japanese culture are superior to other
cultures. There is no recognition of any invented culture or tradition.
Of course the claim of cultural uniqueness is not only seen in the case of Japan, as Smith points
out that heritage must be preserved against inner corruption and external control, and that the community
has a sacred duty to extend its culture values outsiders. Persians, Armenians, Poles, Russians, Chinese,
Koreans, Japanese, Americans, Irish, English and French, to name but a few, have all cultivated this sense
of uniqueness and mission by nurturing ethnic values and traditions, through myths of distinct origins and
symbols and memories of golden age of former glory. Smith, 130.
61Kosaku Yoshino claims that many of nihonjinron of the 1970s have presented the image of the
Japanese as simply being very different without explicitly claiming superiority. Yoshino, 29.
125
The presence of a long history of successive emperors and royal families in Japan
lent support to the notion of an inherent cultural uniqueness. Lets take a closer look at
what Japanese intellectuals claim in their discussions on Japanese culture and Japanese
identity, in order to see the connections between cultural supremacy and Japanese
national identity.
When we trace studies on nihonbunkaron (theory of Japanese culture) or
nihoniinron (theory of Japanese identity), we find no systematic discussion of the Edo or
pre-modern period. Rather a systemic and more frequent discussion emerged in the
modern period during the Meiji era, when Japan confronted Western techniques and
culture. The Japanese began to evaluate who they were in comparison to their Western
counterparts and culture.62 Since then, studies of the Japanese identity and Japanese
culture have appeared in periodicals more frequently. Particularly evident is the
increased discussion taking place in academic discourse since World War U.
A major study that stimulated Japanese scholars in this area was The
Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Pattern of Japanese Culture, written by Ruth Benedict,
an American anthropologist in 1946.63 Ruth Benedict is also known as one of the first
persons to use the term racism historically.64 Interestingly, her research on Japan was
62 Hiroshi Minami, Nihonjinron no keiju (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1980), 13.
63This book was written for understanding the culture of the enemy. On the first page of this book,
Benedict stated that the Japanese were the most alien enemy the United States had ever fought in an all-
out struggle. Written during the Pacific War, it was also translated into Japanese and published in 1947.
Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns o f Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1946). See the further study on the view of Ruth Benedicts work in Yoshiya Soeda,
Attempting A Study o f Japanese Culture: Reading Benedict's The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Tokyo:
Shinyosha, 1993).
MIn her book, Race and Racism, Benedict defines racism as the dogma that one ethnic group is
condemned by nature to congenital inferiority and another group is destined to congenital superiority.
Cited in John Solomos and Les Back eds., Racism and Society (London: Macmillan Press, 19%), 4.
126
commissioned by the American government during World War II in order to better
understand the patterns of Japanese behavior.63 In this sense, her work cannot escape
being politically suspicious. In fact, she often falls into a pattern o f creating stereotypes
of other cultures. Nevertheless her insightful work had a tremendous influence on the
people in Japan. Many Japanese see themselves in Benedicts analysis.
Perhaps the best-known of her conclusions is the naming of Japanese culture as
the shame culture, in which individuals are controlled by social threats to personal
honor and reputation. In contrast the West is a guilt culture.66 This shame culture is
interpreted, however, in a positive way among the Japanese, who hear in it such virtues as
humility, and tolerance for others. With Ruth Benedicts non-Japanese groundwork, an
avenue of continuing discussion was opened on the nature of Japanese culture as well as
the identity of the Japanese that continues right up to the present day.67 Japanese
intellectuals reading Benedicts work recognized themselves and who they are.68 Eiichiro
Ishida, one of the major Japanese scholars, led the public discourse of nihonbunkaron,
and explains the purpose of the study of ethnography and folklore in relation to Japanese
culture as follows:
Japanese ethnology is all about Japanese culture and objects and the purpose of
Japanese ethnology is self-cognition as a Japanese, particularly our tradition and
cultural, ethnic, and national temperament. 9
Yoshino, 145.
Ibid., 33.
67Kosaku Yoshino (5) reports that the publications of Benedicts book has reached 1 million four
hundred, both hard cover and papeifeack including a pocket size edition.
Soeda, 6.
Eiichiro Ishida, Nihon bunkaron (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1969), ii.
127
There is no inherent problem in pursuing self-cognition or ones identity. The
problem is that Japans self-cognition has been attained by only facing toward the West,
rather than constructing and reflecting enough on Asian contexts and Japanese
relationships with other Asian people. It is ironic that postwar nihonjinron was triggered
by a foreigner, particularly one who was Western, because nihonjinron's stress on
superiority is the flipside of its historically constructed inferiority complex concerning
the West. Befu Harumi, in her critique on nihonjinron, demonstrates that the
psychological aspect underlying its motivation is.
to rescue the Japanese style from its inferior status and demonstrate the merit of
the Japanese culture by crystallizing the essence of Japanese culture and making
this essence readily comprehensible to ordinary Japanese, and to remove Japan
from the possibility of invidious comparison with the West through the claim of
incomparable uniqueness of its essence.70
Befits analysis of the psychological aspects of the Japanese intellectual motivation
concerning Japans inferiority complex is perhaps correct. However, she overlooks the
broader context in which this inferioriority complex toward the West is related to a
superiority complex toward Asia.
The discourse on Japanese culture reached a boom during the late 1960s and early
1970s.71 Here, we need to pay attention to the social, political and economic climate of
1960s in Japan in order to more clearly see the intentional re-production of an invented
70Cited in Yoshino, 187.
71The number of publications on the subjects of nihonjinron shows the phenomenon of the boom.
About 700 publications were issued between 1946-1978, and 25 percent of them were published between
1976-1978. Dale, 15.
128
tradition. During the late 60s and early 70s, Japans economic growth accelerated at an
unprecedented pace.72 This was also a time of upheaval in the society, and was also a
very significant period in Japanese politics. The radical student movements against the
Japan-US Safe Treaty and the movement of the anti-Vietnam war became serious issues
of national crisis.73 These economic, political and social upheavals seriously influenced
the works of Japanese intellectuals.74
During this same period, the attempt to reproduce the emperor ideology candidly
began as well. For example, the emperors nationwide tour was re-instituted, aiming to
make the visual presence of the emperor more appealing to the populace. The pageantry
of the emperor had been a major historical strategy to demonstrate the emperors
legitimacy when the Meiji emperor was enthroned at the beginning of the modem
emperor state. In the 1960s and 1970, reinforcement of the presence of the emperor, and
the corresponding boom of the nihonbukaron as well as nihonjinron in the circumstance
of a national crisis were also calculated strategic actions. This triple connection resulted
in a prepared national narrative or cultural nationalism. Anthony Smith defines the
function of cultural nationalism:
Though cultural nationalism has been made to appeal to a far wider constituency,
including teachers and other liberal professions, it has always constituted the
creation and special zone of intellectuals. For they, above all, feel the need for a
resolution of those crises of identity which menace modem man, and which
require of him a moral regeneration, a rediscovery and realization of self through
a return to that which is unique to oneself, to ones special character and history,
72This growth is attributed to the stimulus of the Korean War and Vietnam War.
73Through the Japan-US Treaty, Japan became a substantial member of the anti-communist block
under US control.
74Takeshi Ishida, The C hangin g Intellectual Climate in Postwar Japanese Social Science and
U.S.-Japan Cultural Relations in The Postwar Development o f Japanese Studies in the United States^.
Historical Review and Prospectsfor the Future (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 1992),7-18.
129
which cannot be severed from the individuality and unique history of ones own
community.75
Thus, Japanese personal identity formation and reaffirmation were interrelated to
the resurgent cultural supremacy of an emperor-centered Japanese nationalism. Whenever
a national crisis is on the horizon and national identity is shaken, then national unity must
be reestablished in order to control people in the very name of that national crisis. The
hoped for result is a uniformed-tamed national identity or Japanese nationalism,
preserved and reproduced, with its superior essence re-emphasized. Then, uniformed-
tamed national identity becomes the basis of racist attitudes.
If the discourse of nihonjinron and nihonbunkaron were only to establish self
cognition free from political and ideological purpose, they might not be problematic.
Clearly, though, this has been not the case. Peter Dale critiques the role of the public
discourse of nihonbunkaron and nihonjinron in this way:
The literature on identity in this sense is the subtlest of instruments of ideological

coercion, and a self-fulfilling prophecy since it reflects and conditions in turn
manipulated categories and modes of expression diffused for the discussion how
the Japanese are supposed to perceive themselves. Such an enculturation of
political discourse is potentially a more powerful form of social control than
prewar thought policing since, though demonstrably heir to the ideological
patrimony of Japanese fascism, the ideological roots of these ideas have been
forgotten, while the ideas themselves are hailed as new conceptualizations and
ethnological description of Japanese realities.76
75Anthony D. Smith, State and Nation in the Third World: The Western State and African
Nationalism (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1983), 94.
76Dale, 17.
130
The point is well taken. The public discourses of nihonjinron and nihonbukaron were
powerful forms of social control due to their style, method and their sources of
dissemination.
Sakai Naokis critical assessment of nihonbunkaron is insightful. He says:
While the actual developments within ubunkaron (cultural theory), involve

complex debates, the common thread in this field is a structure in which terms
such as Japanese culture, Japan or the Japanese are the subjects; examples
of ethnic differences are the attribution of the subject and various exceptional
traits are the predicates. In other words, with culturalism, the use from the very
start of the term Japanese culture as a theme prevents us from asking whether
this thing called Japanese culture exists at all.
Sakais post-modern critique is a sharp and substantial challenge that all writers of
nihonjinron or nihonbukaron should take seriously, since they themselves do not raise the
question of their own presuppositions about the content of Japanese culture or Japanese
tradition.
In sum, a culturally-manifested understanding of the concept of nation has
sustained the myth of one unified ethnicity through combining claims of cultural
uniqueness seen in the public discourses of nihonjinron and nihonbunkaron with
powerful emperor-centered cultural myths. In this way, emperor ideology has been a
cultural source of domination and control and must be viewed as the ideology of
chauvinistic nationalism and racism in Japan.
77Naoki Sakai, Nationality and Politics of Mother Language (Nashonariti to Bo (koku)go no

