SpecPro Case Digest

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests (2 nd Batch)
2.6 Claims Against the Estate (Rule 86, Rules of Court) NOTES
1. Santos v. Manarang (Gian)
FACTS: Don Lucas died leaving a will w/c stated his desire that his debts be religiously paid by his wife &
executors in the form & at the time agreed upon w/ his creditors. Among the debts mentioned in the will was
one in favor of Santos. The will was duly probated & a committee was appointed to hear & determine the
claims against the estate. Hence, the committee submitted its report to the court.
Thereafter, Santos presented a petition to the court asking that the committee be required to reconvene &
pass upon his claims against the estate w/c were recognized in the will. His petition was denied by the court on
Pagethe
| 1ground that the same (petition) was barred by the statute of nonclaims. Santos contended that his failure
to present his claim to the committee w/in the statute of nonclaims was due to his belief that it was
unnecessary to do so because of the fact that Don Lucas (testator), in his will, expressly recognized the debts &
directed that they should be paid.
HELD: The claim of Santos is barred by the statute of nonclaims. Santos should have presented his claim to the
committee during the 6 month period prescribed by law.
RATIO
Debts may accrue and be paid in whole or in part between the time the will is made and the death of the
testator. To allow a debt mentioned in the will in the amount expressed therein on the ground that such was
the desire of the testator, when, in fact, the debt had been wholly or partly paid, would be not only unjust to
the residuary heirs, but a reflection upon the good sense of the testator himself.
The direction in the will for the executor to pay all just debts does not mean that he shall pay them without
probate. There is nothing in the will to indicate that the testator intended that his estate should be
administered in any other than the regular way under the statute, which requires "all demands against the
estates of the deceased persons," "all such demands as may be exhibited," etc. The statute provides the very
means for ascertaining whether the claims against the estate or just debts.
But it is said that the plaintiff's (Santos) claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of a legacy and
disposed of accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff (Santos) would receive nothing until after all debts
had been paid and the heirs by force of law had received their shares. From any point of view the inevitable
result is that there must be a hearing sometime before some tribunal to determine the correctness of the debts
recognized in the wills of deceased persons. This hearing, in the first instance, cannot be had before the court
because the law does not authorize it. Such debtors must present their claims to the committee; otherwise
their claims will be forever barred.
2. Tan Sen Guan v. Go Sui San (Chai)
FACTS:
TAN SEN GUAN (plaintiff) is the administrator of the intestate estate of Tan Peng Sue, and GO SUI SAN
(defendant) is the administrator in the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Antonio
Tampoco.
According to the books kept by the defendant administrator, Antonio Tampoco owed Tan Peng Sue, the sum of
P25,802.60, with the interest at the rate of 9 6/10 per cent per year, w/c amounted to P30,272.89 at the end
of the year 1922.
Upon the death of Antonio Tampoco, a proceeding was instituted in the CFI of Manila for the settlement of his
estate; that year commissioners were appointed to hear and decide whatever claim might be presented
against the estate; their final report was approved by the court.
After the approval by the court of the report of the committee on claims, the plaintiff, in his capacity as
administrator of the estate of Tan Peng Sue, moved the court that the committee on claims be again
authorized, or a new committee appointed, to hear and decide a claim that he had and which he was to
present against the estate, alleging, among other grounds, that the administrator Go Sui San had been
assuring the heirs of Tan Peng Sue that they would not lose their credit.
After due proceeding the new commissioners, who were appointed by the court on Sept. 21, 1992, admitted
the claim of the plaintiff, recommending its payment by the defendant administrator, which was by agreement
of the parties estimated at P30,272.89.
On December 22, 1923, the court presided over by Judge Anacleto Diaz absolved the defendant administrator
of the estate of Antonio Tampoco from the complaint, holding that the commissioners appointed on
September 21, 1922, had no authority under the law to hear and decide said claim, because the court that had
appointed them had on the said date no jurisdiction to appoint them in view of the fact that more than 14
months have elapsed since their final report was submitted by the former committee on claims in the
aforesaid testamentary proceeding and approved by the court. From this, Plaintiff moved for a new trial.
On March 27, 1924, the lower court presided over by the Honorable Geo. R. Harvey, judge, after considering
the motion for new trial, rendered a new decision, setting aside that of December 22, 1923, and ordering the
administrator of the estate of Antonio Tampoco to pay the administrator of the estate of Tan Peng Sue the sum
of P28,802.60, with interest thereon at the rate of 9 6/10 per cent annum.
Page | 2
From this decision the administrator of the estate of Antonio Tampoco appealed, and his counsel in this court
prays for the reversal of the decision appealed from, alleging that the lower court erred: (a) In setting aside its
former decision and in entering a new decision entirely contrary to the preceding one, instead of granting a
new trial; (b) in holding that the claim presented was valid and effective at the time it was presented, and in
not holding that the same was extinguished at that time under the law; and (c) in not absolving the defendant
from the complaint.
ISSUE: whether or not this action/claim against the estate has prescribed, as contended by the defendant.
HELD: Judgment appealed from is reversed. Plaintiff appellee has lost his right to enforce his claim in this
proceeding.
The pertinent part of section 695 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
A person having a claim against a deceased person proper to be allowed by the committee, who does not,
after publication of the required notice, exhibit his claim to the committee as provided in this chapter, shall be
barred from recovering such demand or from pleading the same in offset to any action, except as hereinafter
provided.
Provisions similar to this are found in the statutes of many, if not all the, states of the Union, and are ordinarily
alluded to as statutes relative to claims not presented in due time. It was enacted in order to facilitate the
speedy liquidation of estates, and to that end, it bars all proceeding when the claim is one that was not
presented after the publication of the notice required.
To avoid the effect of section 695, the plaintiff lays stress on two circumstances. In the first place, he says that
his failure to present the claim to the committee appointed by the court on September 21, 1922, was due to
the machinations and fraudulent and false representations of the defendant.
While it is easy to understand that the interests of the plaintiff, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of
Tan Peng Sue, were not duly protected, and that his conduct was, to a certain extent, influenced by the
unfavorable circumstances that surrounded him, yet we hold that prescription cannot be avoided on the
ground of fraud or undue influence. The failure of Tan Chu Lay, heir of Tan Peng Sue, to present his claim was
an omission committed by an heir who had knowledge of the existence of the credit of his deceased father.
The fact that Tan Chu Lay might have been induced by fraudulent machinations and unlawful influence of the
defendant administrator cannot affect the legal consequences of said act.
And even if it be admitted that the widow of Tan Peng Sue was in China while the committee on claims was
acting in the proceeding for the settlement of Antonio Tampoco's estate, still the result would be the same.
The law does not make any reservation or exception whatever, and this court cannot make either.
. . . Where the statute of non-claim makes no exception as to any persons or class of persons, the courts can
make none; and hence in the absence of some provision to the contrary, the statutes of non-claim run against
non-resident as well as resident, and infant as well as adult claimants, and also against insane persons, and the
estate of a deceased creditor.
Secondly, to avoid the effect of section 695, the plaintiff alleges that the notice to the creditors was not
published in the manner prescribed by section 687 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
We think that the documents attached to the report of said committee, the stipulation of facts and the
approval of said report by the trial court constitute a conclusive proof that the commissioners have complied
with the statute, requiring the publication of the notice to the creditors.
Under section 690, a creditor who has failed to present his claim within the period fixed by the committee on
claims may apply to the court, within six months after the period previously fixed, for the renewal of the
commission for the purpose of examining his claim. The record shows that the application of the plaintiff was
presented 14 months after the expiration of the period fixed for the filing of claims. And while it was
presented before the final settlement of the estate of Antonio Tampoco, yet, it having been proved that the
committee had published in the newspaper La Nacion the notice required by law, there was no possible
ground for granting said application. We believe that the lapse of 14 months is an unsurmountable barrier
opposing the granting of said application.
3. Barredo v. Court of Appeals (Mike)
FACTS: The heirs of Barredo files a petition for tardy claim based on a promissory note secured by a mortgage
Pageexecuted
|3 by McDonough in favour of the late Fausto Barredo. The mortgage was annotated at the back of
certificate of land. Upon the death of Fausto Barredo, the heirs adjudicated extrajudicially unto themselves the
said credit. Which was however cancelled by the Japanese Imperial Army in August 1944 (McDonough an
American, considered enemy citizen, hence his properties were appropriated to the invader) and the heir was
paid Php20K and signed a certificate requesting the Register of Deeds to cancel the mortgage of these
properties.
McDonough died on March 5, 1945 and an intestate proceeding was instituted. A notice to creditors requiring
them to file their claim with the clerk of court within 6 months from the date of its first publication (August 23)
until February 23, 1946.
On Oct. 22, 1947, the heirs of Barredo filed their belated claim. The administrator opposed. The RTC allowed
the claim, but the CA reversed the order of allowed; hence, the present appeal.
ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in disallowing the heirs to file their claim. Consequently, when is the 1 month
period referred in Section 2 Rule 87 of the Rules of Court for allowing a creditor who has failed to file his claim
within the 6 month period be counted.
HELD: Yes. the probate court previously fixed the period for filing claims at 6 months reckoned from the date
of first publication, and first publication was made on August 23, 1945, the present claim was filed on October
22, 1947. Clearly, the claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed. But a tardy claim may be allowed,
at the discretion of the court, upon showing of causes for failure to present said claim on time.
But the probate courts discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing claims but before entry
of an order of distribution presupposed not only a claim for apparent merit but also cause/s existed to justify
the tardiness.
In the case at bar, the allege excuse for their tardiness is the recent discovery of the papers of the deceased
Barredo from the lawyer who is also deceased; is insufficient due to the availability and knowledge by the
petitioners of the annotation at the back of the certificate as well as the payment of Php20K.
The 1-month period specified in the Rules of Court is the time granted claimants after the regular period for
filing claims but before entry of judgment of an order of distribution is to begin from the order authorizing the
filing of the claims. It does not mean that the extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original
period fixed by the court for the presentation of claims.
4. Villanueva v. PNB (Fide)
Facts: For the administration of the estate of her deceased husband, Mauricia De Villanueva petitioned the CFI
for Letters of Administration. The petition was set for hearing and notice thereof was published in the Manila
Daily Bulletin. After the appointment and oath-taking of Atty. Teodulo Ricaforte as administrator, the Clerk of
the CFI issued a Notice to Creditors which was published in the Morning Times on November 16, 23, and 30,
1950 which expired on November 16, 1951.
On July 20, 1953, PNB filed in the administration proceedings a Creditors Claim. The administrator opposed
the claim alleging that the said claim is barred forever on the ground that the notice to creditors having been
published in the Morning Times on November 16, 23, and 30, 1950, the PNB failed to file its claim within the
time limited in the notice which was on November 16, 1951.
On November 14, 1958, more than four (4) years after the opposition of the claim by the administrator, filed a
Petition for an Extension of Time within which to File the Claim of the PNB, alleging, among others, that
Section 2 , Rule 87 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of claims even if the period stated in the notice to
creditors had elapsed, upon cause shown and on such terms as are equitable; that its failure to present the
claim within the period stated in the notice, was its lack of knowledge of administration proceedings. The CFI
denied the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the claim of PNB against the estate of the deceased Pascual Villanueva is already
barred.
Held: YES. Admittedly, the claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the Order of the CFI, within
which to present claims against the estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed on November 16, 1951 and
the claim was filed on July 20, 1953 or about 1 year and 8 months late. This notwithstanding, appellant
Pagecontends
|4 that it did not know of such administration proceedings, not even its employees. It is to be noted
that the petition for Letters of Administration and the Notice to Creditors were duly published in the Manila
Daily Bulletin and in the Morning Times, respectively, which was a full compliance with the requirements of
the Rules. Moreover, the supposed lack of knowledge of the proceedings on the part of PNB and its employees
had been belied by uncontested and eloquent evidence, consisting of a deposit of an amount of money by the
administrator of the estate in said Bank. The deposit was made on December 1, 1951, in spite of which PNB
only filed its claim on July 20, 1953. It is quite true that the Courts can extend the period within which to
present claims against the estate, even after the period limited has elapsed; but such extension should be
granted under special circumstances. The lower did not find any justifiable reason to give the extension and for
one thing, there was no period to extend, the same had elapsed.
5. PNB v. De Villarin (Alvin)
On July 7, 1955, PNB obtained a judgment against Portfolio Villarin in Civil Case of the CFI sentencing the latter
to pay PNB sums of money. On January, 1961, Villarin died in Misamis without leaving any will. PNB claims to
have learned of his death in 1963. On July 13, 1965, PNB filed a petition in CFI for the issuance of letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Villarin since no proceedings for settlement has been instituted by the
widow or any heirs. On September, 1965, letters of administration were issued to the widow, Mrs. Purificacion
De Villarin as the administratrix.
On March, 1966, PNB filed in CFI its claims against the intestate estate of the deceased in the amount awarded
in the judgment. The administratrix filed her answer alleging that PNBs claim has prescribed which limits to 10
years within which an action to revive a judgment may be filed (Article 1144 of CC).
On September, 1967 the son of the deceased together with Purificacion likewise filed an opposition that the
claim of PNB has been barred by the statute of limitations, that the money judgment relied upon could have
been enforced by an independent civil action for revival of judgment under section 6, rule 39 of ROC.
PNB countered and admitted that more than 10 years have already elapsed from the time judgment became
final; however, the prescriptive period was interrupted by the partial payment made by the judgment debtor,
the last of which was on March, 1956. PNB also claims that there was an acknowledgment of the debt, hence,
resulting to interruption. PNB cited various instances wherein the deceased, during his lifetime and after the
decision became final, made representations to it for grace to pay the judgment credit. The administratrix
herself likewise made representations to the PNB.
CFI rendered a decision against PNB where its claims have already prescribed for failure to file a motion for
execution within 5 years from date of judgment nor filed an action to revive judgment within 10 years from
date of judgment. Hence, this appeal to CA
ISSUE:
1. Whether PNBs claim consisting of money judgment against the deceased which became final on
August 11, 1955 could still be filed in the intestate estate of the deceased after 10 years for the
revival of the judgment has already lapsed
2. Was the claim filed on time?
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court "a judgment may be executed on motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time,
and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action." PNB maintains
that the applicable period of prescription is not the 10-year period for filing an action to revive a judgment but
the period of prescription for the filing of creditor's claim against the judgment debtor's estate under Section
2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
The records show that on July 13, 1965, the appellant Bank filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in the settlement of the intestate estate of Porfirio Villarin and on September 24, 1965, the
letters of administration was issued in favor of the widow of Porfirio. If the money judgment obtained by PNB
against Porfirio Villarin became final and executory on August 11, 1955, it has up to August 11, 1965 to file an
action to revive the judgment. However, appellant Bank did not actually file an action to revive the money
judgment but a claim against the estate of the deceased on March 9, 1966.
Yes. When PNB filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration stating therein that it was one of
the creditors of the estate of the deceased, it can be considered that the Bank has made known its claim
against it and since the aforesaid petition was filed within the 10-year prescriptive period for the revival of the
money judgment in question, appellant Bank may be deemed to have filed its claim on time. In effect, the
filing of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is the first concrete step to take so that the
creditors of the estate of the deceased may be known and recognized. Once a creditor has filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration, the court shall issue letters of administration to a qualified person.
Immediately after the granting of the letters of administration, the court shall issue notice requiring all persons
having money claims against the decedent to file them with the clerk of court. In the notice, the court shall
state the time for the filing of the claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve (12) nor less
than six (6) months after the date of first publication of the notice ... Immediately after the notice is issued to
creditors, the administrator shall cause the notice to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks successively
Pagein| the
5 newspaper of general circulation in the province, and to be posted for the same period in four public
places in the province and in two public places in municipality where the decedent last resided.
In the case before us, there is no showing that the lower court has issued a notice requiring all persons having
any claim against the decedent to file them with the clerk of court. But even before the lower court could issue
such notice to all creditors of the estate, appellant Bank filed on March 9, 1966 its formal claim against the
estate of the decedent. At first, it would appear that the filing of the claim on March 9, 1966 was already out
of time because it was filed more than seven months after the ten-year prescriptive period for reviving the
money judgment has prescribed. However, considering that the appellant Bank has already filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration in the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent on July 13,
1965, which is within the 10-year period, the filing of the formal claim on March 9, 1966 can be made to
retroact to the date when the petition for letters of administration was filed with the lower court because that
was actually the time the appellant bank had made known to the court that it has a claim against the estate of
the deceased. And thus having made known on time its claim against the estate of the deceased by means of
its petition for the issuance of letters of administration in the settlement of the intestate estate of Porfirio
Villarin, this, the court has given appellant Bank sufficient cause of action to assert its claim against the estate
of the deceased.
6. Aguas et al. V. Fernandez (Alex)
Facts:
Sometime in March 1960, sps. Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas filed an action for recovery of
damages before the CFI of Samar against Hermogenes Llemos averring that the latter had served
them by registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession only to discover in court
that no such petition had been filed.
However, the defendant (Llemos) died before answering the complaint against him a month after the
said complaint was filed.
The plaintiffs amended their complaint and included the heirs of the deceased and their claims for
damages be chargeable against the estate of the deceased.
Plaintiffs argue with considerable cogency that contrasting the correlated provisions of the Rules of
Court, those concerning claims that are barred if not filed in the estate settlement proceedings (Rule
87, sec. 5) and those defining actions that survive and may be prosecuted against the executor or
administrator (Rule 88, sec. 1), it is apparent that actions for damages caused by tortious conduct of
a defendant (as in the case at bar) survive the death of the latter.
The heirs of Llemos then filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint.
The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the heirs should not be a party in the
complaint and instead, a legal representative should have been made a party in the same.
ISSUE: Do the plaintiffs have legal personalities to file their claims for damages against the estate or can they
be parties- in-interest in the settlement of estate proceedings to secure their claim?
HELD: NO
Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they
are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon;
and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages
under the last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property,
but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished. To maliciously cause a party to
incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly injurious to that party's property. Thus, the
plaintiffs action is not proper to be filed against the estate of the deceased with respect to the above-
mentioned rule. Instead, it can be filed against the executor of administrator of the estate as a contingent
claim.
7. Vera et al. V. Fernandez (Van)
FACTS:
The case involves an appeal from 2 orders (1) Dismissal of the Motion for Allowance of Claim and an
Order of Payment of Taxes against the Estate of the late Luis Tongoy for deficiency income taxes of
the decedent including surcharge, interests, and penalties (2) Denial of MR of Order of Dismissal
BIR Petitioners claim represents the indebtedness to the government of the late Luis Tongoy for the
deficiency income taxes, evidenced by a Proof of Claim.
The estates administrator opposed the claim on the basis of Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the ROC.
Respondent Judge dismissed Ps claim (order 1) and upon filing a motion for reconsideration denied
the same (order 2).
PageISSUE:
| 6 WON the Statute of Non-Claims, Sec. 5 Rule 86 of ROC, bars he BIRs claim for unpaid taxes
HELD: No, therefore, the order is REVERSED
BASIS OF REVERSAL:
CIR v. Ilagan: Assessment, collection and recovery of taxes, as well as the matter of prescription thereof
are governed by the provisions of the NIRC, Sec. 331 and 332 not by other provisions of law. Even
without being specifically mentioned, the provisions of Sec. 2 Rule 86 of the ROC may reasonably be
presumed to have been also in the mind of the Court as not affecting the aforecited section of the NIRC
Pineda v. CFI: Taxes assessed against the estate of a deceased person need not be submitted to the
committee on claims in the ordinary course of administration. In the exercise of its control over the
administrator, the court may direct the payment of such taxes upon motion showing that the taxes have
been assessed against the estatexxxClaims for taxes may be collected even after the distribution of the
decedents estate among his heirs who shall be liable therefore in proportion of their share in the
inheritance. Reason for liberality: Lifeblood Theory (yun o!)
Pineda v. CFI Supra: Sec. 315 of NIRC states that payment of income tax shall be a lien in favor of the
government from the time the assessment was made until fully paid. By virtue of such lien, this Court
held that the property of the estate already in the hands of an heir or transferee may be subject to the
payment of the tax due the estate.
Before the inheritance has passed to the heirs, the unpaid taxes due the decedent may be collected, even
without its having been presented under Sec. 2 of Rule 86. Until the property of the estate of the
decedent has vested in the heirs, the decedent, represented by his estate, continues as if he were still
alive, subject to the payment of such taxes as would be collectible from the estate even after his death.
Thus, the income taxes sought to be collected were due from the estate for the years 1946-1948
following his death in May, 1945.
Even if the claims for taxes have to be filed within the time prescribed by Sec. 2, Rule 86, the claim in
question may be filed even after the expiration of the time originally fixed therein. P filed an application
after the expiration of the time previously limited but before an order of the distribution is entered, which
the court should have granted.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is REVERSED.
8. Gotamco v. Chan Seng (Febb)
Facts
o Antonio Tanpoco died in the year 1920 and left a will dividing his estate of over P300,000
among four sons, one-half of which he bequeathed to Tan Kim Hong, the claimant, whom
he described in his will as his legitimate son, and the other half he left in equal shares to
his three adopted sons, Tan Kimco, Tan Kimbio and Tan Kim Choo, and appointed Go Siu
San, a resident of Manila, as executor of his will, which provided that no bond should be
required.
o Two Chinese named Tan Kim Lay and Te Sue, one of Tarlac and the other of Manila, were
appointed and qualified as commissioners, and later they published the usual notice to
creditors to present their claims within six months at the office of Attorney M. G. Goyena,
of Manila.
o The commissioners presented their report to the court in which, among others, they
reported the allowance of the claim here in question. At the time all of the heirs, including
Tan Kim Hong, were minors and had lived in China since the death of Antonio Tanpoco, as
also had the widow of the deceased.
o When such report has been filed, the executor filed a motion asking for the appointment
of an attorney of his own choice as curador ad litem for the minor heirs which, among
other things, that the heirs who are interested in the estate of the above entitled action
are all minors, to wit: Tan Kimco, age 20;Tan Kim Hong, age 12; Tan Kimbio, age 11; and Tan
Kim Choo, age 4; and that all the above heirs are now in China, and the day of their return
to the Islands is unknown to the administrator of the estate which court ignored but
appointed Mr. Canillas who considered such appointment as only formality such that he
did not make any investigations thereof and hence, the report was approved.
o In September, 1922, they arrived in Manila and employed counsel to represent and protect
their interest, and it was then that Chan Seng learned for the first time of the allowance of
the claim in favor of Tan Kim Hong. Upon her motion, on November 27, 1922, Judge
Harvey ordered an investigation of the administration of Go Siu San as executor, which was
made by Mr. Felipe Canillas, who still held the position of curador ad litem of all the minor
heirs, including the claimant, who made a written report to the court.
o The report concluded with a recommendation for the removal of the executor for gross
misconduct and fraud, and the annulment of the claim of Tan Kim Hong. After the report
Page | 7 was filed, a hearing was had and testimony was taken, and Judge Harvey removed Go Siu
San as executor, and in his order of removal, among other things, said that commissioners
Te Sue and that he had not received any claim;
o That the claims which appears in the report were taken from the books of the business of
the deceased, Antonio Tanpoco; nevertheless, the claim of Tan Peng Sue does not appear
in the report of these commissioners on claims although it appears in the books and was
afterwards accepted by the commissioners last appointed.
o After such proceedings, nothing was further done until November 14, 1923, when the
present administrator applied to the court for authority, among other things, to pay the
claim in question, to which the appellee appeared and objected. The court denied the
application of the present guardian to the claimant to require the administrator to pay the
claim in question upon the ground that it was void and fictitious, from which Tan Kim Hong
appeals, contending that the lower court erred in hearing and sustaining the objections to
the allowance of the claim, and in denying the motion of the administrator for authority to
pay the claim, alleging that the report of the committee allowing the claim was made and
filed on June 29, 1921, and contends that it became automatically final on July 14, 1921;
o That the opponent should have made her opposition within the time specified in the Code,
and that her failure to take the statutory appeal is a bar to all defenses, citing and relying
upon the case of De los Santos vs. Reyes.
Issue: Whether or not the claim was timely filed and presented and that such filing became final.
Held: NO. The court found as a fact that in the De los Santos vs. Reyes case, supra, there was a
substantial compliance with all of the statutory requirements, and the decision in that case was
based upon that fact. But there is a marked distinction between the facts there and those in the
instant case.
o Here, all of the parties in interest were minors. The evidence is conclusive that at the time
the alleged claim was allowed, Tan Kim Hong was only twelve years of age, and that all of
the other parties were minors. There is no claim or pretense that Tan Kim Hong had a
guardian or that anyone had the legal authority to appear for and present his claim or to
represent him, or that his claim was ever presented. There is no claim or pretense that any
of the parties in interest had any knowledge of the fact that the claim was presented and
allowed before they came to Manila from China in September, 1922. As a matter of fact,
there is no evidence that the claim in question in any manner, shape or form was ever
presented to the commissioners by anyone.
o For aught that appears in the record, the claim was allowed by the commissioners on their
own motion and of their own volition. It also appears that the entries which were made in
the books of the deceased were made by his bookkeeper, and there is nothing to show
that they were made by the authority of the deceased. It is very significant that the will of
the deceased was made sometime after the entries were made, and that no reference
whatever is made in the will to the claim in question. A judgment is the law's last word in a
judicial controversy. It may therefore be defined as the final consideration and
determination of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the matter ssubmitted to it in an
action or proceeding. A more precise definition is that a judgment is the conclusion of the
law upon the matters contained in the record, or the application of the law to the
pleadings and to the facts, as found by the court or admitted by the parties, or deemed to
exist upon their default in a course of judicial proceedings. It should be noted that only is a
judgment which is pronounced between the parties to an action upon the matters
submitted to the court for decision. . ..In the instant case there was not claim made, filed
or presented by anyone. Legally speaking, the allowance of the claim would be like
rendering a judgment without the filing of a complaint, or even the making or
presentment of a claim. Upon the facts shown, to legalize the allowance of the claim with
all of the formalities and requisites of a final judgment, would be a travesty upon justice. It
appears from the record before us that the commissioners did not have any jurisdiction to
allow the claim; that as to the claim in question their proceedings were null and void ab
initio, and hence they were not res judicata and in addition to that, it clearly appears that
the allowance of the claim was a fraud upon the appellee. Affirmed.
9. Paredes v. Moya (Gian)
NOT AVAILABLE
10. Ignacio et al. v. Pampanga Bus Co. (Chai) Rule 3, SEC. 21.
FACTS: In a suit to collect P105k upon a contractual obligation filed by Pampanga Bus (PAMBUSCO) against 2 Where claim does not
defendants: Valentin Fernando and Encarnacion Elchico vda. De Fernando, Encarnacion died at the time survive. When the
PagePAMBUSCO
|8 already presented its case. Intestate proceedings were filed. Notice to the estate's creditors was action is for recovery
given for them to file their claims within six (6) months. of money, debt or
interest thereon, and
On Pambusco's motion, the court in the civil case ordered Jose Nicolas, then administrator, to substitute for the defendant dies
the deceased Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando as one of the defendants. Jose Nicolas, as such before final judgment
administrator, filed an amended answer with counterclaim against Pambusco. in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be
After trial on the merits, the CFI of Manila rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the dismissed to be
defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P93k. Counterclaim dismissed. CA AFFIRMED. prosecuted in the
manner especially
Both defendants appealed by certiorari to this Court. Valentin Fernando's appeal was dismissed for having provided in these
been filed out of time. The appeal of the estate of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando, raising issues of fact, rules.
likewise dismissed.
The judgment in the civil case having reached finality, Pambusco moved in the intestate proceedings that the
heirs and/or the present joint administratrices, Natividad E. Ignacio and Leonor E. Almazan, be ordered to pay
P46,500.00, the share of the deceased in the judgment debt.
The administratrices opposed. Ground: Pambusco's claim is time-barred.
PROBATE COURT: allows said amount of P46,500.00 to be paid by the heirs and/or the joint administratrices;
but no payment thereof shall be made until after the administratrices shall have informed the Court in writing
as to the existence of other unsettled money claims against the estate and of the sufficiency of the assets
available for payment of all the debts.
ISSUE: Was Pambusco's claim properly admitted by the probate court?
HELD: YES. Order of lower court affirmed.

