OSCAR VILLAMARIA, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND JERRY V.

BUSTAMANTE
GR NO. 165881 APRIL 19, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner was the owner of the jeepneys which the private respondent is the
one who is driving in a boundary basis. Villamaria and Bustamante entered into a
contract were the petitioner agreed to sell the jeepney entitled Kasunduan ng Bilihan
ng Sasakayan sa Pamamagitan ng Boundary-Hulog were Bustamante would remit to
Villamaria P550.00 a day for a period of four years. Both parties agreed in such terms
and stipulations of the contract.When the private respondent failed to pay the
boundary-hulog, Villarama took back the jeepney driven by Bustamante and barred
the latter from driving the vehicle. Due to the action of petitioner, Bustamante files a
complaint before the court.

ISSUE:
Whether employer-employee relations exists.

HELD:
The juridical relationship of employer-employee between petitioner and
respondent was not negated by the foregoing stipulation in the Kasunduan,
considering that petitioner retained control of respondents conduct as driver of the
vehicle. Even if the petitioner was allowed to let some other person drive the unit, it was
not shown that he did so; that the existence of an employment relation is not
dependent on how the worker is paid but on the presence or absence of control over
the means and method of the work; that the amount earned in excess of the
boundary hulog is equivalent to wages; and that the fact that the power of dismissal
was not mentioned in the Kasunduan did not mean Villamaria never exercised such
power, or could not exercise such power. Hence, the employer- employee relationship
exists.
ALHAMBRA INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, -vs-
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and ALHAMBBA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (FTUP),
Respondents.

G.R. No. L-25984 October 30, 1970

x----------------------------------------------------x

Appeal by Certiorari from respondent courts Decision in an unfair labor practice

case that the fifteen drivers and helpers not recognized by petitioners are in truth and in
fact its employees, and not separate and independent employees of its salesmen and
propagandists, and are therefore entitled retroactively to all the privileges, rights and
benefits provided for all its other regular employees under its collective bargaining
agreement with respondent union.

The complaint for unfair labor practice for violation of section 4(a) subsections (4)
and (6) of the Industrial Peace Act, was filed by the acting prosecutor of respondent
court against petitioner, upon the charges of respondent union that fifteen of the union
members, employed as drivers and helpers of petitioner, were being discriminated
against by petitioners not affording them the benefits and privileges enjoyed by all the
other employees for no justifiable reason other than their union membership; and that
the union had asked petitioner to negotiate with respect to said fifteen drivers and
helpers who were being excluded from the benefits of their subsisting collective
bargaining agreement, but petitioner refused to do so. The union prayed for a
desistance order and that petitioner be ordered to bargain collectively in good faith
and to grant the drivers and helpers the same benefits and privileges extended to and
enjoyed by all its other employees.

In answer, petitioner denied the unfair labor practice imputed to it and

countered that the fifteen drivers and helpers were not its employees, but separate and
independent employees of its salesmen and propagandists who exercised discretion
and control over their selection, employment, compensation, suspension and dismissal.

It is admitted that respondent union is sole and exclusive collective bargaining

representative for all the employees of petitioner and that collective bargaining
agreements had been successively signed between the union and petitioner on March
14, 1962 and on February 18, 1964. Both the union and petitioner exhausted steps 1 to 3
of the grievance machinery provided in the collective bargaining agreement with
regard to the unions claim that the benefits thereof should be extended to the fifteen
drivers and helpers and the petitioners contrary stand that they were not its
employees. Hence, as they could not resolve by conferences this dispute, the union
invoked the final step in the grievance machinery, after written notice thereof, and
elevated the issue of the true status of said drivers and helpers to respondent court
through its complaint for unfair labor practice.

Respondent court in its decision, affirmed by its resolution en banc of April 11, 1966,
categorically held petitioners disclaimer of the employee status of the drivers and
helpers to be baseless and untenable, as follows: In accordance with the
memorandum of instructions, Exhibit 24, which the respondent corporation issues to
the salesman or propagandist, it is really from here that the latter is authorized by the
former to engage the services of a driver or helper. So that even when the driver or
helper does not apply directly to the respondent corporation for the job but to the
salesman or propagandist, nevertheless, the authority of the salesman or propagandist
to employ the driver or helper emanates from the respondent corporation. It is,
therefore, apparent that in truth and in fact, the respondent corporation is the
employer of the driver or helper and not the salesman or propagandist who is merely
expressly authorized by the former to engage such services.