Seiji) in Deconstruction o f Nationality (Nashonariti no Datsukochilcn), eds., Toshio Iyotani, Brett de Bary,
and Naoki Skai (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo, 19%), 15.
Chapter Five
Methodological Moves for a Feminist Political Ethic of Self-Reliance
In this last chapter, I will begin to construct a feminist political ethic for the
people of Japan. I will name this constructed political ethic, jiritsutekijosei seiji rinri
(Feminist political ethic of self-reliance).1 While this is a study in Christian ethics, I do
not wish to label my proposed ethic Christian because the Christian population in Japan
(and within the Korean community in Japan) is so small 1% of the Japanese population
and less than O.S of the Korean population. My method and construction of a political
ethic should therefore be more inclusive and relevant as well to non-Christian people in
Japan. In addition, for me, living a Christian life with integrity means the seeking of
social justice and peoples liberation in the broader social context.
The deconstruction I undertake in each of the previous chapters could rightfully
be undertaken as a separate project. However, I intentionally sought to discuss such huge
themes as the emperor ideology, nationalism and racism in order to demonstrate that they
are all inherently interconnected, and that the so-called minority issues or problems are
in truth issues for all Japanese people. Also, a broader contextual understanding is
necessary for the reformulation of an adequate notion o f moral agency. Deconstructing
the problems of domination from historical, social, cultural/religious and political points
of view helps us to see the social contradictions of Japanese society clearly and enables a
The term jiritsuteki rinri was used by Kyung Shik Suh, a writer from the Korean community in
Japan, in a Japanese TV program on September 26,2000. I added two more adjectives, josei and seiji to
Suhs term. Josei literally means woman but I translate it as feminist with the belief that all women need to
befeminist Seiji means politics. The wordjirituteki may be translated as self-reliance or self
independent 1was fascinated with the wordjiritsuteki because it has a symbolic nuance in the cultural
context of Japan which encourages dependency rather than interdependency in social relations.
132
holistic response. Hence, we are now in a better position to begin examining the criteria
for social transformation that might bring about justice and liberation for the people of
Japan.
Radical Christian feminist Beverly Harrison writes about several methods for
liberation. About one in particular, she writes:
A further aspect of this sociohistorical ethical method is careful examination of

the roots and ongoing dynamics of oppression or subjugation. The roots of
oppression are important, not because they lead us to understand the past for its
sake (whatever that might mean) but because, as I emphasized earlier, the past
continues to live on, embedded in present social relations. While it is
epistemologically futile to seek single causes of oppression, it is morally
significant to illuminate the way that oppression has formed the identities o f both
the powerful and the exploited. Without such analysis, it will never be clear to us,
much less to those who have internalized oppression.2
In the Japanese case, naming and analyzing the emperor ideology (seen in connection with
the nationalism of cultural supremacy) as a form of racism is a crucial task for doing liberation ethics
precisely because, as Harrison points out, it is the past root of oppression that lives on in Japan
today.
The emperor ideology not only functions as a means of political and social control
but also defines an entire culture with patriarchal control at its very heart. As I
mentioned in chapter one, Confucian patriarchal moral theory and ethics has influenced
cultures in East Asia (China, Korean and Japan) in a way that restrains the development
of personal moral decision-making, encouraging in its place an obedience to authority.
Combining Confucian moral traditions with an emperor ideology has produced a very
sophisticated ethos that demands obedience to the moral decisions of authoritarian groups
2Beveriy Harrison, Making the Connections: Essays in Feminist Social Ethics, cd. Carol Robb
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 250.
133
such as family or company. Group or collective decision-making, however, can only be
liberative as long as individual moral decisions are genuinely considered, respected and
protected in the process.
Communal decision-making is important, but the Japanese problem is that the
emperor-centered familial patriarchal culture tends to discount, even ignore, individual
opinions. Obedience is demanded particularly when personal ideas or opinions differ
significantly from the dominant Japanese way o f thinking. To a fault, the opinions or
judgments made by a father figure - boss, head, chief, principle or president o f a group -
are the opinions that are upheld. This is clearly seen in the Japanese proverb that the
nail that sticks out will be hammered-down. If you possess distinguished or radical
ideas or opinions, you will be declared murahachibu. Mura means a village and
hachibbu means eighty percent. In other words, you are no longer a member of the group
and will not be accepted one hundred percent as a full member of a community. This
expression is often used in daily life within Japan as a way to exclude and alienate
people. In order to avoid being murahachibu, people in Japan strive to keep a
harmonious order by suppressing their own opinions and following decisions from
above.3
Cooperation and conformity are virtues that help preserve a Japanese social order
programmed by the dominant authority. It is in the interest o f the authorities to have a
cooperative and docile populace. In such a cultural setting, diversity o f opinion and
individual moral decision-making are discouraged not only by those in authority but by
the individual members o f each community as weil. This demand for harmony, with the
*My opinion regarding the notion of harmony is that harmony can only become a virtue when all
differences are accepted and respected equally.
134
father figure of emperor symbolizing supreme authority, is nothing more than the
application of arbitrary, systemic, institutionalized power.
Furthermore, additional attention must be paid to the complexity o f the role of the
emperor as the supreme authority figure. Latter-day feminist studies in Japan point out
that, to increase the efficacy of social control, the metaphor and characteristics of various
mother images (harmonious, generous and loving) [all are stereotypical] were
deliberately and positively used in the patriarchal emperor system.4 Thus the father
figure o f the emperors systemic power was softened and blurred, its true aims hidden.
In this cultural setting, constructing a feminist political ethic for the Japanese
context has two potential benefits. First, it can provide a counter ideology to the emperor
ideology that might empower, transform and emancipate the people o f Japan. Such a
counter ideology can provide alternative norms, values and strategies that help us to
reflect on our internalized mainstream norms and values and thereby facilitate building
within us a notion of a healthy moral agency for both individual and communal subjects.
Some of these counter values are the values o f resistance to the dominant moral and
cultural conformity, understanding each others cultural heritage, believing there is power
in being in relation with others, and celebrating who we are as we are. Self-affirmation
of who we are is directly linked to personal identity and should be the foundation for
the formation of a communitys moral agency and its capacity to survive and flourish.
Second, a new feminist political ethic might well create a public space where
people can learn how to acknowledge and articulate differences in social power and
reflect about justice, ethics, and liberation, all dead words and concepts in todays Japan.
4Mikiyo Kanou, Okuni no tameni shinn koto to umu koto to in [Nihon] kokka to om a, ed.
Midori Igata (Tokyo: Sdkyusha, 2000), 118.
135
This public discussion will facilitate a re-examination of suffering and o f what liberation
means for both the oppressed group (Koreans and other non-Japanese) and the oppressor
group (Japanese).3
Encouraging the development of self-independent moral thinking and decision
making is an urgent task. I need to clarify, however, that my emphasis on self-reliance,
self-independence, the individual and the personal, is by no means a westernized notion
of individualism. My understanding of agency, self, subject, individual and personal
starts with the unchangeable presupposition that to be an individual is always to be an
individual-in-community.
In order to construct a social transformative line of action for justice and
liberation for the people in Japan, the task of a feminist political ethics of self-reliance is
to awaken both women and men to the realization that all individuals are responsible
moral agents. In the process of engaging in concrete action against the injustice of the
dominating emperor ideology, social transformation requires self-transformation. And, to
make the point once again, learning about and reflecting upon the task of moral agency is
a methodological approach required not only for Korean residents in Japan but also for
the Japanese. This is true as long as what we seek is right relations for mutual liberation.
Somewhat obviously, in order to construct a political feminist ethics of jiritusteki
josei seiji rinri we need to be in dialogue with the theo-ethical claims (selected, of
course) of feminist/womanist theological ethicists and liberation theologians. I will rely
3Although Asian feminists mention the need for making a critical assessment of Asian culture and
tradition, this assessment has not been fully developed. I assume this is due to the relatively short history
of Asian feminist theology and its focus on biblical and theological reflection. See Chung Hyun Kyung,
Struggle to be the Sun Again: Introducing Asian Women's Theology (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1990) and
Kwok Pui-Lan, Introducing Asian Feminist Theology (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 2000).
136
mainly on feminist/womanist ethicists from North America, critiquing those from Asia,
because for the most part Asian feminists works are concentrated in either the biblical or
theological fields, with little attention paid to the need for a radical liberation feminist
ethic. The starting point of my study was the critical investigation of the oppressive roots
of cultural and traditional moral norms as seen in the modem Japanese emperor state
system and the culture it generates. In this regard, this entire study lays the groundwork
for a liberation ethic for all Asians in general and for Korean residents in Japan in
particular.
Although Korean residents in Japan are certainly oppressed, they probably should
not be considered third world people. Compared to other oppressed groups in Asia,
Korean residents in Japan have received some of the economic privileges of living in a
first world nation. In this context, the situation of some of the minorities living in
North America might be useful. In addition, unlike the case of many Asian feminist
theologians who write about related topics, this study comes out of my own direct
experience of being marginalized, invisible-lized, degraded, ignored and erased.
Likewise, the writings of various womanist ethicists and Black feminists provide insights
arising from their own direct oppression.
Moral Agency and Identity Formation
Confucian patriarchal culture has always prioritized hierarchical group decision
making and group action over personal moral agency (again, seen as person-in-
relation). According to Miki Sehito, however, agency is seen as a function of an
individual, subjective actor, in contrast to a social structure, and it is this concept of
137
agency that will be appropriated to enhancejiritustekijosei seiji rinri.6 Planting the seed
of person-in-relation moral agency into the Japanese context is an urgent task not only
for constructing a radical feminist ethics but simply for the basic formation and
reformation of personal identity, which I have stated is crucial if social transformation is
to be possible. Identity here is a multi-layered concept, inclusive of and derivative from
ones ethnic culture, class culture, gendered culture, religious faith, political beliefs, etc..
In the past and even now, for the Korean community in Japan, the issue of
identity formation has been closely related only to Korean ethnicity. One way to resist
Japanese social denigration is to nurture ethnic pride (i.e., creating a firm ethnic
identity), this precisely because the younger generation of Koreans has largely accepted
the Japanese image of Koreans. Katie Cannon has observed a similar phenomenon
among Black Americans. She writes:
The vast majority o f Blacks suffer every conceivable form of denigration. Their
lives are named, defined and circumscribed by whites.7
The lives of Korean residents in Japan are also named, defined and circumscribed by
Japans dominant norms and values. Negative social perceptions o f Koreans result in
difficulties with Korean identity formation. Yet, this limited ethnic heritage-based
identity formation has not empowered Koreans to actively participate in their own
liberation. Like the Black American community, Koreans need to cultivate another layer
of identity in order to make it stronger, perhaps drawing from their religious faith or their
political beliefs. Again, Cannon writes:
6 Mild Sehiro, Agency, Gendai Shiso (July 1999): 52.
7Kade G. Cannon, Black Womanist Ethics (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 3.
138
Black faith and liberation ethics are extremely useful in defying oppressive rules
or standards o f law and order which unjustly degrade Blacks in the society.
They help Blacks to purge themselves of self-hate, thus asserting their own
human validity.8
While there is no such tradition of a liberation ethic in the Korean community in Japan
(certainly not in systematic written form), the survival wisdom of the first generation of
Koreans, particularly women, might be counted as a source for building another layer of
identity, and this will perhaps become the seed of a true liberation ethic.
In sum, constructingjiritsutekijosei seiji rinri acknowledges the importance of
creating a firm sense of identity as a moral agent. That identity, however, cannot be
based only on ethnic heritage. Our task must be to create a broader sense of
understanding personal identity, one that includes the history of ones tradition and
praxis, be it political or religious or both. This broader sense of understanding identity is
particularly important for the Japanese as well, because whether socialized as a member
of the oppressed or the oppressor, we all need to develop the awareness that each
individual is a moral agent and has responsibility and accountability to society and to
ones community. Sincejiritsuteki josei seiji rinri (a feminist political ethic of self-
reliant) requires self, personal and/or individual moral reflection in relation, it can be
effective only insofar as it is based within a society that cultivates a healthy and firm
sense of citizenship. Without knowing who we really are, we cannot determine what we
ought to do to bring about justice and liberation. In the Japanese context, it becomes
critical for both Koreans and Japanese to be able to build their inner individual power and
identity to resist the dominant ideology o f an emperor-centered culture. As we saw in the
Ibid., 3.
139
previous chapter, chauvinistic nationalism directly affects the Japanese in the process of
their socialization. The emperor ideology has encouraged either the evil supremacy of a
racist national identity or an apolitical consciousness (political apathy) toward ones own
society.
Creating a normative identity of ourselves as moral agents in the Japanese context
is the task. How do we begin?
Some of the articulations of moral agency by feminist/womanist scholars are
helpful. In Chapter One, I wrote that I sought moral agency as responsible self-direction
to be shaped in relation to transforming ones community and society, relying on
Canadian feminist ethicist Marilyn Legges definition. Lets examine her definition in
greater detail:
By moral agency I mean a capacity that is developed as an ongoing project within

