People of the Philippines v.

Pletcha
G.R. No. 19029-CR
Sison, J.

FACTS: Tito Pletcha, Jr., a farmer, invoking self-help in defense of the land he inherited from
his father 19 years ago against the workers of Radeco Corporation, who without court order,
were constructing a fence in a hacienda allegedly leased by the corporation from a certain
Lopinco. Claiming actual possession and ownership and believing that the land sought to be
fenced was an integral part of the land he inherited, Pletcha asked the group to desist from
fencing pending a resurvey he proposed, but he was totally ignored, thus he fought off and
prevented the workers. As a result of such resistance he was prosecuted and convicted of grave
coercion by the Municipal Trial Court. Pletcha appealed the decision of the MTC with the Court
of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the appellants action is a legitimate exercise of a private citizens self-help.

HELD: Yes. In the instant case, the usurpers possession has not yet become complete and the
complainants were in the act of building a fence. Such an act constitutes force in contemplation
of the law. This act of trespass justified the appellant to drive them away, even by means of bolo
because they refused to listen to his appeal which is reasonable. The appellant need not rush to
the court to seek redress before reasonably resisting the invasion of his property. The situation
required immediate action and Art. 429 gave him the self executory mechanics of self-defense
and self-reliance.

The provision in Art 429 of the New Civil Code confirms the right of the appellant, an owner and
lawful possessor, to use reasonable force to repel an invasion or usurpation, actual, threatened
or physical of his property. The principle of self-defense and the protective measures related
thereto, covers not only his life, but also his liberty and property.

The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force, not only to prevent a
threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is a sort of self-defense. It is lawful to repel
force by force. He who merely uses force to defend his possession does not possess by force.
The use of such necessary force to protect propriety or possessory rights constitutes a justifying
circumstance under the Penal Code.
Custodio v CA, GR 116100
Regalado,J

FACTS:

A case for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa (who
died during pendency of case and was substituted by his spouse and children) against
the defendants, spouses Custodio et al
Mabasa owned a parcel of land with a 2-door apartment located in Taguig, Manila. Said
property may be described as surrounded by other immovable pertaining to defendants
herein
When Mabasa purchased said property, he acknowledged the tenants occupying the
premises. However, sometime later, when one of the tenants vacated the apartment and
Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that an adobe fence (brick wall-ish) was built
in a passageway which made it narrower in width
The adobe fence was first constructed by another tenant therein (also one of the
defendants) and another tenant (also a defendant here) also constructed her own adobe
fence and even extended it in a way as to block the entire passageway
Defendants testified that they built the fence due to inconveniences like having the front
of their house a pathway where drunk tenants would bang their doors, windows and
some footwear were even lost
Trial court rendered a decision ordering defendants to give plaintiff (Mabasa) permanent
access to ingress and egress to the public street
Plaintiffs unsatisfied, went to CA to ask for damages. CA modified TCs decision only
insofar as awarding damages to plaintiff (65K actual damages, 30K moral damages and
10K exemplary damages)
Petitioners (tenants) went to SC raising two issues (see below)

ISSUE/S:

Whether grant of right of way is proper

Whether award of damages is in order

RULING/S:

As to 1st issue: Since petitioners did not appeal from decision of CA granting private
respondents (Mabasa) right of way, they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication.
Failure to appeal renders the decision against petitioner final and can no longer be reviewed,
much less reversed by SC.

As to 2nd issue: CA erred in awarding damages, it did not have substantial legal basis. It was
solely based on the fact that Mabasa incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the
tenants vacated. This does not give rise to recover damages. Act of petitioners in constructing
fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their rights as owners, hence not contrary to
LaMoCPoP.
Art. 430 of CC provides that every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by
means of walls, ditches

As a GR, theres no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a
lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable
loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. (Meaning damage was
caused but there was NO LEGAL INJURY because the act or omission is not deemed by the
law as amounting to a legal injury or wrong. Thus, no basis for award of damages.) Law will only
give redress if there was damnum et injuria.
Isaguirre v De Lara, GR 138053
Gonzaga-Reyes, J

FACTS: Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales
Application over a parcel of land with an area of 2,342 square meters. Upon his death, he was
succeeded by his wife-respondent Felicitas de Lara as claimant. On this lot stands a two-story
residential-commercial apartment declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondents
sons, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara. When Felicitas encountered financial difficulties, she
approached petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre.