The salary of the driver or helper also comes from the respondent corporation
in the form of driver allowance which is appropriated for the purpose. This
allowance is given to the salesman or propagandist who in turn pays the same
to the driver or helper for salaries or wages. Of course, we realize that this mode
of paying the salaries or wages of the driver or helper indirectly through the
salesman or propagandist will save the respondent corporation the burden of
record keeping and other similar indirect costs. Nevertheless, it could not be
denied that it is the respondent corporation that pays the wages and salaries of
the driver or helper.

The duties and obligations of the driver or helper do not come from the
salesman or propagandist but are expressly stated by the respondent
corporation in the memorandum of instructions. He does not only accompany
the salesman or propagandist in all the trips, but also drives or watches the truck
which is the property of the respondent corporation. He also assists the
salesman in making deliveries to different stores and in the preparation of
inventories. These duties are the dictates of respondent corporation and not of
the salesman or propagandist. It is therefore clear that the terms and conditions
of employment of the driver or helper are those fixed and determined by the
respondent corporation. From all the foregoing consideration we are convinced
that the driver or helper is an employee of respondent corporation.

It therefore rendered the following judgment against petitioner:

IN CONCLUSION, THEREFORE, we rule and so hold that all the fifteen (15) drivers
and helpers whose names are listed in the Partial Stipulation of Facts are
employees of the respondent Alhambra Industries, Inc., and as such they should
be given and/or extended all the privileges, rights and benefits that are given to
all other regular employees, including those fringe benefits provided for in the
Collective Bargaining agreement signed and concluded between the
complainant union and the respondent corporation, retroactive as of the
effectivity of the first agreement of March 14, 1962 up to the present.

Petitioner, in this appeal, does not dispute the respondent courts basic ruling that
the fifteen drivers and helpers are in truth and in fact its employees and that its making
use of its salesmen and propagandists, as the ostensible employers of the drivers and
helpers was in effect but an elaborate artifice to deprive the drivers and helpers of their
status as employees of petitioner, entitled to enjoy all the privileges, rights and benefits
provided for all other employees under the collective bargaining agreements.

The lone error assigned by petitioner in its brief is that respondent court acted in
excess of jurisdiction in entering judgment against petitioner in spite of its finding that
the petitioner had not committed any act of unfair labor practice. 2 Petitioner uses as
props for this lone assigned error respondent courts statements in the body of its
decision that (S)ince the grant of benefits to the drivers will depend on a finding by the
Court that they are employees of the respondent corporation and not on account of
their membership with the complainant union or activities therein, then the charge of
discrimination against the respondent corporation is without basis in fact and in law.
Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that in order to adjudge an employer of
discrimination in accordance with the Act, it must be due to the union affiliation or
activities of the employee concerned and that both parties tried their level best to
decide the issue before the Court is the last step provided for in their grievance
machinery, Step No. 4 . . . Since the grant of benefits to the drivers and helpers hinges
on the decision of the Court that they are employees of the respondent corporation,
then the latter could not have been guilty of refusal to bargain in accordance with the
Act. Petitioner, invoking section 5(c) of the Industrial Peace Act, 3 thus contends that
it is mandatory upon the respondent court to order the dismissal of the complaint,
once it finds out that no unfair labor practice has been committed and it, should have
left the parties alone to settle their differences through conciliation, mediation and
recourse to the ordinary courts.

Petitioners appeal must be dismissed. It is speciously grounded on mere form rather

than the realities of the case. In form, respondent court gently treated petitioners
scheme to deprive the fifteen drivers and helpers of their rightful status as employees
and did not denounce it as a betrayal of the salutary purpose and objective of the
Industrial Peace Act, 4 but instead remarked that since the grant of employees
benefits hinged on the courts decision on their status as such employees, petitioner
could not have been guilty of refusal to bargain in accordance with the Act. The
reality, however, is that respondent court expressly found that in truth and in fact,
(petitioner) corporation is the employer of the driver or helper and not the salesman or
propagandist who is merely expressly authorized by the former to engage such
services. Petitioners failure to comply with its duty under the collective bargaining
agreement to extend the privileges, rights and benefits thereof to the drivers and
helpers as its actual employees clearly amounted to the commission of an unfair labor
practice. And consequently respondent court properly ordered in its judgment that said
drivers and helpers should be given and/or extended all the privileges, rights and
benefits that are given to all the other regular employees retroactive as of the
effectivity of the first agreement of March 14, 1962 up to the present. In so ordering,
respondent court was but discharging its function under section 5(c) of the Act, supra,
to order the cessation of an unfair labor practice and take such affirmative action as
will effectuate the policies of this Act.