specific conditions of possibility and constraint. Moral agency is based on the
value of human persons and their sustainable environments, aiming at the
enhancement of personhood, defined as the capacity for responsible self-
direction.9
Before I respond to Legges definition o f moral agency as responsible self-
direction, it is necessary to note its implied critique of the assumption that the moral
agent is free and self-directing. The precondition of freedom which is critical to attain
self-direction is not the same for people in the oppressed group and people in the
oppressor group. Emilie Townes explains a critique made by Katie Cannon as follows:
Cannon goes on to note that dominant ethics makes a virtue o f qualities that lead
to economic success; self-reliance, frugality, and industry. For the dominant
ethics assumes that the moral agent is free and self-directing and can make
suffering a desirable norm... In Cannons view, this understanding o f moral
agency is not true for African Americans. The reality of white supremacy and
Marilyn J. Legge, The Grace o f Difference: A Canadian Feminist Theological Ethic (Atlanta:
Scholars Press, 1992), 13.
140
male superiority force Blacks, and whites, women and men, to live in different
ranges of freedom. In situations of oppression, freedom is not a choice nor is self-
reliance.10
In other words, it is necessary to pay attention to the differing the levels of freedom
available to differing moral agents.
While Legge defines moral agency as responsible self-direction, she further
argues that the task of feminist ethics is to uncover the massive social denial and distrust
of womens moral agency.11 Legge presumes all human beings are already moral agents;
however, women and Koreans have often been denied this condition by the Japanese
male-dominated society. In order to unearth the dormant moral agency lying among the
non-Japanese in Japan, we need to critically investigate their social location, as Ive been
arguing throughout this study. Beginning with Japanese feminism, I will first
demonstrate that Japanese feminists have often failed to adequately investigate their own
social location.
Japanese feminist discourse - looking for a new method
Jiritsutekijosei seiji rinri is not an individualistic, self-centered, personal ethic. It
enables the sort of self-reliance that pursues self-independent moral decision-making
processes in relation to others in the community. In order to avoid being self-righteous
moral agents, the principle in relation, wherein we mean of course right relation, has
to be emphasized In fact, for a group of North American feminists at least, the notions
o f right relation and justice are integral to each other:
I0Emilic M. Townes, WomanistJustice, WomanistHope (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), 176.
"Legge, 13.
141
We are inspired to work toward justice which we define as right-relation by

the voices of all people who call us into the struggle for human dignity, survival
resources, and the creation o f a world in which every man and woman is truly at
home.12
Such a definition of justice as right relation is useful and concrete for constructing a
feminist political ethic in Japan. In addition to the principle of in relation, a
specifically liberationist feminist perspective must be emphasized as well.
The relational liberationist feminist perspective I employ does not argue about
which resistance principles are first, whether it be resistance against problems of sexism,
nationalism, or racism, as if they were separate or unrelated. Rather as I have argued, the
oppression of Korean residents in Japan is multi-dimensional, incorporating elements of
race/ethnicity, class and gender. A basic methodological principle for a feminist political
ethic is recognizing the interconnections among the multi-layered dimensions of
oppression.
Yet, Japanese feminists do not all share this approach. Some overlook the
interrelated connections of oppression and limit the role of feminism to the dimension of
gender. Consider the comments by Chizuko Ueno, a leading feminist theorist in Japan.
She defines feminism in a relatively narrow sense:
By bringing in a notion o f gender control, it would be possible for feminism to

deal with not only patriarchal capitalism, but also the patriarchal state and
patriarchal corporate organization. However, the analytical perspective based on
gender domination has limitations as well. The scope of feminism does not
extend to racism or ageism. To say that feminism is a theory of liberation from
all discrimination would be overreaching. Feminism has grappled with gender
domination but that does not mean it can unravel the mechanism behind racial
discrimination.13
I2The Amanecida Collective, Revolutionary Forgiveness: Feminist Reflections on Nicaragua