Rule 3, Sec.21 of rules of court explains that, upon the death of defendant, all money claims should be filed in
the testate or interstate proceedings "to avoid useless duplicity of procedure." Obviously, the legal precept just
quoted is procedural in nature. It outlines the method by which an action for recovery of money, debt or
interest may continue, upon the terms therein prescribed.
But is there justification for the civil case to go on in spite of the death of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de
Fernando "before final judgment in the Court of First Instance?"
At the time of the death of defendant Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando, plaintiff Pambusco had already
closed its evidence and submitted its case. Her administrator substituted. By this substitution, the estate had
notice of the claim. The estate was thus represented. The administrator did not complain of the substitution.
At no time did the estate of the deceased impugn the authority of the regular courts to determine the civil
case. Now that the judgment has become final, the estate cannot be heard to say that said judgment
reached after a full dress trial on the merits will now go for naught. The estate has thus waived its right to
have Pambusco's claim re-litigated in the estate proceedings. For, though presentment of probate claims is
imperative, it is generally understood that it may be waived by the estate's representative . And, waiver is to
be determined from the administrator's "acts and conduct." Certainly, the administrator's failure to plead the
statute of nonclaims, his active participation, and resistance to plaintiff's claim, in the civil suit, amount to
such waiver.
Appellants' technical objection after judgment had become final in the civil case that plaintiff's claim
should have been litigated in the probate court does not impair the validity of said judgment. For, such
objection does not go into the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter.