Failure on petitioners part to live up in good faith to the terms its collective
bargaining agreement by denying the privileges and benefits thereof to the fifteen
drivers and helpers through its device of trying to pass them off as employees of its
salesmen and propagandists was a serious violation of petitioners duty to bargain
collectively and constituted unfair labor practice in any language. 5 As succinctly
stated by Mr. Justice Castro in Republic Savings Bank vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 6
in unfair labor practice cases, (T)he question is whether the (respondent) committed
the act charged in the complaint. If it did, it is of no consequence either as a matter of
procedure or of substantive law, what the act is denominated - whether as a restraint,
interference or coercion, as some members of the Court believe it to be, or as a
discriminatory discharge as other members think it is, or as refusal to bargain as some
other members view it, or even as a combination of any or all of these.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. The writ of preliminary

injunction heretofore issued on May 17, 1966 is lifted and set aside. With costs against
petitioner.
ORLANDO FARMS GROWERS ASSOCIATION/GLICERIO AOVER vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 129076 November 25, 1998

FACTS: Orlando Farms Growers Association is an association of landowners engaged in

the production of export quality bananas established for the sole purpose of dealing
collectively on matters concerning technical services, canal maintenance, irrigation
and pest control, among others. Respondents were hired as farm workers by several
member-landowners but; nonetheless, were made to perform functions as packers and
harvesters in the plantation of petitioner association. Respondents were dismissed on
various dates. Petitioner alleged that respondents were not its employees and butof the
individual landowners which fact can easily be deduced from the payments made by
the latter of respondent's SSS contributions. Moreover, it could have never exercised the
power of control over them with regard to the manner and method by which the work
was to be accomplished, which authority remain vested with the landowners despite
becoming members thereof.

ISSUE(S):

(1) Whether or not an unregistered association may be an employer independent of

the respective members it represents.

(2) Whether or not EER exists.

HELD: YES. An employer is any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly. The law does not require an employer to be registered before he may come
within the purview of the Labor Code, consistent with the established rule in statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. To do
otherwise would bring about a situation whereby employees are denied, not only
redress of their grievances, but, more importantly, the protection and benefits
accorded to them by law if their employer happens to be an unregistered association.

The following are generally considered in the determination of the existence of an

employer-employee relationship; (1) the manner of selection and engagement; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of the power of dismissal; and (4) the
presence or absence of the power of control; of these four, the last one being the most
important. The following circumstances which support the existence of employer-
employee relations cannot be denied. During the subsistence of the association,
several circulars and memoranda were issued concerning, among other things,
absences without formal request, loitering in the work area and disciplinary measures
with which every worker is enjoined to comply. Furthermore, the employees were issued
identification cards. While the original purpose of the formation of the association was
merely to provide the landowners a unified voice in dealing with Stanfilco, petitioner
however exceeded its avowed intentions when its subsequent actions reenforced only
too clearly its admitted role of employer.
CAURDANETAAN PIECE WORKERS UNION VS. LAGUESMA & CORFARM GRAINS
G.R No. 113542, February 24, 1998

Facts:
Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union members (petitioners) worked as cargadores forCo
rfarms Grains, Inc. (private respondent). They loaded, unloaded and piled sacks of
palay from the warehouses to the cargo trucks and from the cargo trucks to the buyers.
They were paid by private respondent on a piece rate basis. When Corfarm denied
some benefits to these cargadores, they organized a union. Upon learning of its
formation, Corfarm barred its members from working with them and replaced them
with non-members of the union. Petitioner filed [a petition] for certification election
before the Department of Labor and Employment and also filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. Corfarm denies that it had the power of control, rationalizing that petitioner's
members were 'street-hired' workers engaged from time to time to do loading and
unloading work .There was no superintendent-in-charge to give orders and there were
no gate passes issued, nor tools, equipment and paraphernalia issued by Corfarm for
loading/unloading. Furthermore they contended that employer-employee relationship
is negated by the fact that they offer and actuallyperform loading and unloading work
for various rice mills in Pangasinan .Labor Arbiter Rolando D. Gambito issued his decision
finding the dismissal of petitioners members illegal. Public Respondent Laguesma
premised the dismissal of the petition for certification election on the absence of an
employer-employee relationship between petitioners members and private
respondent