(New York: Oibis Books, 1987), xxx.
13Chizuko Ueno, Kajuchosei to shihonsei (Tokyo: Iwanami Publisher, 1990), 276.
142
A liberation feminist perspective of jiritustekijosei rinri rejects this narrow
notion of feminism. Uenos gender reductionists has been criticized by both Koreans
and Japanese feminists. Yet, Japanese feminist methodology must still continue to work
to overcome its general reductionist tendencies, aimed only or at least primarily at
eliminating sexism.
Historically, Japanese feminist discourses are silent in making the connections
between gender issues, nationalism, and the state ideology of colonialism. Yet, drawing
these connections into feminist theory is an inevitable part of the critical quest for
liberation by Korean residents as well as other ethnic minorities in Japan. It is
necessary here to note that among Koreans, particularly men, these connections have not
been fully considered either, nor has the struggle against institutional racism or the
national movement been fully engaged.
The lack of perspective on such interrelations within oppression is revealed by a
critical review of the historical development of Japanese feminist discourse. Japanese
feminist discourse emerged in three distinct waves, the first in the 1920s, the second in
the 1970s, and the third from the mid 1980s into the 1990s. The first wave of Japanese
feminism was represented by Raicho Hiratsuka (1886-1971), Yosano Akiko (1878-
1942), and others. Hiratsuka published the first womens magazine Seito in 1911, created
by women only for women. In the first publication Hiratsuka wrote a famous poem,
originally women were the sun, authentic human-being, but now women are the moon.
So women have to depend on others (men) and we are only able to be brightened by the
other. We are the moon, and the faint color o f our face is like a sick person.14
14Raicho Hiratsuka, Hiratsuka Raisho shyu (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1984), 14.
143
Hiratuskas fame does not, of course, derive solely because of this poetry. She
and other women o f the first wave o f Japanese feminists are considered as the founders of
Japanese feminism. However, their feminism did not reveal the problems of colonialism,
even though the publication of their magazine Seito came just one year after Japans
formal annexation of Korea. None of the recent feminists in Japan can ignore the works
of the first wave of Japanese feminism. Yet, critical reviews by current Japanese
feminists of Hiratsukas first wave o f Japanese feminism are few. Among them, for
example, Akiko Yamashita criticizes Hiratsuka with regard to her poetic use of the
metaphor of the sun as the positive symbol, contrasted with the moon as the negative
symbol. Yamashita points out that in the culture of the desert, the moon is a symbol of a
mother who brings life-giving water at night, then emerging as the sun for fertility in the
morning.13 Hiratsukas metaphor that women were originally the sun stems from Japans
mythological ancestral goddess, the Sun goddess. Yet, as weve already seen, the
mythology of the Sun goddess was an ideological construction serving to justify the
emperors religious authority by claiming that the Sun goddess was the ancestral god of
the emperor and his family. This Sun goddess became a national god in the process of
the formation and solidification of the modern emperor state system in Hiratsukas era.
Hiratsuka embraced this. For her, bearing a child was not only a personal matter. It also
contributed, and appropriately so in her view, to reproducing and preserving the superior
species of ethnic Japanese.
Although Hiratsuka and other members of the Seito group were radical enough to
perform as new women, they did not have an adequate perspective from which to
lsAldlco Yamashita, ed. Nihon no sekushuariti (Kyoto: Hozokan, 1991), i i
144
analyze the structural contradictions of womens oppression.16 This lack of structural
insight and analysis, with its consequent inability to recognize as unjust Japans policy of
colonialism over other Asian people at the time, is perhaps predictable.
The second wave of Japanese feminism emerged in the early 1970s as a result of
the influence of radical Western feminism and the exploration o f internal contradictions
of the male-centered student movements on the 1960s. Japanese women began to
question and protest the presumed leadership of men, along with their sexism, in the
movement. One o f the major figures of the second wave of the feminist movement was
Mitsu Tanaka, whose famous phrase was that women need to be liberated from the
toilet. In her view, men thought o f women either as mothers or as sex machines for their
disposal, like a toilet. This phrase reflected the rising emotion and anger against men.17
Yet the second wave of Japanese feminism was, to some degree, similar to the
first wave. They demanded their rights of Eros and sexuality. While there is certainly
nothing wrong per se in seeking autonomy for womens sexual pleasure, the emphasis
was overwhelmingly on the private sphere. Ultimately, second-wave Japanese feminists
failed to lend their voices to advocate for broader political and historical reforms.
The third wave o f feminism in Japan, the social activist grassroots movement,
developed in an academic setting with a concentrated sociological approach, and
exhibited the influence of womens studies in the 1980s. A major theme of the 1980s
dealt mostly with the family in the context of Japans social and cultural setting. Lacking
was any analysis o f the emperor state ideology and how it determined the dominant
16Aiko Ogoshi, Feminisumu wa ai to sekusyuariti o katareruka in Ibid., 163.
17Yamashita, 175.
145
pattern of social relations. Without the perspective of the interconnections between the
problems of the Japanese family system and the emperor state ideology (which grounds
the fundamental power and function of the patriarchal system), analysis was necessarily
limited. 1980s Japanese feminist discourse failed to recognize the multi-dimensionality
and interconnections among the various types of oppression such as colonialism, racism
and nationalism. This recognition began, at last, to emerge in the 1990s.
In the 1990s, Japanese feminists began to address the so-called military comfort
women issue of sexual slavery during World War n. It was receiving international
attention and so became a pressing domestic social and political issue in Japan as well.
The connections between national militarism and colonialism on the one hand, and
gender on the other finally became explicit.18 Because earlier feminist discourse had
been characterized by a lack of a broader perspective for incorporating gender issues into
larger historical and social contexts, earlier Japanese feminists also put too much
emphasis on experience from the individual victims point o f view. This prevented them
from seeing the power dynamic among different groups o f women. Had that been
possible, more privileged Japanese feminists might have begun to recognize themselves
as part of oppressor groups.
The issue of military comfort women provided an important opening to reflect
on the limitations of Japanese feminist theory. However, in my view, Japanese feminist
theories must be politicized still further in order to work toward an authentic solidarity
with people who are facing different types of oppression. In order to make further
IfVeiy little had been written earlier by Japanese feminists in any wave about the relationship
between the oppression of women and the oppression of Koreans and other minorities. This despite the
first and largest mass movement in the Korean community in Japan against the Alien Registration Law in
the 1980s.
146
strides toward solidarity, Japanese feminists must learn to appreciate Black feminist bell
hooks criticism of white womens failures, hooks believes that womens social
experiences need to be examined distinctively by differing groups. Without
acknowledging the difference between white women and black women, as well as among
women of color, there can be no authentic solidarity. She rejects the idea that
solidarity can occur solely based on womens experience of gender, a point which white
women in the U.S. once emphasized, hooks challenge to white women is relevant to all
situations where womens (and others) power and experience of victimization is
unequal.
hooks position is that victimhood cannot be an adequate basis of solidarity.
Solidarity must have concrete political grounding. In order to overcome the historical
insufficiencies of white feminism, white women must change their politics. Japanese
feminists, first of all, have to state their politics explicitly, hooks comments:
I encouraged women to bond on the basis of political solidarity. It seemed ironic

to me that white women who talked the most about being victims as I wrote then
were more privileged and powerful than the vast majority of women in our
society. And if shared victimhood were the reason to be feminist then women
who were empowered, who were not victims, would not embrace feminism.19
Again, hooks critique suggests that victimhood cannot be the basis for right relation
between oppressor and oppressed groups. For hooks, in addition to refusing victimhood,
it is important for women o f all classes and colors to cultivate personal accountability.
Thinking of oneself only as a victim disempowers and disables participation in social
19bell hooks, killing rage ending racism (New York: Heniy Holt and Company, 1995), 51.
147
transformation. Referring to her own experience of black women in the U.S. south,
hooks continues:
I lived in a world where women gained strength by sharing knowledge and

resources, not by bonding on the basis of being victims. Despite the incredible
pain of living in racial apartheid.20
Analogously, my experience suggests that second and third generation Koreans in
Japan must gather the strength for enabling survival while rebuilding the same strong
social ties that existed among the first generation. Those strong ties have fallen away
gradually and without significant resistance as second and third generation Korean
residents in Japan have been assimilated into Japanese society. Instead, latter-generation
Koreans have developed a strong sense of victim mentality, hooks suggestion of using
political resistance and communal pride as the basis for solidarity should therefore be
appreciated by both Korean residents in Japan and Japanese people as well. In so doing,
Koreans will perhaps be able to overcome the tendency of national reductionism, and
Japanese feminists will perhaps be able to overcome their gender reductionism.
Lately, there has been a movement by other Japanese feminists to overcome the
gender reductionism of Japanese feminist discourse. As already mentioned, the
movement was challenged and refueled again by the issue of military comfort women.
and as Japanese feminists began to reflect on the privilege of their being Japanese, they
have begun to acknowledge themselves as oppressors. For example, Aiko Ogoshi and
Kiyoko Shimizu, leading progressive feminist scholars, self-critically confess their past
blindness:
J0Ibid., 52.
148
The latter two issues21 concerns us Japanese, but instead o f directly confronting
these matters, we have closed our eyes, deceived ourselves, and sought escape in
forgetfulness and ignorance. But former comfort women, after many years of
great pain and anger, have come forward with their charges. Their appearance
has conclusively shaken our self-deception. Through these women, we have had,
for the first time, the experience of feeling close at hand to the actual existence of
these victims, and in the face of their intense accusation, we have been compelled
to see ourselves as victimizer. We have begun to acknowledge our long-denied
guilt for a crime in the same category as the Holocaust.22 (Emphasis is mine)
Unlike Uenos view, Ogoshi and Shimizus sincere self-reflection offers hope for efforts
to solve the social and historical problems lying at the intersecting of national and gender
issues. However, from the point of view of Korean residents in Japan, this latter day
confession has come very late. During the 1970s and 1980s, the human rights movement
against institutional Japanese racism peaked within the Korean community and within
Japanese society. Japanese media coverage was extensive. Yet very few Japanese
feminists took part in the action to change institutional discrimination. If they had heard
the suffering of Korean residents in Japan at the time, they might have resisted such
institutional racism before the issue of military comfort women came to the fore.
The human rights issue of Korean residents in Japan has been invisible to most
Japanese feminists. They started to get involved with the issue o f military comfort
women simply because it was considered a womens issue, even though they explained
that they were moved by the testimony of the survivors. If Japanese feminists had earlier
21These were Japans Imperial Armys Rape of Nanking and Japans government-sponsored
sexual enslavement of women under the euphemism comfort women. The victims of sexual enslavement
were women from former victim countries of the Pacific War such as Korea, Taiwan, China,
Philippines, Holland, Indonesia. The largest number were from Korea but there were Japanese women as
well
Aiko Ogoshi and Kiyoko Shimizu, Japanese Women Who Stand with Comfort Women, in
War's D irty Secret: Rape, Prostitution, and Other Crimes Against Women, ed. Anne Llewellyn Barstow
(Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press 2000), 26.
been sensitive to other types of oppression (aside from their own), solidarity work might
have taken place during the 1970s and 1980s. Confronting the issue of Korean residents
in Japan must be taken seriously by Japanese feminists, so that they might be able to see
how the Japanese governments policies on domestic oppression (i.e. racism against non-
Japanese) are connected to its policies on international oppression (i.e. the issue of
military comfort women). Such connections are not simply the legacy o f colonialism,
but of an ongoing oppression structured at the intersection o f nationalism and racism.
Hence, Japanese feminists (and progressive Japanese intellectuals and activists as well)
need to enhance their theories and deepen their engagement for social, political and
cultural transformation.
In order to enhance and develop a feminist liberation perspective that can deal
with the interconnection of gender issues and racism/nationalism, more profound
Japanese feminist political, social and religious theories need to be developed. With a
radical political ethic, Japanese and non-Japanese alike may be able to resist the emperor-
centered patriarchal culture that has incorporated gender oppression and Japanese racism.
In particular, this enhanced perspective must focus on the connections between the
oppressive ideology of nationalism and the domestic problem o f Japanese racism. For
Korean residents in Japan the issue of military comfort women not only reflects the
legacy of colonialism but also integrally involves racism. Hence, an effective
methodology for a feminist political ethic has to incorporate a more complete array of
feminist theories. For example, the definition of feminism articulated by Black feminist
Barbara Smith might be incorporated. Smith defines feminism (in stark contrast to Ueno)
as follows:
150
The reason racism is a feminist issue is easily explained by the inherent definition
of feminism. Feminism is the political theory and practice that struggles to free
all women: women of color, working class-women, poor women, disabled
women, lesbian, heterosexual women. Anything less than this vision of total
freedom is not feminism, but merely female self-aggrandizement.23
In fact, such a feminism holds the potential to free not only all women but also all
men, because it is a compelling political theory of human liberation. This point needs to
be considered as well in the context of the social and political situation of Korean
residents in Japan. The damage done by Japanese racism (through the dominant ideology
of national chauvinism) has obviously affected both Korean women and men. Thus, as
long as feminism aims for total human liberation, it should be liberating for both female
and male. Of course, we need to acknowledge that total human liberation is the final goal
and in the process of achieving that goal we have to be careful about the differences
inherent in each type of oppression.
Limitations of Progressive Japanese Intellectuals* Methodology
In its quest for total liberation, jiritsutekijosei seiji rinri rejects conventional
ethical norms imposed by authorities. Instead, it seeks to build an alternative power
based on a counter ideology, with counter norms and values. As we have already seen,
one of the dominant social norms in Japan is the superiority of the Japanese in contrast
to the alien or foreigner. This norm is reinforced by juxtaposing a dualistic criterion of
the Japanese as good (harmless) and the foreigner as bad (harmful). All non-
Japanese are considered foreigners, including Korean residents in Japan. They are
excluded from institutional benefits as well as social relations. So being a foreigner in
^Barbara Smith, Racism and Womens Studies in Making Race, Malting Soul Creative and
Critical Perspective by Feminists o f Color, ed. Gloria Anzaldua (San Francisco: aunt lute books, 1990), 25.
151
Japan means that one is automatically an object of exclusion or degradation. The word
foreigner carries a negative connotation in Japan that implies nonexistence or
strangeness at the level of expression. This affects the consciousness of ordinary
Japanese and creates a powerful stereotype. As just another group of foreigners, many
young Koreans have internalized this dominant normative value, causing them to deny
themselves and their own self-worth.
Again, constructing a feminist political ethic in Japan must start with the question
of personal identity - including what it means to be Japanese or Korean. In turn,
forming a healthy identity in order to be able to engage persistently in social justice
pursuits might be impossible without critical investigation of our own social location.
Beverly Harrisons warning should be considered the first step in acquiring the ability of
self-critical investigation. She claims:
For anyone to do liberation theology, it is necessary to develop a critical