It matters not that Pambusco's said claim was filed with the probate court without the six-month
period from March 25, 1955, set forth in the notice to creditors. For, Section 2, Rule 86, permits
acceptance of such belated claims. Says Section 2: 18
SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. In the notice provided in the preceding section, the
court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than
twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However,
at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to
Page | 9
file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as
are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a tune not exceeding one (1) month.
Here, the claim was filed in the probate court on February 25, 1959, while the defendants in the civil case were
still perfecting their appeal therein. The record does not show that the administrator objected thereto upon
the ground that it was filed out of time. The pendency of that case, we are persuaded to say, is a good excuse
for tardiness in the filing of the claim. 19 And, the order of final distribution is still to be given.
11. Bachrach Motor v. Incarangal (Mike)
FACTS: Defendant executed in favour of of Bachrach a promissory note and executed a real estate mortgage on
a parcel of land. Incaringal defaulted in the payment of the monthly instalments; prompting plaintiff to
institute an action for the collection of the amount due on the note.
RTC ruled in favour of Bachrach and issued a writ of execution. The sheriff levied on the properties of the
defendants, including the mortgaged property in favour of plaintiff. Oriental Commercial, interposed a third-
party claim, alleging that a previous writ of execution was issued on its favour over the same property and it
already acquired the same at a public auction.
Therefore, the judgment in favour of Bachrach remained unsatisfied. Plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose
the mortgage which the RTC dismissed.
ISSUE: WON Plaintiff is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage after it has elected to sue and obtain
a personal judgment against the defendant on the promissory note.
HELD: Yes. Most of our rules on civil procedure are taled from that of California, and in that jurisdiction the
rule has always been; that a party who sues and obtains a personal judgment against a defendant upon a note,
waives thereby his right to foreclose the mortgage securing it.
Section 708 of our Code of Civel Procedure provides that a creditor holding a claim against the deceased,
secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, has to elect between enforcing such security or abandoning
it by presenting his claim before the committee and share in the general assets of the estate. Therefore, if the
plaintiff elects one of the 2 remedies procided, he waives the other, and if he fails, he fails utterly.
Also the rule against the splitting of a single cause of action is applicable in the case at bar. A party cannot split
a single cause of action into parts and sue on each part separately. For non-payment of a note secured by a
mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in
the recovery of the credit with execution of security. In other words, the creditor may make two demands; (1)
payment and (2) foreclosure. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt
which is a single cause of action.
12. Soriano v. Parsons (Fide)
Facts: Parsons was the holder of two (2) mortgage deeds over four parcels of registered land executed by the
spouses Claro Soriano and Irene Quilao. After Sorianos death, plaintiff-appellant Quirino Soriano was
appointed administrator of the estate of the former. In the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Soriano, Parsons filed a Contingent Claim Against the Estate on the basis of the various debts
owing to it by the Soriano spouses, including the ones covered by the two (2) aforementioned real estate
mortgages. Paragraph 5 of the said pleading states that Parsons relies upon the two (2) real estate mortgages
for the satisfaction of its claims but it nevertheless reserves its right to file a Contingent Claim for whatever
amount that may be left unsatisfied after judicial foreclosure of the two (2) real estate mortgages.
Four years later, Parsons sent a letter to the sheriff requesting him to foreclose the mortgages extra-judicially
pursuant to the terms of the mortgage deeds. Acting on the request, the sheriff scheduled the public auction
sale of the encumbered properties. Three days prior to the scheduled date of the sale, Parsons, together with
Quirino Soriano and the widow Irene Quilao, requested for the postponement of the auction sale to a later
date. The request was granted. Thereafter, the public sale was held as scheduled.
One year after the public sale, Quirino Soriano, in his capacity as the administrator of the intestate estate of
Claro Soriano, lodged a complaint for annulment of a foreclosure sale, recovery of the mortgaged properties
subject of said sale, and damages in the CFI. Quirino Soriano argues that the foreclosure sale was void as
Parsons, having previously elected to pursue its claim in the intestate proceedings, could not in law be
permitted to instead pursue the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure.
Page |The
10CFI dismissed the complaint.
Issue: Whether or not under Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court the filing of the Contingent Claim by
Parsons in the intestate proceeding constituted a bar to the extra-judicial foreclosure sale thereafter had.
Held: NO. There is no doubt that Parsons elected the second remedy under Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court. But election by the creditor of any of the three (3) options is not jurisdictional, and as long as no
positive forward step has been taken by him in the pursuance of the option selected, he is not precluded from
dropping the option already chosen and resorting to any of the two other options available to him.
Section 7 of Rule 86 does no more than provide the mortgage-creditor, in the interest of speedy, orderly, and
inexpensive settlement of the estate of a decedent, a choice of one of three courses of action for the
satisfaction of its loan portfolio. An entirely distinct and independent act, to be performed in conformity with
procedures laid down by the Legislature or by the Supreme Court, is still necessary to effectuate and achieve
the remedy elected. Thus, in this case, the mere fact that Parsons formally informed the intestate court that it
was electing to foreclose judicially its mortgages did not automatically operate as authority for the court to
motu proprio put into motion the machinery necessary for the judicial foreclosure of the said securities. It was
indispensable for Parsons to file an independent complaint for that specific purpose. Parsons did no more than
signify its election of an option.
13. De Los Reyes v. CFI (Alvin)
FACTS: Benito Delos Reyes and wife filed a petition for the writ of certiorari in this court for the purpose of
quashing an order of CFI of Batangas granting an attachment of property belonging to the plaintiffs (Chua Pua
Hermanos).
ISSUE: Whether in a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage upon land, the court entertaining such proceeding
can issue an attachment against other property of the defendants than such as is included in the mortgage,
upon a showing, by affidavit, that the mortgage property is insufficient to pay the mortgage debt and that the
defendants are attempting to alienate their unmortgaged property to other persons with intent to defraud the
plaintiff.
HELD: Yes. Thalvie court has such authority. The affidavit accompanying the application for attachment shows,
in conformity with the requirement of section 426 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the value of the
mortgaged property is not sufficient to satisfy the debt. In addition to this, it is alleged in the affidavit that the
defendants are attempting to dispose of their other property, meaning property not mortgaged to the plaintiff,
with intent to defraud the plaintiff. This is in conformity with the requirement of subsection 5 of section 412 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
Under section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an attachment may be obtained at or after the
commencement of the plaintiff's "action." The word "action," as used in this provision, includes in the courts
opinion a proceeding for the foreclose of a mortgage. This is of course directed primarily to the property
covered by the mortgage, but under section 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the mortgage creditor is
entitled to judgment for any excess remaining due upon the mortgage debt after the mortgaged property shall
have been sold; and this judgment for the balance due is entered upon motion in the foreclosure proceeding
itself. This fact, taken in connection with the statement of the affidavit to the effect that the mortgaged
property was insufficient in value to cover the indebtedness due to the plaintiff, made a case where it was
proper to grant an attachment upon the facts stated.
It results that the trial court did not act irregularly in excess of its jurisdiction, in granting the attachment.
14. Republic v. Cojuangco (Alex)
FACTS:
Respondent Maria Clara Lobregat died during the pendency of a case charging her with the violation
of Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 in the Office of the Ombudsman in her capacity as a member of the
Board of Directors of the UCPB and UNICOM allegedly because these transactions allowed the other
respondents unwarranted benefits and were grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Page | 11 Respondent's counsel moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the death of
respondent Lobregat extinguishes both her criminal as well as civil liability based solely on the act
complained of.
The OSG opposed the motion on the ground that respondent's death does not extinguish her civil
liability because the same is not solely based on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
The OSG maintains that while Lobregat's death extinguished her criminal as well as civil liability
predicated solely on the delict, her civil liability arising from other sources of obligation, i.e., based
on law and contract, subsists independently of that predicated on the delict. Invoking Sections 31
and 33 of the Corporation Code, petitioner reiterates that respondent Lobregat, in her capacity as a
member of the Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and the United
Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM), had willfully and knowingly voted for and assented to patently
unlawful acts of the corporations which constituted the bases for her civil liability ''as a corporate
officer who had duties under the law and in accordance with her employment contract" with the
companies.
The heirs of the respondent counter that the death of the respondent extinguished her civil liability,
if any, since the same could only be based on delict and that the deceased respondent Lobregat was
a mere respondent in a criminal complaint for alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019 which the Office of
the Ombudsman had long dismissed.
ISSUE: WON respondent, through her heirs, can be made civilly liable for obligations arising from law and
contract by virtue of respondent Lobregat's being one of the Directors of UCPB and UNICOM, which is to be
considered an employment contract.
HELD: NO.
The death of respondent Lobregat, which occurred during the pendency of the case and before final judgment
is rendered, extinguishes whatever criminal liability she might be held responsible for, as the same is purely
personal to her. Consequently, the civil liability arising from whatever criminal liability may be adjudged
against her is perforce extinguished. The nature of the action involves a determination of whether the
contracts or transactions entered into by respondents were grossly disadvantageous to the government,
whether they caused undue injury to the government, and whether respondents had obtained personal gain
in these transactions. Necessarily, the foregoing matters are criminal in nature. Being a criminal complaint
against the respondents, the death of respondent Lobregat results in the dismissal of the present case against
her and the concomitant civil liability arising therefrom. It is absurd to dissociate the criminal aspect of the
case from that of respondent Lobregat's alleged liability as a member of the board of the two aforementioned
companies precisely because she was being sued in such capacity.
15. San Juan v. Judge Cruz (Van)
FACTS:
Loreto San Juan died leaving a will where Oscar Casa was named as one of the devisees therein.
Atty. Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will. While the petition was pending Oscar died
intestate. The firm of Atty. Aquino entered their appearance as counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who
claimed to be one of the heirs of the devisee and their representative. The probate court denied the
firms entry of appearance since Federico was not the executor or administrator of the estate of the
devisee, therefore cannot be substituted for the deceased as his representative. The court issued an
order directing Atty. Aquino to secure the appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate
of Oscar in order that the appointee be substituted in lieu of the said deceased. Upon filing an
Appointment of Administrator, the Casas unanimously designated Federico.
P filed a Motion to Declare Appointment of Administrator as Inadequate or Insufficient stating that
it should be the heirs who should present an administrator for Oscars estate. Atty. Aquino invokes
Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the ROC that the heirs of Oscar may be substituted for the deceased without need
for appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate.

RTC denied Ps motion and held that theres no need for the appointment of an administrator or
executor as substitute for the deceased devisee.
ISSUE: WON there is a need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa
HELD: NO, there is no need for the appointment of an administrator, it is enough that he be substituted by his
heirs.
Page | 12 The second paragraph of the Sec. 16, Rule 3 is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor.
However, if within the specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the
opposing counsel, within a specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or
executor who shall immediately appear for the estate of the deceased.
When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize
the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit
them from representing the deceased, and since no administrator had as yet been appointed at the
time of the institution of the Complaint, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of
John D. Young, Sr. who represented his estate in the case filed before the SEC (Gochan v. Young).
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an administrator
of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired
his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an
administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal
capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate. Said heirs may designate one or some of
them as their representative before the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
Note: First issue asks WON the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner in the CA was time-barred. SC says
Yes, it is. The petition or certiorari filed by petitioner with the CA on November 22, 2004 was filed beyond the
60-day period therefor. Petitioner received, on March 18, 2004, the February 27, 2004 Order of the court
denying his motion for reconsideration of the December 2, 2003 Order. Petitioner had 60 days from March 18,
2004 or until May 17, 2004 within which to file his petition for certiorari. However, petitioner filed his petition
for certiorari with the CA only on November 22, 2004.
The 60-day period should not be reckoned from petitioner's receipt on June 11, 2004 of the denial of his May 7,
2004 second motion for reconsideration. The 60-day period shall be reckoned from the trial court's denial of his
first motion for reconsideration, otherwise indefinite delays will ensue.
16. Sps. Suria v. Heirs of Tomolin (Febb)
Facts:
o Brigido M. Tomolin was the owner of 22,820 sqm lot in Agusan del Sur. The lot is registered
under his name.
o On July 13, 1998, Tomolin sold the lot to Carlos Suria, petitioner, for P228,200.00, as shown
by a Deed of Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Land. Consequently, the old title was cancelled
and in lieu thereof a new title was issued in petitioners name.
o After the sale, Carlos Suria and his wife Juanita, also a petitioner, had the lot subdivided
into several parcels. Thus, TCT No. T-12112 in the name of petitioner Carlos Suria was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT Nos. T-12949, 12950, 12951, and 12952 were all issued in
the names of petitioners.
o On September 22, 2000, Tomolin filed a Complaint for Annulment of the Deed of Absolute
Sale of a Parcel of Land and Cancellation of TCT No. T-12112 with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against petitioners. The complaint alleges, among others, that
Tomolin, then seriously ill, was inveigled by petitioners into signing the contract of sale
and that they did not pay him the amount of P228,200.00 and the subsequent
subdivision of the lot is tainted with bad faith
o On the next day, Tomolin died. He was survived by his nieces, namely: Damiana Tomolin
Perez, Caridad Tomolin Soria, Lucresia Tomolin Declaro, and Lolita Tomolin Espina.
o On October 28, 2001, counsel for Tomolin filed with the trial court a Notice of Substitution
of a Party pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
o The trial court allowed the substitution of the heirs of Tomolin.
o The substitution is opposed by the petitioners which subsequently denied by the court for
lack of merit.
o On December 7, 2001, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the trial court in its Order dated January 29, 2002. A second motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied.
o Thereupon, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari . In its
Decision dated February 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
o Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: W/N the action to annul the DOAS and to cancel land title by Tomolin survive the latter after
his death.
o Petitioners contend that the action to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale and to cancel TCT
No. T-12112 filed by Tomolin did not survive after his death. Hence, his heirs cannot
continue to prosecute the action.
HELD AGAINST THE PETITIONER
Page | 13 In Gonzales v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, the SC reiterated the ruling in Bonilla
v. Barcena on how to determine whether an action survives or not, thus:
o The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action
and the damage sued for.
o In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental,
while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the
person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. (Emphasis supplied)
o In his complaint and amended complaint filed with the trial court, Tomolin prayed for the
(1) annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Land dated July 13, 1998; (2)
reconveyance of Lot No. 6098; (3) reconveyance of TCT No. T-1981; and (4) cancellation of
TCT Nos. T-12112, T-12949, T-12950, T-12951, and T-12952 in the names of petitioners.
o There can be no dispute that Tomolins complaint affects primarily and principally property
and property rights. Clearly, the action survives his death. Thus, the Court of Appeals did
not err in affirming the trial courts judgment allowing the substitution of the late
Tomolin.
17. Stronghold Insurance v. Republic-Asahi (Gian)
FACTS: Republic-Asahi entered into a contract w/ Santos, the proprietor of JDS Construction. In order to
guarantee the faithful & satisfactory performance of its undertaking, JDS executed jointly & severally w/ SICI a
performance bond. JDS failed to perform its obligation prompting Republic-Asahi to rescind the contract w/JDS
& file a claim against SICI for the amount of the performance bond.
SICI contended that Santos of JDS died the previous year; hence, his death had extinguished the money claims
of Republic-Asahi against SICI & JDS.
HELD: SICI is still liable.
RATIO
Asurety companys liability under the performance bond it issues is solidary. The death of the principal obligor
does not, as a rule, extinguish the obligation and the solidary nature of that liability.
As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation. Obligations
are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the
parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons
themselves are extinguished by death.
Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a
contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. What is
extinguished is only the obligees action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate
court.
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with
respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death did
not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate. Death
is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond.
Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its
performance bond.
Under the law and jurisprudence, respondent may sue, separately or together, the principal debtor and the
petitioner herein, in view of the solidary nature of their liability. The death of the principal debtor will not work
to convert, decrease or nullify the substantive right of the solidary creditor. Evidently, despite the death of the
principal debtor, respondent may still sue petitioner alone, in accordance with the solidary nature of the
latters liability under the performance bond.
2.7 Actions by and against Executors and Administrators (Rule 87, Rules of Court) NOTES
18. Pascual v. Pascual (Chai)
FACTS: While the proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased Eduarda de los Santos were pending
in the CFI of Rizal plaintiff, Sinforoso Pascual, instituted in the CFI of Pampanga against defendants Ponciano
S. Pascual and others, an action for the annulment of a contract of sale of a fishpond situated in Lubao,
Pampanga, supposedly executed without consideration by said deceased in her lifetime in favor of the
defendants.
Plaintiff and defendants are all legitimate children of the testatrix, Eduarda.
Page | 14
Defendants filed of a motion to dismiss, alleging want of cause of action, limitation of action, wrong venue and
pendency of another action. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that the action should have
been brought by the executor or administrator of the estate left by the deceased. The amended complaint of
plaintiff did not cure this defect so the Trial Court dismissed the action. It is from this order of dismissal that
plaintiff interposed his appeal.
HELD: Order is reversed. The case is remanded the trial court for further proceedings, with costs against
appellees.
Under Rule 86, section 1, of the new Rules of Court, actions for the recovery or protection of the property or
rights of the deceased for causes which survive may be prosecuted or defended by his executor or
administrator. Upon the commencement of the testate or intestate proceedings the heirs have no standing in
court in actions of the above character, except when the executor or administrator is unwilling or fails or
refuses to act, in which event to heirs may act in his place. Here, the fictitious sale is alleged to have been
made to the defendants, one of them, Miguel S. Pascual, being the executor appointed by the probate court.
Such executor naturally would not bring an action against himself for recovery of the fishpond. His refusal to
act may, therefore, be implied. And this brings the case under the exception. It should be noted that in the
complaint the prayer is that the fishpond be delivered not to the plaintiff but to the executor, thus indicating
that the action is brought in behalf of the estate of the deceased.
Appellees contend that there is here a wrong venue. They argue that an action for the annulment of a contract
of sale is a personal action which must be commenced at the place of residence of either the plaintiff or the
defendant, at the election of the plaintiff (Rule 5, sec. 1, Rules of Court), and, in the instant case, both plaintiff
and defendants are residents of Malabon, Rizal, but the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga. It appearing, however, that the sale is alleged to be fictitious, with absolutely no consideration,
it should be regarded as a non-existent, not merely null, contract. And there being no contract between the
deceased and the defendants, there is in truth nothing to annul by action. The action brought cannot thus be
for annulment of contract, but is one for recovery of a fishpond, a real action that should be, as it has been,
brought in Pampanga, where the property is located (Rule 5, sec. 3, Rules of Court.)
Appellees argue further that the action brought by the plaintiff is unnecessary, the question involved therein
being one that may properly be raised and decided in the probate proceedings. The general rule is that
questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate proceedings. The court is, however, of the
opinion and so holds that, when as in the instant case, the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased
claiming title under him, the question as to whether the transfer made by the latter to the former is or is not
fictitious, may properly be brought by motion in the testate or intestate proceedings on or before the
distribution of the estate among the heirs. This procedure is optional to the parties concerned who may
choose to bring a separate action as a matter of convenience in the preparation or presentation of evidence,
and accordingly, the action brought by the appellant is not improper.
19. Lopez v. Olbes (Mike)
FACTS: Petitioner brought a suit against Olbes, the testamentary executor of the deceased Martina Lopez. It
was alleged that the deceased executed a public instrument during her lifetime whereby she donated to the
plaintiffs a parcel of land, which was proved as a valid donation. Olbes as executor claimed to have rights to
ownership and possession to the aforementioned land and succeeded in placing the same in trust.
Olbes filed a demurrer alleging that the facts do not constitute a right of action, that the plaintiffs as heirs or
donees, could not maintain any suit against the testamentary executor to recover the title or possession of the
land so long as the court had not adjudicated the estate to them or until the time allowed for paying the debts
should have expired.
Plaintiffs argued however that under the Code of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court now, this is a 1910 case), it
only speaks of heirs or devisees and donees are not included and may be allowed to file suit against the
executor.
ISSUE: WON plaintiffs may suit the executor for the recovery of the land in question.
HELD: Yes. Questions as to the validity of a donation and which affect its force must be argued and decided in
accordance with law at a regular trial and by a final judgment. Neither shall the questions mentioned be
decided in an incidental trial concerning testate or intestate proceedings, for the reason that the thing donated
is no longer the property of the deceased donor, nor does it form a part of the hereditary estate, but belongs
Page |to15
the done until by executory judgment declaring the donation null and irregular.
2.8 Rules 88-90, Rules of Court NOTES