ISSUE: The present controversy hinges on whether or not an employer-employee

relationship between the CPWU members and Respondent Corfarm exist.

HELD:

Yes there is employer-employee relationship. To determine the existence of an

employer-employee relation, this Court has consistently applied the "four-fold" test
which has the following elements: (1) the power to hire, (2) the payment of wages, (3)
the power to dismiss, and (4) the power to control - the last being the most important
element.Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union members (petitioners) performed work whi
ch isdirectly related, necessary and vital to the operations of Corfarm. Moreover,
Corfarm did not even allege, much less prove, that petitioner's members have
"substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, [and]
work premises, among others. To be considered as independent contractors.
Furthermore, said respondent did not contradict petitioner's allegation that it paid
wages directly to these workers without the intervention of any third-party independent
contractor. It also wielded the power of dismissal over petitioners; in fact, its exercise of
this power was the progenitor of the illegal dismissal case. Clearly, the workers are
not independent contractors. Assuming arguendo that they did work with other rice
mills, this was required by the imperative of meeting their basic needs.
ALEJANDRO MARAGUINOT, JR. AND PAUILINO ENERO v. NLRC, VIC DEL ROSARIO, VIVA
FILMS
G.R. No. 120969

Facts:
Maraguinot and Enero were separately hired by Vic Del Rosario under Viva Films as part
of the filming crew. Sometime in May 1992, sought the assistance of their supervisor to
facilitate their request that their salary be adjusted in accordance with the minimum
wage law.

On June 1992, Mrs. Cesario, their supervisor, told them that Mr. Vic Del Rosario would
agree to their request only if they sign a blank employment contract. Petitioners refused
to sign such document. After which, the Mr. Enero was forced to go on leave on the
same month and refused to take him back when he reported for work. Mr. Maraguinot
on the other hand was dropped from the payroll but was returned days after. He was
again asked to sign a blank employment contract but when he refused, he was
terminated.

Consequently, the petitioners sued for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. The
private respondents claim the following: (a) that VIVA FILMS is the trade name of VIVA
PRODUCTIONS, INC. and that it was primarily engaged in the distribution & exhibition of
movies- but not then making of movies; (b) That they hire contractors called
producers who act as independent contractors as that of Vic Del Rosario; and (c) As
such, there is no employee-employer relation between petitioners and private
respondents.

The Labor Arbiter held that the complainants are employees of the private
respondents. That the producers are not independent contractor but should be
considered as labor-only contractors and as such act as mere agent of the real
employer. Thus, the said employees are illegally dismissed.

The private respondents appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter declaring that the complainants were project employees due to the ff.
reasons: (a) Complainants were hired for specific movie projects and their employment
was co-terminus with each movie project; (b)The work is dependent on the availability
of projects. As a result, the total working hours logged extremely varied; (c) The
extremely irregular working days and hours of complainants work explains the lump sum
payment for their service; and (d) The respondents alleged that the complainants are
not prohibited from working with other movie companies whenever they are not
working for the independent movie producers engaged by the respondents.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the complainants but was denied by NLRC. In
effect, they filed an instant petition claiming that NLRC committed a grave abuse of
discretion in: (a) Finding that petitioners were project employees; (b) Ruling that
petitioners were not illegally dismissed; and (c) Reversing the decision of the Labor
Arbiter.

In the instant case, the petitioners allege that the NLRC acted in total disregard of
evidence material or decisive of the controversy.

Issues:
(a) W/N there exist an employee- employer relationship between the petitioners and
the private respondents.
(b) W/N the private respondents are engaged in the business of making movies.
(c) W/N the producer is a job contractor.
Held:
There exist an employee- employer relationship between the petitioners and the private
respondents because of the ff. reasons that nowhere in the appointment slip does it
appear that it was the producer who hired the crew members. Moreover, it was VIVAs
corporate name appearing on heading of the slip. It can likewise be said that it was
VIVA who paid for the petitioners salaries.