awareness of how ones specific social location affects ones theological and
moral sensibilities.24
As Harrison suggests, critical awareness or critical investigation of our own social
location will affect our theological and moral sensibilities, and it will also determine our
methodologies for formulating an ethics for human liberation. Without knowing or
acknowledging our own social location, we will fail to be accountable to our own
community.
Although self-investigation of ones own social location is crucial for social
change to proceed, liberal Japanese intellectuals often fail to recognize their own
24Beveriy Harrison, Making the Connection: Essays in Feminist Social Ethics, ed. Carol S. Robb,
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 235.
152
privileged social location. For example, in the book Contemporary Christian Ethic 3: To
Live in Japan. Keiichi Kaneko, a theologian and one of the books editors, emphasizes
that Christians have to listen to the voices of the lowest and the weak as one of the
primary methods for doing ethics23 Then, he sensitively suggests that weakness or
lowest will be a force to connect people to each other. Toward this aim, his book is a
collection of stories o f various voices o f the other within Japanese society. The other
voices disclose the situations and experiences of Korean residents in Japan, indigenous
Ainu people, Okinawan people, disabled people, Buraku outcast people, etc.
Kaneko further emphasizes the point that we need to be alert to discern the
weakness along personal dimensions that is structurally entrenched in society.26 While
I agree with this point and the importance of his method, the problem is that such
methods have been suggested for decades now but the conditions o f the weak and the
lowest have barely changed at all. Kanekos polite, friendly suggestion conveys
neither his own social location nor the urgency o f the plight o f those he professes to listen
to. Thus, privileged people who wish to take part in implementing a radical feminist
political ethic must investigate their own social privilege in relation to the other.
Kanekos suggestion leads to the next question: how long will oppressed groups
have to share their experiences in order to establish right relations between the oppressor
and the oppressed. Korean residents in Japan might well doubt whether Kaneko
adequately understands the social reality o f young Koreans, who must often hide their
ethnic heritage because of the social pressure of racism Speaking out for themselves
2SKeiichi Kaneko, [Koza] gendai kirisutokyo tinri 3: Nihon ni ikiru (Tokyo: Japan Christian
Publisher, 1999), 30.
ibid., 31.
153
requires for Koreans tremendous courage, energy and resources. Who will listen to the
oppressed when the oppressed have been silenced? A Korean writer challenges this
listening communication pattern in the following way:
These attempts at reaching out and communicating - whether they be from

Okinawans, Koreans in Japan, women or other minoritiesalways involve an
intense sense of urgency on the part o f the speaker. And yet, these words end up
as nothing more than objects of consumption for the listeners.27
Koreans have become skeptical about whether the Japanese will understand their
stories and the structural contradictions within society that have contributed to them. It is
a question Japanese need to ask of themselves as well. Again, being Japanese is
understood normatively as a condition of supremacy and privilege, a condition that
excludes non-Japanese. Reinvestigating and deconstructing this norm must take place
before one who is Japanese can even begin to listen to other voices. In other words, the
Japanese people must acknowledge their privileged social position and question it before
they will be able to listen to the voices of the lowest and weak. At the same time,
those who are the oppressed also need to investigate their own motivation when they
speak out. Are they truly committed to social justice, or are they merely expressing a
false and isolated heroism? Liberation theologian Jose Miguez Boninos comments are
worth hearing in this regard:
For the human being, however, social location is a matter not merely of fate of
circumstance, but also of option and decision. We are situated in reality, to be
surehistorically, geographically, culturally, and most o f all groupwise and
classwisebut we can also position ourselves differently in relation to that
situation. The ethical question, therefore, passes through the decision about ones
own social position, with ones option, ones slant on reality, ones choice of
relevant subject, with the goal o f ones work. What an analysis of the situation
r SuhKyung Shik, Bundan o ikilu (Tokyo: Kage Publisher, 1997), 182-183.
154
puts before us is the question of how we choose in relation to the alternatives and
challenges we confront.28
Hence, for oppressors and oppressed alike, a self-critical examination of social location is
a necessary part of the journey toward liberation. Karin Cases reflection on the multi
dimensional meaning of being white employs a useful method for Japanese seeking to
reinvestigate the privileged social norm of being Japanese. Reflecting on the identity
of the oppressor group, Case argues that it is:
necessary to distinguish between white as skin color, white as racial identity,

white as dominant location within the system of white supremacy, and whiteness
as the process of reproducing white skin privilege, advantage, normativity and
dominance within the system of white supremacy.29
The structural contradictions and the dominant ideology o f tea emperor-centered culture
have undermined not only people who are weak and oppressed, but have distorted the
oppressors values, norms and national identity as well. The multi-dimensional meaning
of being Japanese must therefore be probed in any process of reconciliation with Koreans
and other groups that have long been oppressed in Japanese society.
Recognizing ones privilege in light of other voices does not automatically free
one from elitism and paternalism. This often lies in the sub-consciousness o f people who
are in the oppressor group. If the identity o f the Japanese cannot be formed without
listening to the voices of the other, and if such listening is impossible without already
a Jose Miguez, Toward a Christian Political Ethics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), 43.
29KarinCase, Erasure, Amnesia, and Denial: The Challenges o f White Blindnessfo r Moral
Agency and Emancipatory Praxis o f White Christians (Unpublished PhD dissertation at Union Theological
Seminary, 2001), 131-152.
155
changing ones identity, then a stalemate is the apparent result. Hence, the works of
Japanese liberal intellectuals, while influential, have had limited impact.
For example, since the latter 1980s in Japan, the notion of kyosei, coexistence, has
been widely used in both public discourse and social movement. It became a popular
slogan for social struggles in both Korean and Japanese communities. A leading
sociologist who deals with the issue of minority problems in Japan, Yasunori Fukuoka,
validates the notion of kyosei in this way:
I happen to believe that if fundamental changes are to be made to society, then a