20. De La Cruz v. De La Cruz (Fide)
Facts: Ignacio De La Cruz, administrator of the intestate estate of Gregorio De La Cruz, filed a petition in the
CFI to sell two (2) parcels of land belonging to the estate in order to satisfy the obligations of said estate. The
CFI allowed the petition. Ignacio then executed a deed of sale in favor of Tomas de Guzman and Benita de la
Roma in which it appears that said parcels were sold at a private sale for the sum of P600. Later, Igmidio De La
Cruz and Pedro De La Cruz, legitimate children of Gregorio and the oppositor-appellants in this case, filed a
petition to nullify the sale arguing that they were not properly represented during the hearing of the petition
since they were not notified of the date thereof. Moreover, they argue that there was no notice by publication
before the hearing and that Ignacio, as the administrator, was not required to give a new bond before the
license to sell was granted. The CFI denied the petition of Igmidio and Pedro. On appeal to the SC, they are
contesting the jurisdiction of the CFI to order the sale of the two (2) parcels of land since the petition filed by
Ignacio did not comply with Section 7(a) of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, particularly, the requirement that the
value of the personal estate be stated in the petition. And neither was there a statement that there is no
personal estate nor a statement that if there be such, its sale would redound to the detriment of the interests
of the participants therein.
Issues:
1) Whether or not there is merit to Igmidio and Pedros claim that the order of sale by the CFI was void
because they were not notified of the date of hearing; there was no notice by publication for three
weeks successively prior to the date of hearing; and that the administrator, Ignacio, was not required
to give new bond before license to sell was granted; and
2) Whether or not there is merit to Igmidio and Pedros claim that the order of sale by the CFI was null
and void since the CFI never acquired jurisdiction to order the sale of the parcels of land because of
non-compliance with the mandate of Section 7(a), Rule 89.
Held:
1) NONE. The record shows that the date of the hearing of the petition was known to appellants as
they appeared and filed an opposition in writing and that copies of the petition were sent to them.
As to their contention that the notice was not published in a newspaper three weeks successively
previous to the hearing, the rules provide that if personal notice is given to the persons interested,
the public notice may be dispensed with. As to requiring the administrator to give a new bond
before license to sell is granted, the rules provide: "If the court requires it, the executor or
administrator, before license is granted, shall give a new bond, . . ." It is evident that the court may
use its discretion and may or may not require a new bond. Therefore, none of the above contentions
of the Igmidio and Pedro has any merit whatsoever.
2) YES. In view of the provisions of our Code of Civil Procedure and jurisprudence, it is held that the
averment as to the value of the personal estate of a deceased person is an essential and necessary
requisite to a petition for the sale of real estate and that a Court of First Instance acquires no
jurisdiction to order such sale if that averment does not appear in the petition; that such an order is
void and that a sale of real estate by virtue of such an order is null and void. The orders of the lower
court re set aside and the sale of the two parcels of land made by virtue of said orders is declared
null and void.
Ratio: The necessity for a sale is not a matter for the executor or administrator to determine, but is a
conclusion which the court must draw from the facts stated, and the petition therefore must furnish
the materials for its judgment.
21. Godoy v. Arellano (Alvin)
FACTS: Felisa Pangilinan executed a document giving Eusebio Godoy an option to buy a dredge for Php.
10,000. It appears from the document that the dredge is the common property of the vendor and of the
Page |brothers
16 Orellano. The condition was that Godoy was to pay the whole price of the dredge within 20 days;
and that said option was granted in accordance with the power of attorney executed by her co-owners who
reserved the right to ratify whatever sale may be made, or option granted by Pangilinan, their attorney in fact.
The co-owners did not ratify the option contract and before the expiration of the 20 days, Godoy was ready to
pay the whole price but Orellano failed to deliver the dredge.
Godoy brought suit in CFI against Pangilinan and the Orellanos praying that they be ordered to deliver the
dredge, to pay for damages and to return Php. 1,000 he earlier paid for the sale to be possible.
Orellano, in their answer denied the facts alleged in the complaint and claimed that the dredge was the
property of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, pending in CFI and under the administration of Pangilinan;
that Godoy knows that said dredge is under judicial control and could not be disposed of without judicial
authority, and the court has never authorized the sale; and Guillermo and Alfredo Orellano are not yet 18
years old, and Paz Orellano is married woman who did not obtained the consent of her husband before
executing the power of attorney.
Pangilinan filed a separate answer, and a defense alleges: (a) That the dredge is property of the intestate
estate of Julio Orellano, of which she is the administratrix; (b) that the plaintiff, as well as the defendants, and
the notary who prepared the option sale, were all aware of these facts, and they led her to believe that she
had the authority to dispose of the dredge in her name; (c) that believing herself to be under obligation to
comply with the aforesaid option deed, she applied to the court of probate for permission to sell the dredge in
the sum of P10,000; (d) that on the day of the hearing of the motion, her codefendants who had themselves
authorized her by means of a power of attorney, opposed the motion through their attorneys on the ground
that there were higher bidders and the best thing to do was to sell it at public auction; ( e) that in view of this
opposition, the administratrix asked the court that it be sold at public auction, and the court authorized said
defendant to sell it at public auction, advertising the sale in newspapers of general circulation, and the
aforesaid dredge was sold for P10,000, accordingly; ( f ) that the defendant did not at any time refuse to make
delivery of the dredge to the plaintiff, but that it was the court that would not give her the authority to do so;
and (g) that she is all times ready to return the P1,000 received from the plaintiff and that she has tendered it
several times, but that the plaintiff refused to accept it.
The court rendered judgment ordering Orellano to pay Godoy Php.2, 000 and to dismiss the complaint against
Guillermo and Alfredo Orellano. From this judgment, Orellano appealed to this court.
By a resolution of this court, the appeal of Orellano was declared abandoned for failure to file their brief
within the period prescribed and the decision concerns only the appeal taken by Pangilinan.
ISSUE: Whether the contract entered into by Pangilinan with Godoy is valid
HELD: No. A sale and conveyance by executors without an order of the probate court, under a will devising
property to them in trust, but not authorizing any sale of the realty, otherwise than by a direction to pay the
debts of the testator, is void, and passes no title to the purchase. (Huse vs. Den, 85 Cal., 390.)
Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of properties like the one under
consideration and the power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the administratrix,
without authority of court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two of the said heirs are under
age, and the others did not ratify the option contract, as provided in the aforesaid power of attorney.
It is not necessary to dwell longer upon this point, as the appellee himself admits in his brief "that the dredge
in question being a part of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, it cannot be disposed of by any person
without the proper authority of the court, in accordance with the existing laws.
In view of the foregoing, the court is of the opinion that the Pangilinan was not, in her capacity as judicial
administratrix of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, legally authorized to sell, or contract to sell, any
property belonging to said estate without the authority of the court, and the contract entered into by her with
the plaintiff, without this authority, is null and void.
22. Manotok Realty v. Court of Appeals (Alex)
FACTS:
Felipe Madlangawa, respondent claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de
Page | 17 Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission obtained from Andres Ladores, then an
overseer of the subdivision, with the understanding that the respondent would eventually buy the lot.
The owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate, including her paraphernal properties
covering the lot occupied by the respondent were placed under custodia legis.
Vicente Legarda, husband of Tambunting received the deposit of respondent amounting to P1,500 for the
lot
Respondent had a remaining balance of P5,700 which he did not pay or was unable to pay because the
heirs of Tambunting could not settle their differences.
Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the estate and the respondent remained
in possession of the lot in question.
Petitioner Manotok Realty, Inc. became the successful vendee of the Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision
pursuant to the deeds of sale executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust Company, as administrator of
the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The lot in dispute was one of those covered by the
sale. The Deed of Sale provided for terms and conditions.
Petitioner caused the publication of several notices in the Manila Times and the Taliba advising the
occupants to vacate their respective premises, otherwise, court action with damages would follow. This
includes respondent among others who refused to vacate the lots
Trial Court dismissed the petitioner's action. CA ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner is to
enforce the collection of the balance because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its predecessor
(Don Vicente Legarda).
ISSUE: Whether Don Vicente Legarda could validly dispose of the paraphernal property?
HELD: NO. Decision of CA is reversed and set aside
The record does not show that Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal properties of
Dona Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be said that the sale which was entered
into by the private respondent and Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death of Clara
Tambunting and was entered into by Don Vicente on behalf of Clara Tambunting but was only consummated
after her death.
Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing
administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting.
Art. 136 NCC. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.
Art. 137 NCC. The wife shall have the administration of the paraphernal property, unless she delivers the
same to the husband by means of a public instrument empowering him to administer it.
In this case, the public instrument shall be recorded in the Registry of Property. As for the movables, the
husband shall give adequate security.
The Court concluded that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab initio,
the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such being the case, the sale
cannot be the subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate court.
After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the estate of Dona Clara Tambunting, he
should have applied before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed property in favor of the private
respondent. If the probate court approved the request, then Don Vicente Legarda would have been able to
execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the respondent. But Don Vicente Legarda had no effort to comply with
the above-quoted rule of procedure nor on that of the respondent to protect his interests or to pay the
balance of the installments to the court appointed administrator.
23. Orola v. Rural Bank of Pontevedra (Van)
FACTS:
Trinidad Orola died intestate, survived by her husband Emilio and their six minor children, and other siblings.
The estate consisted of property located in Pontevedra, Capiz. Emilio, who had married anew, executed a
waiver of all his rights and interests over the said property in favor of his children. His petition for
appointment as guardian over the persons and property of his minor children was granted. Emilio filed a
petition with the RTC for the settlement of the estate of Trinidad and his appointment as administrator of her
estate. The RTC issued an order appointing Emilio as administrator of the estate.
As administrator Emilio took possession of the said parcels of land. He embarked on a massive sugar
Page |production
18 and, with prior approval of the court, negotiated with banking institutions for financing loans to
purchase the required equipment. As the sugar industry collapsed Emilio found it necessary to develop the
swampy portion of the estate for the production of fish and needed at least P600,000.00 to finance it.
Emilio filed for authority to negotiate a P600,000.00 loan from the Central Bank of the Philippines for the full
and complete development of the fishpond portion of the estate, and to transfer the sugar account of the
estate from the PNB to the Republic Planters Bank (RPB). The court granted the motion. He then filed an
application with the Rural Bank for a financing loan of P600,000.00. However, the bank informed him that the
said loan would have to be processed by the Central Bank and that it would take some time. He was informed
that there would be no need for the Central Bank to intervene if the loan of P600,000.00 would be broken
down into three parts of P200,000.00, each to be applied for by three applicants to whom the property to be
used as collateral would be leased by the estate. Emilio agreed and talked to his children and the three siblings
agreed. The intestate estate court issued an Order approving the contracts.
However, it turned out that the lessees would not qualify for the loans; the bank required a lease period of at
least 10 years from the time the court approved the same. Emilio, Antonio, Manuel and Josephine Orola filed a
Manifestation with the intestate court, praying that its order be amended to state that the periods of the
leases were to commence from court approval of the said contracts.
However, the estate, through Emilio, as lessor, and Josephine, Antonio and Manuel Orola, executed separate
Amended Contracts of Lease covering the same property. The periods of the lease were extended to 12 years,
to commence from their approval by the intestate estate court. The lessees were also authorized to negotiate
loans for the development of the leased premises not to exceed P200,000.00, and to bind the leased premises
by way of real estate mortgage as security therefor.
Emilio filed an Ex Parte Motion in the intestate estate court for the approval of the amended contracts of lease
appended thereto. Angeline, Myrna and Althea Orola filed their Joint Affidavit of Conformity to the motion.
The court granted the motion of Emilio and approved the amended contracts of lease.
Antonio, Manuel and Josephine signed separate Promissory Notes on March 21, 1983 in which they promised
and bound themselves to pay their respective loans in 10 years in stated annual installments. However, the
real estate mortgage contracts were not submitted to the guardianship and intestate estate courts for
approval. Neither were Myrna, Angeline and Althea aware of the said loans.
The net proceeds of the loan, were deposited in the Rural Bank in Emilios account. Emilio, thereafter, failed to
pay the amortizations of the loans to the Rural Bank.
This prompted the Rural Bank to write separate letters of demand to Josephine, Manuel and Antonio,
demanding payment of the balance of their accounts within seven days from the receipt thereof, otherwise
the Rural Bank would cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages.
On October 1, 1987, Josephine Orola and her siblings, Myrna, Angeline, Manuel, Antonio and Althea, filed a
Complaint against the Rural Bank, their father Emilio and the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff for the nullification of
the Promissory Notes and Real Estate Mortgages executed by Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola, and the
sale of the property subject of the said deed at public auction. They alleged therein that they became the sole
owners of Lots 1088 and 1071 when their father executed a waiver of his rights over the said lots in their favor.
They also alleged that the real estate mortgage contracts were null and void because the same were never
submitted to and approved by the RTC.
The trial court held that although the intestate estate court authorized Emilio to negotiate a loan of
P600,000.00 with Rural Bank, he was not authorized to mortgage the real property of the estate to the Rural
Bank. The court ruled that the September 12, 1980 Order of the intestate estate court was null and void
because the motion of the administrator for authority to negotiate a loan with the Rural Bank was made ex
Page |parte
19 , that is, without notifying the plaintiffs who were the heirs of the deceased. The court also held that the
plaintiffs were not estopped from assailing the real estate mortgage contracts, the same being null and void. It
also declared that the issue of whether or not the plaintiffs were the co-owners of the property should be
ventilated with the proper RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction in an ordinary action for the said
purpose.
The CA reversed the RTCs decision stating that the intestate courts approval of the amended contracts of
lease carried with it the approval of the real estate mortgages executed by Emilio in favor of the Rural bank.
CA denied the MR, hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the mortgages constituted are void for non-compliance to Sec.7, Rule 89 of the ROC
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
Section 2, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court provides that, upon application of the administrator and on written
notice to the heirs, the court may authorize the administrator to mortgage so much as may be necessary of
the real estate for the expenses of the administrator, or if it clearly appears that such mortgage would be
beneficial to the persons interested. After the real estate mortgage is executed in accordance with the
foregoing regulations, the said deed must be submitted for the consideration and approval or disapproval of
the court.
The records show that respondent Emilio Orola notified the petitioners of his motion for the approval of the
amended contracts of lease. Although the motion was ex parte, nonetheless, petitioners Angeline, Myrna and
Althea Orola filed their Joint Affidavit of Conformity
However, the Court agrees with the petitioners contention that respondent Orola failed to secure an order
from the intestate estate court authorizing him to mortgage the subject lots and execute a real estate
mortgage contract in favor of respondent Rural Bank. What the intestate estate court approved in its
December 17, 1982 Order was the authority incorporated in the amended contracts of lease respondent Orola
gave to petitioners Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola so that the said lots could be mortgaged to the
respondent Rural Bank as security for the P600,000.00 loan under their respective names. In fine, the intestate
estate court authorized the petitioners, not respondent Orola, to mortgage the said lots to respondent Rural
Bank. Moreover, under Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, only the executor or administrator of the
estate may be authorized by the intestate estate court to mortgage real estate belonging to the estate; hence,
the order of the estate court authorizing the petitioners to mortgage the realty of the estate to the respondent
Rural Bank is a nullity.
The estate court had not appointed petitioners Antonio, Josephine and Manuel Orola as attorneys-in-fact of
respondent Emilio Orola empowered to execute the said contracts. Hence, they had no authority to execute
the said Real Estate Mortgage Contracts for and in behalf of respondent Orola, in the latters capacity as
administrator of the estate.
Worse, respondent Orola failed to submit the real estate mortgage contracts to the intestate estate court for
its consideration and approval. Unless and until the said contracts are approved by the intestate estate court,
the same cannot have any binding effect upon the estate; nor serve as basis for any action against the estate
and against the parcels of land described in the said contracts belonging to it.
It bears stressing that respondent Orola had no right or authority to mortgage the realty belonging to the
estate. He derived his authority from the order of the estate court which had jurisdiction to authorize the real
estate mortgage thereof under such terms and conditions and upon proper application. Any mortgage of
realty of the estate without the appropriate authority of the estate court has no legal support and is void. The
purchaser at public auction acquires no title over the realty. The real estate mortgage contracts, as well as the
Page |extrajudicial
20 foreclosure thereof and the sale of the property described therein at public auction, can thus be
attacked directly and collaterally.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.
24. Dael v. IAC (Febb)