On February 1960, a document denominated as Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights
and Interests was executed by Felicitas and Isaguirre, whereby the former sold a 250 square
meter portion of the subject lot, together with the two-story commercial and residential structure
standing thereon. Sometime in May 1969, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint
against petitioner for recovery of ownership and possession of the two-story building. However,
petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property and was issued an OCT. Due to
overlapping of title, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title. Judgment was rendered in favor
of the respondents. When respondent filed a motion for execution, petitioner opposed, and
alleged that he had a right of retention over the property until payment of the value of the
improvements he had introduced on the property.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith with respect to the
improvements he made on the property.

RULING: No. The petitioner is a possessor in bad faith. Based on the factual findings from this
case, it is evident that petitioner knew from the very beginning that there was really no sale and
that he held respondents property as mere security for the payment of the loan obligation.

Therefore, petitioner may claim reimbursement only for necessary expenses; however, he is not
entitled to reimbursement for any useful expenses which he may have incurred
Heirs of Romano Soriano v CA, GR 93401
Medialdea, J

FACTS: The land in dispute in this case is originally owned by Adriano Soriano who died
sometime in 1947. Adriano Soriano has 7 heirs whom leased the subject parcel of land to David
de Vera and Consuelo Villasista for a term of 15 years starting July 1, 1967. The lease contract
states that Roman Soriano will serve as the caretaker of the said property during the period of
lease. During the effectivity of the lease contract, the heirs of Adriano Soriano entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of his estate. As a result of the settlement, the property was divided into
two properties, Lot No. 60052 which was assigned to Lourdes and Candido, heirs of Adriano
and the heirs of Dionisia (who is another heir of Adriano). The other property, Lot No. 8459 was
assigned to Francisco, Librada, Elcociado and Roman all heirs of Adriano. The owners of Lot
No. 60052 sold the lot to spouses Braulio and Aquiliana Abalos, and the owners of Lot No.
8459, except Roman also sold their shares to spouses Briones.

On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman as caretaker and appointed another
person as his substitute. Roman filed a case for reinstatement and reliquidation against the de
Vera spouses. The Agrarian Court rendered a decision authorizing the ejectment of Roman. On
appeal, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Before the CA decision was
executed, the parties entered into a post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses
allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property until the termination of the original lease. This
agreement was approved by the CAR court.

On August 1976, the Abalos spouses applied for the registration of the disputed parcel of land.
Roman Soriano and the Director of Lands acted as oppositors. The Land Registration Court
granted the application for registration. After the expiration of the original lease and sub-lease in
favor of Roman Soriano, the Abalos spouses filed a case for unlawful detainer against Roman
Soriano, later, this case was dismissed on motion of the Abalos spouses. Thereafter, Elcociado,
Librada, Roman, Francisco, Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia filed a complaint to
annul the deeds of sale they executed in favor of the Abalos spouses or should the deeds be
not annulled, to allow Roman, Elcociado and Librada to redeem their shares in the disputed
land and to uphold Roman Sorianos possession of the fishpond portion of the property as a
tenant-caretaker.