slogan is needed that will appeal to the great masses of the people. In the Japan of
the late 1960s and 1970, the word kyoto, meaning joint struggle, had a certain
degree of power to arouse people. However, if we examine this word in the
context of improving majority/minority relations, it is evident that we cannot
expect members of the majority to participate in joint struggle, except for a small
number of radicals. Another word that has recently been used as a rallying call in
social movements isjinken (human rights). Within Japanese society, however,
this term tends to carry the patronizing implication we fortunate members of the
majority, then, human rights are thought of as being somebody elses problem.
I believe that the limitations o fjoint struggle and human rights as organizing
concepts for social change leaves coexistence as the best paradigm currently
available to concentrate efforts toward a solution o f the Zinich [Korean residents
in Japan] Koreans problem that has been the theme of this book.30
Fukuoka goes on to claim that his intention is to construct a system of social
relations under which the majority and minority can live together in peace.31 His intent
can be seen as similar to many if not most liberal Japanese intellectuals, including
Kaneko. Stated another way, most Japanese liberals are starting inherently from an
unequal relationship and status as the result of the Japanese governments racist policies.
Yet, instead of analyzing historical, ideological and structural problems as their own
Yasunori Fukuoka, Lives o f Young Koreans in Japan, Translated by Tom Gill (Melbourne, Trans
Pacific Press, 2000), 251.
31Ibid., 252.
156
problems, they simply objectify the phenomenon of inequality and then proclaim the
need to work for kyosei.
Furthermore, Fukuokas assumptions pose two problems. First, when joint
struggle was urged during the 1960s and 1970s, the aim was to organize specific groups,
not general masses; hence, his premise that members o f the majority (referring to the
Japanese) would not participate in this joint struggle because it was too radical is flawed.
I do not believe that the degree or quality of radicality was the reason why the Japanese
masses did not participate in the struggle for social change. While this may have been a
factor, a more fundamental reason was the historical and political consciousness of the
Japanese. Second, Fukuokas analysis of the concept o f human rights doesnt go far
enough. He does not consider why the members of the majority (the Japanese) do not
understand the importance of human rights for themselves. This is a more fundamental
problem in Japanese society. After all, if one cannot recognize ones own rights as a
human being then how can one recognize the rights of others? Clearly, without
considering and comprehending these fundamental problems, the notion of kyosei cannot
be the best paradigm. Coexistence in an unjust society without structural social change
only solidifies the conditions of the oppressed.
Fukuokas analysis and interpretation are typical of many that appeared during
this period in Japan. The slogan or notion of kyosei has spread among liberal sects of
Japanese society and has even been affirmed by some Korean activists and intellectuals.
Nevertheless, I believe the notion is problematic because when people talk about working
toward kyosei (living together in some relative harmony), they appear to be talking about
a future vision only, and again, this tends to foster ignoring todays oppressed reality. A
157
future vision that fails to evaluate or assess past collective memories will not bring
about true reconciliation between Japanese and non-Japanese. Before proclaiming a
future vision to live together in peace, people have to understand the fundamental
structural and ideological forces that have caused the so-called minority problem in
Japan. They will have to understand it, more specifically, as a basic problem of Japanese
identity. The Japanese must reassess their responsibility to society and acknowledge
their chauvinistic racist attitude toward Koreans and non-Japanese. Instead of asking
these questions, Fukuoka explains Japanese chauvinistic attitudes as follows;
Hitherto the Japanese majority has always attached negative connotations to the
ethnic differences of the Korean minority, and this has undermined the
discriminatory treatment inflicted upon Koreans. We must overcome the
discriminatory relationship and create a new relationship where difference does
not imply discrimination.
Again, Fukuoka does not ask why Japanese attach such negative connotations to ethnic
differences. If differences are a major cause of discrimination against Koreans, then the
Japanese have to ask from where this idea comes.
Another form of discrimination against Korean residents in Japan occurs when the
Japanese do not acknowledge the differences between Koreans and Japanese in the first
place. Koreans, they say, look the same in physical appearance and speak only Japanese.
They might comment that you look like Japanese or look almost the same as Japanese,
and mean it as a compliment. Most Japanese, in fact, are not aware that such polite
comments reflect a kind of supremacist thinking.
Fukuoka and other Japanese liberals need to recognize that it is equally racist
when the Japanese discriminate against Koreans because of perceived differences
Ibid., 252.
158
between them or because those differences are ignored entirely. Once Fukuoka and
others can acknowledge both sides of this reality, they might be able to reexamine their
own consciousness and identity issues rather than simply interviewing Koreansthe
major project in Fukuokas academic career thus far.
I suggest that, in order to foster right social relations between Japanese and
Korean residents in Japan, the notion of kyosei be replaced with notions of responsibility
and solidarity. The notions of responsibility and solidarity are necessary ethical
ingredients for creating right-relations between Japanese and Koreans. They are also
important in considering the meaning of liberation for the Japanese in particular, because
given their relative power they must bear the primary responsibility for the changes
needed. Without the bearing of this responsibility, there will be no liberation for anyone.
Included in this bearing of responsibility must be the idea that social, political,
ideological and economic contradictions that engender so-called minority problems in
Japan are not others (Korean) problems, but indeed Japanese problems. For this, the
Japanese will need to incorporate solidarity and responsibility into their moral identities.
Rational agreement alone will not be enough.
According to Janet Jakobsen, responsibility can become a major symbol for moral
agency.33 This is why moral agency is so crucial. A reexamination of the public
discourse of postwar Japanese responsibility in light of Legges definition of moral
agency as responsible self-direction reveals how far the reality of Japanese consciousness
33She explains Richard Niebuhrs responsible self in such a way in her essay T he Gendered
Division of Moral Labor Radical Relationalism and Feminist Ethics, in Living Responsibly in
Community: Essays in Honor o fE Clinton Gardner, eds. Frederick E. Glennon, Gary S. Hank, Darryl M.
Trimiew (Lanham: University Press of America, 1997), 27.
159
has to go before the vision of kyosei (living together peaceably, with justice! becomes a
reality.
While the notion of kyosei has been discussed since the late 1980s in relation to
the so-called minority problems, Japanese postwar responsibility emerged in the mid
1990s when Japan confronted the fiftieth anniversary of World War II and also found
itself facing its unresolved criminal actions both during the war and during the colonial
period leading up to it. When Japans postwar responsibility was discussed then, it
should have included unresolved institutional discrimination against colonial
descendants, but instead was focused mainly on the treatment of immediate war victims.
Yet, the discourse about postwar responsibility has had a more significant influence, in
both positive and negative ways, on Japanese self-transformation and social
transformation than has kyosei.
On the positive side, the public discourse brought about serious reflection on the
part of Japanese on Japans past history and actions, revealing much to them about their
severe treatment of other peoples in Asia. On the negative side was the re-emergence of
a neo-nationalist movement; which included the legalization of hinomaru as the national
flag and kimigayo as the national anthem. The hinomaru is the symbol of invasion for
Asian people and kimigayo is the song to glorify the emperor and his heredity. The most
controversial issue was the anachronistic revision o f the compulsory history textbook (see
chapter two about the making of the new book). The neo-nationalist movement in the
mid 1990s is often compared to the revisionist movement which took place during
1980s in Germany.
160
On balance, much remains to be accomplished. Unlike Germanys postwar
policies (the other country on the losing side in World War II) the Japanese government
and its citizens have not fully acknowledged their past collective sin, and their
responsibility to Japans victims from the war and from its earlier colonial policies.
Germanys postwar policy has been contrasted favorably in relation to Japan. The
Japanese government has been pressured to apologize and compensate its war victims
(such as the comfort women survivors). Worse than denial, however, Japan has
deliberately distorted its past actions toward the people o f other Asian countries. Again,
without accurate acknowledgment of Japans past history, there can be no possibility of
forgiveness and reconciliation, a prerequisite for creating right-relation. Thus Legges
vision of moral agency as responsible self-direction should and must be preceded in
Japan by an acknowledgment and acceptance of its past history.
Even though Japans social and political climate moved toward the right during
the decade, the 1990s presented a great opportunity for rethinking and reflecting not only
on Japanese responsibility for its wartime actions, but also for its hidden racism. Public
discourse raised questions of feminism and nationalism, the politics of identity (who are
the Japanese in relation to the modern nation-state) and the politics of memories. Yet, the
reactions from both right-wing intellectuals and liberal intellectuals were primarily
defensive. While the need for a response to past actions and apologies by the Japanese
government were acknowledged, they were also watered down by 1) presenting reasons
why individuals ought to take responsibility for what the government did; 2) assertions
that severe war-time acts are a necessary evil; and 3) that all wars, not only Japanese
wars, involve brutality.
161
Such discussions regarding responsibility for and accountability to society have
involved both public and private. Many war victims have demanded not only the
governments formal apology and compensation, but have also asked individual Japanese
to share in and understand what the victims experienced in the past, all in order to prevent
the same things from happening again in the future. In other words, war victims began
seeking a vision for creating a just society that incorporates learning the past. The
Japanese, however, reacted defensively to the call to resist unjust government policies
and to correct racist thinking. Such defensive reactions concerning their own moral
responsibility are integrally related to the uncritical acceptance o f the dominant emperor-
centered ideology of cultural supremacy. It is primarily this that blinds the Japanese to
the non-Japanese view of society.
The public discourse of postwar Japanese responsibility did not directly deal with
the domestic issue of Korean residents in Japan, nor the problem of the emperor ideology.
Incorporating these, however, is a must. As I have said, Japanese responsibility should
start with awareness of how emperor-centered norms and values have undermined and
continue to undermine the Japanese perceptions of and empathy toward others pain.
Unless the Japanese people can develop these perceptions as a part of their own moral
identity, both structural transformation and right relational patterns between the Japanese
and non-Japanese will continue to be severely hampered.
Feminist ethicist Beverly Harrison adds another dimension to this discussion. She
writes:
All knowledge is rooted in our sensuality. We know and value the world, if we
know and value it, through our ability to touch, to hear, and to see. Perception is
foundational to conception. Ideas are dependent on our sensuality. Feeling is the
162
basic bodily ingredient that mediates our connectedness to the world. All power,
including intellectual power, is rooted in feeling.34
Harrison is reminding us that a keen and sensitive perception can be the basis o f power
for social change for justice. Sensitive perception will enhance the formation o f a moral
agency that includes solidarity and responsibility, a moral agency that incorporates the
lessons of the past, now discerned more clearly.
A sensitive perception will enhance the ability to imagine the past from todays
situation, as Dorothee Soelle has learned:
When I think of innocent words such as star, or hair, or smoke, then as a writer I
am obliged to know the resonance that comes with these words. What
associations do they bring up? What is the difference when they are used in 1930
or 1943 or 1980? Can anyone who writes in German and is linguistically aware
and sensitive use a word such as star as if it simply referred to a heavenly body?
Suppose I realize that I am living after, suppose I wish to remember, can I then
ever hear the word star without thinking of those yellow stars? Is smoke still a
symbol of peace, of the village, o f home, as with Hoelderlin, so long before? Is
hair still merely hair?33
Soelles imaginative perception keeps and shapes her identity as a German who
cannot escape from the responsibility of a shamed national history. Such an attitude is
necessary in the building o f an authentic solidarity. The self-critical investigation of
ones identity shapes ones sensitive perception, enabling one to perceive anothers pain
as ones own pain. This also is part of the grounding of personal moral responsibility that
leads to authentic solidarity and liberation for oppressors and oppressed alike.
^Beverly W. Harrison, ed. Carol S. Robb, Making the Connection: Essays in Feminist Social
Ethics (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 13.
3SDoiothee Soelle, The Arms Race K ilbEven Without War, trans. Gerhard A. Elston
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), 13-14.
163
Empowerment and Inner-Self-Liberation for Korean Residents in Japan
Critical investigation of social location as a key element of a feminist liberation
ethic is not only necessary for the Japanese, but critical as well for Korean residents in
Japan. An attitude of resistance by and for Korean residents in Japan is also a necessary
component. Due to the dominant ideology of cultural supremacy, many Koreans deny
their cultural heritage. This harms their affirmation o f their own existence and self-
realization. As a result, they lack confidence and develop a victim mentality. Self-denial
and victim mentality, in turn, prevent them from discovering the power within to resist
the oppressive historical and structural forces they face.
In this section, I will focus briefly on the meaning of liberation for Korean
residents in Japan. Because of the advanced economic development of Japan, the quest
for true liberation for both Japanese and Korean residents in Japan is ironically more
difficult, precisely because Koreans have enjoyed some degree of material satisfaction in
their lives. Liberation, however, entails more than freedom from starvation, as Gustavo
Gutierrez points out. He writes:
A consideration of development as a total process leads one to consider also all