Facts:
o Victorina Durana died intestate on August 1, 1977, she was the wife of the deceased
Cesario Cabutihan who died earlier on June 9, 1972;
o Cesario Cabutihan was first married to Bienvenida Durana in February, 1942; the latter died
on May 2, 1957;
o It was less than a year thereafter or particularly on April 6, 1958 that Cesario Cabutihan
married Victorina Durana, sister of his first wife, Bienvenida Durana.
o The first marriage of Cesario Cabutihan produced the following legitimate children:
Nonilon Carmencita, Romulo, Lermo and Bienvenido all surnamed Cabutihan and who are
the intervenors in this case.
o The second marriage of Cesario Cabutihan with Victorina Durana did not produce any
issue; however, the latter's heirs are the children of her two sisters and a brother namely:
Bienvenida Durana, Soledad Durana and Federico Durana Sr.; the latter is the father of the
oppositors, Federico, Jr., Flordelizada (sic), Fredizvinda, Fabian and Fe Patricio, all
surnamed Durana; while Soledad Durana is the mother of the other oppsitors, Evaristo,
Domingo Jr., Lucilda and Conrado, all surnamed Dael;
o The other heirs of Vitorina Durana are the petitioner herself and the intervenors who are
all the children of Bienvenida Durana.
o It is claimed by all the oppositors that they are entitled to 2/3 portion of the estate of
Victorina Durana considering that their predecessors-in-interest are the brother and sister
of Victorina Durana; while the remaining 1/3 portion should devolve to the petitioner and
the intervenors who represent their mother Bienvenida Durana and the other sister of
Victorina Durana.
o There no dispute concerning the relationship of the petitioner, oppositors and the
intervenors to the decedent Victorina Durana; there is neither any question concerning the
right of all the parties in this case to inherit from the deceased Victorina Durana;
o Likewise established is the fact that during the second marriage of Cesario and Victorina,
they were engaged in a copra business and a public transportation business, with Victorina
managing the former.
o After the demise of Cesario, Victorina and the private respondents entered into a extra-
judicial settlement of his estate on December 30, 1973. Part of the properties adjudicated
to Victorina include the copra business abovementioned, as well as some of the vehicles
used in the transportation business. Subsequently, however, the vehicles were transferred
to the private respondents by virtue of a "deed of sale" dated July 24, 1978.
o This case was commenced by Carmencita Cabutihan who filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Victorina Durana, wherein she also prayed for her
appointment as administratrix.
o Petitioners herein filed an opposition, asking that the letters of administration be issued
instead to herein petitioner Lucilda Dael. The other private respondents, on their motion,
intervened in the case.
o On December 22, 1977, Honesto Cabutihan, Democrito Cabutihan and David Cabutihan
filed their claim against the estate for the payment of the harvest of their property which
had been entrusted to Victorina Durana for purposes of her copra business but which
obligation she failed to pay due to her untimely death.
o Said claim, in the amount of P70,350.82, was approved by the probate court on December
2, 1980. 10
o The lower court appointed Amado Zoleta as special administrator of the estate
o On January 16, 1979, a "Supplementary Inventory" was filed by the special administrator
covering other real properties of the estate of Victorina, consisting of the undivided shares
in the inheritance of Cesario Cabutihan from his parents, Bartolome Cabutihan and
Natividad Daelo.
o The total value of the properties listed in the supplementary inventory is P4,700.82. 13
The properties that were adjudicated to Victorina in the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of Cesario were included in the inventory submitted by the special administrator.
o Private respondents moved for the disapproval of said inventories claiming that the
Page | 21 properties listed therein were either acquired during the first marriage of Cesario
Cabutihan or were merely the products or fruits of the properties of said first union or
otherwise acquired through the funds thereof.
o In due course, the trial court rendered a decision holding that Victorina Durana had no
paraphernal properties brought or contributed to her marriage with Cesario Cabutihan;
that the copra business was formed in 1949 during the first marriage; that Victorina used
the same facilities, credit and capital in managing the business; and that the main source
of income not only of Cesario Cabutihan and also of Victorina during their respective
lifetimes was the copra business.
o Hence, the extent of the Estate of Victorina Durana shall consist only of her share in the
inheritance of the Estate of Cesario Cabutihan.
o The probate court thereby disapproved both inventories and annulled the extrajudicial
settlement and deed of sale (Exhibit 1 Dael and Exhibit 3-Dael) mentioned earlier. The
latter two were annulled for being simulated or fictitious and for involving conjugal
properties of the first marriage, including properties of Bienvenida, to which Victorina is
not an heir.
o As a consequence, petitioners appealed. CA affirmed the decision of the LC.
Issues/HELD:
o W/N The copra business, as well as the properties listed in the inventories as acquired
during the second marriage, are assets of the conjugal partnership of the first marriage
between Cesario and Bienvenida.
o The share is pro-rated based on the length of marriage in absence of proof of
contribution
o Ratio:
When Bienvenida Durana died on May 2, 1957, the first conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved. That conjugal partnership was then converted into an
implied ordinary co-ownership. It was also at this point in time that the
inheritance was transmitted to the heirs of Bienvenida. Thus, her heirs, Cesario,
Nonilon Carmencita Romulo, Lermo and Bienvenido, acquired respective and
definite rights over one-half (1/2) of the conjugal partnership property which
pertained to Bienvinida.
Consequently, whatever fruits or income may thereafter be derived from the
properties, including the copra business, would no longer be conjugal but would
belong in part to the heirs in proportion to their respective shares. The fruits
and income of the other half of the property of the conjugal partnership would
exclusively belong to Cesario.
The marriage of Cesario and Victorina on April 6, 1952 also produced the
corresponding legal consequences. From that moment on, the fruits or income
of the separate properties of the spouses would be conjugal, including those
acquired through their industry.
Hence, the fruits and income of Cesario's share in the inheritance from
Bienvenida and of his conjugal share in the property of the first conjugal
partnership would form part of the conjugal partnership properties of the
second marriage. The fruits and income derived or acquired through these last-
mentioned properties would likewise be conjugal in nature.
It would have been ideal had there been a liquidation of the conjugal partnership
properties of the first marriage between Cesario and Bienvenida. Unfortunately,
the SC cannot determine from the records the amount of such properties at the
time of Bienvenida's demise.
The problem on how to apportion the properties involved between the two
conjugal partnerships. is guided by the Civil Code that whenever the liquidation
of the partnership of two or more marriages contracted by the same person
should be carried out at the same time and there is no evidence to show the
capital or the conjugal property belonging to each of the partnerships to be

liquidated, the total mass of the partnership property shall be divided between
the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the
property belonging to the respective spouses.
The first marriage existed for approximately fifteen (15) years (1942 to 1957),
while the second marriage lasted for about fourteen (14) years (1958 to 1972).
Applying the aforestated rule, the first conjugal partnership will be prorated a
share of fifteen twenty-ninths (15/29) of the properties included in the inventory
Page | 22 submitted on August 30, 1978, while the second conjugal partnership will get
fourteen twenty-ninths (14/29) thereof.
One-half (1/2) of the properties that pertain to the first conjugal partnership
belong to Cesario as his conjugal share therein, while the other half shall be
considered as inherited by him and his five children as the heirs of Bienvenida.
The properties pertaining to the second partnership shall also be equally divided,
one-half (1/2) to belong to Cesario and the other to Victorina as their respective
shares in their conjugal partnership properties. The share of Cesario should then
be divided among his heirs, namely, Victorina and his five (5) children.
o W/N: The approval of the claims of Democrito Honesto and David Cabutihan is against the
Dead Mans Statute.
Held. No.
Petitioners' effete opposition is that said claim "was approved primarily on the
basis of the testimony of claimant Democrito Cabutihan" which, according to
them, is inadmissible under the Dead Man's Statute or the survivorship
disqualification rule.
The argument must fail. Because as the LC correctly observe the claim is sufficiently established by
documentary evidence.
25. Camia v. Reyes (Gian)
FACTS: Andres died leaving as heirs: Ilano (his daughter by his first marriage), Camia (his 2 nd wife) & Bibiano
(his son w/ Camia). Andres left a will and appointed Camia as executrix. Camia filed a project of partition w/c
was opposed by Ilano on the following grounds:
1. Some of the items stated in the project of partition were unnecessary & inaccurate, to wit: the
transportation expenses indicated therein included expenditures for the company of Camias mother
& son (Bibiano)
2. The project of partition contained properties belonging to the conjugal partnership of the 1 st
marriage.
Ilano, in the course of her opposition, also submitted a counter project of partition. The counter project of
partition was the one approved by the lower court.
ISSUES & HELD:

