RULE 111 PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

A. Civil liability arising from the offense is deemed instituted (Sec. 1)

- Exceptions: waiver, reservation, prior institution (WaRP)
- on filing fees; counterclaim, cross-claim, 3rd party complaint
- compare with Secs. 7, 8, 11 of Rule 6
- peculiar nature of B.P. 22
Read: Solidum vs. People, 718 SCRA 263
Castillo vs. Salvador, July, 2014
B. Suspension of Civil Action (Sec. 2)
- when suspended; consolidated
- what is the Bar Rule in Amparo and Habeas Data
Read: Lim vs. Kou Co Ping, 679 SCRA 114
C. Independent Civil Action (Sec. 3)
- Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
Read: Casupanan vs. Laroya, 388 SCRA 28
D. Effect of death on the Civil Action (Sec. 4)
- compare with Secs. 17, 18, and 20 of Rule 3
Read: People vs. Romero, 306 SCRA 90
E. Prejudicial Question (Secs. 6 and 7)
Read: Magistrado vs. People, 527 SCRA 125
Pimentel vs. Pimentel, 630 SCRA 436
J.M. Dominguez vs. Liclican, July 28, 2015

Civil Liability is Deemed Instituted in Criminal Action

Cortez
SOLIDUM V. PEOPLE
718 SCRA 263
Jurisdictions Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his
arrest or voluntary appearance.- Appellant is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were
conducted, the trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. In the
case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the appellant when he was arrested on
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March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person
Criminal Procedure Arraignment Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to
apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized
against him.
Same Same His counsels active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully
aware of the charges against him, otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of
this blunder. Appellants belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured

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when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be
arraigned. In fact, his counsel even crossexamined the prosecution witnesses. His counsels active
participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him;
otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest
was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure
undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences,
that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this
procedural defect. This Court will not allow it.
Same Same We held that while the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had been
submitted for decision, the error is nonprejudicial and has been fully cured. In People v. Cabale and
People v. Atienza where the same issue was raised under similar circumstances, we held that while the
arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for decision, the error is
nonprejudicial and has been fully cured. Since appellants rights and interests were not prejudiced by this
lapse in procedure, it only follows that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was not violated.
Facts
Gerald Albert Gercayo was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two days after his
birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out
through the abdominal walls, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his
body. On May 17, 1995, Gerald was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr.
Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Lucerio, Dr.Donatella
Valeria and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologist included Drs. Abella, Razon and Solidum. During the
operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks, but he
regained consciousness only after a month however, he could no longer see, hear, or move. A complaint
for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries was filed by Geralds parents against the
team of doctors alleging that there was failure in monitoring the anesthesia administered to Gerald.
It was found that the case for serious physical injuries should be filed against Dr. Solidum alone
as the anesthesiologist for he acted negligently in administering drugs to Gercayo. The RTC found
Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him to prison and made him jointly and severally
liable with Ospital ng Maynila requiring the payment of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00
as exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed such decision, hence, Solidums petition to the
Supreme Court.
Issues
Whether or not Ospital ng Maynila should be jointly and severally liable.
Held
No. Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that in criminal prosecutions, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal action. Such refers only to the
criminal action arising from the offense charged and in this case, for serious physical injuries against
Solidum. Although Solidum is acquitted, the Supreme Court cannot, for now, declare him civilly liable
because the circumstances that have been established here do not present the factual and legal bases
for validly doing so. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause
of the hypoxia. The court is not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on
competent evidence.

39
 In applying such rule, it is also puzzling for both the RTC and CA to adjudge Ospital ng Maynila
jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the fact that the same hospital was
not charged along with Dr. Solidum. They are not parties to the case and their right to be heard was
violated. In addition to that, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability
would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code but the conditions do
not apply. Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but
purely in charitable and humanitarian work, had it been engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be
shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation
on Gerald but again, he was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. Lastly, assuming that
civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the
execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.

Independent Civil Action

Diolata

LILY LIM vs KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO

G.R. No. 175256 August 23, 2012
Civil Liability A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender(1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising
from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability,
that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. A single act or
omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on that
part of the offender. (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense
under Article 100 of he Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that
may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. That independent civil liability may be based
on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, as provided in Article 31
of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission
that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific
provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code (in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries).