the external and internal factors which affect the economic evolution of a nation
as well as to evaluate the distribution of goods and services and the system of
relationships among agents o f its economic life.36
According to Gutierrez, the total process of liberation includes economic, social,
political and cultural aspects. Because this is the case, there remains a crucial need for
liberation among marginalized peoples in all countries, including economically
developed countries such as Japan. As this dissertation has examined, the oppressive
36Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology o f Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation (Maiyknoll: Oibis
Book, 1973), 24.
164
forces surrounding Korean residents in Japan have affected not only their economic well
being, but their social status, political place and cultural standing as well. With these
thoughts in mind, how ought we to understand liberation for Korean residents in Japan?
How will they come to be able to take their rightful place as full and accepted members
of Japanese society, and begin to celebrate their own lives? Liberation from institutional
oppression, economic exploitation, and from cultural and ideological degradation these
must all proceed apace. Yet for Koreans in Japan, perhaps the most urgent task is to be
liberated from Japanese stereotypes and the negative images held by mainstream
Japanese society. While these factors have resulted in a collective inferiority complex, as
long as Koreans continue to accept and internalize these factors, they cannot resist
institutional and individual racism.
Insuring survival and a productive quality of life are major themes o f womanist
theology and ethics. In the racist system of white supremacist society, these are integral
to liberation.37 One of the major theological themes of third world feminist theology is
a sense of new empowerment.38 A new empowerment is equally necessary in order for
Korean residents in Japan to free themselves from the collective inferiority complex that
has been so firmly implanted by the dominant ideology of an emperor-centered culture of
supremacy. A major theme, then, for constructing a radical feminist political ethics must
be self-liberation and self-empowerment. Self-liberation is not simply internal
psychological liberation, however. Self-liberation will require Koreans to realize that
37Gary Dorrien, Soul in Society: The Making and Renewal o f Social Christianity (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1995), 254.
"Ursula King, ed., Feminist Theologyfrom the Third World: A Reader (New York: Spck/Oibis
Press, 1994), 18.
165
their collective inferiority complex is a result of not only the legacy of Japanese
colonialism but is also a result of the ongoing dominant ideology of racism. Both of
these are based upon an assumed cultural supremacy rooted in the emperor ideology. To
do this, Koreans in Japan must understand the social and historical constructs of their
oppression, and then take constructive action to dismantle them.
Such a process of self-conscientization and self-transformation can begin through
education. Toward this end, churches ought to and can be vital vehicles to educate and
encourage people to participate in concrete social action. In order for churches in general
and Korean churches in Japan in particular to be transformative educational vehicles, the
churches need to undertake social analysis, economic analysis, sexuality/gender analysis
and ideological analysis.39
At a minimum, churches have to discard the conventional theological principle of
the separation o f church and state. This principle prevented Korean Christian churches in
Japan from becoming meaningful advocates for social justice until the 1970s. During the
mid-1970s and early 1980s, I worked on human rights issues as a community organizer
and staff person at the Korean Christian Center in Osaka, Japan. From this vantage point,
I was able to observe and evaluate how the Korean Christian churches in Japan responded
and took action against institutional racism. It was during this period that I learned a lot
about the limitations of the social mission work of Korean churches in Japan, including
the Korean Christian Center. For example, there was very little interaction between the
39A black theologian, James Cone, analyzes the weakness of the black church for radical change.
These weaknesses need social, economic and sexual analysis. It is the same for Korean churches in Japan,
and I add ideological analysis as well. See Cones discussion of the weakness of the black church, For My
People: Black Theology and the Black Church, Where have we been and Where are we going (New York:
Orbis Books, 1984), 86-98.
166
Christian and non-Christian Korean communities. Korean churches slowly changed,
however, as they were challenged by the social activities of non-Christians. After the
1970s, the movement for human rights for Korean residents visually emerged, peaking in
the 1980s when the effort to abolish the Alien Registration Law became a nationwide
movement in Japan. During that time, Korean churches in Japan became part of the
struggle against institutional racism, inherent in the statutes of Alien Registration of Law.
In retrospect, this social participation o f Korean churches in Japan demonstrates that it is
possible for the church to be an educational and practical institution for social justice.
However, the churches did not further develop and sustain their potential for being a
powerful collective moral agent. As I analyze it, they did not adequately grasp the
concept that Koreans are moral agents called to make a commitment to social
transformation. They did not seem to understand that individual salvation is connected
with social structures. Instead o f embracing their faithful role as moral agents, the
churches mobilized solely around the dimension of ethnic discrimination and ended
within that same dimension. In no way do I want denigrate this movement, for it was
truly a historical moment. In some ways, it can be equated with the civil rights
movement in the United States during the 1960s. Indeed, the movement resulted in
certain important legal changes. However, in order to obtain the consciousness o f the
self-direction o f moral agency defined by Legge, Korean churches and Korean residents
in Japan have to go further toward developing a theological social ethics that incorporates
a firm identity for themselves as Korean and Christian moral agents.
In order to become effective moral agents, Koreans and their churches must
discover and believe in themselves and in their own power. The task of reconstructing
167
their self-affirmation as a people is critical to resisting ongoing institutional and social
oppression. In order to do this, Koreans have to be politicized. Political here means
wholeness in human thinking - that is, incorporating a conscientized historical world
view inclusive of a value system that views society from the bottom up, one that
integrates spirituality and concrete on the ground politics. Latin American liberation
theologians often identify their ethics as Christian political ethics. They too
conceptualize political in a broader sense than the partisan activity o f political parties,
thus providing one model of what I am suggesting.40
Politicization can serve to enable and reinforce the process o f inner-self-
liberation. This is particularly necessary for the younger generation o f Korean residents
in Japan because their ethnic identity has been diluted by social pressures for
assimilation. The complexities o f intermarriage between Koreans and Japanese, and the
impetus of naturalization (obtaining Japanese nationality), have added to the difficulties
as well. As explained in chapter two, nationality significantly affects Koreans ethnic
identity. In such a social reality, Korean residents in Japan must be educated or
conscientized to look at society differently, so that insecurity and inferiority no longer
feel natural.
Even if institutional and legal racism were confronted by powerful indirect factors
such as pressure from a movement of liberal Japanese or international governmental
groups, this alone would not cure the inferiority complex of Koreans. Revolutionary
institutional change often takes years, but Korean residents in Japan cannot wait that
long. They need to be empowered to cultivate their own lives o f freedom right now.
*Thomas L. Schubeck S.J., Liberation Ethics: Sources, Models and Norms (Minneapolis; Fortress
Press, 1993), 37.
168
Liberation will not simply be given. It must be attained by Koreans themselves. That
will be a difficult and complex task. One important step, however, toward empowerment
and inner-self-liberation might well be finding the power o f anger, not a destructive but a
compassionate anger, as described by Beverly Harrison:
Anger is not the opposed of love. It is better understood as a feeling-signal that