1. WON the transportation expenses incurred for Camias mother & son were necessary expenses.
HELD: They were necessary expenses.
RATIO
Taking into consideration, however, that the executrix is only 31 years of age and is the widow of a
decedent who, in life, had been a good social standing, Philippine idiosyncrasy and tradition demand
that she be surrounded by every protection and care needed by a widow of good reputation, in
respect of the memory of her deceased husband. For these reasons this court is of the opinion that
the company of the mother and son of the executrix during the trips which she had to make in
connection with the affairs of the estate of which she was the testamentary executrix, is justified and,
consequently , the expenses for transportation and subsistence incurred by her and her companions
should be approved.
2. WON the project of partition contained properties belonging to the conjugal partnership of the 1 st
marriage.
HELD: No. Properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal properties. In this case,
there was no evidence presented sufficient to rebut the presumption.
3. Major issue: WON the lower court was correct in accepting the counter project of partition
presented by Ilano.
RATIO
There is nothing in the law imposing upon the executor or administrator the obligation to present a
project of partition for the distribution of the estate of a deceased person. Section 753 of the Code of
Civil Procedure authorizes the court to assign ". . . the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to
the same, and in its order the court shall name the persons and proportions, or parts, to which each
is entitled . . ." (See also article 1052, Civil Code.) It is referred from these legal provisions that it is
the Court of First Instance of Cavite alone that may make the distribution of his estate and determine
the persons entitled, and it may require the executrix to present a project of partition to better
inform itself of the condition of the estate to be distributed and so facilitate the prompt distribution
thereof. The project of partition that the executor or administrator might have presented would not
be conclusive and the interested parties could oppose the approval thereof and enter their
counterproject of partition which the court might accept and approve, as it did in this case. In
Page | 23 adopting the project of partition of the oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano, said court acted
within its discretionary power and committed no error of law.
26. Reyes v. Baretto Datu (Chai)
FACTS: This case is direct appeal from a judgment of the CFIof Bulacan, , dismissing the complaint of appellant
Tirso T. Reyes or his action to recover 1/2 share in the fishpond, located in the barrio of San Roque, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, being the share of plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the deceased Salud Barretto, widow of plaintiff
Tirso Reyes, guardian of said minors.
It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast
estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan. When Bibiano Barretto died on
February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his share of these properties in a will to Salud Barretto,
mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa
Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of the fishpond situated in Bulacan,
however, was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo.
Maria Gerardo was appointed administratrix, and the project parttion she prepared was approved by the CFI
of Manila. The distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a
consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the
original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.
Upon Maria Gerardos death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she
instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same
and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first
rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the
lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano
Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same.
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo,
plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in
usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of 1/2 portion, thereof.
The defendant (MILAGROS) contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in
question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title thereto, and that the court did not
acquire any jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, who was then a minor.
Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the LOWER COURT declared the project of
partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto to be null and void
ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs, was not a
daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition was
decreed on the basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows: .
A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall
be null and void.
And it concluded that, as defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to
recover from Salud, and from the latter's children and successors, all the Properties received by her from
Bibiano's estate, in view of the provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines establishing
that property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the real owner. However,
it denied defendant's prayer for damages. Hence, this appeal interposed by both plaintiffs and defendant.
HELD:
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been misapplied to the
present case by the court below. The reason is obvious: Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in
the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; The legal precept (Article
1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary
Page |or24
intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her
being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free
portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime
of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the
institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir.
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is merely a proposal for
distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes the distribution
of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled, and it is that
judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous or not
in conformity with law or the testament, the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once
it had become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for
lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the same
has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate court distributed the estate of her
father in 1939 does not imply that the said court was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution.
So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not only made a party by publication but
actually appeared and participated in the proceedings through her guardian: she, therefore, can not escape
the jurisdiction of the Manila Court of First Instance which settled her father's estate.
Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16 years old (Exhibit 24), she became of age
five years later, in 1944. On that year, her cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of fraud the court
decree distributing her father's estate and the four-year period of limitation started to run, to expire in 1948
(Section 43, Act. 190). In fact, conceding that Milagros only became aware of the true facts in 1946, her action
still became extinct in 1950. Clearly, therefore, the action was already barred when in August 31, 1956 she
filed her counterclaim in this case contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano Barretto's estate.
In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros Barretto in the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by the CFI of Manila in 1939, is not void for
being contrary to either Article 1081 or 1814 of the, Civil Code of 1889; ( 2) that Milagros Barretto's action to
contest said partition and decree of distribution is barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim
that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a possessor in bad faith and should account for the fruits received from
the properties inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It follows that the plaintiffs'
action for partition of the fishpond described in the complaint should have been given due course.
Wherefore, the decision of the CFI of Bulacan now under appeal is reversed and set aside in so far as it orders
plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee Milagros Barretto Datu the properties enumeracted in said decision,
and the same is affirmed in so far as it denies any right of said appellee to accounting. Let the records be
returned to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed with the action for partition of the fishpond.
27. Garcia v. Orozco (Mike)
FACTS: Respondents are the natural children of the deceased Epifanio Orozco. Epifanio upon his death was
married with Albina Garcia (second wife, not mentioned.Stepmom of the Orozco siblings). After the death of
Epifanio, Albina sold 2 parcels of land in favour of petitioner, her own brother and sister.
One of the children was appointed as administrator of the estate and brought an action for the recovery of the
lands in question against Albina (stepmom). The siblings and Albina (stepmom) entered into a convenio and
rendered a judgment based on the said agreement which provides that the lands sold to the Garcias be
adjudicated to the estate of the deceased while the other properties were to be given to Albina. The decision
expressly stated that Albina no longer had the usufructuary right as a widow.
By virtue of a writ of execution the administrator was placed in possession of the lands, petitioner however re-
entered the lands and extrajudicially ejected the administrator therefrom.
Respondent filed a suit to recover possession of the land. The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents which
was affirmed by the CA.
Page | 25
ISSUE: WON the sale made by Albina Garcia to petitioners of the land after the death of her husband was valid
and binding insofar as of it was concerned.
HELD: No. The judgment in rendered in the civil case between Albina and the other heirs, which is based upon
the convenio agreed upon and submitted by the parties; awarded among others, the ownership of the lands in
question to the estate of the deceased, while the other properties were given to Albina as her share in the
conjugal partnership. This judgment had long become final and executory.
The Code of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court) provides that When the marriage is dissolved..., the community
property shall be inventoried, administered and liquidated, and the debts shall be pain in the testamentary or
intestate proceedings..., or in an ordinary liquidation and partition proceeding... In case it is necessary to sell
any portion of said community property in order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations of the same,
such sale shall be made in the manner and with the formalities established by this Code... Any sale, transfer,
alienation or disposition of said property effected without said formalities shall be null and void, except as
regards the portion belonging to the vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was made.
In the case at bar, the formalities required by the law were not followed by the widow. At the time of the sale,
the rights of the widow and the heirs were not yet fully vested in the particular lot or property. Since the sale
executed by Albina was after the death of her husband and was prior to the liquidation and partition of the
conjugal interest was ineffective since the lots were not adjudicated to the surviving spouse at the time the
liquidation and partition was made as provided by law.
However, petitioner argued that the sale should be valid and binding with respect to the share of the
property sold which pertained to the share of Albina. The SC held the argument not meritorious, by virtue of
the convenio entered by the parties.
NB: petitioners right of recourse is against their sister.

28. Siguion v. Tecson (Fide)
Facts: Paulino Gocheco mortgaged to Paz Siguion a piece of registered real property to secure a debt of P30,
000. Some ten years later, he constituted a second mortgage on the same property in favor of Siguions son,
Alberto Torres, to secure a debt of P20, 000. Gocheco died without having discharged either mortgage.
Proceedings for the settlement of his estate were instituted in the CFI where Go Tecson was appointed judicial
administrator. Subsequently, actions were filed against Tecson as administrator for the foreclosure of the two
(2) mortgages. Judgment was rendered against Tecson.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment of foreclosure against Tecson is barred by res judicata
o Tecson argues that by virtue of an alleged order read during the administration proceedings where it
is stated that Siguion has signified her willingness to accept the payment for the mortgage
obligation, Siguion is barred from instituting an action for judicial foreclosure of the two mortgages,
there being res judicata.
Held: NO. The record does not disclose facts sufficient to support the claim of res judicata. The record of the
administration proceedings has not been presented, and nowhere does it appear that a claim for the mortgage
indebtedness was formally filed in the administration proceedings and that it was there litigated and judicially
determined.
There is, for sure an alleged order read at the hearing conveying the information that the administrator has
made an overture to pay the mortgage debt and the mortgagees (or one of them) have signified willingness to
accept payment. But there is nothing in the order to show that the offer of payment has been preceded by the
formal filing of a claim. Without that formality, the mortgagees cannot be deemed to have waived their
mortgage so as to be stopped from bringing a foreclosure suit.
29. Divinagracia v. Rovira (Alvin)
FACTS: Feliciano Divinagracia died in Iloilo in 1964, survived by his wife and their 4 daughters named Emilia,
Dolores, Rosario and Juanita. The notice of his death was published in Manila Times. Two days after his death,
a petition was filed in CFI for the settlement of his estate. Emilia was qualified as administratrix and she
administered the estate for 7 years where she paid the estate and inheritance taxes. In 1971, she submitted to
the court a final accounting and project of partition with a prayer for the closure of the proceeding. That
pleading, which was signed by the widow and her four daughters, contains, aside from the accounting, (1) an
inventory of the assets of the decedent's estate; (2) a declaration as to who were the heirs of the decedent
Page |and
26 their respective shares in the estate; (3) a statement that the five heirs (the widow and four daughters)
had received their respective shares, each consisting of a one-fifth pro indiviso participation in the decedent's
estate, and (4) an assumption by the heirs of the obligations of the estate.
Judge Veloso in his order approved the final accounting and project of partition and declared the proceeding
"closed and terminated. However, Camilo Divinagracia filed a motion to re-open it and to set aside the order of
foreclosure. He alleged that he was an illegitimate child of the decedent; that he came to know of the intestate
proceeding only when he was transferred as a government employee from Masbate to Iloilo. Hence, he prayed
for the determination of his share in the decedent's estate.
The administratrix in her opposition to the motion contended that the proceeding could no longer be
reopened; that its expediente had already been archived; that there is no allegation in the motion that
Camilo's filiation was acknowledged by the decedent, and that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Iloilo has exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain Camilo's action for acknowledgment.
The motion remained unresolved for more than four years. Judge Veloso did not act on it before he retired so
the case was re-raffled to respondent Judge Roviro who issued the questioned order on reopening the
intestate proceeding. The probate court set aside its prior order of closure because it assumed that there was
no liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Feliciano Divinagracia and Salud Bretaa; that there
was no declaration of heirs, and that an interested party, who was left out in the partition, should be allowed
to secure relief in the intestate proceeding by filing the proper motion within the reglementary period.
The lower court denied the administratrix's motion for reconsideration of its order reopening the intestate
proceeding. Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether an intestate proceeding, which had already been closed, can still be re-opened so as to allow a
spurious child to present evidence on his filiation and to claim his share in the decedents estate
HELD: No. The probate court erred in reopening the intestate proceeding, a proceeding in rem of which Camilo
Divinagracia is deemed to have had constructive notice. The order closing it was already final and executory.
The motion to reopen it was not filed within the thirty-day reglementary period counted from the date the
order of closure was served on the administratrix. The closure order could not be disturbed anymore.
The project of partition and distribution, with final accounting, which was submitted by the administratrix and
approved by the probate court, contained a liquidation of the conjugal partnership and a statement as to who
were the decedent's heirs and what were their respective hereditary shares. That project of partition was a
substantial compliance with articles 179 et sequentia of the Civil Code.
The probate court further erred in entertaining Camilo Divinagracia's motion to reopen the intestate
proceeding. It erred because that motion involved the determination of his status as the decedent's spurious
child. The Court said that the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well
as the prescriptive period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent
portions of the case are quoted hereunder:
The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly known as
bastards, include those adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with
a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are
entitled to support and successional rights. But their filiation must be duly proven.
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the paternity or
maternity or spurious children under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The
implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of filiation of
natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be
applied to spurious children.
Page |That
27 does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used with respect to
natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural
children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.
A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children.
In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his filiation may be
established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the
aforementioned articles 283 and 284.
The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural children, as
provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious children.
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over spurious one . However,
Roviro treats them as equals with respect to other rights, including the right to recognition granted by Article
285
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose
putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the
Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or
taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit, on
their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. In the instant case, Camilo Divinagracia did not disclose
whether he has any evidence of voluntary recognition of his filiation. There is no allegation in his motion that
would sustain his claim for compulsory acknowledgment of his filiation.
30. Sanchez v. Court of Appeals (Alex)
FACTS:
Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca
Petitioners Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the
illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.
When Juan C. Sanchez died, petitioners filed a petition for letters of administration over the
intestate estate Sanchez, which petition was opposed by respondent Rosalia.
Rosalia and petitioners executed a compromise agreement wherein they agreed to divide the
properties enumerated therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez. Rosalia was appointed
administratrix of her fathers intestate estate.
Petitioners filed a motion to require administratrix Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24 hectares

and or to set aside compromise agreement. Rosalia and petitioners then entered into and
executed a memorandum of agreement which modified the compromise agreement.
Nine years later petitioners filed a motion to require Rosalia to submit a new inventory and to
render an accounting over properties not included in the compromise agreement. They
likewise filed a motion to defer the approval of the compromise agreement, in which they
prayed for the annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud.
On the bases of memoranda submitted by the parties, the TC rendered judgement dividing the
estate between Rosalia and the petitioners according to their agreement. The TC also ordered
Rosalia to pay respondents exemplary damages for failure to render an accounting report and
give cash advances to them during their minority and hour of need from the net income of the
estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which adversely prejudiced their social standing and pursuit of
college education.
On appeal, petitioners contend that because the compromise agreement was executed during
the pendency of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with
validity. They stress that the probate court had jurisdiction over the properties covered by said
agreement.
Page | 28
ISSUE: WON a compromise agreement partitioning inherited properties valid even without the approval of the
trial court hearing the intestate estate of the deceased owner.
HELD: YES.
The parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their
respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions. Not only did the parties knowingly enter
into a valid compromise agreement; they even amended it when they realized some errors in the original.
Such correction emphasizes the voluntariness of said deed.
In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp on the
minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the
courts approval is necessary in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or
children.
However, although denominated a compromise agreement, the document in this case is essentially a
deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that [e]very act which is intended
to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the
following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all
had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by
their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument
or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this
case. We therefore affirm the validity of the parties compromise agreement/partition in this case.
In their comment before the Court of Appeals, petitioners based their objection to said compromise
agreement on the solitary reason that it was tainted with fraud and deception, zeroing specifically on the
alleged fraud committed by private respondent Rosalia. The issue of minority was first raised only in
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision; thus, it is as if it was never duly
raised in that court at all.
31. Vda. De Gurrea v. Suplico (Van)
FACTS:
The lot in question situated at San Juan was originally owned by Rosalina Gurrea. Sometime in 1958, Rosalina
transferred the ownership of said lot to Adelina Gurrea. That Adelina continued to be the owner of the lot
until her death. Special proceedings were instituted for settlement of her estate after will was probated ante
mortem. Under the said will, the San Juan lot was bequeathed to Pilar and Luis Gurrea, while 700,000 pesetas,
of the lot in Baguio City and a one-hectare piece of land in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental were given to
Ricardo Gurrea.
Ricardo, represented by and through his counsel Atty. Enrique Suplico opposed. In consideration of said
representation, Ricardo agreed to pay Suplico "a contingent fee of twenty (20%) of whatever is due me, either
real or personal property. During the pendency of the proceedings and upon the oral instructions of Ricardo
Suplico negotiated with the other heirs of regarding the transfer of the apartment in Spain to Ricardos
daughter, Juliet. Ricardo further instructed Atty. Suplico not to enter into any settlement with the heirs unless
the apartment is transferred to his daughter. Finally, the transfer was executed and the heirs arrived at an
amicable settlement regarding the estate of Adelina. Hence, Ricardo withdrew his Opposition and the heirs
then drew up a project of partition which was eventually approved by the probate court.
As payment of his attorneys fees, Ricardo offered the San Juan lot to Suplico who was initially hesitant to
accept the same as the property is occupied by squatters. However, in order not to antagonize his client,
Suplico agreed to Ricardos proposal with the further understanding that he will receive an additional
commission of 5% if he sells the Baguio property. On August 20, 1975, the deed was finally signed by Ricardo
Gurrea at the office of Atty. Pama, in the presence of the latter, Atty. Suplico, Victor Tupas and another person,
the last two acting as witnesses. Later, on October 7, 1980, Atty. Suplico registered the deed and obtained a
title/TCT to the San Juan property under his name. Ricardo died on October 22, 1980. After his death, his heirs
instituted the settlement of Ricardos estate. In the said proceedings, Atty. Suplico filed several claims for
Page |unpaid
29 attorneys fees however, all were dismissed with finality. Also in the same case, the estates
administrator, Carlos Gurrea, filed an Inventory of Properties left by the decedent, which did not initially
include the property subject of this case. The said lot was included only subsequently in the Amended
Inventory.
RTC dismissed the complaint ground: it does not state a cause of action because the plaintiff is not the real
party-in-interest. The complaint-in-intervention was likewise dismissed. Plaintiff filed an appeal with the CA
questioning the July 11, 1985 Order of the RTC.
Accordingly, an Amended Complaint was filed in the RTC impleading the heirs of Ricardo as additional
plaintiffs, to wit: Natividad Ariaga Vda. de Gurrea, Carlos Gurrea, Julieta Gurrea, Teresa Gurrea-Rodriguez,
Ricardo Gurrea, Jr., Ma. Victoria Gurrea Candel and Ramona Gurrea-Montinola. 12 Thereafter, trial ensued.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the case. Plaintiffs and defendant appealed the case to the
CA.
CA affirmed RTC. It maintained the lower courts ruling that the plaintiffs-appellants failed to present clear and
convincing evidence that defendant-appellant defrauded and exerted undue influence on Ricardo in the
latters execution of the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest and in consequently transferring his ownership
of the San Juan lot in his (defendant-appellants) favor; and that based on the evidence, the San Juan lot may
be considered as reasonable attorneys fees for defendant-appellant.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT THE TRANSFER OF RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS WAS DULY EXECUTED BY RICARDO GURREA, THE SAME VIOLATES ARTICLE 1491 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE AND, THEREFORE, NULL AND VOID.
HELD: The Petition is MERITORIOUS.
As to the first issue, petitioners argue on the premise that, under the law, estate proceedings shall be deemed
closed and terminated when the court declares it to be so and only after delivery of the remaining estate to
the heirs entitled to receive the same. Petitioners contend that no evidence was presented to show that the
probate court issued an order declaring Special Proceedings No. 7185 closed and terminated. In addition,
when the Transfer of Rights and Interest in favor of respondent was notarized on August 20, 1975, the title
over the subject lot was still in the name of Adelina Gurrea and that said title was transferred only in the name
of Ricardo on October 7, 1980. On these bases, petitioners conclude that at the time the Transfer of Rights and
Interest was notarized, there is no dispute that the subject property still formed part of the estate of Adelina
Gurrea and was, therefore, still the subject of litigation. Hence, the transfer of rights and interest over the
subject property in favor of Atty. Suplico (respondent) is null and void.
It is necessary to resolve whether the subject property was still the object of litigation at the time the deed of
Transfer of Rights and Interest in favor of respondent was executed; and if so, whether the same should be
considered null and void for being violative of the provisions of Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
It is clear that its sole basis in concluding that Special Proceedings No. 7185 had been terminated and that the
subject property is no longer the object of litigation at the time the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was
executed on August 20, 1975 is the allegation of the executor, Angel E. Ordoez, in his Motion 18 for
Termination of Proceeding and Discharge of the Executor and Bond dated June 20, 1975, that he had already
turned over to the respective heirs and devisees all their respective shares in accordance with the project of
partition duly approved by the probate court.
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the
moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. 19 In the present case, there is no proof to
show that at the time the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the probate court had issued
an order granting the Motion for Termination of Proceeding and Discharge of the Executor and Bond. Since the
Page |judge
30 has yet to act on the above-mentioned motion, it follows that the subject property which is the subject
matter of the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest, is still the object of litigation, that is Special Proceedings
No. 7185.
Furthermore, we agree with the petitioners undisputed contention that when the deed of Transfer of Rights
and Interest was executed, the title over the subject lot was still in the name of Adelina Gurrea and that it was
only on October 7, 1980 that the title was transferred in the name of Ricardo. The rule is that as long as the
order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated.20 The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only
after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same.21 In the present case, while the subject lot was assigned as Ricardos share in the project of partition
executed by the heirs of Adelina Gurrea, the title over the subject lot was still in the name of the latter and
was not yet conveyed to Ricardo when the Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed. As correctly cited by
petitioners, the Court held in Lucero v. Baaga22 that:
[t]he term "delivery" or tradition has two aspects: (1) the de jure delivery or the execution of deeds of
conveyance and (2) the delivery of the material possession (Florendo vs. Foz, 20 Phil. 388, 393). The usual
practice is that, if the land to be delivered is in the name of the decedent, the administrator executes a deed,
conveying the land to the distributee. That deed, together with the project of partition, the order approving it,
the letters of administration and the certification as to the payment of the estate, inheritance and realty taxes,
is registered in the corresponding Registry of Deeds. Title would then be issued to the distributee. Thereafter,
the administrator or executor places him in material possession of the land if the same is in the custody of the
former.23
It follows that, since at the time of execution of the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest, the subject
property still formed part of the estate of Adelina, and there being no evidence to show that material
possession of the property was given to Ricardo, the probate proceedings concerning Adelinas estate cannot
be deemed to have been closed and terminated and the subject property still the object of litigation.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA together with the RTC are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is rendered canceling Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24474 in the name of respondent
Enrique P. Suplico and reinstating Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24473 in the name of Ricardo Gurrea.
Guardianship (Rules 92-97, Rules of Court; A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC 2003-05-1) NOTES
32. Guy v. Court of Appeals (Febb)
FACTS:
Private respondents (minors) Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother
Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati
City, alleging that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died
intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at 10M.
His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and
Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in the
meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of
the estate.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts
and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have established
their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the
Family Code.
Petitioner and his co-heirs also alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of that Remedios signed on June 7, 1993 a Release
and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received
from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all
Page | 31 liabilities.
RULING AND RATIO