Same Remedial Law Criminal Procedure If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to
or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of
the criminal action. The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or
omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal
action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the
action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action;
its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on
delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

Same Same Same Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities,
jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or
cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pedentia, or res judicata. The
independent civil liabilities are separated from the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as
provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code which state that; ART. 31. When the civil action is based
on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony , such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
(Emphasis supplied.) ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.

40
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied.) Because of the distinct and independent nature of the
two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil
liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or
res judicata.

Facts
FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant, issued several
withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. Co
sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of P 64.00 per bag or a total of P 3.2 million.
FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities.
Lim sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return
of her money had failed.
An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co before Branch 154
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal proceedings to prove her damages. She
prayed for Co to return her money, foregone profits, and legal interest, and for an award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees. In 2003, the Court rendered its Order acquitting Co of the
estafa charge for insufficiency of evidence.
Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila. The
defendants in the civil case were Co and all other parties to the withdrawal authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-
Cement Center, FRCC, Southeast Asia Cement, and La Farge Corporation. The complaint asserted two
causes of action: breach of contract and abuse of rights.
Issue
Whether or not the two cases herein involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed
independently of each other?
Held
YES. Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations are
authorized by law to proceed independently of each other. The first action is clearly a civil action ex
delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal action. On the other hand, the second action,
judging by the allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil action arising from a contractual obligation
and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights).
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be
pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained
of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that
the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without
offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.

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The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal action.
In addition, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the complaint,61 is a civil action
arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights).
Herein civil case involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in
the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged. They present
different causes of action, which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and independent from
each other. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double
recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

Huerto
CASUPANAN VS. LAROYA
388 SCRA 28

Same Same Same Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate
civil action.Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000
Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to
wit: SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) x x x. No counterclaim, crossclaim or third-
party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could
have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied) Since the
present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action,
there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.

Same Same Independent Civil Actions To file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-
delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring
such action.Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for brevity), as
amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action provided
the offended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil
action before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same
act or omission were deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case. These civil actions referred to the
recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages
for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations. Thus, to file a separate and
independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the
criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly
instituted in the criminal action

Same Same Same Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111 what is deemed instituted with the
criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. Under
Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the action to
recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the
criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these
articles of the Civil Code.

Same Same Same Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to
the accused.Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules,

42
expressly allows the offended party to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent
civil action for quasidelict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the
offended party may bring such an action but the offended party may not recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended
party in the criminal action, not to the accused.

Facts
As a result of a vehicular accident between two vehicles, one driven by Mario Llavore Laroya and
the other owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by Avelino Casupanan, two cases were filed before the
MCTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property. This case was on its preliminary investigation stage when Casupanan
and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. However, upon motion of Laroya on the
ground of forum-shopping, the MCTC dismissed the civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration,
Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo then filed a petition for certiorari before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac. But the RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the
MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore, the proper remedy should have been an
appeal. Hence, Casupanan and Capitulo filed this petition.
Casupanan and Capitulos contention: that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim
against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time.
They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless
imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the
same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case
can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only
one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of
the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.
Laroyas contention: that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents.
Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal
when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to
be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lapsed appeal.
Issue
Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant
in the criminal case.
Held
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on
the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article
2176 of the Civil Code. Althoughthese two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have
different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised

43
Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code. And par 6, sec 1 of Rule 111.
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a
separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate
civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the
prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files
a separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is
filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with
the criminal action. The consolidationunder this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from
the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action,
filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the
present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to
recover damages ex-delicto.
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly
allows the "offended party" to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
"offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent
civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that
the "offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the
offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first
a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other
a civil case for quasi-delict without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases
can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of
the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the
offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating
the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule
111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is
only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil
aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately
his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-
delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-
delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil
Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of

44
the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while
refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to
the courts, and equal protection of the law.Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by
Casupanan and Capitulo is proper..

Extinguishment of Civil Liability

Falucho
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
MARTIN L. ROMERO and ERNESTO C. RODRIGUEZ.
G. R. No. 112985. April 21, 1999
Criminal Law; Estafa; Elements of Estafa.- Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315, as amended by R.A
4885, the elements of estafa are: (1) a check was postdated or issued in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time it was issued; (2) lack of insufficiency of funds to cover the check; (3) damage to
the payee thereof. The prosecution has satisfactorily established all these elements.

Same; Same; Same; What fraud deem to comprise.- Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to
comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a
breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidences justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or
by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all
multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to
secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suspension of truth and includes all
surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated.