Respondents also admit that the petitioners were part of a work pool wherein they
attained the status of regular employees because of the ff. requisites: (a) There is a
continuous rehiring of project employees even after cessation of a project; (b) The tasks
performed by the alleged project employees are vital, necessary and indispensable
to the usual business or trade of the employer; and (c) However, the length of time
which the employees are continually re-hired is not controlling but merely serves as a
badge of regular employment.

Since the producer and the crew members are employees of VIVA and that these
employees works deal with the making of movies. It can be said that VIVA is engaged
of making movies and not on the mere distribution of such.

The producer is not a job contractor because of the ff. reasons: (Sec. Rule VII, Book III of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.)

a. A contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work

on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and
method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters
connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof. The said
producer has a fix time frame and budget to make the movies.

b. The contractor should have substantial capital and materials necessary to conduct
his business. The said producer, Del Rosario, does not have his own tools, equipment,
machinery, work premises and other materials to make motion pictures. Such materials
were provided by VIVA.

It can be said that the producers are labor-only contractors. Under Article 106 of the
Labor Code (reworded) where the contractor does not have the requisites as that of
the job contractors.
MAKATI HABERDA SHERY INC., JORGE LEDESMA AND CECILIO INOCENCIO VS. NLRC,
etc.,

Facts:
This is a petition assailing the decision of NLRC affirming the decision of Labor Arbiter
finding Haberda guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering him to reinstate the dismissed
workers and in concluding that there is employer-employee relationship between
workers and Haberda.

The complainants were working for Haberda as tailors, seamstress, sewers, basters and
plantsadoras. Paid on a piece-rate basis with allowance when they report for work
before 9:30am everyday.(MON-SAT)

July 1984, the labor organization where the complainants are members filed a
complaint for underpayment of basic wage, living allowance, non-payment of
overtime work, non-payment of holiday pay, non-payment of service incentive pay ad
other benefits under wage orders.

During the pendency, Haberda dismiss the workers for the alleged job acceptance
from another, which was denied by the workers and countered by filing a complaint for
illegal dismissal. Which was granted by NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether there exists an employer-employee relationship.

HELD: The facts at bar indubitably reveal that the most important requisite of control is
present. As gleaned from the operations of petitioner, when a customer enters into a
contract with the haberdashery or its proprietor, the latter directs an employee who
may be a tailor, pattern maker, sewer or "plantsadora" to take the customers
measurements, and to sew the pants, coat or shirt as specified by the customer.
Supervision is actively manifested in all these aspects the manner and quality of cutting,
sewing and ironing. It is evident in the memorandum, that the petitioner has reserved
the right to control its employees not only as to the result but also the means and
methods by which the same are to be accomplished. That private respondents are
regular employees is further proven by the fact that they have to report for work
regularly from 9:30 a.m. to6:00 or 7:00 p.m. and are paid an additional allowance of P
3.00 daily if they report for work before 9:30 a.m. and which is forfeited when they arrive
at or after 9:30 a.m.
HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORPORATION VS. LABOR ARBITER ADRIAN N.
PAGALILAUAN AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS, AND ROGELIO A. ABAN

This is a petition to review on certiorari the resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the labor arbiter's decision ordering herein
petitioner, Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation to reinstate Rogelio A. Aban to his
former position without loss of seniority rights, to pay him 12 months backwages in the
amount of P18,000.00 and to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P1,800.00.

On October 24, 1978, petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its
"Legal Assistant." He received a basic monthly salary of P1,500.00 plus an initial living
allowance of P50.00 which gradually increased to P320.00.

On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the corporation informing him that
he would be considered terminated effective October 4,1980 because of his alleged
failure to perform his duties well.

On October 6, 1980, Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal.

The labor arbiter ruled that Aban was illegally dismissed. This ruling was affirmed by the
NLRC on appeal.

Hence, this present petition.

The only issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not there was an employer-
employee relationship between the petitioner corporation and Aban. The petitioner
questions the jurisdiction of the public respondents considering the alleged absence of
an employer-employee relationship.