LOWER COURT
o The Regional Trial Court denied the Motion to Dismiss (joint and supplemental). It ruled
that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been
established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no
renunciation of right occurred.
COURT OF APPEALS affirmed the decision of the lower court
SUPREME COURT
ISSUES:
o Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming
their successional rights and whether private respondents are barred by prescription from
proving their filiation.
BOTH ISSUES ARE HELD IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
On the issue of validity of waiver of claims
o Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, does not bar private respondents from claiming
successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its
terms do not explicitly and clearly evince intent to abandon a right.
o There was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state
with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received
P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial
assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x
against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim." Considering that the document did not
specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it
cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
o Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents,
such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code which provides
that parents and guardians may not repudiate the inheritance of their wards without
judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which
must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been
judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will
not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance
of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a
mistake or misapprehension of fact. In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly
waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged
illegitimate children of the deceased.
On the issue of prescription on proving filiation
Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate
children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
o ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter
may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which
nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which superseded Article 285 of
the Civil Code, provide:

o ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Page | 32 o ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a
state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both of the parties.
o ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
o The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may
be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules
or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence
to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to
determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a
trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial.
While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the
trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the
settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of each heir. That the two causes
of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one
complaint. (Pertinent to our topic)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its
Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let
the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further
proceedings.
33. Parco v. Court of Appeals (Gian)
FACTS: As guardian of Soledad & w/ authority from the court handling the guardianship proceeding, Francisco
sold to Parco 3 parcels of land for the support, maintenance, & medical treatment of Soledad. After more than
a year from the approval of the sale, Francisco filed a petition in the CFI of Quezon invoking Sec. 6, Rule 96 of
the ROC & praying that an order be immediately issued requiring Parco to appear before the court so that he
can be examined as regards the sale of the lots w/c were allegedly in danger of being lost, concealed &
embezzled (Francisco claimed that he only entered into a loan agreement & not an absolute sale w/ Parco w/
express commitment that he can recover the same property w/in 3 months. Francisco also claimed that the
titles over the lots had been sold by Parco to another person). Hence, the CFI ordered the reconveyance &
delivery of the parcels of land to the ward (Soledad).
Thus, Parco contended that the CFI, exercising limited & special jurisdiction as a guardianship court under Sec.
6, Rule 96 has NO JURISDICTION to order the delivery or reconveyance of the lots to the ward.
HELD: CFI erred in ordering the reconveyance & delivery of the parcels of land.
RATIO
Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery
of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. In a categorical language of this
Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been
already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery
or return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is
clear and undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is
in dispute, under the Cui case, the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the person said to
have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and
not in guardianship proceedings.
In the case at bar, We are not prepared to say, at this premature stage, whether or not, on the basis alone of
the pleadings of the parties in the trial court, the title or right of the ward Soledad Rodriguez over the three (3)
parcels of land in question is clear and undisputable. What is certain here is the fact that the sale of the
Page |properties
33 in question were duly approved by the respondent Judge in accordance with the provisions on
selling and encumbering of the property of the ward under Rule 97 of the Rules of Court. It must be noted that
while the original urgent petition dated May 13, 1968 prayed for the examination of petitioners herein
regarding the alleged concealing, conveyancing and embezzling of the questioned properties, the amended
petition dated March 24, 1969 asked for reconveyance.
Moreover, it may be observed that private respondent contended that the sale of the first two lots was actually
a loan agreement with right of recovery while that of the third lot was subject to condition, hence, a fictitious
or simulated sale. On the other hand, according to petitioners, the sales were all absolute and protected by the
Torrens System since new transfer certificate of titles were issued in their name. Apparently, there is a cloud of
doubt as to who has a better right or title to the disputed properties. This, We believe, requires the
determination of title or ownership of the three parcels of land in dispute which is beyond the jurisdiction of
the guardianship court and should be threshed out in a separate ordinary action not a guardianship
proceedings as held in Cui vs. Piccio supra.
34. Paciente v. Dacuycuy (Chai)
FACTS: Leonardo Homeres died in 1972 leaving his wife, Lilia Samson Homeres and his two minor children,
Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of land. On September 9, 1976, Lilia sold the said lot to Conchita Dumdum for
Php10,000. On November 11, 1976, Lilia filed a petition for guardianship over the persons and estate of the
minors which was granted by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Leyte (Respondent Court).
On September 21, 1977, Conchita Dumdum sold the same lot (which was already under her name) to Patria
Paciente (herein petitioner) for Php15,000. The latter mortgaged the lot (which is already under her name)
with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company (hereinafter referred to as CBTC) for Php30,000.
On September 12, 1980, the Acting City Register of Deeds of Tacloban City filed with the said court a
manifestation informing respondent court of the abovementioned facts which involve a lot which is under
guardianship proceedings. Due to this, the court issued an order directing the petitioner and the manager of
CBTC to appear before it and show cause why the title of the said lot co-owned by the minors Shirley and
Leandro should not be cancelled for having been alienated without its authority. The two did not appear.
Instead, it was Conchita Dumdum who appeared and explained to the court that she sold the lot without the
approval of the court because she was not aware of such requirement regarding the properties of the minors.
On the same day, the court issued another order requiring the petitioner and the manager of CBTC to explain
why the title should not be cancelled for their failure to first secure judicial authority before disposing the
property. During the hearing, George Go, petitioners husband told the court that the petitioner was an
innocent purchaser for value of the lot in question. The court issued an order directing the petitioner and
Conchita Dumdum to give and deposit with the clerk of court the amount of Php10,000 more as additional
consideration of the subject lot which the court believes to be the fair and reasonable price of the property. If
the said amount will not be deposited on or before June 24, 1981, the title shall be cancelled. Their motion for
reconsideration was denied by the court and it likewise ordered that the Register of Deeds shall cancel the title
of the petitioner and shall issue a new title in favor of the two children.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that the court in hearing a petition for
guardianship is not the proper situs for the cancellation of a Torrens Title.
ISSUES:
1. Was it proper for the court to order the delivery or return of the subject lot?
2. Was it proper for the court to order the delivery of an additional Php10,000?
RULING:
1. Yes, it was proper. It is under the jurisdiction of the guardianship to order the delivery or return of the
property in question because the right or title of the minors is clear and indisputable (Section 6, Rule 88 and
Section 6, Rule 97 of the Rules of Court). Since the property was sold without the approval of the court it is
right to order such delivery or return.
In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the property is clear and indisputable. They inherited
Page |a 34
part of the land in question from their father. The sale of this land, where they are co-owners, by their
mother without the authority of the guardianship court is illegal.
2. No, it was not proper. The order was issued without a hearing and the time frame for fixing said amount is
not clear. Hence, it is null and void.
Petition is dismissed. The guardianship court in Special Proceedings No. JP-0156 of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Leyte is hereby ordered to conduct further hearings of the case.
35. Garcia Vda. De Chua v. Court of Appeals (Mike)

FACTS: Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo. They begot two
illegitimate children. Roberto died intestate in Davao City. Vallejo filed aa petition for guardianship over the
persons and properties of the 2 children and for the issuance of letters of administration. While the petition is
pending petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged she is the
surviving spouse of the deceased.
Vallejo opposed to Chuas motion arguing she has no personality to intervene nor to oppose in the petition,
she being a total stranger to the minors. She also presented evidence to prove that Roberto is not married to
the petitioner and was never married to anyone for that matter.
The RTC ruled in favour of Vallejo and dismissed Chuas motion. The RTC held that petitioner is a total stranger
to the minors and has no personality to intervene in the proceedings. The RTC also issued letter of
administration in favour of Vallejo and appointed her as guardian of the 2 minors.
Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the action of the RTC alleging it acted with grave
abuse of discretion in unilaterally and summarily converting, if not treating, the guardianship proceedings into
an intestate proceeding, that the RTC of Cotabato is not the proper venue and lack of jurisdiction because no
notice was sent to her. CA ruled in favour of Vallejo and dismissed the petition, hence; the present case.
ISSUE: WON the RTC and the CA erred in allowing both the petition; guardianship and intestate proceeding to
continue and WON petitioner has the personality to intervene in the proceedings.
HELD: Lower courts did not committed any error. The present proceeding is not only for guardianship over the
persons and properties of the minors but also for the issuance of the letters of administration in favour of
Vallejo. This is evident on the pleadings submitted by Vallejo which she categorically prayed for both. (NB: if
petition filed is only for guardianship, the court cannot hear estate or intestate proceeding)
Petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is not related to the deceased, nor does
she have any interest in his estate as creditor or otherwise. The Rules are explicit on who may do so:
Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration - Any interested person, may by filing a written opposition,
contest the petition on .the ground of incompetency of the person for whom letters of administration are
prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestant's own right to the administration, and may pray that
letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition.
36. Yangco v. CFI (Fide)
Facts: Luis Yangco, a man of twenty-one (21) years and the owner of property valued at nearly P1, 000, 000,
was temporarily traveling abroad at the time when his relative Teodoro Yangco filed a petition in the CFI for
Luiss declaration as a spendthrift and the appointment of a guardian of his property. It is conceded that no
notice was given to Luis personally, the only notice of any kind in the proceedings was given to Luiss mother-in
law and brother-in-law.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment decreeing Luis Yangco a spendthrift and appointing a guardian of his
property is null and void upon the ground that the proceedings were had and the decree entered without
notice to Luis Yangco, the alleged spendthrift.
Held: YES. Where in a proceeding to have the court declare that the person against whom proceeding is
directed is a spendthrift and incompetent to manage his property, the statute provides that on presentation of
a petition, duly verified, alleging that a given person is a spendthrift and incompetent to manage his estate,
the court or judge must cause notice to be given to the alleged incompetent of the time and place of the
hearing on the petition, not less than five (5) days before the time set for the hearing, and further requiring
that such person must be produced on the hearing if he is able to attend, such notice is jurisdictional and the
Page |failure
35 to give such notice deprives the court or judge of power to make a valid decree affecting the interests
of the alleged incompetent.
Furthermore, where the statute in such a proceeding requires personal notice and there is no provision for
other notice, notice to a person other than the alleged incompetent, although it may be a near relative or
friend, does not comply with the statute and confers no jurisdiction on the court or judge.
A person temporarily absent from the Philippine Islands for the purpose of traveling abroad is not a person
who resides without the Philippine Islands so as to confer on the court or judge in an application to declare
such person a spendthrift and incompetent to manage his estate authority to order service of the notice of the
application by publication or otherwise than personally.
37. Guerrero v. Teran (Alvin)
FACTS: Salvador Guerrero, the guardian of minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez
Munoz, filed an action against Leopoldo Teran to recover the sum of P4,129.56 on the theory that
Teran h a d b e e n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f t h e e s t a t e o f Antonio Sanchez Munoz from 1901-1906.
Teran admitt ed he owed Guerrero P188.39 but claimed that the latter owed him P482.14.
CFI found that Teran, as administrator of said estate, owed Guerrero the sum of P3, 447.46.
ISSUE: Whether Leopoldo Teran is liable
HELD:
NO. Teran was the duly appointed and recognized representati ve of the minors Maria
M a n u e l a a n d M a r i a D e l C a r m e n i n t h e administrati on of their
interests in the estate of Antonio Sanchez Munoz from Sept.17, 1901 until March 18, 1902.
Teran was appointed as administrator of said estate on Sept.17, 1901. He entered into a bond o f
1 0 , 0 0 0 d o l l a r s f o r t h e f a i t h f u l performance of his duties as such representative.
On March 18, 1902, the CFI of Albay appointed Maria Munoz y Gomez as guardian for said minors
and she gave the required bond for the faithful performance of her duties as such guardian.
While there are some indicati ons that Teran c o n ti n u e d t o a c t a s t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f