all is not well in our relations to other persons or groups or to the world around us.
Anger is a mode of connectedness to others and it is always a vivid form of
caring. To put the point another way; anger - is and is always - a sign of some
resistance in ourselves to the moral quality of the social relations in which we are
immersed. Extreme and intense anger signals a deep reaction to the action upon
us or toward others to whom we are related.41
Anger is a vivid form of caring, so Korean residents have to unearth their anger, anger
that has been suppressed by the dominant cultural ideology as well as by negative
individual Japanese reactions day in and day out. Although many young Koreans feel
their anger when they experience discrimination, they are not able to express it because
of fear. Yet they need to explore their anger. They need to be angry about having to hide
their Korean heritage. They need to feel anger at having to use Japanese names in order
to avoid negative social pressure and to survive. Using Korean names in any social
setting is the foremost action of self-affirmation. It is an event of resurrection. Koreans
need their anger to resist the historical weight o f oppression they have suffered. If anger
is a mode o f connectedness to other persons, then anger can forge a connectedness not
only between Koreans and Japanese but also among Koreans themselves.
Under the pressure of a powerful dominant ideology, young Koreans alienate
themselves by avoiding contact with the Korean community as a way to protect
themselves from being revealed as Korean. This self-alienation destroys the possibility
4lHanison, 14.
169
of their reclaiming their own power. Instead, jiritsutekijosei seiji rinri proclaims that
they must begin to feel their anger and thereby restore the power that comes from
recognizing that they are part of group o f other Koreans who have reclaimed their
identity and know who they are.
Conclusion
This project has grown out of my ten years of direct experience with the human
rights movement in Japan, both as a community organizer and as a member of an
oppressed group (Korean residents) in the country. In reflecting on the meaning of
liberation for both Korean residents and the Japanese during those years, I came to
believe that looking at the oppressive situation of the Korean minority from the sole
vantage point of Japans colonial legacy is not sufficient. This project has suggested a
different approach, one that focuses attention on the dominant national ideology I have
called the emperor ideology. I have argued that many of the root causes of oppression in
Japan stem from this ideology. The equivalent of racism, it has fostered a national
culture of exclusion o f all except those who pass as pure Japanese.
In my deconstruction and reconstruction, I have carefully examined the various
relationships between the emperor ideology and a variety of related issues, including
minority issues, Japanese chauvinism, cultural supremacy, nationalism and racism. All
of these themes are related phenomena that must be considered in order to adequately
understand the social and historical oppression of Korean residents in Japan, and to begin
the construction of a feminist political ethics of self-reliance as an effective response.
170
These themes are directly linked to our search for liberation. So now, what is the task of
jiritsuteki josei rinri?
Neither angry accusations nor protests against exclusionary Japanese political
policies are sufficient forjiritsutekijosei rinri. Japanese culture at its heart needs to
change. We need to be aware of how the dominant emperor ideology has affected and
continues to affect our daily lives. In particular, we need to be aware of the controlling
mechanisms within the resulting and still prevailing Japanese cultural codes.
Is the system of State Shinto reemerging in todays Japanese political culture,
thereby perpetuating the patterns of oppression? Both conservatives and progressives
deny this. Yet without an adequate critique o f the emperor ideology and the related claim
of Shinto nativity, we cant seriously address the question. As I demonstrated in chapter
three, we need to be suspicious of the claim of Shinto nativity as representative of and
foundational to modern-day Japanese culture. I have suggested instead that this claim is
a legacy of modern construction and invention by the Meiji government, and that Shinto
itself is an amalgamation of Confucianism, Buddhism, and of late, Christianity. There
simply is no pure culture, no pure race or ethnicity in the world. All cultures evolve
through more or less continuous contact and engagement with other cultures. Cultures
are hybrids. Yet the myth of cultural purity has prevailed in Japan for a long time. We
can no longer merely accept our cultural myths. Instead, we desperately need the ability
and will to critically examine them.
As I noted in chapter five, religion might well play a powerful role in the
movement toward liberation. In Chapter m o f the postwar Japanese constitution, Rights
and Duties of the People, Article 20 says:
171
Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any

privileges from the State, nor excise and political authority. 2) No person shall be
compelled to take part in any religious acts, celebration, rite or practice. 3) The State and
its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.
Will this newly constituted religious freedom in Japan develop into a truly liberative
power? We are reminded again that the Meiji Imperial Constitution of 1890 granted
freedom o f religion so that all religious groups might be free (read compelled) to
worship the emperor. Of course, today's cultural control mechanisms are more hidden,
subtle and sophisticated. Ive argued that since the 1970s, the ruling class in Japan has
begun to reorganize and reproduce the emperor ideology, in part through the legalization
of gengoMeiji, Taisho, Showa and Heisei (see chapter three). Government officials
make highly visible public visits to the Yasukuni shrine. The legalization of hinomaru
and kimigayo as national flag and national anthem have reinstitutionalized these powerful
symbols of the emperor system. Even though progressive Christian communities in
Japan participated in the political protests against some of these actions, they did so
without an understanding of the continuing power and pervasiveness o f the emperor
ideology and the racism it perpetuates. Again, this understanding is vital so that Korean
Christians might see themselves clearly, both as parts o f oppressed Korean communities
and Christian communities who are related and bound to each other in pursuing common
liberative visions and ways of life.
This is the initial concrete task o f jiritsuteki josei rinri. When it takes hold in the
lives of Koreans, Christians, and other dissidents in Japan, this counter-cultural
movement of moral agency might also begin to enable the Japanese themselves to view
the privilege o f being Japanese as the prison it truly is.
172
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Abstract
All oppression is rooted in ideologies o f control and domination. In Japan, the

oppression faced by Korean residents stems from an ideology o f "cultural supremacy"
underpinning Japan's emperor system. I argue here that this ideology is a form of
racism.
The major rationale of Japanese racism is to distinguish and separate Japanese

from non-Japanese, and is bolstered by the myth of superiority attributed to a pure and
homogeneous Japanese ethnicity. The myth undergirds the emperor system, and the
emperor system in turn perpetuates the myth. The emperor system has contributed
historically to a strong and often arrogant Japanese national identity and culture. Today,
Japanese racism continues to thrive in that culture and to contribute to ongoing
discrimination against Korean residents on multiple societal levels. I argue that as long
as the emperor and its symbols continue to dominate Japanese culture, Japanese racism
will continue to valorize a false Japanese purity, resulting in the exclusion of non-
Japanese and in the veiled subjugation of the Japanese people as well.
I offer a feminist ethic of self-reliance as a moral tool for liberation for Japanese
and non-Japanese alike. Such a feminist ethic needs to operate on two major levels.
First, progressive Japanese feminists and Christian churches must encourage all Japanese
to investigate their own privileged social location and to develop an awareness of the
myriad interconnections in and among the phenomena of Japanese nationalism, racism,
emperor ideology, and feminism. Second, Korean residents in Japan must strive to
develop a strong sense of personal moral agency in order to recognize and resist the
racism in their midst, in the form of a still persistent emperor ideology, for the sake of
their own liberation and the liberation of Japanese society.
185
AUTHORS VITAE
Eun Ja Lee attended Japanese schools in Osaka, Japan. In 1987 she earned B.A. in
Humanities at the New College o f California. In 1989 she earned M.A. in Religion and
Society from Pacific School of Religion in Berkeley and M. Div. in 1991. She received
her Ph.D. degree form Union theological Seminary in New York City.

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METHODOLOGICAL MOVES TOWARD A FEMINIST

RELIGIO-POLITICAL ETHIC OF SELF-RELIANCE

(JIRITSUTEKIJOSEI SEIJI RINRI)

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to express my profound appreciation and thanks to my former advisor, Dr, Beverly

to carefully read my dissertation and share thoughtful suggestions.

is particularly true for me in writing a dissertation using my third language of English.

would not been able to come this far today.

encouragement. I am indebted to Gary Mathews offer to help improve my writing. His

amazing skill in editing my dissertation made it clear for an English-reading audience.

during the program.

I am grateful to so many longtime friends in Japan, Hawaii, and California.

of the state legislature in Hawaii, he helped to get my last revisions in on time. My

know they are awaiting eagerly the completion of my dissertation.

Finally, my deepest thanks goes to my family in Japan, my sister, Yon Ja Lee,

sustained, nurtured and strengthened me to persevere in the program. Thanks also to my

Chapter One Introduction 1

Chapter Two Korean Residents in Japan: History and Problems 6

Chapter Three Underpinning of Cultural Supremacy:

Chapter Four The Emperor State Ideology as an Ideology of Racism 95

Chapter Five Methodological Moves Toward

Author's Vitae 185

Hobsbawm as composed of a population that is ethnically almost or entirely

homogeneous.1This study assumes that the notion of homogeneity generally applied to

construct a new national identity of Japanese, a definition that excludes anyone of

non-Japanese origin, or those categorized as Other. I am one of the members of the

Other category, a Korean woman born, raised and educated in Japan.

Although Japan is an Asian country, it resembles a Western country in the eyes of

Nation and Strengthen the Army.

The Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) led to the

colonization of Taiwan (1894-1945), and opened a way to colonizing Korea as well.

Korea (1910-1945).2 Japans participation in World War I (1914-1918) led to Japans

mandate to acquire Micronesia in the Pacific. In addition, after Japans invasion of

included the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Micronesia.3

some voluntarily migrated to Japan in order to survive.4 My parents moved to Japan in

said something negative about Korea.

representations of Koreans. I had no self-esteem as a Korean. I feared being ostracized as

Having a Japanese name, in other words, is a temptation for us living between an

to face the possibility of being insulted or discriminated against simply because we

identity. Past experiences still challenge and haunt me.

I recall when several policemen surrounded me during my early stages of

However, I was just beginning to be politicized through involvement in community

organizing surrounding the issue of human rights of Korean residents in Japan. So

without the slightest hesitation 1 said my Korean name. It was a challenge

for me to do this because I was no longer in a protected territory such as my home

to reclaiming my pride as a Korean.

a Korean, I represented the most dangerous residents among aliens.

Korea have a sense of ethnic pride/identity which sustains them. Besides, in my

inferiority among Koreans, assimilation into Japanese society involves internalizing a

the eyes of the Japanese - that is, as inferior.

generations, nationality or ethnicity has become a source of intimidation, self-denial

Japan as a non-Japanese, particularly as a second or later generation Korean, is a struggle

reproduction of what many today call colonial discourse.

be distinguished clearly from previous eras.

developing a constitution in which the emperor was guaranteed absolute authority. As a

circumstances, discrimination against Koreans and other non-Japanese gets more