The petitioner contends that its relationship with Aban is that of a client with his
lawyer. It is its position that "(a) lawyer as long as he is acting as such, as long as he is
performing acts constituting practice of law, can never be considered an
employee. His relationship with those to whom he renders services, as such lawyer, can
never be governed by the labor laws. For a lawyer to so argue is not only demeaning
to himself (sic), but also his profession and to his brothers in the profession." Thus, the
petitioner argues that the labor arbiter and NLRC have no jurisdiction over the instant
case.

The contention is without merit.

A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private
corporation or even of the government. It is not unusual for a big corporation to hire a
staff of lawyers as its in-house counsel, pay them regular salaries, rank them in its table
of organization, and otherwise treat them like its other officers and employees. At the
same time, it may also contract with a law firm to act as outside counsel on a retainer
basis. The two classes of lawyers often work closely together but one group is made up
of employees while the other is not. A similar arrangement may exist as to doctors,
nurses, dentists, public relations practitioners, and other professionals.

This Court is not without a guide in deciding whether or not an employer-employee

relation exists between the contending parties or whether or not the private respondent
was hired on a retainer basis.

As stated in the case of Tabas v. California Manufacturing Co., (G.R. No. 80680, January
26, 1989):

"This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or not there is an
employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the manner of selection
and engagement of the putative employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (.3)
the presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of a
power to control the putative employee's conduct. Of the four, the right-of-control test
has been held to be the decisive factor."

Aban was employed by the petitioner to be its Legal Assistant as evidenced by his
appointment paper (Exhibit "A"). The petitioner paid him a basic salary plus living
allowance. Thereafter, Aban was dismissed on his alleged failure to perform his duties
well. (Exhibit "B")

Aban worked solely for the petitioner and dealt only with legal matters involving the
said corporation and its employees. He also assisted the Personnel Officer in processing
appointment papers of employees. This latter duty is not an act of a lawyer in the
exercise of his profession but rather a duty for the benefit of the corporation.

The above-mentioned facts show that the petitioner paid Aban's wages, exercised its
power to hire and fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised control
over Aban by defining the duties and functions of his work.

Moreover, estoppel lies against the petitioner. It may no longer question the jurisdiction
of the labor arbiter and NLRC.

The petitioner presented documents (Exhibits "2" to "19") before the Labor Arbiter to
prove that Aban was a managerial employee. Now, it is disclaiming that Aban was
ever its employee. The proper procedure was for the petitioner to prove its allegations
that Aban drank heavily, violated company policies, spent company funds and
properties for personal ends, and otherwise led the employer to lose trust and
confidence in him. The real issue was due process, not the specious argument raised in
this petition.

The new theory presented before this Court is a last-ditch effort by the petitioner to
cover up for the unwarranted dismissal of its employee. This Court frowns upon such
delaying tactics.

The findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter being supported by substantial evidence are
binding on this Court. (See Industrial Timber Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 83616, January 20, 1989).

Considering that the private respondent was illegally dismissed from his employment in
1980, he is entitled to reinstatement to his former or similar position without loss of
seniority rights, if it is still feasible, to backwages without qualification or deduction for
three years, (D.M. Consunjo, Inc. v. Pucan, 159 SCRA 107 (1988); Flores v. Nuestro, G.R.
No. 66890, April 15, 1988), and to reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of
P5,000.00. Should reinstatement prove no longer feasible, the petitioner will pay him
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. (City Trust Finance Corp. v. NLRC, 157 SCRA 87;
Santos v. NLRC, 154 SCRA 166; Metro Drug v. NLRC, et al., 143 SCRA 132; Luzon
Brokerage v. Luzon Labor Union, 7 SCRA 116). The amount of such separation pay as
may be provided by law or the collective bargaining agreement is to be computed
based on the period from 24 October 1978 (date of first employment) to 4 October
1983 (three years after date of illegal dismissal). /Manila Midtown Commercial
Corporation v. Nuwhrain, 159 SCRA 212 (1988).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petitioner is ordered
to reinstate the private respondent to his former or a similar position without loss of
seniority rights and to pay three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction
and P5,000.00 in attorney's fees. Should reinstatement not be feasible, the petitioner
shall pay the private respondent termination benefits in addition to the above stated
three years backpay and P5,000.00 attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.