Upon presentation of said check to the drawee bank for payment, the same was dishonored and that
notwithstanding repeated demands made on said accused to pay and/or change the check to cash, they
consistently failed and refused to pay or redeem the check, to the damage and prejudice of the
complainant. Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315, as amended by R.A. 4885, the elements of estafa are:
(1) a check was postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time it was issued; (2)
lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; (3) damage to the payee thereof. The prosecution has
satisfactorily established all these elements. Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything
calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or
equitable duty, trust, or confidences justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue
and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.

Facts
Martin L. Romero and Ernesto C. Rodriguez of SAIDECOR which solicit funds from the general
public for investment defrauded one Ernesto A. Ruiz a radio commentator, by convincing the latter to
invest his money in the amount of P150,000.00 with a promise return of 800% profit within 21 days. Upon
receipt of the money, accused-appellant Martin Romero issued a postdated check in the amount of One
Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00). Upon presentation of said check to the drawee
bank for payment, the same was dishonored and that notwithstanding repeated demands made on said
accused to pay and/or change the check to cash, they consistently failed and refused to pay or redeem
the check, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant. Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315, as
amended by R.A. 4885, the elements of estafa are: (1) a check was postdated or issued in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time it was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; (3)
damage to the payee thereof. The prosecution has satisfactorily established all these elements. Fraud, in
its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions,

45
and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidences justly reposed,
resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.

Ernesto Rodriguez, died pending appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the civil action was extinguished upon the death of the accused.

Held:

Pursuant to the doctrine established in People vs. Bayotas, death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission. Applying this set of rules, the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of. In this case,
Rodiguez death extinguished his criminal liability as well as the civil liability because it is predicated on
the complained act.

Prejudicial Question
Lasam
FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ELENA M. LIBROJO
G.R. No. 148072. July 10, 2007
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Appeals; Correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal; RTC-Branch
83s Order of dismissal was a final order.The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal, not
only because RTC-Branch 83 did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners
Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 but also because RTC-Branch 83s Order of dismissal
was a final order from which petitioners should have appealed in accordance with Section 2, Rule 41 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also provided in Rule 41
of the Rules of Court.Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the
Revised Rules of Court to be appealable. The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also
provided in Rule 41.
Same; Same; Same; A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court lies
only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.We
have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails
to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for lost
appeal.
Same; Same; Same; The rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due
process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with

46
the provisions of the law.As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, we have repeatedly emphasized
that the perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory
but jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final and
executory. This rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law
but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of the law.
Same; Same; Same; The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability
of the special civil action for certiorari.The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or successive. A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are
antithetical to the availability of the special civil action for certiorari.
Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial Questions; Definition of Prejudicial Question; Requisites for a civil action
to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case.A prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a
case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the
court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. Thus, for a civil action
to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings
until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
Same; Same; There is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law,
proceed independently of each other.If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine
the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no
necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil
case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
Same; Same; If proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and
prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts.The power to
stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases
on its dockets, considering its time and effort, those of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must
be stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations,
conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. It bears stressing that whether or not the
trial court would suspend the proceedings in the criminal case before it is submitted to its sound
discretion. Magestrado vs. People, 527 SCRA 125, G.R. No. 148072 July 10, 2007
Facts
Petitioner comes before the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court to question the decision of the MeTC Judge which was subsequently upheld by
the RTC to deny his motion to suspend proceedings of a perjury case against him based on a prejudicial
question. Petitioner alleges that there are pending civil cases for recovery of a sum of money and for

47
cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages which must be resolved first before the criminal
case against him may proceed.
Issue
Whether or not the prejudicial question in the pending civil cases may suspend the criminal action
against the petitioner.
Held
No. For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of
the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be
present:
1) The civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based;
2) In the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined; and
3) Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
In the case at bar, the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other. The
purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing on
whether he knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit. Regardless of the outcome of the two
civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury.
Therefore, the civil cases cannot suspend the criminal action against the petitioner.

Prejudicial Question
Javier
PIMENTEL VS. PIMENTEL
630 SCRA 436
Parricide Prejudicial Questions Annulment of Marriage Annulment of marriage is not a
prejudicial question in criminal case for parricide. Annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial
question in criminal case for parricide. Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question
that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.