s a i d estate aft er the appointment of Maria Munoz Gomez, up to Oct. 6, 1906, yet the fact
exists t h a t s a i d M a r i a M u n oz w a s t h e actual representative o f t h e
m i n o r s f r o m a n d a ft e r March 18, 1902 unti l Oct.6, 1906, and therefore she, must be
held responsible for the property belonging to said minors during the period.
Maria Munoz, for the reason that she was not a r e s i d e n t o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s a t t h e

ti m e o f h e r appointment, was removed as guardian by the C F I . F e l i x S a m s o n w a s
t h e n a p p o i n t e d a s guardian. The mere fact that she was removed as guardian did not relieve
her, nor her bondsmen from liability to the minors during the ti me that she was duly acti ng
as said guardian. If during the ti me that she was the guardian she allowed other persons to
handle the property of her wards a n d i f a n y m i s m a n a g e m e n t o r l o s s o c c u r r e d thereby, the
responsibility must fall upon her. T h e r e f o r e , i f a n y l o s s o c c u r r e d t o t h e m i n o r s
between March 18, 1902 and Oct.6, 1906, they have a right of acti on only against said
Maria Munoz y Gomez as their legal guardian and under the law the administratrix of the property of their
estate. Teran was liable for losses only during the time that he was acting as the legal representative of t h e
s a i d m i n o r s i n t h e m a n a g e m e n t o f t h e i r estate, from Sept.17, 1901 up to the time that he was
superseded by Maria Munoz y Gomez, on March 18, 1902.
There is no proof showing that any of the losses claimed by Guerrero occurred within this
period. Thus, Teran is liable only for the amount of P188.39, the amount he admitted he owed the
plaintiff.
Page | 36
On appointment of administrators or guardians: Maria Munoz was removed on the theory that her
appointment was void because she was not a resident of the Philippines. There is nothing in the law
which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However,
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e a r e n o statutory requirements upon this
questi on, the c o u r t s , c h a r g e d w i t h t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i ti e s o f p r o t e c ti n g t h e e s t a t e s
o f d e c e a s e d p e r s o n s , wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty i n c o m p l y i n g w i t h
t h i s d u t y b y a p p o i n ti n g a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a n d g u a r d i a n s w h o a r e n o t
personally subject to their jurisdiction. The courts should not consent to the appointment of persons a s
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a n d g u a r d i a n s w h o a r e n o t personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts
here.
38. Nery v. Lorenzo (Alex)
Facts:
Spouses Nery and de Leon bought a parcel of land from Bienvenida de la Isla, widow of the deceased
Leoncio Lorenzo and guardian of their children, Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebeeca, Asuncion, Mauro
and Lourdes, who thereafter challenged the validity of such a transaction. It was their contention
that notwithstanding an order authorizing the sale from the probate court, it could be, impugned as
they were not informed of such a move. Moreover, the guardianship proceeding, was heard without
the two elder children, Dionisio and Perfecto Lorenzo being notified although they were then more
than 14 years of age. The heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth of the property in
question, intervened in such action. In the lower court decision, they were adjudged co-owners of
the aforesaid one-fourth portion of the property, the sale by the widow being considered null and
void insofar as they were concerned. The rights of the Children of Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida
de la Isla to one-half of the three-fourths appertaining to such spouses were likewise accorded
recognition.
The TC held that in the guardianship proceedings, the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons
of the minors who were not notified of the petition, at least 2 of them being over 14 years of age;
that as the inventory submitted by the guardian stated that the minors had no real estate, the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the real property of the minors and could not have validly
authorized its sale, and the total absence of the requisite notice necessarily rendered the order of
sale null and void, and the defendant, Martin S. Nery, a lawyer, could not be considered a purchaser
in good faith of the one-half portion of the land belonging to the minors.
The CA, however, declared valid the deed of sale executed by the mother Bienvenida de la Isla in
favor of the Spouses Nery and de Leon as to the whole three-fourths, without prejudice however to
the children demanding from their mother their participation in the amount paid for the sale of such
property. It thus ignored the grave jurisdictional defects that attended the challenged orders, starting
with the two elder children not being notified of the petition for guardianship, even if they were
already above 14, as pointed out and stressed in their petition for review.
ISSUE: WON the deed of sale was valid.
HELD: NO.
"When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for
hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the
petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and
may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given." Service of the notice upon the minor if above
14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no
jurisdiction to appoint a guardian. Moreover, where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it
is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an
unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties.
Much less could the decision arrived at both by the lower court and respondent Court of Appeals as to the
heirs of Silvestra Ferrer being entitled to one-fourth of the property in question be set aside. At no time had
Page |the
37deceased Leoncio Lorenzo ever denied that he was holding such property in the capacity of trustee for
them. At the time then that the settlement of his estate was pending in the probate court, his widow,
Bienvenida de la Isla, the vendor, could not assert any other right, except that traceable to her late husband.
Respondent Court of Appeals did note that petitioner Martin S. Nery is a lawyer. As a member of the bar, he
could not have been unaware that his vendor could not sell to him more than she rightfully could dispose of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered with the modification as above set forth that the children of the deceased
Lorenzo and de la Isla are adjudged co-owners to the extent of one-half of the three-fourths of the property in
question, as was decreed by the lower court, with costs against Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon.
39. Zafra-Sarte v. Court of Appeals (Van)
FACTS:
Respondent Exaltacion Zafra-Sarte petitioned the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the appointment
of a legal guardian over the person and property of Remigia Zafra, whom said respondent herein alleged to be
an incompetent person, afflicted with mental disorder and other ailments which rendered her incapable to
take care of herself and to manage her property. In her verified petition, Exaltacion prayed for her
appointment as the legal guardian of the person and property of Remigia, claiming that she is a niece of the
latter, being a daughter of her sister. Said petition was opposed by Julian Lua, who claimed that he and Remigia
Zafra have lived together as common-law husband and wife for more than 30 years, and by Francisco Unabia,
who claimed that he is a half-brother of the alleged incompetent. The oppositors prayed that either of them
be appointed legal guardian of Remigia, should she be found incompetent."
At the conclusion of the trial, respondent Judge found Remigia to be really mentally deranged and for this
reason appointed Exaltacion as legal guardian of the former's person and property. Julian Lua and Francisco
Unabia submitted their MR of that order of the respondent Judge, but on the same date, while such motion
was still unresolved and before the period for appeal had expired, said respondent directed the issuance of the
corresponding letters of guardianship, and as a matter of fact such letters were issued, after Exaltacion had
submitted the required bond of P1,000.00 and had taken her oath of office as legal guardian of the person and
property of Remigia Zafra. Petitioners were notified of the order of respondent Judge denying their action for
reconsideration as oppositors.
Before such motion for reconsideration was resolved, petitioner filed an urgent motion to enable her as such
guardian to bring the ward to the hospital before the Court of Juvenile & Domestic Relations. Respondent
Judge favorably acted upon this motion, the opposition thereto of herein petitioners notwithstanding, and
ordered them to transfer and surrender the person of the incompetent to Exaltacion Zafra-Sarte. Petitioners
filed a MR of said order of the court praying that the status quo as to the custody of Remigia Zafra, who is
under the charge of Felisa Unabia, be maintained during the pendency of their appeal. The MR was denied.
Respondents Julian Lua, the common-law husband and her half-brother, Francisco Unabia as well as her half-
sister, respondent Felisa Urnabia they filed a special civil action for certiorari with respondent CA. They were
able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the enforcement of the aforesaid order complained
of. As noted in the brief for petitioner: "Upon the facts above-stated, the Court of Appeals annulled and set
aside the order issued by the trial court on May 15, 1964, in Special Proceeding No. 03773, and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued on July 14, 1964 was ordered stayed until such time the Court of Appeals shall
have the opportunity to review the merits of the aforesaid order appointing Exaltacion Zafra-Sarte (herein
petitioner) as legal guardian of the person and property of Remigia Zafra." The MR was denied, hence this
appeal.
HELD: CA decision is REVERSED
Petitioner would impress on us that the issue as to the power of respondent Court to suspend the effectivity of
an order appointing a guardian in the event of an appeal therefrom, The order declaring the incompetency
and appointing a guardian was good, until reversed or set aside, and authorized the guardian, in spite of the
appeal, to do whatever was necessary under the direction of the Court, to protect the property of the
incompetent." The above citation does impart more than a semblance of plausibility to her contention. It does
Page |support
38 her stand.
It is to be admitted that the excerpt on which petitioner would pin her hopes resulted from the realization of
this Court that if it were not thus there was the fear, not without basis, that the property of the person
adjudged incompetent could be frittered away during the pendency of such appeal or converted to the use of
designing persons. The above consideration does not detract from the general principle announced that such
appointment of a guardian should be considered good until reversed or set aside on appeal. No such weighty
and persuasive reason that would call for a different ruling may be discussed from the facts as found by the
Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the decision of CA is REVERSED

40. Pardo de Tavera v. El Hogar (Febb)
FACTS:
o A parcel of land was registered under Carmen Pardo de Tavera, then 11 years old, and her
relatives as co-owners.
o The co-owners agreed to organize a corporation for the purpose of building a modern
structure on the parcel of land and to that end they also agreed to accept shares of stock
of the corporation to be organized in exchange for their respective shares in the parcel of
land.
o The mother of Carmen, the latters duly appointed guardian, filed a petition in the probate
court seeking authority to accept shares of stock of the Corporation in exchange for the
share of the minor in the property.
o The petition was granted.
o El Hogar Filipino, Inc. granted the Corporation a loan secured by a mortgage on the parcel
of land.
o Subsequently, El Hogar foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially and purchased the land at
public auction sale. The land was subsequently sold to Magdalena Estate, Inc.
o Tavera then brought an action to annul the transfer of her right, share and interest in the
property made by her guardian to the Corporation.
o Tavera contends that the order of the probate court was a nullity because, among others,
the petition did not set forth the condition of the estate of the ward and the facts and
circumstances upon which the petition was founded tending to show the necessity or
expediency of the transfer.
ISSUE/ HELD:
o W/N the grant of authority to the guardian to sell the shares of Tavera was proper. YES, the
probate court validly granted the petition of the guardian.
RATIO:
o In the petition, the guardian alleged that the transfer of her wards share in the property
would be to or for her benefit and she expected that the construction of the building
would enhance the value of her wards share in the property and increase her income.
o It is not necessary for a grant of authority to the guardian to sell the estate of the ward
to state that the income is sufficient to maintain the ward and his family or to maintain
or educate the ward when a minor.
o It is enough that it appears to the satisfaction of the court that it is for the benefit of the
ward that his real estate or some part thereof should be sold, and the proceeds thereof
put out at interest, or invested in some productive security.
41. Crisostomo v. Endencia (Gian)

NOT AVAILABLE
42. Vda. De Bengson v. PNB (Chai)
FACTS: As the mother of a veteran who died in World War II, Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson became entitled
Page |to39
certain accrued insurance benefits which amounted to P10,738 as of July 1, 1957, and to a monthly death
compensation for the rest of her life, all extended by the United States Veterans Administration.
Upon inquiry which showed that the beneficiary was incompetent, the Veterans Administration filed Special
Proceeding No. 586 in the CFI of La Union, which adjudged Carmen Vda. de Bengzon to be an incompetent and
appointing the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as guardian of her estate comprising the monies due from the
said Veterans Administration. Letters of guardianship were issued in favor of the Philippine National Bank.
On March 5, 1960, alleging that she had regained her competence, her ward, by counsel, filed a petition
asking for an order terminating the guardianship, and for delivery to her of the residuary estate . Attached to
this petition was a medical certificate attesting that she was mentally competent and possessed full knowledge
of her environmental surroundings. This was opposed by the Veterans Administration on the ground that by
reason of her advanced age (78), physical and mental debility, she was still an incompetent within the meaning
of Section 2, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court.
The son of the ward, Francisco Bengson, filed a "Manifestation" to the effect that he was the personal
guardian of the incompetent; that if appointed guardian of her estate as well, he will comply with all the
provisions of the Rules of Court, will not ask any remuneration for his services, and will file a nominal bond. On
the same date, the lower court ordered Francisco Bengson to be appointed guardian of the ward's estate to
substitute the PNB, upon filing a P1,000 bond with proper sureties. (Bond later raised to 13k)
Hence, this joint appeal by the Philippine National Bank and the Veterans Administration.
ISSUE: WON the substitution of the guardianship of PNB by Francisco Bengzon (son of ward) valid? NO.
HELD: We find the appeal meritorious. The grounds for which a guardian may be removed are found in Section
2, Rule 98 of the Rules.
When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable
therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty days after it is due to render an
account or make a return, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him, and
compel him to surrender the estate of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled
thereto.... (emphasis supplied).
Since the Rules enumerate the grounds for removal of a guardian, a guardian cannot be legally removed from
office except for the causes therein mentioned.
No pretense is made in this case, and nothing in the record would indicate, that there was any legal ground
upon which the removal of the Philippine National Bank as guardian was founded. Neither in Francisco
Bengzon's manifestation nor in the orders of the lower court is it made to appear that the Philippine National
Bank had become incapable of discharging its trust or was unsuitable therefor, or that it had committed
anything which the Rules includes as grounds for removal. On the contrary, it appears incontestable that all
throughout, the Philippine National Bank has discharged its trust satisfactorily. The it has received
commissions allowed by law for its services is no ground to remove it, especially since the Bank's commission
averages no more than P100.00 a year and is offset by interest on the ward's deposit and the sum that the son
would probably have to disburse in bond premiums. Neither is it sufficient to base removal on the
unsubstantiated opinion that it would be more beneficial to the interests of the ward and more convenient for
the administration of the estate. A guardian should not be removed except for the most cogent reasons;
otherwise, the removal is unwarranted and illegal.
As to the alleged inconvenience of the guardian of the incompetent's person having to come to Manila to
obtain money for the ward's sustenance, the same can be obviated by merely requiring the appellant Bank to
keep part of the moneys in the San Fernando (La Union) branch, without altering the guardianship.
Page |WHEREFORE,
40 the orders appealed from are reversed, costs against the appellee Francisco Bengson.

SpecPro Case Digest

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

SpecPro Case Digest

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests (2 nd Batch)

denied the petition.

The administratrices opposed. Ground: Pambusco's claim is time-barred.

ISSUE: Was Pambusco's claim properly admitted by the probate court?

HELD: YES. Order of lower court affirmed.

for appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate.

HELD: SICI is still liable.

2.8 Rules 88-90, Rules of Court NOTES

HELD: NO. Decision of CA is reversed and set aside

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.

24. Dael v. IAC (Febb)

capital or the conjugal property belonging to each of the partnerships to be

ISSUES & HELD:

NB: petitioners right of recourse is against their sister.

Petitioners filed a motion to require administratrix Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24 hectares

HELD: The Petition is MERITORIOUS.

RULING AND RATIO

the Civil Code, provide:

35. Garcia Vda. De Chua v. Court of Appeals (Mike)

notice to Luis Yangco, the alleged spendthrift.

ISSUE: Whether Leopoldo Teran is liable

While there are some indicati ons that Teran c o n ti n u e d t o a c t a s t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f

Maria Munoz, for the reason that she was not a r e s i d e n t o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s a t t h e

ISSUE: WON the deed of sale was valid.

HELD: CA decision is REVERSED

WHEREFORE, the decision of CA is REVERSED

41. Crisostomo v. Endencia (Gian)

otherwise, the removal is unwarranted and illegal.

Você também pode gostar