After the dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer, the Abalos spouses filed a motion for
execution of the post-decisional order embodying the agreement of Roman Soriano and the de
Vera spouses allowing the former to sublease the property. Then, Roman filed a motion to
suspend hearing on the rental demanded by the Abalos spouses until after the other issues
raised in his opposition to the motion for execution are resolved. The motion to suspend hearing
on the issue of the rentals was denied and the trial court authorized the substitution of the de
Vera spouses by the Abalos spouses. Roman Soriano's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Roman filed petition for certiorari and prohibition in the CA but the latter denied the petition,
pending the denial of this petition, Roman Soriano died. Not satisfied with the decision of the
Court of Appeals, the heirs of Roman Soriano brought this case in the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether a winning party (ABALOS) in a land registration case can effectively eject the
possessor (SORIANO) thereof, whose security of tenure rights is still pending determination
before the DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board)

RULING: No. The Court held that a judgment in a land registration case cannot effectively used
to oust the possessor of the land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination
before the DARAB. There is no dispute that Abalos spouses' title over the land under litigation
has been confirmed with finality. However, the declaration pertains only to ownership and does
not automatically include possession, especially so in the instant case where there is a third
party occupying the said parcel of land, allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant.
Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Possession is the holding of a thing or
the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing
with or without right. A judgment of ownership does not necessarily include possession as a
necessary incident. Such declaration pertains only to OWNERSHIP and does not automatically
include possession.

Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on their
respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. Security of tenure is a
legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself ad deprivation of their
landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. The exercise of the
right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. The
Supreme Court decided to refrain from ruling whether petitioners may be dispossessed of the
subject property while petitioner's status as tenant has not yet been declared by the DARAB

DOCTRINE: A person may be declared the owner of a property but he may not be entitled to
possession. The exercise of the rights of ownership is subject to limitations that may be imposed by law.
Although declared to be the lawful owner, such owner cannot automatically evict the physical possessor
of the land unless it has been determined that no rights of the possessor will be violated by such eviction.
Munoz v CA, GR 102693
Medialdea, J:

FACTS:

Case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer by Nicolas Garcia (respondent)
before the MCTC of Masantol, Pampanga.
The complaint alleged that Nicolas is the owner of an agricultural land situated in the
same municipality; that he and his co-owners acquired such by succession from their
deceased father; that said lot is tenanted by one Loreto Garcia; that defendants (herein
petitioners) constructed their houses on a portion of the lot without the knowledge and
consent of the owners; that he sent letters of demand asking defendants to remove their
houses within 15 days and despite this, defendants refused to vacate
In answer, defendants denied the allegations of Nicolas and alleged that Loreto Garcia is
already deemed the owner of the land pursuant to PD 27 (which decrees emancipation
of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring ownership to them of the land
they till), inter alia
The MCTC rendered a decision in favour of Nicolas Garcia. Defendants appealed to the
RTC which REVERSED the decision of the MCTC.
RTC reasoned that Nicolas failed to establish his proof of prior physical possession over
the land where the houses of defendants were erected, considering that the case at bar
only deals with possession de facto and not possession de jure. RTC also believed that
the subject matter is beyond the jurisdiction of the MCTC
Nicolas appealed to the CA and it ruled in favour of him. Defendants elevated the case
to the SC

ISSUE/S: Whether the complaint filed by Nicolas before the MCTC was for summary
proceeding of forcible entry or unlawful detainer or an accion publiciana. In the latter case, the
RTC and not the MCTC has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and try the complaint

RULING/S: The respondent appellate court erred in holding that this case is one for unlawful
detainer. It failed to consider the basic distinction that in forcible entry, possession is illegal at
the inception while in unlawful detainer, possession is illegal until demand is made to recover
such possession or until the possessor does or fails to do an act which makes his continued
possession of the premises illegal. The fact that a demand was made by the private respondent
for the petitioners to vacate the subject premises cannot change the nature of the latters
possession of the property and convert the formers action from forcible entry to one for unlawful
detainer, The respondent appellate court likewise erred in applying the doctrine that a
person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by the implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is proper remedy against them
because, the possession by defendants was illegal at the inception as alleged in the complaint,
hence, there was no tolerance.

VERDICT: The decision of the CA is SET ASIDE the decision of the RTC in REINSTATED.
*** Case was heavy on remedial law. The syllabus of the case presented and answered 5
issues all relating to this topic: REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; FORCIBLE ENTRY.
Full text of case also answered directly, only issues dealing with RemLaw

-STSJ