Same Same Same The issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the
victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide, which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. The relationship between the
offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue
in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimatelyrelated to the issue in the criminal case for
parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

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Same Same Same Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still married to respondent.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitate d to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent
as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were
married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 047392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime
that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

Facts
The wife of the petitioner filed an action for frustrated parricide against him before the RTC. On
Feb.7, 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before RTC for pre-trial and trial for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. On Feb.11, petitioner filed an urgent motion
to suspend the proceedings on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted
that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide. Both the RTC
and CA ruled that there is no prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case
against the petitioner and dismissed the petition.
Issue
Whether or not Annulment is a prejudicial question to the crime of parricide?
Held
Annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case for parricide. Further, the
resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal
action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and
there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action
may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The relationship between the offender and the
victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person who shall kill his father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his
spouse. The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from
murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is
not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

Prejudicial Question
Navarroza
J.M. Dominguez vs. Liclican,
764 SCRA 338, July 28, 2015

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Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Prejudicial Questions; A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that
must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case.As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that
must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence
rests on the concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Facts
During the stockholders meeting of the JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, presided by Cecilia (one of
the respondents,) and attended by Norma and Purita (her co-respondents) and petitioners Helen, Patrick,
Kenneth and Shirley, Patrick and Kenneth were not allowed to vote as their mother and grandmother,
both deceased are the stockholders of the company and no settlement of estate was shown to transfer
their shares in the company. Tensions rose, and respondents walked out of the meeting. Since quorum
still existed, the election proceeded. As a result, Helen, Patrick, Kenneth and Shirley were elected
officers. On the other hand, after staging the walkout, the respondents executed a Board Resolution
certifying that during the meeting, the following set of officers were elected as officers: Cecilia, Norma,
Purita, Tessie, and Shirley.
The petitioners then filed a complaint against respondents before the RTC of Baguio City for nullification
of meetings, election and acts of directors and officers, injunction and other reliefs, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6623-R. It was raffled off to Branch 7 of the RTC for Judicial Dispute Resolution. The
petitioners as stockholders then represented themselves as JMDs lawful directors and officers, collected
rentals and deposited rents due the company to its bank account. They then filed a complaint for
Qualified Theft against Ceclia, Norma and Purita. They alleged that the respondents, without any
authority, conspired to withdraw the amount of P852,024.19 from the corporations savings account with
Equitable PCIBank, and issued Check No C0002489901 in the amount of P200,000.00 payable to cash,
drawn against JMDs account with Robinsons Savings Bank. In another compliant, they claimed that
respondents issued Equitable PCIBank check no. 320953 payable to one Atty. Alexander Lava for
P200,000.00.
After preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of Infomations
against the respondents. The Informations were raffled off to Branch 7 RTC of Baguio City. Finding
probable cause, the latter court issued a warrant for the arrest of respondents.
Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. They averred the existence of a
prejudicial question. By filing the complaint, petitioners were already assuming that they are the
legitimate directors of JMD, which is the very issue in the intra-corporate dispute pending with the same
RTC Branch 7.
The CA granted the petition for certiorari, holding that Since there is doubt in the instant case as to the
sufficiency of the authority of a corporate officer, Judge Tiongson-Tabora should have exercised prudence
by holding the criminal cases in abeyance pending resolution of the intra-corporate dispute which private
respondents themselves instituted. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that their
election as officers of JMD had been sustained by virtue of the judgment in Civil Case No. 6623-R date
May 6, 2011. The issue of whether or not the judge committed grave abuse of discretion was rendered

50
moot and academic by the judges inhibition in the criminal cases. The CA nevertheless denied the
motion. Hence, the petitioner elevated their case to the Supreme Court via petition for review on
certiorari, on whether or not a prejudicial question exists.
Issue
Whether or not Civil Case No. 6623-R constituted a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case for Qualified Theft.
Held
The petition lacks merit.
The challenged Orders of the trial court were issued in grave abuse of discretion
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates
or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant,
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. The word
capricious, usually used in tandem with the term arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful and
unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that Judge Tiongson-Tabora acted with grave abuse of discretion
when she ordered the arrests of respondents Isip and Liclican despite the existence of a prejudicial
question.
As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be pre-emptively
resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The
rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence rests on the
concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
Here, the CA aptly observed that Civil Case No. 6623-R, the intra-corporate dispute, posed a prejudicial
question to Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R. To be sure, Civil Case No. 6623-R involves the
same parties herein, and is for nullification of JMDs meetings, election and acts of its directors and
officers, among others. Court intervention was sought to ascertain who between the two contesting group
of officers should rightfully be seated at the companys helm. Without Civil Case No. 6623-Rs resolution,
petitioners authority to commence and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R against
respondents for qualified theft in JMDs behalf remained questionable, warranting the suspension of the
criminal proceedings.
Judge Tiongson-Tabora cannot deny knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. 6623-R as the judge
presiding over its JDR. As correctly held by the CA:
Judge Tiongson-Tabora is well-aware of the existence of said prejudicial question that should have barred
the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioners Liclican and Isip, for the simple reason that a
juridical person can only act through its officers, and the issue in the main case submitted for JDR before
Judge Tiongson-Tabora is one for nullification of meetings, election and act of directors and officers,
injunction and other reliefs. Thus, she knows for a fact that there is a question as to who are the legitimate

51
directors of JMD such that there is doubt as to whether private respondents are in a position to act for
JMD. (emphasis added)
Verily, the RTC ought to have suspended the proceedings, instead of issuing the challenged Orders
issued by the RTC.
The subsequent resolution of the prejudicial question did not cure the defect
It may be, as the petitioners pointed out in their motion for reconsideration filed before the CA, that Civil
Case No. 6623-R was eventually resolved in their favor through a Judgmentdated May 6, 2011 rendered
by the RTC, Branch 59, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing disquisitions, the Court hereby declares that
the plaintiffs [petitioners herein] are the duly elected board of directors and officers of the JM
Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc. for the year 2008 and hold-over capacity unless here had
already been an election of new officers.
Consequently, all Corporate Acts which the defendants [herein respondents and one Gerald Cabrera
and one Oscar Aquino] have done and performed and all documents they have executed and issued
have no force and effect.
Considering that the amount of Php850,000.00 which defendants have withdrawn under the account of
JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc. from the Equitable PCI Bank (now Banco de Oro) is the same
subject in CC no. 29175-R entitled Pp. vs. Cecilia Liclican and Norma D. Isip for Qualified Theft, the Court
will no longer dwell on the same.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. (emphasis and words in bracket added)
This Judgment has, on June 6, 2011,become final and executory, as per the Notice of Entry of Judgment
issued by the same trial court.Evidently, whatever cloud of doubt loomed over petitioners actuations has
already been dispelled. Petitioners then postulate that the question on whether or not the challenged
Orders were issued in grave abuse of discretion has already been rendered moot and academic by the
June 6, 2011 ruling and by Judge Tiongson-Taboras subsequent inhibition in the criminal proceedings.
Consequently, they argue that their motion for reconsideration should have been granted by the appellate
court.
We are not convinced.
The resolution of the prejudicial question did not, in context, cure the grave abuse of discretion already
committed. The fact remains that when the RTC, Branch 7 issued its challenged Orders on March 10,
2009, the Judgment in favor of petitioners was not yet rendered. Consequently, there was still, at that
time, a real dispute as to who the rightful set of officers were. Plainly, Judge Tiongson-Tabora should not
have issued the challenged Orders and should have, instead, suspended the proceedings until Civil Case
No. 6623-R was resolved with finality.
To grant the instant petition and rule that the procedural infirmity has subsequently been cured either by
the Judgment or by Judge Tiongson-Taboras inhibition would mean condoning the continuation of the
criminal proceedings despite, at that time, the existence of a prejudicial question. Such condonation
would create a precedent that renders inutile the doctrine on prejudicial question, such that the court
trying the criminal case will be permitted to proceed with the trial in the aberrant assumption that the
resolution of the prior instituted civil case would benefit the private complainant in the criminal
proceedings. To reiterate, there was no certainty yet on how the RTC, Branch 59 would rule; thus, no
assumption on Civil Case No. 6623-Rs resolution can be made when the challenged Orders were issued.

52
Indeed, had the RTC, Branch 59 not given credence to petitioners arguments,it would have led to an
awkward situation wherein much time and effort is wasted by the RTC, Branch 7 in trying criminal cases it
should not have entertained.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it should be made clear that the nullification of the March 10, 2009 Orders
does not, under the premises, entail the dismissal of the instituted criminal cases, but would merely result
in the suspension of the proceedings in view of the prejudicial question. However, given the resolution of
the prejudicial question and Judge Tiongson-Taboras inhibition, Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-
R may already proceed, and ought to be re-raffled to re-determine the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against respondents.

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